Full opinion text
ORDER J.P. STADTMUELLER, District Judge. This case involves a host of claims made by a business against a competitor, as well as related standards-setting bodies and business leagues. In an effort to make something stick, plaintiff Edgenet, Inc., appears to have taken the kitchen-sink approach in its Second Amended Complaint (Docket # 43). Plaintiff has alleged seemingly every claim it can imagine: monopolization, racketeering, conspiracy, copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, consumer fraud, common law misappropriation, and unjust enrichment. In response, defendants GS1 U.S., Inc. (“GS1 U.S.”) and 1 SYNC, Inc. (“1 SYNC”) have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Docket # 56), supported by a brief (Docket # 57) that fights fire with fire by offering up its own kitchen-sink approach. Defendants American Hardware Manufacturers Association (“AHMA”) and GS1 AISBL join in the motion (Docket #’s 58, 59). The brief challenges nearly every aspect of every claim, leaving the court to determine to what extent this action will proceed, if at all. In conformance with the analysis below, the court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, allowing Counts VI and VII, the copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets claims, to survive. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In order to set the stage, the court will first outline the facts alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff is an information technology company that, among other things, operates “data pools” that aggregate, organize, and deliver data for clients. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3). A data pool acts as a central repository, allowing trading partners to share product data. See id. at ¶ 19. As the operator, plaintiff contracts with retailers as well as suppliers. Id. Plaintiff builds and maintains data pools for retailers containing data related to products they sell. Id. Additionally, suppliers also provide product data to plaintiff. Id. Retailers may then subscribe to particular suppliers’ data pools, operated by plaintiff, and have that product data added to the retailer’s data pool, also operated by plaintiff. Id. In order to standardize product data, many entities participate in the Global Data Synchronisation Network (“GDSN”). Id. at ¶ 18. The GDSN synchronizes product data between interconnected data pools. Data Synchronisation (GDSN), GS1, http://www.gsl.org/ gdsn/ds (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). The GDSN works by: (1) a seller registering product and company information in a data pool; (2) a portion of that data is sent to a global registry; (3) the buyer subscribes to receive a seller’s product information through its own data pool; and (4) the seller’s data pool shares the information with the buyer’s data pool. How Does GDSN Work, GS1, http://www.gsl.org/ gdsn/ds/how (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); see also (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19). Defendant GS1 AISBL controls the GDSN and the certification process that data pool operators such as plaintiff must undergo in order to operate a “GS1-GDSN certified” data pool. Id. at ¶ 18, 20. GS1 AISBL also controls the Global Standards Management Process (“GSMP”) used to develop product description standards for use in the GDSN. Id. at ¶ 20. In order to participate in the GDSN, a company must obtain a GSl-assigned “company prefix.” Id. at ¶ 21. For a U.S. business to obtain a company prefix, it must do so through defendant GS1 U.S., which is an independent member organization of GS1 AISBL, but also allegedly the “U.S. arm” of GS1 AISBL. Id. at ¶¶ 6,10, 21. In the dispute at hand, plaintiff specifically aggregates, categorizes, and serves up what it terms “basic supply-chain data,” such as product measurements, as well as “marketing data,” which may include images or certain product-specific information. Id. at ¶ 3. Supply-chain data is standardized through the GDSN, whereas marketing data is essentially proprietary. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Collectively, the court will refer to the combination of supply-chain and marketing data as “product data.” In order to provide marketing data, plaintiff developed the “Collection Taxonomy and Attributes” (“Master Collection”) to aggregate, organize, and distribute product data. Id. at ¶ 26. The Master Collection consists of a “collection taxonomy,” which is a system of organization that places products into a variety of categories and sub-categories, as well as “attributes” that detail various properties of a product. Id. In addition to cataloguing product properties, the attributes also include questions that plaintiff asks to collect the data, whether such questions are mandatory or optional, and the format of potential answers. Id. at ¶¶ 26-29. The Master Collection is the subject of federal copyright registration. Id. at ¶ 26, 32. Defendant 1 SYNC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant GS1 U.S., and operates data pool services accounting for approximately 85% of GSl-registered products in the United States. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 11, 22. Both GS1 U.S. and 1SYNC are currently tax-exempt non-profit organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6). Id. at ¶¶ 4, 22, 40, 41, 43. In the past, 1 SYNC has focused on collecting and delivering only supply-chain data, whereas plaintiff invested in developing data pools and systems to collect and deliver marketing data in addition to GDSN supply-chain data. Id. at ¶¶ 23-25. According to plaintiff, because of its innovative provision of marketing data, defendants GS1 AISBL, GS1 U.S., and 1SYNC began to see plaintiff as a threat and so set about to eliminate competition from plaintiff in a number of ways. Id. at ¶ 39. First, plaintiff alleges that GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC have falsely represented themselves as non-profit business leagues to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Id. at ¶¶ 41-53. As a result, plaintiff alleges that GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC have abused their tax-exempt status to maintain a monopoly over the data pool market. Id. at ¶¶ 54-61. GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC allegedly initiated a project intended to develop marketing data to add to the GDSN in an attempt to eliminate competition from other data pool providers that provide proprietary solutions, such as plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 55-59. Plaintiff alleges that GS1 U.S. and 1SYNC then set about effectuating this plan by engaging in exclusionary conduct, including the issuing of a press release stating their ability to satisfy the attribute needs of Home Depot, which had recently switched to plaintiff, through the GDSN. Id. at ¶ 60. According to plaintiff, this statement was false. Id. at ¶ 61. Next, plaintiff alleges that GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC abused their control over a standard-setting initiative to add the Master Collection to the GDSN. Id. at ¶ 62-63. Around November 2006, defendants GS1 U.S., 1SYNC and AHMA began the Hard-lines & Electronics Attribute Initiative (“HEAI”) in order to add marketing data to the GDSN. Id. at ¶ 64. The HEAI is allegedly intended to maintain monopoly power over the data pool market. Id. at ¶ 65. The process sought to develop marketing attributes to then