Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER LORETTA A. PRESKA, Chief Judge. Plaintiffs Amnesty International USA (“AI”), the Center for Constitutional Rights, Inc. (“CCR”), and Washington Square Legal Services (“WSLS,” and together with AI and CCR, “Plaintiffs”) served four requests for records (the “Requests”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, on Defendant Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA” or “Defendant”). Currently before the Court are the CIA’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. no. 141] and Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment [dkt. no. 158] which raise the questions of whether the CIA adequately searched for the requested records and properly invoked several of the exemptions set forth in the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that the CIA’s search for responsive records was adequate, except for its search for records relating to the CIA’s use of the “attention grasp” technique in its interrogations of suspected terrorists. In addition, the Court finds that the CIA’s assertion of the various FOIA Exemptions and its Glomar responses are, for the most part, justified. Accordingly, the CIA’s motion and Plaintiffs cross-motion are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 1. BACKGROUND A. The Reqtiests Collectively, Plaintiffs have submitted four FOIA requests to the CIA and other agencies seeking records relating to the detention and treatment of detainees. The specifics of each request will be discussed in turn. i. The CCR FOIA Request On December 21, 2004, CCR submitted a FOIA request for “records relating to the identity of, transport and location(s) of, authority over, and treatment of all unregistered, CIA, and ‘ghost’ Detainees interdicted, interrogated, and detained by any agency or department of the United States.” (Hilton Decl., Ex. B and Brown Decl, Ex. A (“CCR FOIA Request”) at 3.) The CCR FOIA Request contained seventeen separate record requests which sought: 1. All records that propose, authorize, report on, or describe, or that discuss the legality or appropriateness of holding Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees in special CIA or other agency facilities for purposes of interrogation. 2. All records that discuss the creation, use and/or closure of the various centers at which the CIA and/or any other agency of the federal government has held, and/or continues to hold Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees. 3. All records reflecting the use of any private companies, other U.S. officials or citizens, and/or officials or citizens of any foreign governments regarding the interdiction, arrest, transfer, detention, questioning, interrogation, and/or other treatment of any Unregistered, CIA, or “Ghost” Detainee[.] 4. All records reflecting standards or policies governing who may be held as an Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainee and what procedural protections or guidelines, if any, are used to review the arrest, detention, and treatment of these Detainees. 5. Every location from September 11, 2001 to the present at which the CIA or any other governmental agency has been or is now holding Unregistered, CIA, or “Ghost” Detainees, the dates of operation of each such facility, whether the facility remains open at this time, the purpose of the facility, a complete list of the Detainees held at the facility (both past and current with indications as to this status), a list of techniques used for interrogation at each facility, and a list of personnel who have worked and those who continue to work at each Center. 6. All records concerning the treatment of the Unregistered Detainees held in any CIA or other governmental facility in the world. Please include all records discussing the following interrogation methods at such facilities, including but not limited to records discussing their legality or appropriateness: using “stress and duress” techniques on Detainees; using force against them; subjecting them to physical injury; requiring them to stand or kneel for prolonged periods; depriving them of sleep, food or water; holding them in awkward and painful positions for prolonged periods; denying them painkillers or medical treatment; administering or threatening to administer mind altering substances, “truth serums” or procedures calculated to disrupt the senses or personality; subjecting them to prolonged interrogation under bright lights; requiring them to be hooded, stripped, or blindfolded; binding their hands and feet for prolonged periods of time; isolating them for prolonged periods of time; subjecting them to violent shaking; subjecting them to intense noise; subjecting them to heat or cold; or threatening harm to them or other individuals. 7. All records setting forth or discussing policies, procedures or guidelines relating to the detention, questioning, interrogation, transfer, and treatment (including, but not limited to the interrogation with use of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees, including but not limited to policies, procedures or guidelines relating to the methods listed above. 8. All records relating to measures taken, or policies, procedures or guidelines put in place, to ensure that CIA Detainees were not, are not or will not be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Please include all records indicating how any such policies, procedures or guidelines were, are, or will be, communicated to personnel involved in the interrogation or detention of CIA Detainees. 9. All records indicating or discussing actual or possible violations of, or derivations from, the policies, procedures or guidelines referred to in Paragraph 4, above. 10. All records indicating or discussing serious injuries, illnesses, and/or deaths of any Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees. 11. All records, including autopsy reports and death certificates, relating to the deaths of any Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees. 12. All records relating to investigations, inquiries, or disciplinary proceedings initiated in relation to actual or possible violations of, or derivations from, the policies, procedures or guidelines referred to in Paragraph 4, above, including but not limited to records indicating the existence of such investigations, inquiries or disciplinary proceedings. 13. All records relating to the actual or alleged torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of any Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainee. 14. All records relating to policies, procedures or guidelines governing the role of health personnel in the interrogation of the Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees, including but not limited to the role of health personnel in the medical, psychiatric, or psychological assessment of Detainees immediately before, during or immediately after interrogation. Please include all records indicating how any such policies, procedures or guidelines were, are or will be communicated to personnel involved in the interrogation or detention of Detainees. 