Full opinion text
ORDER HAWKINS, Senior District Judge. This matter is before the court on defendant’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial absolute, or, in the alternative, new trial nisi remittitur. This case was tried before a jury from September 11, 1997 through October 8,1997. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiffs favor. This court entered judgment on October 9, 1997. Defendant timely moved for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial and Plaintiff opposed the motions. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This products liability case was tried on plaintiffs complaint, alleging that the lift-gate latch in the Jimenez family’s 1985 Dodge Caravan minivan was defective and unreasonably dangerous. (Comply 18) As a result of the defective design, plaintiff claims that the latch failed, allowing the liftgate to open in a rollover accident on April 10, 1994. (Compl. ¶¶ 13 and 14) During the rollover, Plaintiffs son, Sergio Hernandez Jimenez, II (“Sergio”), was ejected from the minivan through the open rear door and killed. (Compl. ¶ 18). Plaintiffs claims originally included strict liability, breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive trade practices and negligence. At trial, the plaintiff presented his case on theories of strict liability, negligent misrepresentation and negligent design. Following arguments of counsel and the instructions of this court, the ease was submitted to the jury, and the jury returned with a verdict in Plaintiffs favor for Twelve Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars in actual damages and Two Hundred Fifty Million Dollars punitive damages. II. DEFENDANT’S RULE 50 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW Defendant Chrysler Corporation (“Chrysler”) moves for judgment as a matter of law based upon various alleged failings of plaintiffs case. Only two of these alleged deficiencies were addressed in the defendant’s memorandum in support of the Motion. Specifically, Chrysler argues that 1)Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of negligent misrepresentation, and 2) Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages. A. Standard under Rule 50 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows this court to grant a party judgment as a matter of law even after a jury has rendered its verdict. Under Rule 50(a), a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is simply a renewed post-trial motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Such motion should be granted when “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue,” Rule 50(a)(1), FRCP. When ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a court should not weigh the evidence or appraise the credibility of the witnesses, but must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all legitimate inferences in his favor. AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872, 113 S.Ct. 206, 121 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). Judgment as a matter of law may be granted only when there is no substantial evidence to support recovery by the party against whom the motion is directed. Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95,100 (4th Cir.1991). B. Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support the jury’s finding of liability on negligent misrepresentation. According to Chrysler, Plaintiff did not establish that Chrysler made any false representation to Plaintiff, that there was reliance upon any particular representation because any advertisements viewed merely offered opinion, or that Plaintiff suffered any pecuniary loss. This court finds that Chrysler failed to raise the issues regarding any false representation, opinion or pecuniary loss in its Rule 50(a) motion at trial. While Chrysler did recite what it contended were the elements of negligent misrepresentation, no reference to “false representation,” “opinion,” or “pecuniary loss,” were made. Rather, Chrysler specifically argued only regarding its contention that Plaintiff Jimenez had failed to prove reliance and proximate causation. Because Chrysler failed to object at trial, it is barred from raising these issues in the first instance in its Rule 50(b) motion. See Price v. City of Charlotte, N.C., 93 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116, 117 S.Ct. 1246, 137 L.Ed.2d 328 (1997) (holding that a party must assert the same reasons in its Rule 50(b) motion as advanced in its Rule 50(a) motion); see e.g. Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[T]he precise claim made in the motion [under Rule 50(b)] must have been made [under Rule 50(a)].”); Kutner Buick, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir.1989) (Judgment as a matter of law made post trial must advance the same issues interposed when the Rule 50 motion was first made.). Therefore, Chrysler is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligent misrepresentation claim on those issues not raised at trial: making a false representation, opinion, and pecuniary loss. With regard to proof of reliance and proximate causation, this court finds that Plaintiff proved not only that the representation of safety was relied upon, but also that the omission of information was relied upon. Further there was evidence presented from which the jury could have reasonably found that such reliance was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs damages. “As a general rule, a person who undertakes to make a' representation is liable for negligent misrepresentation if a plaintiff suffers physical injury from reliance upon the misrepresentation.” F.P. Hubbard & R.L. Felix, The South Carolina Law of Torts, p. 357 (2d ed.1997). The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated: ‘A duty to exercise reasonable care in giving information exists when the defendant has a pecuniary interest in the transaction.’ ‘The recovery of damages may be predicated upon a negligently made false statement where a party suffers either injury or loss as a consequence of relying upon the misrepresentation.’ These general rules have been applied ... to support the recognition of a negligent misrepresentation claim where the misrepresented fact(s) induced the plaintiff to enter a contract or business transaction. Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 324 S.C. 269, 478 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1996), quoting Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1990) (citations omitted). According to Chrysler, there is no evidence demonstrating that the Jimenez family relied on any misrepresentations. South Carolina has adopted the Second Restatement view for analyzing the reliance element in a negligent misrepresentation claim. See ML-Lee Aquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 327 S.C. 238, 489 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1997). According to the Second Restatement, direct reliance by a particular plaintiff is not required. Chrysler’s “supplyfing] the information for repetition to a certain group or class of person [of which Mr. Jimenez] is one, even though [Chrysler] never had heard of [Mr. Jimenez] by name when the information was given” is sufficient for imposing liability. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 cmt. h (1977). In this case, Ms. Barrientos, Sergio’s mother, testified that she saw commercials that led her to believe that Chrysler minivans were safe vehicles. (Tr. 1072) Robert Eaton, Chrysler’s CEO, testified that consumers “absolutely” have “a right to expect” safe vehicles from Chrysler. (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 44.) The jury reasonably could infer from this evidence that the Jimenez family would not have bought their minivan had Chrysler not misrepresented the vehicle as safe. Moreover, Ms. Barrientos’ reliance on Chrysler’s silence regarding the latch was demonstrated by her utilizing the minivan in ignorance of the non-disclosed defect, believing it to be safe and suitable to transport her children, allowing her son to sit in the third seat (by the rear door), and not seeking to have a headed striker installed, unknowing of its importance or availability. Assuming arguendo, that Chrysler preserved the issues of “false representation,” “opinion,” or “pecuniary loss,” for consideration by this court post-trial, the court still concludes that judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiffs claim of negligent misrepresentation is inappropriate. Even disregarding Chrysler’s procedural default, it cannot succeed on the merits. As' to false representation, Chrysler argues that it made no representation to Plaintiff and that any representation allegedly made was not false, essentially contending that a misrepresentation must be an affirmative misstatement. This contention is contrary to the evidence and to well-settled South Carolina law. At trial, it was unrebutted that Chrysler touted the safety of all its minivans in advertising. Eaton testified that “yes,” one of the ways by which minivans were sold was with “promises of safety,” that “image” was “critical” to Chrysler’s ability to sell minivans, that Chrysler “advertise[s] safety on all of our vehicles” and that people have a “right” to expect a safe vehicle from Chrysler. (Deposition of Robert Eaton at 18, 44) The fair reading of Eaton’s testimony is that Chrysler minivans carried with them “promises of safety” because this description was “critical” to the minivans’ “image.” With all inferences in favor of Jimenez, the evidence further showed that commercials stressing safety, among other things, influenced Ms. Barrientos, in deciding to purchase the subject minivan. (Tr. 1072) Moreover, there was abundant additional evidence to support Plaintiffs claim of negligent misrepresentation by virtue of Chrysler’s misrepresentation by silence when there was a duty to speak. In this regard, Jimenez introduced uncontrovert-ed evidence that Chrysler had an ongoing duty to notify consumers of the defect in its latch. For example, one of Jimenez’s expert witnesses, Ronald Elwell, expressly opined, in testimony that was unrebutted by Chrysler, that Chrysler had a duty to notify consumers who had unheaded strikers that there was a defect in consumers’ vehicles. (Tr. 740, 744-45) The law also mandates a continuing duty by automobile manufacturers to disclose defects. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 30118-30120. See also Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir.1971) (under 15 U.S.C. § 1402, if a manufacturer discovers “in one car a defect common to automobiles manufactured by it, [it] then [has] a duty to notify other purchasers”); United States v. General Motors Corp., 574 F.Supp. 1047, 1050 (D.D.C.1983) (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 1411 imposes a “duty on a manufacturer to notify of and remedy safety-related defects even in the absence of an agency order to do so.”). It was undisputed that, at no time between the date of manufacture of the Jimenez minivan and Sergio’s death on April 10, 1994, did Chrysler ever notify either Sergio’s parents or any other consumers of the defect in the minivans. It was not until approximately a year after Sergio’s death that Chrysler sent Plaintiff a notice of the opportunity to replace the rear door latch, albeit even then not stating that the latch was unsafe. (Plaintiffs exhibit 243.) Under South Carolina law, nondisclosure is fraudulent concealment if there is a duty to speak. See, e.g., Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1978); Ardis v. Cox, 314 S.C. 512, 431 S.E.2d 267, 270 (Ct.App.1993). This precept mandates that “[f]ailure to speak when fair dealing requires one to do so may amount to a suppression of a fact which should have been disclosed, and constitute a fraud.” Gardner v. Nash, 225 S.C. 303, 82 S.E.2d 123, 127 (1954). Thus, if Chrysler suppressed a material fact that duty obligated it to disclose, it effectively made a false representation. See Landvest Assocs. v. Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1981). Accordingly, state and federal law imposed on Chrysler a duty to disclose. The Court rejects Chrysler’s argument to the effect that it was incumbent upon Mr. Jimenez to make a separate claim for negligent misrepresentation by omission. A claim for negligent misrepresentation embraces both misrepresentation by omission and commission. See id. at 434. In addition, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff failed to plead a breach of the duty to disclose. See Complaint ¶ 35. In any event, the Court finds that the issue of negligent misrepresentation by omission, if arguendo not framed by the pleadings, was tried by the implied consent of the parties. There was abundant evidence of both the duty to disclose the latch hazard and Chrysler’s breach of this duty by failing to disclose the hazard, much of it not objected to by Chrysler during the course of the trial. See, e.g., Tr. 740, 744-45; Deposition of Jerome Mitchell, at 133-34. Nor did Chrysler challenge the articulation of “non-disclosure” as presented in both opening statement and in closing arguments. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), an issue tried by the implied consent of the parties shall be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. An amendment of the pleadings may be made as necessary to conform them to the evidence, and this may be done even after judgment. Application of these principles compels the conclusion that Mr. Jimenez succeeded in establishing a false affirmative representation and Chrysler’s silence in the face of a duty to speak operated as an active fraud. Chrysler’s silence was tantamount to fraud. See Lawson v. C & S National Bank of S.C., 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1972); Gardner, 82 S.E.2d at 127. In arguing that there was no reliance, Chrysler also argues that Plaintiff could not rely upon advertisements viewed by Ms. Barrientos as evidence of some representation of fact because, according to Chrysler, those representations were mere opinion, for which a tort claim will not he. The Court rejects this argument for multiple reasons. First, Chrysler’s failure to disclose the existence of a known safety defect to consumers, including Mr. Jimenez and Ms. Barrientos, had nothing to do with opinion. Second, affirmative touting by Chrysler of the “safety” of its minivans was not a mere expression of opinion, particularly given Chrysler’s knowledge of the flimsy rear door latch and its clear safety implications. In distinguishing a misrepresentation from an opinion, a court examines the defendant’s pecuniary interest in the transaction, defendant’s expertise or knowledge, the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and the circumstances of the transaction. See AMA Management Corp. v. Strasburger, 309 S.C. 213, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Ct.App.1992). If the defendant “possesses expertise or special knowledge that would ordinarily make it reasonable for another to rely on his judgment,” then his statements constitute