be reviewed and approved by industry before implementation in the GDSN. Id. at ¶ 67. The project was slow to implement its first round of attributes — it took nearly fourteen months to develop marketing data for washing machines alone. Id. at ¶¶ 68-72. As a result, the defendants moved to shift the standard-setting process from AHMA control to a smaller, GSl-controlled group with less industry participation. Id. at ¶¶ 75-76. What appears to be the heart of plaintiffs complaint, however, occurred in 2008 when GS1 U.S., 1 SYNC and AHMA allegedly received a spreadsheet or series of spreadsheets (“Spreadsheet”) containing taxonomy categories and marketing attributes for a number of products. Id. at ¶ 77. The Spreadsheet is allegedly derived from the Master Collection. Id. GS1 U.S. then allegedly took the Spreadsheet and created a derivative work which was used to expedite addition of taxonomy categories and marketing attributes to the GDSN. Id. at ¶¶ 78-95. During this process of expedited addition, GS1 U.S., 1SYNC and AHMA allegedly made false representations regarding participation in the standard-setting process in order to conceal the source of the new standards, as well as to induce standard-setting participants to vote in favor of accepting new standards. Id. at ¶¶ 80, 83-88. Further, the process also resulted in GS1 AISBL, GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC causing AHMA to publish communications and documents containing copyrighted material to the GS1 website. Id. at ¶¶ 84-90, 93. Finally, plaintiff alleges that GS1 AISBL, GS1 U.S., and 1SYNC continue to: falsely represent the source of the new marketing data; threaten to continue to misuse plaintiffs proprietary information; and that GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC continue to misrepresent and abuse their tax-exempt status. Id. at ¶¶ 101-07. LEGAL STANDARD A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) asserts that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In order to survive the motion, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a “plausible” claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements” are insufficient, the complaint need only “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Put differently, plausibility requires only that a court be able to “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Facts that raise a “reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The court reads the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, and draws all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008). Factual allegations are presumed true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Legal conclusions are not entitled to this assumption of truth, but may provide a framework within which to work. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. ANALYSIS On the basis of the facts alleged, plaintiff sets out ten separate claims against the defendants. Against GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC, plaintiff alleges monopolization under federal and Wisconsin law, a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), civil conspiraey under RICO, violation of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act (“WOCCA”), copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets under Wisconsin law, violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, common law misappropriation, and common law unjust enrichment. Id. at ¶¶ 115-218. Plaintiff asserts claims for civil RICO conspiracy, copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, common law misappropriation, and unjust enrichment against GS1 AISBL. Id. at ¶¶ 155-63, 176-98, 204-18. Finally, plaintiff asserts copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets against AHMA. Id. at ¶¶ 176-98. With the benefit of the analysis detailed below, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to monopolization, RICO, RICO conspiracy, WOCCA, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, common law misappropriation, and common law unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs claims for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets survive to fight another day, however. I. STANDING At the outset of both the supporting and reply briefs, defendants make numerous challenges to plaintiffs allegations of injury. Though defendants later make some individual standing challenges, the court interprets these initial challenges to injury as questioning whether plaintiff has sufficiently plead standing for each claim. In order to have standing to bring suit, a plaintiff must show: injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and a likelihood the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). These elements must be established “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. A. Monopolization Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act Plaintiffs first count alleges improper maintenance of a monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. Defendants ostensibly make three arguments against plaintiffs standing. Defendants first argue that plaintiff has failed to allege plausible damage and thus has not shown injury. Second, defendants argue plaintiff has not shown a causal link between GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC’s conduct and the injury. Third, defendants argue plaintiff has not sufficiently shown “antitrust injury.” Each argument is discussed in turn. 1. Showing Injury As plaintiff correctly notes, and defendants concede, there is no requirement that a plaintiff prove the facts alleged in a complaint. To require otherwise would ignore the command to treat all well-pleaded facts as true. Here, plaintiff has in fact alleged lost profits and reduced income. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 112). Defendants refer to such allegations as “summary conclusions” (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 5), arguing plaintiff has not alleged “non-conclusory” facts (Defs.’ Reply Br. 3). However, Twombly and Iqbal only prohibit giving credence to legal conclusions. Further, plaintiff has in fact alleged damages in excess of 50 million dollars. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 110). The only relevant question is whether these allegations give rise to a plausible claim of injury. Assuming the 50 million dollar sum to be true, the plaintiff would clearly be concretely and particularly injured. Thus, plaintiff has sufficiently shown plausible injury. 2. Showing a Causal Link Here again, defendants argue that plaintiffs factual allegations are too conclusory to support the plausible existence of causation. However, it is entirely plausible that, assuming defendants took and made use of plaintiffs proprietary information, id. at ¶¶ 77-95, that it resulted in some form of lost profits, reduced income, or some portion of the 50 million dollar sum. Taken as true, this proprietary information provided plaintiff with a competitive advantage, the loss of which could plausibly lead to a loss of customers and thus a loss of profits and reduced income if a competitor was then able to provide the same services. Accepting the allegation that defendants are generally able to provide data pool services at lower costs, causation is particularly plausible. Id. at ¶ 120. The actual measure of such damages, and the accuracy of the 50 million dollar sum are not appropriate considerations at this stage of litigation. Thus, plaintiff has sufficiently shown plausible causation. 