15. All records relating to medical, psychiatric or psychological assessment of any Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainee or guidance given to interrogators by health personnel immediately before, during or immediately after the interrogation of any Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees. 16. All records indicating whether and to what extent the International Committee for the Red Cross (“ICRC”) had, has or will have access to Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees, including but not limited to records related to particular decisions to grant or deny the ICRC access to any Detainee or group of Detainees. 17. All records indicating whether and to what extent any other non-governmental organization or foreign government had, has or will have access to the Unregistered, CIA, and/or “Ghost” Detainees, including but not limited to records related to particular decisions to grant or deny them access to any Detainee or group of Detainees. (Id. at 4-6.) ii. The AI Requests On April 25, 2006, AI, together with the WSLS, submitted two separate FOIA requests to the CIA. (See Hilton Decl. Ex. F and Brown Decl., Ex. B (“First AI FOIA Request”); Hilton Decl., Ex. G and Brown Decl., Ex. C (“Second AI FOIA Request”).) The First AI FOIA Request, entitled “Request ... Concerning Detainees, including ‘Ghost Detainees/Prisoners,’ ‘Unregistered Detainees/Prisoners,’ and ‘CIA Detainees/Prisonersf,]’ ” sought “any records reflecting, discussing or referring to the policy and/or practice concerning:” 1. The apprehension, transfer, detention, and interrogation of persons within the Scope of Request, including but not limited to: (a) The transfer of intelligence by one or more U.S. agencies or government officials to one or more foreign agencies or officials, in connection with the apprehension or detention of a person. (b) A request or direction by one or more U.S. agencies or government officials to one or more foreign agencies or officials regarding the apprehension of any person, and any related agreement concerning such apprehension. (c) The apprehension of a person in a foreign country by, with the involvement of, or in the presence of one or more U.S. officials. (d) The transfer of a person from any country to any other country for the purpose of detention and/or interrogation, at the direction or request or with the knowledge of one or more U.S. agencies or officials. (e) The transfer of a person from one place of detention to another within the same country at the direction or request or with the knowledge of one or more U.S. agencies or officials. (f) The detention of a person in a foreign country at the direction or request of one or more U.S. agencies or officials, including any agreement concerning the detention. (g) One or more U.S. agencies or officials seeking and/or being granted access to a foreign national detained in a foreign country. (h) One or more U.S. agencies or officials being present in a place of detention in a foreign country. This does not include visits to U.S. citizens by U.S. officials pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. (i) One or more U.S. agencies having control, direction, or administration of a subdivision, portion, or “cell” of a place of detention in a foreign country. 2. Current and former places of detention where individuals within the Scope of Request have been or are currently held, including but not limited to: (a) Any place of detention in a foreign country being under the control, direction, or administration of one or more U.S. agencies. (b) Any place of detention that is not under the control, direction or administration of one or more U.S. agencies, where a detainee is held at the request or instruction of one or more U.S. agencies or officials. (c) Any subdivision, portion, or “cell” of a place of detention in a foreign country under the control, direction, or administration of one or more U.S. agencies. (d) Any agreement between the U.S. government or one or more U.S. agencies or officials, and a foreign government or one or more foreign agencies or officials, in relation to a place of detention in a foreign country, regardless of whether that place of detention is foreign or U.S. — controlled. 3. The names and identities of detainees who fall within the scope of this request. (First AI FOIA Request at 1, 4-5.) The Second AI FOIA Request, entitled “Request ... Concerning Ghost Detainee Memoranda, Department of Defense Detainee Reporting, Reports to Certain U.N. Committees, and the Draft Convention on Enforced Disappearance,” sought the following records: 1. Any memorandum of understanding, or other record reflecting an agreement or proposed agreement between agencies, or between any agency and any subdivision or official, concerning the handling of ghost or unregistered detainees. This includes but is not limited to: (a) Any record reflecting communications about whether or not to draft any memorandum of understanding or agreement regarding unregistered or ghost detainees. (b) Any record reflecting communications about the content of any memorandum of understanding or agreement regarding unregistered or ghost detainees. 2. Any record reflecting a policy, whether formal or informal, about the reception, detention, or movement of unregistered or ghost detainees. 3. Any memorandum of understanding, or other record reflecting an agreement between any agencies, or between any subdivision or official or any other agency, regarding the transfer of detainees from the custody of one agency to that of another. 5. Communications regarding the United States’ Second Periodic Report to the Committee Against Torture, including but not limited to: (a) Communications regarding whether any individual, place of detention, or practice should be mentioned or discussed in the report to the Committee Against Torture. (b) Communications with a foreign government, or agency of a foreign government, regarding any provision of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment relating to apprehension, transfer and detention, (including Articles 1, 3, 5, 16), or whether any individual, place of detention, or practice should be mentioned or discussed in the report. (c) Proposed language or earlier drafts of the report to the Committee Against Torture. 6. Communications regarding the United States’ Third Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee, including but not limited to: (a) Communications regarding whether any individual, place of detention, or practice should be mentioned or discussed in the report to the Human Rights Committee. (b) Communications with a foreign government, or agency of a foreign government, regarding any provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights relating to apprehension, transfer and detention, (including Articles 6, 7, 9), or whether any individual, place of detention, or practice should be mentioned or discussed in the report. (c) Proposed language or earlier drafts of the report to the Human Rights Committee. 