Full opinion text
CLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM OPINION COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge. Petitioner Fayiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari (“Al Kandari”) has been detained by the United States Government at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba since 2002. According to his own statements and admissions against interest, Al Kandari was in the mountains near Tora Bora, during the height of the Battle of Tora Bora, armed with a Kalishnikov rifle, and in the company of several members and high-level leaders of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated enemy forces, who were actively engaged in fighting the United States and its Coalition allies. Based on these admissions and other evidence in the record, the Government asserts that it has the authority to detain Al Kandari pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (“AUMF”), which authorizes the use of force against certain terrorist nations, organizations, and persons. Al Kandari believes he is unlawfully detained and has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This civil proceeding requires the Court to determine whether or not Al Kandari’s detention is lawful. In connection with this inquiry, the Court has considered the factual evidence in the record, the extensive legal briefing submitted by the parties, and the arguments presented during a five-day Merits Hearing held on October 19-23, 2009. The parties did not present any live testimony at the Merits Hearing, but Al Kandari did listen telephonically to the unclassified opening statements by his counsel and Government’s counsel. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Al Kandari became part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated enemy forces. Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Al Kandari’s petition for habeas corpus. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History Al Kandari filed his petition for habeas corpus on May 1, 2002, making this case the oldest of the pending Guantanamo Bay habeas cases. After several years of litigation, this case was stayed pending resolution of whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear Al Kandari’s petition. On June 12, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Boumediene v. Bush, clarifying that this Court had jurisdiction to consider the petition and advising this and the other judges in this District that “[t]he detainees are entitled to [ ] prompt habeas corpus hearing[s].” 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2275, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008). Following the Boumediene decision, this and most of the other judges in this District agreed to consolidate their Guantanamo Bay habeas cases before former Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan for issuance of an initial case management order that would expeditiously move these cases toward resolution. Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order on November 6, 2008, which he amended on December 16, 2008, and which the Court adopted in this case on December 22, 2008. The Court has relied on the Amended Case Management Order (“CMO”) as the backdrop for its subsequent Scheduling Orders. The Government filed an Amended Factual Return on September 15, 2008, and pursuant to the schedule set by the Court, A1 Kandari filed a Traverse on March 30, 2009. The parties engaged in extensive discovery and motions practice in the interim. AJ Kandari filed a Motion for Additional Discovery on January 26, 2009, which the Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part on February 12, 2009, after a hearing on February 11, 2009. A1 Kandari filed a Motion to Produce a Declassified Factual Return on January 9, 2009, which the Government produced on February 6, 2009. The Court also required the Government to provide A1 Kandari with certain discovery from the Guantanamo Bay Joint Task Force database. In addition, to narrow the disputed issues presented at the Merits Hearing and to focus the parties on the specific documents underpinning their respective arguments, the Court ordered the Government to file a Statement of Facts on which they intended to rely at the Merits Hearing (which narrowed the allegations presented in the Amended Factual Return), and instructed both parties to submit Witness and Exhibit Lists. Finally, the parties filed seven prehearing motions, most of which sought rulings concerning the admissibility of particular evidence. By order dated June 16, 2009, the Court granted the parties’ motions to rely on hearsay evidence at A1 Kandari’s Merits Hearing and granted the Government’s motion to amend its Statement of Facts and Exhibit List as to A1 Kandari, but held their other evidentiary motions in abeyance to be resolved in the context of A1 Kandari’s Merits Hearing. On September 9, 2009, the Court issued a Merits Hearing Procedures Order, which scheduled A1 Kandari’s Merits Hearing to begin on October 19, 2009, and to continue through October 23, 2009, as needed. In addition, as the Court has done with respect to each of the prior Merits Hearings in this case, the Court permitted the parties to file motions for leave to amend the parties’ respective Witness and Exhibit Lists, Respondents’ Statements of Facts, and/or the underlying Factual Return and Traverse. Pursuant to the schedule proposed by the parties and adopted by the Court, the parties exchanged their initial proposed amended exhibits by October 5, 2009; exchanged any additional amended exhibits by October 9, 2009; and conferred regarding their final Exhibit Lists and any objections to the same prior to their submission to the Court on October 13, 2009. This schedule, as suggested by the parties, was intended to ensure that both sides had an opportunity to review the opposing side’s proposed amended exhibits, to adjust their own proposed amended exhibits in response, and to narrow any disputes as to the proposed motions to amend. The Court advised the parties that it would likely exclude from consideration any evidence at the Merits Hearing that had not been identified in the Witness and Exhibits Lists by the October 13, 2009 deadline. The parties timely submitted these materials, and the Court held an on-the-record unclassified telephone conference call with counsel for all parties on October 15, 2009, and a classified status hearing on October 16, 2009, to discuss the parties’ motions for leave to amend and their respective objections to the other side’s amended exhibits. Discussion principally focused on A1 Kandari’s objections to Respondents’ newly amended exhibits (“Amended Exhibits”), and in particular, on his objection to the admission of certain of the Government’s Amended Exhibits on the basis that Petitioner’s counsel would not have an opportunity to show or discuss those exhibits with his client, A1 Kandari, prior to the Merits Hearing. In an effort to address this specific objection, Respondents — with the Court’s firm encouragement — -assisted Petitioner’s counsel in obtaining expedited declassification review of certain exhibits and in arranging a secure telephone conversation between Petitioner’s counsel and A1 Kandari in Guantanamo on Sunday, October 18, 2009, to discuss the Amended Exhibits. At the close of the October 16, 2009 hearing, the Court granted A1 Kandari’s motion for leave to amend his Exhibit List and granted-in-part and held in abeyance-in-part Respondents’ motion for leave to amend the Statement of Material Facts and the