Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge. Denying the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the court on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mashour Abdullah Muqbel Alsabri (ISN 324) (“the petitioner”), a Yemeni national detained at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (“GTMO”). The government maintains that the petitioner was part of and provided material support to the Taliban, alQaida or associated enemy forces and is therefore lawfully detained. The petitioner asserts that he was neither part of nor supported those forces and that the court should therefore direct the government to release him from custody immediately. In November 2010, the court held a merits hearing addressing the legality of the petitioner’s detention. During the course of that hearing, which spanned four days, the parties introduced dozens of exhibits concerning the petitioner’s alleged role in the Taliban and al-Qaida, including interrogation reports reflecting statements made by the petitioner and other GTMO detainees, declarations of intelligence officials and translations of documents purportedly seized from al-Qaida and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan. As discussed below, the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2000 to fight with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces, stayed in Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouses, sought out and received military-style training from the Taliban or al-Qaida, traveled to the battle lines in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban or al-Qaida and remained part of those forces at the time of his capture in early 2002. Thus, based on the totality of the evidence, the court is compelled to conclude that the petitioner was part of the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces and is therefore lawfully detained. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Overview The petitioner is a thirty-four year old Yemeni national who was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents. GE 1 at 1; GE 3 at l. He attended school in Saudi Arabia until approximately the ninth grade, when he dropped out and began working odd jobs, including driving a taxi. GE 1 at 2; GE 3 at 1; GE 10 at 1. During this period, the petitioner became acquainted with a Yemeni man named [redacted] GE 10 at 1; GE 43 at 1, a former mujahaddin in Bosnia, PE 115 at 2, who would later introduce the petitioner to various jihadists and members of al-Qaida, see infra Part IV.B.l.a. In late 1998, Saudi authorities arrested the petitioner for allegedly harboring an individual wanted for passport forgery. GE 1 at 2; GE 3 at 1; GE 9 at 1. After a month-long stay in a Saudi jail, the petitioner was deported to Yemen, his country of citizenship. GE 1 at 2; GE 3 at 2. The petitioner was barred from returning to Saudi Arabia for a period of five years. GE 1 at 2; GE 2 at 2. After arriving in Sana’a, Yemen from Saudi Arabia, the petitioner contacted and met with [redacted] GE 3 at 2-3; GE 10 at 1; GE 43 at 1. The petitioner spent a few days in Sana’a before traveling to the city of Ta’iz, GE 3 at 2-3; GE 10 at 1, where he remained for several weeks, living with extended family and working in the honey trade, GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3; GE 10 at 1. While in Ta’iz, the petitioner’s uncle taught him how to use an AK-47 and a pistol. GE 3 at 5. During this period in Ta’iz, the petitioner became acquainted with a twenty-five year old Saudi man named [redacted] GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. [redacted] had received military training from the Taliban and had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan two years earlier. GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. The petitioner and [redacted] discussed various topics, including the local honey trade and the conflict in Afghanistan. GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. In the summer of 1999, the petitioner returned to Sana’a, purportedly in the hopes of obtaining a visa to return to Saudi Arabia. GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3. While his visa application was pending, [redacted] arranged for the petitioner to stay at a boardinghouse operated by [redacted] brother-in-law, [redacted] (“the [redacted] boardinghouse”). GE 3 at 3-4; GE 43 at 1. The petitioner shared the [redacted] boardinghouse with at least eight other men. GE 1 at 3-4; GE 3 at 3-5. At the time, the [redacted] boardinghouse served as the hub of a car theft ring whose aim was to violently free a Yemeni terrorist from a Sana’a prison. GE 1 at 5; GE 2 at 2. Many of the individuals who lived at or were associated with the [redacted] boardinghouse were veteran jihadists and several would later travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaida. See infra Part IV.B.l.a. One of these men would later be a suicide bomber during alQaida’s October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. See id. Approximately two weeks after arriving at the boardinghouse, the [redacted] petitioner was arrested by Yemeni authorities, along with other individuals associated with the boardinghouse, on suspicion of involvement in the car theft conspiracy. GE 1 at 4; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 1. The petitioner was released from prison in December 1999 and, after briefly visiting his uncle in Ta’iz, returned to the [redacted] boardinghouse. GE 1 at 5-6; GE 9 at 2. The petitioner was re-incarcerated for a few days by Yemeni authorities for allegedly providing a cell phone to one of his imprisoned housemates from the [redacted] boardinghouse. GE 1 at 5. During this period, the petitioner socialized with [redacted], who had also been recently released from prison, and became acquainted with individuals whom the petitioner has admitted were members of al-Qaida. See infra Part IV.B.l.a. Around this time, the petitioner decided to leave Yemen and travel to Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5. The petitioner has stated that his decision to go to Afghanistan was influenced by a fatwa (religious decree) issued by nationally recognized religious scholars encouraging men to travel to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. GE 3 at 5. The petitioner also stated that he was influenced by [redacted] the former Taliban fighter he had met in Ta’iz, who purportedly told the petitioner that he could find work and a better life in Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 3. The petitioner did not tell anyone, including his family, that he was planning to go to Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6. In August 2000, following travel instructions provided to him by [redacted] the petitioner flew from Sana’a, Yemen through Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan and then on to Quetta, Pakistan, a city near the Afghan border. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5; GE 6 at 2. In Quetta, the petitioner stayed for three days at the Daftar al-Taliban, a Taliban-run facility which arranged for him and three other men to be transported across the border to Kandahar, Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1; GE 6 at 2. The three men who crossed the border with the petitioner admitted that they were traveling to Afghanistan to become martyrs. GE 10 at 2. In Kandahar, the petitioner and his companions were taken to a guesthouse known as the Haji Habash guesthouse, which was run by an individual named [redacted]. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 3. The petitioner stayed at this guesthouse for approximately two weeks. GE 4 at 1; GE 9 at 3. From there, the petitioner traveled to Kabul, where he stayed for a few days at a guesthouse operated by an individual named Hamza al-Ghamdi. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. The petitioner requested permission from al-Ghamdi to travel to the front lines, but al-Ghamdi denied the request because the petitioner lacked weapons training. GE 9 at 4. The petitioner then traveled on to Jalalabad, where he allegedly stayed at the home of [redacted], an individual whom [redacted] had advised the petitioner to contact once in Afghanistan. GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4; GE 10 at 2. After several months, the petitioner returned to the alGhamdi guesthouse in Kabul. GE 9 at 5-6. With al-Ghamdi’s authorization, the petitioner then traveled to the battle lines manned by Taliban fighters in combat with the Northern Alliance. GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 6. After leaving the Taliban battle lines, the petitioner allegedly returned to [redacted] house in Jalalabad. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 6. As coalition forces approached the city in late 2001, the petitioner fled Jalalabad for Pakistan. GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 3. The petitioner was arrested by Pakistani authorities in early 2002 and transferred to the custody of the United States military. GE 6 at 3. He was subsequently transferred to GTMO, where he is currently detained. Pet. at 1. B. Procedural History The petitioner commenced this action in October 2006 by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See generally Pet. In December 2006, the court stayed the case while the Circuit and the Supreme Court considered whether the federal district courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by individuals detained at GTMO. See Mem. Order (Dec. 4, 2006) at 2. The Supreme Court resolved this question in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008), in which the Court held that individuals detained at GTMO were “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention,” id. at 2262, and that the federal district courts have jurisdiction over such challenges, id. at 2274. Although the Supreme Court did not specify what procedures the district courts were to employ in resolving these habeas petitions, it did emphasize that the “detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing.” Id. at 2275. Toward that end, this court and other judges in this district agreed to consolidate their cases before Judge Hogan for the purpose of adopting common procedures for the GTMO detainee litigation. On November 6, 2008, Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order (“CMO”) to govern these proceedings, which he amended on December 16, 2008. See generally Am. CMO (Dec. 16, 2008). This court adopted the provisions of the amended CMO, subject to modifications set forth in an Omnibus Order issued on April 23, 2009. See generally Omnibus Order (Apr. 23, 2009). Meanwhile, having filed its initial Factual Return for the petitioner in April 2007, the government filed a motion to amend its Factual Return, which Judge Hogan granted in November 2008. See Order (Nov. 7, 2008). Following an extensive period of discovery, the court issued an order in February 2010 establishing dates to bring this litigation to completion. Order (Feb. 16,2010). On April 29, 2010, the government filed a second motion for leave to amend the factual return, see generally Govt’s 2d Mot. for Leave to Amend Factual Return, which the court ultimately granted, see generally Mem. Order (June 9, 2010). The petitioner filed his traverse on April 30, 2010, see generally Traverse, and on June 4, 2010, the government filed its motion for judgment on the record, see generally Govt’s Mot. for J. on R. The petitioner filed his cross-motion for judgment on the record on June 18, 2010. See generally Petr’s Cross-Mot. for J. on R. In late August and early September 2010, the parties filed supplements to their cross-motions for judgment on the record addressing recent Circuit rulings concerning the scope of the government’s detention authority. See generally Govt’s Supplemental Mot. for J. on R.; Petr’s Supplemental Mot. for J. on R. On September 16, 2010, the court denied the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the record and scheduled a merits hearing to begin November 8, 2010. Order (Sept. 16, 2010). On October 25, 2010, two weeks before the merits hearing was scheduled to begin, the government filed a motion to supplement the record with additional evidence. See generally Govt’s Mot. to Supplement Evidence. Following expedited briefing, the court denied the motion and ordered the government to limit its presentation to evidence previously disclosed to the petitioner as part of the factual return. See generally Mem. Op. (Nov. 4, 2010). The merits hearing began on November 8, 2010 and spanned four days. At the outset of the hearing, the court ruled on the government’s motion to admit hearsay evidence with a presumption of accuracy and authenticity. See generally Govt’s Hearsay Mot. The court held that although the government’s evidence would, in appropriate circumstances, be afforded a presumption of authenticity, it was not entitled to a presumption of accuracy. See infra Part III.A. During the course of the merits hearing, the parties presented the court with extensive argument and nearly two hundred exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties’ submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. With the record now complete, the court turns to the applicable legal standards and the evidence and argument presented by the parties. III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS A. Admissibility and Reliability of Hearsay Evidence As alluded to above, prior to the merits hearing, the government submitted a motion in which it argued that the court should afford a presumption of accuracy and authenticity to its hearsay evidence. See generally Govt’s Hearsay Mot. That motion was granted in part and denied in part at the outset of the merits hearing. Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at 3-4. The reasoning underlying the court’s ruling is set forth in greater detail below. This court has previously held, in another GTMO habeas case, that although hearsay evidence is always admissible in these habeas proceedings, the court must make individualized determinations about the reliability and accuracy of that evidence and the weight it is to be afforded. Hatim v. Obama, 677 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.2009). The court further stated that based on the principles underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), which sets forth the hearsay exception for reports of regularly conducted activity, the government’s interrogation reports and intelligence reports were entitled to a presumption of authenticity. Id. The court declined, however, to presume the accuracy of the government’s exhibits, noting that there was ample reason not to afford such a presumption to those exhibits, many of which contained two or three levels of hearsay. Id. This Circuit has since issued a number of decisions consistent with this approach to hearsay evidence. The Circuit has made clear that although “hearsay evidence is always admissible in Guantanamo habeas proceedings, such evidence must be accorded weight only in proportion to its reliability.” Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 428 (D.C.Cir.2010); accord Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C.Cir.2010) (observing that “the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible — it is always admissible — but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits”). Nothing in these Circuit decisions suggests that the court should presume the accuracy or reliability of the government’s exhibits; to the contrary, the Circuit has stated that before relying on any piece of evidence, the district court must make a threshold determination that it is sufficiently reliable and probative. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C.Cir.2010) (citing Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 847 (D.C.Cir.2008)); cf. Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C.Cir.2010) (holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where “[t]he government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability, and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence”). Accordingly, at the outset of the merits hearing in this case, the court ruled that hearsay evidence would be admissible and that the court would presume the authenticity but not the accuracy of the government’s intelligence reports and interrogation reports. Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at 3-4. The court further ruled that it would make individualized determinations regarding the reliability of any hearsay evidence presented by the parties. Id. B. Assessment of the Evidence As noted, before the court may consider whether the government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is lawfully detained, the court “must evaluate the raw evidence, finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of certainty.” Parhat, 532 F.3d at 847 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993)). Thus, before relying on any piece of evidence in these GTMO habeas proceedings, the court must examine that evidence to “determine whether the evidence is in fact sufficiently reliable to be used as a justification for detention.” Khan v. Obama, 646 F.Supp.2d 6, 12 (D.D.C.2009); see also Naji al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F.Supp.2d 32, 38 (D.D.C.2010) (observing that “[i]n Guantanamo habeas proceedings, the Court must assess the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of each piece of evidence presented by the parties in the context of the evidence as a whole” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The reliability of hearsay evidence may be established by the intrinsic characteristics of the evidence, such as the nature and consistency of the details contained in the hearsay, Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 428-29, as well as through corroboration by other evidence in the record, id. at 429 (noting that “an intelligence report’s reliability can be assessed by comparison to ‘exogenous information’ ”); Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725-26 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 849). Two pieces of evidence, “each unreliable when viewed alone,” can corroborate each other and mutually establish their reliability. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 726 (citing United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 100-03 (D.C.Cir.1986)). In this case, the government has based its case principally on interrogation reports reflecting statements allegedly made by the petitioner. See generally GE 1-6, 8-10, 24, 27, 36, 40-41, 43. These statements, which the government relies on to establish the petitioner’s actions and intentions before his apprehension, plainly constitute hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). The court has carefully reviewed each report to ensure that the statements contained therein are sufficiently reliable for use in assessing the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention. At the outset, the court notes that the petitioner’s statements to interrogators are recorded in standard reporting forms, such as FD-302s, Summary Interrogation Reports (“SIRs”) and Intelligence Information Reports (“HRs”). See generally, e.g., GE 1, 2, 24. These reports are prepared by intelligence and law enforcement agents in the normal course of their duties to memorialize intelligence gathered from various sources, including interviews of detainees. See GE 30 (Decl. of [redacted] Decl. II”)) at 6-7. The fact that these reports were prepared by government agents in the course of their normal intelligence gathering duties provides a degree of support for their reliability. Moreover, the court finds ample evidence in the content of these interrogation reports to support their reliability. With few exceptions (on which the court does not rely), the statements reflected in these interrogation reports concern information about which the petitioner had personal knowledge. Furthermore, these statements are replete with specific details, lending further support to their reliability. The court has been presented with no evidence that any of the statements were elicited through undue coercion. Moreover, although the details sometimes differ, the accounts of the petitioner’s actions in these different interrogation reports are remarkably consistent. Indeed, as evidenced in the following sections, many of the statements that the court relies on in its analysis are repeated by the petitioner in multiple interrogations and corroborated by the statements of third-party detainees. See infra Part IV.B.1-5. Although the petitioner challenges the accuracy of the translation and transcription of certain statements that the reports attribute to him, nothing about these purported errors calls into question the inherent reliability of the reports. See Alr-Warafi, 704 F.Supp.2d at 39 (“[T]hat the [petitioner’s] statements were translated does not render them unreliable or incredible. Petitioner’s reservations about the accuracy of the translations of the statements goes to the weight ... the Court should afford the statements, not their reliability.”). Thus, although the court must, in the course of its analysis, address the parties’ disagreements regarding the probative value of various portions of these interrogations reports, the court concludes that the reports are sufficiently reliable to be considered in its assessment of the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention. The government also relies on other types of evidence, such as interrogation reports containing statements made by third-party detainees, see, e.g., GE 7, 8, 12, 13, declarations of intelligence officers and subject-matter experts, see, e.g., GE 14,19, and intelligence reports regarding materials captured from al-Qaida and Taliban forces, see, e.g., GE 25, 29. The reliability of each of these exhibits is assessed individually in the course of the analysis. See infra Part IV.B.1-5. IV. ANALYSIS A. The Scope of the Government’s Detention Authority The government’s authority to detain individuals at GTMO derives from the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which provides that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. Pub.L. No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2001) This Circuit has stated that the AUMF authorizes the government to detain two categories of persons: (1) individuals “part of’ forces associated with alQaida or the Taliban and (2) individuals who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against the United States. Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. To justify its detention of an individual, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual falls within one of these categories of detainable persons. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.Cir.2010) (stating that “a preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a habeas petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF”); accord Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. In this case, the government’s principal contention is that the petitioner is lawfully detained because he was “part of’ the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces. The Circuit has observed that because alQaida’s organizational structure is amorphous, “it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an individual is ‘part of al Qaeda.’ ” Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. Accordingly, the district courts must determine whether an individual is “part of’ alQaida or associated forces on a “case-by-case basis” employing a “functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.” Id. “That an individual operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure is surely sufficient but is not necessary to show that he is ‘part of the organization.’ ” Id.; see also Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (“If the government can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a detainee was part of the ‘command structure’ of al Qaeda, this satisfies the requirement to show that he was ‘part of al Qaeda.’ But there are ways other than making a ‘command structure’ showing to prove that a detainee is ‘part of al Qaeda.’ ”). On the other hand, “the purely independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough” to show that an individual is detainable as “part of’ of those enemy forces. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725; see also Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that “the government’s failure to prove that an individual was acting under orders from alQaida may be relevant to the question of whether the individual was ‘part of the organization when captured’ ”). The government’s “authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if released.” Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. The government must prove, however, that the petitioner was “part of’ the Taliban, alQaida or associated forces at the time of his capture to demonstrate that his detention is lawful under the first prong of the standard. See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 751 (observing that “the relevant inquiry is whether [the petitioner] was ‘part of alQaida when captured’ ”); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.Supp.2d 43, 71 (D.D.C.2009). In assessing whether the government has met its burden, the court may not view each piece of evidence in isolation, but must consider the totality of the evidence. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C.Cir.2010). Even if no individual piece of evidence would, by itself, justify the petitioner’s detention, the evidence may, when considered as a whole and in context, nonetheless demand the conclusion that the petitioner was more likely than not “part of’ the Taliban or alQaida or purposefully and materially supported such forces. Id. (concluding that the district court erred in “requiring] each piece of the government’s evidence to bear weight without regard to all (or indeed any) other evidence in the case”); cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (observing that “individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it” because the “sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts”). B. The Petitioner Is Lawfully Detained During the course of the merits hearing, the parties presented evidence and argument on the following five disputed material issues: 1. The government’s allegation that the petitioner went to Afghanistan to receive military-style training from and fight for al-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces. 2. The government’s allegation that the petitioner stayed at guesthouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces. 3. The government’s allegation that the petitioner attended a training camp or training camps operated by or associated with al-Qaeda, the Taliban or other associated forces. 4. The government’s allegation that the petitioner traveled to the battle lines in Afghanistan as part of al-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces. 5. The government’s allegation that the petitioner was part of al-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces at the time of his capture. Joint List of Contested Issues (Oct. 15, 2010). The court considers these disputed issues in turn. 1. The Petitioner Traveled to Afghanistan to Fight for the Taliban, al-Qaida or Associated Enemy Forces During the merits hearing, the parties devoted substantial time and effort addressing the first material disputed issue: whether the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. Nov. 8 Tr. at 32-154; Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 4-100. Their attentiveness to this issue was well warranted. The Circuit has observed that although an “intention to fight is inadequate by itself to make someone ‘part of al Qaeda’ ... it is nonetheless compelling evidence when ... it accompanies additional evidence of conduct consistent with the effectuation of that intent.” Awad, 608 F.3d at 9. The government bases its contention that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces on: (1) the petitioner’s association with the [redacted] boardinghouse; (2) the influence and assistance of [redacted] (including the implausibility of the petitioner’s account of how [redacted] convinced him to go to Afghanistan); (3) the influence of the religious fatwa that the petitioner encountered in Yemen; and (4) the petitioner’s travel route and travel companions. The court considers these matters below. a. The Petitioner’s Association With [redacted] the Boardinghouse The government contends that the petitioner’s association with individuals at the [redacted] boardinghouse supports the inference that he went to Afghanistan to engage in jihad and, in fact, shows that he was a “part of’ al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces even before he left Yemen for Afghanistan in the summer of 2000. Nov. 