Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER FRANK MAAS, United States Magistrate Judge. In this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), Plaintiff Fox News Network, LLC (“Fox”) seeks agency records from the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) related to the intervention of the federal government (“Government”) two years ago to prevent the impending financial collapse of American Insurance Group (“AIG”) and Citigroup, Inc. (“Citigroup” or “Citi”). Treasury provided over 10,000 pages of documents to Fox, but withheld all or portions of approximately 7,000 pages under applicable FOIA exemptions. The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment with respect to approximately 300 documents that Fox argues were improperly withheld. For the reasons detailed below and in Appendix A to this Decision and Order, both motions are granted in part and denied in part. I. Factual and Procedural Background The documents sought by Fox relate to events arising out of the financial collapse of Citigroup and AIG in late 2008, and the Government’s subsequent intervention. A. AIG Bailout On September 15, 2008, three rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings, downgraded AIG’s debt substantially, thereby alerting the Government that AIG would require an immediate influx of money to fund its collateral obligations and avoid insolvency. (Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & in Supp. of Cross-Mot. (Docket No. 44) (“Fox Mem.”) at 5). Thereafter, the Government determined that it would be best to prevent “further disruption to already fragile financial markets that would be caused by a disorderly failure of AIG.” (Mem. of L. in Supp. of Treasury’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket No. 39) (“Treasury Mem.”) at 6). Accordingly, on September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) authorized the New York Federal Reserve Bank (“NYFRB”) to provide an “$85 billion credit facility” to AIG. (Id.; Fox Mem. at 6). On September 22, 2008, AIG and NYFRB entered into a credit agreement which was collateralized by all of the assets of AIG. (Treasury Mem. at 6; Fox Mem. at 6). The credit facility was intended to allow AIG to continue operating long enough to sell its assets and repay NYFRB. (Treasury Mem. at 6-7; Fox Mem. at 6). The agreement also established a trust pursuant to which Treasury received a 79.9% equity interest in AIG. (Fox Mem. at 6; Treasury Mem. at 7). The instrument formally establishing the trust was not executed until January 16, 2009, at which point NYFRB appointed three trastees in consultation with Treasury to administer the trust. (Treasury Mem. at 7). On October 3, 2008, Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”), which authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”). (Fox Mem. at 6; Treasury Mem. at 4); see also EESA, Pub.L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). On October 14, 2008, after a competitive proposal process, Treasury retained the Bank of New York Mellon (“BONY”) to act as the custodian of TARP funds “and to help Treasury with custodial, accounting, auction management and other infrastructure services needed to administer the complex portfolio of troubled assets” that Treasury had purchased through TARP. (Deel. of Joseph J. Samarías, dated June 22, 2009 (Docket No. 23) (“First Samarías Decl.”), ¶ 18) (quoting Oct. 14, 2008 press release, available at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/hp 1211.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2010)). After AIG’s financial position continued to deteriorate throughout October, Treasury began working with FRB and NYFRB in an effort to provide additional funds to AIG. (Treasury Mem. at 7). On November 10, 2008, FRB and Treasury announced the broad terms of an agreement with AIG whereby Treasury would purchase $40 billion of senior preferred AIG stock under the Systematically Significant Failing Institution Program (“SSFI”). (Fox Mem. at 7). This transaction was completed on November 25, 2008. (Id.; Treasury Mem. at 7). B. Citigroup Bailout Citigroup received TARP funds on three separate occasions between October 2008 and January 2009. (Treasury Mem. at 9; First Samarias Deck ¶ 30). On October 28, 2008, Treasury invested $25 billion in Citigroup through the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”). (Treasury Mem. at 9). However, in November 2008, because Citigroup’s “financial prospects and viability” were still cause for concern, Treasury began working closely with FRB, NYFRB, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to address Citigroup’s continuing woes. (Id.). On November 23, 2008, Treasury announced additional programs of investment in Citigroup. (Id.). On December 31, 2008, Treasury invested another $20 billion in Citigroup by purchasing perpetual preferred stock and warrants through the Targeted Investment Program (“TIP”). (Id.). Finally, on January 16, 2009, Treasury, FDIC, and NYFRB entered into loss sharing arrangements with Citigroup as part of the Asset Guarantee Program (“AGP”) to “provide protection against the possibility of Citigroup’s suffering large losses on an asset pool of approximately $301 billion of primarily mortgage-related assets.” (Id.). C. Consultants In addition to working with NYFRB, Treasury enlisted the assistance of several outside consultants. On October 10, 2008, Treasury retained Simpson Thacher & Bartlett (“STB”) as its legal counsel in connection with the Citigroup transactions (Id. at 10) and on November 4, 2008, it retained the Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP law firm (“DPW”) as its legal counsel with respect to the AIG transaction. (Id. at 8, 10). On December 18, 2008, Treasury retained Pricewaterhouse Coopers (“PwC”) to assist it with the AIG transaction. (Id. at 8). Treasury also worked closely with NYFRB’s outside consultants. On September 16, 2008, NYFRB retained DPW to provide legal advice with respect to the AIG transaction. (Treasury Mem. at 7 n. 3). On September 19, 2008, NYFRB retained the Ernst & Young accounting firm (“E & Y”) to assist it in conducting due diligence on the AIG transaction. (Id.). On October 16, 2008, NYFRB retained Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”) as its financial advisor. (Id. at 7 n. 3). NYFRB retained the Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP law firm (“Cleary”) to represent it in connection with future Citigroup transactions on November 25, 2008. (Id. at 10 n. 4). Finally, Treasury also worked with the FDIC and the Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP firm, which the FDIC had retained to represent it with respect to the Citigroup transactions. (Id.). D. Fox FOIA Requests Fox sent Treasury two FOIA requests. The first, dated November 25, 2008 (“November Request”), sought documents concerning BONY and AIG generated after July 1, 2008. (Id. at 3). The first six items in that Request sought the disclosure of an unredacted copy of Treasury’s custodian agreement with BONY, as well as records related to the compensation paid to BONY pursuant to that agreement, and any records relating to actions either BONY or Treasury took in connection with BONY’s obligations under the agreement. (See Decl. of Paul Ostensen, dated Aug. 7, 2009 (Docket No. 45) (“Ostensen Decl.”), Ex. 1). The remaining ten items sought records “relating to funds paid to and assets acquired from AIG pursuant