representations, not opinion. Id. (citations omitted). Chrysler possessed a pecuniary interest in its misrepresentations because it sold the minivans, reaping substantial profits, and making statements “in the course of [its] business, profession, or employment is sufficient to show [Chrysler] has a pecuniary interest....” See id. (citations omitted). Chrysler enjoyed special expertise and knowledge concerning the minivan, namely that it contained a defective rear door latch, but it did not impart this knowledge to the Jimenez family. As for the relationship between the parties, Chrysler maintained all the advantages: size, superior knowledge and access to information. The Court finds, therefore, Chrysler’s statements and silence, when it had a duty to speak, constituted misrepresentations of fact, not mere opinion. Chrysler’s also challenges the negligent,misrepresentation claim, arguing that Plaintiff Jimenez failed to prove pecuniary loss. This court notes that although the jury instructions referred to pecuniary loss as an element of the tort, that was not a complete description of the law. Under South Carolina law, a plaintiff prosecuting a negligent misrepresentation claim that entails physical injury or death is not required to show pecuniary loss. See, e.g., Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 324 S.C. 269, 478 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1996); Restatement (Second) Torts § 311 cmt. c (1977). For example, in Evans, the South Carolina Supreme court recently reiterated that “ ‘[t]he recovery of damages may be predicated upon a negligently-made false statement where a party suffers either injury or loss as a consequence of relying upon the representation.’ ” Evans, 478 S.E.2d at 848 (citation omitted; emphasis added). It is only where the plaintiff seeks to recover a pecuniary loss that he must prove such loss. See Harrington v. Mikell, 321 S.C. 518, 469 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ct.App.1996). Mr. Jimenez sought to recover only the intangible damage he and Barrientos suffered from the loss of their son — not any pecuniary loss. Consistent with this, the special verdict form that the parties agreed upon expressly put the case to the jury on the basis that a negligent misrepresentation claim was established if the misrepresentation and reliance proximately resulted in Sergio’s death. The verdict form, which never mentioned pecuniary loss, was correct. The negligent misrepresentation claim properly went to the jury and this court declines to award judgment as a matter of law to the defendant on this issue. C. Plaintiffs Claim for Punitive Damages Defendant also argues that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate as to punitive damages. According to Defendant, there is insufficient evidence to support punitive damages in any amount against Chrysler on any of Plaintiffs claims. This court finds that a jury easily could have found in the evidence presented a basis for punitive damages under the appropriate standard of clear and convincing proof. There was evidence of conduct by Defendant that the jury could have reasonably deemed willful, wanton or reckless. 1. Negligent design Chrysler specifically argues that Plaintiffs claim of negligent design is not a basis for punitive damages. According to Defendant, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that at the time the tort was allegedly committed, Defendant was then conscious of the conduct as an invasion of Plaintiffs rights. This court disagrees. Plaintiff produced evidence showing that before the original sale of the Jimenez minivan, Chrysler was conscious of the danger of the flimsy latch with an unheaded striker that it had installed in the minivan’s rear door. First, as a general matter, punitive damages are recoverable under a negligent design cause of action. While South Carolina law does not permit the imposition of punitive damages for mere negligent conduct, (see, e.g., Carter v. R.L. Jordan Oil Co., Inc., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (Ct.App.1990)), South Carolina law does permit the imposition of punitive damages if the conduct at issue is willful, wanton or reckless. See, e.g., Scott v. Fruehauf Corp., 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1990). Further, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has explained that conduct is willful, wanton, or reckless if “committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiffs rights.” Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 479 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1996). Thus, “[a] conscious failure to exercise due care constitutes willfulness.” Id. Material for purposes of imposing punitive damages in conjunction with negligence is that “the tort-feasor be conscious, or chargeable with consciousness, of his wrongdoing.” Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258, 264 (1958). Moreover, by special verdict form, the jury determined by clear and convincing evidence that Chrysler’s conduct was “reckless, willful or wanton,” and exhibited a “conscious failure to exercise reasonable care.” The jury awarded punitive damages, therefore, based not on mere negligence, but on the egregious level of conduct that South Carolina law requires. In this case, the jury could have taken from the evidence that Chrysler’s initial design of the latch, its failure to test that design, the subsequent cover-up, and Chrysler’s longstanding failure to disclose the defect, while selling “safety” to its customers, were each reckless and provided sufficient support for a finding of punitive damages. Secondly, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, there was evidence presented showing that before the original sale of the Jimenez minivan, Chrysler was, at least, chargeable with consciousness of the danger associated with the flimsy latch with an unheaded striker. Chrysler minivans manufactured in model years 1984-88 are the only passenger vehicles available in the United States, since the 1960’s, that fail to use a striker post with an upset head in a striker-style door latch. (Tr. 520-21, 746; Deposition of Donald Lordo, at 99-100) Emerson Krantz (“Krantz”), Chrysler’s chief latch designer, testified that during the development of the minivan, Chrysler engineers advocated using a headed striker, but Chrysler’s product planning department rejected the idea, ostensibly because the head of a headed striker post might “snag” items being placed inside the minivan. (Deposition of Emerson Krantz, at 167-68.) Additionally, the evidence showed that the latch Chrysler chose to use in the rear door of its minivans did not meet the then-current federal government latch strength standards for passenger door and cargo door latches, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (“FMVSS”) 206. Further, Chrysler performed no safety testing relating either to the danger of passenger ejection from the rear door or rear door latch failure. (Deposition of William Shol-lenberger, at' 87-88; deposition of Emerson Krantz, at 48, 52-53, 326, 336, 366-67; deposition of James V. Tracy, at 129-30; Tr. 2290-91) It is legitimately inferable from the evidence presented that Chrysler could have understood the consequences of its choice to place the headless striker in its minivan rear doors fairly soon after the minivan was introduced. The first known incident in which the rear door of a Chrysler minivan is alleged improperly to have'opened, resulting in the ejection of a passenger through the rear door opening, occurred