Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER LYNWOOD SMITH, District Judge. Plaintiffs, Jennifer Hall and Jose Rocha, formerly worked as hourly-wage employees in the Russellville, Alabama poultry processing plant originally owned by Gold Kist, Inc., but subsequently acquired by Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. More than three years ago, plaintiff Jennifer Hall commenced this suit as a putative class action, alleging that, over the four years preceding the date of her complaint, defendants, Phyllis Thomas and Gloria Fisher, conspired “with their fellow Gold Kist and Pilgrim’s Pride facility human resources ... personnel” at several named and unnamed facilities in multiple locations across the country for the purpose of “depressing] the Class’ wages by knowingly employing large numbers of illegal immigrants ....” Plaintiffs’ claims are based upon the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (“RICO”). In addition to the criminal sanctions provided by RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), Congress declared that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains...." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Section 1962 makes it illegal to participate in a RICO "enterprise" that engages in a "pattern of racketeering activities," or to "conspire" to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d); see also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506, 120 S.Ct. 1608, 146 L.Ed.2d 561 (2000) (stating that, to prove a violation of the conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), plaintiff must show that defendants (1) knowingly and willfully joined a conspiracy (2) with the purpose of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). To establish the requisite "pattern of racketeering activity," a plaintiff must demonstrate the "commi[ssion] of at least two distinct but related predicate acts." Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir.2010) (bracketed alteration added) (quoting Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir.2006)). In this case, the predicate acts plaintiffs claim defendants or their coconspirators engaged in are violations of two provisions of § 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) which—provided plaintiffs can prove that the violations were for financial gain—-are defined in RICO as predicate acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F). Specifically, plaintiffs claim defendants violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A), which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly hire[] for employment at least 10 individuals with actual knowledge” that those individuals were illegal aliens and were brought into the country illegally, and § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iii), which makes it a federal crime to knowingly or recklessly “conceal[], harbor[], or shield[ ] from detection” an alien who “has come to, entered, or remains in the United States” illegally. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (l)(A)(iii); id. § 1324(a)(3)(A); see also Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1292-94, 1297-1300 (interpreting these provisions in the RICO context). “RICO claimants ... must [also] show (1) the requisite injury to ‘business or property,’ and (2) that such injury was ‘by reason of the substantive RICO violation.” Williams, 465 F.3d at 1283. Plaintiffs’ theory of damages is that defendants’ alleged hiring and/or harboring depressed their wages below what they otherwise would have been. This action is currently before the court on five motions: (1) defendants’ motion for summary judgment; (2) defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. George J. Borjas, plaintiffs’ expert witness; (3) defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of James M. Johnston, another of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses; (4) plaintiffs’ petition for further discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f); and (5) plaintiffs’ motion to amend the scheduling order. I. BACKGROUND Because the disposition of the motions before this court and, ultimately, the action itself, turns purely on whether plaintiffs have sustained their burden of proving the reliability of their experts, and of providing evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding the technical requirements of the statutory provisions under which they brought suit, recitation of the factual narrative would be both unnecessary and largely unhelpful. Accordingly, the court will dispense with the usual statement of disputed and undisputed facts and address those few facts that are relevant to the substantive determinations in the analysis that follows. A. Procedural History of the Case Before delving into the merits of the motions and the substance of the contested testimony, however, it behooves the court to untangle the tortuous procedural history that has placed this case in its present and, as plaintiffs correctly put it, “unique procedural posture.” A great deal of water has gone under the bridge since this case was filed. That necessarily must factor into whether this court should countenance plaintiffs’ request for further discovery, to permit their damages expert to produce the evidence of proximate causation of damages to business or property necessary to establish their prima facie case. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, putatively on behalf of a nationwide class, on March 16, 2007. The complaint asserted that current and former Human Resources personnel at Gold Kist and Pilgrim’s Pride chicken processing facilities across the country engaged in a nationwide conspiracy to knowingly employ illegal immigrants in order to depress the wages of native unskilled laborers, like plaintiffs. In sum and substance, these are the very same factual allegations plaintiffs asserted in their Second Amended Complaint, filed more than a year later on May 2, 2008. On May 7, 2007, defendants—who are individual managers or Human Resources personnel at the Pilgrim’s Pride processing facility in Russellville, Alabama— moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Twenty-three days later, defendants took the unorthodox step of also moving for summary judgment, contending, among other things, that the allegations in this action were without foundation and were simply copied—virtually verbatim—from at least three other complaints filed by one of plaintiffs’ attorneys in other United States District Courts within the six months preceding the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint in this case. Defendants then moved, on June 12, 2007, to stay discovery pending determination of their motion to dismiss. In an order dated June 22, 2007, this court denied as premature defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, pursuant to the general rule in this Circuit, stayed discovery pending decision on defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for modification of the stay based on what appeared on its face to be the sealed affidavit of an immigration agent