Government’s Exhibit List. The Court made clear that it would not exclude Respondents’ Amended Exhibits from consideration ex ante because of the importance of ensuring that its ruling on A1 Kandari’s habeas petition was made on the basis of all available evidence. The Court indicated instead that it would permit the presentation of all evidence, including Respondents’ Amended Exhibits, during the course of the Merits Hearing and would reserve its final decision regarding the parties’ objections to particular pieces of evidence until after all evidence and the parties’ positions thereto had been considered. The Court notes that while the volume of Respondents’ Amended Exhibits was not insignificant, Respondents’ request for leave to amend was timely filed in compliance with the parties’ own proposed schedule and both parties were aware that the number of amended exhibits submitted with respect to A1 Kandari— the last of the four habeas petitions in this case — was likely to be substantial, given the parties’ ongoing efforts to respond to the Court’s prior rulings in these habeas cases. Nonetheless, A1 Kandari’s concerns regarding the timing of the Government’s Amended Exhibits and its effect on his ability to respond to the Amended Exhibits would be considered by the Court in determining the weight to be afforded to any particular piece of evidence during the course of the Merits Hearing. AI Kandari gave no indication that he required additional time in light of this evidentiary approach to further investigate the Amended Exhibits or to augment the record in order to present an adequate defense as to those exhibits, nor did he request a postponement of the Merits Hearing. Accordingly, the Merits Hearing began as scheduled on Monday, October 19, 2009. As the hearing progressed, A1 Kandari’s objections to the Amended Exhibits became increasingly focused on the allegation that his defense was hampered by his counsel’s inability to conduct a further investigation into certain of those exhibits because of the timing of their submission by the Government. On the morning of the fourth day of the Merits Hearing, Thursday, October 22, 2009, the Court halted the parties’ presentation of evidence to address the issue. Observing that most of the evidence relied upon by Respondents from the Amended Exhibits neither raised new allegations against nor contained new information concerning A1 Kandari, the Court cautioned that A1 Kandari must specify precisely how he would be prejudiced if the Court were to rely on the Amended Exhibits in ruling on his habeas petition. The Court advised the parties that it would provide Petitioner’s counsel a final opportunity before the close of the Merits Hearing to identify — -with specificity — the particular actions counsel would have taken in order to complete A1 Kandari’s defense with respect to the Amended Exhibits, if counsel had additional time. To the extent Petitioner’s counsel was able to identify such actions with particularity, the Court would order the record held open for the limited purpose of permitting counsel additional time to conduct the requested investigation with respect to the Amended Exhibits and any exhibits submitted at the Court’s request during the Merits Hearing. In the absence of any particularized assertions of prejudice, however, the Court would conclude that A1 Kandari had completed his defense as to these exhibits; the Court would close the factual record at the end of the Merits Hearing, as anticipated, and make its final decisions on both the exclusion of evidence and the merits of A1 Kandari’s habeas petition on the present record. Accordingly, immediately prior to closing arguments, Petitioner’s counsel was presented with an opportunity “to identify what [Petitioner] need[ed] to do to complete [his] defense as it relates to ... these new exhibits.” 10/22/09 (AM) Mrts. Hr’g Tr. at 14:3-5. This opportunity was specifically limited to the Amended Exhibits as well as to any evidence newly presented at the Court’s request during the course of the Merits Hearing. See id. at 57:19-25, 58:12-19. The Court made clear that it was not permitting A1 Kandari the opportunity to advance new objections to previously disclosed evidence or to reopen discovery as to all issues. See 10/22/09 (PM) Mrts. Hr’g Tr. at 60:1-11. At that time, Petitioner’s counsel made seven specific requests for further action with respect to the Respondents’ Amended Exhibits only. Based on these particularized representations, the Court agreed to leave the record open for A1 Kandari to pursue these specific actions. Although this course of action would inevitably delay final resolution of A1 Kandari’s petition for habeas corpus, Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that his client preferred to obtain a continuance of the Merits Hearing rather than rest his defense and leave the Court to make its final decisions on both the exclusion of evidence and the merits of Al Kandari’s habeas petition on the present record. See id. at 66:5-19. The record was therefore left open for the limited purpose of permitting Petitioner’s counsel to pursue the specific actions identified on the record at the close of the Merits Hearing. The Court ordered Respondents to search and disclose certain information requested by Petitioner regarding the Amended Exhibits by no later than November 24, 2009. To the extent Respondents’ searches uncovered responsive information that was inculpatory in nature, the Court indicated that the Government would be permitted to seek leave to augment the record with this additional material as well. Pursuant to the schedule suggested by the parties and adopted by the Court, on February 26, 2010, the Government — but not Al Kandari — filed a Motion to Augment the Record. Al Kandari opposes that Motion, which is now fully briefed and pending before the Court. By contrast, Al Kandari did not seek to admit any additional evidence into the record in response to the seven areas of concern related to the Respondents’ Amended Exhibits, despite having been permitted an additional four months to conduct further investigations in order to complete his defense as to those exhibits. With the Court’s leave, however, Al Kandari filed a Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum directed at securing certain testimony relating to the Amended Exhibits as well as a supplemental brief in support of his objections to certain of the Amended Exhibits. See Feb. 3, 2010 Order. The Government opposes Al Kandari’s Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum, which is now fully briefed and pending before the Court. Both Respondents’ Motion to Augment the Record and Al Kandari’s Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum are discussed in further detail below. See discussion infra pp. 20-21. B. Evidentiary Issues 1. Hearsay As stated above, the Court granted the parties’ motions to rely on hearsay evidence in this proceeding. The plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld specifically acknowledged that “[hjearsay ... may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government.” 542 U.S. 507, 534, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). The Court finds that allowing the use of hearsay by both parties balances the need to prevent the substantial diversion of military and intelligence resources during a time of hostilities, while at the same time providing Al Kandari with a meaningful opportunity to contest the basis of his detention. The Court is fully capable of considering whether a piece of evidence (whether hearsay or not) is reliable, and it has made such determinations in the context of the evidence and arguments presented during the Merits Hearing — including any arguments the parties made concerning the unreliability of hearsay evidence. Cf. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C.Cir.2008) (explaining, in the context of the Detainee Treatment Act, that the Court was “not suggesting] that hearsay evidence is never reliable — only that it must be presented in the form, or with sufficient additional information, that permits [the finder of fact] to assess its reliability”) (emphasis in original). The D.C. Circuit recently approved this approach to the admission of hearsay evidence, explaining that “the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible — it is always admissible — but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits.” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C.Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.Cir.2010) (affirming that “hearsay evidence is admissible in this type of habeas proceeding if the hearsay is reliable”); Al Odah v. Obama, 611 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C.Cir. 2010) (same). 2. Presumption of Accuracy and Authenticity For similar reasons, the Court shall deny the Government’s motion to have its evidence admitted with a presumption of accuracy and authenticity. Relying in part on the Supreme Court’s statement in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided,” 542 U.S. at 534, 124 S.Ct. 2633, the Government argues that a presumption as to its evidence is both appropriate and necessary. The Court disagrees. One of the central functions of the Court in this case is “to evaluate the raw evidence” proffered by the Government and to determine whether it is “sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of clarity.” Parhat, 532 F.3d at 847. Simply assuming the Government’s evidence is accurate and authentic does not aid that inquiry. Cf. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F.Supp.2d 51, 55 (D.D.C.2009) (rejecting a presumption of accuracy for the Government’s evidence and holding that “the accuracy of much of the factual material contained in [the Government’s] exhibits is hotly contested for a host of different reasons ... ”). The Court also finds that there are significant reasons why the Government’s proffered evidence may not be accurate or authentic. Some of the evidence advanced by the Government has been “buried under the rubble of war,” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532, 124 S.Ct. 2633, in circumstances that have not allowed the Government to ascertain its chain of custody, nor in many instances even to produce information about the origins of the evidence. Other evidence is based on so-called “unfinished” intelligence, information that has not been subject to each of the five steps in the intelligence cycle (planning, collection, processing, analysis and production, and dissemination). Based on the Government’s own declarations, its raw intelligence may not have been fully analyzed for its “reliability, validity, and relevance” in the context of other intelligence where “judgments about its collective meaning” are made. Ex. 58 at 3-5 (09/19/08 Decl. of [Redacted] Ex. 59 at 1-2 (05/29/09 Decl. of [Redacted] explaining that the five steps in the intelligence cycle are not “mechanical” and that the process “var[ies] by collection specialty,” but not disturbing the conclusion that “unfinished” intelligence has not undergone the same rigorous integration and evaluation process that produces “finished” intelligence). Still other evidence is based on multiple layers of hearsay (which inherently raises questions about reliability), or is based on reports of interrogations (often conducted through a translator) where translation or transcription mistakes may occur. Accordingly, the Court shall not accord a presumption of accuracy or authenticity to the Government’s evidence, but shall consider the accuracy or authenticity of the evidence in the context of the entire record and the arguments raised by the parties. S. Al Kandari’s Pre-Hearing Motions to Exclude Evidence The Court shall also use the same approach to consider Al Kandari’s pre-hearing evidentiary motions, as supplemented by his post-hearing briefing, that sought to exclude particular pieces of evidence based on their alleged lack of authenticity, reliability, or relevance. Rather than exclude evidence from consideration ex ante by examining it in a vacuum, the Court concludes that the better approach is to make such determinations after considering all of the evidence in the record and hearing the parties’ arguments related thereto. Cf. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 880 (“Where the touchstone of a proceeding is ‘meaningfulness,’ empowering a district court to review and assess all evidence from both sides is a logical process.”). The Court believes this approach is particularly useful where, as here, a document viewed in isolation may appear to be irrelevant, but when considered in the context of the other evidence in the record its importance may become clear. Accordingly, the Court’s consideration of the evidence proffered by the parties shall encompass inquiries into authenticity, reliability, and relevance. Cf. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 847 (describing the Court’s inquiry into whether evidence is “ ‘sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of certainty’ ”) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993)). A Al Kandari’s and the Government’s Post-Hearing Motions As explained above, the following post-hearing motions were filed by the parties and remain pending before the Court: (1) Al Kandari’s Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum; and (2) Respondents’ Motion to Augment the Record. Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and responsive briefing, and their respeetive arguments as contained therein, the Court shall deny both motions as moot because they relate to evidence that the Court has not relied on in reaching its decision to deny Al Kandari’s petition for habeas corpus. First, as set forth in Petitioner’s motion, he requests the Court issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for the production of two individuals currently detained in United States’ custody, Mohammed Monsour Jabarah and [Redacted] Al Kandari seeks to secure testimony from the first individual, Jabarah, with respect to statements made by him in Exhibit 76 (FD-302 [Redacted] and [Redacted] As Al Kandari himself recognizes, however, his “petition need not be granted if the Court excludes Exhibits 76 [Redacted] from consideration.” Pet’r’s Pet. for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum at 1. Accordingly, because the Court has not relied on either Exhibit 76 or [Redacted] in reaching its decision in this case, Al Kandari’s Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum is denied as moot. Second, the Government seeks in its motion to augment the record to include two additional pieces of evidence that relate to [Redacted] Again, however, the Court does not reach herein either [Redacted] or the Government’s allegation [Redacted] Accordingly, Respondents’ Motion to Augment the Record is also denied as moot. The record before the Court is therefore limited solely to evidence submitted by the parties prior to or during the Merits Hearing in this case. C. Standard of Detention The Government derives its authority to detain Al Kandari from the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The D.C. Circuit has held that the President’s authority to detain individuals under the AUMF includes, but is not necessarily limited to, “those who are part of forces associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.” Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. Both prongs of this test, which are informally referred to as the “part of’ and the “support” prongs, are “valid criteria that are independently sufficient to satisfy the standard” for lawful detention under the AUMF. Id. at 874. In this case, the Government contends that it is lawfully authorized to detain Al Kandari because he was part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated enemy forces. See Jt. List of Contested Issues, Docket No. [663]. Although the D.C. Circuit “has yet to delineate the precise contours of the ‘part of inquiry,” Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 424, this Court is not without guidance. The Court of Appeals has emphasized that the focus of this inquiry is whether an individual is “functionally part of’ al Qaeda, the Taliban or affiliated forces. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C.Cir.2010) (emphasis added). For example, while proof that “a detainee was part of the ‘command structure’ of al Qaeda [] satisfies the requirement to show that he was ‘part of al Qaeda,” such a showing is not necessary. Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (rejecting claim that “there must be a specific factual finding that [the detainee] was part of the ‘command structure’ of al Qaeda”); Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725 (“That an individual operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure is surely sufficient but is not necessary to show he is ‘part of the organization.”). Similarly, proof that an individual actually fought for or on behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban, while sufficient, is also not required to demonstrate that an individual is a “part of’ such enemy forces. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872-73. Ultimately, the determination whether an individual is a “part of’ al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, “must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.” Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. D. Burden of Persuasion Pursuant to the CMO that the Court adopted in this case on December 22, 2008, the Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that AJ Kandari is lawfully detained. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, CMO § II.A, 2008 WL 4858241 (Nov. 6, 2008) (“[t]he government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s detention is lawful”) (citing Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2271) (“[T]he extent of the showing required of the government in these cases is a matter to be determined.”). The D.C. Circuit has affirmed that “a preponderance of evidence standard is constitutional in evaluating a habeas petition from a detainee held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Awad, 608 F.3d at 10; see also Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 14 (“It is now well-settled law that a preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional in considering a habeas petition from an individual detained pursuant to authority granted by the AUMF.”). Accordingly, Al Kandari need not prove his innocence nor testify on his own behalf. The burden of proof has remained on the Government at all times. The Court has drawn no inference based on Al Kandari’s decision not to testify in this case. Accord Awad v. Obama, 646 F.Supp.2d 20, 24 (D.D.C.2009), aff'd, Awad, 608 F.3d 1. The Government must come forward with evidence demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that Al Kandari is lawfully detained, and if the Government fails to meet this burden, the Court must grant Al Kandari’s petition for habeas corpus. II. DISCUSSION The following facts are uncontroverted and/or uncontested. Al Kandari is a citizen of Kuwait and was 26 years old at the time of his arrival in Guantanamo in 2002. Stip. of Fact ¶ 13. In or around August 2001, Al Kandari traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. Id. ¶ 15. He was subsequently captured while fleeing the mountains near Tora Bora shortly after the feast of Ramadan, which the Court takes judicial notice occurred on or around December 16, 2001. Ex. 139 at ¶ 7 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR); Ex. 99 (Timeline of Operation Enduring Freedom); 10/19/09 Mrts. Hr’g. Tr. at 47:24-48:1. Al Kandari’s activities within Afghanistan during this time, however, are in dispute. Al Kandari asserts that he engaged in charitable work while in Afghanistan and that he was attempting to escape the fighting in that country when he was captured fleeing Tora Bora. The Government contends that Al Kandari joined with and fought along side members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, while in Afghanistan. For this reason, among others, the Government argues that it is more likely than not that Al Kandari was part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, and is therefore lawfully detained pursuant to the President’s authority under the AUMF. The record in this case is voluminous. The Merits Hearing took place over five days, and the parties have introduced approximately 230 exhibits into the record, consisting of Al Kandari’s own statements as well as the statements of numerous third-party sources and other documents. Ultimately, the Court finds that Al Kandari’s own statements and admissions against interest regarding his travel and activities in Afghanistan between August and mid-December of 2001 are sufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that Al Kandari was part of forces associated with al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban. The Court’s discussion of the evidence in the record shall proceed in two steps. First, relying solely on Al Kandari’s own statements, both in his declaration and in his statements to Government interrogators, the Court shall describe Al Kandari’s version of events leading up to his detention; identify several of the reasons why Al Kandari’s exculpatory version of events is not credible; and explain why Al Kandari’s own statements and admissions against interest demonstrate that Al Kandari was more likely than not part of alQaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Having found that Al Kandari’s own statements and admissions against interest discussed at the first step are by themselves sufficient for the Government to meet its burden in this case, the Court need not reach the other evidence offered by the Government but shall nonetheless briefly discuss the remaining evidence in the record at the second and final step. A. Al Kandari’s Own Statements The record now before the Court consists of Al Kandari’s statements made to Government interrogators during the course of his detention as well as a declaration, sworn to under penalty of perjury, submitted by Al Kandari in 2009 in support of his habeas petition. Al Kandari urges the Court to exclude, or at minimum decline to consider, all of his statements made to interrogators and rely solely on statements made in his declaration. He advances four principal arguments in support of this assertion. Given the importance of the Government’s evidence regarding Al Kandari’s statements to Government interrogators and the centrality of such statements to the Government’s case, the Court addresses each of these arguments at the outset. First, Al Kandari asserts that the interrogation reports recording his statements should be excluded as hearsay because he does not speak English and his interrogations were necessarily conducted through interpreters. While the use of an interpreter to relay Al Kandari’s otherwise admissible answers “does introduce a level of technical hearsay,” this does not require the exclusion of his interrogation answers from these habeas proceedings. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (“But that such evidence [is] hearsay does not automatically invalidate its admission.”). The question for this Court is not whether Al Kandari’s statements to interrogators are admissible, but what probative weight should be given to such statements. Id. Second, Al Kandari argues that the use of an interpreter to facilitate his interrogations renders the Government’s reports of his interrogation answers inherently unreliable as a category of evidence. In support of this contention, Al Kandari has introduced the Declaration of Karin C. Ryding, Ph.D., Concerning Arabic Interpretation Issues, see Ex. 195, and a newspaper article from April 7, 2004, containing an interview with [Redacted] who was identified as one of the interpreters who facilitated [Redacted] interrogation of Al Kandari (as reported in Exhibit 28), see Ex. 194. Neither Exhibit 194 nor Exhibit 195 discuss Al Kandari’s statements or identify any specific errors in the interrogation reports now in the record. Dr. Ryding opines that “it cannot be presumed that Arabic interpretation in the interrogation of detainees, whether performed by a native speaker of Arabic or an American with some command of [Modern Standard Arabic], was fully accurate or reliable.” Ex. 195 at ¶ 32. [Redacted] reported comments, at most, merely support the same conclusion reached by Dr. Ryding — namely, that interrogation reports facilitated by an interpreter should not be presumed to be automatically reliable or accurate. See Ex. 194. But the Court has not presumed that any evidence in these proceedings, including the interrogation reports of Al Kandari’s own statements, are either accurate or reliable. Rather, it has reserved that determination to be made after considering all of the evidence in the record and hearing the parties’ arguments related thereto. To the extent Al Kandari advances specific arguments that particular interpreter-related errors occurred, the Court shall consider such evidence and arguments in evaluating the probative weight of those statements. Third, Al Kandari’s counsel argued during the Merits Hearing that the reports of Al Kandari’s statements are not reliable because they “[are] not and do[ ] not even purport to be a verbatim transcript of what the interpreter said that [A1 Kandari] said,” but rather are written in a “summary fashion.” 10/20/09 (AM) Mrts. Hr’g Tr. at 15:6-121 That intelligence reports include summaries, rather than a verbatim transcript, of A1 Kandari’s statements does not render the reports inherently unreliable. Cf. Abdah v. Obama, 709 F.Supp.2d 25, 37 n. 16 (D.D.C.2010) (“that an SIR lacks certain details does not make the information it does include inaccurate”). While it may be a reason not to presume the reports are reliable or accurate, the Court has not granted the Government’s evidence any such presumption of accuracy or reliability in this case. Rather, consistent with the Court’s evidentiary approach in this matter, the Court shall consider the summary nature of the reports, and whether A1 Kandari has identified any specific statements that he claims are inaccurate as the result of their presentation in summary form, in reaching its decision about how much probative weight, if any, to afford a particular piece of evidence. Fourth and finally, A1 Kandari broadly asserts in his declaration that the interrogation reports containing his answers to Government interrogators are plagued with inaccuracies, the implication of which is that they cannot and should not be relied on. A1 Kandari states in his declaration that he has reviewed his interrogation answers and “see[s] many places where my statements have been so badly distorted or taken out of context that they are not true.” Ex. 139 at ¶ 9 (03/06/09 Deel. of A1 Kandari). The Court emphasizes that A1 Kandari has not argued in these habeas proceedings that any of his statements were the product of abuse or coercion. While A1 Kandari makes a general claim in his declaration that he was subjected to abusive and coercive interrogation tactics by the United States, he does not claim that he ever made any statements that were the product of such alleged abuse and coercion. See Ex. 139 at ¶ 8 (03/06/09 Decl. of A1 Kandari). Similarly, while A1 Kandari makes a general claim in his declaration that his interrogators “tried to make me confess to things I did not do, and to say things about other people I did not know,” he does not claim that such alleged efforts were successful— i.e., that he in fact made false statements as a result of these alleged interrogation tactics. See id. Indeed, neither A1 Kandari in his declaration nor his counsel at the Merits Hearing claimed that A1 Kandari has ever made false or inaccurate statements because of the Government’s alleged abuse and/or use of coercive interrogation tactics. Moreover, when specifically asked by this Court during the Merits Hearing if A1 Kandari was advancing a claim of abuse in this case, A1 Kandari’s counsel explicitly acknowledged that A1 Kandari’s generalized claims of abuse are “not relevant to what the Court has to decide.” 10/21/09 (PM) Mrts. Hr’g Tr. at 13:10-12; see also 10/22/09 (AM) Mrts. Hr’g Tr. at 87:2-3 (“Your Honor, we’re not claiming that Mr. A1 Kandari made false statements as a result of coercive tactics.”); id. at 93:22-94:8 (“The Court: ... But as I understand it, you’re not claiming that he was coerced to make false statements. Mr. MacLean: Your Honor, we don’t have a basis to make that — •... We’re not making that claim, Your Hon- or.”). Accordingly, there is no claim in this case that, as a result of coercion, A1 Kandari made statements to interrogators that he knew to be false, such that his statements, although accurately reported, are unreliable. Al Kandari instead argues that he never made certain inculpatory statements attributed to him — i.e., that such statements are not accurately reported and are therefore unreliable. While Petitioner’s counsel speculated at the Merits Hearing that these alleged distortions and errors referred to by Al Kandari may be the result of interpreter error, among other potential possibilities, he conceded that Al Kandari himself has not proffered an explanation for these alleged errors. See 10/22/09 (AM) Mrts. Hr’g Tr. at 91:19-92:1. Save for a few limited exceptions, see Ex. 139 at ¶¶ 17, 28 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari), Al Kandari has not disputed the specific wording of any particular statement he is reported to have made nor has he identified any particular phrases that he alleges are the result of interpreter error, see generally id. Rather, Al Kandari has in most instances simply offered a blanket denial that he made certain inculpatory statements. See Ex. 139 at ¶ 9 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari) (“As to these statements, I can only say that they are not my words.”). After considering the evidence in the record and the parties’ respective arguments thereto, the Court finds that such blanket denials, where they have been made without further explanation or support, are not credible. As compared to his inculpatory admissions against interest made to Government interrogators, Al Kandari’s statements in his declaration denying that he made certain prior inculpatory statements lack sufficient indicia of reliability. The Court emphasizes that with respect to those statements that Al Kandari now denies having made to Government interrogators, there is no evidence in the record that Al Kandari ever recanted or denied making such assertions to the Government interrogators during his interrogations. Rather, it is only in his declaration, submitted several years after-the-fact, that Al Kandari denies having made these statements. Al Kandari has a motive to deny prior statements that are inculpatory in nature. Cf. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C.Cir.2010) (“[I]t accords with common sense that he may have had a motivation to lie about his own involvement in nefarious activity....”). Moreover, the Court notes that Al Kandari himself does not dispute the accuracy of many of his statements as reported in the Government’s interrogation reports — at least as to many of those statements that are exculpatory in nature. As is discussed below, Al Kandari states in his declaration that he traveled to Afghanistan for charitable purposes; engaged solely in charitable activities while there; and was captured while attempting to flee to Pakistan to avoid the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan. These are the same basic assertions that he is consistently reported to have made to Government interrogators (although, as is discussed below, many of the specific details of Al Kandari’s explanation vary between his different statements). As a practical matter, Al Kandari asks this Court to accept the accuracy of these exculpatory statements to interrogators, at least to the extent they are consistent with his declaration, while simultaneously asking the Court to reject as inaccurate any and all inculpatory statements he made to interrogators during his detention. The Court declines to do so. Nonetheless, insofar as Al Kandari offers specific indications that particular statements he is reported to have made are inaccurate or unreliable, the Court shall consider his evidence and arguments in evaluating the probative weight of those specific statements. As the above discussion reveals, a key inquiry in this case is the extent to which the Court assesses Al Kandari’s statements — in his declaration as well as in his statements to Government interrogators— as credible, accurate, and reliable. In evaluating Al Kandari’s statements, the Court shall proceed as follows. First, the Court shall set forth Al Kandari’s version of events. As indicated above, Al Kandari has maintained both in his declaration and in his statements to Government interrogators that he engaged in charitable work only while in Afghanistan and was attempting to escape the fighting in that country when he was captured fleeing Tora Bora. Second, the Court shall identify several reasons why Al Kandari’s exculpatory statements explaining his reasons for traveling to and his activities within Afghanistan are not credible. Third, the Court shall consider Al Kandari’s inculpatory statements admitting that he was given a Kalishnikov rifle and taught how to use it, and that he associated with members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, while in Tora Bora, and shall explain why these statements are credible and reliable. Ultimately, the Court finds that Al Kandari’s own statements and admissions against interest demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he was part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated enemy forces, and is therefore lawfully detained under the President’s authority pursuant to the AUMF. 1. Al Kandari’s Version of Events Al Kandari states that he traveled to Pakistan in June of 2001 to visit Sheikh Mohammed Wali Allah Arrahmani, whom he describes as a respected Pakistani scholar. Ex. 139 at ¶ 3 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari.); Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR). While in Pakistan, he studied at Sheik Arrahmani’s school. Ex. 139 at ¶ 3 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari). After staying with Sheik Arrahamani in Pakistan for approximately two months, Al Kandari decided to travel to Afghanistan for the purposes of doing charitable work. Ex. 139 at ¶ 3 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari). According to Al Kandari, this decision was consistent with his prior history of doing charitable work, which includes traveling to other countries such as Pakistan and Bosnia to assist with charitable projects. Ex. 139 at ¶¶ 2, 11 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302); Ex. 6 (03/18/03 Al Kandari MFR); Ex. 74 (05/23/02 Al Kandari FD-302). See also Ex. 140 (02/22/09 Deck of M. Al Kandari). Al Kandari left Pakistan in or around August of 2001 to head to Afghanistan. Ex. 139 at ¶ 3 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari HR). He traveled first to Kandahar before then proceeding on to Kabul. Ex. 139 at ¶ 3 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR). Upon his arrival in Kabul, Al Kandari went to the local office of al-Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia (“alWafa”). Ex. 139 at ¶ 4 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Stip. of Fact ¶ 16; Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR); Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR). Although the parties introduced evidence [Redacted] Ex. 25 (9/19/08 Decl. of [Redacted] Stip. of Fact ¶ 3 [Redacted], Al Kandari states in his declaration that he went to al-Wafa because it was “[o]ne of the principal charitable organizations in Afghanistan at that time,” and he “never had any reason to suspect” that al-Wafa was involved with al Qaeda, Ex. 139 at ¶ 4 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). At al-Wafa, Al Kandari inquired about opportunities for charitable work and was directed by a member of the organization to a village located approximately 45 minutes to one hour outside of Kabul. Ex. 139 at ¶¶ 4-5 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR). He traveled to this unnamed village, arriving sometime in early September 2001. Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302). While there, Al Kandari worked on a charity project digging a well for the community. Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). He stayed in this village for approximately one and a half months until Coalition forces began bombing Afghanistan, which the Court takes judicial notice occurred on October 7, 2001. Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302); Ex. 99 (Timeline of Operation Enduring Freedom). At that time, Al Kandari realized that he should leave Afghanistan. Ex. 139 at ¶ 6 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). He left the village where he had been staying and returned to Kabul. Ex. 139 at ¶ 6 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302). He went back to the al-Wafa office there, but found that it was closed. Ex. 139 at ¶ 6 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302). A taxi cab driver suggested that he go to Jalalabad and offered to take him there for a large sum of money. Ex. 139 at ¶ 6 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302). Upon arriving in Jalalabad, Al Kandari met a Saudi named Abdul Rah-man al Kasimi, who permitted Al Kandari to stay at his house for approximately two days. Ex. 139 at ¶ 6 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302). Al Kandari explains that fighting was breaking out everywhere, and Arabs were being rounded up by police and militias to be handed over in exchange for money. Ex. 139 at ¶ 7 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). He joined with a small group of Arabs who were trying to flee the fighting through the Tora Bora mountains. Ex. 139 at ¶ 7 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). The group walked for a few days in the mountains, but they were eventually captured by Afghani villagers while staying the night at a village home owned by an unidentified Afghani. Ex. 139 at ¶ 7 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR). Al Kandari was later transferred into American custody. Ex. 139 at ¶ 7 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR). 