Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER BENSON, District Judge. J. INTRODUCTION Presently before the Court are four motions for partial summary judgment brought by defendant, Microsoft Corporation. In its complaint, plaintiff, Caldera, Inc., alleges that Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive conduct in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, as well as § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14. Microsoft has attempted to separate what it believes are Caldera’s individual claims by filing the following nine motions for partial summary judgment on: (1) “Plaintiffs Preannouncement Claim,” (2) “Plaintiffs Product Disparagement Claim,” (3) “Plaintiffs Claim Regarding Microsoft’s Licensing Practices,” (4) “Plaintiffs Perceived Incompatibilities Claim,” (5) “Plaintiffs Intentional Incompatibilities Claim,” (6) “Plaintiffs ‘Predisclosure’ Claim,” (7) “Plaintiffs Technological Tying Claim,” (8) “Plaintiffs European & Japanese Claims,” and (9) “Plaintiffs State Law Tortious Interference Claims.” In addition to responding to each of Microsoft’s motions for partial summary judgment, Caldera filed its own “Motion to Strike Microsoft’s Partial Summary Judgment Briefs Relating to Substantive Antitrust Violations.’* In its Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 28, 1999, the Court denied three of Microsoft’s motions for partial summary judgment. The motions denied were “Plaintiffs Product Preannouncement Claim,” “Plaintiffs Product Disparagement Claim,” and “Plaintiffs Claim Regarding Microsoft’s Licensing Practices.” Additionally, the Court denied from the bench defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on “Plaintiffs Japanese and European Claims,” as memorialized in its Order dated July 27, 1999. With respect to “Plaintiffs State Law Tortious Interference Claims,” the Court continues to take the matter under advisement. This Opinion addresses defendant’s motions for partial summary judgment on “Plaintiffs Claim of Intentional Incompatibilities,” “Plaintiffs Claim of Predisclo-sure,” “Plaintiffs Claim of Perceived Incompatibilities,” and “Plaintiffs Claim of Technological Tying,” as well as plaintiffs motion to strike. The Court heard oral argument regarding defendant’s present motions for partial summary judgment and plaintiffs motion to strike on June 8, 10, 29, and July 6, 8, 1999. Based on the motions presently before the Court, the memoranda, exhibits submitted by both parties, and the statements presented in oral argument, the Court makes the following findings and issues this Memorandum Opinion and Order. II. BACKGROUND & DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS This case finds its genesis in the mid-1970s with the advent of the personal computer. Critical to the evolution of the personal computer was the development of the computer operating system. An operating system functions as the control center of the computer. It controls the computer’s interaction with peripheral hardware such as keyboards, modems, and printers and also serves as the underlying support structure for software applications. An operating system functions as the interface between the computer and the software applications. Independent software venders (ISVs) write software application programs, such as games, spreadsheets, and wordprocessors, that rely for their operation on certain general functions written into the operating system. As the computer age dawned, new and old companies alike scrambled to pioneer the emerging frontier. Founded in 1976 by Gary Kildall, Digital Research, Inc. (DRI) developed one of the first operating systems for personal computers, known as CP/M (Control Program for Microprocessors). According to plaintiff, CP/M was the dominant operating system for 8-bit personal computers in the late 1970s and early 1980s. CP/M operated much the same as a disc operating system (DOS) operates today. Both CP/M and DOS are character based, requiring the user to direct the computer to perform desired operations by using specific keystrokes. At the same time DRI was making inroads into the operating systems market, a new start-up partnership called Microsoft was formed which focused on programming languages. In July 1980, IBM approached Microsoft about designing 16-bit versions of its most popular products to be used with IBMs forthcoming personal computer, which at the time was still undisclosed to the public. IBM was also looking for an operating system to install onto its personal computers. At that time, DRI had preliminary designs for a 16-bit version of CP/M. IBM contacted DRI about obtaining a license of this 16-bit version, known as CP/M-86, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. Microsoft also began exploring the possibility of developing or acquiring its own operating system. In 1981, Microsoft first licensed and later purchased for a reported $50,000 a 16-bit CP/M clone from Seattle Computer Products, a small original equipment manufacturer (OEM). This system, named QDOS (Quick and Dirty Operating System), mirrored the functionality of CP/M. Thereafter, IBM obtained a license from Microsoft for QDOS. When IBM launched its personal computer in August 1981, this operating system was installed on each computer, offered as PC-DOS 1.0 to IBM’s direct customers, and offered by Microsoft as MS-DOS 1.0, to all other OEMs. IBM’s personal computer incorporated the Intel x86 microprocessor. Other OEMs were able to use this same microprocessor to essentially clone the IBM personal computer, and MS-DOS was compatible with all of these clones. Accordingly, literally millions of Microsoft’s operating systems were installed worldwide. By 1985, MS-DOS was the prevalent operating system in the world for personal computers using Intel x86 microprocessors. As a result, Microsoft enjoyed enormous financial success. By 1988 Microsoft had obtained a monopoly position in the DOS market. For purposes of the present motions, Microsoft does not dispute the contention that it has such a monopoly in the operating systems market. By the mid-1980s, the computer industry began exploring alternatives to DOS, which were considered by many to be difficult to use because they required the user to type in commands in order to operate the computer. As a result, graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were developed, which replaced some of the character-based commands of DOS with graphical commands that users could execute through the use of point-and-click technology. In using a GUI, the user operates a “mouse” that controls an arrow on the screen and enables the user to control the computer by pointing at screen icons and clicking on them. GUIs were initially utilized by Apple Computer, Inc. In the early 1980s Apple developed the Macintosh microprocessor, which, unlike the IBM personal computer, ran on the Motorola 68000 microprocessor chip. However, unlike Microsoft’s GUI, called Windows, Apple’s GUI was a complete operating system. Windows had the appearance of running the computer as its own operating system, but it was in essence merely, operating on top of DOS, unable to function without the underlying DOS program. Notwithstanding, Microsoft’s Windows gained widespread popularity due to the dominance of the Intel x86 microprocessor