Full opinion text
ORDER JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge. On May 7, 2010, the Honorable Michael H. Dolinger, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a thorough and well-reasoned 107-page Report and Recommendation (“Report”) in the above-captioned matter, recommending that: 1) the motion for summary judgment by plaintiff Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation (“TAF”) be granted; 2) the motion by counterclaim defendants TAF, William Griffin and Kevin Stevens dismissing claims by counterclaim plaintiff Pamela Carvel (“Ms. Carvel”) be granted; 3) the motion by Ms. Carvel for sanctions against counterclaim defendants be denied; 4) defendant Carvel Foundation be dismissed from the lawsuit; 5) TAF, Griffin and Stevens be awarded their costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as against Ms. Carvel for their defense against her claims; and, finally, 6) that the Court enjoin Ms. Carvel from further, similar court filings as follows: Pamela Carvel is hereby permanently enjoined from filing any new lawsuit against any defendant in the Southern District of New York that arises from or seeks to affect the disposition of any assets in the custody or control of any fiduciaries of the estates or trusts of Thomas Carvel or Agnes Carvel without first obtaining leave of court in accordance with the following conditions: (1) (A) Pamela Carvel shall file with the complaint of any new action a motion captioned “Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File; (B) Pamela Carvel shall attach, as an exhibit to the motion, a copy of this order; (C) Pamela Carvel shall also attach, as an exhibit to the motion, an attestation under penalty of perjury that she has (i) complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (ii) has complied with the conditions of this injunction; (2) Any initial filing that does not include an attestation that complies with the requirements of subdivision (C) shall be summarily dismissed pursuant to the terms of this injunction; and (3) Any initial filing that does not comply with the terms of this injunction may subject plaintiff to sanctions and/or citation for contempt of court. On June 10, 2010, Ms. Carvel filed voluminous objections, amplified by numerous exhibits, objecting to the Report “in its entirety.” Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the objections and underlying record de novo. Having done so, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the Report, which the Court hereby adopts by reference. Among other things, this means that the aforesaid injunction takes effect immediately. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter final judgment and to close documents 5 and 41 on the docket of this case. SO ORDERED. REPORT & RECOMMENDATION MICHAEL H. DOLINGER, United States Magistrate Judge. TO THE HONORABLE JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.: Plaintiff Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation (the “TAF”), a New York not-for-profit corporation, commenced this lawsuit in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, seeking recognition, under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5303 and 5304, of two money judgments entered in the courts of the United Kingdom against defendant Pamela Carvel. In addition to Ms. Carvel, plaintiff named as a second defendant the so-called Carvel Foundation, Inc., a not-for-profit Florida corporation that Ms. Carvel had founded. Ms. Carvel, appearing pro se, removed the case to this court based on diversity-jurisdiction. She then asserted counterclaims and third-party claims against the TAF as well as against William Griffin, who is the chairman of the TAF (Decl. of Joan Magoolaghan, Esq. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss Countercls. and for Sanctions, executed Aug. 28, 2009, ¶ 8 n. 7), and against Kevin Stevens, Esq., who is the attorney representing the TAF on its application for recognition of the United Kingdom judgments. Plaintiffs initial filing in state court was in the form of a Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint. Upon removal of the case to this court, the TAF filed a full-blown motion for summary judgment, premised in large part on the papers that it had filed in state court. (See Aff. of Kevin A. Stevens, Esq. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., executed July 15, 2009, ¶¶ 1-2 & Ex. A). In addition, the TAF and Messrs. Griffin and Stevens, represented by separate counsel, have moved to dismiss Ms. Carvel’s counterclaims and third-party claims. They also seek to impose sanctions on her for bad-faith litigation and to enjoin her from filing further lawsuits on the same topics against the TAF and its representatives. Ms. Carvel has opposed all of these motions and has in turn moved for sanctions against the TAF and Messrs. Griffin and Stevens. For reasons to be noted, we recommend (1) that the defendant Carvel Foundation, Inc. be dismissed from the case, (2) that the motions of plaintiff the TAF for summary judgment and of the TAF and the third-party defendants for dismissal of Ms. Carvel’s claims be granted, (3) that their motion for sanctions be granted in part and (4) that Ms. Carvel be enjoined from pursuing similar litigation against the TAF and its agents in this court. We also recommend that Ms. Carvel’s motion for sanctions be denied. I. A Brief Historical Survey for Context To aid in understanding the issues in this case, we summarize certain events concerning the disposition of assets from the estate of Thomas Carvel, including related legal proceedings. In doing so, we make no effort to recount the many twists and turns of the extremely lengthy and complicated history of Pamela Carvel’s dealings with the estates of her uncle and aunt and with the TAF, as well as with the numerous individuals drawn into the vortex of estate-related litigation. We instead limit ourselves to the contextual facts most pertinent to the current controversy. The genesis of this litigation goes back to documents executed in 1988 by ice-cream magnate Thomas Carvel and his wife Agnes Carvel, the uncle and aunt, respectively, of Pamela Carvel. At that time they signed a will contract, which provided for the mutual execution of mirror-image wills, each specifying that, in case of the death of the testator, the assets of the marriage would be placed in a marital trust and provide income for life to the surviving spouse, with the residual assets then being left, on the death of the surviving spouse, to the TAF for charitable uses. Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 8; In re Thomas & Agnes Carvel Found., 8 Misc.3d 1025(A), 806 N.Y.S.2d 449, 2002 WL 32872391, *2-3 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County Apr. 1, 2002) (hereafter “In re TAF”). The couple executed compliant wills and stock powers at the same time. These documents created a testamentary trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse and named the TAF as the sole beneficiary upon the death of both Carvels. Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 8; In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *3; App. to Pamela Carvel’s Aff. & Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Countercls. and for Sanctions (“Carvel Aff. in Opp’n to Dismissal and Sanctions”), executed Sept. 23, 2009, A1-880213TC WILL, at 1, 6-7) (included on submitted compact disc). Thomas Carvel died in 1990, and the Surrogate’s Court of Westchester County took jurisdiction over his estate. In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *3. Under his will, both Agnes Carvel and Pamela Carvel were appointed, with five other individuals, as co-executors of his estate. (App. to Carvel Aff. in Opp’n to Dismissal and Sanctions, A1-880213TC WILL, at 10). They also were appointed as co-trustees of the testamentary trust created by his will. Id. At about that time Agnes Carvel executed a new will in the belief that her original 1988 will had been lost. The new will reflected in substance the same terms as its predecessor, and was thus compliant with the reciprocal agreement between her and her late husband. In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *3; Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 10. In 1991 she created a revocable trust, titled the Agnes Carvel 1991 Trust. Under its terms she took a life interest in the trust fund, with the balance bequeathed to the TAF on her death. She later transferred substantial assets into that trust. In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *3; Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 10. In the period between December 1994 and February 2005, Pamela Carvel transferred more than $2 million from the estate of Thomas Carvel into a London account in her own name and that of her aunt, and did so without notice to the other co-executors of the Thomas Carvel estate. (Magoolaghan Decl., Ex. F—In re Thomas Carvel, Order at 3 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County July 5, 1995), Ex. G—In re Thomas Carvel, Decision at 2-3 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County Feb. 17, 2000)). In 1995 Agnes Carvel moved to the United Kingdom, apparently to live with Pamela Carvel, who already principally resided there. (Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ ll). In addition, in June 1995 Pamela Carvel obtained appointment by the Florida Circuit Court for Palm Beach, Probate Division, as limited guardian of her aunt’s property. (Magoolaghan Deck, Ex. F at 3). Shortly after the transfer of the $2 million to the London account of Pamela and Agnes Carvel, Pamela’s Carvel’s co-executor Betty Godley applied to the Surrogate’s Court to order a return of these assets to the Thomas Carvel estate. (Id., Ex. G at 3). In the course of that proceeding, the Surrogate suspended Pamela Carvel’s roles as co-executor of Thomas Carvel’s will and co-trustee of his testamentary trust based inter alia on her misconduct in connection with the unauthorized transfer of assets to the London account. (Id., Ex. F at 3-4, Ex. G at 3). The court also found Agnes Carvel to be a person under a disability, and it suspended her as trustee of the testamentary trust created by Thomas Carvel’s will, and appointed a guardian ad litem for her in her status as a beneficiary under Mr. Carvel’s will. (Id., Ex. F at 2-4, Ex. G at 3). At the same time Agnes Carvel resigned as co-exeeutor of her husband’s estate rather than appear for evaluation by the court. (Id., Ex. F at 2-4). Only two days after the issuance of the Surrogate’s order suspending both Pamela and Agnes Carvel as fiduciaries of the estate and trust of Thomas Carvel and appointing a guardian ad litem for Agnes Carvel, Pamela’s aunt executed a new will, naming her niece as sole executor. Under the terms of the will, she bequeathed her residuary estate to the confusingly named Carvel Foundation, a Florida not-for-profit corporation of which Pamela Carvel was the founding director (hereafter “the Florida Foundation”). In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *4; App. to Carvel Aff. in Opp’n to Dismissal and Sanctions, A8950707-AGNES CARVEL PROBATED WILL, 4; Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 11. In substance, this will purported to change the residual beneficiary from the TAF—as specified in the will contract between Agnes and Thomas Carvel—to a corporation apparently controlled by Pamela Carvel. Agnes Carvel died in August 1998 at the approximate age of 90. Pamela Carvel then probated the 1995 will in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, in London and was appointed by that court the sole personal representative of her aunt’s estate. In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *4. She undertook this proceeding without any notice to the TAF.’ (Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 12). Subsequently, Ms. Carvel and the TAF have been embroiled in a vast array of estate-related litigation in New York, Florida, Delaware and the United Kingdom. As immediately relevant, upon the death of Agnes Carvel the TAF commenced a proceeding in 1998 in the Westchester County Surrogate’s Court to enforce the will contract between Agnes and Thomas Carvel. In that proceeding, in which Pamela Carvel participated, the Agnes Carvel estate was represented by Leonard Ross, Esq., a New York attorney who had previously represented Agnes Carvel and who was appointed by the court as New York ancillary administrator of the Agnes Carvel estate. Thomas & Agnes Carvel Found. v. Carvel, 2007 WL 1623233, [2007] EWHC 1314(Ch.), [2008] Ch. 395, 400 ¶¶ 9-10 (hereafter “TAF v. PC”). On April 1, 2002, after a trial at which Ms. Carvel appeared and testified, the Westchester County Surrogate found that the 1995 Agnes Carvel will had violated the terms of the 1988 will contract between Agnes and Thomas Carvel, and he held that the TAF was entitled to the residual assets of the Agnes Carvel estate. In re TAF, 2002 WL 32872391, at *3-4, *9-10. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision in 2003. In re Carvel, 2 A.D.3d 847, 848, 769 N.Y.S.2d 402, 402-03 (2d Dep’t 2003). In the meantime, on June 13, 2003 Pamela Carvel filed a lawsuit in her own name in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in London, suing herself as executor of the Agnes Carvel estate and claiming that the estate owed her personally £6, 640, 897.79, together with accrued interest of £1, 148, 827. 90. See TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 400 ¶ 11. In commencing this proceeding, she gave no notice to the TAF or to any fiduciaries of the Thomas Carvel estate. Id. at 401 ¶ 14, 769 N.Y.S.2d 402; Magoolaghan Decl., Ex. M—In re Recognition of Foreign Judgment: Carvel v. Estate of Agnes Carvel, Order at 2 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Jan. 31, 2006). She also did not mention to the High Court that the 1995 will appointing her as executor had been set aside by the Westchester Surrogate. See TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 409 ¶ 48. The High Court substituted Pamela’s creation, the Florida Foundation, as the defendant representing the Agnes Carvel estate—presumably because the Florida Foundation was the sole beneficiary of the 1995 will—and that foundation then conceded the purported debt to Ms. Carvel and admitted liability. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 400-01 ¶ 12. In the absence of any opposition, on January 8, 2004 the High Court entered judgment for Ms. Carvel and against her aunt’s estate for £8,085,-095.51 plus costs. Id.. With judgment in hand, on April 14, 2005 Ms. Carvel proceeded to Florida state court—the state in which her Florida Foundation was domiciled—asking the Florida Circuit Court for Broward County to domesticate the judgment entered by the High Court (hereafter “the Chancery judgment”). Id., [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 13; Magoolaghan Decl., Ex. M at 3. Again, she gave no notice to the TAF of this filing. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 14; Magoolaghan Decl., Ex. M at 3. By order dated May 10, 2005, the Circuit Court directed that the Chancery judgment be entered as a judgment in Florida. Magoolaghan Decl., Ex. M at 3; TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 13. Moving swiftly, Pamela Carvel registered the Florida domestication order with the New York State Supreme Court for Nassau County on August 26, 2005. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 15. (See also Magoolaghan Decl., Ex. N—Carvel v. Estate of Carvel, Order dated Jan. 25, 2006, 2). This step presumably reflected an effort to avoid the Westchester Surrogate’s Court, in which Thomas Carvel’s will had been probated and in which the court had already determined in 2002 that the 1995 Agnes Carvel will was invalid and that the TAF was entitled to the residual assets of her estate. On August 29, 2005 Pamela Carvel obtained a writ of execution from the Nassau County Supreme Court in the amount of $15,929,214.15 and arranged for its service on the Bank of New York and the firm of Edward Jones, which collectively held estate assets in excess of nine million dollars. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 16. Both entities refused, however, to surrender the assets without a turnover order, and so Ms. Carvel petitioned the Nassau County Supreme Court for such an order, misleadingly claiming that the estate of Agnes Carvel had received notice and did not oppose, all again without notice to the TAF or Mr. Ross, the appointed New York representative of the Agnes Carvel estate. Id.. This apparent scheme to seize the Agnes Carvel estate assets stalled, however, when Mr. Ross and the TAF, alerted to Ms. Carvel’s efforts, successfully applied to the Nassau County Supreme Court to issue a temporary restraining order, on December 29, 2005, barring Ms. Carvel from enforcing the Chancery judgment. Id. at 401 ¶ 17. On the same day the Surrogate’s Court in Westchester issued a parallel temporary restraining order. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 17. The next day the TAF intervened in the Broward County proceeding in Florida and obtained a stay of the domestication order on January 10, 2006. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401 ¶ 17. The Florida court then vacated the domestication order on January 31, 2006, finding “strong evidence of a fraud upon the court perpetrated by [Pamela Carvel] in both the proceedings before the High Court and this Court.” Id.; Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 16 & Ex. M at 5. Seemingly undeterred, Ms. Carvel moved on January 20, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to confirm the Chancery judgment and to enforce it against the Agnes Carvel estate. In doing so, she named as defendant only the Florida Foundation and did not mention the state-court restraining orders or the Florida court’s vacatur of the original judgment registration, nor did she give notice to the TAF or to Mr. Ross, as the appointed New York representative for the Agnes Carvel estate. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 401-02 ¶ 17; Magoolaghan Deck, Ex O at 15-16, Ex. I at 5). The District Court finally dismissed her application on March 29, 2006, holding that it was barred by the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction and finding that Ms. Carvel was attempting to perpetrate the same fraud on the court as she had in the United Kingdom and in Florida. (Magoolaghan Deck, Ex. I at 5-7). Ms. Carvel appealed that decision to the Second Circuit, which affirmed. Carvel v. Carvel Found., Inc., 230 Fed.Appx. 103, 103-04 (2d Cir.2007). The TAF turned to the High Court in London in August 2006, seeking to replace Pamela Carvel as the sole personal representative of the Agnes Carvel estate, and to substitute a neutral independent professional representative. Naming both Ms. Carvel and the Florida Foundation as defendants, the TAF also sought vacatur of the 2003 Chancery judgment, which had awarded the Ms. Carvel more than £8 million against the Agnes Carvel estate. Eventually the High Court granted both forms of requested relief to the TAF, TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 409-11 ¶¶ 48-58, and it subsequently issued two cost judgments against Ms. Carvel as the losing party. (Aff. of Rupert Ticehurst, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. in Lieu of Compl., executed Apr. 17, 2009, Exs. I, K, L). These cost judgments are the subject of the TAF’s current application here for recognition. Finally, we note that Ms. Carvel has pursued a somewhat similar path in the State of Delaware. In 2003—after the decision of the Westchester Surrogate invalidating the 1995 will of her aunt—she petitioned the New Castle County Register of Wills for authority to appear as ancillary personal representative of the Agnes Carvel estate in Delaware. In support of that application, she presented the previously invalidated 1995 will. Moreover, her application did not list the TAF as a beneficiary of the estate and did not mention the proceedings in, or rulings of, the Westchester Surrogate, particularly his ruling that the TAF was the legitimate residual beneficiary of that estate. In this state of affairs, the Register granted Ms. Carvel’s application. See Thomas & Agnes Carvel Found. v. Carvel, 2008 WL 4482703, *2, *7 (Del.Ch. Sept. 30, 2008), aff'd, 970 A.2d 256, 2009 WL 714958 (Del. Mar. 19, 2009). Having been appointed, Ms. Carvel made several belated inventory filings but did not list the TAF as beneficiary of the Agnes Carvel estate, and she apparently took no steps to assemble the Delaware assets of the estate. Id., 2008 WL 4482703, at *10. In the wake of the 2007 decision of the High Court of Justice vacating the Chancery judgment, the TAF petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery to remove Ms. Carvel as Delaware ancillary administrator of the Agnes Carvel estate. In opposing this application, Ms. Carvel argued inter alia that the TAF lacked standing because it was not the real Carvel foundation and that any prior decision of the Surrogate’s Court should be ignored as it was the result of bribery of the court. Id. at *3, *9. Rejecting the first argument based on prior findings of the Westchester Surrogate’s Court and the Florida Circuit Court for Broward County, and dismissing the second as meritless, the Delaware Chancery Court granted the TAF’s application to remove Ms. Carvel as ancillary administrator based on her violation of her fiduciary duties, all stemming from her demonstrated hostility towards the TAF, which the court recognized as the legitimate residual beneficiary of the Agnes Carvel estate. Id. at *6, *9, *11. She appealed that decision, but the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed in 2009. Carvel v. Thomas & Agnes Carvel Found., 970 A.2d 256, 2009 WL 714958 (Del. Mar. 19, 2009). II. Procedural Issues: The Status of the Florida Foundation Before addressing the various motions that the litigants have offered for our consideration, we turn to two, ultimately related, procedural issues, one of which the parties have not mentioned and the other of which has been raised only by defendant Pamela Carvel. The first concerns the unanimity requirement for removal of cases from state court and the other involves the status of the defendant Florida Foundation, which is not represented by an attorney in this lawsuit and indeed has not appeared at all. The federal removal statute authorizes the defendant or defendants in a state-court lawsuit to remove the case to federal court if, inter alia, the federal court would have original subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit, including, as in this case, jurisdiction based on complete diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See Giordano v. Mkt. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.2010); Bounds v. Pine Belt Mental Health Care Res., 593 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir.2010). In a multi-defendant case, however, the defendant seeking removal must obtain the consent of all other defendants and document that consent in its moving papers. See, e.g., Heller v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2010 WL 481336, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010) (citing cases). Failure to do so amounts to a procedural defect in the removal process and justifies a remand by the federal court. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zhigun, 2004 WL 187147, *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2004); Ell v. S.E.T. Landscape Design, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 188, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y.1999). The primary exception to this requirement is if the remaining defendants are only “nominal”, Heller, 2010 WL 481336 at *2, a status that apparently reflects that they do not have any interest in the outcome of the case. E.g., id. at *3 (quoting Novovic v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 5000228, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008)). In this case we note that the removal was accomplished explicitly and solely by defendant Pamela Carvel. Moreover, there is no indication in her removal papers that she obtained the consent of her co-defendant Carvel Foundation, although it appears that she established this foundation, and we infer that she may have practical control over it. Though plaintiff has not addressed this issue, it appears that the foundation is at best a nominal defendant here, since, although it was a defendant in the United Kingdom proceeding, the two cost judgments at issue here were entered only against Ms. Carvel. Hence its consent was not required for removal. The remaining issue concerns the appropriate disposition of the Florida Foundation as a party here. The foundation is a corporation located in Florida. (See Ticehurst Aff., Exs. C & D). Because of its corporate status, the foundation cannot appear in this case on a pro se basis. See, e.g., Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139-40 (2d Cir.2007) (citing cases); Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir.1991). See also Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993). Accord Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir.2010) (noting that non-lawyer litigant can represent only himself because of high risk that untrained advocate will inadvertently waive or abandon an issue while navigating the “esoteric pitfalls” of the law). To date, however, it has not filed any appearance by counsel; indeed, it has not appeared at all. The papers submitted in opposition to plaintiffs claims and its summary-judgment motion are all in the name of only Pamela Carvel, the foundation’s co-defendant. Similarly, only Ms. Carvel has asserted counterclaims and third-party claims. Moreover, Ms. Carvel—who is apparently not a licensed attorney-has represented that she is appearing in this case on a pro se basis because she lacks the funds to hire counsel. (Stevens Aff., Ex. B—Def.’s Notice of Removal from State Court at 4; Def.’s Answer at p. 1). While these circumstances suggest that the Florida Foundation cannot proceed with a defense in this case, Ms. Carvel has requested informally that the proceeding be dismissed against the foundation since it was not named in the cost judgments for which the TAF seeks recognition. (Aug. 1, 2009 letter to the Court from Pamela Carvel). Plaintiff did not respond to that application, and we see no legitimate basis to oppose the request. Accordingly we recommend that the Carvel Foundation be dismissed as a defendant. III. The Jurisdictional Issue We also address a jurisdictional issue not mentioned by the parties because we are required to examine our jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., Vasquez v. GMD Shipyard Corp., 582 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir.2009). We do so here solely to confirm that this proceeding is not barred in federal court under the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction. In that regard we note that the exception is limited to proceedings that would require the federal court to exercise authority that is assigned exclusively to the state probate court, that is, the probating or annulment of a will, the administration of an estate and the disposition of property that is in the custody of a probate court or the fiduciary of an estate. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006); Lefkowitz v. Bank of New York, 528 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir.2007). Thus, for example, in a related judgment-recognition and enforcement case brought by defendant Pamela Carvel—seeking recognition and enforcement of the 2003 Chancery judgment—the Second Circuit recently concluded that the exception barred suit in federal court because the relief sought involved disposition of estate property. Carvel v. Carvel Found., Inc., 230 Fed.Appx. 103, 103-04 (2d Cir.2007). In this case, however, the judgments that plaintiff seeks to enforce embody only a monetary award against Ms. Carvel based on her performance in a litigation that the TAF successfully pursued to obtain her removal as the United Kingdom executrix of her aunt’s 1995 will and the vacatur of the judgment that she had obtained in 2003 against the Agnes Carvel estate. To enforce or otherwise assess such an award does not trench upon the exclusive functions of a probate court, and hence the probate limitation on diversity jurisdiction does not apply here. See, e.g., Lefkowitz, 528 F.3d at 108. As for Ms. Carvel’s counterclaims and third-party claims, some appear to sound in tort and demand compensatory damages from a number of parties that have been involved in estate-related litigation against her. To that extent, these claims are also not barred by the probate exception. E.g., Lefkowitz, 528 F.3d at 107-08. As we note, however, in addressing the motion to dismiss all of Ms. Carvel’s claims, several of those claims are worded in such a manner as to trigger the probate exception, and as to these we recommend below that they be dismissed on that basis as well as on other grounds. See pp. 760-61, 763-64, infra. IV. Plaintiff’s Summary-Judgment Motion The TAF seeks summary judgment on its application for recognition of the two United Kingdom cost judgments against Ms. Carvel. Those judgments, rendered initially in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, awarded the TAF an aggregate amount of £185,472.13 in litigation expenses generated by Ms. Carvel’s resistance to the TAF’s application in that court to replace her as the United Kingdom executrix of the estate of Agnes Carvel and to vacate the 2003 Chancery judgment obtained by her against that estate. A. Summary-Judgment Standards Before addressing plaintiffs summary-judgment motion, we summarize the pertinent standards for assessing such a motion. The court may enter summary judgment only if it concludes that there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts and that, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.2004). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ for these purposes if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law’ [while] [a]n issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Shade v. Hous. Auth. of the City of New Haven, 251 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). It is axiomatic that the responsibility of the court in deciding a summary-judgment motion “is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986); see, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150-51 (2d Cir.2000). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir.2002). If the non-moving party has the burden of proof on a specific issue, the movant may satisfy its initial burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence in support of an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.2002); Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995). If the movant fails to meet its initial burden, however, the motion will fail even if the opponent does not submit any evidentiary materials to establish a genuine factual issue for trial. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140-41 (2d Cir.2003). If the moving party carries its initial burden, the opposing party must then shoulder the burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Santos v. Murdock, 243 F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir.2001). In doing so, the opposing party cannot rest “merely on allegations or denials” of the factual assertions of the movant, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see, e.g., Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll & Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 59-60 (2d Cir.2004), nor can she rely on her pleadings or on merely conelusory factual allegations. See, e.g., Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000). She must also “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir.2005). Rather, she must present specific evidence in support of her contention that there is a genuine dispute as to the material facts. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir.1994). B. Assessment of Plaintiffs Motion 1. The Statutory Framework Article 53 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“N.Y. C.P.L.R.”) defines the circumstances under which New York courts will recognize foreign-country judgments. It codifies pre-existing case law authority, and was enacted mainly to encourage foreign courts to recognize New York judgments. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301, David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries C530L1 at 540 (McKinney’s 1997) (citing 13th Jud. Conf. Rep. 194, 195 (1968)). As characterized by the pertinent practice commentaries, “[s]o liberal has New York caselaw been in the recognition of the judgments of foreign nations, in fact, that the occasion to use Article 53 has been rare.” Id. at 540. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5307 (Article 53 is not exclusive; enforcement may be granted in situations not covered by statute). Article 53, which is titled the “Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act”, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5309, applies to any foreign country judgment that is “final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered”. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5302. It provides that, absent circumstances that are specified in section 5304, such a judgment, insofar as it awards a sum of money, “is conclusive” and may be ordered recognized inter alia pursuant to a summary-judgment motion in lieu of a complaint. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5303. Section 5304 specifies ten potential exceptions to recognition. Two mandate non-recognition, and the other eight leave the court with discretion not to recognize the judgment. The circumstances that mandate non-recognition are the following: 1. [T]he judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; 2. [T]he foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a). As for the circumstances that permit discretionary nonrecognition, they include: 1. [T]he foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2. [T]he defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; 3. [T]he judgment was obtained by fraud; 4. [T]he cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state; 5. [T]he judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; 6. [T]he proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; 7. [I]n the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action; or 8. [T]he cause of action resulted in a defamation judgment obtained in a jurisdiction outside the United States, unless the court before which the matter is brought sitting in this state first determines that the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by both the United States and New York constitutions. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b). 2. The Pertinent Facts The circumstances of the United Kingdom proceeding are not in genuine dispute and are fully summarized and documented in an affidavit by the attorney who represented the TAF in that case. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶ 1). We briefly review them here. The litigation was commenced by the TAF on August 30, 2006 in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, and it named as defendants both Pamela Carvel and the Florida Foundation. Plaintiff sought, among other relief, an order removing Ms. Carvel as United Kingdom executrix of the estate of Agnes Carvel under her 1995 will, based on serious misconduct by her involving the diversion of estate assets. This application was accompanied by a request for vacatur of the prior Chancery judgment awarding Ms. Carvel more than £8 million from the estate, and for a declaration that the TAF is entitled to the net assets of the estate. (Id. at ¶ 2 & Ex. A). Consistent with the requirements of the High Court rules of procedure, the TAF served its claim form and a set of witness statements on Ms. Carvel by first class mail in London on August 30, 2006. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶ 3 & Ex. A). She confirmed service on her by an acknowledgment dated September 15, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 4 & Ex. B). She then filed her witness statements on October 13, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff also served the Florida Foundation in person in Florida on October 4, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 5 & Ex. C). Although not formally acknowledging service, the foundation sent the High Court a letter admitting that it had been served (id. at ¶ 5 & Ex. D), and it consented to the court’s jurisdiction and participated in the lawsuit. (Id. at ¶ 5). On November 8, 2006, the TAF moved for summary judgment. Ms. Carvel opposed, and both defendants appeared through counsel at a hearing on the motion on May 23 and 24, 2007. (Id. at ¶ 6). By decision dated June 11, 2007, Mr. Justice Lewison granted the TAF’s motion insofar as it sought an order that Ms. Carvel be removed as executrix of the estate and that the prior Chancery judgment be vacated. (Id., Ex. E at 9-11—TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 409-11 ¶¶ 48-58). By separate order issued the same day, Justice Lewison directed inter alia that the TAF be awarded its costs of the action, to be paid by Ms. Carvel, and he referred that matter to a costs judge for assessment. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶ 6 & Ex. F at ¶ 14). The order also directed that Ms. Carvel pay the TAF, by October 1, 2007, the sum of £100,000 on account of those costs, with that amount to be credited against the ultimate cost award. (Id. at ¶ 6 & Ex. F at ¶ 15). Finally, the court denied Ms. Carvel’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and set July 16, 2007 as the deadline for her to apply to that higher court for leave to appeal. (Id. at ¶ 6 & Ex. F at ¶¶ 17-18). Ms. Carvel applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the High Court decision. The Court of Appeal denied her application on October 2, 2007. (Id. at ¶ 6 & Ex. G). She renewed her application to appeal the decision at an appearance at the Court of Appeal, but the court again denied her request. (Id. at ¶ 6 & Ex. H). As a result, the decision of Justice Lewison is no longer subject to appeal. (Id. at ¶ 6). Ms. Carvel failed to comply with the court’s directive that she pay the TAF £100,000 in costs by October 1, 2007. (Id. at ¶ 7). On December 18, 2007 the TAF mailed her its notice of commencement of an assessment of its costs. (Id.). She served her opposition to the proposed bill of costs on January 7, 2008, and the TAF replied on January 24, 2008. (Id.). Following the filing of the TAF’s request for a detailed cost assessment, a hearing took place before a cost judge, Master Rogers, on June 3, 2008. Ms. Carvel attended in a pro se capacity. (Id. at ¶ 8). By order dated June 17, 2008, Master Rogers determined the TAF’s total recoverable costs to be £177,222.13, inclusive of the previously ordered payment of £100,000, and he ordered that Ms. Carvel pay that sum within fourteen days. (Id. at ¶ 8 & Ex. I). Under the Judgments Act, 1838, 2 Viet., c. 110, § 17 (U.K.), interest on this sum accrues at a rate of 8 percent per annum from the date of Justice Lewison’s order. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶ 8). On June 23, 2008, Ms. Carvel applied to the High Court for a stay of all orders and judgments against her. (Id. at ¶ 9 & Ex. J). The court (by Deputy Master Farrington) dismissed the application by order dated August 13, 2008 and assessed additional costs of £8,250 against her. (Id. at ¶ 9 & Ex. K). The statutory time for compliance with that order was fourteen days. (Id. at ¶ 9). On September 12, 2008 the court (by Deputy Master Lloyd) modified the prior cost order in one minor respect, eliminating a reference to the value added tax, since the TAF does not pay such a tax. (Id. at ¶ 10 & Ex. L). The TAF communicated this order to Ms. Carvel on September 15, 2008 (id. at ¶ 10 & Ex. M), but she has never complied with the amended order. (Id. at ¶ 11). As a result, interest on that award has been accruing since August 13, 2008 at 8 percent per annum. (Id.). 3. Assessment of Plaintiffs Motion Plaintiffs submissions amply, and without triable dispute, satisfy the prerequisites of N.Y. C.P.L.R. Article 53 for recognition of a foreign judgment. We address each statutory requirement in turn. i. Mandatory Criteria (a) “Final, conclusive and enforceable” money judgment The two money judgments that were issued against Ms. Carvel to impose the prevailing party’s costs on her as a losing litigant are final and enforceable. As noted, Ms. Carvel was refused permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal the June 11, 2007 order, which, inter alia, required her to pay the TAF’s costs, and that order is now unappealable. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶ 6). Moreover, Ms. Carvel’s attempt to stay the enforcement of this judgment was denied, and therefore the judgment is enforceable. (See id. at ¶ 9). Likewise, Ms. Carvel did not apply to vary the August 13, 2008 cost order within 14 days after she was served with the modified order, and that order is therefore also final and enforceable. (See id. at ¶ 10). (b) “Impartial Tribunal” and “Compatible Procedures” There is no question that the two cost judgments were entered against Ms. Carvel by a court of competent jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the judicial system in England has long been recognized as providing “impartial tribunals” and “procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law”. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a). See, e.g., CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 100 N.Y.2d 215, 222, 762 N.Y.S.2d 5, 10, 792 N.E.2d 155 (2003) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304, David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries C5304:l at 65 (McKinney’s 2003 Pocket Pt.)). Indeed, the notion that the English judicial system might not qualify has been described as “bordering] on the risible.” Tropp v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 2008 WL 5758763, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (quoting inter alia Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir.2000)). (c)Personal Jurisdiction As for personal jurisdiction, the documentary record conclusively demonstrates that the High Court had jurisdiction over Ms. Carvel. She concedes that in her capacity as executor of her aunt’s estate, she is a citizen of the United Kingdom. (See Stevens Aff., Ex. B—Notice of Removal at ¶ 4). Moreover, she was served at her designated London address—28 Old Brompton Road, Suite 158-when the TAF filed suit. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶ 3). Indeed, she has long and consistently demanded that she be served at that address even in cases pending in the United States. (See Def.’s R. 56.1 Resp. at fifth page ¶ 2(c) & Ex. D; Supplemental Aff. of Victoria Sweeting, Esq., executed June 9, 2009, ¶ 5)). This alone is sufficient under the statute to preclude a challenge by Ms. Carvel to the foreign court’s jurisdiction. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5305(a)(4). She also conceded in writing that she had been served, she contested the substance of the plaintiffs claims in that proceeding, and she even personally appeared in court to pursue her defenses and attempted appeal. (Ticehurst Aff. at ¶¶ 4, 6-9 & Exs. B, H, J). Again, all of the facts independently demonstrate conclusively, under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5305(a), that the High Court of Justice had personal jurisdiction over her. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5305(1) & (2). ii. Discretionary Criteria None of the other, discretionary, factors that may justify a court in declining to recognize a foreign judgment suggests a different result here. Ms. Carvel simply makes no showing that would permit their invocation even if the court were so inclined. (a) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction There is no suggestion in the record that the High Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, we note that Ms. Carvel herself probated her aunt’s will in that court, and then pursued litigation there on her purported claims against her aunt’s estate and initially obtained a large judgment that she then sought to register and enforce in this country. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 399 ¶ 7, 340 ¶ 11. It was both her status as executor of her aunt’s 1995 will and the entry of the Chancery judgment against her aunt’s estate that triggered the TAF application in the same court. Moreover, the High Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the TAF’s claim under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, 50 Viet., c. 35, § 1 (U.K.) which, inter alia, authorizes the court to replace all or any existing trustees of a trust if sufficient cause is shown for doing so by a beneficiary of the trust. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 402-03 ¶ 20, 404-06 ¶¶ 28-32. (b) Adequacy of Notice There is also no question that Ms. Carvel received adequate notice of the proceeding commenced in the High Court by the TAF; indeed, she acknowledged such notice, was represented by counsel throughout the process, submitted witness statements on her own behalf and participated in the hearing that led to the adverse judgments—a hearing that took place many months after plaintiffs initial filing. (See Ticehurst Aff. at ¶¶ 4, 6). Moreover, there is nothing in the record suggesting that she ever complained that she needed more time before the hearing at issue was conducted by the High Court. (c)Fraud on the Court Defendant also fails to create a triable issue on her contention that the result of the High Court proceeding was obtained by fraud. Although Ms. Carvel uses the terms “fraud”, “fraudulent” and “fraudster” rather liberally in her narrative (e.g., Def./Countercl. Pl.’s Aff. and Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Summ. J., at ¶¶ 37, 54-55; Def.’s R. 56.1 Resp. at p. 2 ¶ 5, p. 4 ¶ 1(b); Def.’s Answer at ¶¶ 8, 10, 11, 13, 22, 27, 33, Def.’s Countercl. at ¶¶ 1-4, 21, 22), these conclusory assertions are unaccompanied by any evidence to support them. Indeed, quite to the contrary, her lengthy litigative history both in the United States and in the United Kingdom is carpeted with claims on her part of fraudulent conduct and conspiracies by a vast array of actors—including not only the TAF and its representatives, but also court personnel, judges, prosecutors and many attorneys— and a consistent array of judicial decisions have rejected these claims on a host of grounds, including their complete lack of substance. See, e.g., p. 739, supra & p. 763 n. 33, 768-69 n. 36, infra. In resisting this conclusion, Ms. Carvel does assert that the High Court cost judgments in question were obtained by fraud on that court. The purported fraud, she says, involved the choice of a replacement estate representative, with the court substituting Guy Greenhous, Esq. for Ms. Carvel and appointing him as personal representative or judicial trustee of the estate. See TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 411 ¶ 55. According to Ms. Carvel, the TAF acted fraudulently because it supposedly concealed from the court the fact that it had hired Mr. Greenhous, who was therefore “not an objective independent professional.” (Def./Countercl. PL’s Aff. and Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Summ. J., at ¶ 19). This argument fails at every level. First, the cost judgments before us pertain to costs incurred in seeking to remove Ms. Carvel as executrix of the estate and to vacate the Chancery judgment in her favor, and do not implicate the wisdom or propriety of the choice of her replacement. Ms. Carvel does not contend, much less attempt to prove, that the High Court’s determination to remove her or to vacate the Chancery judgment or to award costs to the TAF was infected by any fraud on the court. The particular choice of a replacement for her was simply not a focus of the TAF’s application or of her opposition. Indeed, in its claim form addressed to the High Court, the TAF did not request appointment of Mr. Greenhous as a replacement estate administrator, mentioning only, as one possibility, “Governor Brendan Byrne” (apparently the former governor of New Jersey and member of the TAF Board of Trustees) “or some other fit and proper person”. (Ticehurst Aff., Ex. A). In any event, if, as Ms. Carvel alleges, Mr. Greenhous has subsequently dealt improperly with regard to any enforceable interest that she may have—a matter to which she alludes without detail or evidence (Def./Countercl. PL’s Aff. and Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Summ. J., at ¶ 19)—she may have a claim against him and pursue it in an appropriate forum. Second, despite the purported concealment by the TAF, Ms. Carvel cites^—for the fact of the TAF’s earlier contact with Mr. Greenhous—an affidavit that Mr. Greenhous submitted to the High Court in October 2007, while the proceeding in question was still pending in the English courts. (Id. at ¶ 20; Def.’s R. 56.1 Resp., Ex. E). In that affidavit he alludes to having discussed his retention as Court Trustee with a representative of the TAF. (Def.’s R. 56.1 Resp., Ex. E at ¶ 11). Hence, there was notice to the English courts (and to Ms. Carvel) that Mr. Greenhous and his firm had been approached by the TAF to determine his willingness to serve as trustee, and Ms. Carvel was therefore free at that time to challenge the propriety of that appointment either on her application for leave to appeal or by application for reconsideration before the High Court. Third, Ms. Carvel offers no indication that the TAF ever concealed from the High Court the fact that it had vetted Mr. Greenhous as a potential trustee, nor does she offer any basis for inferring that such a contact was inappropriate, since the TAF had previously and conclusively been deemed the only beneficiary of the Agnes Carvel estate. Indeed, the decision of Justice Lewison makes clear that when he decided to appoint Mr. Greenhous, he was aware that it was the TAF that was proposing his appointment. TAF v. PC, [2008] Ch. at 411 ¶ 55. Necessarily, then, he was aware that the TAF had previously conferred with Mr. Greenhous to determine his willingness to serve. In short, Ms. Carvel offers no evidence of any fraud on the court. (d) Repugnancy to New York Public Policy The claims on which the cost judgments rest are not repugnant to New York public policy, nor are the judgments themselves. The TAF sought Ms. Carvel’s removal as United Kingdom executor of her aunt’s estate, a step already taken by a number of American courts, which had removed her from any role in administering that estate or the estate of her uncle, based on specific findings of misconduct by her. (See Magoolaghan Deck, Ex. G at 7-8 (Westchester Surrogate’s Court decision accepting Ms. Carvel’s resignation as executrix and trustee of Thomas Carvel’s estate and noting that “[h]er unwarranted actions have subjected the parties to immeasurable expense”), Ex. I at 5-6 (Eastern District decision noting restraining order preventing Ms. Carvel from taking action with regard to assets of her aunt’s estate)); In re Carvel, 49 A.D.3d 877, 853 N.Y.S.2d 902 (2d Dep’t 2008) (noting that Ms. Carvel was no longer executor of her aunt’s estate). The TAF also sought vacatur of the 2003 Chancery award to Ms. Carvel, a step premised on Ms. Carvel’s provable prior fraud on the court. In short, both applications were entirely consistent with American legal principles. As for the United Kingdom cost judgments themselves, Ms. Carvel claims that they violate New York public policy because they are premised on an award of attorneys’ fees against her as the losing party. This argument will not fly. To avoid recognition of a foreign judgment on public-policy grounds, the defendant must satisfy a very challenging standard. In the words of the Second Circuit, as a matter of comity “A judgment is unenforceable as against public policy to the extent that it is “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought”.... The standard is high, and infrequently met. As one court wrote, “[ojnly in clear-cut cases ought it to avail defendant” ... In the classic formulation, a judgment that “tends clearly” to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the law, or security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private property is against public policy.” Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864, 866 n. 17 (D.C.Cir.1981) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L.Rev. 1601, 1670 (1968); Paulsen & Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L.Rev. 969, 980-81, 1015-16 (1956))). Similarly, under New York law, to justify a refusal to recognize a foreign judgment on public-policy grounds, the opponent must establish that such recognition would be “inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.” Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 78, 82, 817 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603, 850 N.E.2d 647 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plainly the award of costs against Ms. Carvel in this case does not remotely meet this elevated standard. Indeed, the New York courts have recognized that the fact that they do not themselves routinely award fees to the prevailing party does not make such an award “repugnant” to any public policy of the State. See, e.g., Blits v. Renaissance Cruise Lines, Inc., 166 Misc.2d 497, 499-501, 633 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935-36 (Sup.Ct. Nassau County 1995) (recognizing Florida judgment despite its award of fees); accord Blacklink Transp. Consultants PTY Ltd. v. Von Summer, 18 Misc.3d 1113(A), 856 N.Y.S.2d 496, 2008 WL 89958, *1-6 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 9, 2008) (recognizing Australian judgment despite inclusion of fee award). Indeed, New York courts do authorize fee awards pursuant to statutory provisions, including for frivolous litigation. E.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 22, § 130-1.1; N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89(4)(c); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 237. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 96 N.Y.2d 811, 812, 727 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378, 751 N.E.2d 456 (2001); Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Signor, 5 N.Y.3d 435, 443, 808 N.Y.S.2d 568, 572-73, 842 N.E.2d 466 (2005); Bd. of Managers of Sea Breeze II Condo. v. Kwiecinski, 72 A.D.3d 630, 898 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (2d Dep’t 2010); Grant v. Grant, 71 A.D.3d 634, 634, 895 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (2d Dep’t 2010). To cite but one circumstance comparable to that encountered here, an estate in Surrogate’s Court may be awarded fees as well as other costs in the face of baseless litigation by a beneficiary or former executor. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Bank of New York, 676 F.Supp.2d 229, 240 (S.D.N.Y.2009). In any event, as one New York court recently observed in rejecting the same argument as Carvel advances here, “Common-law jurisdictions have different procedural rules, some of which reflect different public policy choices. Different does not mean repugnant. ... The so-called ‘English rule’ under which a loser pays the winner’s attorneys’ fees, and the usual ‘American rule’, under which each side bears its own attorneys’ fees, reflect such choices.” Blacklink Transp. Consultants PTY Ltd., 2008 WL 89958 at *5. See also Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110-11, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) (“We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.”). (e) Remaining Factors The remaining section 5304(b) provisions that would permit an exception to judgment recognition have also not been shown, even arguably, to apply. The United Kingdom cost judgments and the decision on which they are based are not in conflict with any other judgment; indeed, they are consistent with a growing body of decisions in this country that have systematically disapproved of Ms. Carvel’s conduct with regard to her aunt’s and uncle’s estates and rejected her claims regarding the disposition of estate assets and related misconduct. {See Magoolaghan Decl. at ¶ 6 (describing cases)). Finally, there is also no suggestion that the parties had agreed before institution of the High Court proceeding to resolve the issues in another forum, or that the High Court was “an inconvenient forum”. Indeed, on the latter point, Ms. Carvel has insisted that she be served with all papers in this and other litigations at her London residence. {E.g., Stevens Aff., Ex. B—Notice of Removal at 4; Sweeting Supplemental Aff. at ¶ 5; Def.’s R. 56.1 Resp. at fifth page ¶ 2(c) & Ex. D). iii. Defendant’s Other Arguments To the extent that defendant resists the recognition of the cost judgments, she largely bypasses the statutory criteria, and relies instead on a litany of unsupported accusations of misconduct against the TAF and its representatives, including third-party defendants Stevens and Griffin. None of this saves her case. One principal thrust of defendant’s non-statutory arguments, reflected in her opposing affidavit and memorandum of law, is that she is owed more money by the TAF and counterclaim-defendant Griffin than she owes the TAF under the challenged cost judgments, apparently at least in part as a result of expenses that she allegedly incurred as a fiduciary of the Agnes Carvel trust and estate. (Def. /Countered. Pl.’s Aff. and Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Summ. J., at ¶¶ 34^15). Whether that be the case or not is irrelevant to the recognition of the United Kingdom judgments. If Ms. Carvel has a potential claim for expenses—and she offers no evidence to that effect—she has had, and may still have, the opportunity to assert those claims in a proper forum, whether it be the Surrogate’s Court in Westchester County or in the Florida Circuit Court or in the Delaware Chancery Court. (See, e.g., Def.’s R. 56.1 Resp., Ex. F) (addressing Carvel’s challenge to accounting rendered by trustees of Agnes Carvel 1991 Trust)). Moreover, if she has other viable claims against those who she claims have injured her in some way, she may obtain a judgment against them in an appropriate forum. The possibility of such a future award to her, however, is not a defense to recognition of a previously entered and unrelated cost judgment. See Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 49, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290-91 (4th Dep’t 2001) (citing Watary Servs. v. Law Kin Wah, 247 A.D.2d 281, 282, 668 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (1st Dep’t 1998)) (refusing to recognize non-statutory defenses to recognition of foreign judgment). Indeed, even if Ms. Carvel had already obtained judgments against any of the other parties in this proceeding—which at present she does not have— that would not be a defense to recognition of the High Court cost judgments, but rather a potential basis for a set-off on actual recovery. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5402(b) (noting that foreign judgment filed with county clerk “is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment of the supreme court of this state”). Since, however, all that plaintiff seeks here is recognition of its cost judgments, Ms. Carvel’s excursion into her probate-related grievances against the other parties is irrelevant to plaintiffs summary-judgment motion. See generally Armada (Singapore) Pte Ltd. v. N. China Shipping Corp., 2010 WL 481061, *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010) (summarizing United Kingdom law on equitable set-offs).