Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GEORGE B. DANIELS, District Judge: This multi-district litigation seeks monetary damages from the named defendants who allegedly participated, conspired, sponsored, aided, abetted and otherwise provided material support to the terrorists who conducted the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Hundreds of defendants are alleged to have knowingly provided financial and other means of material support directly or indirectly to Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs contend that the provision of material support by these defendants assisted al Qaeda’s ability to accomplish the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, thereby resulting in death and injury. Since its inception in the late 1980’s, al Qaeda has relied on well-placed financial facilitators and logistical sponsors to raise, manage and distribute money and resources, enabling it to grow rapidly into a formidable international terrorist network. Al Qaeda’s ability to maintain its far-reaching reign of terror is by virtue of an underground infrastructure of global dimension. To defy detection, financial and other material support winds it way through a labyrinth of interconnected individuals and entities before arriving at its final intended recipient, al Qaeda. It is described, by plaintiffs, as an elaborate and complex web of banks, financial institutions, businesses, individual financiers, relief organizations, charities, foreign governments and their officials; all of whom purportedly use their united international efforts to covertly infuse al Qaeda with massive amounts of financial and other material support. Charities cloaked in a veil of legitimacy have allegedly amassed enormous sums of money for al Qaeda by diverting charitable donations from the hands of the needy into the hands of the terrorists. By allegedly feeding on years of financial, logistical, and other material support provided by others, al Qaeda grew in numbers, prominence and military strength, ultimately maturing into an organization, so highly skilled and proficient in the ways of terrorism, that it was able to accomplish attacks, including on United States soil, of unprecedented magnitude. Plaintiffs maintain that, since at least the mid-1990’s, it has been publicly known that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were engaged in a global campaign of terror directed at its proclaimed enemy, the United States. In 1996, Osama bin Laden identified the United States as al Qaeda’s main enemy. In 1997, he declared jihad against the United States and, in 1998, made more explicit his declaration of war by calling upon all Muslims to kill Americans whenever and wherever they may be found. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda affirmatively acted in carrying out their murderous threats against the United States as evidenced by the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1998 bombings of two United States embassies in East Africa, and the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. Plaintiffs contend that, because it was publicly known since at least the mid-1990’s that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had targeted the United States (including more specifically the World Trade Center) and its citizens, those who directly or indirectly provided material support to them, during that period of time, plainly knew they were assisting al Qaeda with its terrorist agenda. Plaintiffs further contend that, given the financial resources and operational logistics required to effectuate the 9/11 attacks, those attacks could not have been possible had it not been for the knowing material support provided to al Qaeda by charities, banks, foreign officials, as well as other components of the terrorist matrix. The numerous complaints assert causes of action for violations of international, foreign, federal and state law, and are pled on concerted theories of liability, ie., aiding and abetting, acting in concert, and conspiracy. Several defendants have separately and collectively moved, by way of more than one hundred motions, to dismiss the respective complaints against them: (1) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, et seq.; (2) pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and/or (4) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), for insufficient service of process. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Multiple cases were filed in various courts asserting similar and related claims in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In December of 2003, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) determined that these “actions present common, complex legal and factual question concerning the efforts of plaintiffs to hold liable an array of defendants who allegedly promoted, financed, sponsored or otherwise supported the terrorists that led to the death and injuries arising from the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.” In re Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, 295 F.Supp.2d 1377, 1378 (Jud. Pan.Mult.Lit.2003). The MDL Panel accordingly ordered that the actions be consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and assigned to Judge Richard C. Casey. Following Judge Casey’s death, the MDL litigation was reassigned to this Court in 2007. At the time of the reassignment, the docket sheet reflected the existence of hundreds of pending motions. Both Judge James Robertson, sitting in the District of Columbia, and the late-Judge Casey entertained motions to dismiss similar to the ones now pending. The motions to dismiss had previously been handled in a piecemeal fashion. This resulted in some moving defendants being granted dismissal as to a particular action, while still remaining a named defendant in several other similar actions comprising this MDL litigation. In particular, Judge Casey entered partial final judgment dismissing the claims for lack of subject and/or personal jurisdiction against a sampling of twelve named defendants. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Terrorist /”). on reconsideration in part 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Terrorist II”). Plaintiffs appealed that judgment with respect to seven of the dismissed defendants, six of whom claimed sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Specifically, those dismissed defendants are: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, five Saudi princes, and the Saudi High Commission for Relief to Bosnia and Herzegovina (“SHC”), a non-corporate Saudi governmental entity created to provide humanitarian aid. Prior to this Court issuing its anticipated decision as to certain of the other pending motions to dismiss, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming the dismissal of the claims against the seven appellees. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2008) (“Terrorist III”), cert. denied sub nom. Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2859, 174 L.Ed.2d 576 (2009). The Second Circuit’s decision focuses on the due process requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under a specific theory of jurisdiction, and addresses issues relating to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The FSIA provides the sole means by which courts in this country can obtain jurisdiction over a “foreign state,” which is defined to include its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. See, Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi AS., 602 F.3d 69, 74 (2d Cir.2010); 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). If the FSIA does not provide a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) “In general, a foreign state or an ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,’ ... is immune from federal court jurisdiction unless a specific exception to the FSIA applies”. Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. P.T. Jamsostek, 600 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, in Terrorist III, that the term “agency” of a foreign state is to be construed “to include senior members of a foreign state’s government and secretariat.” Terrorist III, 538 F.3d at 83. The Circuit accordingly held “that an individual official of a foreign state acting in his official capacity is the ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state, and is thereby protected by the FSIA” “for [his] official-capacity acts”. Id. at 81, 83. Having determined that none of the FSIA exceptions relied upon by plaintiffs were applicable, the Second Circuit accordingly held that the FSIA protects from suit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the SHC as an “agency or instrumentality” of the Kingdom, and the Saudi officials, insofar as they are sued in their official capacities. Id. at 75. Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. Pursuant to the parties’ request, the regularly scheduled conference before this Court was adjourned for six months to await a determination on plaintiffs’ application. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ request seeking a writ of certiorari. Prior to resolving the pending motions to dismiss, this Court afforded the parties an opportunity to simultaneously file supplemental briefs addressing the import of the Second Circuit’s decision, and to thereafter file reply briefs. Plaintiffs’ subsequent application seeking to supplement their previously filed supplemental briefing was denied by the Court. Notwithstanding such a denial, the parties have filed a number of further supplemental briefings, the last one filed only a few weeks ago on May 10, 2010. A few days ago, on June 1, 2010, the United States Supreme Court held in Samantar v. Yousuf, — U.S. ---, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 176 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2010) that an individual foreign official sued for conduct undertaken in his official capacity is not a “foreign state” entitled to immunity from suit within the meaning of the FSIA, thereby partially abrogating the Second Circuit’s holding in Terrorist III. Yesterday, chambers received a letter from plaintiffs addressing the import of the Supreme Court’s most recent opinion. The Court received a similar letter from defendants. The Supreme Court holding pertains to a government official being sued in his “personal capacity,” as oppose to his official capacity, for “actions taken in his official capacity.” Id., at 2282-84, 2291-92. The Supreme Court noted, that since the FSIA is inapplicable to individuals, a plaintiff seeking to sue a foreign official must demonstrate that personal jurisdiction exists over the official on some basis other than reliance on the service of process and jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA. Id. at 2292 n. 20. The Supreme Court further found that, although the FSIA will not provide immunity to individuals, the suit “may still be barred by foreign sovereign immunity under the common law.” Id. at 2292. Resolution of an individual foreign official’s claim of common-law immunity typically involves a two-step procedure. Id. at 2284-85. First, the State Department is afforded an opportunity to make a “suggestion of immunity,” and, if it does so, the Court surrenders jurisdiction. Id. In the absence of the State Department’s recognition of immunity, the Court still retains the authority to determine for itself whether all requirements for immunity exists. Id. (citations omitted). “In making that decision, a district court inquire[s] whether the ground of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the State Department to recognize.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Supreme Court additionally observed that “not every suit can successfully be pleaded against an individual official alone.” Id. at 2292. “Even when a plaintiff names only a foreign official, it may be the case that the foreign state itself, its political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality is a required party, because that party has ‘an interest relating to the subject of the action’ and ‘disposing of the action in the person’s absence may ... as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.’ ” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(B)) (alteration in original). “If this is the case, and the entity is immune from suit under the FSIA, the district court may have to dismiss the suit, regardless of whether the official is immune or not under common law.” Id. The Supreme Court further noted “that some actions against an official in his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party in interest.” Id. There is presently pending five foreign officials’ motions to dismiss on immunity grounds. Based on the Second Circuit’s ruling, plaintiffs conceded that dismissal of the actions was warranted as to one defendant, and with regard to the others, plaintiffs limited the alleged wrongful acts of the officials to conduct purportedly undertaken outside the scope of their governmental duties. In light of the recent Supreme Court holding, plaintiffs’ concessions are unwarranted and will be disregarded insofar as they relate to FSIA’s applicability to individuals. The government official-defendants are now asserting common-law immunity. Additionally, they contend that the claims based on alleged acts taken in their official capacity must be dismissed because they are in essence claims against their respective governments, which are immune from suit under the FSIA. Although this Court has thoroughly examined that issue, the issue of immunity need not, however, be resolved. These defendants have also moved, inter alia, to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Because the Court finds that their motions to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction are meritorious as to the government official-defendants, the question of immunity need not be discussed here. PERSONAL JURISDICTION Dozens of defendants have moved to dismiss the respective complaints against them for, among other grounds, lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the Court has jurisdiction over the defendants. In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir.2003); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir.1996). “[T]he nature of plaintiffs obligation varies depending on the procedural posture of the litigation.” Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.1990). Where no evidentiary hearing has been held, nor have the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs prima facie showing may be established solely on the basis of legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction. In re Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 206; Ball, 902 F.2d at 197; Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.1985). The Court is to accept all averments of jurisdictional facts as true, and construe the pleadings and affidavits in plaintiffs favor. In re Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 206; PDK Labs. Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997). Where jurisdictional discovery has taken place, however, plaintiff has the burden to make a factually supported prima facie showing which includes an averment of facts that, if given credit by the ultimate trier of fact, would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant. Overseas Media, Inc. v. Skvortsov, 277 Fed.Appx. 92, 94 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Ball, 902 F.2d at 197).; see also, Schultz v. Safra Nat’l Bank of New York, 377 Fed.Appx. 101, 102, 2010 WL 1980234, at *1 (2d Cir. May 17, 2010) (citations omitted). “Generally, personal jurisdiction has both statutory and constitutional components.” Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir.2009). “A court must have a statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction over a defendant, and the Due Process Clause typically also demands that the defendant, if not present within the territory of the forum, have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal citations, quotation marks and alterations omitted). “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’ ” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Due process requires a defendant to have “fair warning” that a particular activity may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. Id. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174. In determining whether the due process requirements are satisfied, the Court must engage in a two step inquiry. Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.2008). It must be initially determined “whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.” Id. “In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (iquoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). “Each defendant’s contacts with the forum [ ] must be assessed individually.” Id. at 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482. If the requisite minimal contacts exists, the Court must then consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant would be reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 568. Where New York State’s long-arm statute provides the basis to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where personal jurisdiction is asserted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k), the exercise of jurisdiction must meet the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. “[T]he due process analysis is basically the same under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The principal difference is that under the Fifth Amendment the court can consider the defendant’s contacts throughout the United States, while under the Fourteenth Amendment only the contacts with the forum state may be considered.” Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 28 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that each of the defendants’ contacts with either New York or the United States as a whole is sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant can be under a “general” or “specific” theory of jurisdiction. Under the specific theory, the cause of action is related to or arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Where the cause of action does not relate to or arise out of the foreign defendant’s activities, a court may assert general jurisdiction if the defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum at the time the initial complaint was filed. Id. at 414-16 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868. If it is determined that a defendant lacks the requisite minimal contacts for either general or specific jurisdiction, the Court need not consider the second prong of the due process test in order to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case. See, Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 568 (citation omitted). GENERAL JURISDICTION Prior to the Second Circuit’s issuance of its decision in Terrorist III, plaintiffs had predominantly opposed the respective motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction relying solely on specific theories of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs now argues that twenty-three of the moving defendants have extensive contacts with the United States, sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under general jurisdiction standards. The standard for evaluating whether minimum contacts satisfy the test for general jurisdiction is more stringent than the test applied to questions of specific jurisdiction. Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 568 (citations omitted). In determining whether a defendant’s general contacts can be characterized as having been continuous and systematic as of the time of the commencement of the litigation, the Court “ ‘examine[s] a defendant’s contact with the forum [ ] over a period that is reasonable under the circumstances-up to and including the date the suit was filed.’ ” Porina, 521 F.3d at 128 (quoting Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 569). For the exercise of general jurisdiction, it is essential that there minimally be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The “purposeful availment” requirement is designed to eliminate random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or the unilateral activity of a third person, from serving as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted). This Court determines that plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing that any of the twenty-three defendants at issue have the requisite continuous and systematic contacts with the New York or the United States sufficient to satisfy the stringent minimal contacts test for the exercise of general personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue that defendant Abdullah Binladin’s role in connection with United States-based charities is sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Abdullah Binladin identifies himself as the nephew of Osama bin Laden, not Osama bin Laden’s brother as the plaintiffs represent. He indicates that had resided in Virginia for several years, during which time, his brother Omar Binladin also resided with him. Abdullah Binladin advises that he moved back to Saudi Arabia, in September of 2000, and has maintained his permanence residence there ever since. (Abdullah Binladin Aff. ¶ 3). Defendant indicates that, for several years prior to his return to Saudi Arabia, he was an administrative officer at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. (Id.). In 1991, Abdullah Binladin established and became president of the United States branch of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (“WAMYUS”), a non-profit corporation in Virginia. Defendant indicates that his work for WAMY-US was in a volunteer capacity, and he has had no further contact with the charity after leaving Virginia in 2000. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7). Defendant also indicates that, from 1991 to 1994, he served on the board of Taibah International Aid Association, a charitable organization in Virginia. Abdullah Binladin’s contacts with the United States ceased to exist prior to the commencement of the cases against him, and even prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Abdullah Binladin, a permanent resident of Saudi Arabia since 2000, has the requisite presence in the United States to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction. Defendants Bakr, Omar, Tariq and Yeslam Binladin, who plaintiffs identify as Osama bin Laden’s half-brothers, are claimed to each have sufficient contacts with the United States to subject them to general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs seek to attribute the United States contacts of certain business and other entities, a particular defendant allegedly controlled, to that defendant individually. Jurisdiction over a corporation’s board member, officer or employee, in his or her individual capacity, must be premised on the defendant’s own personal contacts with the forum, and not the acts and/or contacts carried out by the defendant in his or her corporate capacity. See, In re AstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F.Supp.2d 453, 467 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“A person’s status as a board member is not alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction ... ”) (citations omitted), aff'd sub nom. State Univs. Ret. Sys. of Illinois v. As trazeneca, PLC, 334 Fed.Appx. 404 (2d Cir.2009); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F.Supp.2d 346, 398 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Jurisdiction over the representatives of a corporation ‘may not be predicated on jurisdiction over the corporation itself, and jurisdiction over the individual officers and directors must be based on their individual contacts with the forum state.’ ”) (quoting Charas v. Sand Tech. Sys. Int’l, Inc., 1992 WL 296406, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1992)); Pilates, Inc. v. Pilates Inst., Inc., 891 F.Supp. 175, 180-181 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“[I]t is well established that individual officers and employees of a corporation are not automatically subject to personal jurisdiction in New York simply because a court can exercise jurisdiction over the corporation.”). While defendants may have profited as a result of those companies’ United States-related activities, they are not, as a result, subject to general jurisdiction. See, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (“[Fjinancial benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral relation to the forum State will not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with that State.”). Moreover, the United States contacts allegedly attributable to the defendants’ in their individual capacity, such as receiving an education in the United States in the 1970’s, significant donations to Harvard University, and having United States investments, are not individually or cumulatively of such a quality, nature or duration to support a finding that any of these defendants have the requisite continuous and systematic contact with the forum to satisfy the stringent general jurisdiction test. See e.g., In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 343 F.Supp.2d 208, 216 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (finding that the act of providing funding to a United States University without more cannot support a finding of general jurisdiction); Schenker v. Assicurazioni Genereali S.p.A., Consol., 2002 WL 1560788, at *3, *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002) (investing money and maintaining bank account insufficient). Plaintiffs further argue that they “have presented factual allegations demonstrating that [defendants Talal M. Bad-kook and M.M. Badkook Company] maintained extensive and ongoing contacts with the United States, sufficient to demonstrate personal jurisdiction under general jurisdiction theories.” (Pis.’ Resp. to Defs.’ List of Defs. at 1). Plaintiffs argue that, “[a]mong other activities in the United States,” Talal Badkook was among the founders and original board member of the United States branch of Muwafaw, a purported charity allegedly used to provide money to al Qaeda. Through Muwafaw and its American operations, Talal Bad-kook is alleged to have become part of al Qaeda’s infrastructure, both individually and through defendant M.M. Badkook Company, which Talal Badkook allegedly owns and controls. Simply because jurisdiction may be exercised over a charity incorporated in the United States does not render its nonresident officer subject to jurisdiction in his individual capacity, and certainly not a company he purportedly owns which itself has no direct relationship to the charity. Even if the United States-based activities of the charity could be imputed to the Badkook defendants themselves, those activities would nevertheless be insufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs allege that the United States branch of Muwafaw was incorporated in Delaware in 1992 and remained in operation until 1997. The Badkook-defendants, however, submitted a Certification of the Secretary of State of Delaware attesting to the fact that the charity ceased to exist and became inoperative as of March 1, 1994. (Kabat Deck Ex. 1 at 3). Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence to contradict or discredit defendants’ showing in this regard. Thus, the record reflects that the charity was only in existence for approximately two years, and ceased to exist seven years prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Although plaintiffs represent, in a conclusory fashion, that there exists other United States-based activities that are attributable to Talal Badkook, they fail to uncover or otherwise identify any specific activity. The Court’s independent review of the voluminous submissions of plaintiffs similarly failed to disclose the existence of any activities or contact with the United States that is attributable to either of these defendants. Thus, neither defendant is subject to the exercise of general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs identify defendant Shahir A. Batterjee’s United States contacts to include his involvement in the establishment of the United States branch of the Benevolence International Foundation (“BIF”) in Illinois in 1992, and his service as a director of that organization. Plaintiffs also claim that defendant Batterjee served as the Director of BIF’s Florida branch. Defendant Batterjee advises that his involvement with BIF ended in 1994. Such an assertion is consistent with the documentary evidence submitted by plaintiffs which merely shows that he was an officer of BIF’s Illinois branch in 1993, and the charity’s Florida branch has been defunct since August of 1994. (Bierstein Aff. Ex. 2, Ex. 3). Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertion that it “appears” that defendant Batterjee is currently living in an apartment in Arizona, is of no evidentiary weight. Defendant advises that he has lived in Saudi Arabia his entire life, except for the brief time he was attending college in the United States from the late 1960’s to 1970. He indicates that he has visited the United States, both for vacation and business trips for the company he works for and in which he has no ownership interest. To find a non-resident defendant is present in the United States, sufficient to satisfy due process, requires more than occasional trips to the United States. See e.g., Hoffritz, 763 F.2d at 57-58 (fifty-four visits found insufficient); Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. American Champion, 426 F.2d 205, 211-12 (2d Cir.1970) (visits “every few months” to solicit business found insufficient); Jacobs v. Felix Bloch Erben Verlag fur Buhne Film und Funk KG, 160 F.Supp.2d 722, 733 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (occasional trips, on average of four to five visits per year, insufficient). Accordingly, the jurisdictional facts asserted by plaintiffs are insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over defendant Shahir Batterjee. In arguing that defendants Abdulrahman and Khalid Bin Mahfouz are subject to general jurisdiction, plaintiffs rely on their alleged conduct in establishing, funding and/or managing a foreign suspect charity, as well as such United States contacts as: United States investments, purported affiliates with entities allegedly having contacts with the United States, ownership of two nonresidential apartments, and/or conduct undertaken in one’s official corporate capacity. Such purported contacts do not rise to the requisite level of continuous and systematic to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over either defendant. See e.g., Weil v. Am. Univ., 2008 WL 126604, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2008) (finding ownership of property in forum is analogous to an investment which is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Schenker, supra (investing money insufficient); First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Brickellbush, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 369, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ownership and sale of apartment, which is not alleged to have ever served as defendant’s residence, insufficient), on reconsideration 219 F.Supp.2d 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd 385 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.2004); Bozell Group, Inc. v. Carpet Co-op of Am. Ass’n, Inc., 2000 WL 1523282, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2000) (mere nominal affiliation with independent New York entities and two visits taking place over three months period insufficient). Plaintiffs similarly focus on defendant Yousef Jameel’s role as an international businessman as a basis to impute to him individually the United States-based activities of companies allegedly controlled by Jameel and his family. Such corporate contacts cannot be attributable to Yousef Jameel in his individual capacity, and accordingly the showing necessary for the exercise of general jurisdiction is absent. Plaintiffs further argue that both defendants Abdul Aziz bin Ibrahim Al-Ibrahim (“Ibrahim Al-Ibrahim”) and Ibrahim bin Abdul Aziz Al-Ibrahim Foundation (“AlIbrahim Foundation”) are subject to exercise of general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, however, fail to identify any contacts the Al-Ibrahim Foundation has ever had with the United States, and accordingly the Court finds general jurisdiction does not exist as to that defendant. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Ibrahim Al-Ibrahim, who established the Al-Ibrahim Foundation, has lived on and off in the United States since the 1980’s, during which time he engaged in romantic pursuits. Plaintiffs further claim that defendant acquired real estate interests in the United States through various companies he allegedly controls. Plaintiffs maintain that defendant is subject to general jurisdiction because of his “extensive use of the United States for residency, business and courtship”. (Pis.’ Opp’n Mem. at 7). Plaintiffs’ allegations lack the factual specificity necessary to demonstrate that the sporadic presence of Ibrahim Al-Ibrahim in the United States is sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. Additionally, courtship and other such romantic endeavors are not activities which alone provide a basis to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Finally, defendant’s alleged ownership of property through various independent entities does not confer jurisdiction as there are no factual allegations pled to establish that such companies are mere shells and are in fact the alter egos of Ibrahim AlIbrahim. See e.g., Reers v. Deutsche Bahn AG, 320 F.Supp.2d 140, 155 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (mere fact that defendant owns or partially owns business registered to do business in forum is insufficient to subject defendant to general jurisdiction); Ontel Prods., Inc. v. Project Strategies, Corp., 899 F.Supp. 1144, 1148 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (individual owner of corporation is not subject to jurisdiction based on corporation’s activities unless corporate veil can be pierced or if corporation acted as agent of owner). Since plaintiffs argues that Ibrahim AlIbrahim is subject to personal jurisdiction solely under theories of general jurisdiction, his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. Plaintiffs allege that defendant DMI Administrative Services S.A. (“DMI S.A.”) is subject to jurisdiction under a general approach. In support of plaintiffs’ contention that DMI S.A. advertises and solicits business in the United States, plaintiffs identify a 1981 advertisement in the Wall Street Journal and claim the existence of other advertisements in United States publications issued by Saudi-based charities. There is no showing that DMI S.A. derived any significant revenue as a result of advertising within the United States. The temporal remoteness and limited nature of its purported advertising does not reflect an active or recent campaign to solicit United States business, and is insufficient to establish DMI S.A.’s presence in the United States. See e.g., Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 662 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (advertising and marketing activities do not constitute adequate basis for general jurisdiction absent a systematic and continuous course of doing business in forum), aff'd 173 F.3d 844 (2d Cir.1999). Similarly unavailing, for purposes of conferring general jurisdiction, is plaintiffs’ assertion that DMI S.A. has investments in the United States. Plaintiffs additionally argue that DMI S.A. has significant business operations in the United States by virtue of the activities of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, as oppose to its own forum-related activities. The allegations, however, do not demonstrate DMI S.A.’s pervasive control over those independent entities to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant based on the activities of its purported subsidiaries. See e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir.1984) (“It is true that the presence of a local corporation does not create jurisdiction over a related, but independently managed, foreign corporation.”). The allegations against defendant Dallah Avco Trans-Arabia Company, Ltd. (“Dallah Avco”), a Saudi-based company, arise from the actions of one of its employees, a suspected advance man who allegedly laid the ground work for the 9/11 attacks and provided direct assistance to two of the hijackers. The employee was allegedly hired in the early 1990’s for a project in Saudi Arabia, but moved to the United States in 1994. His employment with Dallah Avco allegedly continued until 2001. Plaintiffs argue that Dallah Avco is subject to general jurisdiction because of its presence in this forum by virtue of its United States-based employee. Dallah Avco indicates that it has never maintained any bank accounts in the United States; was never domiciled, organized or incorporated in any form in the United States; has never been licensed or registered to do business here; never owned or leased property in the United States; never offered or advertised any activities or services within the United States; no shares in the company have ever been offered or sold in the United States; and it never had a branch office, representative or agent in the United States. Dallah Avco further denies ever having an employee stationed in the United States. Plaintiffs maintain that the subject employee’s “ostensible employment” with Dallah Avco in the United States was a “ghost job.” Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he employee performed no traditional duties for Dallah Avco in the U.S. and only showed up for work once.” (Pis.’ Resp. to Defs.’ List of Defs. at 7). A foreign corporation must be doing business in the forum with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, as opposed to occasionally or casually, in order to be deemed to have a presence in the forum. See, Li v. Hock, 371 Fed.Appx. 171, 174-75 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.2000)). The only basis upon which plaintiffs claim Dallah Avco was doing business in the United States is the domicile of an employee, who they claim was not performing any traditional or legitimate business-related activities on behalf of his employer. Even if Dallah Avco stationed its employee in the United States, Dallah Avco would not have the necessary continuous, permanent and substantial presence for the exercise of general jurisdiction. See, Saudi v. Marine Atl., Ltd., 306 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (2d Cir.2009); see also, Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. 154. The allegations against defendants Abdullah, Saleh and Sulaiman Al Rajhi focus primarily on their relationship to their family-owned bank, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Company (“Al Rajhi Bank”), and their family’s connection to the SAAR Foundation, a non-profit organization that was headquartered in the United States. In arguing the existence of general jurisdiction over the Al Rajhi individuals, plaintiffs rely on the United States contacts of the SAAR-related entities and corporations, as well as donations made by defendants to United States-based charities. Those entities’ United States contacts cannot be imputed to the defendants as individuals to support a finding of general jurisdiction over them. Nor is defendants’ alleged conduct in donating to United States charities sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The claims asserted against Sheikh Saleh Al-Hussayen (“Sheikh Al-Hussayen”), the Saudi General President of the Committee of the Two Holy Mosques, arise from alleged conduct undertaken outside the scope of his government duties. Plaintiffs argue that Sheik Al-Hussayen is subject to the Court’s exercise of general jurisdiction based on his alleged continuous personal contacts with the United States. The record, however, indicates that, over a twenty-five year period, Sheik Al-Hussayen visited the United States on two occasions, the last being in August and September of 2001. During his last visit, Sheik Al-Hussayen allegedly met with officials from charitable organizations with purported terrorist ties. It is alleged that he stayed at the same hotel as certain of the 9/11 hijackers. Such isolated and sparse contacts with the United States are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under a general theory. Dr. Abdul Rahman Al Swailem (“Dr. Al Swailem”), the Saudi Deputy Minister of Health for Executive Affairs, is being sued, in his personal capacity, for alleged conduct undertaken in both his personal and official capacities. In holding the that the FSIA does not extend to sovereign state’s officials, the Supreme Court observed that plaintiffs must establish the existence of personal jurisdiction over the officials on some other basis other than the FSIA provision that makes personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign automatic when an exception to immunity applies. Since Dr. Al Swailem is being sued in his personal capacity, the contacts he had with the United States while acting in his official capacity on behalf of the sovereign state, cannot be imputed to him for purposes of determining whether his individual due process rights will be violated by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The claims against Dr. Swailem arise from his position as Chairman of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee and President of the Saudi Red Crescent Society; organizations which plaintiffs concede are entitled to FSIA immunity under the Second Circuit’s holding. Dr. Swailem indicates that he only visited the United States for official visits relating to his government service as Deputy Minister. Plaintiffs have failed to make any showing that Dr. Swailem himself independently has any contacts with the United States, and accordingly general jurisdiction does not exist over this defendant. Dr. Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obaid (“Dr. Al-Obaid”), the Saudi Minister of Education, is claimed to be subject to the exercise of general jurisdiction based on his activities as a senior officer of numerous alleged al Qaeda front charities, including United States-based organizations. His status as officer of entities based in the United States cannot, standing alone, provide a basis to confer general jurisdiction over him. Plaintiffs have not alleged any United States contacts or activities attributable to Dr. Al-Obaid personally, but rather rely on those undertaken in his official capacity on behalf of independent entities. Dr. Abdullah Muhsen Al Turki (“Dr. Al Turki”) has served as both Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs and Member of the Council of Ministers. In addition, he held the position of Secretary-General of the purported al Qaeda front charity World Assembly of Muslim Youth (“WAMY”). Dr. Al Turki acknowledges that, in his role as Secretary-General of WAMY, he visited the United States. There are no allegations that Dr. Al Turki personally had any other contacts with the United States. Dr. Al Turki’s contacts with the United States in connection with his role as an officer of an organization, cannot be imputed to him in his individual capacity for the purpose of asserting general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue that Saudi defendant, the National Commercial Bank (“NCB”), is subject to general jurisdiction because it has continuously conducted its financial services in the United States by various means over the last thirty years. Plaintiffs attempt to demonstrate NCB’s presence in the United States based on its doing business through its own New York office that closed in 1992, and thereafter through the United States office of its purported subsidiary, SNCB, which closed in 2001. Neither NCB’s office or that of its claimed subsidiary was in existence at the time plaintiffs commenced their actions, and accordingly cannot be relied upon as a basis to demonstrate NCB’s presence for purposes of general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs nevertheless allege that “although in theory, SNCB was closed in 2001, prior to the commencement of this lawsuit, ... [it] was not truly closed and maintained its corporate status in the U.S. through the time this action was filed” in 2002. (Pis.’ Opp’n Mem. at 41). SNCB’s target date for closure was allegedly the end of 2000, which is when two of its officers purportedly entered into renewable consultancy agreements with NCB. Plaintiffs allege that, after SNCB officially closed in early 2001, it continued to operate by virtue of the activities of those two officers who, working from their private residences, managed SNCB’s investments and bank accounts though at least 2001, with financial activities in the millions of dollars. (Pis.’ Factual Averment ¶ 60). Plaintiffs, therefore, contend that “[t]he renewable consultancy agreements, couple with the intentions to continue to operate for NCB after the SNCB offices closed, indicates that NCB continued to operate similarly in the United States through the consultancy agreements with” these two former SNCB officers. {Id. ¶ 61). Plaintiffs’ contention is, at best, mere speculation, unsupported by the relevant factual circumstances concerning the corporate existence and activities of NCB and SNCB. Further, there is no merit to plaintiffs’ contention that NCB maintains a presence in this country by virtue of its correspondent banking relationship with financial institutions in the United States. “ “Without correspondent banking ... it would often be impossible for banks to provide comprehensive nationwide and international banking services-among them, the vital capability to transfer money by wire with amazing speed and accuracy across international boundaries.’ ” United States v. Davidson, 175 Fed.Appx. 399, 401 n. 2 (2d Cir.2006) {quoting Hearings on the Role of U.S. Correspondent Banking in International Money Laundering, Subcommittee on Investigations of Senate Committee on Government Affairs (opening statements of Senator Susan M. Collins, Subcommittee Chairman)). Thus, correspondent banking relationships play an essential role in today’s global economy, enabling foreign banks, having no presence in the United States, to provide services to their customers that they would otherwise be unable to do because of geographical limitations. Id. The mere maintenance of such correspondent bank accounts by a foreign bank does not, standing alone, provide a basis upon which to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign financial institution. See, Licci v. Am. Express Bank, Ltd., 704 F.Supp.2d 403, 407, 2010 WL 1378807, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.31, 2010) (cases cited therein). Similarly unavailing is plaintiffs’ contention that NCB is subject to general jurisdiction because it maintains an interactive website which allow website visitors, who plaintiffs claim are mostly from Saudi Arabia, to manage accounts and access investment services. A foreign bank will not be subject to the general jurisdiction of American courts based solely on its operation of an interactive website that is accessible to its customers worldwide. See, Northrop Grumman Overseas Serv. Corp. v. Banco Wiese Sudameris, 2004 WL 2199547, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004) (interactive website allowing all clients to bank on line held insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over foreign bank, notwithstanding its New York correspondent banking accounts). Plaintiffs further argue that NCB carries out banking services in the United States by making loans to United States companies. The dubious and isolated incidences upon which plaintiffs rely do not demonstrate the requisite continuity and degree of permanence necessary to support a finding that NCB is doing business in the United States for purposes of general jurisdiction. Finally, plaintiffs allege that NCB has a division within the bank that conducted aviation business in the United States. NCB denies the existence of an aviation division, and further indicates that it has not derived any revenues from the ownership or operation of air-crafts in the United States or from any business that owned or operated aircrafts in the United States. The supporting exhibits submitted by plaintiffs do not demonstrate, nor even give rise to a reasonable inference, that NCB maintained an aviation division or, more generally, did business or otherwise derived revenue from aviation-related activities in the United States. Accordingly, the totality of NCB’s activities, upon which plaintiffs rely, is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION Plaintiffs argue that thirty-seven of the moving defendants are subject to the exercise of specific jurisdiction; twenty-two of whom were also argued to be subject to general jurisdiction as well. As previously explained, specific jurisdiction exists where the cause of action relates to or arise out of the foreign defendant’s activities. For purposes of specific jurisdiction, the “fair warning” requirement of due process is satisfied where “the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation resulted from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (internal citations omitted). The so-called “effects test,” enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Colder, supra, provides for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on his alleged: (1) intentional, tortious actions; (2) which were expressly aimed at the United States; (8) that causes harm, the brunt of which is suffered- — and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered — in the United States; and (4) the injuries that are the subject of the litigation arise from or relate to defendant’s subject conduct. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482. Under the effects test, contacts that are too remote or attenuated to the United States will not suffice to confer specific jurisdiction. In addressing the propriety of Judge Casey’s dismissal of the actions for lack of personal jurisdiction against the five Saudi princes sued in their individual Capacities, the Second Circuit’s jurisdictional analysis, in Terrorist III, supra, focuses on the due process requirements associated with the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Four of the princes were alleged to have given money to Muslim charities knowing that their sizeable donations would be channeled to al Qaeda, which used the money to finance the September 11th attacks. As to the fifth prince, plaintiffs alleged that, in his capacity as an executive of various private banks, he knowingly and intentionally provided financial services to terrorists who, in turn, planned to attack the United States. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that the Saudi princes took intentional and allegedly tortious action expressly aimed at the United States. With regard to the four Saudi princes, the Second Circuit reasoned: The plaintiffs do not allege that the Four Princes directed the September 11 attacks or commanded an agent (or authorized al Qaeda) to commit them. Rather, the plaintiffs rely on a causal chain to argue a concerted action theory of liability: the Princes supported Muslim charities knowing that their money would be diverted to al Qaeda, which then used the money to finance the September 11 attacks. Even if the Four Princes were reckless in monitoring how their donations were spent, or could and did foresee that recipients of their donations would attack targets in the United States, that would be insufficient to ground the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Rather, the plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the Four Princes engaged in intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions expressly aimed at residents of the United States. That burden is not satisfied by the allegation that the Four Princes intended to fund al Qaeda through their donations to Muslim charities. Even assuming that the Four Princes were aware of Osama bin Laden’s public announcements of jihad against the United States and al Qaeda’s attacks on the African embassies and U.S.S. Cole, their contacts with the United States would remain far too attenuated to establish personal jurisdiction in American courts. It may be the case that acts of violence committed against residents of the United States were a foreseeable consequence of the princes’ alleged indirect funding of al Qaeda, but foreseeability is not the standard for recognizing personal jurisdiction. Rather, the plaintiffs must establish that the Four Princes expressly aimed intentional tortious acts at residents of the United States. Providing indirect funding to an organization that was openly hostile to the United States does not constitute this type of intentional conduct. Terrorist III, 538 F.3d at 94-95 (internal citations, parentheticals, quotation marks and alterations omitted). In regard to the remaining prince, the Second Circuit observed that just because al Qaeda would need access to financial institutions, to fund its terrorist attacks, does not mean that managers of those financial institutions purposefully directed their activities at residents of the United States. The prince was not a director, officer, shareholder or employee of the banks that purportedly held terrorist deposits, but was once a manager of another bank which invested in those terrorist-related banks. The Second Circuit found that providing financial services to an entity that carries out a terrorist attack on United States citizens was an insufficient basis, under the circumstances presented, to subject the prince to the jurisdiction of American courts. Id. at 96. The Second Circuit’s rulings can be synthesized to stand for the following cohesive principle of controlling law: The due process rights of a foreign defendant protects him from being subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts based solely on allegations that he provided material support to al Qaeda through either contributions to Muslim charities or provision of financial services to entities with al Qaeda ties, and did so when he: (1) was “aware” that Osama bin Laden has publicly declared war against the United States; (2) was “aware” that, consistent with the declaration of war, al Qaeda has committed violent attacks against the United States; (3) “intended” to provide support to al Qaeda through circuitous, indirect means aimed at defying detection; (4) “did foresee” that the ultimate and intended al Qaeda recipients, of the support given by him, would attack targets in the United States; and (5) did “foresee []” that the consequence of his indirect support of al Qaeda would be the commission of undisclosed acts of violence against residents of the United States. The Second Circuit identified a defendant’s alleged intentional, tortious conduct that is expressly aimed at the United States as being a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Although the Second Circuit concluded that providing indirect funding to al Qaeda did not constitute this type of intentional conduct, the Second Circuit did not articulate what acts would constitute intentional conduct for purposes of specific jurisdiction. This Court finds that, in the context of a terrorism-related litigation, a defendant’s alleged intentional tortious conduct aimed at the United States is conduct that is intended to directly aid in the commission of a terrorist act, with knowledge that the brunt of the injuries will be felt in the United States. Defendants, however, argue that, pursuant to the Second Circuit’s ruling, specific jurisdiction can only be exercised over a defendant who is alleged to have intentionally provided financial services or funding to specifically support the 9/11 terrorist attacks because, without more, allegations of providing support to a global organization, like al Qaeda — even if knowing and intentional — lacks a sufficient nexus to the September 11th attacks from which plaintiffs’ injuries arise or relate. Defendants argue that plaintiffs would be required to allege a defendant’s actual involvement in the September 11th attacks, or that the September 11th hijackers operated at the direction, under the control, at the request of, or on behalf of the defendant. In finding that the allegations against the Saudi princes were insufficient to demonstrate that they had engaged in intentional tortious conduct expressly aimed at the United States, the Second Circuit observed that there was no allegations that they had themselves committed the attack, directed the September 11th attacks, commanded an agent to commit them or authorized al Qaeda to commit them. Terrorist III, 538 F.3d at 94. While the Second Circuit suggested, in dicta, that such allegations of direct personal involvement in the effectuation of the 9/11 attacks would be sufficient for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the Second Circuit did not hold that those were the only grounds upon which specific jurisdiction could be found to exist. Moreover, the Second Circuit’s decision addresses the indirect provision of material support to al Qaeda, especially under the guise of charitable donations. A defendant who allegedly indirectly provides funding to al Qaeda through charitable donations, relinquishes all control over the donated funds. While a defendant-donor may intend, and have every reason to believe, that the suspect charity will funnel those charitable funds to al Qaeda, the donor himself has no authority to direct how the monies are used nor the power or ability to direct his monetary donations into the hands of al Qaeda. In contrast, a defendant who, for example, provides money laundering services directly for al Qaeda, assumes possession of and control over the monies, and takes an active role in directing the flow of funds to and from al Qaeda and its operatives. If such money laundering activities are intentionally performed to support some future attack to be planned by al Qaeda against the United States, reasonably anticipating that the brunt of the injuries will be felt there, the defendant need not know that the support provided is specifically for the 9/11 attacks in order to be subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The secrecy of the specific nature of a terrorist attack is paramount to its success. Hence, it would not be reasonable to require, as a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, that such information be shared throughout al Qaeda’s global infrastructure, or to all those who wish to support such an attack. A defendant, who knowingly provides aid to support an attack against the United States, cannot escape the exercise of jurisdiction by simply remaining safely within the shadows, far removed from United States soil, as he awaits the anticipated harm to befall America, even though unenlightened as to the s