chip. Since its inception in 1985, Windows has maintained a monopoly position in the GUI market. Despite the dominant market position of MS-DOS, DRI continued development of its operating system. In 1987, DRI developed DR DOS, an operating system that competed directly with MS-DOS and was compatible with software written for use with MS-DOS. In May of 1988, DRI launched DR DOS 3.31. Plaintiff claims DR DOS was a better product than MS-DOS, as it included features MS-DOS did not have, operated at a faster speed, and was less expensive. Plaintiff contends that DR DOS’s superiority over MS-DOS was due in part to Microsoft’s assumption that the new operating system it was developing with IBM, called OS/2, would replace DOS as the preferred operating system. Therefore, according to plaintiff, Microsoft spent little time in further developing or improving MS-DOS. Contrary to Microsoft’s and IBM’s projections, computer users did not switch to OS/2 at the rate anticipated, and DOS continued to be the preferred operating system. In July 1990, DRI launched DR DOS 5.0, an updated and improved version of DR DOS 3.31. Nicknamed “the Leopard,” DR DOS 5.0 received positive reviews from several trade magazines as well as computer industry awards. In an internal Microsoft e-mail sent to Phil Barrett, a Microsoft executive, from one of his subordinates, DR DOS 5.0 received similar high praise when compared to MS-DOS: Last Thursday you asked me for a user’s view of DR DOS 5.0.... I used DR DOS 5.0 with a HUGE number of apps. I found it INCREDIBLY superi- or to MS DOS 3.31 and IBM DOS 4.01. 1) DOS compatibility The most important reason to use ANY version of DOS is to run DOS apps. DR DOS 5.0 runs every DOS app I know. DR DOS 5.0 works successfully with Windows (2.11, Win 386 2.11 and Windows 3.0 and 3.0a). CONCLUSION: DR DOS is vastly superior to MS dos 5.0. Both have nearly identical features ... I don’t see any real ‘cutting edge’ advantage of one over the other. (Pl.’s Exhibit 123). Caldera claims that Microsoft, alarmed at this positive reception of DR DOS 5.0 the computer industry and concerned about losing its DOS monopoly, began to engage in a series of practices to eliminate the threat DR DOS posed to Microsoft’s market dominance. Initially, rather than competing with DRI, Microsoft attempted to bargain for DRI’s exit out of the market. In essence, as plaintiff alleges, Microsoft offered DRI a certain amount of money for the use of DR DOS technology. Microsoft was proposing that DRI market MS-DOS instead of DR DOS and that each company license rights in the other’s product. DRI, uninterested in a long-term relationship with Microsoft, offered DR DOS technology to Microsoft for $30 to $40 million. Microsoft refused. Plaintiff alleges that beginning in approximately the latter half of 1990 with the introduction of DR DOS 5.0 into the marketplace, Microsoft began its improper campaign to eliminate DR DOS as a competitor and to illegally maintain its operating systems monopoly. By this time, DR DOS had captured approximately six percent of the operating systems worldwide market. Among the first of these allegedly improper actions was Microsoft’s use of preemptive false and misleading announcements of forthcoming, competitive MS-DOS and Windows products. This practice of preannouncing upcoming products is known in the industry as “vaporware.” Caldera claims that beginning in April 1990, Microsoft began making knowingly false and misleading preannouncements relating to the forthcoming MS-DOS 5.0, an allegedly comparable product to DR DOS 5.0. Plaintiff claims Microsoft knowingly mislead the public by stating MS-DOS 5.0 would be available to OEMs by September 1990, a full nine months before it was actually on the market. Following DRI’s April 26, 1990 announcement at an England trade show that DR DOS 5.0 would be available in eight weeks, Microsoft immediately an-nouneed to the trade press its development of MS-DOS 5.0. An e-mail sent by Mark Chestnut, then a product manager of MS-DOS 5.0, to a number of Microsoft executives on May 2,1990, stated: On the PR side, we have begun an “aggressive leak” campaign for MS-DOS 5.0. The goal is to build an anticipation for MS-DOS 5.0 and diffuse potential excitement/momentum from the DR DOS 5.0 announcement. At this point, we are telling the press that a major new release from Microsoft is coming this year which will provide significant memory relief and other important features. This was picked up by the major weeklies in the U.S. and was the page 1 story in PC Week on 4/30. Additionally, Chestnut himself flew to several countries, meeting with dozens of OEMs and telling them that they could expect MS-DOS 5.0 by September 1990. Plaintiff alleges that Chestnut’s representations caused these OEMs to postpone any decision to switch to DR DOS. Caldera argues that the purpose behind Microsoft’s preannouncements was to prevent OEMs from entering into licensing agreements with DR DOS 5.0. and that Microsoft knew it could not possibly comply with the schedule it was announcing to the public. Caldera’s expert states that such an aggressive schedule was objectively unattainable. For one thing, a release date of September 1990 would only allow for a three-month beta test cycle, which, according to Caldera, is an unacceptably short beta testing period. Plaintiff argues that by the end of 1990, however, Microsoft was aware that its tactics were working. In a performance self-evaluation, Chestnut wrote “virtually all of our OEMs worldwide were informed about DOS 5, which diffused DRI’s ability to capitalize on a window of opportunity with these OEMs.” (Pl.’s Exhibit 62). By mid-October 1990, the media became concerned about the veracity of Microsoft’s preemptive remarks directed at DR DOS 5.0. Such media pressure was not taken lightly. Following an interview with PC Week, a trade magazine, regarding the release of MS-DOS 5.0, Chestnut wrote to other Microsoft employees on October 17, 1990: I’m afraid that this guy [Paul Sherer of PC Week ] is going to write that we are being open about DOS 5 beta because we are trying to pre-empt DR DOS 5 sales. I tried real hard to present a different point of view, but I don’t think he bought it. I’m concerned that this article may make us look bad. Can you guys follow up and see if we need to do some damage control? This was the toughest interview I’ve ever done, I felt like Richard Nixon giving his “I am not a crook” speech. (PL’s Exhibit 87). In addition to Microsoft’s “vaporware” strategies, Caldera alleges that following the launch of DR DOS 5.0 Microsoft refined and dramatically expanded a campaign of “fear, uncertainty, and doubt” (FUD) against DRI and all of its forthcoming versions of DR DOS. Plaintiff alleges that account managers were directed to share purported “serious problems” with OEMs considering a switch to DR DOS 5.0. Caldera asserts that Microsoft deliberately withheld from these same OEMs independent tests confirming DR DOS 5.0 compatibility with MS-DOS and Windows, while creating its own tests to give the appearance of “incompatibility.” In addition to its improper vaporware and FUD campaigns, Caldera alleges that Microsoft also forced OEMs away from DR DOS 5.0 by what plaintiff refers to as the “licensing triple-whammy,” which refers to (1) per processor