in 1985. (Deposition of LouAnn Van Der Weile, at 53-54.) Also in 1985 — the year that the Jimenez minivan was manufactured — Chrysler’s engineering department was ordered to and did conduct a comprehensive study on how to strengthen the rear door latch and supporting structure. Krantz, who was chief engineer at the time, prepared the drawings necessary to complete these design modifications and forwarded the design drawings to his superiors. He then heard nothing further concerning the latch modification project, even though his department had devoted over a month to the project. Evidence was presented that, if Chrysler had acknowledged that the 1984 latch design was defective, the company would have had to recall its many minivans sold to date and would have had to stop selling its current inventory of its popular new product until the problem was remedied. (Deposition of William Randall Edwards, at 79.) Chrysler chose not to acknowledge the problem. Further, all documents related to the proposed 1985 latch redesign were destroyed by Chrysler. (Deposition of Emerson Krantz, at 112-17, 120-22, 124-25, 417-18.) The result was that the minivans manufactured in 1985, like that of Plaintiff, contained a headless striker as a part of the latch mechanism and a trunk-quality, as opposed to passenger car door or cargo door quality latch. Further, there was evidence establishing that Chrysler’s failure to remedy the rear door latch problem continued after the Jimenez vehicle was manufactured. The evidence showed that sometime around January 1988, without any public statement, Chrysler began using a striker post with an upset head in the rear door latches of its mid-year 1988 and later models. (Tr.2510) Chrysler instituted this modification as a “running change,” replacing parts on the assembly line in mid-1988 rather than waiting for the next model year when it normally implemented ordinary design changes. Chrysler’s designated corporate witness on this design change issue testified under oath, however, that (1) Chrysler did not know why the change was made, (2) no documents exist regarding the change, and (8) no Chrysler employees could recall why the change was implemented. (Deposition of Jerome Mitchell, Jr., at 15-16, 20, 27, 29-30, 68, 65-66, 126-30, 147, 151, 155; Plaintiffs exhibit 142.) The evidence revealed Chrysler did conduct some crash testing of its minivans in the 1982-83 pre-production time period. These tests, however, did not test the rear door latch, but rather were designed to ensure that the minivan satisfied federal fuel tank integrity standards. Under a Chrysler’s internal procedure, all crash tests are filmed, detailed written and computer reports are prepared by Chrysler test engineers, and the films and reports are stored for future reference. Such films and reports capture and document everything that occurs, including parts failures during such tests, not just facts relating specifically to fuel tank integrity. However, curiously, on October 19, 1988— the same year that Chrysler added headed strikers to new minivans, and while there were at least three minivan rear door ejection claims pending in litigation against Chrysler (Plaintiffs exhibit 57A; see also Deposition of LouAnn Van Der Weile, at 37-38, 112-14) — Chrysler shredded and burned all videotapes and written reports of crash tests involving left side impacts (like the incident here), and purged all computer codes showing component failures in those tests. (Deposition of William Shollenberger, at 238-40, 253-54, 265-66; deposition of Mark W. Crossman, at 85-86.) While Chrysler argued that this was a routine purge, the jury could have easily drawn other conclusions. In April 1990, Chrysler received a letter from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) in which NHTSA told Chrysler that its data showed that minivan rear doors were about four times more likely to open in an accident than were the front doors. (Plaintiffs exhibit 39.) At that same time, the evidence showed that Chrysler was on notice of at least seven separate cases of alleged minivan liftgate openings, resulting in injuries or death. (Plaintiffs exhibit 57A.) Soon thereafter, an internal Chrysler engineering study revealed that the rear door latches in Chrysler minivans were significantly weaker than the rear door latches in the minivans of Chrysler’s domestic competitors. (Plaintiffs exhibit 129.) In July 1990, there were at least ten claims against Chrysler involving deaths or serious injuries that were attributed to rear door ejections from minivans about which Chrysler was aware. (Plaintiffs exhibit 57A.) In that same month, Henry Cook (“Cook”) of Chrysler’s engineering department wrote a memorandum to John Nemeth, then general manager of Chrysler’s minivan platform, acknowledging the fact that Chrysler’s rear door latch failed to meet Ford, GM, or FMVSS 206 performance specifications. (Deposition of Henry George Cook, at 61-63; deposition of Ronald Blazic, at 88-89; Plaintiffs exhibit 8.) Cook stated in his memorandum that production of a latch meeting FMVSS 206 would take thirty-two weeks to implement and would result in a piece cost penalty of approximately 26c to 50c per latch and a tooling cost, covering parts suppliers, of approximately $125,000. (Plaintiffs exhibit 8.) Despite these findings, Cook recommended that Chrysler avoid improving the latch, because correcting the latch would undercut the position Chrysler was taking in response to NHTSA’s 1990 inquiry. Even after the initial inquiry by NHTSA, the evidence showed that Chrysler continued to disregard or dispute information establishing the defective nature and problems with its minivans’ rear door latch, and also continued to refuse to correct the problem. Evidence was presented at trial showing that in 1992, for example, a Chrysler’s “liftgate latch work team” concluded that Chrysler’s latch was conspicuously weak, especially compared to the latches of its competitors. (Tr. 1474-75) Not,only did Chrysler refuse to take any action, it took the affirmative step of directing its employees not to write anything down about the latch. (Tr. 1480-81) In January 1993, at a time when at least twenty-one claims were pending against Chrysler involving alleged rear door openings and ejections (Plaintiffs exhibit 57A), Chrysler formed a minivan “Safety Leadership Team,” with Paul Sheridan (“Sheridan”) serving as chairman. (Tr.1465) While Chrysler strongly disputed his testimony, Sheridan testified at trial that, on one occasion, he was ordered to pick up and destroy minutes of a Safety Leadership Team meeting where the subject of the latch and other problems were discussed. (Tr. 1484-85.) Sheridan testified further, again without rebuttal by Chrysler, that, in approximately February 1993, Chrysler’s latch problems interfered with its own internal tests of components on the minivan. For instance, Chrysler test managers duct-taped the rear doors shut before Chrysler bumper tests because, otherwise, the rear doors opened on impact. Sheridan testified that in reviewing these tests Chrysler personnel joked that Chrysler had to use duct tape to keep the test equipment from being ejected out of the rear of the minivan “but we didn’t have a latch adequate enough to keep [people] from falling out of the back.” (Tr.1480) In April 1993, Chrysler management rejected yet another proposal by Chrysler’s minivan Safety Leadership Team to improve the latch. Sheridan testified that a Chrysler official told him that if Chrysler changed the latch at that point it “would indict