8 Tr. at 61-143. The petitioner responds that his fleeting association with these individuals establishes nothing and does not support the government’s contention that he traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 41-54. As noted in the factual overview, in the summer of 1999, the petitioner traveled from Ta’iz to Sana’a and stayed at the [redacted] boardinghouse while purportedly attempting to obtain a visa to return to Yemen. GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3. Approximately two weeks after his arrival, Yemeni authorities arrested the petitioner and several other individuals associated with the boardinghouse on suspicion of belonging to a car theft ring. GE 1 at 5; GE 2 at 2. According to the petitioner, the car theft conspiracy centered on a plot to steal cars in order to purchase arms, which they would then use to violently free an individual named [redacted] who was held in a Sana’a prison. GE 1 at 5; GE 9 at 3. [Redacted] had been convicted of kidnapping and murdering four western tourists as part of a plot to free an imprisoned sheikh associated with a South Yemen Islamist group. GE 1 at 5; GE 9 at 3. According to the petitioner, the conspirators also considered using the stolen vehicles to kidnap tourists, whom they would use to negotiate the release of [redacted] GE 1 at 5. Many of the individuals associated with the [redacted] boardinghouse during this period were experienced jihadists. According to Abdu Ali al Hajj Sharqawi, a veteran jihadist whom the petitioner asserts is a reliable source, see Petr’s Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 16, [redacted] the individual who introduced the petitioner to the [redacted] boardinghouse, “was a mujahaddin in Bosnia and ... was a well-known person.” PE 115 at 1. Likewise, Sharqawi states that Issam al-Maklahfi, the leader of the car theft ring, and Ahmed al Khadr al-Bidani, another member of the conspiracy, were also veterans of Bosnian jihad. Id. at 2. Sharqawi also states that Fawaz al-Rabia’i lived at the [redacted] boardinghouse and was an al-Qaida operative at the time he was imprisoned by Yemeni authorities. PE 115 at 3; see also GE 8 at 1 (GTMO intelligence report indicating that al-Rabia’i was a known al-Qaida associate). The petitioner himself admits that housemates [redacted] and [redacted] had received jihadist training in Afghanistan. GE 3 at 5. Another housemate [redacted] had, according to the petitioner, trained at the Khalden camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, GE 3 at 4, a jihadist training camp affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban, GE 19 (Decl. of [redacted] at 7-8. Likewise, the petitioner admits that [redacted] an individual who resided at the boardinghouse during the petitioner’s stay, had fought and trained with the Taliban in Afghanistan. GE 1 at 4; GE 3 at 4; GE 43 at 2. [redacted] would later be one of the suicide bombers in the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. GE 2 at 3; GE 4 at 3; GE 5 at 2; GE 6 a 3; GE 9 at 5; GE 43 at 2. During the period that the petitioner lived there, the [redacted] boardinghouse served as a hub for the individuals involved in a car theft ring whose aim was to free [redacted] from prison. GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 3; see also PE 115 at 1 (interrogation report in which Sharqawi stated to interrogators that residents of the boardinghouse were involved in a plot to steal cars and that this group “wanted to get rid of the Yemeni Government because the Yemeni Government killed Abu Hassain al Miktar, a famous mujahaddin”). The petitioner has acknowledged that [redacted] the leader of the plot, [redacted] and visited the [redacted] boardinghouse while the petitioner was there. GE 1 at 4-5; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 2. The petitioner also admitted that [redacted] his roommate and closest friend at the boardinghouse, GE 3 at 4, served as a driver in the car theft plot, GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 1, and that bin Attash, his housemate and a veteran jihadist, was arrested with the petitioner and formally charged in the conspiracy, GE 8 at 2. In total, the petitioner identified more than half a dozen individuals who resided at or visited [redacted] the boardinghouse while he first lived there who were involved in the car theft plot designed to free [redacted]. The petitioner claims that he had no real association with these individuals, noting that he stayed at the [redacted] boardinghouse for less than two weeks before he was arrested. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 41. As described above, however, the petitioner revealed to interrogators detailed knowledge about the biographies of these men, suggesting that his relationships with these individuals were more than fleeting. See Al-Adahi 613 F.3d at 1109 (observing that the petitioner’s detailed knowledge of personal information about a group of alQaida operatives, including where they had fought and what languages they could speak, tended to show that the petitioner had close relationships with these individuals and strengthened the probability that that he was part of al-Qaida). Moreover, it is the timing, rather than the duration, of the petitioner’s initial stay at the [redacted] boardinghouse that is particularly telling. The fact that a group of veteran jihadists permitted the petitioner to live at the [redacted] boardinghouse while the location was used as a hub for an active terrorist conspiracy suggests that they considered the petitioner an individual they could trust. It is highly unlikely that these men would allow an individual into their living and meeting space, even if only for two weeks, during such a sensitive period without some assurance that the individual shared some allegiance with them and would not undermine their plot. Although this evidence hardly establishes that the petitioner was “part of’ al-Qaida at this time, it does support the government’s contention that the petitioner had associations with known terrorists and had gained their confidence prior to his departure for Afghanistan. The petitioner has also stated that when he first went to live at the [redacted] boardinghouse, he had no idea that anyone associated with the boardinghouse was involved in any criminal activity. GE 1 at 5; GE 2 at 2; GE 9 at 2. According to the petitioner, he first learned about the details of the plot during his period of incarceration when [redacted], the head of the conspiracy, was released from solitary confinement. GE 9 at 2. Even if the court were to credit the petitioner’s version of events, it would not dramatically alter the court’s assessment of his associations with members of the [redacted] boardinghouse conspiracy. It seems unlikely that a veteran jihadist [redacted] like would have revealed the details of the plot to the petitioner, while they were still in custody and the information could plainly be used against them, unless he had reason to believe that the petitioner would not reveal this information to Yemeni authorities. Moreover, rather than distancing himself from the conspirators following his arrest, the petitioner continued to associate with members of the terrorist conspiracy during his