2. Al Kandari’s Version of Events is Not Plausible Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record and listened to counsel’s arguments during the Merits Hearing, the Court concludes that Al Kandari’s explanation for his time in Afghanistan, as asserted in both his declaration and in his statements to Government interrogators, is not plausible for three principal reasons. First, Al Kandari’s version of events suffers from several inconsistencies. Second, Al Kandari’s explanation does not fully explain or account for his time in Afghanistan. Third, Al Kandari’s exculpatory statements are not credible in several key aspects. a. Al Kandari’s version of events suffers from several inconsistencies. First, Al Kandari’s version of events suffers from several inconsistencies that have not been explained. Although Al Kandari has maintained the same general explanation for his time in Afghanistan throughout his detention — that he traveled to Afghanistan for charitable purposes; engaged solely in charitable activities while there; and was captured while attempting to flee to Pakistan to avoid the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan — the specific details provided by Al Kandari regarding his activities have varied and have even conflicted at times. For example, Al Kandari has offered conflicting statements as to the identify of the individual he spoke with at the al-Wafa office in Kabul when he initially inquired about possible charitable opportunities and was referred to the unnamed needy village. Al Kandari has variously asserted that he spoke with: (a) an unidentified worker at the al-Wafa office, but was unable to speak with the Director, whom Al Kandari explained was not present at the office at that time of his visit, Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR); (b) a man whom he believed at the time to be the Director of the Kabul al-Wafa office and whom he later learned upon his arrival at Guantanamo Bay was Abdallah Al Matrafi (ISN 005), Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR); see also Ex. 32 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR) (met with [Redacted] at the al-Wafa office), a Saudi whom the Government identifies as [Redacted] Ex. 25 [Redacted] Deck); Ex. 32 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR); and (c) an unidentified man with a long beard who was neither a Saudi nor a Kuwaiti and whose name he did not know, Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302). Al Kandari’s declaration does not clarify these inconsistencies, indicating only that he briefly met with an unidentified official at the Kabul al-Wafa office. Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari). In addition, Al Kandari has offered conflicting reasons for his initial decision to travel to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan. During an interrogation in May of 2002, Al Kandari explained that he went to Pakistan to look up a Sheik, whose name he could not recall, with whom Al Kandari had been in communication; he stated that he stayed at the Sheik’s apartment, which was located near an unidentified Islamic school, for approximately two months before then traveling to Afghanistan after learning that there had been a famine in that country. Ex. 28 (5/6/2002 Al Kandari FD-302). In both an October 2004 interrogation and in his present declaration, however, Al Kandari stated that he had actually been invited to Pakistan by Sheik Arrahmani, whom he was able to identify by name, to study at the Sheik’s madrassa. Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR); Ex. 139 at 13 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari). Al Kandari also initially advised interrogators that he had first heard about al-Wafa from Sheik Arrahmani, but when later asked who had first told him about al-Wafa, stated only that he “used to hear about it.” Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR). Al Kandari’s declaration does not provide clarification, indicating simply that he went to Afghanistan because he had decided that it was the best place for charitable work. Ex. 139 at ¶ 3 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). Similarly, Al Kandari has variously stated that he went to al-Wafa to inquire where he could make a charitable donation of six to seven thousand dinars, Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302), and that he went to al-Wafa to inquire where he could go to build a well, Ex. 7 (10/24/04 Al Kandari SIR); see also Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari) (assisted villagers with digging a well). Al Kandari has also offered inconsistent statements regarding his travel path immediately after the bombing campaign began in October of 2001. He stated on one occasion that, upon returning to Kabul and discovering the al-Wafa office closed, he initially decided to travel south away from Kabul and then decided to reverse his travel path and head to Jalalabad only after traveling south for an unspecified period of time. Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR). Al Kandari has otherwise indicated, however, that he left Kabul directly for Jalalabad, which the Court takes judicial notice is east of Kabul. Ex. 74 (05/23/02 Al Kandari FD-302) (stating he located a taxi driver to drive him directly from Kabul to Jalalabad); see also Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302); Ex. 139 at ¶ 6 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari). Finally, Al Kandari has provided conflicting statements as to whether he met with Anas Al Kandari (“Anas”), while in Afghanistan. Al Kandari repeatedly admitted to Government interrogators on multiple occasions that he met Anas during his visit to the Kabul office of al-Wafa, Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302); Ex. 32 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR); Ex. 43 (10/06/05 Al Kandari IIR); Ex. 122 (6/15/05 Al Kandari SIR), and that Anas told Al Kandari during this meeting that he and an associate, Jassem Al Hajeri, had recently received military training at the Libyan camp in Afghanistan, Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302); Ex 43 (10/06/05 Al Kandari IIR); Ex. 122 (6/15/05 Al Kandari SIR). However, in his declaration submitted nearly eight years later as part of this litigation, Al Kandari denies these admissions for the first time, stating that he “did not meet Anas Al Kandari in Afghanistan” and that he has “no knowledge about anything [Anas] did.” Ex. 139 at ¶ 17 (03/06/09 Deck of Al Kandari). The Court finds that Al Kandari’s contradictory denial in his declaration, made without further explanation, is not credible, and therefore serves to undermine the credibility of