licenses, (2) minimum commitments subject to forfeiture, and (3) increased license duration. Per processor licensing agreements required an OEM to pay Microsoft a royalty on every machine the OEM shipped regardless whether the machine contained MS-DOS or a different operating system. This is in contrast to a per system licensing agreement, which required OEMs to pay a royalty on only those computers shipped with MS-DOS installed. The use of per processor agreements is argued by plaintiff to be Microsoft’s most effective single weapon against DR DOS. Plaintiff alleges that DRI had no realistic chance to license DR DOS to OEMs under a per processor license with Microsoft. It would make no sense for an OEM to install DR DOS when it had already paid for MS-DOS on every machine. Microsoft contends that OEMs were free to depart from the per processor licensing scheme, and that price differentials between license types were “relatively minor.” However, plaintiff points to the depositions of several OEM executives who testified that even slight price differentials between the per processor and per system licenses meant that only the per processor license was financially viable. Plaintiff also asserts that Microsoft’s use of minimum commitments with prepaid balances raised the costs to OEMs who may have wanted to switch to an alternative operating system. As alleged, during the life of a Microsoft contract, OEMs could find themselves over-committed with respect to units of Microsoft products. Plaintiff claims that given the nature of Microsoft’s mandatory, nonrefundable minimum commitment payments, OEMs faced the prospect of either forfeiting their prepaid balance or signing a new agreement with Microsoft to partially recoup the prepaid balance. The rationale, plaintiff asserts, behind Microsoft’s minimum commitments policy was not just to provide an OEM an opportunity to recoup the prepaid balance, but rather to sign a new license agreement so that the OEM would continue to distribute only MS-DOS. Microsoft’s final licensing tactic aimed at DR DOS, as plaintiff alleges, was increased license duration. Microsoft began increasing its licensing agreements from two-year to three-year terms and gave OEMs a small price break for agreeing to the longer term. Caldera claims that the increased licensing time was implemented only after DR DOS became a threat to MS-DOS’s monopoly position, and that Microsoft deliberately increased the term length as part of its illegal scheme to drive DRI from the market. The strategy, plaintiff alleges, foreclosed DR DOS from effectively competing for existing OEM business. On July 17, 1991, DRI announced its intent to merge with Novell. The result of this announcement intensified the threat DR DOS posed to Microsoft. The potential merger was a concern on more than one level. One Microsoft executive, Jim Allchin, expressed: “I thought about it all night. Since I came here I said there were two things that concerned me related to Novell: one Novell partnering with IBM and two Novell coming to us at the desktop. Both fears have now come true.” (Pl.’s Exhibit 148). One of Microsoft’s MS-DOS’s product managers, Richard Freedman, expressed: The offensive scenario presumes Novell is actively developing products to compete with Win Peer and NT, and ultimately plans to enter the standalone OEM DOS business. It is this worst-ease scenario we’re focusing on. This scenario assumes Novell aims to own the desktop, both server and workstation, and assumes they’ll attempt to do this first by integrating Netware and DR DOS, and then, having legitimized DR DOS, by going after OEM business. IBM licensing DR DOS is a major X factor in this scenario. (Pl.’s Exhibit 153). Plaintiff alleges that these and other excerpts indicate that Microsoft was alarmed at not only the prospect of Novell competing in the MS-DOS arena, but also that an alliance between IBM and Novell would make DR DOS a much larger threat. On September 23, 1991, IBM officially endorsed DR DOS 6.0, which was scheduled to be released to the public in September or October of the same year. Plaintiff alleges that in response to IBM’s endorsement and in anticipation of an IBM/Novell alliance, Bill Gates publicly threatened retaliation against IBM should it choose DR DOS. Caldera claims that as a result of the threatened retaliation and intense FUD concerning DR DOS incompatibility with Windows, IBM withdrew its consideration of DR DOS. In late September 1991, Novell released DR DOS 6.0. Plaintiff alleges with this release, Microsoft adhered to the same pattern of attack, vaporware, FUD, and per processor licensing agreements, but with more intensity. Microsoft executives were aware of the threat Novell/DRI and the new DR DOS 6.0 posed. Jim Allchin wrote on September 9,1991: We must slow down Novell.... As you said Bill, it has to be dramatic .... We need to slaughter Novell before they get stronger. (Pl.’s Exhibit 175). On March 26, 1993, Allchin also wrote: I still don’t think we take them as serious as is required of us to win. This isn’t IBM. These guys are really good; they have an installed base; they have a channel; they have marketing power; they have good products. AND they want our position. They want to control the APIs, middleware, and as many desktops as they can in addition to the server market they already own. We need to start thinking about Novell as THE competitor to fight against — not in one area of our business, but all of them. If you want to get serious bout stopping Novell, we need to start understanding this is war — nothing less. That’s how Novell views it. We better wake up and get serious about them or they will eventually find a way to hurt us badly. (PL’s Exhibit 349). Plaintiff alleges that with this mind-set, Microsoft intensified its improper FUD campaign against DR DOS. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Microsoft attempted to convince OEMs that DR DOS would to be incompatible with the upcoming Windows 3.1, when in fact Microsoft knew that DR DOS was, or with minor adjustments could be, compatible with Windows. On April 6,1992, Windows 3.1 was launched worldwide. Following this release, plaintiff claims users immediately bombarded Microsoft with requests regarding problems setting up Windows 3.1 over DR DOS. Microsoft’s standard response, according to plaintiff, was to tell the users that Windows was only tested with MS-DOS, not DR DOS, and that using a system other than MS-DOS puts the user at his own risk. When eonfrontéd with the issue of compatibility between Windows and DR DOS, Microsoft’s marketing staff was instructed to respond, “we only test windows on Microsoft supported operating systems, so there’s really no way to know in the future what will work and what will not.” (PL’s Exhibit 176). Recognizing the damage that its FUD campaign could have on DR DOS, Microsoft stated: “We need to create the reputation for problems and incompatibilities to undermine confidence to drdos6; so people will make judgments against it without knowing details or fa[c]ts.” (PL’s Exhibit 227). To assure DR DOS’s incompatibility with Windows, plaintiff alleges that Microsoft placed DRI on a “beta blacklist.” According to plaintiff, Microsoft knew that if the DR DOS development team had access to a Windows 3.1 beta, it would