created in aid of an ongoing criminal investigation. On February 12, 2008, the court heard oral arguments regarding the pending motions and, subsequently, filed a memorandum opinion and order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and lifting the stay on discovery. However, noting that the Eleventh Circuit had, in a very similar case (also brought by the same attorney for the plaintiffs), expressed serious concerns with the “particularly difficult proximate causation issues [that] may be presented where a plaintiff alleges nationwide injury” in the form of wage depression resulting from alleged illegal hiring, the court “limited [discovery] to those facts (if any) substantiating plaintiffs allegations of a RICO conspiracy at the Russellville, Alabama Pilgrim’s Pride facility.” Cf. Williams, 465 F.3d at 1290; see also Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 619 (6th Cir.2004) (stating, in yet another similar case brought by plaintiffs’ counsel, that “[i]n the face of the[ ] attenuated links in the chain of causation, [defendant] asserts [that] plaintiffs cannot show proximate cause. [They] may be right— but we cannot say so at" this [12(b)(6)] stage in the proceeding.”). The order made clear that only upon demonstration of a prima facie case as to that locale would the court consider broadening the scope of discovery nationwide. Four days after plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, as required by the same order that denied the motion to dismiss, this court entered the first Scheduling Order governing the initial phase of discovery. According to that order, plaintiffs were required to designate and submit their expert reports by April 21, 2008, and all discovery was due to be concluded no later than May 30, 2008. A week later, one day before the parties filed the report of their Rule 26(f) meeting, plaintiffs filed their first motion to extend the time for designating expert witnesses. As defendants noted in their opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time, many of the rationales asserted by plaintiffs to explain why they believed further time was necessary involved uncertainty about facts into which plaintiffs could have made significant inquiry even without discovery, and facts that would seem central to a good faith basis for filing suit in the first instance. Plaintiffs also asserted, in the Rule 26(f) meeting, that they would undertake no discovery with respect to damages or proximate causation whatsoever, arguing that the court’s orders did not require them to establish those two elements of a prima facie case. On April 9, 2008, this court entered a Revised Scheduling Order, making clear that the parties were “to fully explore all aspects of plaintiffs’ RICO claim as it relates to the Russellville, Alabama, poultry processing facility during this limited period,” including proximate causation of damages resulting from the alleged RICO predicate acts. The order stated in no uncertain terms that the initial discovery period was intended to permit plaintiffs to establish a case, supported by sufficient facts on all elements of their claim to survive a motion for summary judgment. That order also extended the discovery period through the month of June and, consistent with plaintiffs’ requests, provided them one further month in which to designate and file reports of their expert witnesses. In so doing, the court warned that the expert deadlines would not again be altered except for good cause shown. Nonetheless, one day prior to the expiration of the revised expert designation deadline, plaintiffs moved to extend the deadlines for their experts’ reports yet again—seeking a one-week extension for their immigration expert, and three weeks extension for their damages and proximate causation expert. Plaintiffs asserted that “good cause” existed for extending the deadline for the report of Dr. George J. Borjas, their damages expert, because the public data upon which he had intended to rely had proven insufficient. Despite over forty-five pages of briefing on the extension, plaintiffs provided only a cursory explanation of why the adequacy of publiely-available data to inform the analysis necessary to support their claims could not have been determined during the fourteen months the case had already been pending. They also failed to explain why they waited until the eleventh hour, more than a month and a half after entry of the revised scheduling order, to request an extension on that basis. Nevertheless, in an effort to afford plaintiffs every opportunity to uncover the evidence necessary to establish their prima facie case, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion, providing plaintiffs until June 11, 2008, to tender the report of their damages expert, and until July 10 for the completion of all discovery. Even so, on June 17, 2008, nearly a week after the date by which plaintiffs were to have tendered their damages expert’s report, the parties filed yet another motion to extend the expert deadlines. No reason at all was given as to why the deadline should be extended for Dr. Borjas’s report. Yet again, however, the court revised the schedule, “with even more liberal deadlines,” but with the caveat that, “absent compelling and unforeseen circumstances, this third order granting an extension of time shall be the last.” Plaintiffs were given until July 22, 2008 to tender the “complete report” of Dr. Borjas. The order stated that all discovery was to be completed by August 8, 2008. Extraordinarily, even though this court had thrice extended the deadline for Dr. Borjas’ report, providing plaintiffs with more than three extra months beyond the due date set in the original scheduling order, the parties provided the following notice, once more approximately a week after Dr. Borjas’ report was due: To date Defendants have only been provided with Plaintiffs’ damages expert report. They have not been provided with the Plaintiffs’ damages expert’s supporting documentation, regression analysis and computer data and other information he relied upon or reviewed [as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) ]. Plaintiffs’ counsel has represented that Defendants should receive all of such information by Tuesday, July 29, 2008. Plaintiffs’ counsel has further represented that the provision of such documentation and information has been delayed because of technical issues in downloading Plaintiffs’ experts’ regression analysis programs to a c.d. Though “not at all impressed with the reasons proffered by plaintiffs’ expert for the delay,” this court recognized that plaintiffs’ failure had deprived defendants’ damages expert of the time that the supposedly “Final Scheduling Order” had provided for his analysis of Dr. Borjas’s report. Consequently, and in light of the joint nature of the motion to revise the schedule, the court granted yet another extension. That order extended the deadline for completion of all discovery to August 29, 2008 As it turned out, not only were plaintiffs’ explanations for the delay in turning over the bases for Dr. Borjas’s report