everything we have done in the field.” (Tr.1535) After a 1993 collision in Fairfax, Virginia, involving a liftgate opening and fatal ejection, NHTSA commenced a formal investigation of Chrysler’s minivan rear door latch. In February 1994, immediately pri- or to the accident involved in this case, Chrysler knew about more than thirty claims involving alleged rear door openings, ejections and injuries or death. (Plaintiffs exhibit 57A.) Although on notice that its latch design was defective, Chrysler did not cure the defect nor even warn its customers of the danger. Sheridan testified that he was told instead “that ship has sailed. We told you that last time, next subject.” (Tr.1539) On November 17, 1994, after the accident at issue in this case, NHTSA provided senior Chrysler executives with a preview of the report that it intended to make public in connection with its investigation of Chrysler latches. NHTSA’s initial draft report documented a series of crash tests showing that the Chrysler minivan rear door latch failed just as it had in the Jimenez accident, by sliding “up and over” the unheaded striker, causing crash test dummies to fly over the rear seat and through the open rear door. (Plaintiffs exhibits 33 and 140.) At that same November 17, 1994 meeting, NHTSA officials showed Chrysler’s representatives overhead slides, later memorialized in a document entitled “Chrysler Minivan Liftgate Latch Failure — Investigation Review.” On the last page of that document, under the heading “Conclusions,” NHTSA told Chrysler: “The latch failure is a safety defect that involves children.” (Plaintiffs exhibit 36.) Evidence was presented showing that Chrysler did not agree with NHTSA’s findings and instead of notifying consumers of the safety defect and taking some corrective action in response, Chrysler intensified its efforts to minimize and conceal the problem. In this regard, Chrysler’s Vice Chairman, Tom Dennome (“Dennome”), persuaded The Detroit News not to print a story scheduled for publication concerning the latch. (Plaintiffs exhibit 274; see also, Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 82-83.) Dennome also wrote to Robert Eaton (“Eaton”), Chrysler’s Chief Executive Officer, in a “Confidential and Privileged” memorandum that, “[i]f we want to use political pressure to try to squash a recall letter, we need to go now.” (Plaintiffs exhibit 274.) Although Eaton denied at trial that Chrysler ever held settlement discussions with NHTSA (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 85), or that Chrysler had believed that NHTSA would find a defect, Jimenez introduced documents at trial showing that Chrysler was discussing “settlement” with NHTSA (Plaintiffs exhibit 271) and showing that Chrysler rated the chances of NHTSA dropping the defect issue at “zero.” (Plaintiffs exhibit 323) While Eaton also denied that NHTSA had “insisted” that Chrysler replace latches with stronger, safer ones, Mr. Jimenez introduced a document that Chrysler had received a letter from NHTSA that said just that. (Plaintiffs exhibit 35) Chrysler did not end up having to recall its minivans to fix the latch, but was instead allowed by NHTSA to conduct a voluntary service action to replace the defective liftgate latches. In nationwide advertising informing consumers of the service action, however, Chrysler suggested that the service action was not due to a problem with the latch. Chrysler’s “1-800 MINIVAN” hotline, ostensibly set up to answer consumer questions regarding the minivan and facilitate expeditious completion of the service action, similarly used a script that sought to downplay the latch problem. ' (Plaintiffs exhibits 35, 48 and 322.) Only after pressure from NHTSA did Chrysler alter its misleading message to consumers. (Plaintiffs exhibits 35 and 48.) The message from the highest echelons of Chrysler management, however, never has changed. Notwithstanding all of the evidence described above, Eaton testified under oath that he has no hesitation stating that the latch is not defective and that NHTSA never concluded otherwise. (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 69-70, 90.) Eaton gave these same assurances to consumers regarding the critical issue of the safety of their vehicles, even though he, a highly-experienced automotive engineer: (1) never looked at the latch (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 40, 134); (2) did not know an unheaded striker existed in the latch until the day of his deposition (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 20-21); (3) did not know or, according to him, care how Chrysler’s latch compared to the strength of all of the competitors’ latches or to FMVSS 206 (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 31-35, 67); (4) never saw (except on television) any actual NHTSA crash tests related to Chrysler minivans (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 134-35); (5) never read the NHTSA conclusions that the latch is a safety defect that involves children (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 78-79, 85); and (6) after receiving a letter from a man whose son, while still strapped in his seat, had been ejected from a minivan, did nothing to investigate why the latch had opened in the accident, and said simply that accidents happen and people get hurt (Deposition of Robert Eaton, at 55-56). From this lengthy recitation of facts with all legitimate inferences in Plaintiffs favor, it is clear that there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that Chrysler acted recklessly when it designed the minivan rear door latch in 1984. Moreover, Chrysler’s conduct during 1985 — the year the Jimenez vehicle was manufactured and the year of the first known ejection from the rear of a Chrysler minivan — further buttresses this conclusion. Additionally, Chrysler’s post-design conduct also supports the jury’s imposition of punitive damages. Chrysler asserts, however, that the punitive damages award cannot rest upon post design conduct because post-design conduct cannot prove that Chrysler was conscious of a failure to exercise due care at the time it designed the latch. This court does not agree. To begin with, this court has just set forth the evidence that the jury could reasonably have relied upon to determine that Chrysler was reckless in 1984 and before when it initially designed and failed to test the rear door latch of the minivan. Further, flagrant post-marketing misbehavior long has been viewed as one of the basic grounds for assessing punitive damages against manufacturers for defective products. See generally David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L.Rev. 1257, 1352-61, 1371 (1976) (if “manufacturers actually aware of serious product hazards refuse to adopt feasible and inexpensive corrective measures plainly called for in light of the substantial risk,” they behave in a manner that reflects a flagrant indifference to the public safety that should be punished and deterred). In this case, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could have determined that Chrysler had subsequent knowledge of problems with the latch and was unwilling to correct the design defect or notify consumers of the situation. The evidence presented by Plaintiff could reasonably have been viewed by the jury as showing conscious efforts to conceal the problem. That post-design conduct, impliedly intended to preserve profits (even a 10% drop in sales in one year would have cost the company, on average, approximately $150 million) and to avoid the cost of a recall (at least $115 million), provides an additional sufficient ground for awarding punitive damages. 