allow them to make DR DOS compatible and consequently allay public fears of incompatibility. DRI submitted a formal request to become a beta site. The request was denied on August 2, 1991. Being placed on Microsoft’s beta blacklist had an alleged direct effect on DR DOS sales. One corporation notifying DRI of its decision to reject DR DOS 6.0, stated that the most important factor, however, is the rift developing between Digital Research and Microsoft. By this I mean Microsoft not allowing you to beta test Windows 3.1. Since the users who would be most inclined to switch to DR DOS are also using Windows, this one factor is of particular concern. (PL’s Exhibit 266). According to Caldera, Microsoft continued its attacks on DRI by intentionally making Windows 3.1 incompatible with DR DOS, not for any technologically significant reason, but for the sole purpose of eliminating DR DOS as a competitor. Caldera supports its claim with internal Microsoft statements, such as these written by David Cole and Phil Barrett on September 30, 1991, respectively: “It’s pretty clear we need to make sure Windows 3.1 only runs on top of MS DOS or an OEM version of it,” and “[t]he approach we will take is to detect dr 6 and refuse to load. The error message should be something like ‘Invalid device driver interface.’ ” (PL’s Exhibits 205 and 206). Microsoft developers discussed reliable DR DOS detection mechanisms, and allegedly incorporated “Bambi,” Microsoft’s code name for its updated disc cache utility, which among other things detects DR DOS and refuses to load, in Windows 3.1. In addition to Bambi, Microsoft added a version check known as the extended memory specifications (XMS) to the Windows 3.1 SETUP program. The XMS made it impossible for Windows to install on a DR DOS system. When it detected DR DOS the user was told: The XMS driver you have installed is not compatible with Windows. You must remove it before SETUP can successfully install Windows. Caldera alleges that there was no valid competitive purpose for this version check, and that' this message was not just misleading, but wrong, and that the DR DOS XMS driver was compatible with Windows 3.1. Caldera further alleges that Microsoft introduced a computer “bug,” known as the nested task flag, that would cause a fatal error when users tried to run Windows 3.1 with DR DOS. Additionally, it is alleged that Microsoft installed “software locks” in the Korean version of Windows causing Windows to malfunction when it operated with DR DOS. Caldera claims that Microsoft knew about these problems, knew the cause of the problems, knew how to fix them, yet did nothing. Finally, Caldera complains of Microsoft’s insertion of a line of code in a beta version of Windows 3.1. The code was designed to detect the presence of MS-DOS. In the event that MS-DOS was not detected, the following message was displayed: Non-fatal error detected: Error number [varied]. Please contact Windows 3.1 beta support. Press enter to exit or C to continue. Through Microsoft’s alleged use of vaporware, per processor licensing agreements, FUD, beta blacklisting, and the insertion of incompatibilities between Windows and DR DOS, Caldera claims that Microsoft was essentially forcing OEMs to purchase both MS-DOS and Windows. By this method Microsoft, Caldera asserts, was using its monopoly in the GUI (i.e. Windows) market, to illegally maintain its monopoly in the operating systems market. One OEM, an alleged leading proponent of DR DOS, stated: “[Microsoft] just said they had changed the way in which they market the product, instead of it being available as two separate packages it now came as an integrated package, which was DOS and Windows 3.11 or DOS and Windows for Workgroups 3.11, take it or leave it.” (Harvey Depo. at 33). According to plaintiff, Microsoft’s desire to combine MS-DOS and Windows extended beyond simply forcing the sale of the two products. Since September 1991, and as reflected in an e-mail sent by Jim All-chin, Microsoft had been exploring the possibility of integrating Windows with DOS, creating a “common install,” and “mak[ing] it so there is no reason to try DR DOS to get Windows.” (Pl.’s Exhibit 175). Acting on this desire, Microsoft took steps to implement its combined product. By early 1992, Microsoft developed “Janus,” which was designed to provide first-time Windows 3.1 purchasers who were using some older version of DOS, with an upgrade to MS-DOS 5.0. For the first time, Windows 3.1 and MS-DOS 5.0 were together in the same package. Each component, however, could still be purchased separately. Janus was not a success, and Microsoft estimated its failure to be the result of only providing an upgrade of one of the products. Therefore, Microsoft focused on the concept of releasing upgraded MS-DOS and Windows versions simultaneously. This project, labeled “Chicago,” ultimately led to the creation of Windows 95. According to Caldera, one of Microsoft’s stated objectives in developing Chicago was to block out Novell. In a June 16, 1992, strategy document Microsoft declared Novell as its biggest threat, and stated that Microsoft “must respond in a strong way by making Chicago a complete Windows operating system, from boot-up to shut-down.” (Pl.’s Exhibit 309). Microsoft continued, “[t]here will be no place or need on a Chicago machine for DR-DOS (or any DOS).” (Id.). While Microsoft was developing Chicago, Novell continued to develop DR DOS. In December 1993, Novell introduced its final upgrade to DR DOS, Novell DOS 7.0, which, according to plaintiff, offered innovative features and received industry praise. Plaintiff claims that Microsoft illegally attempted to eliminate Novell’s momentum by continuing its FUD campaign, beta-blacklisting, and spreading vaporware. For example, in August 1993, Microsoft announced the forthcoming release of MS-DOS 7.0 to coincide with Novell DOS 7.0. However, MS-DOS 7.0 was never released. Additionally, Caldera alleges that further vaporware and FUD was being spread in relation to Chicago. Specifically, Microsoft leaked information that Chicago would be released in 1993 or 1994, and that Novell’s DOS would not run on Chicago. Finally, Caldera claims that shrouded in the fog of such vaporware and as a result of years of Microsoft’s illegal anticompetitive conduct, Novell announced in September 1994 that it would withdraw from active development and marketing of further versions of DOS. On the heels of Novell’s exit from the market, Microsoft announced on December 20, 1994, that Chicago, now officially termed “Windows 95,” may not be available until August 1995. In August 1995, Microsoft released Windows 95. For ten years prior thereto, Microsoft had sold MS-DOS and Windows separately. However, Windows 95 combined the functions of Windows and DOS into one product. Microsoft touts Windows 95 as one of the most popular software products in history, selling within four months after its release nearly eleven million copies through OEM channels and nearly five million copies through retail channels. After its release, virtually all new personal computers came with Windows 95 preinstalled by OEMs. With the release of Windows 95, users of the Intel-based personal computer had a totally integrated (from boot-up to shutdown) graphical operating system for the first time. Microsoft