7. Any record reflecting communications regarding the negotiation or drafting of the draft Convention on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 8. Any record reflecting communications with a foreign government, or an agency or official of a foreign government, regarding the drafting of the draft Convention on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. (Second AI FOIA Request at 4-7.) iii. The Specific FOIA Request On December 28, 2007, Plaintiffs submitted a fourth FOIA request entitled “Request ... for Specific Records Concerning Information on Secret Detention and Rendition.” (Hilton Decl., Ex. H and Brown Decl., Ex. D (“Specific FOIA Request”).) The request sought seventeen different categories of records including; 1. The spring 2004 report by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on the CIA’s compliance with the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 2. The list of “erroneous renditions” compiled by the CIA’s OIG. 3. The fax sent by the CIA to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Directorate (RCMP CID) in the afternoon or evening of Oct. 3, 2002, asking a number of questions about Maher Arar. 4. The document sent by the CIA to the RCMP CID, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and Project A-0 Canada on Nov. 5, 2002 in response to requests for information on the whereabouts of Mr. Arar. 5. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations (or other agency official(s)) at the CIA and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of a slap on detainee Abu Zubaydah (Zein al Abideen Mohamed Hussein). 6. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA (or other agency official(s)) and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of a slap on detainee Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 7. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations (or other agency official(s)) at the CIA and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of an ‘attention shake’ on Abu Zubaydah. 8. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA (or other agency official(s)) and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of an ‘attention shake’ on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 9. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA (or other agency ófficial(s)) to the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of sleep deprivation on Abu Zubaydah. 10. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA (or other agency official(s)) and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of sleep deprivation on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 11. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA (or other agency official(s)) and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of water-boarding on Abu Zubaydah. 12. The cables between the Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA (or other agency official(s)) and the operative(s) in the field discussing and/or approving the use of water-boarding on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 13. Video tapes, audio tapes, and transcripts of materials related to interrogations of detainees that were acknowledged to exist during the case of United States v. Zacharias Moussaoui and described in a letter from United States Attorney Chuck Rosenberg to Chief Judge Karen Williams, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and Judge Leonie Brinkema, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, dated October 25, 2007, including, but not limited to two video tapes and one audio tape of interrogations of detainees, the transcripts of those tapes submitted for the court’s review in the Moussaoui case, and the intelligence cables summarizing the substance of those tapes. 14. The Sept. 13, 2007 notification (described in a letter from Chuck Rosenberg to Judges Williams and Brinkema, dated October 25, 2007) from the attorney for the CIA informing the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia that the CIA had obtained a video tape of an interrogation of one or more detainees. 15. The communications between the CIA and the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen, relating to the apprehension, transfer and/or detention of Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah (Muhammad Bashmilah). These communications likely occurred on or around March 5, 2005, and were preparatory to a communication between the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a and the Government of Yemen that has been acknowledged by the Government of Yemen. 16. The communications between the U.S. Government and the Government of Yemen, and/or any documents pertaining to the transfer of Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah from U.S. custody to the custody of the Government of Yemen on or near May 5, 2005. The Government of Yemen has acknowledged the existence of communications between the U.S. Government and the Government of Yemen concerning Mr. Bashmilah’s transfer. 17. A copy of the files relating to Salah Nasser Salim Ali and Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah provided to the Government of Yemen on Nov. 10, 2005 by the United States Government. The Government of Yemen has acknowledged the existence of these files. (Id. at 2-5.) B. Procedural Background On April 28, 2008, the CIA filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the CCR FOIA Request and both the First and Second AI FOIA Request pursuant to the Stipulation and Order between Plaintiffs and the Central Intelligence Agency Regarding Procedures for Adjudicating Summary Judgment Motions (the “First Stipulation”) [dkt. no. 67]. On November 14, 2008, the CIA filed a second motion for summary judgment with respect to the Specific FOIA Request [dkt. no. 116], and Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment [dkt. no. 124]. On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order entitled, “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations.” Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009). The Order suspended all interrogation techniques other than those found in the United States Army Field Manual and created a panel composed of various government officials to study whether the Army Field Manual provided “an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies.” Id. Following the issuance of President Obama’s Executive Order, on or about April 16, 2009, the CIA released to Plaintiffs portions of the three memoranda from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, which had previously been withheld in full, withdrew both of its summary judgment motions, and Plaintiffs likewise withdrew their cross-motions. On or about September 18, 2009, the parties entered into the Second Stipulation and Order Between Plaintiffs and the Central Intelligence Agency Regarding Procedures for Adjudicating Summary Judgment Motions (the “Second Stipulation”) [dkt. no. 154], which set forth an agreement between the parties that set a schedule according to which the CIA would reprocess, and describe on a Vaughn index, certain records responsive to all four FOIA requests. C. CIA’s Searches i. CIA’s Record Systems Due to the decentralized nature of the CIA’s records systems, all FOIA requests are first processed by the Information and Privacy Coordinator, Information Management Systems (“IMS”), located within the Office of the Chief Information Officer (“OCIO”). (Hilton Decl. ¶ 24.) The request is then analyzed by an IMS information management professional who determines which CIA components reasonably might be expected to possess responsive records and transmits the records to the corresponding component. (Id. ¶ 25.) The various CIA components are contained within one of five directorates or office clusters: the National Clandestine Service (NCS), which