Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SIDNEY I. SCHENKIER, United States Magistrate Judge. Allegations of an underage drinking party and the rape of a minor in Westmont, Illinois, evolved into this lawsuit after the alleged victim’s parents expressed their discontent with the Westmont Police Department (“WPD”) investigation in a variety of ways, and were eventually arrested on various charges. Plaintiffs — Jane Doe 1 (“Miss Zitzka,” the minor who was the alleged victim of a rape), her parents (Mr. and Mrs. Zitzka), and Miss Zitzka’s two younger siblings — filed this suit on February 20, 2007, against the Village of Westmont (“Westmont” or “the Village”) and six Westmont police officers in their individual and official capacities. In an earlier opinion, the Court dismissed Counts II-III, V-VI, and VIII of the first amended complaint (“the Complaint”). Zitzka v. Vill. of Westmont, No. 07 C 0949, 2007 WL 3334336 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 6, 2007). In the remaining claims, plaintiffs sue defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation and unlawful arrest in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments (Counts I and IV), as well as for intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution in violation of state law (Counts VII and IX). Defendants have filed five individual motions for summary judgment, with one joint memorandum and reply brief in support of the motions (doc. # 123). The individual motions were filed by: (1) the Village (doc. # 122); (2) Westmont Police Detective Michael Dale (“Detective Dale”) (doc. # 121); (3) Westmont Police Officers Terrence Boyer (“Officer Boyer”) and Gregory Compton (“Officer Compton”) (doc. # 119); (4) Westmont Police Officers John Bright (“Sergeant Bright”) and David Newton (“Officer Newton”) (doc. # 120); and (5) Westmont Police Detective James Schlicher (“Detective Schlicher”) (doc. # 117). Defendants also have filed three motions to strike various materials plaintiffs have filed in opposing the summary judgment motions (docs. ## 142-144). For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) denies the motions to strike (docs. ## 142-144); (?) grants the Village’s motion for summary judgment (doc. # 122); and (3) grants in part and denies in part the remaining motions for summary judgment (docs. ## 117,119-21). I. As a preliminary matter, we address the three motions to strike filed by defendants. A. We consider together defendants’ joint motion to strike, in whole or in part, plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ joint Local Rule (“L.R.”) 56.1(a) statement of facts (doc. # 143), and their joint motion to strike plaintiffs’ L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts (doc. # 144). Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ responses and additional facts should be stricken because they do not comply with L.R. 56.1 and this Court’s Case Management Procedures, contain improper legal argument, and are not supported by proper citations to the record (Defs.’ Mot. to Strike Resp. at 2; Defs.’ Mot. to Strike Add’l Facts at 2). In addition, defendants contend that plaintiffs’ responses to defendants’ statement of facts are non-responsive (Id.) In this district, L.R. 56.1 provides the framework through which parties lay out the material facts that support or oppose summary judgment. The trial court deems the properly supported material facts set forth in the parties’ statements to be admitted unless they are properly controverted by the statement of an opposing party. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir.2006); L.R. 56.1(a)(3); L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(c). Although we are entitled to demand strict compliance with the Local Rules, whether to do so is entrusted to trial court’s discretion. Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir.2004). In a recent case in this district, the court considered a motion to strike portions of the defendants’ statement of facts and the affidavits they relied on, based on similar reasons alleged by defendants in this case: they were not supported by admissible record evidence, lacked foundation, contradicted prior deposition testimony, or were conclusory. Alvarado v. Corporate Cleaning Serv., Inc., 719 F.Supp.2d 935, 938 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.2010). “While the court agreed with the plaintiffs that a number of the defendants’ factual statements lacked proper evidentiary support or otherwise violated L.R. 56.1, the court chose to disregard the improper factual assertions rather than strike them and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike as moot. Id.; see also Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 583-85 (N.D.Ill.2000) (where assertions advanced as material fact are not supported by admissible record evidence, the court has discretion to disregard tire alleged facts). Similarly, in the instant case, many of defendants’ criticisms are well-taken. However, like the court in Alvarado, we are able to separate plaintiffs’ properly alleged facts from the improperly asserted characterizations of or conclusions drawn from those facts. Furthermore, although the Court will not consider additional facts improperly alleged in plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ statement of facts, many of these facts are properly asserted elsewhere in plaintiffs’ submissions. Therefore, we deny as moot defendants’ joint motion to strike plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ statement of facts (doc. # 143), and defendants’ joint motion to strike plaintiffs’ statement of additional facts (doc. # 144). B. Defendants also have filed a joint motion to strike plaintiffs’ exhibits 1 through 7 (doc. # 142): (1) Mrs. Zitzka’s declaration; (2) Mr. Zitzka’s declaration; (3) Miss Zitzka’s declaration; (4) the declaration of the Zitzkas’ son, John Doe; (5) the declaration of the Zitzkas’ youngest daughter, Jane Doe 2; (6) the declaration of Robert Pekich, Mrs. Zitzka’s father; and (7) the declaration of John Quinn, the attorney who represented Mrs. Zitzka in three prosecutions brought against her based on arrests by the WPD. Defendants contend that these declarations violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which provides that an affidavit “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Defendants argue that various paragraphs from each of the above declarations should be stricken because they contradict or are inconsistent with the affiant’s prior deposition testimony, raise improper legal argument, are conclusory or vague, contain inadmissible hearsay, fail to establish a proper foundation, or are not based on the affiant’s personal knowledge. As with defendants’ first two motions to strike, we find this motion unnecessary. The Court can separate improper legal argument and vague or conclusory statements on the one hand, from properly asserted statements of fact on the other. In addition, we will not consider inadmissible hearsay statements whose substance would not be admissible at trial, see Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 466 (7th Cir.2010), nor “self-serving statements” that are without factual support in the record. Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 933 (7th Cir.2006); see also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir.1998) (“Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.”). Likewise, the Court will assess whether statements in the affidavits contradict the affiant’s prior deposition testimony or are not based on the affiant’s personal knowledge. “As a general rule, the law of this circuit does not permit a party to create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit whose conclusions contradict prior deposition or other sworn testimony.” Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). When a declarant contradicts his or her prior deposition testimony, a court must examine the particular circumstances of the change in testimony to determine “whether it is plainly incredible or merely creates a credibility issue for the jury.” Patton v. MFS/Sun Life Fin. Distribs., 480 F.3d 478, 488 (7th Cir.2007). That said, these principles do not require that a court jettison an entire affidavit because some portions of it contradict sworn testimony. Rather than strike the declarations and risk striking some consistent statements, we will review each statement in the affidavits separately and determine on a case by case basis whether the statement contradicts prior testimony; is based on personal knowledge; and is material to the motions. Thus, we deny as moot defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ exhibits 1 through 7 (doc. # 142). II. We now proceed to the well-established legal standards governing summary judgment motions. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact on all essential elements of its case. Id. The Court will construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Durable Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 578 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.2009). When a material fact or set of facts yields competing, but reasonable, inferences, then there is a genuine issue that precludes summary judgment. Coles v. City of Chicago, 361 F.Supp.2d 740, 741-42 (N.D.Ill.2005). In light of these summary judgment standards and the rulings on defendants’ motions to strike, we turn to the material facts that are relevant to the motions for summary judgment, as taken from defendants’ joint statement of material facts (“DSOF”) (doc. # 124) and plaintiffs’ statement of additional facts (“PAF”) (doc. # 135), The facts set forth below are undisputed unless otherwise noted by the Court. “We review only those facts whose substance would be admissible at trial under a form permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, although the form produced at summary judgment need not be admissible.” Wragg, 604 F.3d at 466. A. On September 25, 2004, Miss Zitzka attended a party at the Westmont home of a classmate, JA (DSOF ¶ 8). Miss Zitzka, who was thirteen years old at the time, came home from the party drunk, stumbling, incoherent, and with vomit on her clothing (PAF ¶ 2). Mrs. Zitzka called the WPD to report that an underage drinking party was taking place at JA’s home (PAF ¶ 3; DSOF ¶ 8). Officers Borgardt and Gunther (who are not parties in this case) reported to the scene and spoke with Mrs. Zitzka outside JA’s home (DSOF ¶ 9). Mrs. A, who is JA’s mother, denied serving alcohol to the minors (Id.). Two of the minors remaining at the party had reportable blood alcohol levels (DSOF ¶ 10). The police arrested them and one other minor (PAF ¶ 3). Other minors later admitted that they had been drinking at the party (Id.). Mrs. A was not charged or arrested in the matter (DSOF ¶ 11). On September 26, 2004, Mrs. Zitzka and her daughter went to the police station so Miss Zitzka could write a statement about the party (DSOF ¶ 12), The investigation was referred to Detective Schlicher on October 2, 2004 (DSOF ¶ 14). He was out of town at the time and did not begin his investigation until October 19, 2004 (DSOF ¶ 15). Detective Schlicher had known Mrs. A and her son for years (PAF ¶ 4). In October 2004, Miss Zitzka began receiving harassing and threatening internet messages from students at her school (PAF ¶ 23). Mrs. Zitzka printed some of the messages and provided them to the WPD (Id.). Detective Schlicher was assigned to investigate this as well, but he did not read any of the messages (Id.). On November 18,2004, Mrs. Zitzka spoke with Lieutenant Sandford about the messages (PAF ¶ 25). On October 21, 2004, Detective Schlicher went to Miss Zitzka’s school and took her into a private room to discuss the alleged underage drinking party and the harassment she had received since then from classmates (PAF ¶ 5). Miss Zitzka had been called a “slut” by her classmates, and Detective Schlicher asked her why she thinks her classmates called her that name (Id.). Miss Zitzka began crying and told Detective Schlicher that she had been raped by her former boyfriend’s older brother, MO, on December 31, 2003 (PAF ¶ 6; Defs.’ Ex. V). That evening, Miss Zitzka told her mother about the alleged rape and her meeting with Detective Schlicher (PAF ¶ 7). Mrs. Zitzka went to the police station to demand an investigation and the arrest of MO (Id.). The desk officer called Detective Schlicher and told him that Mrs. Zitzka was at the police station, but Mrs. Zitzka did not meet with Detective Schlicher that night (Id.). The next day, October 22, 2004, Mrs. Zitzka met with Detective Schlicher to demand an investigation into the alleged rape (PAF ¶ 8). On October 26, 2004, Detective Schlicher met with Miss Zitzka and the female students who had been bullying her since JA’s party (PAF ¶ 9). The students were angry with Miss Zitzka, who felt intimidated at the meeting (Id.; Defs.’ Ex. V). Detective Schlicher doubted Miss Zitzka’s credibility and did not believe that Mrs. A served alcohol at the party (PAF ¶ 8; Defs,’ Ex. V). On November 2, 2004, Detective Schlicher closed the investigation into the alleged underage drinking party at Mrs. A’s house based on the testimony of Mrs. A and other minors who were at Mrs. A’s home that night (DSOF ¶ 22). On October 27, 2004, Mrs. Zitzka returned to the police station to discuss the rape investigation (PAF ¶ 10). Detective Schlicher and Lieutenant Sandford doubted her daughter’s credibility (Id.). On November 3, 2004, Detective Schlicher interviewed the accused rapist, MO, for the first time (PAF ¶ 11). MO’s mother and step-father were present during the questioning (DSOF ¶ 24). MO denied raping Miss Zitzka, maintaining that he was with his girlfriend the night of the alleged rape (PAF ¶ 11; DSOF ¶ 25). Detective Schlicher never called or contacted the girlfriend (PAF ¶ 11). He closed the investigation into the alleged rape that day without filing charges (DSOF ¶ 27; Defs.’ Ex, W at 5-6). B. Mr. and Mrs. Zitzka expressed their dissatisfaction with the WPD’s investigation in several ways. First, in late October 2004, Mrs. Zitzka placed a sign on the Zitzka family automobile which read: “The Westmont Police Do Not Serve or Protect” (PAF ¶ 12). The sign remained on the family automobile through April 2005 (DSOF ¶ 33). Mr. Zitzka also displayed a sign on his truck which read: “The Westmont Police Do Not Serve or Protect. Why Are We Paying Their Salaries?” (PAF ¶ 12), The sign remained on the truck until early November 2004 (PAF ¶ 13), Officer Compton learned about the signs from the WPD’s morning roll call, where the signs were being discussed among the police officers (PAF ¶ 20). Officer Boyer had never heard of the Zitzkas before he saw the sign on the car in the Zitzkas’ driveway (PAF ¶ 21). Detective Dale and Sergeant Bright were aware that signs on the Zitzkas’ vehicles said something derogatory about the WPD, but they denied seeing the signs themselves (DSOF ¶¶ 37-38). Sergeant Bright was offended by the signs, and he discussed them with other officers (PAF ¶ 18). Detective Dale talked about the signs with his fellow detectives, including Detective Schlicher (PAF ¶ 19). Detective Schlicher saw the sign on the car when it was parked in front of the junior high school (DSOF ¶ 41). Only one defendant, Officer Newton, claimed not to have been aware of the signs on the Zitzkas’ vehicles until they filed this lawsuit (DSOF ¶ 36); however, in a handwritten message dated June 16, 2005, Lieutenant Sandford asked Officer Newton to note if Mrs. Zitzka’s vehicle had any new messages on its window (Resp. to DSOF ¶ 36; Pis.’ Ex. 9). Second, after the underage drinking and rape cases were closed, Mrs. Zitzka contacted the DuPage County State’s Attorney’s office to demand further investigation (DSOF ¶ 28). On March 3, 2005, Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Joe Ruggiero notified, her that charges against Mrs. A were denied (DSOF ¶ 29). The Children’s Center unit of the State’s Attorney’s office independently investigated the rape claim made by Miss Zitzka against MO, and on or about June 20, 2005, the State’s Attorney’s office determined that there was insufficient evidence to file charges against MO (DSOF ¶¶ 30-31). Third, on April 28, 2005, Mrs. Zitzka made a speech before the Village of Westmont Committee of the Whole, which was broadcast on television (PAF ¶ 14). The speech criticized the WPD and Detective Schlicher’s handling of the investigation into the alleged rape of Miss Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 34). The speech was played repeatedly on the television at the Westmont police station (PAF ¶ 14), Detective Dale and Sergeant Bright testified that they were not aware of Mrs. Zitzka’s speech until the instant case was filed (DSOF ¶¶ 37, 38). Detective Schlicher stated that he watched part of Mrs. Zitzka’s speech in the police department lunchroom (PAF ¶ 22). C. During the period from September 25, 2004 — the date of the alleged underage drinking party — through June 2005, the Zitzka family had several more encounters with the WPD. 1. Sometime after Mr. and Mrs. Zitzka displayed the signs on their vehicles, the WPD ordered extra watches to be assigned to Zitzkas’ home, meaning that officers would make an extra pass by the Zitzka home during a shift or sit in their car and watch the area for a while (PAF ¶ 27). As shift supervisor, Sergeant Bright ordered most of the extra watches (Id.). Detective Dale estimated that he sat in Ms unmarked squad car near the Zitzka house on five or six occasions (DSOF ¶ 148), Detective Schlicher sat near the Zitzka house in his unmarked squad car on two occasions when he attempted to serve Mrs. Zitzka with arrest warrants in June 2005, and he occasionally drove past the Zitzka house in the normal course of his police duties (DSOF ¶ 150). 2. On March 10, 2005, Officers Boyer and Compton went to the Zitzka residence in two separate patrol cars pursuant to Lieutenant Sandford’s orders (PAF ¶ 30; DSOF ¶ 44), and threatened Mrs. Zitzka with arrest if she did not stop calling the State’s Attorney’s office (PAF ¶ 31). The parties dispute whether the officers went to the Zitzka home at the request of the State’s Attorney’s office or on their own accord (DSOF ¶ 42; Pis.’ Resp. to DSOF ¶ 42). When the officers entered the home, Mrs. Zitzka’s two younger children were sitting on the couch watching television near the police officers (PAF ¶ 31). The parties dispute whether Mrs. Zitzka invited the officers into the home or whether the officers opened the screen door and walked in without an invitation (DSOF ¶ 45; Pis.’ Resp. to DSOF ¶45). Mrs. Zitzka testified that the officers were in her home five to ten minutes, while the officers believe they were there one to two minutes (DSOF ¶ 48). The Chief of the WPD, Randall Sticha, ultimately apologized to Mrs. Zitzka because ASA Ruggiero later informed the WPD that Mrs. Zitzka was not the person calling their office (DSOF ¶ 52). Rather, Angela Goetschel— with whom Mrs. Zitzka worked at the time — had been calling the State’s Attorney’s office about twenty times per day (DSOF ¶ 53). 3. In April and May of 2005, the WPD responded to several alleged incidents between MO’s family and the Zitzka family (DSOF ¶¶ 56-59). On April 19, 2005, MO’s mother, Mrs. O, reported to the WPD that Mrs. Zitzka had been driving by her house making obscene gestures and yelling obscenities (DSOF ¶¶ 58-60). Mrs. O also reported that Mrs. Zitzka made a harassing telephone call to her house on April 19, 2005 (PAF ¶ 38). That day, April 19, 2005, Lieutenant Sandford and Chief Sticha exchanged emails discussing Mrs. O’s complaints (PAF ¶ 33; Defs.’ Ex. CB). Lieutenant Sandford wrote that “the only thing that will stop her [Mrs. Zitzka] is to get arrested several times” (DSOF ¶ 65). Lieutenant Sandford assigned Detective Schlicher to investigate the call (PAF ¶ 38), On April 21, 2005, Mrs. O’s husband, Mr. O, reported to the WPD that Mrs. Zitzka drove past his house, stuck up her middle finger, and yelled rapist and faggot (DSOF ¶ 66). Also, on May 16, 2005, Mrs. O reported that Mrs. Zitzka tailgated her while she was driving (DSOF ¶ 67). These complaints did not result in criminal charges against Mrs. Zitzka. On June 13, 2005, AT & T notified Detective Schlicher that its trace of the April 19, 2005, phone call indicated that it came from the phone of a teenaged girl unrelated to the Zitzkas (PAF ¶ 39), On June 15, 2005, Detective Schlicher prepared a complaint charging Mrs. Zitzka with harassment by electronic communication, and obtained a warrant for her arrest (PAF ¶ 40; DSOF ¶ 86). On May 30, 2005, Officer Sean Lawrence (who is not a party in this case) was dispatched to the O’s home when Mr. O crashed his vehicle into a utility pole following a confrontation with Mrs. Zitzka outside his residence (PAF ¶ 41; DSOF ¶¶ 69-72). There were two reports filed in connection with the incident: an incident report for disorderly conduct, naming Mrs. Zitzka as the suspect and MO as the victim (Pis.’ Ex. 19 at 1), and a crash report (Pis.’ Ex. 20). In the incident report, Officer Lawrence reported that Mr. 0 related that Mrs. Zitzka was harassing MO and shouting at him (Pis.’ Ex. 19 at 4). MO’s younger brother reported seeing Mrs. Zitzka standing on the sidewalk in front of his house (Id.). Mrs. Zitzka related to Officer Lawrence that she was driving in front of Mr. O’s house when she saw MO running down Ms driveway toward her car and then Mr. O’s vehicle pulled in front of her car (Id.). Mrs. Zitzka related that she then put her vehicle in reverse, and Mr. O’s vehicle pursued her vehicle in reverse, at which point he lost control of Ms vehicle and struck a utility pole (Id.). Mrs. Zitzka contends that she never entered the O’s property (PAF ¶ 41). Officer Lawrence noted that “[d]ue to the related, ongoing problems between the mentioned parties ... [he] would pass on all information concerning this incident on to Detective Schlicher ...” (Id., DSOF ¶74). Officer Jeff Borgardt filled out the crash report on May 30, 2005. He wrote that Mr. O was m a vehicle “chasing a red vehicle containing both Zitzkas [Mrs. Zitzka and Miss Zitzka],” and while Mr. O’s vehicle was in reverse, he “lost control & spun & hit a utility pole” (Pis.’ Ex. 20 at 2). Mr. O received a citation (Id.). Detective Schlicher wrote up a second incident report for the May 30, 2005, event on June 30, 2005 (Pis.’ Ex. 21). In the report, he indicated that the O family complained that Mrs. Zitzka had been harassing their family for several months, including driving down their street and swearing out her vehicle window at them and their son MO (Id. at 1). Detective Schlicher wrote that MO reported that on May 30, 2005, Mrs. Zitzka was on the O’s property inside of the sidewalk taking pictures and calling MO names (Id.). The June 30 report indicated that the O’s signed a complaint against Mrs. Zitzka, and that on June 15, 2005, Detective Schlicher obtained an arrest warrant for Mrs. Zitzka for criminal trespass to land (Id.; PAF ¶ 43; DSOF ¶ 85). 4. On May 27, 2005, several students from Westmont Junior High and Westmont High School met at a park near the Zitzka home to carry out a plan to throw eggs at the Zitzka home (DSOF ¶ 92). That night one of the students. HH, wrote the word “SLUT” in black spray paint on the sidewalk in front of the Zitzka home (Id.). Officer Nicholas Glynn (who is not a party in this case) arrived at the scene in response to a report of a female yelling for help (DSOF ¶ 93). Mr. Zitzka, who was bleeding from Ms face, informed Officer Glynn that after hearing noises, he went outside and discovered vandals outside Ms home (PAF ¶ 49; DSOF ¶ 94). Although most of the students ran off, Mr. Zitzka caught one of the girls (AMM) and a boy (PK), who tried to get Mr. Zitzka to release AMM (DSOF ¶ 95). Mr. Zitzka alleged that PK struck him in the face (Id.), and then Mr. Zitzka grabbed AMM and PK by the neck of their hoodies and began walking them back towards Ms house to call police (DSOF ¶ 96). AMM got away and ran into a neighboring house (DSOF ¶ 97). Officer Glynn located AMM at Brett Laduzinski’s house (DSOF ¶ 99). AMM told Officer Glynn that Mr. Zitzka swung at PK but missed and hit her in the nose, but Mr. Zitzka contends that PK struck AMM when he swung at but missed hitting Mr. Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 99; Pis.’ Resp. to DSOF ¶ 99). After taking AMM’s report, Officer Glynn arrested her, charging her as a juvenile with disorderly conduct (DSOF ¶ 99). Officer Borgardt was also at the Zitzka house the night of May 27, and he observed the word “SLUT” spray painted on the sidewalk (DSOF ¶ 115) On May 28, 2005, Officer Glynn interviewed HH, AMM, and another minor who was at the scene the previous evening, AS (DSOF ¶ 100). HH admitted throwing eggs at the Zitzka home and spray painting the word “SLUT” on the sidewalk in front of their house, covering two sidewalk squares (Id.). HH was charged as a minor with criminal damage to village property (Id.). On May 29, 2005, Officer Glynn interviewed PK regarding the incident and charged him as a minor with disorderly conduct and battery to Mr. Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 101). On May 31, 2005, Chief Sticha met with Lieutenant Sandford, Detective Schlicher, and Deputy Chiefs of Police Tom Mulhearn and Randy King (PAF ¶ 34). Chief Sticha’s brief handwritten notes from the meeting state, in their entirety: “(Zitzka Caper) — Rick, Tom, Jim, Randy & Me— Ostranders!,] daughter Angel!,] Marmolejo!,] Hackney!,] Moats!,] Seedmanf,] Klemz” (Pis.’ Ex. 8). In his deposition, Chief Sticha stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss “the ongoing Zitzka case” (Pis.’ Ex. 15: Sticha Dep. at 110, 114). Also on May 31, 2005, Lieutenant Sand-ford assigned Detective Dale to investigate the May 27, 2005 incident (PAF ¶ 51). Detective Dale spoke with Mr. Zitzka and AMM about the incident (DSOF ¶¶ 103-04). AMM admitted throwing eggs at the Zitzka house, and she stated that Mr. Zitzka choked her by grabbing her hoodie, but she was able to run to a neighbor’s home when PK hit Mr. Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 104). Detective Dale observed a bruise on the inside of AMM’s upper lip and marks on her neck (Id.). Detective Dale next interviewed the Zitzkas’ neighbors. On June 1, 2005, he interviewed Mr. LaduzinsM (DSOF ¶ 105). Mr. Laduzinski reported that on May 27, 2005, he heard a young woman screaming “Help me! Help me! He’s coming after me!” (Id.). Mr. Laduzinski then ran to his door to let AMM in, and he saw that she was bleeding “profusely” from the nose and mouth (Id.). Mr. Laduzinski showed Detective Dale a drop of AMM’s blood on his floor (Id.). Detective Dale also interviewed Zitzka neighbor Karen Majewski. She told Detective Dale that on May 27, 2005, she heard a man screaming “Why are you always fucking with my daughter!” and a young girl scream “Help me! Oh my God help me! Please help me!” (DSOF ¶ 110). On June 2, 2005, Detective Dale interviewed neighbor Thomas Maicke (DSOF ¶ 111). Mr. Maicke said that on May 27, 2005, he heard a man yelling at some kids, and when he looked outside, he saw a man dragging two kids by the neck, yelling ‘You’re fucking with my daughter all the time,” and “I should kick your asses” (Id.). Mr. Maicke reported that he saw the man throw’’ the boy to the ground and pull back his arm to hit the boy, but he did not see if the hit occurred because he went to call the police (Id.). Detective Dale noted a “galvanizing of the neighborhood against the Zitzkas” (PAF ¶ 52). Detective Dale interviewed PK on June 2, 2005 (DSOF ¶ 112). PK admitted throwing eggs at the Zitzka house on May 27, 2005 (Id.). PK stated that Mr. Zitzka grabbed AMM and screamed ‘You guys are dead! I’m going to kill you” (Id.). PK said that when he tried to help AMM, Mr. Zitzka grabbed his collar, pressing his right thumb in the side of his neck (Id.). PK reported that he asked Mr. Zitzka to ease his grip, but Mr. Zitzka pushed harder, threw him to the ground, and swung at him, missing and hitting AMM instead (Id.). Mr. Zitzka men grabbed PK by his hoodie but PK was able to wriggle out and hit Mr. Zitzka in the face once or twice (Id.). PK denied hitting AMM (Id.). On June 9, 2005, Detective Dale interviewed AS, who was part of the group of minors in front of the Zitzka house on May-27, 2005 (DSOF ¶ 116). She reported hearing Mr. Zitzka scream, “Come back, I’m gonna kill you all,” and she saw him grab AMM (Id.). Detective Dale interviewed Mr. Zitzka on June 10, 2005. Mr. Zitzka provided a written statement detailing his version of the May 27, 2005 events, which was typed up by Mrs. Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 118). During the meeting, Detective Dale saw that Mr. Zitzka had a tape recorder in his shirt pocket, and Lieutenant Sandford ordered Mr. Zitzka to give him the tape recorder, which Mr. Zitzka did (PAF ¶ 69). The WPD kept the tape recorder as evidence of a possible crime (PAF ¶ 70; Ex. P: Sandford Dep. at 134-43). On June 10, 2005, AS, AMM, and HH received station adjustments for the charges against them (DSOF ¶ 119). On the same day, AMM’s and PK’s mothers signed criminal complaints against Mr. Zitzka for battery arising from the May 27, 2005 incident (DSOF ¶ 117), and the court issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Zitzka on the charge of criminal battery (DSOF ¶ 120). 