claims that Windows 95 offered many new features of functionality over that provided by the combination of MS-DOS 6.0 and Windows 3.0 when those products were installed separately on a personal computer. Caldera, however, alleges that in reality Windows 95 is not an integrated software product, but rather two products — MS-DOS 7.0 and Windows 4.0, which Caldera asserts are merely updated versions of both MS-DOS 6.22 and Windows 3.1 — packaged together using a common installation program with blue cloud graphics to make them appear to be a single product. Plaintiff claims that MS-DOS 7.0 and Windows 4.0 can be easily isolated and sold as separate products. Since the release of Windows 95, updated versions of Windows and MS-DOS were not sold separately. Plaintiff claims No-vell would have been able to compete with Microsoft but for Microsoft’s prior conduct and ultimately this illegal tying arrangement of, Windows 95, which plaintiff argues was the coup de grace for DR DOS. On July 23, 1996, Caldera acquired DRI from Novell. Included in the purchase was the right to bring this lawsuit against Microsoft. Based on the foregoing, Caldera filed its complaint against Microsoft, alleging the improper use and maintenance of monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act and for the illegal restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Caldera supports its § 1 claim by arguing that Windows 95 constitutes an illegal tie of two separate products formerly sold as MS-DOS and Windows. Caldera supports its § 2 claim, as aforementioned, by alleging that Microsoft engaged in an anticompetitive scheme, the factual components of which consist of, improper licensing arrangements, improper preannouncements, improper intentional and perceived incompatibilities, beta blacklisting, the improper creation of fear, uncertainty, and doubt, and the illegal tying together of its products. Caldera acknowledges that each instance of alleged misconduct taken alone may not amount to a violation of § 2. However, when viewed in totality, Caldera asserts that Microsoft has engaged in an unlawful, anticompeti-tive scheme to illegally maintain its monopoly in the operating systems market. III. DISCUSSION In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in an effort to protect competition and prevent monopolies. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[ejvery contract, combination ..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Despite this broad language, almost from its inception the Sherman Act has been read to prohibit only those restraints of trade that are unreasonable. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed. 683 (1918) (recognizing that because every agreement involving trade is a restraint on trade in some form, the proper inquiry is whether the restraint suppresses or destroys competition). Courts have also developed a doctrine of per se violations to cover those business relationships that “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.” Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958). Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has determined that “the offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Although by enacting the Sherman Act Congress expressed an inherent distrust of monopolies and their possible adverse effects on competition, it did not declare monopolies illegal per se. Antitrust laws are designed to protect and foster competition, even when the competitor is a monopolist. In general, a monopolist is free to market its products, engage in research and development to improve its products, and engage in any other business practice that is procompetitive. If smaller businesses find themselves unable to compete on the merits of their products against a procompetitive monopolist, there is nothing in the antitrust laws to protect them. Antitrust laws protect the competitive process; they do not protect individual competitors. Notwithstanding, § 2 does proscribe a monopolist from engaging in business practices that are anticompetitive or exclusionary. Congress, recognizing that “it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combination!],]” left to the courts the responsibility of defining the parameters of anticompetitive conduct. 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890). Anticompetitive conduct describes a wide variety of behavior including espionage, sabotage, predatory pricing, fraud, price discrimination, price-fixing, bid-rigging, illegal tying arrangements, product disparagement and a host of other activities that improperly stifle competition. Section 2 prohibits a monopolist from engaging in anticompetitive practices that are designed to deter potential rivals from entering the market or from preventing existing rivals from increasing their output, no matter'how flagrant or subtle the violation. A monopoly may not improperly “wield [its] resulting power to tighten its hold on the market.” Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir.1979). Perhaps the clearest way to explain what a monopolist may legally do is to say that the monopolist may engage in all of the same procom-petitive activities that allowed it to become a legal monopolist in the first place. These would include building a better or less expensive product, engaging in better public relations, employing effective (and honest) advertising campaigns, and developing aggressive and effective marketing techniques. If these activities result in even more market share, and drive competitors out of the market, the monopolist is nevertheless fully entitled to such expansion, and its conduct is not a violation of the Sherman Act. Conversely, a monopolist may not engage in any activities other than those that are procompetitive, as generally described above. A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike As mentioned at the outset of this Opinion, in response to Caldera’s allegations that Microsoft violated § 2 by willfully maintaining its monopoly position through anticompetitive means, Microsoft filed nine separate motions for partial summary judgment. Seven of the nine motions relate to specific conduct Caldera claims against Microsoft. Caldera objected to these motions by filing a motion to strike the partial summary judgment motions as improper. Caldera argues that Microsoft has artificially created seven discreet claims out of Caldera’s singular claim that Microsoft violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Caldera requests that the Court strike the seven partial summary judgment motions as improper and allow Caldera to present evidence of Microsoft’s alleged anticompetitive behavior to a jury. The jury would in turn consider whether, based on the aggregate effect of the anti-competitive behavior presented, defendant unlawfully maintained a monopoly. Microsoft objects to plaintiffs motion to strike for two reasons. First, Microsoft asserts that a motion to strike is a procedurally improper challenge to motions for summary judgment, and second, Microsoft contends that each allegation of anticom-petitive conduct must be examined separately to determine if a § 2 violation has occurred. Defendant argues that if specific anticompetitive conduct fails by itself to support a § 2 claim then such conduct may not later be