unimpressive, they were also false. Dr. Borjas never created a regression analysis for this case at all, so there were no technical problems associated with downloading it. Moreover, while some of the promised data underpinning the report were indeed turned over within the timeframe described in this fourth motion to extend, plaintiffs appear not to dispute that portions of the data were not turned over until September 16, 2008, more than two weeks after the deadline for completion of discovery. Almost immediately, on August 5, 2008, defendants filed a so-called “preliminary” motion to strike Dr. Borjas’s report, for summary judgment on damages and proximate causation, and to stay discovery, on the basis that Dr. Borjas’s report was fatally incomplete. In that motion, defendants explicitly “reservefd] their rights to more fully brief’ plaintiffs’ asserted failure to prove damages and causation in subsequent Daubert and summary judgment motions “should it be necessary.” When the motion was filed, more than three weeks remained in the discovery period defendants’ damages expert’s complete report had not yet been tendered, and neither Dr. Borjas nor defendants’ damages expert had yet been deposed. Considering the motion decidedly premature, the court summarily denied it ten days after it was filed. On September 22, 2008, defendants filed three of the motions presently under consideration: (1) a motion to exclude the testimony of James M. Johnston, plaintiffs’ immigration expert; (2) a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Borjas, plaintiffs’ damages and proximate causation expert; and (3) a motion for summary judgment. The briefing regarding these motions concluded on October 27, 2008. On December 1, 2008, Pilgrim’s Pride filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. While, technically, Pilgrim’s Pride is not a party, the company has factually been at center stage in this action and, moreover, has paid the litigation fees associated with defending the two individual defendants from the outset. Therefore, not surprisingly, nearly a year passed during which this court saw neither hide nor hair of either party, save for occasional administrative filings related to counsel. The court attempted to jump start the stagnant litigation on October 8, 2009, by setting the two outstanding motions to exclude for a hearing one month and ten days later. Counsel for both parties, however, left a telephone message with chambers on October 26, 2009, stating that they would be unable to attend, and, three days later, plaintiffs filed a motion to continue the evidentiary hearings. Defendants’ counsel responded on the same day, suggesting the hearing be continued indefinitely, pending the determination of an as-yet-unfiled motion in the bankruptcy court to permit them to continue representation of defendants. Recognizing that, without an authorization order from the Bankruptcy Court, defendants’ counsel could be forced to withdraw, this court granted a continuance of the Daubert hearing on November 2, 2009, directing counsel to notify the court regarding the progress of that motion. On December 7, 2009, defendants gave notice that the Bankruptcy Court had granted their motion. Yet, one week later, the parties filed a joint motion to continue the Daubert hearing “until after ‘Plaintiffs’ Objection to Debtors’ Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 ... filed by Pilgrim’s Pride ...’ [was] resolved.” The motion alerted the court that, shortly after the date upon which the court continued the Daubert hearing and the date upon which the Bankruptcy Court authorized defendants’ counsel to continue representation in the bankruptcy case, plaintiffs’ counsel had filed objections to the plan filed in the Bankruptcy Court. Accordingly, the parties jointly requested that no hearing date be set until the dispute regarding Pilgrim’s Pride’s Reorganization Plan had been resolved. Before the parties notified the court about such a resolution, however, on February 3, 2010, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Strike Defendants’ Experts’ Declarations and Deposition Transcripts and to Decide Defendants’ Daubert Motions without a Hearing.” Plaintiffs contended that defendants’ suggestion that they would not introduce the live testimony of defendants’ experts at the hearing on defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts meant defendants were not entitled to use the declarations or deposition testimony of the experts they had retained in this action for any purpose. In addition to providing no citation even remotely supporting the relief sought, plaintiffs’ motion was also, as a motion to strike expert testimony, nearly a year and a half tardy. The motion was denied on February 19, 2010, 2010 WL 4595716. On March 5, 2010, the parties filed a joint notice regarding the status of the action. That document alerted the court about the following occurrences in the Bankruptcy Court. On January 1, 2009, Pilgrim’s Pride moved to extend the automatic stay in the bankruptcy action to include all pending litigation that would use its resources, including this case. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on February 3, 2009. On March 3, 2009, the bankruptcy court declined to extend the stay and instead permitted the litigation to be addressed through the adversary proceeding process in that court. Such a proceeding was, however, never initiated with respect to this action. Pilgrim’s Pride and the related entities who were debtors-in-possession in the bankruptcy proceedings subsequently filed a Plan of Reorganization that was adopted by the Bankruptcy Court, but plaintiffs filed an objection to that plan on November 30, 2009. The plan was confirmed over plaintiffs’ objections. As part of the company’s discharge from bankruptcy, Pilgrim’s Pride is excluded from liability in this case. However, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order on January 14, 2010, clarifying that suits against third-parties, like the individual employee defendants in this case, could nonetheless proceed. With few exceptions, the parties gave no notice regarding the occurrence or details of most of these proceedings and determinations until March 5, 2010. After review of these materials, the court once again set defendants’ motions to exclude for a hearing, this time on April 27, 2010. Over the course of more than eight hours, the court took testimony from both of plaintiffs’ experts and heard extensive argument regarding whether those experts, and specifically the reports they have tendered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as elucidated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny. B. Professor Borjas’s 26(a)(2)(B) Report and Proposed Testimony Plaintiffs have proffered Dr. George J. Borjas for the purposes of testifying “that wages paid by Pilgrim’s Pride to the Plaintiffs were depressed as a result of Defendant’s alleged practice of employing legally ineligible workers.” See Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir.2006) (reiterating the elemental requirement that plaintiffs must