5. The night that the word “SLUT” was painted in black on the sidewalk in front of their home, Mr. Zitzka tried to power wash the spray paint off the sidewalk (PAF ¶ 55). When that failed, between May 28 and May 30, 2005, Mrs. Zitzka painted a base coat of white or gray paint over the insult, and then painted “V Jesus” in orange over the top (PAF ¶ 55; DSOF ¶ 108). Mrs. Zitzka’s painting covered three sidewalk squares (DSOF ¶ 108). On May 30, 2005, Officer Borgardt observed the white or gray paint covering up the word “SLUT” but not the orange paint, and he did not believe there was anything wrong with it at the time (DSOF ¶ 115; Defs.’ Ex. BH: 7/23/07 Criminal Trial Tr. at 26-28). On June 2, 2005, Lieutenant Sandford assigned Detective Dale to investigate the Zitzkas for criminal defacement of property (DSOF ¶ 106). The Zitzkas’ neighbor Ms. Majewski told Detective Dale that she observed Mrs. Zitzka spraying white paint on the sidewalk on May 28, 2005, and on May 30, 2005, she saw Mrs. Zitzka shaking a can of spray paint and bending over the sidewalk (DSOF ¶ 110). On June 10, 2005, Detective Dale signed a criminal complaint on behalf of the Village of Westmont for criminal defacement of property against Mrs. Zitzka, and the court issued an arrest warrant on that charge (DSOF ¶ 121). 6. The WPD also became involved in various incidents between Mrs. Zitzka and Mrs. A’s family, whom the Zitzkas alleged had hosted an underage drinking party on September 25, 2004. On June 4, 2005, Mrs. Zitzka flagged down Officer Gritzenback (who is not a party in this case) to report an underage drinking party at the A home (DSOF ¶ 75). It turned out that there was no drinking party in progress, but rather an eighth grade graduation party for Mrs. A’s son, JA (Id.). Mrs. A called the WPD to report that Mrs. Zitzka was driving by her home (DSOF ¶ 76). On June 12, 2005, JA reported to the police that Mrs. Zitzka gave him a mean look and displayed her middle finger to him (PAF ¶ 45). Mrs. A was not present at that time (Id.). Officer Newton, who had never before seen criminal charges resulting from someone displaying their middle finger, referred the matter to detectives for investigation (PAF ¶ 46). Lieutenant Sandford assigned the case to Detective James Gunther (who is not a party in this case), who prepared a complaint charging Mrs. Zitzka with criminal disorderly conduct for Mrs. A to sign (PAF ¶¶ 45-46). The complaint did not state that it was based on showing a middle finger; rather, it alleged a “lewd gesture in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm and disturb ... this provoked a breach of the peace” (PAF ¶ 47). Detective Gunther obtained a warrant for Mrs. Zitzka’s arrest for disorderly conduct on June 15, 2005 (Id.). D. When Mr. and Mrs. Zitzka were arrested on the aforementioned warrants in June 2005, they had the following interactions with members of the WPD. 1. Mrs. Zitzka was arrested on June 15, 2005, pursuant to the warrant for disorderly conduct (PAF ¶ 58). That day, Officer Newton was on routine patrol when Detective Schlicher radioed seeking assistance from Westmont units in the area of 55th Street west of Cass Avenue to make an arrest on an outstanding warrant (DSOF ¶ 88). Officer Newton responded that he was in the area, and Detective Schlicher advised that he was following a white Ford F150 southbound on Washington Street from 55th Street being driven by Mrs. Zitzka, and that there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest for disorderly conduct (Id.). At Detective Schlicher’s request, Officer Newton conducted a traffic stop of that vehicle (DSOF ¶ 89). After confirming Mrs. Zitzka’s identification, Officer Newton, with assistance from Officer Malloy (who is not a party in this case), handcuffed her and transported her to the WPD to be processed (Id.). 2. The next day, June 16, 2005, Mrs. Zitzka was arrested by Detective Schlicher and Officer Weibler (who is not a party in this case) pursuant to the warrants for criminal trespass and telephone harassment (DSOF ¶ 90; PAF 59). Ms. Goetschel, for whom Mrs. Zitzka worked as a “home helper” under the auspices of the Department of Human Services in DuPage County, was in the car with Mrs. Zitzka when the arrest occurred (PAF ¶ 60; Defs.’ Ex. E: Mrs. Zitzka Dep. at 17). Detective Schlicher broke the car door handle trying to reach Mrs. Zitzka (PAF ¶ 61), and then, according to Ms. Goetschel, Detective Schlicher threw Mrs. Zitzka against his car forcefully and handcuffed her (PAF ¶ 60). That day, Officer Newton was on routine patrol when he was called to assist with a traffic stop (DSOF ¶ 91). When he arrived, Mrs. Zitzka was already handcuffed, and Detective Schlicher instructed him to put her in his police vehicle and transport her to the WPD (Id). Ms. Goetschel testified that Detective Schlicher ordered an officer to retrieve the camera of a witness who tried to take photos of the arrest (PAF ¶ 62). When Mrs. Zitzka arrived at the station, Detective Dale attempted to serve her with the additional warrant for criminal defacement of property, and when Mr. Zitzka came to pick up his wife, Detective Dale attempted to serve him with the warrant for battery from the May 27 incident (DSOF ¶ 122). The Zitzkas told him that they could not be arrested because the charges were facing a motion to quash (Pis.’ Resp. to DSOF ¶ 122). Detective Dale then released the Zitzkas and returned Mrs. Zitzka’s bond (DSOF ¶ 124; Pis.’ Resp. to DSOF ¶ 124). 3. On June 17, 2005, Sergeant Bright, the shift supervisor, informed Detective Dale that a motion to quash did not invalidate an arrest warrant unless it was granted by the court (DSOF ¶ 125). Detective Dale contacted the clerk of the court and verified that the Zitzkas’ motion to quash had not been ruled on (DSOF ¶ 126). On June 18, 2005, when the Zitzkas called the WPD to report that an egg had been thrown on their driveway (DSOF ¶ 127), Sergeant Bright responded to the call with Officer Rainaldi (who is not a party in this case) to help serve the arrest warrants for criminal defacement to property and battery (DSOF ¶ 128). Sergeant Bright arrested Mr. Zitzka for criminal battery and Mrs. Zitzka for criminal defacement of property (PAF ¶¶ 64-65; DSOF ¶ 136). The Zitzkas’ three children were present at home during the arrest (PAF ¶ 66). E. None of the arrests led to guilty charges against Mr. or Mrs. Zitzka. Mrs. Zitzka was found not guilty of disorderly conduct on September 7, 2005 (PAF ¶ 84). On January 3, 2006, the Circuit Court of Du-Page County entered a finding of not guilty following a bench trial on the misdemeanor battery charge against Mr. Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 140). On May 31, 2006, the Zitzkas moved to Indiana (PAF ¶ 78). Over a year later, on July 23, 2007, following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of DuPage County entered a finding of not guilty on the criminal defacement of property charge against Mrs. Zitzka (DSOF ¶ 141). On the same day, the criminal trespass and telephone harassment cases against her were dismissed nolle prosequi, or for want of prosecution, on the prosecutor’s motion after the prosecution’s witnesses did not appear and the court denied the State’s motion to continue those trials (DSOF ¶¶ 142-46). III. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on each of the four remaining claims in plaintiffs’ complaint: First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs assert these four counts against each defendant sued in the complaint: Westmont, Detective Schlicher, Detective Dale, Officer Newton, Officer Compton, Sergeant Bright, and Officer Boyer. Although plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment follows their First Amendment claim in the complaint, we address the Fourth Amendment claim first, as the Fourth Amendment claim’s question of probable cause affects certain of plaintiffs’ other claims. A. Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by arresting them without probable cause. A plaintiff claiming that he was arrested without probable cause carries the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir.2009). Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest asserted under the Fourth Amendment and Section 1983. Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir.2010). The probable cause inquiry is an objective one. Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, III, 605 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir.2010). Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity; the evidence need not show that the officer’s belief was more likely true than false, Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 722-23 (7th Cir.2010). “Probable cause exists if, at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the defendant’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed ... an offense.” Stokes, 599 F.3d at 622. A court evaluates probable cause not with the benefit of hindsight, “but on the facts as they appeared to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, even if that reasonable belief turned out to be incorrect.” Id. An officer may base a determination of probable cause on information from a single putative victim or eyewitness if the officer reasonably believes that the victim is telling the truth. McBride, 576 F.3d at 707; Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir.2000). “In crediting the complaint of a reasonably believable witness or putative victim, the police are under no constitutional obligation to exclude all suggestions that the witness or victim is not telling the truth.” Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.2003). However, if the victim’s or witness’s information would lead a reasonable officer to be suspicious, the officer has a duty to pursue reasonable avenues of investigation and may not close his or her eyes to facts that would clarify the situation. McBride, 576 F.3d at 707; Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743. Whether or not an officer must conduct some investigation before making an arrest depends on' factors including the information available to the officer, the gravity of the alleged crime, the danger of its imminent repetition, and the amount of time that has passed since the alleged crime. Stokes, 599 F.3d at 625. A police officer’s probable cause determination depends on the elements of the applicable criminal statute. Stokes, 599 F.3d at 622. Accordingly, we address the probable cause determination for each arrest separately. 1. On April 19, 2005, Mrs. O contacted Detective Schlicher to report that Mrs. Zitzka had made a harassing telephone call to her house claiming to be her son’s girlfriend (Defs.’ Ex. AA: 4/19/05 Incident Report at 2). Mrs. O “trapped” the telephone number to trace from where the call was placed (Id.). On June 13, 2005, AT & T sent a fax to Detective Schlicher listing the telephone number from which the call was placed (Pis.’ Ex. 10). The fax did not report to whom the telephone number belonged (Id.). A complaint was prepared against Mrs. Zitzka for harassment by telephone on June 13, 2005, and Mrs. O signed the complaint on June 15, 2005 (Defs.’ Ex. AW). The judge issued the arrest warrant on June 15, 2005, and Mrs. Zitzka was arrested on June 16, 2005 (Id.). Detective Schlicher testified in his deposition that sometime after June 16, 2005, he determined that the April 19, 2005, call came from a cellular telephone belonging to a juvenile girl from Westmont unrelated to the Zitzkas (see Defs.’ Ex. J: Schlicher Dep. at 361-62, 373, 376). Detective Schlicher spoke with the girl, who told him that she had never lent her telephone to any of the Zitzkas, but that Mrs. Zitzka may have attended a soccer game that the girl also had attended on April 19, 2005 (Id. at 362-63, 374-75). In a supplemental report dated July 4, 2005, Detective Schlicher reported that Mrs. O told him that she knew Mrs. Zitzka was the caller because she recognized her voice, even though the caller did not identify herself (Defs.’ Ex. AA: 7/4/05 Supp’l Report). In that report, Detective Schlicher indicated that he was “currently working on obtaining the account holder” of the telephone number from which the April 19, 2005, call was made (Id.). Although Detective Schlicher testified that the attorneys prosecuting the matter should have seen the information about the telephone trace in a police report (Schlicher Dep. at 376-77), the source of the telephone call was not indicated on any police report in the record. On July 23, 2007, the day the telephone harassment case was set for trial, Detective Schlicher told the prosecutors of the results of the telephone trace (Schlicher Dep. at 378). None of the O family appeared in court that day to testify on the matter (Defs.’ Ex. BH: 7/23/07 Trial Tr. at 8). The prosecutor made an oral motion for a continuance, but the court denied the motion (Id.). Therefore, the state moved to nolle prosequi the case (Id. at 9). Mrs. Zitzka’s attorney demanded a trial, but the judge granted the prosecutor’s motion (Id.). Plaintiffs appear to argue that Detective Schlicher violated Mrs. Zitzka’s Fourth Amendment rights when he obtained the arrest warrant for telephone harassment, because he knew or should have known that the allegedly harassing telephone call came from someone other than Mrs. Zitzka based on the results of AT & T’s trace of the call on June 13, 2005. Detective Schlicher contends that based on Mrs. O’s complaints and his own investigation, he had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Zitzka (Schlicher Mot. at 9). Plaintiffs argue that at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether probable cause existed to issue a warrant for the arrest of Mrs. Zitzka for telephone harassment. The criminal complaint against Mrs. Zitzka indicates the charged offense was “harassment by telephone.” Although harassment by telephone is addressed in 720 ILCS § 135/1-1, the criminal complaint cites to 720 ILCS § 135/1-2, which addresses harassment through electronic communications (Defs.’ Ex. AW). The operative elements of the statutes for purposes of probable cause, however, are the same: whether Mrs. Zitzka made the telephone call or electronic communication, and whether it was made with the intent to harass the O family. Plaintiffs carry the burden to establish that there was no probable cause for Mrs. Zitzka’s arrest, McBride, 576 F.3d at 706, and they will succeed in showing Detective Schlicher violated Mrs. Zitzka’s Fourth Amendment rights “only if a reasonably well-trained officer in [his] position should have known that the information he provided in support of the warrant would have failed to establish probable cause that he should not have applied for the warrant in the first place.” Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 457-58 (7th Cir.2007), Plaintiffs must identify evidence in the record showing that Detective Schlicher “knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth,” made false statements to the judge issuing the warrant that were necessary to the determination of probable cause or “failed to inform the judge of facts that he knew would detract from a finding of probable cause.” Id. at 458. “A ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ is demonstrated by showing that the officers entertained serious doubts as to the truth of their statements [or] had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information reported.” Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743. “[A]n officer may not close his or her eyes to clearly exculpatory facts ...” Stokes, 599 F.3d at 624. Plaintiffs argue that Detective Schlicher closed his eyes to clearly exculpatory facts when he sought the arrest warrant for telephone harassment because at that time, he knew the number from which the telephone call at issue was made, and he either determined or could have determined with some investigation that the telephone number did not belong to the Zitzkas. As explained above, an officer may be required to conduct an investigation before making an arrest depending on the information available to the officer, the gravity of the alleged crime, the danger of its imminent repetition, and the amount of time that has passed since the alleged crime. Stokes, 599 F.3d at 625. In this case, Detective Schlicher was well aware that the 0 family and the Zitzka family had had numerous confrontations since at least late October 2004, and that the WPD had responded to several incidents of alleged harassment between the O family and the Zitzka family in April and May of 2005 alone (see, e.g., Defs.’ Ex. Z; 4/19/05 Incident Report at 1-3; Defs.’ Ex. AB: 4/21/05 Incident Report at 2; Defs.’ Ex. AD: 5/16/05 Incident Report at 2). In light of the history of confrontation between the two families, and the fact that Detective Schlicher had the AT & T trace report of the telephone call in hand as of June 13, 2005, a jury reasonably could find that Detective Schlicher should have investigated the source of the telephone number before seeking the complaint and arrest warrant for Mrs. Zitzka. Instead, as late as July 4, 2005, Detective Schlicher still had not verified to whom the telephone number traced by AT & T belonged. There was no danger of imminent repetition that required immediate action; the harassing call allegedly occurred on April 19, 2005, and there is no allegation of additional harassing calls in the nearly two months that passed before the complaint and arrest warrant issued. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Detective Schlicher had probable cause to obtain a warrant for the arrest of Mrs. Zitzka for telephone harassment on June 15, 2005. 2. Plaintiffs also argue that Officer Newton should have known that there was no probable cause behind the warrant for telephone harassment, and thus, that he violated Mrs. Zitzka’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her, In a supplemental report dated June 21, 2005, Officer Newton reported that on June 16, 2005, he responded to the area of 521 South Washington Street to transport a prisoner for Detective Schlicher (Defs.’ Ex. AA: 6/21/05 Supp’l Report). Mrs. Zitzka was handcuffed by Detective Schlicher before Officer Newton arrived on the scene, and Detective Schlicher secured Mrs. Zitzka in the rear of Officer Newton’s squad car (Id.). Officer Newton transported her to the WPD and was met in the booking room by Detectives Dale and Schlicher, who provided Officer Newton with copies of a complaint and warrant for telephone harassment (Id.) Facially valid arrest warrants carry a presumption of validity. Suarez v. Town of Ogden Dunes, Ind., 581 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.2009). Here, Detective Schlieher handed Officer Newton the facially valid complaint and arrest warrant at the WPD station. Under the “collective knowledge doctrine,” the police officer who actually makes the arrest need not personally know all the facts that constitute probable cause if he or she is reasonably acting at the direction of another officer whose knowledge is sufficient to constitute probable cause. United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir.2005). Moreover, in this instance, Officer Newton was Mrs. Zitzka’s “temporary custodian and nothing else,” as he simply transported her from the location of her arrest to the police station for booking. Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1000-01 (7th Cir.2003). Officer Newton’s actions, pursuant to a facially valid warrant and orders from his superior officer, cannot form the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment forbids execution of a facially valid warrant if the arresting officer knew the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 350-51 (7th Cir.1992). Here, however, plaintiffs offer no evidence that Officer Newton knew about the trace of the telephone call, and thus there was no cause for him to doubt the validity of the arrest. Plaintiffs argue that the entire WPD was out to get Mrs. Zitzka, and that Officer Newton thus had reason to doubt the validity of the arrest. However, the argument that a dispute between a citizen and the police department requires an officer to assume that any complaint and arrest warrant involving that citizen is invalid proves too much. We grant Officer Newton summary judgment on Mrs. Zitzka’s Fourth Amendment claim against him in connection with this arrest. B. The next incident that resulted in an arrest occurred on May 27, 2005. That evening, Mr. Zitzka found vandals outside his home. He caught two of the vandals, AMM and PK, and dragged them by their hoodies. PK struck Mr. Zitzka in the face, and AMM and PK reported that Mr. Zitzka swung at PK but missed and hit AMM in the nose instead. Mr. Zitzka, in contrast, contends that PK struck AMM. The Zitzkas’ neighbors heard Mr. Zitzka screaming at PK and AMM. Detective Dale took charge of the investigation, and PK’s and AMM’s parents signed complaints against Mr. Zitzka for battery. A judge issued a warrant for Mr. Zitzka’s arrest, and Mr. Zitzka was arrested by Sergeant Bright on June 18, 2005. Plaintiffs appear to argue that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Zitzka because he was attempting to stop a trespass to his home when the alleged battery occurred. Under Illinois law, battery is committed when a person intentionally or knowingly by any means, and without legal justification, causes bodily harm to another individual, or makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature to an individual. 