Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DAVIS, District Judge. These actions were brought by Martin Cavanagh in his own right and on behalf of his son, Matthew (together, the “Cav-anaghs”), relying principally upon the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq., against defendants, the Maryland State Department of Education and its Superintendent, Nancy S. Grasmick (together, “MSDE”) and the Prince George’s County Public Schools and its Superintendent, Jerome Clark (together, “PGCPS”). The Cavanaghs allege, inter alia, that defendants failed to provide Matthew with a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) for the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years and otherwise violated IDEA in myriad respects. The Cavanaghs filed separate actions for each of the school years at issue and the actions have been consolidated. Pending before the court are MSDE’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, For Summary Judgment, and PGCPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment. I have reviewed the administrative record and thoroughly examined the parties’ submissions; no hearing is necessary. For the reasons discussed below, I will grant defendants’ motions. I. FACTS A. Background Matthew, now 16 years old, has a history of congenital hydrocephalus and Arnold-Chiari Malformation Syndrome. He is classified as “other health impaired” and qualifies for special education services under the IDEA. As a result of his condition, and although he presents socially as a normal child, his cognitive functioning falls within the mentally deficient range. He has difficulty with focusing, retaining information and with spatial and visual perception. During the 1996-97 school year, Matthew attended seventh grade and received regular and Intensity III special education services at the Benjamin Tasker Middle School (“Tasker”), a public school within the PGCPS system. During Matthew’s year at Tasker, the Cavanaghs concluded that its services were not meeting Matthew’s educational needs. They requested an Admission, Review and Dismissal (“ARD”) meeting with PGCPS to discuss accommodations to meet Matthew’s educational needs and to develop an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”). Between early and mid-1997, the Cavanaghs submitted Matthew to the Kennedy Kreiger Institute (“Kennedy Krieger”) for evaluation and retained the services of Dr. Laura Soloman, an independent special education consultant, to assist them in identifying an appropriate program for Matthew. In the course of negotiations between the Cavanaghs and PGCPS regarding Matthew’s year at Task-er and Matthew’s future educational placement for the upcoming 1997-98 school year, the parties reached an impasse and the Cavanaghs filed a due process hearing request. On or about August 28, 1997, and prior to the completion of the requested due process hearing, the Cavanaghs and PGCPS reached a settlement agreement. The parties agreed that Matthew’s educational needs for the 1997-98 school year could be accommodated by the special education services provided in the special education “wing” at Kettering Middle School (“Kettering”), another public school placement within the PGCPS system. Following Matthew’s assignment to Kettering, but before Matthew enrolled, the Cavanaghs took a tour of the school. Undoubtedly, they were impressed with the understanding that the Kettering program included functional life skills instruction combined with intensive one-on-one instruction for Matthew with a personal aide. B. The 1997-98 School Year 1. The September 11 IEP Matthew started eighth grade at Kettering on September 2, 1997. Shortly thereafter, on September 11, 1997, the Kettering ARD team met to develop an IEP for Matthew. Dr. Soloman attended the meeting with Mrs. Cavanagh. Mr. Cav-anagh, who was out of town at the time, did not attend. Based on her own evaluation of Matthew, Dr. Soloman, on behalf of the Cavanaghs, submitted for consideration by the ARD team her proposals regarding the appropriate reading, math, written language, functional life, self-help, organizational, business and services skills objectives for Matthew for the 1997-98 school year. To meet these objectives, Dr. Soloman suggested a functionally- and vocationally-oriented program. In addition, Mrs. Cavanagh expressed her concern at the meeting that the IEP should emphasize the development and reinforcement of Matthew’s reading skills. Incorporating some of the suggestions made by Dr. Solo-man and Mrs. Cavanagh, the ARD team developed an IEP for Matthew that provided for Intensity IV special education services at Kettering. Matthew’s IEP articulated eight annual goals, each consistent with the Cavanaghs’ and PGCPS’ mutual conclusion that a functional vocational educational program would meet Matthew’s educational needs. The annual goals were to be achieved through 56 enumerated objectives and measured by, for the most part, teacher-made tests, record-keeping and review of Matthew’s work samples. Matthew’s IEP was to be executed during 27.5 hours of special education instruction in the Kettering wing, to be divided between CRI/CBI functional vocational classes and self-contained academic classes in Reading, Math, Science, English and Social Studies. The IEP did not allocate the 27.5 hours between CRI/CBI classes and self-contained classes with any particularity. Itinerant special education services, such as occupational and psychological therapy, were to be furnished on a consultation basis. The IEP also provided for a full-time aide to assist Matthew with organization and recording of assignments. To supplement Matthew’s special education services and to provide the least restrictive environment, the IEP also provided for 3.5 hours of regular education, which included interaction with non-disabled peers in Physical Education and Creative Arts classes. The subjects covered by the Creative Arts class — Art, Power Math, Drama and Music — changed on a quarterly basis. In addition to regular classes, Matthew’s IEP provided for interaction with non-disabled peers during meals, assemblies, special events, recreational activities, student clubs, field trips and locker assignments. The IEP, which was agreed to by the Cavanaghs, called for a 45 day review. 2. The November 5 IEP Review a. Concerns raised by the Cavanaghs On November 5, 1997, the ARD reconvened for its scheduled 45 day review to assess Matthew’s progress at Kettering,’ to make any needed adjustments to Matthew’s IEP and to take up any issues raised by the Cavanaghs and Dr. Soloman. What can be distilled from the record is that during Matthew’s first four weeks or so at Kettering, the following concerns were brought to light by the Cavanaghs: (1) that Matthew required more reading time; (2) that the functional vocational lessons in the CRI class were below Matthew’s abilities; and (3) that the CBI field trips (i) conflicted with Matthew’s reading time on Tuesdays, and (ii) combined with CRI, were generally repetitive and redundant in view of Matthew’s abilities. b. Modifications suggested by the Cav-anaghs To address their concern about improving Matthew’s reading ability, the Cav-anaghs proposed adjusting Matthew’s schedule to include a substantial period of time each day for interaction with his aide for the purpose of concentrating intensely on basic reading and to help Matthew develop a reading strategy. See PGCPS Exhibit 6. Strengthening Matthew’s reading skills, the Cavanaghs hoped, would facilitate the improvement of Matthew’s writing and mathematics skills. See