show that “the injury pled was proximately caused by the claimed RICO violations”) (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458-59, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006)). Pursuant to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and the orders of this court, Dr. Borjas created a report detailing his methodology, the data upon which he relied, and the opinions he derived from the data. The central premise of much of Dr. Borjas’s academic work, and of his analysis in this case, is that, at least in the short run, “[o]ther things equal, an immigration-induced increase in the size of the workforce lowers the wage of competing workers.” This assertion proceeds from foundational economic principles of supply and demand in a competitive market. Consistent with this theory, Dr. Borjas developed an econometric framework to “estimate[ ] the responsiveness of wages to immigration-induced supply shifts in a national labor market defined along the dimension of skills....” Though Dr. Borjas admits that no studies have yet done so, he asserts that “there are no conceptual reasons that prevent the theory and econometric methodology from being adapted to the current context.” To that end, his report proposes to measure this responsiveness of wages to increases in the labor supply resulting from immigration (the “wage elasticity”) by use of a regression analysis that will determine the curve-of-best-fit for the relationship of three variables: (1) the increase in the labor supply as a result of immigration to the area, determined by using the relative increase in the number of students in the Russellville School District as a proxy; (2) the real wage of hourly workers employed at the Russell-ville Pilgrim’s Pride facility; and (3) the number of person-hours employed at the plant. The slope of this curve will describe the change in wage for every incremental increase in the local labor supply. To deal with the problem that such a measure “would simply reflect the market pressures ... in the entire labor market, and would not provide any information about how the Russellville plant’s wages respond to a shift in Pilgrim’s Pride’s own polices towards employment of undocumented workers,” he proposes to further demonstrate that the company has “wage discretion,”—that is, it has market power to pay a lesser wage than its competitors for the same pool of labor. With this demonstration of market power, his report indicates he can simply multiply the coefficient of wage-change for every increase in labor supply (determined by the regression) by the number of workers hired in violation of the predicate acts, and thereby determine proximately caused damages. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Daubert Motion Standards “ ‘Rule 702 compels the district courts to perform the critical ‘gatekeeping’ function concerning the admissibility of expert scientific [and technical] evidence.’ ” United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir.2004)) (alteration in original). “This function inherently requires the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions to ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). [T]he objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). At base, the analysis requires “the proponent of the testimony ... [to] show that: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which he reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact.” ' Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 665 (11th Cir.2001). These requirements can be shown by demonstrating that “ ‘(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.’ ” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702). “The inquiry ... is a flexible one” because, in any given case, “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and ... [there is no] definitive checklist or test.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Factors that may be relevant include: (1) whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) in the case of a particular ... technique, the known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted by the relevant ... community. Hendrix ex rel. G.P., 609 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). B. Summary Judgment Standards Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court “view[s] the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion” and “all reasonable doubts about the facts [are] resolved in favor of the non-movant.” See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; instead, there must be “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) Petition for Further Discovery Lead counsel for plaintiffs, Howard Foster, executed an affidavit seeking further discovery contemporaneously with plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Oddly, other than two bare citations to the exhibit number of this document in their brief opposing summary judgment, plaintiffs did not expressly advert to what effectively amounts to a Rule 56(f) affidavit in any filing, nor did plaintiffs ever file a standalone motion seeking further discovery in conjunction with it. At the Daubert hearing, defendants argued plaintiffs had failed to timely move, under Rule 56(f), for further discovery, and plaintiffs did not dispute that assertion. Plaintiffs did, however, stringently argue that, to the extent doing so was necessary, Dr. Borjas would be able to “complete his report” and cure any deficiencies in it as proof of causation and damages if they were permitted further discovery. The court will address this assertion on the presumption that a Rule 56(f) petition was properly made. Cf. Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 841, 844 (11th Cir.1989) (“We reaffirm that rule 56(f) is ‘infused with a spirit of liberality,’ [though] we cannot go so far as to require courts to make such a motion on behalf of a party that deliberately chooses not to do so itself.”) (quoting Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir.1983)) (emphasis supplied). Further, since the additional discovery sought, would be directed exclusively to permitting Dr. Borjas to amend his report, it must be dealt with before the court will examine whether Dr. Borjas’s proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable evidence on these two elements of plaintiffs’ prima facie case. Plaintiffs identify two related categories of data about the employment levels at the Russellville facility that would allegedly enable Dr. Borjas to complete his report. First, they seek “to resolve the dispute and/or verify” data about the total number of employees at the facility, including temporary workers, calculated in terms of man-hours, for the previous decade, as well as the wages paid all unskilled workers for the same period. As a closely related corollary, they seek information about any capital improvements at the plant, so that Dr. Borjas may properly account for the effects of process automation on employment levels. To demonstrate an entitlement to further discovery under Rule 56(f), a party must “set[ ] forth with particularity the