3. Showing Antitrust Injury More forcefully, defendants argue that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a specific “antitrust injury” necessary to carry forward an action under the Sherman Act. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, antitrust injury is “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). Congress wrote antitrust laws for “the protection of competition, not competitors.” Tri-Gen Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1031 (7th Cir.2006). The Supreme Court noted that proof of lessened competition is not always necessary, pointing to short-term effects of some anti-competitive behavior, such as predatory pricing which initially stimulates price competition. 429 U.S. at 489 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 690. However, it remains true that an antitrust injury must show loss from acts reducing output or raising consumer prices. Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir.1992). The Seventh Circuit has indicated that the requested relief may often serve as “an important clue to the soundness of the antitrust claim.” Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir.1984). There, in affirming the dismissal of antitrust claims, the court noted that the plaintiffs request to transfer ownership of a patent involved a desire to make as much money as possible from the patent — a request in which the court could find no benefit for the consumer. Id. This court reads plaintiffs complaint to allege that: defendants GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC instituted “Operation Anaconda” in order to restrain competition; misused proprietary information by incorporating it into GDSN standards to be shared with participating entities; abused the HEAI standards-setting process; and abused their tax-exempt statuses, all in order to restrain competition. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-40, 55-60, 62-65, 74, 77-79, 84-85, 94, 101-02, 108, 119-21, 123). Further, plaintiff specifically alleges that GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC’s conduct has injured consumers by means of “reduced competition, reduced innovation, and reduced consumer choice” and that there is a “dangerous probability” defendants will control consumer prices long-term. Id. at ¶ 124. The existence of Operation Anaconda, without more, cannot establish plausible antitrust injury. Plaintiffs allegations of intent to develop marketing attributes in order to “squelch” competition, id. at ¶ 55, are no more than hidden legal conclusions as to defendants’ “anticompetitive” behavior within the meaning of antitrust injury. Stripped of legal conclusions, an internal agreement to develop marketing attributes is equally consistent with a legal business strategy to better compete by matching a competitor’s product. Attempts to reduce competition through further competition within the market (i.e., out-competing a competitor) are not the type of injury antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The misuse of proprietary information in the HEAI standards-setting process also fails to establish plausible antitrust injury. While such misuse may be independently unlawful, the mere addition of marketing attributes to standards shared with all GDSN-certified data pool operators is not itself anti-competitive within the meaning of antitrust laws. There is no showing of reduced output or raised consumer prices. Because these standards are intended to be used by all, the addition of plaintiffs marketing attributes would serve only to increase competition, as consumers will now have greater choice in data pool operators if they wish to use marketing attributes. Neither are there facts showing long-term negative effects. Such misuse of information made available to all competitors is insufficient to establish plausible antitrust injury. The only way either Operation Anaconda or the misuse of proprietary information might form an antitrust injury is in conjunction with defendants’ alleged abuse of tax-exempt status. Abuse of tax-exempt status could plausibly allow an organization to set prices at an anti-competitive level. However, “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). Predatory pricing requires that prices are “below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs” and there is “a dangerous probability” of the rival recouping the loss. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24,113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993). As explained by the Seventh Circuit, predatory pricing has three stages in which low prices are set, producers who cannot make a profit exit, and monopoly prices ensue. Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir.2006). Without exit, or where recoupment is improbable even with some producers exiting, there is no antitrust injury. Id. Thus, abuse of tax-exempt status could allow defendants to more easily engage in predatory pricing. However, even accepting plaintiffs allegations of intent to muscle out for-profit data pool providers, the complaint contains no allegations indicating that any for-profit data pool providers would in fact be forced to exit the market, let alone that defendants would then be able to recoup then-losses. In fact, the allegations indicate that for-profit companies can compete despite the improper tax-exempt status. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 6 (claiming 15% of the market held by five for-profit operators). There are no allegations that any for-profit operator was losing market share before the advent of marketing data innovations. At most, plaintiff appears to allege only that it will have lost its competitive advantage. Thus, the alleged abuse of tax-exempt status is insufficient to establish plausible antitrust injury. Finally, plaintiffs explicit allegations of reduced competition, reduced innovation, reduced consumer choice, and lack of lower prices are also insufficient to establish plausible antitrust injury. Alleging reduced competition is little more than a hidden legal conclusion alleging anti-competitive conduct. Alleging that lower prices will not occur is not the same as plausibly claiming that consumer prices will be raised. Alleging reduced innovation as a result of defendants’ conduct does not create an inference of raised consumer prices or reduced output. Finally, alleging reduced consumer choice might allow an inference of raised consumer prices, however, plaintiff appears to have plead itself out of such a claim. Rather than being faced with less consumer choice, the alleged misuse of plaintiffs proprietary information and incorporation into GDSN standards will increase the choice of data pool operators who can offer those sorts of marketing attributes. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to show plausible antitrust injury and consequently failed to state a plausible claim for monopolization under the Sherman Act. B. Copyright Infringement and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets As to defendants’ charge that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the copyright claim, it essentially relies on the same brief arguments of failure to plead actual harm and a causal link. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 5-7). Defendants cite one case specific to copyright infringement for the proposition that a plaintiff must show financial loss or the infringer’s profits in order to obtain compensatory damages. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir.2003). This is accurate. It is also the case that statutory damages or an injunction may be had without showing financial loss. Id. The question is simpler than that, however. Under the Copyright Act, the “legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright” may bring an action for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Plaintiff is alleged to own the copyright and thus satisfies standing under the Act. As to constitutional standing, by defendants’ alleged copying and use of the copyright, plaintiff has lost some measure of its value by losing competitive (and potentially pricing) advantage. This is a concrete and particular injury. It is also imminent based on plaintiffs allegations of looming inclusion in GDSN standards. Further, as alleged, plaintiffs injury is the result of defendants’ copying. Thus, a causal link is alleged to exist as well. Therefore, plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to show the plausible existence of standing to bring the copyright claim. This analysis is equally applicable to the trade secrets claim under Wisconsin law. The information alleged to be a trade secret is essentially the same as the copyright material. E.g., Second Am. Compl. ¶ 190. Thus, the injury and causation analysis apply in the same manner and plaintiff has sufficiently shown facts establishing the plausible existence of standing as regards the trade secrets claim. II. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT Plaintiff has alleged that defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), specifically Section 1962(c). Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks standing to include as predicate acts the alleged tax fraud and false statements, and that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(c) states that: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). A claim under this section of RICO must sufficiently allege: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Jennings v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). An enterprise is any individual or legal entity, or union or group of individuals associated in fact. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two predicate acts of racketeering within a ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); Jennings, 495 F.3d at 472. “Racketeering activity” is exhaustively defined in RICO section 1961(1). Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 497 n. 2, 120 5.Ct. 1608, 146 L.Ed.2d 561 (2000). Predicate acts include mail fraud, wire fraud, and criminal copyright infringement. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Plaintiff alleges mail and wire fraud related to sending false tax returns (“Tax Fraud Acts”), wire fraud through misrepresentations made to induce industry participants to approve defendants’ proposed standards (“HEAI Acts”), mail and wire fraud related to GS1 U.S. and 1SYNC falsely holding themselves out as nonprofit organizations (“False Nonprofit Acts”), and mail and wire fraud through misrepresentation of their data pool capabilities (“False Capability Acts”). (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 60, 80, 83-92, 103-07, 145-47). Plaintiff also alleges the predicate act of criminal copyright infringement. Id. at ¶¶ 78, 84-95, 149-51. The court rejects defendants’ argument as to standing for predicate acts, but nonetheless finds that plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the pattern element. A. Standing Related to Predicate Acts Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently show causation between the alleged predicate acts of tax fraud and false statements and the eomplained-of injuries. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 18-20); (Defs.’ Reply Br. 11-12). They suggest that because the causality between the acts and injury is too remote, those predicate acts may not be considered for the purpose of determining whether a pattern exists. Plaintiff responds, however, that the injury may arise from any predicate act within the pattern and, once such injury is established, a predicate act allegedly within the pattern may only be ignored if it does not satisfy the relatedness prong of the “continuity plus relationship” test. (PL’s Br. in Opp’n 23-24). Plaintiff has the right of it here. A plaintiff need not suffer injury from each predicate act necessary to state a RICO violation. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir.1987). “Imposing such a requirement ... would conflate what must be two separate inquiries: first, was there a pattern of racketeering activity violating RICO, and second, was the plaintiff injured by the RICO violation?” Id. Here, the cases defendants cite are more properly understood as finding that causation between the alleged RICO violations (the pattern as a whole) and the claimed injuries were too remote. Rather, defendants’ real argument is more appropriately directed toward whether the alleged predicate acts are related enough to constitute part of the alleged pattern. See id. (“At what targets the acts of racketeering activity are aimed goes to the question whether a ‘pattern’ has been demonstrated.”). Thus, because there is no requirement that each alleged predicate act exhibit independent proximate cause of the claimed RICO injury, the alleged tax fraud and false statements may be considered in the pattern inquiry to follow. B. Showing a “Pattern” Requisite for a RICO Violation However, plaintiffs allegations do not sufficiently show a plausible pattern claim because of a lack of continuity. Courts apply the “continuity plus relationship test” to determine satisfaction of the pattern element. Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473. The test requires the predicate acts be related and pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Id. Continuity may be closed- or open-ended. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). Closed-ended continuity exists where related predicate acts take place over a “substantial period of time.” Id. at 242,109 S.Ct. 2893. Open-ended continuity exists where, even despite a short duration, there is a demonstrable threat of continuity. Id. This demonstration may occur by “specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future,” or by showing the predicates “are part of an ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business.” Id. The Seventh Circuit offers the following “Morgan factors” to assess in determining continuity: “the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries.” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473 (quoting Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986)). As regards the number and variety of acts, “mail and wire fraud allegations are unique among predicate acts because multiplicity of such acts may be no indication of the requisite continuity of the underlying fraudulent activity.” Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1024-25 (7th Cir.1992); see also Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 663 (7th Cir.1992) (no pattern where multiple acts of mail fraud only furthered single scheme and had non-distinct injuries). Accordingly, courts should look to whom a defendant directed the mail and wire fraud acts toward, their similarity, and whether the injuries were distinct. See Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1025. The pattern analysis is intended to reach “a natural and commonsense result, consistent with Congress’s concern with long-term criminal conduct.” 