2. Negligent Misrepresentation Chrysler also argues that punitive damages were unrecoverable under Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation cause of action. However, this court finds that it is well-settled that a claim of negligent misrepresentation can support an award of punitive damages if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently egregious. See Scott v. Fruehauf Corp., 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1990) (stating that punitive damages can be recovered in negligence suits if negligence is sufficiently egregious); Lengel v. Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc., 286 S.C. 515, 334 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ct.App.1985) (holding that a plaintiff can recover punitive damages in a negligent misrepresentation claim if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently egregious). As with the negligent design claim, this Court finds that viewing the facts with all legitimate inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the jury could reasonably find clear and convincing evidence to support the award of punitive damages for the negligent misrepresentation claim. Jimenez offered advertisements portraying the minivan with the defective liftgate latch as safe. See, e.g., Plaintiffs exhibits 237, 239 and 242. Eaton testified that all Chrysler minivans expressly were held out to the public with “promises of safety,” because representing the minivan as safe was “critical” to its “image.” Eaton testified further that consumers absolutely have a right to expect safe minivans. There was evidence presented, from which the jury could infer that, well before Sergio’s death, Chrysler was fully aware of the defect in its minivan latches and actually covered it up. In addition, Elwell testified that Chrysler had a duty to inform customers that the minivan was defective. Chrysler’s silence in the face of clear knowledge and understanding of the defect and destruction of materials potentially documenting its culpability could easily have been deemed by the jury to demonstrate Chrysler’s knowledge of information that it consciously failed to impart. Such conduct operates as an affirmative misrepresentation or fraud. Such evidence constituted clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Chrysler’s reliance on Saval v. BL Ltd,., 710 F.2d 1027 (4th Cir.1983) (per curiam), in this regard, is misplaced. In Saval, plaintiffs who purchased automobiles sought punitive damages under Maryland law because the automobiles failed to operate as warranted. Id. at 1033-34. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to punitive damages because their case properly was characterized as “a breach of warranty case with, perhaps fraudulent overtones.” Id. at 1034 Importantly, the court noted that the plaintiffs had not suffered “personal injuries arising from products defects,” which generally is the predicate for awarding punitive damages for defective products. Id. According to the court, the automobiles failed to “live up to their expectations or the [defendant’s] boasts” and were not “patent lies” that could support an award of punitive damages. Id. Unlike Saval, this is not a breach of warranty case, but a tort case. Also, unlike Saval, the defective product here caused a death. According to Saval, the existence of personal injury is what distinguishes cases in which punitive damages are appropriate. Id. Finally, there was evidence presented in support of Plaintiffs contention that Chrysler engaged in “patent lies,” not mere boasts, in that the jury could have determined from the evidence presented that Chrysler consciously placed a defective product containing a known defect in the stream of commerce, misrepresented that product as safe, and concealed for years its knowledge of the defect. Accordingly, this Court holds that Chrysler is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. III. DEFENDANT’S RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Defendant alternatively makes a motion for new trial based upon certain “substantial errors” in the admission or rejection of evidence which affect Chrysler’s substantial rights and based upon the argument that the jury’s award of damages was the result of passion and prejudice. Alternatively, Chrysler argues for remittitur. A. Standard for New Trial under Rule 59 On a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a), FRCP, however, it is the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict, and grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict. Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs., Co., 836 F.2d 194, 196 (4th Cir.1987). A remittitur, used in connection with Rule 59(a), is the established method by which a trial judge can review a jury award for excessiveness. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587 (4th Cir.1996). In a remittitur the court orders a new trial unless the plaintiff accepts a reduction of an excessive jury award. Id. If a court finds a jury award excessive, it is the court’s duty to require a remittitur or order a new trial. Id.,citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Wkrs., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65-66, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966). B. Errors in the Admission or Rejection of Evidence Chrysler argues that its substantial rights were affected by this court’s admission and or rejection of certain specific evidence in this case. Specifically, Chrysler points to rulings of the court regarding the 1) exclusion of evidence concerning the underlying accident 2) admission of evidence regarding the strength of certain liftgate latches, and, 3) admission of evidence of post-accident conduct by Chrysler and the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration. 1. Evidence concerning the underlying accident Chrysler challenges this court’s evidentiary rulings disallowing evidence of fault and seatbelt usage in the underlying accident. Chrysler argues that by preventing it from introducing evidence that Ms. Barrientos may have been at fault in the accident, that Chrysler was also prevented from proving Ms. Barrientos comparatively liable for Sergio’s death under Plaintiffs negligent design and negligent misrepresentation claims. This court finds that the evidence of fault in the underlying accident was properly excluded. Further, to the extent that Chrysler now also proffers Barrientos’s alleged negligence as relevant to damages issues, such as emotional distress, why the family dissolved, and the like, Chrysler never proffered relevance on that basis before. The argument therefore is waived. Ms. Barrientos allegedly failed to obey a traffic signal. Because Plaintiffs claims focus on the crashworthiness of the minivan, any alleged negligence on Ms. Bar-rientos’s part is irrelevant and properly excluded. Additionally, the Court finds that the potential for prejudice and confusion if that evidence had been introduced would have outweighed its probative value. This issue turns on an interpretation of South Carolina law. South Carolina is at the forefront of imposing liability on defectively designed automobiles that exacerbate injury because of a design defect. Indeed, South Carolina was one of the very first states to adopt the crashworthiness doctrine. See Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173, 187 (1969). Since Mickle, many other courts have adopted the crashworthiness