facts the moving party expects to discover and how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.” Harbert International, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir.1998). Plaintiffs’ affidavit provides sufficient detail about the facts they seek to discover and, albeit inferentially, how those facts would create a genuine issue. Particularly where the parties have already been afforded significant discovery, however, such a showing is not, by itself, sufficient. E.g., First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270, 298-99, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) (approving of denial of Rule 56(f) motion where failure to produce necessary evidence, “despite considerable discovery, demonstrated that additional discovery would be merely a fishing expedition and would unduly harass” the other party). The Eleventh Circuit has made abundantly clear that a party will not be entitled to further discovery under Rule 56(f) where the absence of evidence crucial to its case is the result of that party’s lack of diligently pursuing that evidence through the discovery it was permitted. E.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.1990) (affirming denial of 56(f) petition where “[t]he parties [had] agreed on a discovery schedule which the trial court extended on several occasions”). “Because the burden on a party resisting summary judgment is not a heavy one, one must conclusively justify his entitlement to the shelter of rule 56(f) by presenting specific facts explaining the inability to make a substantive response as required by rule 56(e).... ” S.E.C. v. Spence & Green Chemical Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis supplied) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). This is “particularly [so] where, as here, ample time and opportunities for discovery have already lapsed.” Id. Accordingly, it is necessary not only for a party moving for further discovery to show precisely what it expects to discover if furnished additional time, but why it should be furnished additional time at all. See 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2741, at 405-07 & n. 15 (2d ed. 1998). Plaintiffs advance three explanations for their failure to obtain sufficient information to enable Dr. Borjas to accurately determine and account for changes in employment levels at Pilgrim’s Pride. First, they contend that they did not become aware that capital improvements may have affected employment levels at the facility until too late in the discovery period. Second, they argue that, notwithstanding the enormous amounts of employment data disclosed, the true level of employment at Pilgrim’s Pride during the relevant period remains “disputed” and “uncertain[]” because of “defendants’ inaccurate discovery responses” and purported failure to disclose the number of temporary workers. Third, they protest that “the very limited discovery permitted ... simply did not permit Plaintiffs to depose the Plant personnel necessary to determine the true level of employment there.” Plaintiffs’ averment in counsel’s affidavit that they did not know about “the possibility that automation decreased the need for hourly employees until the end of the discovery period” is flatly contradicted by the expert whose testimony would be shored up if they were granted the further discovery they seek. Initially, it is difficult to believe, especially in light of plaintiffs’ counsels’ extensive experience with cases alleging wage depression theories identical to the one at issue here, that plaintiffs were unaware that their damages theory, which necessarily requires precise measurement of trends in employment levels, would need to account for automation. The potential impact of automation on employment levels in the short run has not only been extensively examined in economic literature since at least the Industrial Revolution, but also is so commonly understood that. it has given rise to its own phrase: “labor-saving technology.” Further, plaintiffs’ assertion that it “makes no economic sense,” and Dr. Borjas’s contention that “it is hard to reconcile the reported decline in employment with the fact that there was an increase in the Russellville plant’s output,” are at best disingenuous when Dr. Borjas’s own textbook addresses the precise point: “If the technological advances that are being introduced constantly into the labor market are good substitutes for unskilled workers ... this type of technological change would lower the demand for unskilled labor.” George Borjas, Labor Economics 306 (4th ed. 2008). Dr. Borjas also does not dispute that United States Census Bureau statistics showed employment per plant falling by 5 percent in the poultry industry as a whole between 2003 and 2006, while output per employee rose 17 percent and capital investment rose by 17.2 percent. More importantly, Dr. Borjas testified that he discovered discrepancies between the data he was given on the output of the Pilgrim’s Pride plant and the number of employees “the minute [he] started playing with the data.” He immediately “told counsel that there were things in the data that seemed contradictory, and [he] did ask specifically about the capital improvements ... and ... told counsel that without resolution of th[o]se issues” he would be unable to perform the regression analysis he had been retained to conduct. At the Dauberb hearing, Dr. Borjas reiterated this point: “And I remember asking counsel at the time, is there anything on the lines of a machine coming in that would explain this? And the answer provided to me at the time was no, but that answer, I think is incorrect.” Plaintiffs never asked defendants for that information. Instead, plaintiffs’ counsel told Dr. Borjas that “[h]e didn’t know of any” capital improvements, and that there “wasn’t any data in the context of the case.” Dr. Borjas conveyed to counsel that, “without resolution of these issues,” he would be unable to determine the critical element of wage elasticity: Q. What did counsel say to you about that? A. Write what you have. Q. Finish your report. A. That’s what I did. Plaintiffs admittedly deposed at least two Human Resources professionals at the plant after Dr. Borjas requested information about capital improvements and their possible impact on total man-hours at the facility, and yet they never asked any questions on the point. Accordingly, this proffered explanation for plaintiffs’ failure to obtain information necessary to permit Dr. Borjas to complete his analysis during the time they were afforded does no more than highlight that they failed to do so. Plaintiffs’ second explanation for their failure to obtain sufficient information regarding the number of man-hours—that defendants “sandbagged” them by providing inaccurate information—also is unavailing and for similar reasons. Plaintiffs make much of Pilgrim’s Pride’s conceded overproduction of employment files for individuals employed on April 18, 2008. Initially, Pilgrim’s Pride produced approximately 1,900 employee files. However, on June 6, 2008, defendants’ response to the first question in