his declaration. Al Kandarfs prior admissions with respect to Anas are consistent across several interrogations, and there is no indication in any of the interrogation reports that his admissions on this point were viewed by the interrogators themselves as incredible or unreliable. It is also significant that Al Kandari never recanted his admission that he met and spoke with Anas at al-Wafa during any of the multiple interrogations in which he consistently admitted to having met Anas in Afghanistan. Moreover, given Anas’ admission to Al Kandari that he received military training, and the Government’s uncontroverted evidence that Anas was responsible for leading an attack on United States Marines on Faylaka Island in Kuwait on October 8, 2002, during which attack both he and [Redacted] were killed, [Redacted] Al Kandari clearly has a motivation to deny any association with or knowledge of Anas or Anas’ associate Al Hajeri. b. Al Kandari’s version of events does not fully account for his time in Afghanistan. Second, Al Kandari’s explanation of events does not fully account for his time in Afghanistan. Al Kandari maintains that he remained in the unnamed village outside of Kabul until Coalition forces began their bombing campaign on Sunday, October 7, 2001, at which time he states that he returned to Kabul. As the unnamed village in which Al Kandari stayed was allegedly located only 45 minutes to one hour by car outside of Kabul, it is reasonable to infer that his return trip from the unnamed village to Kabul would have taken no more than one day. Upon arriving in Kabul and finding the al-Wafa office closed, Al Kandari states that he paid a cab driver a large sum of money to drive him from Kabul to Jalalabad. The Court takes judicial notice that Jalalabad is located approximately 90-100 miles east of Kabul. See Ex. 94 (map of Afghanistan with scale). Al Kandari has never suggested that the drive from Kabul to Jalalabad took an unusual or extended period of time; absent any indication to the contrary, it is reasonable to infer that this trip would have taken no more than one or two days. Accordingly, Al Kandari’s own statements place him in Jalalabad by no later than October 14, 2001, approximately one week after his departure from the unnamed village on or around October 7, 2001. Upon his arrival in Jalalabad, Al Kandari states that he stayed with al Kassimi in Jalalabad for two days. He then joined a group of Arabs who were trying to flee through the mountains of Tora Bora and traveled with them for a few days in the mountains before he was ultimately captured by Afghan forces. Therefore, according to Al Kandari’s own version of events, he was captured no more than five days after his arrival in Jalalabad, which would place his capture on or around October 19, 2001. It is uncontroverted, however, that Al Kandari was not actually captured by Afghani villagers and turned over to American forces until approximately two months later, shortly after December 16, 2001. Ex. 139 at ¶ 7 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari Decl.); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Interrogation of Al Kandari); Ex. 99 (Timeline of Operation Enduring Freedom). Al Kandari’s own explanation for his activities in Afghanistan therefore creates a “missing” two months of time for which Al Kandari cannot account. Moreover, the fact that Al Kandari was unwilling repeatedly to provide a full explanation for his time and activities in Afghanistan is itself evidence that undermines the veracity of his version of events. AI Kandari is by no means an unsophisticated individual, having studied Shari’a law at college in Ra’s al Khayman, United Arab Emirates. Stip. of Fact ¶ 14. His interrogators repeatedly noted as much, observing him to be “very polite and well-educated” and “smart with the attitude that the interrogation team cannot catch him.” Ex. 6 (03/18/03 Al Kandari MFR); Ex. 118 (08/05/03 Al Kandari MFR). The evidence in the record strongly suggests that Al Kandari has affirmatively chosen not to provide any detailed information about his time in Afghanistan. In late 2002, Al Kandari explicitly advised his interrogators that, although he was willing to discuss certain issues, he would not talk about his activities in Afghanistan. Ex. 48 (12/13/02 Al Kandari HR); cf. Ex. 43 (10/06/05 Al Kandari HR) (assessing Al Kandari as “deceptive” and concluding that he “is most likely withholding information”); Ex. 122 (6/15/02 Al Kandari SIR) (assessing Al Kandari as “deceptive” and noting that he “appears to cooperate but offers information of insignificant value”). Similarly, in his testimony during his Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) Proceeding, Al Kandari declined to explain his activities in Afghanistan. See generally Ex. 121 (Al Kandari ARB Statement). In his declaration submitted in support of his habeas petition, Al Kandari once again declined to provide any specific details regarding his time in Afghanistan or to address any of the deficiencies identified above. See generally Ex. 139 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). While recognizing that Al Kandari has no burden to prove his innocence in these habeas proceedings, his repeated unwillingness to provide details as to his time in Afghanistan is nonetheless inconsistent with, and undermines the credibility of, his claim that he was an innocent charity worker who became inadvertently trapped in Afghanistan in the wake of September 11, 2001. c. Al Kandari’s version of events is not credible in certain key aspects. Third, Al Kandari’s explanation is not credible in certain aspects. Although Al Kandari maintains that he remained in the unidentified needy village for approximately one and a half months, during which time he stayed in the village leader’s house, Al Kandari has been consistently unable to recall or otherwise identify the name of that village or anyone in it or provide any other identifying information. Ex. 7 (10/27/04 Al Kandari SIR); Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR); Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). Yet he is able to easily recall the name of a restaurant near which he stayed for two days while in Kandahar on his way to Kabul in August of 2001. See Ex. 27 (11/20/03 Al Kandari IIR) (explaining that he stayed at a hotel located near the Ariana restaurant in Kandahar for two days); Ex. 28 (05/06/02 Al Kandari FD-302) (same); Ex. 74 (05/23/02 Al Kandari FD-302) (same). Al Kandari explains in his declaration that he “wrote down the name of the village and the mayor and other people” in a notebook, which he states is now in the possession of the United States Government. Ex. 139 at ¶ 5 (03/06/09 Decl. of Al Kandari). The Government represented that it was unable to locate any such notebook in its possession and also disputes Al Kandari’s claim that he was detained with a notebook. The evidence presented on this issue is conflicting. However, even assuming that Al Kandari maintained a notebook, as he asserts in his declaration, this fact does not negate the implausibility of his continued inability to independently recall any information identifying: the village in which he claims to have lived for approximately six weeks; the village leader, whose house he asserts he stayed in during his one and a half months in the village; or any of the local villagers, whom he alleges to have worked beside for the duration of his stay in the village. in addition, Al Kandari’s assertion that he visited al-Wafa solely for assistance in locating a village where