considered in determining whether a § 2 violation has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances. Microsoft relies on Southern Pacific Communications Corp. v. AT & T, 556 F.Supp. 825 (D.D.C.1982), in support of its position. Microsoft claims that in Southern Pacific the court considered and rejected the idea that a plaintiff can assert one overarching § 2 claim. However, a careful reading of that case shows that the court there found it unnecessary to decide the issue and considered it only in dicta. The D.C. district court wrote: The Court is satisfied that nothing in Continental Ore requires a conclusion that a defendant that has not engaged in an unlawful conspiracy, and has commit-' ted no acts in themselves violative of the Sherman Act, could be found guilty of antitrust violations on some theory that the acts have “synergistic effects” that convert lawful conduct into violations of law. Such a doctrine, with its potential for converting entirely innocent conduct into violations of law, would at the very least demand careful and sparing application .... Fortunately, it is not necessary for the Court to decide whether plaintiffs’ expansive reading of Continental Ore can be justified. Id. at 888 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court in Southern Pacific did not reject the idea, as defendant claims, that plaintiff should not be allowed to present its antitrust case based on the totality of defendant’s conduct when none of the conduct alone could support a separate and independent antitrust claim. Rather, the court stated that such a theory would “at the very least demand careful and sparing application.” Defendant also asserts that the Supreme Court “tacitly rejected” plaintiffs theory in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In Matsushita, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the appropriate standard for summary judgment in cases involving conspiracies to monopolize. However, defendant does not elaborate on how the Supreme Court tacitly rejected plaintiffs theory, nor can this Court, after its own reading of the case, find such a rejection. In fact, Matsushita seems to support plaintiffs synergy theory rather than reject it. On the same pages cited by defendant, the Supreme Court in Mat-sushita found that of the numerous con-spiracles to monopolize alleged, only the conspiracy to monopolize the American market through predatory pricing could support respondent’s claim of antitrust injury. However, the Court noted that evidence of the other conspiracies would be considered if “in context evidence of these ‘other’,conspiracies raises a genuine issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing conspiracy.” Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The Court found that although the “other” conspiracies could not alone support an antitrust claim, they could be used to bolster the remaining conspiracy claim when viewed in context. This Court reads nothing in Matsushita that limits, either explicitly or tacitly, the aggregation of evidence to conspiracy to monopolize cases. In support of its position, Caldera relies primarily on Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.1984), which was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 105 S.Ct. 2847, 86 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985). That case involved two owners of ski resorts in Aspen, Colorado. The plaintiff .owned one of four ski resorts located in Aspen. The defendant owned the remaining three. From the 1962 ski season through the 1971 ski season, the parties offered a joint multi-day lift ticket which could be used at any one of the four ski resorts. After a one-year reprieve, the multi-day lift ticket was reinstituted in 1973 through the end of the 1976 season. The revenues from the tickets were divided based on a percentage of the actual use of each facility. For the 1977-78 season, defendant offered to continue the multi-day lift ticket but only if plaintiff agreed to a fixed percentage of the revenues. Plaintiff requested that the parties continue to base the revenue sharing on actual usage but ultimately agreed to 15% of the revenues. In the 1978-79 ski season defendant offered to continue the joint ticket if plaintiff would agree to accept 12.5% of the revenues from ticket sales. Plaintiff again requested that the parties return to their previous arrangement. However, because the parties were unable to agree on a method of dividing the revenues, the multi-day lift ticket was discontinued. Plaintiff brought suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. After the close of evidence at trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The district court granted the motion on all claims except the claims of unlawful monopolization and conspiracy to restrain trade. On both of the remaining claims, the jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant argued that “there was insufficient evidence to present a jury issue of monopolization because, as a matter of law, the conduct at issue was pro-competitive conduct that a monopolist could lawfully engage in.” Id. at 1516-17 (citations omitted). Defendant further argued that each of the six things the plaintiff relied on to support its § 2 claim must support the claim independent of each other and may not be considered in the aggregate to determine if a violation of § 2 has occurred. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating, “defendant’s argument would require that we view each of the “six things” in isolation.” To do this, however, would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonition that an antitrust plaintiff “should be given the full benefit of [its] proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate cléan after scrutiny of each.” Id. at 1522 n. 18 (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962)). The Tenth Circuit continued by adding, “[p]laintiffs evidence should be viewed as a whole. Each of the ‘six things’ viewed in isolation need not be supported by sufficient evidence to amount to a § 2 violation. It is enough that taken together they are sufficient to prove the monopolization claim.” Id. Microsoft attempts to distinguish this case by highlighting the fact that the Aspen Highlands court allowed the plaintiff the benefit of the synergistic effect of its evidence to prove that the defendant monopolist had refused to deal with the plaintiff in violation of § 2. Whereas here, Microsoft argues, Caldera is requesting that all the evidence be considered in determining whether defendant violated § 2 without alleging any specific claim other than the defendant engaged in anticom-petitive behavior. However, this distinction is immaterial. The Supreme Court’s directive in Continental Ore that a plaintiff should not be denied the “full benefit of its proof’ is equally applicable here. The Court finds nothing in the relevant law that prevents a plaintiff from asserting one overarching claim of a § 2 violation. Conversely, to allow defendant to carve plaintiffs complaint into seven discreet claims that plaintiff never intended to allege as independent claims not only appears to offend the purpose behind § 2, but also turns basic civil procedure principles on their head. Caldera claims that Microsoft is a monopolist that engaged in