months of incarceration and became lasting friends with several members of the group. GE 1 at 5-6; GE 3 at 3-5; GE 9 at 1-2. Thus, the evidence indicates that even if the petitioner was not considered an ally at the time he first went to the [redacted] boardinghouse, he became one during his months in prison. Indeed, even after he was released from prison in late 1999, the petitioner maintained his associations with members of the [redacted] boardinghouse. According to the petitioner, Yemeni authorities released him from prison at the same time as two of his former housemates, [redacted] and [redacted] GE 9 at 2. The petitioner has admitted that upon his release, he chose to return to the [redacted] boardinghouse with these men, both of whom were veteran jihadists. GE 1 at 5-6; GE 9 at 2. Shortly after their return to the [redacted] boardinghouse, the petitioner and [redacted] attended al-Ansari’s wedding to a daughter of an individual named [redacted] GE 9 at 2. Another of [redacted] sons-in-law was 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar. Id. at 3. Although the petitioner states in one interrogation that he only stayed at the [redacted] boardinghouse for a week after his return from prison, GE 1 at 5-6, the fact that the petitioner chose to return to the boardinghouse at all following his release from prison, at which point he clearly knew about the car theft conspiracy, supports the notion that the petitioner’s associations with the individuals at the [redacted] boardinghouse were meaningful. The petitioner’s attendance at [redacted] wedding further indicates that the petitioner had become accepted in the jihadist circle that he encountered at the [redacted] boardinghouse. Following his release from prison, the petitioner also maintained a relationship with [redacted] one of the drivers in the car theft plot. GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 1. The petitioner attended [redacted] court appearances and smuggled a cell phone to [redacted] in prison, an act which resulted in the petitioner’s brief re-imprisonment. GE 1 at 5. The fact that the petitioner would take such a risk for [redacted] undermines the petitioner’s contention that his associations with all the members of the car theft ring were fleeting and insignificant. In fact, the petitioner’s associations with individuals at the [redacted] boardinghouse survived his journey to Afghanistan. For instance, one of the individuals the petitioner met at the [redacted] boardinghouse was [redacted] also known as [redacted] GE 5 at 1. According to the petitioner, after [redacted] was released from prison, he went to the front lines in Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Id. While staying at an al-Qaida guesthouse in Kabul, see infra Part IV.B.2.C, the petitioner inquired as to the whereabouts [redacted] and was told that [redacted] was at the frontlines and would come to visit him at a later time. GE 6 at 2-3. The incident demonstrates not only that the petitioner had a continuing association with [redacted] in Afghanistan, but also that the petitioner was sufficiently integrated into the al-Qaida/Taliban structure such that he was able to send and receive messages through its military apparatus. While in Afghanistan, the petitioner also maintained his relationship with [redacted]. The petitioner had met [redacted] after his release from prison while socializing at [redacted] home in Sana’a. GE 3 at 5. The petitioner has acknowledged that [redacted] was a member of al-Qaida, who trained at the al-Farouq training camp and possibly the Abu Obeida training camp, both of which are al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2. The petitioner states that [redacted] visited him while he was in Jalalabad and that [redacted] and [redacted] were the only people in Afghanistan who knew him by his real name rather than his kunya. GE 9 at 4-5. In fact, once in Afghanistan, the petitioner listed [redacted] as his reference on an application to attend a terrorist training camp. GE 25 at 4; infra Part IV.B.3.b. The purpose of this discussion is not to condemn the petitioner on the basis of his associations. Indeed, the petitioner’s relationships with individuals associated with the [redacted] boardinghouse, standing alone, likely would not demonstrate that the petitioner was “part of’ al-Qaida during his time in Yemen. The evidence does establish, however, that by the time the petitioner chose to travel to Afghanistan, he had developed significant and lasting relationships with veteran jihadists, who accepted him into their midst while they were involved in an active terrorist conspiracy. Many of the individuals associated with the boardinghouse would go on to become active al-Qaida associates and fight on the front lines in Afghanistan, and the petitioner maintained his relationships with these individuals as well. The fact that the petitioner had enduring relationships with known jihadists prior to his decision to go to Afghanistan supports the contention that he traveled to Afghanistan to train and fight with al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces. b. [Redacted] Influence and Assistance The petitioner has stated that one of the principal influences on his decision to go to Afghanistan was an individual he met in Ta’iz named [redacted] GE 9 at 3. The government contends that [redacted] was a Taliban facilitator and that his influence on the petitioner’s decision to travel to Afghanistan supports its allegation that the petitioner went there to receive training and fight for the Taliban and al-Qaida. Nov. 8 Tr. at 142, 150; Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 17-20. The petitioner contends that there is no evidence that [redacted] was a Taliban facilitator and that [redacted] merely encouraged the petitioner to travel to Afghanistan to seek out a better life. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 57-62. There is no dispute that [redacted] had a significant influence on the petitioner’s decision to travel to Afghanistan. The petitioner has stated that [redacted] “was the person who had the most influence on [him] going to Afghanistan, although he admitted that he was also influenced by a fatwa issued by the sheikhs in Yemen.” GE 9 at 3. Nor is there any dispute that two years before they met, [redacted] had received military training in Afghanistan and had fought for the Taliban. GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. There is, however, no evidence that at the time [redacted] encouraged the petitioner to go to Afghanistan, he was acting as a Taliban recruiter or facilitator, at least in any formal capacity. The government has provided no evidence that [redacted] influenced any other individuals to travel to Afghanistan or that he had any formal relationship with the Taliban or alQaida. See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 726 (concluding that the government failed to establish that the petitioner was an alQaida facilitator in the absence of reliable evidence that the petitioner had links to alQaida or facilitated the travel of al-Qaida members). Indeed, the petitioner has stated that when they first met, [redacted] encouraged him to enter into the honey trading business in