495 F.3d at 473. 1. Open-Ended Continuity Plaintiffs complaint does not show plausible open-ended continuity because there are no allegations of plausible continued threat. At the outset, where plaintiff merely alleges that conduct threatens to continue, e.g., Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102, 152, such allegations are legal conclusions under the pattern analysis, and not to be given the assumption of truth under Iqbal. Where plaintiff instead alleges the threat of continuity either directly, e.g., id. at ¶ 148, or by inference from the predicate acts alleged, e.g., id. at ¶ 150, such allegations are tied to the predicate acts and discussed below. The allegations of a continued threat of copyright infringement are not plausible. Even taken as true that defendants are prepared to put the copyrighted information into GDSN standards, see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 102, the injury has already occurred. The infringement would have occurred when defendants first used the Spreadsheet to create the derivative from which new standards are developed. Though defendants may not have completed their implementation, doing so remains merely a step within the alleged infringement. Instead, a threat of continuation might be plausible if plaintiff alleged facts showing defendants were prepared to continue stealing and infringing other copyrighted material from the Master Collection not yet obtained, or perhaps that defendants regularly commit criminal copyright infringement as part of their business. They have not. Thus, the complaint has not shown a threat of future copyright infringement. The complaint also fails to show a plausible threat of future tax fraud. The Tax Fraud Acts relate only to one overarching tax-fraud injury. That alleged injury occurred upon the first alleged false filing and has simply become more severe with each subsequent filing. The successive filings have not created distinct injuries, nor separate tax-fraud schemes. Skepticism of mail fraud to support closed-ended continuity encourages skepticism of multiple mailings to show future repetition. Accordingly, the tax-fraud injury remains in existence, but there is no showing it will be repeated, nor would it satisfy the “regular way of doing business” test because such test implies repetition. It may be defendants’ “regular way of doing business” to annually file forms that maintain tax-exempt status, but it is not alleged that defendants engage in other distinct acts of tax fraud as part of their business. Therefore, the complaint does not show a threat of future distinct tax fraud. The complaint also fails to show a plausible threat of future wire fraud related to the HEAI Project. As with the Tax Fraud Acts, all of the alleged HEAI Acts are incident to a single injury: improperly including plaintiffs proprietary information in new GDSN standards. While it may be true that further communications are necessary before the standards are implemented, the result is ultimately one injury as a part of one scheme. There are also a lack of allegations that it is defendants’ regular way of doing business to issue wire communications seeking to fraudulently induce approval of standards derived through copyright infringement. The complaint contains no facts sufficient to show that the defendants threaten to commit future acts of wire fraud unrelated to this singular copyright dispute. Finally, the False Nonprofit Acts and False Capability Acts are not plausible predicate acts and thus cannot be considered in the pattern analysis. Mail and wire fraud require a scheme to defraud, intent to defraud, and use of the mail or wires in furtherance of such. United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 786 (7th Cir.2006). A scheme to defraud is one to “deprive another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27, 108 S.Ct. 316, 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987) (interpreting mail fraud statute). “To defraud” has a “common understanding of wronging one in his property rights.” Id. (interpreting mail fraud statute). Additionally, puffery does not constitute fraud. United States v. Canty, 499 F.3d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2007) (“puffing” does not give rise to actionable fraud); Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 2003) (dismissing RICO claim because sales puffery did not constitute mail fraud); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1330 (7th Cir.1994) (inherently subjective expressions ill-suited as basis for mail and wire fraud). Here, the alleged False Nonprofit Acts are not technically false. GS1 U.S. and 1 SYNC are in fact technically nonprofits, though their status may have been improperly acquired. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶4, 22, 40, 43. Further, the alleged False Capability Acts are no more than puffery. Statements regarding the ability of a business to meet clients’ needs are completely subjective. Thus, neither set of alleged predicate acts are plausible and so cannot be considered in the pattern analysis. Therefore, because the complaint fails to show any plausible threat of continuity, it has failed to show plausible open-ended continuity sufficient to establish a RICO pattern. 2. Closed-Ended Continuity There is no plausible closed-ended continuity here either. While the series of alleged predicates occurred over more than four years, the other Morgan factors and common sense counsel against finding closed-ended continuity. The examination of the number of victims, presence of separate schemes, occurrence of distinct injuries, and number and variety of predicate acts weigh more heavily than the time period, and thus against finding closed-ended continuity. Even accepting the allegations as true, only plaintiff and the United States are indicated as victims. The complaint does not show plausible victimization of other market participants. Defendants’ alleged misuse of plaintiffs copyright in fact would benefit the other participants, as discussed' previously. Additionally, the alleged acts of mail and wire fraud cannot serve to create victims through a general scheme to eliminate competition. The Seventh Circuit has cited approvingly the proposition, and this court agrees, that competitive injury is not the type of harm which may form the basis for mail or wire fraud. Jepson, 34 F.3d at 1327. Thus, because anticompetitive injury is not a proper basis for mail or wire fraud, other market participants are not properly considered victims for purposes of the Morgan factor. Further, the United States as a victim adds little if any weight to plaintiffs claim. While predicate acts harming only a third party may be considered in analyzing the existence of a pattern, that third party is a much less convincing victim for continuity purposes when the harm is wholly different. Moreover, as just discussed, the Tax Fraud Acts are not to be viewed as creating market-participant victims through a (tenuous) relation to competitive injury. Thus, not only do the Tax Fraud Acts fail to show market participant victims, the United States itself is the victim of an alleged scheme that is unrelated to anything harming plaintiff. Consequently, plaintiffs complaint shows, at best, one victim and one very tenuously related victim, and, as a