is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from human sources and maintaining records of information on persons who are of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest to CIA and other U.S. Government agencies; the Directorate of Intelligence (“DI”), which analyzes, interprets, and forecasts foreign intelligence issues and world events of importance to the United States, is responsible for the production of finished intelligence reports for dissemination to policymakers in the U.S. Government; the Directorate of Science and Technology (“DS & T”), which is responsible for creating and applying technology to fulfill intelligence requirements; the Directorate of Support (“DS”), which provides the CIA with mission-critical services, including the protection of CIA personnel, security matters generally, facilities, communications, logistics, training, financial management, medical services, and human resources and maintains records on all current and former CIA employees as well as other individuals for whom security processing or evaluation has been required; and the Director of CIA Area (“DIR Area”), which is a cluster of offices directly responsible to the Director of CIA and is distinct from the other directorates. (Id. ¶¶ 26-31.) In each directorate, appropriately trained personnel regularly conduct FOIA and Privacy Act searches. (Id.) ii. The CIA’s Initial Search for Responsive Records Pursuant to the First Stipulation, the parties agreed that the “withholding of records that have been or currently are being litigated in American Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151(AKH)” (the “ACLU Action”) will not be litigated in this action. (First Stipulation ¶ 1.) The parties also agreed that the search would be limited to non-operational files. (Id. ¶ 4.) The CIA’s search of nonexempt files for documents responsive to the CCR FOIA Request and the First and Second AI FOIA Request focused on the CIA directorate determined by IMS to be the most likely to have records responsive to the Plaintiffs’ request: the DIR Area. (Id. ¶ 36.) The DIR Area was thought to have responsive documents for two reasons: at the time the search was conducted, the President and the Director of CIA had acknowledged the existence of the detention program, and the nature of the requests was such that the responsive records would “likely [] be found in the cluster of components in the DIR Area, such as the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”).” (Id. ¶ 37.) Professionals in the relevant components searched their records systems for documents concerning rendition, including records analyzing the legality of rendition and records identifying the identities of any persons subject to detention or rendition. (Id. ¶ 38.) If a determination could not be made as to the responsiveness of a document, it was deemed responsive. (Id.) The CIA’s initial search located more than 7000 responsive records (“Responsive Records”). (Id. ¶ 40.) Of the Responsive Records, approximately 230 were located in the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”), approximately 89 were located in DIR Area components other than the OGC and OIG, and the remaining Responsive Records were found in the investigation files of the OIG (the “OIG Investigation Files”). (Id.) OIG Records pertaining to investigations that were open as of the date Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, June 7, 2007, but that had been closed by December 1, 2007 (“Additional OIG Records”) were processed separately from the Responsive Records. (First Stipulation ¶ 4; Hilton Decl. ¶ 41.) In addition to the Responsive Records, the CIA identified more than 2100 responsive Additional OIG Records. (Hilton Decl. ¶ 41.) in. The CIA’s Search Pursuant to Plaintijfs’ Specific FOIA Request The CIA conducted searches for records responsive to categories 1, 2, 7, 8, and 11 through 14 of the Specific FOIA Request. (Id. ¶ 42.) The search for responsive records in each category will be discussed in turn. a. Category One Based on Plaintiffs’ request, Hilton determined that the record requested refers to the OIG’s Special Review regarding counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities, dated May 7, 2004 (the “Special Review”). (Id. ¶ 43.) The search did not locate any other OIG report responsive to this category. (Id.) According to Hilton, because the Special Review was being litigated in the ACLU Action, she understood it to be outside the scope of this litigation and referred Plaintiffs to the version of the document that was released pursuant to rulings in the ACLU Action. (Id. ¶ 44.) b. Category Two The CIA determined that any records responsive to Plaintiffs’ request would be found in the files of the OIG Investigations Staff. (Id. ¶ 45.) The CIA officials responsible for this search consulted with the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations within the OIG (“OIG Deputy Assistant”). (Id. ¶ 46.) The OIG Deputy Assistant was serving in the OIG in May 2004 when the OIG issued the Special Review, so she was “intimately familiar with OIG investigations regarding CIA counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities, including renditions.” (Id.) Also, because the OIG Deputy Assistant was involved in the search of OIG files and the review of documents in closed OIG investigations in connection with this case, she, too, was “intimately familiar with the documents in OIG files relating to CIA detainees.” (Id.) In response to the search request for Category Two records, the OIG Deputy Assistant stated that no such documents exist. (Id. ¶ 48.) c. Categories Seven and Eight In response to these requests, CIA officials consulted with the relevant NCS officials regarding the existence of such cables, and they stated that the “attention shake” was not an interrogation technique used by the CIA; thus, no responsive documents exist. (Id. ¶ 49.) d. Categories Eleven and Twelve CIA officers searched within a wordsearchable database of cables concerning Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed during their detentions and interrogations. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) In searching the database, the CIA officers used search terms including “waterboard,” “water,” and other variations of “waterboard.” (Id.) For Zubaydah, the search produced two responsive classified intelligence documents that are not part of the ACLU Action, and the officials determined that it was not likely that other responsive documents existed. (Id. ¶ 50) For Sheikh Mohammed, the search produced forty-nine classified intelligence cables, and officials determined that it was not likely that any other files would contain additional responsive records. (Id. ¶ 51.) e. Category Thirteen CIA officers consulted NCS officers, who would be the most likely to identify and to locate responsive records, to search for potentially responsive records. (Id. ¶ 52.) The NCS officers determined that three transcripts, two video recordings, and one audio recording were the only responsive records that existed. (Id.) f. Category Fourteen To search for this record, CIA officers consulted with the attorneys in the CIA Office of General Counsel who were familiar with the CIA’s involvement in the case of United States v. Zacharias Moussaoui. (Id. ¶ 53.) The attorneys stated