id. To address their concern that the instruction provided in the CRI setting appeared to be below Matthew’s ability, Dr. Soloman concluded following her October 29, 1997, observation of CRI class that Matthew would be better served by tailoring the CRI lessons to his level by grouping him with two or three of the similarly-functioning youngsters. See Tr. I at 765-66. To address the concern that the CBI class conflicted with Reading class and was at times overly repetitive, the Cavanaghs made no specific proposal, yet both the Cavanaghs and PGCPS affirmed their belief that a functional and vocational instruction program was consistent with Matthew’s needs. See Tr. I at 642; id. at 768-69 (“The team made it very clear that Matthew could continue to go on the CBI field trips.”) (testimony of Dr. Soloman). c. The November 5 Modifications To accommodate the Cavanaghs’ concern that Matthew required more concentrated instruction in reading, the ARD team added another reading objective to Matthew’s IEP. To accommodate the Cavanaghs’ concern that the CRI instruction was below Matthew’s ability, the ARD team made adjustments by removing CRI from Matthew’s schedule, and placing in its stead a self-contained Science and Health class that was part of the wing. See Tr. I at 647; id. at 762; compare Parents Exhibit 13 (Schedule, Matthew Cavanagh), with Parents Exhibit 17 (Proposed Non-CRI Schedule, Matthew Cav-anagh). To accommodate the Cavanaghs’ concern about the conflict between CBI and Matthew’s Reading class and the repetitive nature of the field trips, the IEP was also modified to allow Matthew to attend CBI field trips only when the parents believed Matthew could benefit from the trip. While Matthew’s schedule was modified at the November 5 meeting, on the whole, the addition of the reading objective and the curtailment of Matthew’s participation in CRI/CBI did not affect the IEP’s distribution of hours between special and regular education classes. Furthermore, with the exception of the additional reading goal approved by all parties, Matthew’s IEP goals remained the same. The itinerant services Matthew received were not changed. d. Additional concerns raised by the Cavanaghs regarding Matthew’s revised schedule Matthew’s new schedule was to take effect on Monday, November 10, 1997. The Cavanaghs, not satisfied with these changes, expressed additional objections which, depending on one’s perspective, can be viewed on the one hand as contradictory and specious or, on the other hand, as subtle and refined. The first objection to the revised scheduled raised by the Cav-anaghs appears to target the transfer of Matthew from the CRI class in the wing to a self-contained Science and Health class. In particular, given that the CRI classes in combination with the CBI field trips were specifically geared towards meeting Matthew’s IEP annual goal four, which provided that Matthew would “explore and experience community-based places of finance, business and science,” PGCPS Exhibit 1, at 8, the Cavanaghs wished to know how this goal and its enumerated objectives were to be accomplished under the new schedule. They also raised the issue of reinforcement of lessons learned on CBI field trips, presumably when Matthew was allowed to go, in the absence of CRI classes. 3. The First Request for a Due Process Hearing At the conclusion of the November 5 meeting, Dr. Soloman stated on behalf of herself and the Cavanaghs that they did not believe that the program as implemented on September 11 and as adjusted on November 5 was appropriate for Matthew. The Cavanaghs, she informed the ARD team, would like Matthew’s placement referred to the Inter-County Admission, Review and Dismissal (“ICARD”) team to consider referring Matthew to Kennedy Kreiger. The ARD team responded when polled that they still believed that Matthew was receiving and would continue to receive educational benefit from the Kettering wing services and that the proposed modifications to Matthew’s schedule would be implemented. In response to the objection by the Cav-anaghs that they did not consent, the ARD team responded that since this was not Matthew’s first IEP, the Cavanaghs’ consent was not necessary, and the changes would be made over their objection. Contending that Matthew’s special educational placement had been changed without their consent, and accepting that the ARD team did not intend to send Matthew’s case to ICARD, on November 6, 1997, the Cavanaghs formally requested that PGCPS refer Matthew for placement at the Kennedy Kreiger Institute. When no such referral was forthcoming, they filed a due process hearing request on December 19,1997. 4. The First Due Process Hearing Over the course of an extensive five-day due process hearing, the Cavanaghs prosecuted alleged procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA. Specifically, the Cavanaghs sought to prove that PGCPS procedurally violated the IDEA because (1) Matthew was educated (a) by uncerti-fied special education teachers, (b) in class sizes that exceeded COMAR requirements; and (2) PGCPS changed Matthew’s special educational placement on November 5, 1997, without their consent. In addition, the Cavanaghs sought to prove that PGCPS substantively violated the IDEA by failing to provide him with FAPE. In a thorough 46-page opinion issued on May 4, 1998, ALJ Hoffman found that PGCPS had complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA and further, even assuming a procedural violation had been proved, that the Cavanaghs had not proved that the procedural violations affected the provision of FAPE. In addition, ALJ Hoffman found and concluded that PGCPS did not “change” (within the contemplation of IDEA) Matthew’s special education placement following the November 5, 1997, ARD meeting; and that, ultimately, PGCPS provided Matthew with FAPE for the 1997-98 school year. The Cavanaghs then brought this action. In addition to the denial of FAPE based on the reasons litigated before ALJ Hoffman, the Cavanaghs allege that they were denied statutory due process in violation of IDEA by virtue of (1) alleged factual and legal errors committed by ALJ Hoffman, specifically that ALJ Hoffman erred in failing to find that PGCPS in fact changed Matthew’s special education placement without their consent; (2) alleged lack of impartiality on the part of ALJ Hoffman; and (3) alleged incompetence and lack of training on the part of ALJ Hoffman in the area of special education law. C. The 1998-99 School Year 1.The June 24,1998 ARD meeting Following ALJ Hoffman’s rejection of the Cavanaghs’ claims regarding the 1997-98 school year, the Cavanaghs and PGCPS convened another ARD meeting on June 24, 1998, to discuss Matthew’s future educational placement. The parties agreed that Matthew’s special education needs could only be met by a nonpublic special education placement. PGCPS indicated that it would refer Matthew to the School for Contemporary Education (“SCE”) and the Harbour School (“Harbour”). The Cavanaghs acceded to these referrals but insisted, again, that they would prefer that Matthew be placed at Kennedy Kreiger. On the basis of its belief that Kennedy Kreieger did not have a high school program, PGCPS did not refer Matthew to Kennedy Kreiger. In response to PGCPS’ referral, SCE responded that it would not be an appropriate placement for Matthew. Harbour responded that although it would be an appropriate placement for Matthew, it could not accept him for the 1998-99 school year because doing so would have a negative impact on its overall student-teacher ratio. 