to TARP, as well as records pertaining to the terms of any TARP-related transactions with AIG, including executive compensation, oversight procedures, and pledged collateral.” (Fox Mem. at 10). The second request, dated December 1, 2008 (“December Request”), sought records concerning any data collected regarding the effect of TARP funds on the availability of credit for consumers and small businesses, documents generated after September 1, 2008 concerning the Citigroup TARP transactions, and any documents submitted by Citigroup “in connection with Citigroup’s request for assistance pursuant to TARP.” (Ostensen Decl. Ex. 2; Treasury Mem. at 4). The Request also sought any records related to agreements entered into between Treasury and Citigroup, including records concerning the terms, conditions, obligations, and restrictions of those agreements. (Ostensen Decl. Ex. 2; Treasury Mem. at 4). Fox sought expedited processing of both requests pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E). (Fox Mem. at 10; Ostensen Decl. Exs. 1-2). When Treasury faded to respond to Fox’s request for ex-pedited processing within the statutory period, Fox commenced this action on December 18, 2008, and sought a preliminary injunction a few days later. (Fox Mem. at 10). On February 19, 2009, Judge Holwell directed Treasury to comply with Fox’s FOIA request within thirty days and to provide a Vaughn index within forty-five days. (See Order dated Feb. 19, 2009) (Docket No. 15). Between February and April 2009, Treasury produced 10,113 pages of materials to Fox in response to its requests. (Treasury Mem. at 13). Of those pages, approximately 4,000 were partially redacted pursuant to various FOIA exemptions. Treasury also withheld in full 3,358 pages of documents. (Id.). In April 2009, Treasury provided an initial 334-page Vaughn index to Fox. (Id.). After a meet-and-confer required by Judge Holwell, Fox provided to Treasury on May 29, 2009, a list of approximately 300 documents still in dispute. (Id.). E. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment On June 22, 2009, Treasury filed a motion for summary judgment concerning the remaining disputed documents. (See Docket No. 22). Fox then cross-moved for summary judgment on August 7, 2009. (See Docket No. 43). Treasury filed its opposition papers on September 8, 2009, and Fox filed its opposition papers on September 18, 2009. (See Docket Nos. 48, 52). Judge Holwell then referred the cross-motions to me for a Report and Recommendation on November 3, 2009. (See Docket No. 55). The parties subsequently consented to my jurisdiction to decide the cross-motions on March 26, 2010. (See Docket No. 64). In its summary judgment motion, Fox challenges the adequacy of Treasury’s search for responsive documents, as well as the withholding of specific documents under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(4) (“Exemption 4”) and 552(b)(5) (“Exemption 5”). Exemption 4 relates to confidential information an agency has obtained from outside persons; Exemption 5 covers discovery privileges that would be available to an agency in litigation. Although Treasury also has withheld documents under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(2) (“Exemption 2”), which relates to internal agency administrative practices, and 552(b)(6) (“Exemption 6”), which relates to the privacy of confidential personal information, Fox has indicated that it does not challenge Treasury’s reliance on these exemptions. (See Tr. of Mar. 19, 2010 Conf. (Docket No. 66) (“3/19/10 Tr.”) at 2-3). On December 4, 2009, I directed Treasury to supplement its Vaughn index with additional descriptions and to explain its failure to use the search term “BONY” in all of the offices it searched. (See Docket No. 57) (“Dec. 4 Order”). On December 11, 2009, Treasury submitted a letter describing its additional searches using the search term “BONY,” (Letter to the Court from Ass’t U.S. Att’y Danna Drori, dated Dec. 11, 2009 (“Drori Letter”)), and it then timely filed its revised Vaughn index on January 22, 2010, see Decl. of Joseph J. Samarias, dated Jan. 22, 2010 (Docket No. 59) (“Fourth Samarias Deck”), Ex. A (“Revised Vaughn Index”). Thereafter, on February 16, 2010, Fox submitted a supplemental memorandum of law in response to the Revised Vaughn Index. (See Docket No. 63). On March 19, 2010,1 held oral argument on both motions, (see 3/19/10 Tr.), directing on March 26, 2010, that the parties provide the Court with redacted copies of the disputed documents listed in the Revised Vaughn Index provided to Fox. (See Docket No. 65). On July 12 and 26, as well as August 30, 2010, I further ordered Treasury to provide to the Court for in camera review fifty-two documents for which the descriptions in the Revised Vaughn Index were insufficient. Treasury timely provided those documents. II. FOIA Through its passage of FOIA, Congress endorsed “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976) (quoting S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965)). “[FOIA] seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands.” Mink, 410 U.S. at 80, 93 S.Ct. 827. Under the statute, agencies must disclose their records upon request unless they can show that the requested records fall within nine enumerated exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (listing exemptions); Mink, 410 U.S. at 79, 93 S.Ct. 827. The exemptions are “explicitly made exclusive.” Mink, 410 U.S. at 79, 93 S.Ct. 827. Citizens may file a challenge to an agency’s response to a FOIA request in a district court, which “shall determine the matter de novo [with] the burden ... on the agency to sustain its action.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Summary judgment is the preferred vehicle for resolving FOIA cases. “In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the defending agency has the burden of showing that its search was adequate and that any withheld documents fall within an exemption to the FOIA.” Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994). The agency can meet this burden through affidavits and declarations “giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption.” Id. Typically the agency will submit a Vaughn index containing descriptions of the withheld documents, along with affidavits or declarations from relevant officials. If the agency’s submissions are adequate on their face, the district court may “forgo discovery and award summary judgment” to the agency, unless the plaintiff makes a showing of bad faith sufficient to impugn the agency’s declarations, provides tangible evidence that an exemption claimed should not apply, or establishes that summary judgment is otherwise inappropriate. Id. (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.Cir.1978)). In resolving a summary judgment motion in a FOIA case, a court must construe the statute broadly in favor of public disclosure and must construe the exemptions narrowly. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8, 108 S.Ct. 1606, 100 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir.1999). In keeping with FOIA’s goal of full disclosure, all doubts should be resolved in favor of disclosure. See Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 478. III. Adequacy of Search Fox contends that Treasury’s search for documents responsive to the FOIA requests was inadequate in several respects. Accordingly, I will address this issue before turning to the exemptions Treasury has claimed. A. Search Terms Fox contends that Treasury erred by not using the terms “TARP” or “BONY” as part of its electronic search of certain offices within Treasury, and it questions Treasury’s use of different search terms in different offices. (Reply Mem. of L. in Further Supp. of Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket No. 52) (“Fox Reply Mem.”) at 2). Treasury responds that the use of different search terms took into account “the different functions of the offices” and therefore was proper. (Mem. of L. in Further Supp. of Treasury’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket No. 48) (“Treasury Reply Mem.”) at 10). “[W]hen a plaintiff questions the adequacy of the search an agency made in order to satisfy its FOIA request, the factual question it raises is whether the search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents, not whether it actually uncovered every document extant.” Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 489 (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1991)). Thus, the question is not whether Treasury’s search was perfect, but whether Fox has identified any flaws that would reveal that Treasury’s search was not “reasonable.” See id.; Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“The adequacy of the search, in turn, is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.”). I am satisfied that Treasury’s search was adequate and that its search terms were appropriate. Treasury employs a “decentralized method” of processing FOIA requests. (Decl. of Hugh Gilmore, dated June 17, 2009 (Docket No. 24) (“Gilmore Deck”), ¶ 10). FOIA requests seeking documents from the “Departmental Offices” bureau of Treasury — such as the requests at issue here — are processed through a sub-office known as “Disclosure Services.” (Id. ¶¶ 1, 10). Disclosure Services reviews each request and refers it to the relevant offices within Treasury, which then individually review the request and gather responsive materials. (Id. ¶ 10). For this reason, the search terms and protocol used in one office may not be the same as those used in another office. Disclosure Services referred the Fox requests to five offices: the Office of Financial Stability (“OFS”), the Executive Secretary’s Office (“OES”), the Office of Legislative Affairs (“OLA”), the Office of the General Counsel (“OGC”), and the Office of Public Affairs (“OPA”). (Id. ¶ 11). Treasury has submitted additional detailed affidavits from the FOIA coordinators for each of these five offices. (See Docket Nos. 25-29). Athough, Fox questions why Treasury’s search terms varied from office to office, there is no requirement that an agency use identical search terms in all of its offices. For each office, Treasury has explained how the particular search terms were selected to target that office’s involvement with AIG, Citigroup, and TARP. For example, OLA searched primarily for documents concerning EESA, as its involvement was primarily related to the passage of EESA. (See Decl. of Gail V. Harris-Berry, dated June 11, 2009 (Docket No. 26) (“Harris-Berry Deck”), ¶¶ 7-8). Treasury’s explanation of why its search terms varied is reasonable. Indeed, there is no reason to believe a search conducted with uniform search terms across its offices would have yielded a greater number of responsive documents. (See Treasury Mem. at 10) (noting that identical search terms would not have accounted for the different functions of each office). Fox’s argument with respect to Treasury’s failure to use the search term “BONY” is largely moot in light of Treasury’s second search. The Dec. 4 Order directed Treasury to justify its failure to search for documents containing the term “BONY” by December 11, 2009, failing which it would be required to conduct such a search. (Dec. 4 Order at 2-3). On December 11, 2009, counsel for Treasury informed the Court that, while Treasury continued to disagree that its earlier search was inadequate, it had searched OES, OLA, and OPA for documents containing the term “BONY.” (See Drori Letter at 3). These searches yielded only seven additional documents, which were released to Fox with limited redactions that Fox has not challenged. (See id. at 1). There was no need to conduct a further search at OFS because it had used the search term “BONY” initially. (See id. at 2). OGC also did not conduct a further search because its staff members performed their own individualized searches for responsive documents, and thus did not conduct a centralized electronic search using keywords as the predicate to any of its production. (Id.). Athough Fox continues to object to the individualized searches conducted by OGC, FOIA does not require an office to use electronic search terms, nor has Fox pointed to any case law imposing such a duty on an agency. In the absence of any such duty, or a showing that the individualized searches were somehow defective, I find that the procedure employed by OGC was “reasonably calculated” to find all responsive documents. See Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 489. In sum, Treasury has shown that its search for documents concerning the Bank of New York Mellon using the term “BONY” was sufficient. Turning to the request to search using the term “TARP,” Treasury explains that the use of this term would make little sense in OFS, which Congress specifically created to implement and manage TARP and whose documents all presumably relate to TARP. (Treasury Reply Mem. at 10). Treasury also notes that searching its records “using the names of [the] entities, in lieu of ‘TARP,’ reasonably could be expected to encompass all documents related to Treasury’s investments in AIG and Citigroup as well as Treasury’s contract with BONY.” (Id.). Accordingly, OES and OPA did not utilize the term “TARP” when searching for records responsive to the November Request because the items sought did not relate to TARP generally, but, rather, to BONY and AIG. (See Decl. of Michelle Ayers, dated June 17, 2009 (Docket No. 25) (“Ayers Decl.”), ¶ 7; Decl. of Rowena Holloway, dated June 18, 2009 (Docket No. 27) (“Holloway Decl.”), ¶ 6). However, both offices used the search term “TARP” in response to the December Request, which sought documents relating to TARP administration. (Ayers Decl. ¶ 9; Holloway Decl. ¶ 6). OLA did not use the search term “TARP,” but searched for documents related to the “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008” and “H.R. 1424,” which presumably would cover OLA’s involvement with TARP in its role as the Congressional liaison office. (See Harris-Berry Decl. ¶¶ 7-8). And, as noted previously, OGC did not do a centralized search, but rather had individual employees search their email and documents, and thus relies on these individuals’ representations that they produced all responsive documents. (See Decl. of Brett M. Kitt, dated June 22, 2009 (Docket No. 28), ¶ 5). Although Treasury’s search admittedly may not have been perfect, the declarations submitted by each of the five offices adequately describe a search that was reasonably calculated to find responsive documents. See Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485 (“In demonstrating the adequacy of the search, the agency may rely upon reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.”). Moreover, Treasury has provided logical explanations for each of the decisions it made as to the search terms to be used and how to conduct the searches. Accordingly, I find that the scope of Treasury’s search in each of the five offices was reasonable. B. BONY Custodianship Documents Fox also has expressed concern about Treasury’s failure to produce any documents relating to BONY’s performance of its custodian agreement with Treasury. (See Fox Reply Mem. at 3). Specifically, Fox points to Items 3 through 5 of its November Request, which sought records related to the compensation that Treasury paid to BONY and to actions undertaken by either Treasury or BONY in connection with their duties and obligations under the custodian agreement. (See Ostensen Decl. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3-5). Treasury responds with respect to Item 3 that it produced an unredacted version of the custodian agreement with BONY, which details the compensation to be paid by Treasury to BONY. (Treasury Reply Mem. at 6). Treasury further notes that it did not produce any documents relating to compensation actually paid to BONY because Treasury “made no payments to BONY until after it received BONY’s first invoice on February 19, 2009, which postdated the commencement of searches for responsive documents.” (Id.). Fox counters that Treasury should not be relieved of the obligation to produce a responsive document of which it is aware simply because the document postdates the commencement of the search. (Fox Mem. at 3 & n. 2). As to Items 4 and 5, Treasury contends that it in fact has produced responsive documents, including “communications between Treasury and BONY relaying wiring instructions and bank routing information used to facilitate certain TARP transactions, describing the process by which Treasury wires money among its internal accounts, and authorizing and directing the transfer of TARP funds.” (Treasury Mem. at 7). Treasury further contends that it has adequately searched for responsive documents. Specifically, Treasury searched the records of Gary Grippo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fiscal Operations, who was responsible for managing the application process through which BONY was selected and for “the ongoing supervision of the financial agency agreement” between Treasury and BONY. (Id. at 6-7). Ellen Neubauer, the Executive Secretary of OFS during the relevant time period, states in her declaration that Treasury provided “all letters, agreements, certifications, approvals, instructions and other documents pertaining to Treasury’s financial agency agreement with [BONY]” from a folder on Mr. Grippo’s computer. (Decl. of Ellen Neubauer, dated June 18, 2009 (Docket No. 29) (“Neubauer Deck”), ¶ 8). She further states that, because of the role Mr. Grippo played in supervising the BONY agreement, it is unlikely there are any non-duplicative records responsive to those items located anywhere else within OFS. (Id.). Fox has failed to point to any evidence that Treasury missed any documents related to BONY in its search. “Mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1201. Accordingly, I find that Treasury’s search for BONY-related items was adequate. Although records of payments from Treasury to BONY were created after the commencement of Treasury’s search for responsive documents, Fox cites to no authority suggesting that FOIA requires Treasury to produce a document post-dating the commencement of the search of which it became aware while the search was underway. Such a rule would be unwieldy, as it would require the Court to ask, in the first instance, who in the agency might have been aware of the existence of a document in order to determine whether the agency’s duty to provide the document would be triggered by a FOIA request. Moreover, utilizing the date the search commences as a cut-off date does not unduly prejudice the requesting party, because it may easily file a follow-up request for documents created after the date the search commenced. For reasons such as these, courts have consistently held that an agency may limit its FOIA search to records created on or before the date of the commencement of the search. See C.2005) (start of search as cut-off date is reasonable); Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 314 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 n. 10 (D.D.C.2004) (same); see also McGehee v. C.I.A., 697 F.2d 1095, 1102-05 (D.C.Cir.1983) (discussing reasonableness of cut-off dates in general); Physicians for Human Rights v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 675 F.Supp.2d 149, 164 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Edmonds with approval). C. Item 15 of November Request Finally, Fox questions the fact that Treasury “has not disclosed any of the ... items AIG was required to report to Treasury, such as those identified in Section 8.5 of the AIG Securities Purchase Agreement....” (Fox Reply Mem. at 3) (emphasis in original). That section requires AIG periodically to certify its compliance with EESA. (Id. at n. 3). Fox contends that such certifications are responsive to Item 15 of the November Request, which seeks records “relating to an[y] accountings that have been given by AIG in connection with the implementation of TARP, [EESA] and/or H.R. 1424.” (Ostensen Deck, Ex. 1 ¶ 15). Fox also notes that Treasury did not provide “the list of AIG’s counterparties and swap positions that had led it to request assistance from Treasury in the first place.” (Fox Reply Mem. at 3). Treasury counters that it has not provided these documents because AIG’s own accounting is publicly available. (Treasury Reply Mem. at 8). Moreover, Treasury argues that it produced information “demonstrating that it received confirmation from NYFRB that the $40 billion was used to repay AIG’s debt to NYFRB.” (Id.). Treasury supplemented its response in a letter to Judge Holwell, in which it noted that AIG did not begin providing the information required by Section 3.5 of the Securities Purchase Agreement until March 2009, “well after its search for responsive documents had commenced.” (Letter to Judge Holwell from Danna Drori, Ass’t U.S. Att’y, dated Sept. 24, 2009, at 1). As to the counterparties and swap positions, Treasury stated in the letter that it provided “the non-exempt portions of responsive documents that it was able to locate in its files regarding the AIG counterparties and swap positions.” (Id. at 2). As with the BONY documents, there is no reason to doubt Treasury’s assurance that it has searched for and provided all documents relevant to Item 15 of the November Request. IV. Preliminary Observations Before turning to a discussion of specific documents or groups of documents, a few words are in order regarding the approach I have taken in addressing the FOIA exemptions claimed and the nomenclature I have used. First, throughout this Decision and Order, the document numbers used refer to the document numbers in the Revised Vaughn Index. Document numbers that begin with a “W” originally were withheld in full, although Treasury has since made “discretionary releases” of portions of some of these documents. Additionally, unless otherwise specified, any document descriptions in quotes are taken from the corresponding entry in the Revised Vaughn Index. Citations to “Document — ,” on the other hand, refer to the actual text of the documents. In some instances, Treasury has withheld different portions of a single document (for example, different emails in an email thread) on the basis of different exemptions or privileges. To account for this, I have indicated that the “portion” was (or was not) properly withheld. At times, the redacted documents indicate that Treasury relies on Exemption 5 although the Revised Vaughn Index cites Exemption 4. Where such conflicts appear, I have treated Treasury’s Revised Vaughn Index as controlling (unless otherwise noted). Finally, there are instances in which Treasury has withheld some or all of a single document on the basis of multiple exemptions or privileges. If necessary, I have addressed the same document multiple times. However, if the document or a portion thereof was properly withheld under one exemption or privilege, it has not been considered in the discussion of other potentially applicable exceptions or privileges. V. Exemption 5 Exemption 5 protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “To qualify, a document must thus satisfy two conditions: its source must be a Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.” Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001). By incorporating the second requirement, Congress evinced its intention that Exemption 5 be coterminous with traditional discovery privileges. Citing Exemption 5, Treasury has withheld documents pursuant to the attorney-client, deliberative process, and executive privileges. The 210 documents withheld under Exemption 5 constitute the bulk of the disputed documents in this case. Fox does not challenge the withholding of documents under the “executive privilege.” The applicability of the other two privileges will be considered below. Prior to considering whether the documents at issue have been properly withheld as privileged, however, the Court must resolve whether the source of the documents is an agency, such that they constitute “inter-agency” or “intra-agency” documents. A. Intra- or Inter-Agency Requirement The documents withheld under Exemption 5 were exchanged between or among Treasury, the White House, FRB, the FDIC, NYFRB, Morgan Stanley, PwC, E 6 Y, and several law firms. Of these, Fox only challenges whether the documents exchanged between or among Treasury and NYFRB, Morgan Stanley, PwC, and E & Y can properly be considered “intra-agency.” (Fox Mem. at 19-21). Treasury contends that all of these documents were properly withheld pursuant to the so-called “consultant corollary” to the definition of “intra-agency.” (Treasury Mem. at 21-24). More specifically, Treasury claims that PwC, E & Y, Cleary, and Morgan Stanley are consultants to NYFRB, which, in turn, serves as a consultant to Treasury. (Id.). “The question at issue regarding the intra- or inter-agency requirement is whether the document either originated from or was provided to an entity that is not a federal government agency, in which case the document is not protected by the exemption.” Tigue v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 312 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir.2002). In 1971, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the “consultant corollary” to the intra-agency definition, which treats documents exchanged with agency consultants as intra-agency for purposes of Exemption 5. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n. 44 (D.C.Cir.1971). It subsequently expanded the application of this corollary beyond the context of paid consultants in a line of cases beginning with Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C.Cir.1980). In Ryan, the D.C. Circuit concluded that questionnaire responses that United States Senators had submitted to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to enable the Attorney General to monitor compliance with President Carter’s merit selection guidelines for federal judges were agency records for FOIA purposes, even though the Senators were not “agencies” within the meaning of FOIA. Id. at 784, 789. As the court explained, “an agency often needs to rely on the opinions and recommendations of temporary consultants, as well as its own employees.” Id. at 789. Accordingly, “[w]hen an agency record is submitted by outside consultants as part of the deliberative process, and it was solicited by the agency, ... [it is] reasonable to deem the resulting document to be an ‘intra-agency’ memorandum for purposes of determining the applicability of Exemption 5.” Id. at 790. The court reasoned that the questionnaires plus responses were the functional equivalent of such consultant submissions. Id. In later cases, the D.C. Circuit has adhered to its expansive view of the intra- or inter-agency requirement in varying contexts. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C.Cir.2008) (opinions and recommendations solicited by the Department of Defense from non-governmental attorneys are intra-agency records); Formaldehyde Inst. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 1118, 1123-25 (D.C.Cir.1989) (peer-review comments regarding a scientific journal submission are intra-agency records). In contrast, although the Second Circuit accepted the Soucie “consultant corollary” to Exemption 5 in Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 610 F.2d 70, 83 (1979) (citing Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1078 n. 44), it has never endorsed the broader Ryan fine of cases, which would exempt the NYFRB records from disclosure even though NYFRB was not a disinterested consultant to Treasury. In the absence of clear authority in this Circuit, both sides focus their arguments on Klamath. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that consultants whose communications have typically been held exempt have not been communicating with the Government in their own interest or on behalf of any person or group whose interests might be affected by the Government action addressed by the consultant. In that regard, consultants may be enough like the agency’s own personnel to justify calling their communications “intraagency.” Klamath, 532 U.S. at 12, 121 S.Ct. 1060. Significantly, a footnote at the end of this paragraph observed that Courts of Appeals have recognized at least two instances of intra-agency consultants that arguably extend beyond what we have characterized as the typical examples. [Citing, inter alia, Ryan ]. We need not decide whether either instance should be recognized as intraagency, even if communications with paid consultants are ultimately so treated. As explained above, the intra-agency condition excludes, at the least, communications to or from an interested party seeking a Government benefit at the expense of other applicants. Id. at 12 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 1060 (emphasis added). Seizing on this latter language, Fox argues that NYFRB was not “brought in to carry out functions of [Treasury,] which is the essence of a consultant’s services to an agency,” but rather to serve its own interests as a secured lender to AIG. (Fox Mem. at 20). It is, of course, clear that NYFRB had an “interest” in the AIG transaction that differed from Treasury’s interest. Specifically, Treasury used TARP funds to retire AIG’s debt to NYFRB, incurred when NYFRB extended its loan in September 2008 before Congress passed EESA. Treasury contends argues that this type of “interest” is not what the Supreme Court had in mind, because NYFRB is a federal institution that does not actually compete in the marketplace. (See 3/19/10 Tr. at 31). Notwithstanding Fox’s contentions, it is clear that NYFRB functioned “enough like” Treasury’s own personnel during these transactions “to justify calling their communications ‘intra-agency.’ ” Klamath, 532 U.S. at 12, 121 S.Ct. 1060. NYFRB and Treasury worked side-by-side in developing the terms of these transactions, and I have no reason to doubt their representations that the fundamental concern of both entities was stabilizing the economy. Since they clearly were on the same team, I find that their communications were “intra-agency” communications within the meaning of Exemption 5. PwC, E & Y, and Morgan Stanley, in turn, functioned as consultants in the more traditional sense; indeed, Fox does not seriously challenge their status as consultants to NYFRB. As the Second Circuit noted in Tigue, communications between an agency’s consultant and a consultant to a consultant may be considered “intra-agency” for purposes of Exemption 5. See Tigue, 312 F.3d at 80 (exempting communications between a commission formed to provide guidance to an agency and the commission’s consultants). Thus, Treasury also is entitled to claim that these sub-consultant’s communications fall within Exemption 5. For these reasons, Treasury properly withheld as “intra-” or “inter-agency” all but two of the documents for which it relies on Exemption 5. The two exceptions, documents W2719 and 8972-8983, dated November 10, 2008, are email threads “discussing] the proposed mechanics of how Treasury will fund the $40 billion purchase of senior preferred stock in AIG.” As part of the email thread at 8972-8983, a Treasury employee forwarded an email from an NYFRB staff member with the subject line “IMPORTANT FW: AIG FUNDING” and the text: “See below a question about funding for AIG.... It seems they need an answer today.” (See Document 8981). The unredacted documents show that it was NYFRB that required an answer, not AIG. In fact, in these emails NYFRB is stating a preference for how an aspect of the transaction — specifically, the transfer of funds to NYFRB — should be conducted. Thus, in this instance NYFRB was not acting as a consultant, but, rather, was functioning as a party to the transaction negotiating with Treasury. Accordingly, the email from NYFRB to Treasury at the top of W2719 (repeated at the bottom of 8979 and bottom of 8982) must be released. B. Deliberative Process Privilege Treasury has withheld all or some of 197 intra- or inter-agency documents pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. The deliberative process privilege applies to materials that are part and parcel of the process of internal agency decisionmaking. See N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (protects documents comprising part of a process by which policies are formulated). The main purpose of this privilege is to promote better policymaking by encouraging candor in internal deliberations; thus it typically protects memoranda, drafts, recommendations, proposals, and other documents that reflect the opinions of their authors, rather than those of the agency. See Tigue, 312 F.3d at 76 (opinions, recommendations, and deliberations); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the writer”). However, in order to be covered under the deliberative process exception, a document must not only be inter- or intra-agency, but also both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 482. “‘A document is predecisional when it is prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.’” Tigue, 312 F.3d at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 482). Although an agency need not “pinpoint” an exact decision made in reliance on the document, it must show, ex ante, that the document “related to a specific decision facing the agency.” Id. This test is designed to distinguish predecisional documents from those that are “merely part of a routine and ongoing process of agency self-evaluation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. E.B. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 233 F.R.D. 289, 293 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (distinguishing “policy oriented judgments” from “routine operating decisions”). To be deliberative, a document must actually be “related to the process by which policies are formulated.” Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 482. Among the factors that courts have considered in this regard are whether the document forms an essential link in a specific consultative process, whether it reflects the personal opinion of the writer rather than the policy of the agency, and whether, if released, it would inaccurately reflect or prematurely disclose the views of the agency. Id. Thus, Treasury must actually identify and explain the role that a given document has played in the decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868 (“agency has the burden of establishing what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the documents in issue in the course of that process”). Because deliberative documents reflect the “give- and-take” of agency decisionmaking, id. at 866, factual material is not covered by the deliberative process privilege. Mink, 410 U.S. at 91, 93 S.Ct. 827. Purely factual material that is severable “without compromising the private remainder of the documents” consequently must be released. Id. The documents withheld by Treasury pursuant to the deliberative process privilege fall into several broad categories. Many of the documents are simply different versions of the same memo, letter, or email and therefore are properly considered together. My review of these groups of documents results in the conclusions set forth below as to whether the documents qualify for exemption under the deliberative process privilege. 1. Transactional Documents Many of the withheld documents are either internal drafts of transactional documents, such as asset purchase agreements or term sheets, or emails reflecting internal discussion about the terms of the AIG or Citigroup transactional documents. Although decisions about the terms of a financial transaction may not be typical of those made by a federal agency, the decisions that Treasury made regarding the use of TARP monies and the structure of the transactions with AIG and Citigroup clearly are policy decisions. Accordingly, any such documents created before the transactions were finalized are predeeisional, and, to the extent that they represent internal deliberation as to the appropriate terms of the transactions, are protected by the deliberative process privilege. Of course, transactional document drafts that eventually were shared with AIG or Citigroup are not exempt. Indeed, Treasury agrees and has represented that it did not claim deliberative process privilege for any such documents. (See Deck of Joseph J. Samarías, dated Sept. 4, 2009 (Docket No. 49) (“Second Samarías Deck”), at 18 n. 7). On the other hand, drafts circulated solely between or among agency personnel (and agency consultants) do potentially fall within this exemption. This includes “redlines” or comparisons of two or more drafts, if at least one of the comparison drafts was not circulated to anyone other than Treasury personnel and Treasury consultants. In addition, portions of transactional documents — such as the executive compensation provisions of the term sheet — fall within this protection, even if they were pasted into the text of an internal email. Documents that are not drafts but reflect internal discussion as to the transaction terms similarly