anticompetitive conduct to preserve its monopoly. The alleged anticompetitive conduct is set forth in general terms in the foregoing background portion of this opinion. Plaintiffs entire case is based on the synergy of all of this conduct to demonstrate anticompetitive intent and effect. Plaintiff has not averred a separate claim of product disparagement, or a “refusal to deal” claim, or any other independent claim in support of its overall § 2 claim. Consequently, the Court sees no reason why plaintiff should now be required to submit to Microsoft’s reclassification of its claim and to independently support each of the seven “claims” as classified by Microsoft as an independent legal claim upon which relief could be granted and liability could be independently based, in order to survive summary judgment. Such an exercise is not appropriate as a matter of summary judgment, though it may have some value in allowing the parties and the Court to focus on the plaintiffs proposed evidence in an effort to minimize evidentiary problems at trial. In full agreement with Aspen Highlands, the Court finds no bar to allowing Caldera to present all of its evidence of Microsoft’s alleged anticompetitive conduct to a fact finder in support of its § 2 claim. However, as a procedural matter, the Court agrees with the defendant that a motion to strike the partial summary judgment motions is improper. Therefore, the Court denies plaintiffs motion to strike, and entertains each of the remaining four motions in the following discussion. Consistent with the foregoing, however, what follows is generally more in the nature of evidentiary analysis. B. Microsoft’s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment The Court now addresses Microsoft’s motions for partial summary judgment regarding (1) “Plaintiffs Claim of Intentional Incompatibilities,” (2) “Plaintiffs Claim of Predisclosure,” (3) “Plaintiffs Claim of Perceived Incompatibilities,” and (4) “Plaintiffs Claim of Technological Tying.” Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and, therefore, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The court is required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991). In considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court determines whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.1991). 1. Intentional Incompatibilities Caldera alleges that in an effort to eliminate competition in the operating systems market, Microsoft introduced intentional incompatibilities between Windows and DR DOS. Caldera maintains that these incompatibilities, in connection with other anticompetitive behavior such as Microsoft’s exclusion of DRI from beta testing Windows 3.1 and Microsoft’s campaign to spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt about Windows’ compatibility with DR DOS, amounted to a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. In response to this allegation, Microsoft seeks summary judgment on Caldera’s claims of intentional incompatibilities. Caldera originally complained of seven technological incompatibilities existing between DR DOS and Microsoft Windows: (1) Nested Task Flag, (2) XMS Version Check, (3) AARD Code, (4) Korean Incompatibilities, (5) PROTMAN.DOS in Windows for Workgroups, (6) VSERVER.386 in Windows for Workgroups, and (7) Windows 95. At oral argument, plaintiff stated that it would no longer pursue any claims relating to PROTMAN.DOS or VSERVER.386. At the same hearing, Microsoft objected to Caldera’s introduction of yet another technological incompatibility, known as “Bambi” which Caldera raised for the first time in its opposition brief to defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs intentional incompatibilities claim. Defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence relating to Bambi based on the fact that discovery had closed and defendant did not have an opportunity to depose plaintiffs expert witness on the subject. The Court held a separate hearing on this matter at which time it determined that the Bambi incompatibility issue and that the declaration of Caldera’s expert witness, Dr. Holl-aar, would be allowed. Therefore, the Court will address incompatibilities relating to Bambi, nested task flag, XMS version check, and Korean incompatibilities. The Court will address the AARD Code and Windows 95 in the “Perceived Incompatibilities” and “Technological Tying” portions of this Opinion. The Court will first briefly describe each technological incompatibility before turning to the applicable law. Caldera-asserts that Microsoft intentionally created a nested task flag incompatibility between DR DOS and Windows 3.1. A nested task flag allows a microprocessor to execute tasks that require several other tasks to be executed in order for a function to be performed. This layering of tasks is called “nesting.” In order to determine if a specific task is nested or not, software is created to detect the numeric value assigned to the nested task flag. If the value assigned to the flag is incorrectly set, the computer may respond in unexpected or even detrimental ways. In the instant case DRI had set the nested task flag value in DR DOS to one. The Intel microprocessor used by Windows 3.1 was set at a default value of zero. Consequently, when Windows 3.1 operated in conjunction with DR DOS, a malfunction occurred. Shortly after Windows 3.1 was released publically in early April 1992, DRI corrected the problem with a small two-byte modification to the IBM-DOS.COM file in DR DOS. Plaintiff claims that Microsoft intentionally created this unnecessary incompatibility between DR DOS and Windows as part of its illegal anticompetitive scheme. Microsoft was aware of the nested task flag error that occurred when the Windows 3.1 beta version operated with DR DOS and even contemplated a remedy for the problem. Ultimately, however, Microsoft abandoned plans to fix the malfunction. Microsoft contends that the decision not to repair the malfunction was made because it required extensive testing to ensure that the remedy did not destabilize Windows. Caldera next claims that Microsoft intentionally added code to the Windows 3.1 set-up program that operated as a check to determine if an appropriate version of extended memory specifications (XMS) was present. When the check found an unacceptable version of XMS, a message appeared on the monitor instructing the user “to remove the old XMS provider from a configuration file called CONFIG.SYS and to proceed with the installation of Windows 3.1.” MS DOS passed the XMS version check. DR DOS did not. The Windows 3.1 set-up program runs in standard (or “protected”) mode, which allows the program to be more user-friendly by adding graphics and other features. In order for the Windows 3.1 set-up program to run in standard mode, Microsoft asserts that a dependable version of the XMS had to be present. However, Caldera asserts that the Windows set-up program never actually used the XMS, which required an internal revision number of 2.6. However, Windows 3.1 required at most an internal revision number of 2.4 to run. Furthermore, Windows 3.1 consists of smaller modules, each containing its own XMS version check. With an internal reversion number of 2.5 DR DOS passed the individual modules checks but failed the Windows set-up XMS