2. The Second Request for a Due Process Hearing With no placement apparent for the upcoming school year, the Cavanaghs filed a due process hearing request on July 17, 1998. In the meantime, PGCPS and Har-bour concluded negotiations respecting Matthew’s placement: in exchange for Harbour’s acceptance of Matthew for the 1998-99 school year, PGCPS agreed, on or about July 31, 1998, to fund an assistant teacher position to compensate for the impact the admission of Matthew would have on the school’s student-teacher ratio. The parties disagree as to when the Cavanaghs were notified of Harbour’s acceptance of the arrangement for Matthew’s 1998-99 school year. 3. The Second Due Process Hearing The due process hearing scheduled for August 10, 1998 was convened. As a preliminary matter, PGCPS moved to dismiss the request for a hearing as moot, since the raison d’etre of the hearing — resolving Matthew’s 1998-99 special education placement-had been obviated by Harbour’s acceptance of Matthew, which had been induced by PGCPS’s agreement to fund an assistant teacher at Harbour. In the face of bickering between the attorneys for the parties over the need for a hearing, and to permit counsel to confirm the details of the arrangement, ALJ Robinson recessed the hearing so the parties could call Harbour’s Director. Thereafter, on the record, the parties confirmed the arrangement agreed upon between Harbour and PGCPS. The Cav-anaghs requested the ALJ to enter a “consent decree” to memorialize the terms of the arrangement, which arguably would have had the desirable effect of bestowing “prevailing party” status upon the Cav-anaghs, thereby enabling them to seek attorney’s fees. PGCPS objected and insisted that the request for a hearing should be withdrawn by the Cavanaghs or dismissed by the ALJ. The ALJ took the issue under advisement and ultimately, in a written order, refused to enter a “consent decree” or similar order, relying on (1) PGCPS’s lack of consent to such order, which was in turn based on its contention that the arrangements with Harbour had been made through the normal ARD process and pri- or to the hearing, and (2) the ALJ’s uncertainty whether she possessed the authority to enter a consent decree. Thus, ALJ Robinson granted PGCPS’s motion to dismiss the proceedings as moot. The Cavanaghs then brought an appeal to this court, which was consolidated with the earlier case relating to the 1997-98 school year. With respect to the 1998-99 school year, although the Cavanaghs do not find fault with Matthew’s placement at Har-bour, they allege that they were denied due process when the ALJ failed to enter a consent decree, which had the effect of denying the Cavanaghs an opportunity to recover attorney’s fees. III. THE IDEA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK The IDEA was drafted to “assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). The “centerpiece” of this “free appropriate public education” is the individualized education program (“IEP”) which is a collaboratively developed plan for a disabled child’s education. See Reusch v. Fountain, 872 F.Supp. 1421, 1426 (D.Md.1994). “The IEP is supposed to be the joint product of discussions among the child’s parents, teachers, and local school officials and must specify goals and short-term objectives for the child, any related services, and the criteria and evaluation procedures that will be used.” Sanger v. Montgomery County Bd. ofEduc., 916 F.Supp. 518, 519 (D.Md.1996) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(a)-(f); COMAR 13.-A.05.01.09). This written plan must be appropriately reviewed and revised. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5). The IDEA mandates that all disabled children are entitled to a FAPE. See Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Disk v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The Supreme Court has not set forth a precise formula for determining what constitutes a FAPE. More generally, it has stated that the child must receive “access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Moreover, although a school system is not required to maximize a child’s potential, see id. at 189, 102 S.Ct. 3034, it is imperative that the educational placement “be likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational advance.” Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.1985), cited with approval in Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247(3rd Cir.l999)(reiterating earlier holding that “IDEA ‘calls for more than a trivial educational benefit’ and requires a satisfactory IEP to provide ‘significant learning,’ ... and confer ‘meaningful benefit.’ ”) (citations omitted). In addition, the IDEA confers upon a federal court power to “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), including, inter alia, an award of “compensatory education,” equitable relief and attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, all of which the Cavanaghs seek here. See generally School Comm, of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW Upon filing a complaint in district court requesting review of the factual findings and legal conclusions of a state administrative law judge, IDEA litigants become subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in ordinary civil litigation in federal district courts. Specifically, because this matter is pending before me on Rule 56 motions for summary judgment, the well-settled principles of summary judgment therefore also apply. See Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Nevertheless, what in other cases is traditionally understood as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment may more aptly be described, in the IDEA context, where the district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the administrative record while giving “due weight” to the administrative findings made below, see Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1176 (4th Cir.1994), as a motion for “summary adjudication.” More particularly, to determine whether a school board has complied with the provisions of the IDEA, a court must follow the two step inquiry set forth in Rowley. See 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. First, the court must determine if “the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act.” Id. Second, the court must evaluate whether the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures [is] reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The burden of proof of establishing a violation of the IDEA falls on the party challenging the administrative findings, see Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859, 112 S.Ct. 175, 116 L.Ed.2d 138 (1991); King v. Board of Educ. of Allegany County, 999 F.Supp. 750, 766 (D.Md.1998), here the Cavanaghs. In conducting these inquiries, a court must not “substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities.” Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 999 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1046, 118 S.Ct. 688, 139 L.Ed.2d 634 (1998). Rather, as noted above, a federal district court must make a bounded independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence, giving “due weight” to the state proceedings. See Doyle, 953 F.2d at 103. If the administrative findings were made in a regular manner and have evidentiary support, they are to be considered prima facie correct. See id. If the court chooses not to follow the administrative findings, it must -explain its departure. See Gerstmyer v. Howard County Pub. Sch., 850 F.Supp. 361, 364 (D.Md.1994). V. ANALYSIS I shall first discuss the plaintiffs’ claims against the state defendants, focusing principally upon the alleged procedural irregularities inherent in Maryland’s statutory scheme for the vindication of rights protected by IDEA. Thereafter, I shall turn to the issues raised by the plaintiffs as to the local defendants. As will be made clear, I am not persuaded that the presumptively correct determinations of the ALJs under review should be upset. A. Claims Against MSDE The principal claims against MSDE are procedural claims, which shall be discussed in detail. To the extent that the Cav-anaghs seek to charge MSDE with substantive violations of IDEA, discussion of those issues is provided in connection with plaintiffs’ claims against the local defendants. 1. Procedural Violations Since the Cavanaghs allege procedural violations under the IDEA, I must embark upon an analysis under the first prong of Rowley. The first step in the Rowley inquiry is to determine whether the Cav-anaghs have succeeded in generating a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to upset the presumptively correct determination of the state ALJ regarding whether MSDE has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Since MSDE was not a party to the proceedings before ALJs Hoffman and Robinson, the source of the Cavanaghs’ discontent with MSDE is found only in the complaints filed in these actions. As therein alleged, the Cavanaghs allege against MSDE three procedural violations. They allege MSDE violated the IDEA by: (1) failing to provide adequate due process procedures; (2) appointing ALJs who were not impartial; and (3) failing to appoint properly trained and competent ALJs. As explicated below, these allegations lack merit. a. MSDE Provided the Cavanaghs with Statutory Due Process i. The Cavanaghs have failed to raise a serious question as to the adequacy and fairness of the procedures had below The Cavanaghs assert that summary judgment is inappropirate because a genuine issue of material fact exists by virtue of an alleged “failure of defendants to provide plaintiffs with adequate due process procedures, including a hearing before a knowledgeable, competent impartial hearing officer.” 1998 Amended Complaint (Count III) (emphasis added); 1999 Complaint (Count II). This claim is one that the law firm representing the Cavanaghs has regularly raised in cases in this court; it is to be contrasted with a claim that the injury suffered in the administrative proceeding is the failure to follow the procedures set forth in the provisions of the IDEA. Unquestionably, where there is a denial of FAPE, and where the procedural requirements of the IDEA are not followed, a state educational agency (“SEA”) may incur liability, as determined by the district court’s discretionary determination of the SEA’s share in the responsibility for the denial of FAPE. See Gadsby v. Gras-mick, 109 F.3d 940, 944 (4th Cir.l997)(ac-knowledging potential state liability where SEA fails to comply with IDEA notice provisions). Given the fact, however, that in order to be eligible for IDEA funds an SEA must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Education the institution of policies and procedures to ensure that it meets the due process requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1415, see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182-84, 102 S.Ct. 3034; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6)(A), and since MSDE has established such procedures to the satisfaction of the Secretary, the Cavanaghs have the significant burden of showing how the procedures implemented by MSDE are inadequate. They have utterly failed to do so in this case. The IDEA allocates specific procedural responsibilities to the SEA. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)-(i). In particular, under the IDEA, the SEA must establish and maintain a “comprehensive set of procedural safeguards to ensure the parents have an opportunity to contest” the decisions of the local educational agency (“LEA”). See Gadsby, 109 F.3d at 944 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)). MSDE aspires to satisfy its IDEA responsibilities under the procedures set forth in Title 8 of the Education Article of the Maryland Code Annotated and Title 13A of the Code of Maryland Regulations, wherein a battery of procedural safeguards have been enacted. For example, whenever an LEA proposes or refuses to initiate or change the student’s identification, evaluation or educational placement, or the provision of FAPE to the student, Maryland law requires that prior written notice be given to the parents explaining the action proposed or refused, see COMAR 13A.05.01.12(B)(1)(1999); why the LEA proposes or refuses to take the action, see id. at 13A.05.01.12(B)(2); the options the LEA considered and the reasons why they were rejected, see id. at 13A.05.01.12(B)(3); each assessment procedure, test, record, or report the LEA uses as a basis for the proposal or refusal, see id. at 13A.05.01.12(B)(4); and any other factors relevant to the proposal or refusal, see id. at 13A.05.01.12(B)(5). There must be included in the written notice provisions an explanation that the parents have procedural protections and an explanation of how to obtain a copy of those safeguards. See id. at 13A.05.01.12(B)(6). The procedural safeguards of which parents are apprised generally provide for “Impartial Due Process,” in which “a parent ... has the right to initiate a hearing when there is a dispute about the identification, evaluation, or educational placement, or the provision of FAPE to a student with a disability .... ” COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(1); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(C) (Michie 1995). Parents must be informed of free and low cost legal and other relevant services, COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(4); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8 — 413(c)(3). Further, Maryland law provides for a “qualified impartial hearing officer to conduct a due process hearing.” COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(5). At the hearing itself, parents enjoy the panoply of rights afforded all litigants appearing before the state Office of Administrative Hearings. See Md.Code Ann. Educ. at § 8 — 413(d)(1) (providing for application of Rules of Administrative Procedure to hearings initiated by parents regarding a dispute about the identification, evaluation, or educational placement, or the provision of FAPE to a student with a disability); COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(5) (same); see generally id. at 28.02.01-24 (Maryland Rules of Administrative Procedure). In addition to the procedural protections furnished in the administrative code, Maryland law specifically enumerates a host of rights intended to ensure due process in the special education context. At the hearing, which is to be a public hearing, see COMAR 1 3A.05.01.15(C)(12)(b)(tracking procedural protections required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)-© and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503-.512); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(e)(2(ii) (same), the parents are furnished the right to be accompanied by counsel and the right to present state-funded testimony from impartial expert witnesses in the diagnosis or education of disabled testimony funded by the state, see COMAR at 13A.05.01.15(C)(10)(a); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(d)(l)(iv); the right to have the subject child present at the