are covered by Exemption 5. These documents include emails commenting on attached drafts, general discussions regarding provisions of the agreements, and discussions about changes that either have been or are to be made. 2. Talking Points, Press Releases, and Other Public Relations Materials Fox argues that documents such as draft talking points and draft press releases are not exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege. (Fox has identified 22 such documents). (Fox Mem. at 23 n. 16). Fox’s argument has two prongs. First, Fox contends that these documents were meant to explain previously-made decisions and thus are post-decisional. (Fox Mem. at 23). In its response, Treasury alleges that at the time these remarks or press releases were prepared, the details of the AIG and Citigroup transactions had not been finalized, so there were decisions remaining to be made. (Treasury Reply Mem. at 32-33). Second, Fox argues that even if the withheld material is predecisional, the deliberative decisions reflected in revisions to proposed remarks for a press conference are not substantive policy decisions, but, rather, decisions about how to present the agency’s decisions to the press. (Fox Reply Mem. at 8). Whether an agency’s discussions about how to package its views for presentation to the public should be covered by the deliberative process privilege is a subject that has yet to be addressed by either the District of Columbia or Second Circuit Courts of Appeal. Two district judges in the Southern District of New York have held that such decisions are not covered by the deliberative process privilege. In New York Times Co. v. United States Department of Defense, 499 F.Supp.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y.2007), Judge Berman concluded that “talking points and the formulation of responses to possible questions ... prepared to aid in briefing officials and preparing them to answer ... inquiries from the press” were neither predecisional nor deliberative. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). Magistrate Judge Francis similarly noted in a non-FOIA case that “[w]hether or not the Mayor should use ... suggested ‘talking points’ is not the sort of public policy decision that falls within the scope of the [deliberative process] privilege.” MacNamara v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 9216(KMK)(JCF), 2007 WL 1169204, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007). Both cases rely upon Second Circuit case law distinguishing “routine and ongoing” agency decisions from “policy-oriented” judgments, finding that only the latter are covered by the deliberative process privilege. See Tigue, 312 F.3d at 80; see also E.B., 233 F.R.D. at 293; Schiller v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 7922(KMK)(JCF), 2007 WL 136149, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007); MacNamara, 2007 WL 1169204, at *5; N.Y. Times Co., 499 F.Supp.2d at 515. On the other hand, in Thompson v. Department of the Navy, No. Civ.A. 95-347 (RMU), 1997 WL 527344, at *4-*5 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1997), Judge Urbina was asked to consider whether documents prepared to assist senior Navy officials in responding to the media in the wake of the USS Iowa explosion were covered by the deliberative process privilege. Included among the documents were (a) a set of hypothetical questions to help an admiral prepare for a television interview; (b) a critique of the admirals practice interview; (c) a draft answer to a possible media inquiry; and (d) a videotape of a mock press conference. Id. at *4. The court held that the Navy had established “that it was engaged in a predecisional, deliberative process concerning what information it was going to disclose to the media vis-a-vis the explosion aboard the USS Iowa.” Id. at *5. Similarly, in Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Interior, 384 F.Supp.2d 1, 22 (D.D.C.2004), Judge Collyer considered a “[d]raft compilation of arguments propounded by outside groups regarding [the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) ], with preliminary responses from the Department.” The agency asserted, and the court agreed, that the document “show[ed] the development of the Department’s policy regarding how to present its positions on ANWR, and, as a draft, [was] predecisional to the Department’s final positions.” Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Most recently, in ICM Registry, LLC v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 538 F.Supp.2d 130, 132 (D.D.C.2008), the plaintiff sought documents from the Commerce Department concerning its involvement in ICANN’s rejection of a new .xxx internet domain. Those documents included an email thread in which “the redactions related] to the opinions of Commerce employees on how to present Commerce’s role in making changes to the authoritative root zone file to the public.” Id. at 136. Judge Robertson rejected the plaintiffs argument that these were not deliberations on substantive agency policy, holding that “deliberations regarding public relations policy are deliberations about policy, even if they involve ‘massaging’ the agency’s public image.” Id. In light of these conflicting decisions, it is appropriate to focus on the policy underlying the deliberative process privilege. As the Supreme Court has stated: “The point, plainly made in the Senate Report, is that the ‘frank discussion of legal or policy matters’ in writing might be inhibited if the discussion were made public; and that the ‘decisions’ and ‘policies formulated’ would be the poorer as a result.” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 150, 95 S.Ct. 1504 (quoting S.Rep. No. 813, p. 9). The key issue therefore is whether it is necessary that deliberations concerning “massaging the agency’s public image” be covered under the deliberative process privilege to further the goals of FOIA. Communications regarding how to present agency policies to Congress, the press, or the public, while deliberative, typically do not relate to the type of substantive policy decisions Congress intended to enhance through frank discussion. Nevertheless, such documents are properly withheld if their release would reveal the status of internal deliberations on substantive policy matters. Here, Treasury claims privilege with respect to four categories of documents relating to press or public relations, each of which merits separate consideration. i. Draft Press Release and Accompanying Comments Nine documents reflect discussions about, and revisions to, a single draft press release. According to the Second Samarías Declaration: The draft press release was prepared in anticipation of the contemplated release of the AIG/SSFI term sheet, which was not finalized until November 10, 2008. The draft includes placeholders in anticipation of the Department’s final decisions related to certain additional limitations, restrictions, and taxpayer protections to be made part of the AIG/SSFI transaction. The remaining documents are subsequent email threads (the latest of which is November 9, 2008), which attach further drafts of the draft release, suggest additional revisions in light of ensuing changes in the proposed terms, and offer opinions and recommendations regarding anticipated press inquiries about the not-yet finalized transaction. (Second Samarías Decl. ¶ 34(f)). The draft press releases were withheld in full; the email discussions were released in part. Although opinions and recommendations regarding press inquiries do not qualify as deliberations about substantive policy decisions, disclosure of the various drafts of the press release at issue here would reveal how Treasury’s deliberations with respect to the underlying substantive policy progressed over the course of several days. It would disclose, for example, alternatives that were not adopted and discussions regarding the rationale for provisions that were adopted which may not accurately reflect the ultimate rationale for their adoption. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 152, 95 S.Ct. 1504 (“The public is only marginally concerned with reasons supporting a policy which an agency has rejected, or with reasons which might have supplied, but did not supply, the basis for a policy which was actually adopted on a different ground.”); Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866 (“The privilege has a number of purposes: it serves ... to protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have been finally formulated or adopted[ ] and to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency’s action.”). Accordingly, the draft press release and emails related thereto were properly withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. ii. Draft of Secretary’s Remarks Document W169-W171 is a “[d]raft of remarks (including redline) to be presented by the Secretary regarding [the] need for [a] comprehensive approach to relieving the stresses on U.S. financial institutions and markets ... The final draft of this statement was issued by [Treasury] on September 19, 2008, and is publicly available on its website.” Treasury contends that disclosure of this document would reveal its deliberative process by disclosing suggested revisions. That assertion is belied by the actual document which does not appear to contain any suggested revisions that would be disclosed. Because Treasury has not met its burden of showing that this document is deliberative, it must be released in full. iii. Congressional Relations Materials Document 3236-3290 is an email thread “commenting on attached draft briefing materials prepared by Treasury staff for Secretary Paulson in anticipation of [the] Secretary’s appearance at [the] House Financial Services Committee.” Treasury has redacted portions of the email thread and withheld the attached briefing materials in full. Treasury contends that the redacted materials “incorporate input requested by the Secretary [which was] culled to identify the topics of greatest significance to be brought to the Secretary’s attention, provide detailed statements of proposed policy initiatives and internal summaries of the potential rationales thereof — including, for example, regarding [Treasury’s] then-unannounced plans aimed at ensuring compliance with its executive compensation requirements.” (Second Samarías Decl. ¶ 34(g)). This document does not merely reflect Treasury’s decisions in relation to “massaging” the agency’s public image. Rather, this document reflects internal agency deliberation on matters of substantive policy prior to the Secretary’s public announcement of those decisions. Accordingly, this document was properly withheld. Document W792-W794 is a draft letter to Congressional leaders from Secretary Paulson regarding the administration of TARP, dated December 12, 2008, intended as a “response to inquiries received from Republican congressional leaders regarding Treasury’s administration of TARP and its efforts to address the financial market crisis.” (Second Samarías Decl. ¶ 34(b)). Treasury argues that the draft “reflects Treasury’s internal deliberations on how to respond to issues raised by congressional leaders.” (Id.). Fox counters that while Treasury may call it internal deliberation, “the description reflects nothing more than a draft document that was expected to be shared with another party.” (Decl. of Steven G. Mintz, Esq., dated Feb. 12, 2010 (Docket No. 62) (“Mintz Decl.”), Ex. 1). The actual document primarily explains and defends actions that Treasury had taken over the preceding several months. Thus, most of this document is not predecisional (because it explains decisions previously made) and does not reflect deliberation on substantive policy-oriented matters. The two paragraphs on the top of W793, however, are forward-looking statements about Treasury’s actions and thus are predecisional. Similarly, because the document is a draft, these paragraphs are also predeliberative, since they do not represent the final view of the agency, but, rather, only the suggestions of the author. Accordingly, these two paragraphs may be redacted, but the remainder of the document must be released, iv. Emails Concerning Press Relations Document 1695-1696, dated November 10, 2008, is an email thread among DPW, Treasury staff, Treasury legal, NYFRB, and Morgan Stanley concerning that morning’s anticipated AIG announcement. According to Treasury, “[t]he withheld information consists of counsel’s opinions analyzing the proposed terms of the AIG TARP transaction and was circulated to assist Treasury decisionmakers in articulating Treasury’s rationale related to the pending decision about AIG funding.” The redacted content is found in one email, with the subject line “Messaging,” sent by a DPW attorney early during the morning of the announcement. Contrary to Treasury’s description, the withheld message does not reflect deliberation regarding agency policy decisions, but, rather, is a message to Treasury staff on the “[cjritical messaging point” for the day’s announcement. (See Document 1695). Because this message consists entirely of outside counsel’s advice regarding “messaging,” i.e., public relations, it is not protected by the deliberative process privilege. Document 1697-1697B, dated Nov. 11, 2008, is an email thread among Treasury’s staff and legal team “discussing how to respond to [a] question received by Treasury regarding [an] anticipated news report concerning the AIG transaction.” As explained by Treasury, “[t]he redacted portions of this November 11, 2008 email thread ... concern an internal policy debate related to an unresolved accounting issue stemming from the November 10, 2008 release of the AIG/SSFI term sheet. The debate arises in the context of an attempt by Treasury [s]taff and Treasury [l]egal to decide how to respond to a press inquiry.” (Second Samarías Decl. ¶ 34(d)). A review of the unredacted documents confirms that the text withheld does not relate to an internal policy issue, but simply involves a Treasury staff member attempting to obtain a factual explanation from the Treasury legal team in order to respond to a press inquiry. The email does not debate how to resolve an accounting issue; rather it is counsel’s attempt to explain a previously-resolved accounting issue. The document is neither predecisional (because there is no substantive policy decision), nor deliberative (because it answers a factual question). It therefore must be released in full. Document 8614 is an email from a DPW attorney to five NYFRB employees, dated November 8, 2008, concerning “Fed Communications.” (See Document 8614). In the email, the attorney states: “I understand we are having a media briefing Monday morning. I hereby suggest a few thoughts....” (Id.). The remainder of the email is redacted. Document 8694-8697 is an email thread that begins with th