plaintiffs’ second set of interrogatories indicated that, on May 1, 2008, there were 1,344 employees at the facility. By June 6, 2008, the discrepancy was resolved when defendants acknowledged they had mistakenly sent the files of approximately 600 individuals who were not current employees on the relevant date. Plaintiffs provide no explanation whatsoever why a discovery discrepancy resolved well over a month and a half prior to issuance of Dr. Borjas’s report would affect his ability to complete it. Further, the production discrepancy related to the analysis of plaintiffs’ immigration expert, James M. Johnston, who examined the files for the purpose of opining about the probable legality of each individual employee. Professor Borjas expressly stated that he had never read Johnston’s report and, even though he cites two numbers from the report, there is no indication any delay in receiving those numbers impacted his analysis. Plaintiffs also advance the argument that they are entitled to more discovery because their failure to obtain accurate employment data for Dr. Borjas is attributable to defendants’ failure to provide them information regarding temporary contract workers at Pilgrim’s Pride. Yet, plaintiffs knew that Pilgrim’s Pride had used temporary employee services at least as early as defendants’ supplemented responses to plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories, which plaintiffs received on June 17, 2008, more than a month before Dr. Borjas rendered his report, and more than two months prior to the close of discovery. Still, they apparently chose thereafter to neither refíne their interrogatories to determine the numbers of such workers, nor to subpoena the records of the several temporary employment service providers defendant Thomas identified as having provided contract labor to Pilgrim’s Pride. Rather, they simply relied on conflicting responses from witnesses to assert that the number of such workers is “disputed,” and that they should, therefore, be entitled to further discovery. Plaintiffs’ apparent contention that defendants should have turned over the information without their requesting it lacks merit entirely. Certainly plaintiffs cannot contend that their failure to properly pursue evidence that they knew existed two months prior to the close of discovery “conclusively justifies their] entitlement to the shelter of rule 56(f) by ... specific facts explaining the[ir] inability to make a substantive response.... ” Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d at 901. Plaintiffs also assert that their failure to obtain correct employment level data was the result of inconsistencies between the numbers of employees stated in defendants’ interrogatory responses and in other documents plaintiffs have uncovered. Specifically, plaintiffs identify two sources of information that appear to conflict with defendants’ responses. The first is a generally addressed memorandum from former Division Manager Don Wisdom discussing the plant’s water needs that indicated there were 2,100 employees at the facility in 2005 (which included employees at a nearby hatchery and feed mill that are not implicated by the claims in this action), portions of which plaintiffs discovered on a now-defunct website. The second is a 2004 Tennessee Valley Authority report indicating that the work force would increase to 1,900 at some unspecified point in the future. Yet again, however, the problem to which plaintiffs point merely highlights their failure to take advantage of the discovery afforded them. Even assuming these two single-page, outside sources are sufficiently reliable to create a reasonable dispute with defendants’ sworn answers to interrogatories, plaintiffs provide no explanation as to why they did not bring the asserted discrepancies to the court’s attention when discovered, rather than providing an incomplete report months later and then pointing to the different numbers as an excuse. A party who reasonably believes its counter-party is prevaricating or falsifying discovery responses should “promptly [seek] the district court’s assistance,” and failure to do so should result in “den[ial of a] Rule 56(f) motion ... on the ground that [the moving party] ha[s] not been diligent.” Exigent Technology, Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (applying Eleventh Circuit law). Indeed, the far more likely explanation for plaintiffs’ ascription of fault to the numbers defendants provided in their discovery responses is that, when Dr. Borjas applied his theory to those numbers, his theory, as he admitted, “simply didn’t hold up in this case.” Neither the failure of discovery to prove what a party hoped it would, nor its possible inconsistency with one piece of online hearsay and one speculative third-party public record, are even marginally convincing justifications under Rule 56(f). Finally, plaintiffs make much of the fact that discovery was “limited in this case,” implying that, to the extent they failed to obtain sufficient information to permit Dr. Borjas to complete his analysis, this court, as opposed to their attorney, is to blame. Yet, with a single exception, the amount of discovery permitted plaintiffs to establish their prima facie case was precisely what plaintiffs asked for in the parties’ Rule 26(f) report. Still, plaintiffs rail that the five depositions this court allowed in its initial scheduling order were insufficient to permit them to discover the information they needed. Yet plaintiffs never, as counsel admitted at the Daubert hearing, moved for leave to conduct additional depositions and, indeed, despite counsel’s suggestion to the contrary, never moved for more discovery at all. Instead, they waged desultory and pointless battles to modify the protective order to which they had agreed. Plaintiffs had self-evidently convincing reasons to permit them to conduct more depositions than allowed in the revised scheduling order: the discovery of new information (regarding possible capital improvements and the use of contract labor) and conflicting data regarding employment levels. They simply chose not to ask. It is far too late in the day for plaintiffs’ plea for further discovery. Even had the parties not absented themselves for a year and a half of wrangling in a Texas Bankruptcy Court, it would still have been too late. Plaintiffs were afforded every opportunity to gain the information necessary to prove their case. The court extended discovery deadlines four times, twice extending the deadline for Dr. Borjas’s report after it was due, and ultimately providing “even more liberal deadlines” than plaintiffs requested. Not once did plaintiffs alert this court to any of the problems they now contend should entitle them to further discovery, nor did they ever seek aid in securing the information Dr. Borjas says was necessary for completion of his report. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) petition is due to be denied. Plaintiffs are not entitled to yet another opportunity to tender a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert report on damages and causation sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The federal rules do not reward the dilatory, and plaintiffs’ lack of diligence militates in favor of denial. Dr. Borjas’s report must stand, if it stands at all, on its own two legs. B. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. George Borjas 1. Dr. Borjas’s report is fatally incomplete Without more, Dr. Borjas’s report fails to present any opinion that would help determine a fact in issue. To prove their RICO claim in this action, plaintiffs must prove damages “by reason of’ the predicate violations. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The object of Dr. Borjas’s proposed expert testimony is to satisfy these elements by causally linking a diminution in wages in a relevant labor market to defendants’ alleged hiring of unauthorized workers. Proper performance of a court’s gatekeeping role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires not only that a court determine that a qualified expert has reliably applied reliable methods to sufficient data to permit him to provide an opinion, but also that the opinion the witness purports to provide be actually helpful to determination of a fact in issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-592, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) ("Rule 702’s `helpfulness’ standard requires a valid ... connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."); United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc) ("The burden of establishing ... helpfulness rests on the proponent of the expert opinion."); Fed.R.Evid. 702 (requiring that expert testimony "assist the trier of fact"). Expert testimony "does not assist the trier of fact unless the testimony has a justified... relationship to the pertinent facts." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786). This requirement stems from basic principles of relevancy: "expert testimony must be `relevant to the task at hand[:] ... it [must] logically advance[] a material aspect’ of the case." Id. at 1298-99 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Courts have fleshed out the concept to clarify that, simply because an expert’s conclusion may superficially appear relevant to and helpful in the determination of facts at issue, if it is too far divorced from the underlying data, it may ultimately prove unhelpful. [T]he Supreme Court has noted that, in the context of this analysis, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.” General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). Although experts “commonly extrapolate from existing data ... nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Id. Rather, the trial court is free to ‘conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.’ Id. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir.2010); see also, e.g., McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1301-02 (“[A]n expert opinion is inadmissible when the only connection between the conclusion and the existing data is the expert’s own assertions.... ”). If an expert’s facially relevant conclusion relates to the data it purports to rely upon only by his own ipse dixit, it ultimately is simply an argument, “offer[ing] nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments” and, consequently, fails to meet Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. As plaintiffs note in their response to the motion to exclude Dr. Borjas’s testimony, his opinions about causation and damages depend on [a] three part scenario: 1. There was an immigration induced increase in the number of potential workers in the local area servicing the Russellville plant. 2. There was a decline in the real wage of hourly workers employed at the Russellville plant; and 3. There was an increase in the number of persons (or, more precisely, person-hours) employed at the Russellville plant. Dr. Borjas’s analysis, however, does not establish the third element. Indeed, in his report, Dr. Borjas explicitly admits that “the data provided to me indicate a decline in employment at the Russellville plant during the at-issue period—-which would seem to contradict” his theory. Only by concluding that the information he was provided on employment levels was false and (admittedly erroneously) that no automation occurred, and then substituting the facility’s output level as a proxy for its employment level, is Dr. Borjas able to draw any conclusion in his report whatsoever. In his deposition testimony, he forthrightly admitted as much while examining the analysis of his work in this case done by defendants’ expert, and Dr. Borjas’s former colleague, Dr. Finis Welch: Q. ... My question for you is ... where it says [“T]he report provided no evidence that the alleged employment of illegal immigrants by defendants caused wages at Pilgrim’s to decline and it does not quantify damages to Plaintiffs,!”] is that accurate? A. That’s accurate. When I ran the regression model that I needed to run and given that I had no regression model to run, I couldn’t go to the next step— Q. [“]His methodology does not include any procedures to examine whether employment of any individuals that might have been illegal immigrants actually caused wages at Pilgrim’s to be lower [than] had no illegal immigrants been employed;[”] is that accurate? ... That sentence is accurate? A. Correct. Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that Dr. Borjas has provided a viable opinion. They point to paragraphs 45 and 46 of his report in support of that claim. Paragraph 45 opines that “the preliminary evidence indicates that unauthorized alien worker-induced supply shifts in Russell-ville did indeed lead to lower wages for workers employed at the Russellville plant.” Paragraph 46 merely indicates that Dr. Borjas “anticipate[s] being able to” complete his analysis “following additional discovery that addresses the above mentioned shortcomings in the data.” Dr. Borjas’s preliminary conclusion regarding wage depression is plainly ipse dixit. In the same paragraph he admits that “it has not yet been possible to estimate the statistical model summarized” in the report. As detailed above, the only data he has regarding one of the three central premises of his theory—that employment levels at the plant increased— flatly contradict his hypothesis. Hence, any conclusion that the hypothesis holds true could only derive from an analytical leap that disregards either the data in front of him, or the conditions antecedent he sets forth. Indeed, the sentence that follows the “opinion” to which plaintiffs point shows that Dr. Borjas was only able to reach even this preliminary conclusion by substituting product output for employment level. Professor Borjas admits that he has no reason to believe that substitution makes sense: A. If you take the data provided in the interrogatories as the true data, the correlation works the wrong way, definitely. If you take the output level in the Gold Kist plant as the true level of—proportional to employment, the correlation works the right way. Q. Okay. Do you know which one is accurate? A: I do not know. “Daubert