hearing, COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(12)(a); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8 — 413(e)(2)(i); the right to present sworn and relevant testimony, see - Md.Code Ann., Educ. §§ 8-413(d)(l)(iii), (v); the right to present evidence, confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses, see COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(10)(b); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8 — 413(e)(l)(ii); the right to prohibit the introduction of evidence not previously disclosed, see COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(10)(c); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8 — 413(e)(l)(iii); the right to written findings of fact and decisions, see COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(10)(d); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8 — 413(e)(l)(v); and the right to a written or electronic verbatim record of the hearing, see CO-MAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(11); see also Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(e)(l)(ii). At the conclusion of the hearing, the parents are entitled to a “written decision not later than 45 days after the receipt of the request for a hearing ....” COMAR at 13A.05.01.15(C)(6); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8 — 413(f), and the right to challenge the result in state or federal court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). See COMAR 13A.05.01.15(C)(10)(e); see also Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(h). The law also mandates that a full explanation of these procedural safeguards be given to the parents whenever the school board receives a referral for an assessment, conducts an evaluation, provides parents with a notice of an IEP meeting, conducts a reevaluation of the child, or receives a request for a due process hearing. See COMAR 13A.05.01.11(A)(l)(a)-(e). These provisions, without a doubt, provide adequate statutory due process consistent with the requirements of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a)-® and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503-.512. Indeed, over the course of the five day hearing before ALJ Hoffman, and during the abbreviated hearing before ALJ Robinson, the Cavanaghs availed themdelves of most, if not all, of these protections. The issue of any inadequacy of the procedures was never raised before the ALJ. Moreover, the Cavanaghs have failed to allege or demonstrate how, if at all, MSDE has failed to follow these procedures or any other protective procedures in the course of litigation in this forum. Therefore, considering the record before me, I conclude as a matter of law that the Cavanaghs’ generic claim of lack of statutory due process fails. ii. The Cavanaghs have failed to raise a serious question regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of ALJs Hoffman and Robinson The Cavanaghs further allege a lack of impartiality on the part of the ALJs presiding over their due process hearings. In support of this contention, the Cavanaghs allege that ALJ Hoffman “demonstrated personal bias against plaintiffs counsel,” 1998 Amended Complaint at 5, ¶ 26, and that the defendants “failed to appoint an impartial ... hearing officer in this matter.” Id. at ¶ 35. The requirement of impartiality for ALJs-presiding over special education matters is set forth in controlling federal regulations, which provide for an “impartial hearing officer.” See 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1999); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (calling for “an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the [SEA] or by the [LEA]”). The IDEA itself provides that a “hearing may not be conducted ... [b]y a person who is an employee of the State agency or the LEA that is involved in the education or care of the child; or ... [b]y any person having a personal or professional interest that would conflict with his or her objectivity in the hearing.” 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.508(a)(1)-(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3) (prohibiting the conduct of the hearing by those employees of the SEA or LEA involved in the education of the child); Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(c)(2)(i) (“In order to conduct a hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall appoint an impartial administrative law judge who ... [h]as no interest that would conflict with the administrative law judge’s objectivity .... ”). Since “[administrative decisionmakers, like judicial ones, are entitled to a ‘presumption of honesty and integrity,’ ” Monis v. City of Danville, 744 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir.1984) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975)), absent a showing of bias stemming from “extrajudicial sources” such as those indicated by 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a), the presumption supporting the impartiality of the ALJs will remain unrebutted. Considering the record here, I conclude that the Cavanaghs have failed to raise a serious question as to the impartiality of ALJs Hoffman and Robinson. In particular, nothing in the record as a whole discloses that either was an employee of the SEA or LEA involved in the education of Matthew, had personal or professional interests, or any bias stemming from an extrajudicial source, that affected their objectivity and impartiality. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.508(a)(1)-(2); Md.Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413(c)(2)(i); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. At bottom, the Cavanaghs appear to equate the ALJs’ rejection of the merits of their legal claims with the presence of personal bias. As discussed above, however, the law makes clear that establishing a claim of bias on the part of the decisionmaker requires a much greater showing than the Cavanaghs have made here. iii. This Court lacks jurisdiction to evaluate the competency of state ALJs and, in any event, the Cav-anaghs have failed to raise a serious question as to the adequacy of the training or competence of ALJs Hoffman and Robinson In the same way the Cavanaghs attempt to transmute the ALJs’ rejection of the merits of their legal claims into a disqualifying bias, the Cavanaghs assert an entitlement to relief on the theory that the ALJs lack training and competence. In support of the allegation that the ALJs presiding over their hearings were not competent or knowledgeable, the Cav-anaghs assert that ALJ Hoffman “was not competent to conduct a hearing in this matter” 1998 Amended Complaint at 7, ¶ 25; that she “demonstrated limited understanding of the issues presented by the plaintiffs, and no meaningful legal analysis,” id. at 7, ¶ 28; and that defendants “failed to appoint a competent ... hearing officer in this matter.” Id. at 8, ¶ 34. In support of their allegation that ALJs were not properly trained, the Cavanaghs assert that “the defendants’ failfed] to provide adequate training to the administrative law judge.” Id. at 8, ¶ 52. Standards for ALJ competency and training are not found within the statutory provisions of the IDEA. Generally set forth in the federal administrative code, however, is the provision requiring that the SEA maintain a list of all “impartial hearing officers,” which “must include a statement of the qualifications of each of those persons.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(c). The Act itself only provides that an “impartial due process hearing ... be conducted by the [SEA] ..., as determined by State law or by the SEA.