720 ILCS § 5/12-3(a). The existence of a legal justification for battery is not an element of the offense, but rather is an affirmative defense. McBride, 576 F.3d at 707. Although the officer “may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the existence of an affirmative defense, the Fourth Amendment imposes no duty to investigate whether a defense is valid.” Id. (internal quotations omitted), Here, the evidence was far from “conclusively established” that Mr. Zitzka had an affirmative defense to battery, As in McBride, the investigating officers interviewed witnesses and observed bruising on the putative victims, and then reasonably determined that Mr. Zitzka intentionally made physical contact with them. Id. at 707-08. Therefore, Detective Dale had probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for Mr. Zitzka. This is an absolute defense to the Fourth Amendment charge. Likewise, Sergeant Bright had probable cause to arrest Mr. Zitzka based on the complaints signed by the putative victims and Detective Dale’s investigation of the circumstances surrounding the incident. There is no evidence that Sergeant Bright ignored exculpatory information when he arrested Mr. Zitzka, and as explained above, even if Mr. Zitzka was legally justified in grabbing or swinging at PK or AMM, this would be an affirmative defense that does not preclude probable cause to arrest. See Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir.2001). C. The next warrant issued against the Zitzkas also stemmed from the events of May 27, 2005. That night, as explained above, a minor spray painted the word “SLUT” in black on the public sidewalk in front of the Zitzka home. Between May 28 and May 30, 2005, Mrs. Zitzka painted a base coat of white or gray paint over the graffiti, and then painted “V Jesus” in orange on top, On May 30, 2005, Officer Borgardt observed the white or gray paint covering up the word “SLUT” but not the orange paint, and he did not believe there was anything wrong with it at the time. Detective Dale — who had already interviewed Mr. Zitzka in connection with the battery incident — was assigned to investigate, and on June 10, 2005, he signed a criminal complaint on behalf of the Village of Westmont for criminal defacement of property against Mrs. Zitzka, and the court issued an arrest warrant on the charge. After speaking with Detective Dale about the warrant, Sergeant Bright executed the arrest warrant on June 18, 2005. In Illinois, a person commits the crime of criminal defacement of property when they “knowingly damage the property of another without his or her consent by defacing, deforming, or otherwise damaging property, by the use of paint or any other similar substance, or by the use of a writing instrument, etching tool, or any other similar device.” 720 ILCS § 5/21-1.3. Plaintiffs argue that Detective Dale did not have probable cause to arrest Mrs. Zitzka because she had Officer Borgardt’s consent to spray paint the sidewalk. Whether or not Officer Borgardt told Mrs. Zitzka that she could paint the sidewalk, there is no evidence that Officer Borgardt had the authority to consent on behalf of Westmont or that he held himself out as having that authority. Under Illinois law, an agent must have explicit authority from the municipality to bind the municipality. See, e.g., Chicago Food Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 163 Ill.App.3d 638, 114 Ill.Dec. 725, 516 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1987). Whether or not Mrs. Zitzka believed Officer Borgardt had the authority to give her permission to paint the sidewalk, a municipality cannot be es-topped by an act of its agent beyond the authority conferred upon him. Id. at 645, 114 Ill.Dec. 725, 516 N.E.2d 880. Moreover, even if Mrs. Zitzka had permission to cover up the word “slut,” she was not authorized to substitute her own personal, religious message on the Village’s property. Accordingly, Detective Dale had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant for Mrs. Zitzka, and Sergeant Bright had probable cause to arrest her on the charge of criminal defacement of property. D. The next arrest warrant for Mrs. Zitzka arose from the incident of May 30, 2005, In the police report from that day, Officer Lawrence reported that Mr. O related that Mrs. Zitzka was harassing MO and shouting at him, and MO’s younger brother reported seeing Mrs. Zitzka standing on the sidewalk in front of the 0 house (Pis.’ Ex. 19 at 4). Mrs. Zitzka related to Officer Lawrence that she was driving in front of the O’s house when she saw MO running down his driveway toward her car, and Mr. O’s vehicle then pulled in front of her car (Id.). Mrs. Zitzka related that she then put her vehicle in reverse, and Mr. O’s vehicle pursued her vehicle in reverse, at which point Mr. 0 lost control of his vehicle and struck a utility pole (Id.). Detective Schlicher wrote up a supplemental incident report on June 30, 2005 (Pis.’ Ex. 21). In the report, he indicated that the O family complained that Mrs. Zitzka had been harassing their family for several months, including driving down their street and swearing out her vehicle window at them and their son (Id. at 1). This report indicated that MO stated that Mrs. Zitzka was on the grass inside the sidewalk, on the O family’s property. Mr. and Mrs. O signed a complaint against Mrs. Zitzka, and on June 15, 2005, Detective Schlicher obtained an arrest warrant against her for criminal trespass to land (Id.; PAF ¶ 43; DSOFf85). Plaintiffs argue that Detective Schlicher did not have probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant because MO’s younger brother, from the window of the O house, observed Mrs. Zitzka standing on the sidewalk, rather than on the O’s property. Detective Schlicher, however, relied on the later testimony of MO — who was closer to Mrs. Zitzka — that Mrs. Zitzka was on the O’s property, not the sidewalk, during their confrontation. While an officer may base a determination of probable cause on information from a single witness if the officer reasonably believes he or she is telling the truth, if the witness’s information would lead a reasonable officer to be suspicious, the officer has a duty to pursue reasonable avenues of investigation. McBride, 576 F.3d at 707; Beau-champ, 320 F.3d at 743. A witness’s motive is one of the factors to be considered in assessing the totality of circumstances supporting probable cause. People v. Jardon, 393 Ill.App.3d 725, 332 Ill.Dec. 576, 913 N.E.2d 171, 184 (2009); see also People v. Rice, 166 Ill.2d 35, 209 Ill.Dec. 635, 651 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (1995) (holding that cross examination at a preliminary hearing may include interrogation necessary to show “interest, bias, prejudice, or motive of the witness, to the extent that these factors are relevant to the question of probable cause”). Here, a jury reasonably could find that an officer in Detective Schlicher’s position should have been skeptical of MO’s testimony as to where Mrs. Zitzka was standing due to the ongoing conflict between the Zitzka family and the O family, especially in light of the conflicting witness testimony about where Mrs. Zitzka was standing. Moreover, none of the other factors which could warrant making an arrest before conducting further investigation — the information available to the officer, the gravity of the alleged crime, the danger of its imminent repetition, and the amount of time that has passed since the alleged crime, Stokes, 599 F.3d at 625 — were present here. Thus, there is a triable issue as to whether Detective Schlicher lacked probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant for criminal trespass to property. For this reason, the claim survives summary judgment. E. The last arrest warrant at issue in this case arose from an incident on June 12, 2005. Officer Newton reported that JA related to the police that Mrs. Zitzka, in