check. Caldera asserts that the only purpose for the XMS check was to prevent DR DOS from loading with Windows 3.1. Next Caldera alleges that Microsoft intentionally placed a detection device known as Bambi to detect DR DOS and refuse to load Windows 3.1 if DR DOS was detected. Bambi was Microsoft’s code name for SMARTDRY, a Windows 3.1 module. Caldera claims that Microsoft included code located within the Bambi module in at least one beta release of Windows 3.1 that checked for DR DOS. Once DR DOS was detected, an error message appeared on the computer monitor and Windows refused to run. Caldera claims that the incompatibility was intentionally inserted and that there was no technological reason or value to adding the error message. Caldera offers the declaration of its expert witness Dr. Hollaar, in support of its allegations. Caldera finally asserts that somewhere between 1990 and 1991, Microsoft put “software locks” into three of its software programs produced for the Korean market. These software locks prevented users from operating Microsoft software with DR DOS. In support of its assertion, Caldera offers the testimony of Richard Dixon, DRI’s vice-president for Far-Eastern OEM sales. Apparently, Mr. Dixon observed Korean versions of Microsoft Word, Works, and Excel being loaded onto DR DOS. When attempting to run these Microsoft software programs on DR DOS, an error message appeared which read, “application terminated.” Mr. Dixon observed previous versions of these same Microsoft applications load onto DR DOS and function properly. Caldera also submits internal Microsoft e-mail which it argues shows that the software locks were intentionally inserted by Microsoft to prevent the software from operating with DR DOS. One e-mail concerns an inquiry by a member of the Korean Windows 2.10 project who wanted to know how the U.S. version of Windows handled MS-DOS clones and how the Korean version should handle clones. Along the chain of responsive e-mails, the discussion noted that Bill Gates, the CEO of Microsoft Corp., wanted all business units to detect all MS-DOS clones and show a warning message indicating that the MS-DOS clone was not tested and that the program might not work correctly. The e-mail directed the Korean Windows 2.1 project member to individuals who could provide code for a checking routine that would display a warning message when an operating system other than MS-DOS was detected. Caldera also asserts that the Korean version of Windows, known as “Hangeul Windows,” contained diagnostic checks to determine if Windows was operating on a system other than MS-DOS. The diagnostic check was contained in both the 3.0 and 3.1 version of Windows and was coupled with a message located in the WIN. CNF file. In the 3.0 version the message read: “Hangeul Windows 3.0 should be executed on Hangeul MS-DOS. For correct execution, please run Hangeul MS-DOS.” In the Hangeul Windows 3.1 version the message read, “Warning: Your DOS is not compatible with MS-DOS. You may have some problems when you use Hangeul Windows 3.1.” Microsoft contends that in order for Caldera to succeed on its claim it must first show that each of the alleged incompatibilities between DR DOS and Windows “had no purpose other than to preclude competition from DRI.” (Def s Reply Mem. at 12). In support of this heavy burden, Microsoft relies on Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. I.B.M. Corp., (In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig.), 481 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.Cal.1979). In Tmnsamerica, the plaintiffs were manufacturers of peripheral computer equipment such as key boards and printers that were compatible with IBM personal computers. The plaintiffs brought suit for antitrust violations when IBM redesigned its central processing unit (CPU) to make it incompatible with any peripheral product not made by IBM. Defendant IBM maintained that the redesign had technological value and therefore the resulting incompatibilities could not support a § 2 claim. Microsoft asserts in its reply brief that the court in Tmnsamerica “held that a plaintiff must prove, in addition to intent, that the design decision was devoid of technical merit and had a significant effect on competition.” (Defs Reply Mem. at 11) (citation omitted). Microsoft also adds that “the court [in Tmnsamerica] expressly stated that design conduct violates § 2 of the Sherman Act only if the ‘design changes had no purpose and effect other than the preclusion of ... competition.’ ” (Id. at 12) (citing Transamerica, 481 F.Supp. at 1002-03). Applying this standard to the instant case, Microsoft argues that Caldera cannot show that even one of the alleged incompatibilities had as its only purpose the preclusion of competition or •that the incompatibilities were devoid of technological merit. Therefore, defendant argues, plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law. Applying this standard, the Court may agree that plaintiff has not met its burden. However, Microsoft has grossly misrepresented the holding of Tmnsamerica. Particularly offensive to the Court is the assertion that “the court [in Tmnsamerica] expressly stated that design conduct violates § 2 of the Sherman Act only if the ‘design changes had no purpose and effect other than the preclusion of ... competition.’ ” (Id.) This is simply not true. It appears that Microsoft scanned the Tmnsamerica opinion for language favorable to its position and then quoted that language entirely out of context with the intent of leading this Court to believe that the court in Tmnsamerica held something it did not. What the Tmnsamerica court did say is [h]ad IBM responded to [the manufacturers of peripheral equipment’s] inroads on its assumed monopoly by changing the System/360 interfaces with such frequency that [peripheral equipment manufacturers] would have been unable to attach and unable to economically adapt their peripherals to the ever-changing interface designs, and if those interface changes had no purpose and effect other than the preclusion of [these manufacturers] from competition, this Court would not hesitate to find that such conduct was predatory. Transamerica, 481 F.Supp. at 1002-03 (emphasis added). The Transamerica court was attempting to provide a hypothetical illustration of what would undeniably be predatory conduct. The court did not maintain that IBM had engaged in such conduct let alone intend to announce a standard that a plaintiff must meet in order to succeed on a technological incompatibility claim. The Tmnsamerica court went on to add, “[i]t is more difficult to formulate a legal standard for design conduct than it is to imagine clearly illegal situations.” Id. at 1003. Finally, the Tmnsamerica court stated the standard by which it would evaluate the changes IBM made to the CPU design: A more generalized standard, one applicable to all types of otherwise legal conduct by a monopolist, and one recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit, must be applied to the technological design activity here. If the design choice is unreasonably restrictive of competition, the monopolist’s conduct violates the Sherman Act. This standard will allow the fact finder to consider the effects of the design on competitors; the effects of the design on consu