doctrine. See, e.g., Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1990); Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Fla.1981); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 577 (1981); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga.App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470, 477 (1984). The crashworthiness doctrine imposes liability on automobile manufacturers for design defects that enhance, rather than cause, injuries. See Mickle, 166 S.E.2d at 187-88. The doctrine applies if a design defect, not causally connected to the collision, results in injuries greater than those that would have resulted were there no design defect. See id. The issue for purposes of a crashwor-thiness case, therefore, is enhancement of injuries, not the precipitating cause of the collision. In Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir.1998), the Fourth Circuit applied the crashworthiness doctrine to conclude that an automobile driver’s intoxication was irrelevant for purposes of determining liability in the context of an allegedly defective fuel tank system that enhanced his injuries but did not cause the collision. As the court explained, a driver’s negligence does not absolve an automobile manufacturer of the duty “to reduce the risk of ‘secondary impact injuries.’ ” Id. at 288, quoting Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118, 127 (1975). Applying Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit therefore has recognized, in at least one context, that a driver’s fault in operating an automobile cannot be held against him under the crashwor-thiness doctrine. The question of contributory negligence as a defense to a negligence claim pertaining to crashworthiness, however, was not before the Fourth Circuit in Binakonsky, because the plaintiff did not contest the point below. Moreover, the case was governed by Maryland law, which differs in material respects from South Carolina law. First, Maryland, unlike South Carolina, is a contributory negligence, rather than comparative negligence, jurisdiction. While the concept of “enhanced injuries” adequately addresses the respective responsibilities of the parties in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, it works less well in an all-or-nothing contributory negligence jurisdiction. Second, in Maryland, unlike in South Carolina, a plaintiff has no need to press negligence claims in the crashworthiness setting, because he can get full relief, including punitive damages, under a strict liability claim. Owens-Illinois Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633, 655 (1992). The presence of such a framework for recovery in Maryland ensures keeping the responsibility on the manufacturer for failing to design a crash-worthy vehicle. As this Court interprets the law; in South Carolina, the same ultimate result is obtained by the conclusion that comparative negligence in causing an accident is not a defense to a negligence claim pertaining to crashworthiness. It follows that Ms. Barrientos’s alleged negligence should not operate against the Jimenez family. See Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1992); Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 796 P.2d 1092, 1095-96 (1990). Given that the crashworthiness doctrine entails liability for enhanced injuries because of design defect, in such a case, a collision is presumed. The Mickle court established this principle in South Carolina law some time ago: It is a matter of common knowledge that a high incidence of injury-producing motor vehicle collisions is a dread concomitant of travel upon our streets and highways, and that a significant proportion of all automobiles produced are involved in such smashups at sometime [sic] during their use. Thus, an automobile manufacturer knows with certainty that many users of his product will be involved in collisions, and that the incidence and extent of injury to them will frequently be determined by the placement, design and construction of such interior components as shafts, levers, knobs, handles and others. By ordinary negligence standards, a known risk of harm raises a duty of commensurate care. We perceive no reason in logic or law why an automobile manufacturer should be exempt from this duty. 166 S.E.2d at 185. See also Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.1968); Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230. Distilling these precepts, the relevant issue is that Chrysler is charged with foreseeing that the minivan would be involved in a traffic accident and that a defective rear door latch could exacerbate an injury — or cause a death — regardless of any conduct by a driver or a passenger of the minivan. Under this rubric, any alleged negligence by Barrientos is remote — and thus irrelevant — and hence properly excluded. It should be noted that, applying this same rule, several courts have concluded that any form of fault or negligence by a driver or passenger of an automobile is immaterial under the crashworthiness doctrine. See, e.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Marinelli, 628 So.2d 378, 385 (Ala.1993); Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 229-30; Andrews, 796 P.2d at 1095-96. As the Reed court explained: The [crashworthiness] theory, which presupposes the occurrence of accidents precipitated for myriad reasons, focuses alone on the enhancement of resulting injuries. The [theory] does not pretend that the design defect had anything to do with causing the accident. It is enough if the design defect increased the damages. So any participation by the plaintiff in bringing the accident about is quite beside the point. Reed, 494 N.W.2d at 230. Therefore, while there is a divergence of opinion on the issue, the better-reasoned rule is to exclude any evidence relating to Ms. Barrientos’s alleged negligence. First of all, such a rule intrinsically dovetails with the crashworthiness doctrine: Because a collision is presumed, and enhanced injury is foreseeable as a result of the design defect, the triggering factor of the accident is simply irrelevant. Secondly, the concept of “enhanced injury” effectively apportions fault and damages on a comparative basis; defendant is liable only for the increased injury caused by its own conduct, not for the injury resulting from the crash itself. Further, the alleged negligence causing the collision is legally remote from, and thus not the legal cause of, the enhanced injury caused by a defective part that was supposed to be designed to protect in case of a collision. Chrysler’s claim that evidence of contributory fault should have been allowed with respect to its negligent misrepresentation claim also is without merit. First, Chrysler never argued that the evidence it was offering, if excludable in a crashwor-thiness case, nevertheless was relevant to support a defense to a negligent misrepresentation claim. The Court must be apprized of the grounds on which evidence is sought to be introduced in order for it to make an appropriate ruling. Chryslers argument in this regard, not having been raised earlier, now is waived. Moreover, since the gravamen of Plaintiffs claim was that Chrysler touted safety while concealing a known defect in the car, any alleged negligence by Ms. Barrientos in connection with the operation of the vehicle is too remote, for proximate cause purposes, to be a defense to the negligent misrepresentation claim. The court holds, therefore, that evidence of any alleged fault by Ms. Barrientos regarding her alleged failure to