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1). Thus, ALJ competency and training appear to be governed solely by state law standards. This conclusion is bolstered by comparison to other portions of IDEA in which Congress expressly provided that general competency standards be satisfied. See, e.g., id. at § 1415(e)(2)(A)(iii) (requiring that the SEA ensure that the mediation process be “conducted by a qualified ... mediator who is trained in effective mediation techniques”); id. at § 1415(2)(2)(C) (providing that the SEA “shall maintain a list of individuals who are qualified mediators and knowledgeable in laws and regulations relating to the provision of special and related services”). The relevant portion of Maryland law governing the general levels of training and competency for ALJs requires that the impartial due process hearing be conducted by a hearing officer who “has received and continues to receive specialized training in matters significant to the educational review of students with disabilities.” See Md.Code. Ann., Educ. § 8-413(e)(2)(ii); cf. Md. R. Jud. Conduct, Canon 3 (providing that a “judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competency in it”). In any event, while Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to federal claims prosecuted under the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (“A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for á violation of this chapter.”), it has not — indeed, it cannot — abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity with respect to state law claims. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Since the Cavanaghs’ allegations of lack of competence and training on the part of the ALJs presiding over their hearings assert essentially state law claims, “I do not have jurisdiction to reach [these issues] because a claim that State officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment.” Carnwarth v. Board of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, 33 F.Supp.2d 431, 434 (D.Md.1998) (citing Pennhurst) (internal quotation omitted); see also Yancey v. New Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 24 F.Supp.2d 512, 515 (D.Md.1998) (entering summary judgment, based on reasons set forth in Carwarth, against a claim asserting the state’s failure “to provide a hearing officer who was knowledgeable in the fields and areas of significance to the educational review of this case”). Because the Cavanaghs assert state law claims over which I have no jurisdiction, they are dismissed. In the alternative, assuming arguendo that the IDEA does incorporate state law standards governing the training and qualifications for ALJs, and considering the record here, I am persuaded that the Cav-anaghs have failed to raise a serious question regarding the competence of ALJs Hoffman and Robinson. In particular, nothing in the record as a whole discloses, nor have the Cavanaghs presented in this forum, any evidence whatsoever which suggests that Maryland’s ALJ training procedures are inadequate, or in what particular manner ALJs Hoffman and Robinson were not qualified to preside over their hearings. The Cav-anaghs purport to demonstrate lack of competence on the part of the ALJs by enumerating a host of alleged factual, evi-dentiary and legal errors which they claim demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact on the question of ALJ competency. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Local Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-8, passim (incorporated into Plaintiffs’ Opposition to State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 6). Essentially, on the basis of an agency theory, the Cavanaghs argue that alleged errors committed by the ALJs in the course of the due process hearings are chargeable to MSDE. I addressed this argument in an unpublished memorandum in Fox v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. AMD-98-200 (D.Md. January 21, 1999), which' relied in turn on Fritschle v. Andes, 25 F.Supp.2d 699 (D.Md.1998). Rejecting the argument, I reasoned that [a] finding that the ALJ committed errors of law or found facts unsupported by substantial evidence will not impute IDEA liability to [MSDE], Rather, if I am persuaded by plaintiffs to reverse the ALJ’s decision, it will of necessity be based on my conclusion that, giving due weight to the ALJ’s findings, [the LEA violated the Act]. Any reversal of the ALJs decision will not rest on the fact that the ALJ, as a “state designee, ” violated the IDEA .... Fox, Civ. No. AMD 98-200, at 8-9 (quoting Fritschle, 25 F.Supp.2d at 705) (emphasis added). This reasoning applies with equal force to this case and supports the grant of summary judgment in favor of MSDE. Thus, for all of the reasons set forth herein, MSDE is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to any claim rooted in alleged procedural infirmities in the administrative proceedings under review. To the extent, however, any alleged procedural error influenced the decisions of the ALJs, they will be discussed in more detail below. 2. Substantive Violations For the reasons explained below, as to the failure of the Cavanaghs to meet then-burden in demonstrating that the decision by ALJ Hoffman that PGCPS did not deprive Matthew of a FAPE for the 1997-98 school year was erroneous, no equitable distribution of relief between MSDE and PGCPS is possible, see Gadsby, 109 F.3d at 954-55, and summary adjudication in favor of MSDE with respect Counts I, IV, and VII of the 1998 Amended Complaint is appropriate. B. Claims Against PGCPS Plaintiffs assert both procedural and substantive violations against the local defendants for school year 1997-98 and procedural violations for school year 1998-99. They shall be discussed in turn. 1. The 1997-98 School Year As explained herein, the Cavanaghs have arguably made out colorable claims of technical procedural violations in respect to certain of their challenges to the ALJ’s resolution of their claims related to 1997-98. Nevertheless, they fail to demonstrate any entitlement to relief because, as explained herein, the ALJ correctly determined that Matthew received all that the IDEA promised him. a. Procedural Violations I turn now to consider the claims against the local defendants. Proceeding under the same lines of inquiry as dictated by Rowley, I must again first determine whether PGCPS committed procedural violations of the IDEA. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. With respect to both the 1998 and 1999 due process hearings, I am satisfied that the Cavanaghs have failed to carry their burden. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, I will grant summary judgment in favor of PGCPS for alleged procedural violations. i. The Cavanaghs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the professional certification of. Ms. McMullen The Cavanaghs contend that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether PGCPS violated the IDEA by educating Matthew with an uncertified special education teacher. See 1998 Amended Complaint at 7, ¶ 49. As support for the assertion that Ms. McMullen, who was Matthew’s English, Social Studies and Reading teacher in the wing at Kettering, was not qualified as a special education teacher, the Cavanaghs point to two excerpts from Ms. McMullen’s testimony. When asked whether she was “a certified special education teacher,” Tr. I at 167, Ms. McMullen responded, “No, I’m taking classes toward that.” Id. When asked again by plaintiffs’ counsel whether she was “certified in the State of Maryland,” Ms. McMullen again responded “No.” Id. Later, when asked whether she was a “certified reading specialist,” Ms. McMul-len again responded, “No, I’ve been trained in Project Read.” Id. Notwithstanding Ms. McMullen’s testimony that she was not a certified teacher, PGCPS presented the contrary written testimony of Gwendolyn Mason, the PGCPS Officer for Compliance and Due Process, and the contrary written testimony of Alan Geisler, PGCPS Supervisor of Instructional Personnel, which the ALJ credited. See PGCPS Exhibits 3 & 4. Each of these witnesses was subject to cross examination during the first due process hearing. Together, they presented evidence that Ms. McMullen was in fact a properly certified special education teacher under Maryland law. To be eligible for IDEA funds, an SEA must “establish and maintain standards to ensure that personnel ... are appropriately and adequately prepared and trained.