result, this factor weighs against a finding of closed-ended continuity. The number of schemes weighs against the claim as well. The predicate acts alleged show, at most, a tax-fraud scheme, an infringement or other misappropriation scheme, and a scheme to eliminate competition. As discussed earlier, schemes to eliminate competition are not the proper subject of fraud, and the alleged copyright infringement would seem to in fact increase competition. Further, the tax-fraud scheme is tenuously related at best. Thus, there is only a showing of two schemes, one of which carries little weight. Therefore, this factor also counsels against finding closed-ended continuity. The injury factor does not help plaintiff either. The copyright infringement is a distinct injury. However, the Tax Fraud Acts, as discussed above, create only a tenuously related injury, and the other acts of mail and wire fraud cannot soundly create injuries to competition. Thus, again, there are, at best, two distinct injuries here, one of which is very tenuously related, if at all. This factor, too, works against finding closed-ended continuity. Finally, the number and variety of predicate acts do not save the claim. There is alleged but one act of copyright infringement. While plaintiff alleges a not insubstantial individual number of mail and wire fraud acts, they are ultimately only subsets of larger acts. The six allegedly fraudulent tax filings constituting mail fraud are in reality only a subset of one continuous alleged improper tax status. The same reasoning applies to the HEAI Acts. The HEAI mail and wire communications are all incident to the same single act of copyright infringement. And, as discussed previously, the alleged False Nonprofit Acts and False Capability Acts do not qualify as predicate acts. In total, the complaint reads as an allegation of copyright infringement or misappropriation that has been padded with allegations of fraud that are either incident to the dispute, tenuously related, or severe overreaching. Thus, the Morgan factors lead the court to find that there is no closed-ended continuity. The length of time over which all the acts occurred is likely sufficient, but not determinative. See Morgan, 804 F.2d at 976 (no single factor necessarily determinative). The number and variety of predicate acts are deceptive and do not weigh in favor of finding continuity. There are only two victims, two schemes, and two injuries at best, and the alleged tax fraud is too tenuously related to give much weight to the second victim, scheme, and injury. Therefore, common sense and the Morgan factors urge the court to, and it does so, find a lack of closed-ended continuity. Because plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show continuity, it has failed to state a claim under RICO. III. CIVIL RICO CONSPIRACY Plaintiff also alleges a violation of RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d). (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 155-63). Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to establish the plausible existence of an agreement giving rise to conspiracy, and that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine operates to bar the claim here. Section 1962(d) of RICO prohibits conspiring to violate any of the other three provisions within § 1962, including subsection (c), as alleged in Count III by plaintiff. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137-54. In order to commit conspiracy under RICO, “[o]ne must knowingly agree to perform services of a kind which facilitate the activities of those who are operating the enterprise in an illegal manner.” Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir.2000). It is unnecessary to show actual commission of predicate acts, nor is it necessary that conspirators agree to actually commit the predicate acts themselves, or even participate, so long as they agree the acts will be committed. Gagan v. Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 961 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, to carry the day, plaintiff must allege facts establishing a plausible claim that: (1) defendants agreed to “conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity”; and (2) defendants “further agreed that someone would commit at least two predicate acts to accomplish those goals.” See Id. Because the court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a plausible claim to conspiracy, the complaint fails to state a claim and it need not address the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Defendants begin by arguing that plaintiff cannot establish a plausible conspiracy if its facts cannot establish a plausible violation. Plaintiff responds that, under Gagan, a RICO violation need not be established in order to establish RICO conspiracy. While this is an accurate statement, it does not apply to the issue at hand. While it is true that RICO conspiracy does not require the predicate acts to have actually taken place, the predicate acts that the parties have conspired to effectuate must be sufficient to create a RICO violation. Without such a showing, it is simply impossible to have a “conspir[acy] to violate” a RICO provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). While not binding, the Ninth Circuit has put this point succinctly: where a party “fail[s] to allege the requisite substantive elements of RICO, the conspiracy cause of action cannot stand.” Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 n. 8 (9th Cir.1992). That circuit later explained this point by writing that “if the section 1962(c) claim does not state an action upon which relief could ever be granted, regardless of the evidence, then the section 1962(d) claim cannot be entertained.” Neibel v. Trans World, Assurance Co., 108 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997). It distinguished such a case from one where “[a] lack of evidence may render the substantive claim deficient, but it does not render it legally impossible,” thus allowing a conspiracy claim to stand despite a directed verdict on the § 1962(c) claim. Id. The Neibel case has been disagreed with here in the Seventh Circuit, but on separate grounds (that is, to the extent the Ninth Circuit’s opinion disagreed with Brouwer). See United States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542, 547-48 (7th Cir.2002). However, in its opinion, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that, regarding conspiracy generally, “[a] conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense.” Id. at 547 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997)). Thus, where plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a plausible claim to relief under § 1962(c), such a deficiency infects plaintiffs § 1962(d) claim as well. Because the facts alleged cannot establish plausible continuity, see Section II.B, the complaint does not show a plausible “pattern of racketeering activity.” Because, under the facts alleged, the pattern element is legally impossible, a RICO violation is legally impossible, and it is correspondingly impossible to conspire to violate § 1962(c) through acts that would not violate § 1962(c). Further, there are no additional facts alleged indicating a conspiracy to commit any predicate acts that would in fact create a RICO violation. Therefore, the court finds plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show a plausible claim to relief under § 1962(d) of RICO. IV. WISCONSIN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT Plaintiff advances the same allegations as appear in its claimed RICO violation to support a violation of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. § 946.80, et seq. (“WOCCA”). (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 164-75). As both parties note, RICO interpretation informs WOCCA interpretation, except where there are express alternative requirements. Brunswick Corp., Mercury Marine Div. v. E.A Doyle Mfg. Co., 770 F.Supp. 1351, 1363 (E.D.Wis.1991). As in RICO, WOCCA prohibits conducting or participating in an enterprise “through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Wis. Stat. § 946.83(3) (2008). The “continuity plus relationship” test applies when analyzing the existence of a pattern. 