obey a traffic signal properly was excluded. Consequently, Chrysler is not entitled to a new trial on this ground. Chrysler also argues that this Court erred in limiting the evidence concerning seatbelt use in the underlying accident. This court limited evidence regarding seat-belts to the fact that the minivan was equipped with them. (See this court’s September 9, 1997 order on motions in limine at p. 6) Chrysler argues that the ruling precluded evidence that was relevant to 1) the determination of whether the minivan was unreasonably dangerous / crashworthiness, 2) legal causation, and 3) damages. Respecting crashworthiness, Chrysler contends that the jury may have speculated that Sergio was thrown from the minivan despite his wearing a seatbelt. As to causation, Chrysler asserts that the evidence was necessary to show that Chrysler could not be liable for Sergio’s death because had he been wearing a seat-belt, Sergio would not have been thrown from the minivan. With regard to damages, Chrysler argues that had Sergio been wearing a seatbelt, he would not have died and that punitive damages are not appropriate in such circumstances. Plaintiff agreed that evidence demonstrating that the minivan was equipped with seatbelts was admissible. According to Mr. Jimenez, however, under South Carolina law, absent a statutory duty to wear a seatbelt, failure to wear seatbelts may not be introduced to establish fault or pre-injury avoidable consequences. This court agrees. In ruling on the pre-trial motion to limit evidence of seatbelt use, this Court relied on Keaton v. Pearson, 292 S.C. 579, 358 S.E.2d 141 (S.C.1987), to conclude that the only relevant evidence of seatbelts in this litigation was that the minivan was equipped with seatbelts. In Keaton, the Supreme Court of South Carolina unequivocally held that “[i]n the absence of an affirmative statutory duty, a plaintiffs failure to use a seatbelt does not constitute contributory negligence or pre-injury failure to minimize damages.” Id. at 141. Chrysler argues that Keaton does not limit evidence of seatbelt use relevant to other uses such as legal causation and the determination of unreasonably dangerous. While Keaton may not definitively resolve the precise issue presented here, several jurisdictions have rejected the cramped interpretation of seatbelt gag statutes offered by Chrysler. See, e.g., Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 437-40 (3d Cir.1992) (holding under Pennsylvania law that plaintiffs non-use of a seatbelt was inadmissible for purposes of liability or minimizing damages in products liability action); Horn v. General Motors Carp., 17 Cal.3d 359, 131 Cal.Rptr. 78, 551 P.2d 398, 404 (1976) (en banc) (holding that the plaintiffs failure to wear a seatbelt could not be introduced by the defendant for purposes of proving that the plaintiff was negligent or that the defendant’s conduct was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 722-23 (D.C.Ct.App.1976) (holding improper an instruction that non-use of seat-belt constitutes negligence by plaintiff); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Macias by Macias, 507 So.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1987) (ruling that a child’s non-use of seatbelt could not be introduced by the defendant as to causation because seatbelts were not a contributing factor to the accident); State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ind.1981) (holding that non-use of a seatbelt is inadmissible as to minimizing damages); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1997) (concluding that no evidence of plaintiffs failure to use a seatbelt may be introduced for any reason); Hagwood v. Odom, 88 N.C.App. 513, 364 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1988) (holding that evidence of a plaintiffs failure to use a seatbelt could not be introduced against him for purposes of liability or limiting damages); Vogel v. Wells, 57 Ohio St.3d 91, 566 N.E.2d 154, 158-59 (1991) (ruling that evidence of non-use of a seatbelt is inadmissible as to liability and damages); Wright v. Hanley, 182 W.Va. 334, 387 S.E.2d 801, 803-04 (1989) (opining that instruction based on non-use of a seatbelt is improper for purposes of comparative fault). This Court concludes that South Carolina law would follow the reasoning and holdings of these courts that evidence of seatbelt usage is inadmissible respecting crashworthiness, causation, and punitive damages. This court disagrees that Hinkamp v. American Motors Corp., 735 F.Supp. 176 (E.D.N.C.1989), aff'd, 900 F.2d 252 (4th Cir.1990) (unpublished) (per curiam), a case argued by Chrysler, is authority for admitting evidence of seatbelt non-use under South Carolina law. Hinkamp did not involve a seat belt issue. Moreover, it was decided under the law of North Carolina, which, in contrast to South Carolina, has been resistant even to recognizing a crash-worthiness cause of action. Id. at 177. In fact, under North Carolina law, a plaintiffs contributory negligence will bar him from recovery if he contributes to just one of the proximate causes of his injury. See id. at 178, citing Badders v. Lassiter, 240 N.C. 413, 82 S.E.2d 357 (1954)). South Carolina does not observe this harsh rule, but provides instead for comparative negligence. Finally, this court notes that Hin-kamp does not appear correctly to reflect North Carolina law on the seatbelt issue. In Hagwood v. Odom, 88 N.C.App. 513, 364 S.E.2d 190, 191-92 (1988), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a plaintiffs failure to wear a seatbelt could not be introduced against him for purposes of liability or avoidable consequences as to damages. These distinctions render Hin-kamp inapposite. Chrysler’s concern that the jury may have speculated that Sergio was belted at the time of the collision and that the seat-belt failed is paradoxical. Chrysler objected during Plaintiffs opening statement when Plaintiffs counsel told the jury that Sergio’s sister “saw that he was clipped in.” Plaintiffs counsel explained at side bar that he also intended to tell the jury that Sergio was not belted at the time of the collision, but Chrysler objected to any further comment at all. (Tr. 52-53, 57, 67, 69-70, 74-75, 79-80) This Court issued curative instructions which operated to remedy any possible impropriety. See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 913 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1065, 116 S.Ct. 749, 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996) (holding that a district court’s curative instructions to the jury with respect to a prosecutor’s statements cured any possible prejudice of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights). Further, as the evidence was presented, the clear implication before the jury throughout the trial was that Sergio had not been belted at the time of the accident. Finally, regardless of the above, Chrysler could not rely upon its use of seatbelts in the design of its minivan to excuse the fact that the rear door latch was not crash-worthy. It was undisputed at trial that, at the time the minivan was designed, Chrysler knew that only 12% of Americans utilized seatbelts, and even today only approximately 50% do. See Plaintiffs exhibit 86; Deposition of Emerson Krantz, 144-45, 525, 528-29. In South Carolina, for example, passengers are not even required to utilize seatbelts in rear seats that do not have shoulder harnesses, as is the case in the minivan at issue. Because lack of seatbelt use was well known to Chrysler, this Court finds, as a matte