that no such written notification had been made but instead was made telephonically. (Id.) iv. The Processing of Responsive Records Information Review Officers (“IROs”) reviewed the records described in the Vaughn index attached to the Hilton Declaration (see Hilton Decl., Ex. A) to determine which FOIA exemptions applied to the information contained in the records and which non-exempt information could be segregated from the exempt information. (Hilton Deck ¶ 57.) If officers determined that non-exempt portions could not be segregated from the exempt portions, then the documents were withheld in full. (Id.) This review sometimes required the coordination with or referral to other CIA components or other agencies. (Id. ¶ 58.) Once this review was completed, the CIA professionals conducted a review from a corporate perspective on behalf of the CIA to resolve conflicting recommendations, to ensure that the release or withholding determinations complied with the law and published CIA regulations, to identify additional exempt information that reflected overall CIA interests, and to produce the integrated final record copy of each document. (Id. ¶ 59.) Following the first review of the Responsive Records, the CIA released: (1) in whole or in part 104 records on April 15, 2008; (2) in part two additional records on June 20, 2008; and (3) one additional record on September 3, 2008. (Id. ¶ 61.) In July 2009, the CIA reprocessed the records listed in the Vaughn index and released in whole or in part an additional twenty-six records and re-released nine records that were previously released in part with fewer redactions. (Id. ¶ 62.) Subsequent to the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the CIA processed twenty-six records and determined that fifteen records (Documents 77, 87, 154, 155, 157, 229, 362, 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 373, 378, 379, and 380) were properly withheld in full. (Second Hilton Decl. ¶ 6.) The CIA determined that eleven of those records (Documents 15, 22, 23, 38, 361, 362, 365, 371, 372, 381, and 382) were releasable in part and released those records on February 19, 2010. (Id.) In addition, on the same day, the CIA released a portion of additional material within Document 95. (Id.) On or about March 5, 2010, the CIA completed processing an additional five records and determined that all five records (Documents 370, 374, 375, 376, and 377) were releasable in part and released the records with appropriate redactions. (Id. ¶ 7.) Lastly, the Second Hilton Declaration attaches twenty-five revised Vaughn index entries that either withdraw (or restrict the scope of) previously asserted exemptions, and/or provide revised record descriptions. (Id. ¶ 9.) As a result of the CIA’s review and processing of the several thousand Responsive Records, the CIA has released to Plaintiffs approximately 133 records (the “Released Records”) that are responsive to the CCR FOIA Request and the First and Second AI FOIA Requests. (Hilton Decl. ¶ 63.) II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. FOIA Summary Judgment Standard A moving party is entitled to summary judgment only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [moving party is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also Overton v. New York State Div. of Military and Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir.2004). In assessing whether summary judgment is proper, the Court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 253 (2d Cir.2002), The moving party bears the initial burden of providing the basis for the motion and of identifying the evidentiary materials, if any, supporting their position. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir.1997). The non-moving party must then “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Mere speculation and conjecture will not suffice. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem. Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.2003). FOIA affords the public access to virtually any federal government record that FOIA itself does not specifically exempt from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C.Cir.1973). Here, in reviewing the CIA’s response to a FOIA request, the CIA has the burden of justifying nondisclosure, and the Court must ascertain whether the agency has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the documents requested are exempt from disclosure under FOIA and that the agency has adequately segregated exempt from non-exempt materials. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Al-Fayed v. C.I.A., 254 F.3d 300, 305 (D.C.Cir.2001). An agency may meet its burden by providing the requester with a Vaughn index, adequately describing each withheld document and explaining the reason for the withholding. James Madison Project v. C.I.A., 607 F.Supp.2d 109, 117 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1998)); see Vaughn, 484 F.2d 820 (fashioning what is now commonly referred to as a “Vaughn index”). The court may grant summary judgment to an agency on the basis of its affidavits if they: [ (1) ] describe the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, [ (2) ] demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and [ (3) ] are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981). B. Adequacy of the Search “In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the defending agency has the burden of showing that its search was adequate and that any withheld documents fall within an exemption to the FOIA.” Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “Affidavits or declarations supplying facts indicating that the agency has conducted a thorough search and giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the agency’s burden.” Carney, 19 F.3d at 812 (footnote omitted). “Affidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith; accordingly, discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s submissions are adequate on their face.” Id.; see McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“ ‘At the summary judgment stage, where the agency has the burden to show that it acted in accordance with the statute, the court may rely on a reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.’ ” (quoting Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C.Cir.1999))). “When this is the case, the district court may ‘forgo discovery and award summary judgment on the basis of affidavits.’ ” Carney, 19 F.3d at 812 (quoting Goland v. C.I.A., 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980)). “[O]nce the agency has satisfied its burden, the plaintiff must make a showing of bad faith on the part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency’s affidavits or declarations or provide some tangible evidence that an exemption claimed by the agency should not apply or summary judgment is otherwise inappropriate.” Id. (citation omitted). The CIA “must establish the adequacy of its searches by showing ‘that the agency made a good faith effort to search for the requested documents, using methods reasonably calculated to produce documents responsive to the FOIA request.’ ” Adamowicz v. I.R.S., 672 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting Garcia v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 181 F.Supp.2d 356, 366 (S.D.N.Y.2002)). The CIA’s search for records does not have to be perfect, only reasonable, and the “failure to return all responsive documents is not necessarily inconsistent therewith: an agency ‘is not expected to take extraordinary measures to find the requested records, but only to conduct a search reasonably designed to identify and locate responsive documents.’ ” Amnesty Int’l USA v. C.I.A, No. 07 Civ. 5435, 2008 WL 2519908, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (quoting Garcia, 181 F.Supp.2d at 368). Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether “the search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents, not whether it actually uncovered every document extant .... ” Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 489 (2d Cir.1999). Reasonableness must be evaluated in the context of each particular request. See Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 460 F.3d 92, 103 (D.C.Cir.2006); Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984). Although an agency is not required to search every record system, the agency must set forth in an affidavit why a search of other some record systems, but not others, would lead to the discovery of responsive documents. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990). i. Sufficiency of the Hilton Declaration “[I]n adjudicating the adequacy of the agency’s identification and retrieval efforts, the trial court may be warranted in relying upon agency affidavits.” Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. N.S.A., 610 F.2d 824, 836 (D.C.Cir.1979). The Court’s reliance is only appropriate when the agency’s supporting affidavits are “ ‘relatively detailed’ and nonconclusory and ... submitted in good faith.” Goland v. C.I.A., 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.Cir.1978) (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C.Cir.1973)). “Even if these conditions are met the requester may nonetheless produce countervailing evidence, and if the sufficiency of the agency’s identification or retrieval procedure is genuinely in issue, summary judgment is not in order.” Founding Church of Scientology, 610 F.2d at 836. Here, the Court finds chat the Hilton Declaration is reasonably detailed, nonconclusory and submitted in good faith. Moreover, even though Ms. Hilton did not actually participate in the search, the declaration sufficiently details the search efforts made by CIA and other governmental personnel. See Adamowicz, 672 F.Supp.2d at 462 (“[T]here is no need for the agency to supply the affidavits from each individual who participated in the actual search.”) (citation omitted). ii. Adequacy of Search: CCR FOIA Request, First and Second AI FOIA Requests The searches performed in response to the CCR FOIA Request and the First and Second AI FOIA Requests were conducted in the DIR Area. As set forth in the Hilton Declaration, the search was limited to the DIR Area for two reasons: (1) because the President and the CIA had acknowledged the existence of the CIA detention program, the Director’s Area was likely to contain responsive documents, and (2) the nature of the requests was such that responsive records were likely to be found in a cluster of components in the DIR Area. (Hilton Decl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs argue that the reasons given by the CIA for limiting the search to the DIR Area were the result of a narrow interpretation of Plaintiffs’ requests. (PI. Mem. at 51-52.) While Plaintiffs are correct that an agency has a “duty to construe [FOIA requests] liberally,” Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.Cir.1995), “FOIA was not intended to reduce government agencies to full-time investigators on behalf of requesters.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 108 F.Supp.2d 19, 27 (D.D.C.2000) (quotation and citation omitted). The CIA’s search resulted in thousands of responsive records that are “unrelated to policy and legal analyses, including operational cables.” (Def. Reply at 46; First Stipulation ¶ 8.) Moreover, although many of the responsive documents are located in the CIA’s operational records — records exempt from search by statute (see 50 U.S.C. § 431) — the parties agreed to search operational records in nonexempt files, i.e., the OIG investigation files which are located in the DIR Area. (Hilton Decl. ¶ 35; Fist Stipulation ¶ 4.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the CIA’s search of the DIR-Area was “reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents” even though it may not have “uncovered every document extant.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1991); see Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 489 (2d Cir.1999) (same). In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the CIA’s search was inadequate because subsequent to the CIA’s search, two responsive documents were located in the DI. (PL Mem. at 52-53.) The discovery of these two records, Plaintiffs contend, belies the CIA’s claim that its search was adequate, and therefore the CIA should have to run searches in the DI as well as other components. (Id.) However, “[a] reasonably calculated search does not require that an agency search every file where a document could possibly exist, but rather requires that the search be reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances.” Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 03-5172, 2004 WL 895748, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 23, 2004) (citing SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1201). “[A]n agency need only pursue leads that raise red flags pointing to the probable existence of responsive agency records that arise during its efforts to respond to a FOIA request.” Wiesner v. F.B.I., 668 F.Supp.2d 164, 170-71 (D.D.C.2009). Moreover, “an agency’s hesitancy to pursue potential leads after its search has been completed,” does not lead to the conclusion that the agency’s “search [was] inadequate.” Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 503 F.Supp.2d 88, 100 (D.D.C.2007). As discussed above, the CIA’s search of the DIR Area was reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents. The fact that two more responsive documents were located in an area that the CIA determined would probably not lead to uncovering responsive documents does not render the CIA’s search inadequate. To find otherwise would reduce the CIA to “full-time investigators on behalf of requesters.” Judicial Watch, Inc., 108 F.Supp.2d at 27. iii. Adequacy of Search: Specific FOIA Request a. Categories Seven and Eight With regard to the CIA’s search for responsive records to the Specific FOIA Request, Plaintiffs again argue that a narrow interpretation of the individual requests resulted in an inadequate search. Specifically, as to Categories Seven and Eight, concerning the use of the “attention shake,” Ms. Hilton stated that the “ ‘attention shake’ was not an interrogation technique employed by the CIA” and therefore, no responsive documents exist. (Hilton Decl. ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs contend that instead of an “attention shake,” an “attention grasp” was utilized by the CIA in interrogating detainees. (PI. Mem. at 54; Satterthwaite Decl., Ex. XX.). Again, although “an agency is ‘not obligated to look beyond the four corners of the request for leads to the location of responsive documents,’ ” the CIA’s interpretation of Plaintiffs’ request was too narrow in this instance. Servicemembers Legal Def. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. et al., 471 F.Supp.2d 78, 86 (D.D.C.2007) (quoting Kowalczyk v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C.Cir.1996)). The request specifically asked for cables “discussing and/or approving the use on an ‘attention shake’ ” on either Abu Zubaydah or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. (Brown Decl., Ex. D at 3.) In describing what was meant by “attention shake,” Plaintiffs included a quote from a former CIA employee who detailed the technique as “[grabbing] the person by their lapels and [shaking] them.” (Id.) In one of the three memoranda released on April 19, 2009, “attention grasp” was defined as follows: “This technique consists of grasping the individual with both hands, one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion.” (Hilton Deck, Ex. J (May 10, 2005 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency).) Even though Plaintiffs did not use the correct terminology, i.e., “attention grasp,” the accompanying definition was sufficient to put the CIA on notice of the documents Plaintiffs requested. Accordingly, the CIA’s search for documents responsive to Categories Seven and Eight was inadequate. b. Category Two With regard to Category Two, the CIA adequately searched its records for lists pertaining to erroneous renditions. Plaintiffs’ specific request, together with the quote from the Washington Post article referencing a list, make it clear that Plaintiffs were seeking an actual list, not information pertaining to erroneous renditions. “FOIA does not require an agency to create a document in response to a request.” Landmark Legal Found. v. E.P.A., 272 F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.2003) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975)). Here, Plaintiffs’ request was clear: they were searching for a list that was referenced in a Washington Post article. (Specific FOIA Request at 2.) Having now learned that no such list exists, Plaintiffs cannot recharacterize their request as one for “information responsive to the underlying request.” (Pl. Mem. at 55.) Nor can Plaintiffs rely on the argument that the CIA should have known what information Plaintiffs were seeking, for an agency receiving a FOIA request “is not required to divine a requester’s intent.” Landmark Legal Found., 272 F.Supp.2d at 64; see Hudgins v. IRS, 620 F.Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C.1985) (“[A]n agency is not required to have ‘clairvoyant capabilities’ to discover the requester’s need.”); see also Thomas v. Office of the U.S. Attorney for E.D.N.Y., 171 F.R.D. 53, 55 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (FOIA requester cannot add to or enlarge underlying FOIA request during pendency of request or litigation). Accordingly, because the CIA conducted a thorough search for documents responsive to Plaintiffs’ Category Two request — a search that included having the person most knowledgeable regarding CIA counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities inquire into the existence of a list of erroneous renditions — the Court finds the CIA’s search to be adequate. c. Categories Eleven and Twelve Plaintiffs’ Categories Eleven and Twelve requests seek cables between CIA officials and operatives in the field concerning the waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. (Specific FOIA Request at 4.) To conduct this search, CIA officers searched within wordsearchable databases of cables maintained by the NCS that were designed to aggregate all CIA cables concerning Abu Zubaydah or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed during the time of his detention and interrogation. (Hilton Decl. ¶¶ 50-51.) Separate from the documents at issue in the ACLU Action, the search uncovered two records for Zubaydah and forty — or Mohammed. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend that the CIA’s search was inadequate for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs argue that the CIA’s explanation regarding the Zubaydah records is “insufficient because the records withheld in the [ACLU Action] are not described in a manner to permit Plaintiffs to determine the total number of records responsive to Category 11.” (PL Mem. at 56.) Second, Plaintiffs point to publicly available documents that state that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarded at least 183 times as evidence that the CIA’s search was inadequate because it only returned forty-nine records, and according to CIA guidelines, operatives in the field were required to exchange cables with CIA headquarters before use of each technique. (Id. at 55.) Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the adequacy of the CIA’s search are unavailing; Plaintiffs criticize the results of the CIA’s search as “[defying] common sense” but do not criticize the search methods themselves. (Id.) “[T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C.Cir.2003). Here, the CIA searched through the appropriate databases using different variations of the term “waterboard.” The fact that this search did not produce what Plaintiffs consider an appropriate number of documents is irrelevant to the adequacy inquiry. Accordingly, the Court finds the CIA’s search of records in response to Plaintiffs’ Categories Eleven and Twelve requests to be adequate. III. EXEMPTION ANALYSIS FOIA requires federal agencies to disclose agency records upon request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). Disclosure is necessary “to promote honest and open government and to assure the existence of an informed citizenry to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir.1999). “FOIA’s broad disclosure mandate consequently requires disclosure of documents unless they fall within one of the enumerated exemptions.” Adamowicz v. I.R.S., 672 F.Supp.2d 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 7, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001)). The exemptions underscore Congress’s “recognition that not all information should be released to the public but do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A. FOIA Exemption S Under FOIA Exemption 3, an agency is permitted to withhold information that is “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). “Under that exemption, the CIA need only show that the statute claimed is one of exemption as contemplated by Exemption 3 and that the withheld material falls within the statute.” Larson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citing Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 761-62 (D.C.Cir.1990)). “Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that its applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within that statute’s coverage.” Goland v. C.I.A., 607 F.2d 339, 350 (D.C.Cir.1978). i. The NSA and the CIA Act as Withholding Statutes The CIA relies on the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (the “NSA”), and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (the “CIA Act”), as the bases for its withholdings. (Def. Mem. at 12.) Section 102(A)(i)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403 — 1(i)(1)) (“IRTPA”) requires the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to “protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. § 403 — 1(i)(1) (formerly 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(7) (“In the [Director of the CIA’s] capacity as head of the intelligence community, the Director shall ... protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”)). The amendments made by the IRTPA transferred the authority for protecting intelligence from the Director of the CIA to the DNI. Section 6 of the CIA Act authorizes the CIA to withhold information that would disclose “the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of [CIA] personnel.” 