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(15)(A). These standards must be “consistent with any State-approved or State-recognized certification, licensing, or other comparable requirements that apply to the professional discipline in which those personnel are providing special education or related services.” Id. at § 1412(a)(15)(B)(i). The State-recognized certification standards under which PGCPS asserts Ms. McMullen was certified as a special education teacher are codified at COMAR 13A.12.01.05H. During the relevant period covering the 1997-98 school year, COMAR 13A.12.01.05H provided: “A Provisional certificate may be issued to- an applicant who does not meet the requirements for a professional certificate under ... this regulation.” 25:9 Md. Reg. 694, 697 (April 24, 1998)(proposing amendments to COMAR 13A.12.01.05H). In order to receive a “Provisional Degree Certificate,” an applicant was required to hold a bachelor’s degree from an institute of higher education, see 25:9 Md. Reg. at 697 (providing pre-1998 language of COMAR 13A.12.01.05H(2)(a)), and follow a course of study created with the local education agency constructed to meet Maryland teaching certification requirements. See id. At a minimum, an applicant was required to take at least six semester hours of course work per year toward the professional certification. See id. (providing unchanged language of COMAR 13A.12.01.05H(2)(b)). Under Maryland law, a teacher is defined as “one holding a professional certificate, a resident teacher certificate, or a provisional certificate.” COMAR 13A.12.01.02. At the hearing, Mr. Geisler demonstrated PGCPS’ compliance with the provisional certification procedures during the 1997-98 school year because Ms. McMullen, who holds a bachelor’s degree in Psychology from Rutledge University, was taking or had already taken an appropriate number of graduate level semester hours at Bowie State University pursuant to a plan of study developed with PGCPS officials. See Tr. I at 397-98, 401, 407-11; COMAR 13A.12.01.02(25) (providing that a plan of study during provisional certification period be established by the LEA and followed by the applicant). The two Bowie State University graduate courses completed by Ms. McMullen served to satisfy two of six requirements necessary to receive a teaching certificate in special education. See Tr. I at 410; see also COMAR 13A.12.02.43B(l)-(6) (setting forth curricular requirements for the certification of special education teachers). The provisional certification procedures found at COMAR 13A.12.01.05H and the evidence presented by Mr. Geisler and Ms. Mason were analyzed by ALJ Hoffman. See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 25-26. Ultimately, ALJ Hoffman found that PGCPS did not commit any procedural violation with respect to this claim, see id. at 26, and further, ALJ Hoffman concluded that even assuming PGCPS committed a procedural violation, the Cavanaghs had not prevailed in demonstrating that such violation actually interfered with the provision of FAPE. See id. at 26-27 (citing Gadsby, 109 F.3d at 956). While the Cav-anaghs may be partly correct in asserting that ALJ Hoffman did not fully “engage in an analysis of applicable legal authority,” Plaintiffs Opposition to Local Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, ALJ Hoffman’s failure to associate the relevant Maryland law provisions with the relevant portion of the IDEA, namely, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(15)(B)(i), did not render her ultimate conclusion unsound. As the opinion demonstrates, ALJ Hoffman properly explicated the provisional certification procedures set forth in COMAR 13A.12.01.05H (providing for provisional certification) and 13A.12.01.02(25) (providing for plan of study to be developed by local school officials). See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 26. In light of the testimony by Mr. Geisler that Ms. McMullen indeed was hired by PGCPS as a special education classroom teacher for the 1997-98 school year, see Tr. I. at 399; that PGCPS developed and submitted a plan of study pursuant to CO-MAR 13A.12.02, see id. at 408, and that a provisional teaching certificate for Ms. McMullen for the 1997-98 school year was issued by the State Superintendent of Education and received by PGCPS, see id. at 401, 405, I am convinced that ALJ Hoffman’s conclusion that Ms. McMullen was properly certified pursuant to state law and consistently with COMAR 13A.12.01.05H(2), as that regulation was in effect during the 1997-98 school year, was made by ALJ Hoffman “in a regular manner and [has] evidentiary support,” Doyle, 953 F.2d at 103. It must, therefore, be considered prima facie correct. Id. Thus, considering ALJ Hoffman’s conclusion that Ms. McMulIIen was properly provisionally certified as a special education teacher for the 1997-98 school year under COMAR 13A.12.01.05H, as it was in effect during that period, and in light of the applicable IDEA personnel standards, I find that ALJ Hoffman’s resolution of the issue effectively constituted a conclusion that Ms. McMullen was certified pursuant to personnel standards that were consistent with “State-approved or State-recognized certification, licensing, registration or other comparable requirements that apply to special education teachers.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(15)(B)(i). Accordingly, I will grant summary judgment in favor of PGCPS as to Count VII of the 1998 Amended Complaint. ii. As a matter of law, Matthew’s placement was not changed following the November 5 ARD Meeting The Cavanaghs contend that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether PGCPS committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing to maintain Matthew’s educational placement following the November 5 ARD meeting. See 1998 Amended Complaint at 7, ¶ 44 (Count IV). The IDEA requires that during the pen-dency of any proceedings challenging LEA decisions respecting the educational placement of a child, the child must remain in the then-current educational placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); see also COMAR 13A.05.01.14K (recodified at 13A.05.01.15C(14) on July 1, 1999). If, however, the decision made by the LEA did not affect the educational placement of the child, then the above-described “stay-put” provision is inapplicable. Hence, the central question is whether the Cavanaghs have succeeded in generating a serious question as to whether the November 5 modifications to Matthew’s IEP amounted to a change in Matthew’s educational placement under the Act. See Deleon v. Susquehanna Community Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir.1984) (“If