requires that trial courts act as ‘gatekeepers’ to ensure that speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury. The trial court must ‘make certain that an expert ... employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’ ” Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). Dr. Borjas admitted that, absent inputs he was unable to consider, his analysis “would not be something that one would present.” Further, his expertise is econometrics and applied microeconomics. His analysis was to include an econometric regression to allow him to calculate the degree to which plaintiffs’ wages were depressed by Pilgrim’s Pride’s alleged hiring of illegal immigrants. That regression analysis, however, was never conducted. Bluntly, Dr. Borjas did not bring his expertise to bear on the relevant factual issues. Shorn of its purely speculative conclusion, Dr. Borjas’s report contains no relevant opinions at all. Rather, it is merely a recitation of a methodology and facts to which that methodology purportedly could be applied. “[I]n acting as a gatekeeper, the court is responsible for ‘keeping] unreliable and irrelevant information from the jury,’ because of its ‘inability to assist in factual determinations, its potential to create confusion, and its lack of probative value.’ ” Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 537 F.Supp.2d 1343, 1349-52 (M.D.Ga.2007) (quoting Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311-12 (11th Cir.1999)). In its present form, Dr. Borjas analysis fails on all three counts. Rather than addressing the obvious shortcomings of the report, or providing any cogent argument as to why they should not result in the exclusion of Dr. Borjas’s testimony from consideration in light of defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs tilt at windmills. Specifically, they first contend that the law does not require them to prove any amount of damages as part of their prima facie case, provided they have shown “the fact of damage.” While this statement of the law is highly questionable, see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 466, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006) (stating that it is “plaintiffs responsibility to prove that the amount of damages he seeks is fairly attributable to the defendant”), this court need not determine whether it is correct, because Dr. Borjas admitted he had not even established that much. When asked whether he had been “able to form an opinion as to whether wages ... were decreasing or increasing or staying the same with the influx of immigrants into the Russellville facility,” Dr. Borjas candidly admitted he “was unable to distinguish among these various possibilities.” He testified that he “ended the report ... basically by saying, if the output data was actually a correct measurement of employment, in other words proportional to employment, and I had no information on capital investment one way or the other ... and counsel said there was nothing to indicate they had,” then he could conclude causation. However, “[t]hat is a big assumption” that “could be wrong,” and, plaintiffs are ultimately forced to admit, albeit circuitously, that it is. Moreover, the preliminary conclusion itself only indicates that “unauthorized worker-induced supply shifts in Russell-ville did indeed lead to lower wages ... at the Russellville plant.” That opinion does not relate at all to any unauthorized workers hired by defendants, much less any such hiring that would constitute a RICO predicate act. It refers only to a possible wage impact of an influx of immigrants into the area. Such a diminution, even if the speculation it occurred is credited, would not be “damages” to “business or property,” since it would be wholly unrelated to “ ‘schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate statutes’ ” linked to the “relationship ... between plaintiff workers and their employer----” Williams v. Mohawk, 465 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002)). Rather, the opinion refers only to the generalized wage-depressive effect, at least in narrowly defined skill groups, within an aggregated labor market that labor-supply shocks may have, which has been the focus of much of Dr. Borja’s work. E.g., George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q.J. Econ. 1335, 1335-40, 1369-70 (2003); Abdurrahman Aydemir & George J. Borjas, Cross-Country Variation in the Impact of International Migration, 5 J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n. 663, 663-666 (2007) (finding, in a study defining the relevant aggregated labor market as three countries, a “numerically sizable and statistically significant inverse relation between labor supply shifts and wages in all three countries”). Second, plaintiffs make a half-hearted attempt to describe this court’s ruling on defendants’ "Preliminary Motion" to strike Dr. Borjas’s report and for summary judgment as "the law of the case." Plaintiffs are mistaken; law-of-the-case doctrine is manifestly inapplicable. See Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (denial of summary judgment is an interlocutory, not final, order); Gregg v. United States Industries, Inc., 715 F.2d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir.1983) ("Ordinarily law of the case applies only where there has been a final judgment and not to interlocutory rulings."); see; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 & n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ("[E]very order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.") (1983); Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912) (Holmes, J.) ("`[L]aw of the case,’ as applied to the effect of previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power."); Curran v. Kwon, 153 F.3d 481, 486-88 & n. 11 (7th Cir.1998) ("[T]he denial of summary judgment... was not the law of the case and did not bind the court...."). As noted above, defendants’ motion was expressly denominated “preliminary” in nature; it was filed more than three weeks prior to both Dr. Borjas’s deposition and the close of discovery; and, most importantly, the motion was summarily denied in a three-sentence order. It should have been blatantly obvious to even the most novice litigator that this order was not intended to foreclose similar arguments when ripely made without wasting judicial resources to hand-hold counsel through the reasoning. Moreover, even if the doctrine were applicable—and it is not—the significant further factual development that occurred after the ruling on defendants’ “preliminary” motion would clearly justify reconsideration. See, e.g., 18B Wright, Miller, & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.1, at 695 (“A ruling made early in the proceedings may rest on poorly developed facts that have been better developed by continuing proceedings. In these circumstances, the forward progress of the case encourages reconsideration.”). Accordingly, Dr. Borjas’s report provides no viable opinion regarding facts in issue. As such, plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that his testimony would prove