770 F.Supp. at 1363. Though WOCCA actually requires a minimum of three predicate acts, Wis. Stat. § 946.82(3), the continuity analysis of plaintiffs alleged predicate acts remains the same. Thus, because the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show plausible continuity, and thus fails to sufficiently show a pattern under RICO, the complaint also fails to show plausible continuity and thus pattern under WOC-CA. Because plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show a plausible pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim to relief under WOCCA. V. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT Plaintiff has also alleged that defendants infringed the copyright in its Big Hammer Master Collection Taxonomy and Attributes 2008 (“Master Collection”) pursuant to Title 17, Chapter 5 of the U.S.Code. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 176-88); 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. Defendants first argue that plaintiff has not stated a claim because the complaint does not allege direct copying from the copyrighted Master Collection, but later recast their argument as a failure to allege substantial similarity. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 30-31); (Defs.’ Reply Br. 18-19). In either case, defendants’ arguments fail. Defendants also argue that the copyright in question lacks sufficient originality to be valid and that the merger doctrine bars plaintiffs claim of infringement. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 31-33). Proving copyright infringement requires: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir.2007). Copying can be shown with direct evidence, or by an inference when there is substantial similarity between the works and the defendant is shown to have had access to the copyrighted work. Id. at 915. However, in the case of inferred copying, access may be presumed where the two works are so similar that it is highly probable the later work is a copy. Id. In determining this probability, courts look to the degree of similarity, as well as the degree to which the alleged copy is “unlike anything in the public domain.” Id. Because plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish the elements of copyright infringement, and has not pled itself out under the merger doctrine, plaintiff has not failed to state a claim for copyright infringement. A. Establishing the Elements of Valid Copyright and Copying Plaintiff has sufficiently shown both required elements of a copyright claim. Direct copying of a copyrighted work is not necessary to infringe, so long as protected elements are copied. Thus, copying from an unregistered derivative may constitute infringement. This is clear from the Seventh Circuit’s formulation of the elements of infringement in JCW: “copying of constituent elements.” 482 F.3d at 914 (emphasis added). Further, while accepted across other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has implicitly recognized this rule. See Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer, 92 F.3d 517, 519-20 (7th Cir.1996). In Harris, the question concerned whether the plaintiff had forfeited its copyright on architectural plans by publishing an unregistered brochure under the 1976 Copyright Act. Id. The court noted that “[i]f the basis of Harris’ claim of copyright was that the underlying architectural plans were registered or published with notice, it could prevail.” Id. at 520. The court cited approvingly a case in which the Fifth Circuit held that copying the reproduction of copyrighted floor plans published in an unregistered brochure constituted infringement. Id. (citing Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.1972)). Here, plaintiff alleges that the Master Collection is the subject of copyright registration. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 177). A certificate of copyright registration provides a prima facie presumption of validity. Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir.1995). Thus, plaintiff has alleged facts, taken as true, that show the plausible existence of valid copyright. As to the second element, plaintiff alleges that the Spreadsheet obtained by defendants contained taxonomy categories. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 77). Plaintiff also alleges that the Master Collection exists to, among other things, “organize” product data, and that the Master Collection is “a hierarchical classification system that [plaintiff] uses to organize products into various categories and sub-categories.” Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff then alleges that defendants created a derivative work from the Spreadsheet. Id. at ¶ 78. Read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the taxonomy categories allegedly contained in the Spreadsheet may be easily inferred to be the exact same organized category information contained in the Master Collection (albeit perhaps only a portion of such categories). Thus, plaintiff has alleged plausible copying of constituent elements and substantial similarity. Plaintiff also alleges that the Master Collection, or portions of it, was improperly reproduced on defendants’ website. Id. at ¶¶ 179-80. Without addressing the sufficiency of alleging that the actual Master Collection was posted to the internet, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff raises an inference that constituent elements of the Master Collection were posted. Thus, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show the plausible existence of the elements required to establish a claim for copyright infringement. B. Originality Defendants’ challenge that plaintiff failed to allege copying of original elements, as required by the second element, is also wrong. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 31); (Defs.’ Reply Br. 19). The bulk of defendants’ argument appears either to insist that the complaint is insufficient because plaintiff has not explicitly used the word “original” in its allegations of copying, or that plaintiff has not proved the originality of copied elements. Defendants primarily point to the fact that plaintiffs registration certificate excludes material from vendors or in the public domain, and that the “overwhelming majority” of the Master Collection is not original. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 31, 32). It is true that compilations (and other work) may consist of protectable and non-protectable material; that is, original and non-original material. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). As regards a compilation, it is the “choices as to selection and arrangement” of collected data that are sufficiently original as to be protectable. Id. Here, as discussed above, plaintiff has alleged that the Master Collection contains a classification system that organizes data into categories, that the Spreadsheet contained categories, and that defendants copied from the Spreadsheet. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 77, 78). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants intended to use the Spreadsheet to “add Edgenet’s ... taxonomy categories to the GDSN.” Id. at ¶ 79. Because categorization requires selection and arrangement, it is plausible that the categories are original. Further, because defendants allegedly copied the Spreadsheet with intent to add the taxonomy categories to the GDSN, it is plausible that defendants in fact copied the plausibly original categories. Thus, read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is entirely plausible that defendants copied original material. Therefore, because the complaint shows the plausible existence of the required elements and originality, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim to copyright infringement. C. Merger Doctrine Finally, plaintiffs copyright claim does not fail under the merger doctrine. The merger doctrine “refers to the situation in which there is only one feasible way of expressing an idea, so that if the expression were copyrightable it would mean that the idea was copyrightable, and ideas are not copyrightable.” Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir.2003). The main thrust of defendants’ argument is that plaintiff essentially pled itself out of a claim by alleging that its Master Collection is the only way to express the underlying idea. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 33). In such a case, the copyright would not be valid and thus fails the first element. Defendants point to paragraph 35 of the complaint, which alleges that “[i]n light of the number and complexity of products and product attributes encompassed in Edgenet’s [Master Collection], a competitor could not independently develop a substantially similar arrangement of attributes without stealing or misusing Edgenet’s intellectual property.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 35). Defendants disingenuously present only a portion of that paragraph, taken out of context. The paragraph in question actually leads off by alleging that “[a]ny company that might wish to develop its own version of a collection taxonomy and attributes ... would have to spend substantial time, money and effort; would need to employ dozens of individuals; and would need unique market access to participants in the hardlines industry.” Id. (emphasis added). Simply by use of the word “version,” it is clear that plaintiff alleges other ways to create a similar product. Taken in context, the passage cited by defendants becomes an allegation that defendants could not have developed their own version in such a short period without stealing or misusing the Master Collection. Thus, plaintiff has not pled itself out by alleging merger of expression and idea. Any further inquiry into merger is inappropriate at the pleading stage because no further factual record has been developed. As discussed earlier, copyright registration is prima facie evidence of validity. Accordingly, defendants’ merger argument fails. Because plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the plausible existence of copyright infringement, and has not pled itself out under the merger doctrine, plaintiffs allegation of copyright infringement does not fail to state a claim. VI. MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS In Count VII, plaintiff claims defendants misappropriated its trade secrets in violation of Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.90. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 189-98). Defendants challenge this claim, asserting that the complaint does not sufficiently allege the material to be a trade secret, either because the information is readily ascertainable or has not been kept secret, that the complaint fails to specify which portions of the Master Collection are trade secrets, and that it fails to sufficiently allege misappropriation. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 34-37). Under Wisconsin law, it is a violation to misappropriate a trade secret by acquiring such through improper means, or by disclosing or using such without express or implied consent in certain situations. Wis. Stat. § 134.90(2). A trade secret is defined as including a “compilation,” and the information must “derivef ] independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally know to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.” Wis. Stat. § 134.90(l)(c). Further, the information must be “the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the circumstances.” Wis. Stat. § 134.90(l)(c). The Act is intended to be interpreted in uniformity with the laws of other states using the same model. Wis. Stat. § 134.90(7); see also Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander; 147 Wis.2d 842, 858, 434 N.W.2d 773, 779-80 (1989) (decisions in other jurisdictions involving the Act to be given “careful consideration”). Accordingly, to establish a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret, a plaintiff must show: (1) the information is economically valuable; (2) the value is the result of not being generally known to or readily ascertainable by others who could obtain value from it; (3) the plaintiff took reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy; and (4) the defendant misappropriated the information. Defendants do not dispute, and plaintiff sufficiently alleges, the information is economically valuable. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-39. The court addresses the remaining three elements and defendants’ arguments below, finding the plausibility of the requisite value from not being readily ascertainable, sufficient specificity as to the trade secrets alleged, plausible existence of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, and plausible misappropriation. A. Value From Lack of Ready Ascertainment Defendants fail in their argument that the Master Collection and the Spreadsheet both consist entirely of information that is readily ascertainable, and thus are not trade secrets. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. 34-35); (Defs.’ Reply Br. 20-21). Defendants first stress the point that “mere variations on widely used information” and “eombination[s] of otherwise known data” are not trade secrets, citing an Eighth Circuit opinion. Strategic Directions Grp., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 293 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002). Though these quotations are accurate, the presentation is misleading. The court in Strategic Directions actually wrote, in full, that “[s]imply to assert a trade secret resides in some combination of otherwise known data, is not sufficient.” Id. (citing Second Circuit). Thus, contrary to defendants’ argument, there are some situations in which a “combination of otherwise known data” may in fact be a trade secret — hence the court’s use of the phrase “mere variations.” Id. (emphasis added). This is evident from the text of the statute: trade secrets include “compilation^].” Wis. Stat. § 134.90(l)(c). It is further evident from Seventh Circuit caselaw: “[a] trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and c