the change ... is not a ‘change in educational placement’ within the meaning of [§ 1415® ], then the [LEA] was free to proceed with the change before completing the mandated due process hearing.”); Lunceford v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1581 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Thus, we reach the central question whether the move ... is a change in educational placement under the [IDEA].”). I conclude as a matter of law that the adjustments made to Matthew’s schedule following the November 5 meeting were not so significant as to amount to a change in his educational placement, thereby triggering PGCPS’s obligation to adhere to the “stay-put” provisions. Accordingly, PGCPS was not obligated to adhere to the stay-put provision provided for by 20 U.S.C. § 1415® and COMAR 13A.05.01.14K, and summary adjudication of this claim in favor of defendants is appropriate. The IDEA does not define what constitutes a “change in placement.” See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), and, while other circuits have passed on the question of what constitutes a change in placement where the provision of special education services are concerned, the Fourth Circuit has never specifically reached this issue. In considering what constitutes a change in placement when special education services are at issue, the Third Circuit in Deleon proceeded with the understanding that the “question of what constitutes a change in educational placement is, necessarily, fact-specific.” Deleon, 747 F.2d at 153. In assessing whether a given modification in a child’s school day should be considered a “change in educational placement,” the Third Circuit also determined that the court should focus on the importance of the particular modification involved. Id. Further, while an expansive reading of the term “change in educational placement” is consistent with the remedial purposes of the Act, see id., the Third Circuit concluded that “the touchstone in interpreting section 1415 has to be whether the decision is likely to affect in some significant way the child’s learning experience.” Id. The Third Circuit’s understanding of what constitutes a change in educational placement is generally consistent with the approach of the Fifth, Sixth and D.C. Circuits. In construing § 1415, they held that “an educational placement, for the purposes of [IDEA], is not changed unless a fundamental change in, or elimination of, a basic element of the educational program has occurred.” Sherri, A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 206 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Lunceford v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1582 (D.C.Cir.1984)); Tennessee Dep’t of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1474 (6th Cir.1996) (“One must identify a detrimental change in the elements of an educational program in order to qualify for the ‘stay put’ provision.”). The teachings of these cases is that a fundamental change in, or elimination of a basic element of, the educational program, which adversely affects the child’s learning experience in a significant way, is what constitutes a “change in educational placement” for purposes of the IDEA. Insight into what constitutes a “fundamental” change to a basic element of a child’s educational program is provided by a policy statement of the United States Department of Education Office of Special Education Programs (“OSEP”). Cf. Honig, 484 U.S. 305, 326 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (deferring, based on statutory ambiguity, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 484 (1987), to the position adopted by an OSEP policy letter advising that a suspension of greater than 10 days constitutes a “change in placement” under the IDEA). In a Policy Letter cited by both parties and analyzed by ALJ Hoffman, see Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 27-29, OSEP concludes that whether a change in educational placement has occurred turns on “whether the proposed change would substantially or materially alter the child’s educational program.” U.S. Dept, of Educ., Office of Special Education Programs, Policy Letter to Fisher (Apr. 18, 1994), at 4-5, 21 IDELR 992, 993-95. In determining whether a proposed change will substantially or materially alter child’s educational program, OSEP advises courts to consider: (a) whether the educational program set out in the child’s IEP has been revised; (b) whether the child will be able to be educated with non-disabled children to the same extent; (c) whether the child will have the same opportunities to participate in non-academic and extracurricular services; and (d) whether the new placement option is the same option on the continuum of alternative placements. See id.; see also Henry v. School Administrative Unit # 29, 70 F.Supp.2d 52, 59 (D.N.H. 1999)(analyzing “stay put” claim under OSEP guidelines provided in Letter to Fisher). As described in detail above, three minor modifications were made to Matthew’s schedule as a result of the November 5 meeting: (1) a reading objective was added to Matthew’s IEP; (2) Matthew was transferred from the CRI class to a self-contained Science and Health class; and (3) Matthew’s participation in CBI field trips became optional. See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 27. The goals and objectives spelled out in Matthew’s IEP, with the exception of the added reading objective, among fifty-six others, remained the same. See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 27; see also PGCPS Exhibit 1 at 3(IEP). In addition, as ALJ Hoffman found, “under the revised schedule ... the Student was to continue to receive special education services for the same number of hours per week.” Id. Indeed, following the November 5 meeting, Matthew spent the same amount of time in the Kettering wing as he did before the meeting. See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 28. Since none of the arrangements for Matthew to attend his regular education Physical Education and Creative Arts classes were changed following the November 5 meeting, Matthew’s opportunity to be educated with non-disabled peers remained unchanged. See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 28; Letter to Fisher, 21 IDELR 292, 293-95. The adjustments, moreover, did not touch on any aspect dealing with Matthew’s ability to participate in extracurricular activities. See Opinion of ALJ Hoffman at 28; Letter to Fisher, 21 IDELR 292, 293-95. The individual and cumulative effect of these adjustments cannot be characterized as constituting a “fundamental change in ... a basic element of the educational program.” Sherri, AD., 975 F.2d at 206; Lunceford, 745 F.2d at 1582. As in Lunceford, of particular significance for the case at hand is the observation that “an interpretation of change in ‘educational placement’ that would include every curriculum change *would virtually cripple [PGCPS’] ability to implement even minor discretionary changes within the educational programs provided for its students.’ ” Lunceford, 745 F.2d at 1582 n. 5 (citing Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 754). The D.C. Circuit further noted reasoning from Concerned Parents which posited that “a move from a ‘mainstream’ program to one consisting only of handicapped students would constitute a change in placement; a move from one mainstream program to another, with the elimination of a theater arts class, would not be such a change.” Lunceford, 745 F.2d at 1582. In Matthew’s case, the move from the CRI special educ