50 U.S.C. § 403g. Plaintiffs do not dispute that either Section 102(A)(i)(l) of the NSA or Section 6 of the CIA Act is an exemption statute. Rather, with respect to the NSA, Plaintiffs argue that the amendments made to the NSA through the IRTPA require a “more searching judicial review than the Supreme Court required in [C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985) ] into whether the CIA is properly withholding ‘intelligence sources and methods.’ ” (Pl. Mem. at 23.) First, Plaintiffs contend that the DNI’s “half-page memorandum” authorizing the withholding is insufficient “to satisfy [his] independent intelligence oversight responsibilities .... ” (Pl. Mem. at 23 n. 50.) Second, in what Plaintiffs characterize as “an issue of first impression,” Plaintiffs argue that the definition of “intelligence sources and methods” established by the Supreme Court in Sims and its progeny no longer controls and must be evaluated “in light of the IRTPA amendments, including provisions facilitating the disclosure to the private sector.” (Id. at 24.) With respect to Section 6 of the CIA Act, Plaintiffs argue that the CIA invoked an overly broad reading of the statute to cover information other than “the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of [CIA] personnel,” 50 U.S.C. § 403g. (See Pl. Mem. at 25.) a. DNI’s Authorization Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § JfiS-ld) The Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument— that the DNI’s authorization is insufficient — to be nothing more than a red herring. Section 403 — l(i) of the NSA provides that the DNI “shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure” and “may only delegate a duty or authority given [him] under this subsection to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.” 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(l), (3). Here, by memorandum dated September 18, 2009, the DNI, Dennis Blair, stated that: (1) he had “been advised that in connection with [this litigation] ... certain information must be protected from public disclosure;” and (2) he “reviewed a sample” of the withheld records and determined that disclosure would “directly implicate sensitive intelligence sources and methods that must be protected from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of the national security of the United States.” (Hilton Decl., Ex. N (“DNI Authorization”).) As a result, the DNI authorized the CIA Director “to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that these sources and methods are protected during the course of this litigation.” (Id.) By drafting the DNI Authorization, the DNI sufficiently executed his duty “to protect intelligence sources and methods.” See, e.g., Gerstein v. C.I.A., No. 006-4643, 2008 WL 4415080 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) (noting that the DNI’s brief authorization directing the CIA Director to “take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that [the] sources and methods are protected” merited a concession from Plaintiff in FOIA action that the authorization met the requirement set forth in 50 U.S.C. 403-1(i). b. Intelligence Sources and Methods Plaintiffs’ attack of the CIA’s designation of the withheld information as “intelligence sources and methods” is three-pronged: (1) the CIA uses the outmoded Sims rubric to define “intelligence sources and methods;” (2) the discontinued practices (i.e., the use of black sites and the use of enhanced interrogation techniques) employed by the CIA are no longer intelligence sources and methods; and (3) illegal conduct is not an intelligence source or method. (PL Mem. at 21-25.) 1. Intelligence Sources and Methods Plaintiffs contend that the amendments to the NSA through IRTPA have “undermined” the definition of intelligence sources and methods as set forth in Sims. (Pl. Mem. at 23.) Plaintiffs’ argument vastly overstates the effect that the enactment of IRTPA had on the NSA. Of the three IRTPA provisions Plaintiffs reference in their brief as providing proof that Congress has “not acquiesced to the Sims interpretation of ‘intelligence sources and methods,’ ” (PL Reply at 22), only one provision actually amended the NSA (see Pub.L. No. 108^57 at § 1101(a)) by conferring upon the DNI the “authority to ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the intelligence community consistent with national security requirements.” 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(g)(1). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ cherry-picking of one line from the Congressional Record more than ten years prior to the enactment of IRTPA does not persuade the Court that Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s analysis of intelligence sources and methods in Sims. (PL Mem. at 24 n. 52.) To the contrary, even after the enactment of IRTPA, several courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have continued to use the Sims framework when analyzing the issue of intelligence sources and methods. See, e.g., Wilner v. N.S.A., 592 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir.2009) (following Sims framework in the context of analyzing an agency’s invocation of a Glomar response pursuant to Exemption 3); Larson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C.Cir.2009) (acknowledging that ‘“Congress gave the Agency broad power to control the disclosure of intelligence sources’ ” and therefore concluding that the CIA’s affidavits, which confirmed that the withheld documents related to intelligence sources and methods, were sufficient to entitle the CIA to withhold the records pursuant to Exemption 3) (quoting C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 173, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985)). Accordingly, in analyzing the CIA’s claim that releasing the withheld documents would reveal intelligence sources and methods, the Court will utilize the Sims framework. Having resolved that the NSA is a withholding statute (see supra III.A.i.a), the Court “must consider whether the withheld material satisfies the criteria of the exemption statute.” Wilner, 592 F.3d at 72 (citations omitted). To do so, the Court must determine whether the CIA has sufficiently demonstrated that the “release of the requested information can reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods .... ” Phillippi v. C.I.A., 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 (D.C.Cir.1976). In evaluating this question, the Court “accord[s] substantial weight and due consideration to the CIA’s affidavits.” Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A., 911 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C.Cir.1990); Church of Sci