Ta’iz, GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3, and the government has offered nothing to discredit that account. Furthermore, the petitioner paid his own way to Afghanistan, GE 3 at 6, a fact inconsistent with Taliban recruitment. Accordingly, the government has not established that [redacted] was a Taliban facilitator. Nonetheless, the evidence does not support the petitioner’s contention that [redacted] influence was entirely benign. The petitioner has admitted that he and [redacted] [redacted] discussed military training in Afghanistan and his experience fighting for the Taliban: Al-Sabri met a Yemeni named [redacted] age 25 in Taiz. [Redacted] had previously traveled to Afghanistan for military training and to fight for the Taliban. Al-Sabri became interested in this discussion and inquired about receiving military training. GE 1 at 3. Whether, as the government suggests, the petitioner was expressing an interest in obtaining military training or, as the petitioner has argued, expressing an interest in hearing about the military training that [redacted] had received in Afghanistan, it is clear that [redacted] and the petitioner discussed the military training available in Afghanistan and fighting with the Taliban. See id. Indeed, the petitioner states that it was during this period in Ta’iz, when he met [redacted] that the petitioner first began thinking about going to Afghanistan. GE 9 at 3. Moreover, the travel route that the petitioner took into Afghanistan, which was furnished by [redacted] GE 3 at 5-6; GE 9 at 3; GE 10 at 2, suggests that [redacted] was assisting the petitioner join with Taliban and al-Qaida fighting forces in Afghanistan. As discussed below, the route that [redacted] instructed the petitioner to take from Sana’a through Bahrain and eventually to Quetta, Pakistan, is the same path used by foreign mujahaddin traveling to Afghanistan to engage in jihad. See infra Part IV.B.l.d. Indeed, [redacted] specifically instructed the petitioner to visit the Taliban offices in Quetta, Pakistan, GE 3 at 6, which, as discussed below, facilitated the travel of fighters to al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses and camps in Afghanistan, see infra Part IV.B.2.a; see also GE 3 at 5 (“[Redacted] told [the petitioner] that the Taliban would assist him in getting from Pakistan into Afghanistan because he was Arabic”). Finally, the petitioner’s account of how [redacted] lured him to Afghanistan is not plausible. According to the petitioner, [redacted] told him “that there was security and peace in Afghanistan,” GE 9 at 3, and that “he should move to Afghanistan as work was easier to find there,” GE 3 at 5. The petitioner stated that [redacted] “convinced him to travel to Afghanistan for a better life and find a wife.” GE 1 at 6. Yet before the petitioner left for Afghanistan, he had spent months with veteran jihadists associated with the [redacted] boardinghouse, some of whom had trained and fought in Afghanistan. See supra Part IV.B.l.a. The petitioner had also had conversations with [redacted] about his own experiences fighting in Afghanistan just two years earlier. GE 1 at 3. Furthermore, as discussed below, the petitioner admits that he encountered at least one fatwa that encouraged men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. See infra Part IV.B.1.C. As the petitioner must have been aware that there was ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, it is difficult to believe that he truly would have believed that Afghanistan offered security and peace. The petitioner’s conduct once in Afghanistan also undermines his account of how [redacted] convinced him to travel there. Although the petitioner contends that [redacted] lured him to Afghanistan with promises of work opportunities, there is no evidence that the petitioner made any effort to secure employment once he was in Afghanistan. See Sulayman v. Obama, 729 F.Supp.2d 26, 46 (D.D.C.2010) (declining to credit the petitioner’s claim that he traveled to Afghanistan to find a job, a wife and a home because he admitted to interrogators that he “never really looked” for a job or a wife and that “he wasn’t really that interested in trying to find a job”). Indeed, as the petitioner must have known, any efforts to secure employment would have been complicated by the fact that he spoke only Arabic. GE 3 at 1. Although the petitioner told interrogators that he had marriage prospects while in Afghanistan, these accounts are contradictory and not credible. For instance, the petitioner stated in one interrogation that the sister-in-law of [redacted] an individual he met in Jalalabad, had introduced him to a young Moroccan woman for the purposes of marriage but that the plans had fallen through due to the chaos following September 11. GE 3 at 6. In another interview, the petitioner stated that [redacted] the man with whom he lived in Jalalabad, had arranged for the petitioner to marry his wife’s sister who lived in Morocco. GE 9 at 4. In yet a third interrogation, the petitioner stated that he was arranged to marry [redacted] sister. GE 6 at 3. The inconsistencies of these accounts cast doubt on the petitioner’s claim that finding a wife was one of the principal reasons he went to Afghanistan. Finally, if the petitioner went to Afghanistan merely for the benign purposes that [redacted] had purportedly discussed with him, it is difficult to understand why the petitioner chose not to inform anyone, including his family in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, of his decision to relocate. GE 1 at 6. The fact that the petitioner hid his plans from his family further undermines the contention that [redacted] persuaded him to go to Afghanistan with promises of work, a wife and a better, more secure life. The petitioner also admitted to interrogators that he assumed a kunya while he was in Afghanistan, GE 10 at 2; see infra Part IV.B.3, and that only two or three individuals (all with ties to al-Qaida or the Taliban) knew his real name, GE 9 at 4. That the petitioner concealed his true identity in Afghanistan is also not consistent with his stated intention of traveling to Afghanistan for benign reasons. In sum, although the government has not established that [redacted] had any formal relationship with the Taliban, the evidence, viewed as a whole, indicates that [redacted] discussed with the petitioner his experiences training and fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and provided the petitioner a route to Afghanistan designed to funnel him into Taliban and al-Qaida fighting forces. Thus, the evidence concerning [redacted] bolsters the contention that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to train and fight with the Taliban, alQaida or associated enemy forces. c. Influence of the Fatwa Issued by Religious Clerics In addition to his discussions with [redacted] the petitioner has stated that he was influenced to go to Afghanistan by a fatwa issued by two Saudi religious scholars, Hammoud al-Aqla and Abdulla al-Jibreen. GE 3 at 2, 5; GE 9 at 3. According to the petitioner, the fatwa “was encouraging men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban.” GE 3 at 5. The government contends that the influence of the fatwa indicates that the petitioner went to Afghanistan to engage in jihad. Nov. 8 Tr. at 148-52. The petitioner responds that there is no evidence that the fatwa advocated taking up arms on behalf of the Taliban. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 62-65. Although the exact fatwa that influenced the petitioner is unknown, another fatwa authored by al-Aqla in 2000 included the following language: At this time, the Taliban Regime remains in a state of warfare against its opposition, the Northern Alliance, so Jihad with it is ordained by the Shariah because Jihad with the Taliban is against the Northern Alliance which is being funded by the forces of Disbelief like America, Britain, and Russia and others who are calling for a broad-based government in Afghanistan established upon a Western legislative system. Since the situation is like this, then indeed it is obligatory to assist the Taliban Regime and to make Jihad with it in order to bring victory to Islam. Govt’s Mot. for J. on the R. at 12-13; see also Nov. 8 Tr. at 152-53. Indeed, one detainee described al-Aqla as “a well known religious leader [who] claimed to have sent 11,000 Saudis to various training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya and the Philippines.” GE 12 at 1. The detainee stated that in his fatwas, al-Aqla “preach[ed] ... that it was the duty of all Muslim men to prepare themselves for jihad.” Id. Another detainee has stated that al-Aqla “encouraged young men to travel to [Afghanistan] and fight against Massoud, who was killing a lot of Muslims. Al Aqla, who issued the fatwa, told his audience that if they did not follow this fatwa they would go to hell.” GE 13 at l. Likewise, at least one GTMO detainee has admitted that his decision to go to Afghanistan and fight for the Taliban was influenced by a fatwa issued by al-Jibreen, the other author of the fatwa that influenced the petitioner in this case. See GE 11 at 2. The detainee stated that he listened to 2 Fatwas that were issued, one by Sheikh Mohammed al Imam and another by Sheikh Bin Gibrin. The Fatwas were read at the Jamal Al Din Mosque and were about going to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The Fatwas had vers[es] from the Koran and talked about the Taliban and its victories. One of the Fatwas further explained how to travel to Quetta and get to a large Taliban center where the Taliban would take people to Afghanistan. [The detainee] decided, on his own, to go to Afghanistan and assist the Taliban based on the Fatwas. Id. (emphasis added). In light of al-Aqla’s and al-Jibreen’s documented history of issuing fatwas encouraging men to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban, it is more likely than not that the fatwa that influenced the petitioner to go to Afghanistan called for Muslim men to “assist the Taliban” by taking up arms against the Northern Alliance. Furthermore, given the petitioner’s documented awareness of the conflict in Afghanistan, it is not plausible that the petitioner could have understood the fatwa’s call to “assist the Taliban” as anything other than a call to take up arms. This evidence therefore provides additional support for the government’s contention that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to engage in jihad. d. The Petitioner’s Travel Route and Travel Companions The government asserts that the route the petitioner followed to Afghanistan is the same route used by other foreign mujahaddin entering Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 12-29. The government also notes that the petitioner has admitted that his traveling companions professed to him that they were going to Afghanistan to become martyrs. Id. at 19. These facts, the government argues, strongly indicate that the petitioner too traveled to Afghanistan to engage in jihad. Id. at 12-29. According to the petitioner, there is no evidence that the route he followed is different from the route any Arab man of limited means would have taken into Afghanistan. Id. at 65. Furthermore, the petitioner argues, the fact that he traveled to Afghanistan with self-professed jihadists does not mean that he was a jihadist. Id. at 64-65. The petitioner left Yemen for Afghanistan in the late summer or early fall of 2000. GE 1 at 6. During the initial leg of his journey, he was joined by an individual name [redacted] whom he had met approximately one week before. GE 9 at 3. The petitioner and [redacted] flew from Sana’a through the United Arab Emirates and on to Karachi, Pakistan before eventually arriving in Quetta, Pakistan, a city near the Afghanistan border. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 6. Once in Quetta, the two took a taxi to the Daftar al-Taliban, a Taliban-run office and guesthouse, as instructed [redacted] by GE 1 at 6; GE 6 at 2. After spending two or three days at the Daftar al-Taliban, the petitioner left for the border along with [redacted] and two other men, whom he knew as [redacted] and [redacted] GE 1 a 6; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 10 at 2. [Redacted] told the petitioner that he was going to Afghanistan for jihad, and [redacted] all told the petitioner that they wanted to be martyrs. GE 9 at 3; GE 10 at 2. The four men were driven by taxi from the Daftar al-Taliban to the border town of Spin Boldak. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 4 at 1. When they reached the border, the men exited the taxi and crossed the border on motorcycles. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1. According to the petitioner, motorcycles were not required to stop at the border. GE 4 at 1. After crossing the border, the men were picked up by the same taxi and carried on to Kandahar, GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1, where, as discussed below, they were taken to an al-Qaida guesthouse, see infra Part TV.B.2.b. The petitioner’s travel route — flying from a Persian Gulf state through the United Arab Emirates to Karachi and then to the Taliban offices in Quetta, Pakistan— was common among jihadists traveling to Afghanistan to train and fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 648 F.Supp.2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C.2009) (concluding that the petitioner’s travel route from Dubai to Karachi and then Quetta before crossing the border into Afghanistan supported the inference that he traveled to Afghanistan to engage in jihad), aff'd, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C.Cir.2010). The petitioner contends that the government has not demonstrated that this route differed from the route taken by any other individuals with limited means traveling to Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 64-65. Indeed, viewed in isolation, evidence that the petitioner utilized a travel route frequented by foreign jihadists may not be particularly probative of the petitioner’s intentions. In this case, however, there are additional facts that color the court’s assessment of the significance of the petitioner’s travel route. First of all, the elaborate arrangements made by the Taliban office in Quetta to ferry the petitioner across the border without detection by border patrol calls into question the legitimacy of the petitioner’s motives. The fact that the petitioner traveled along this route with individuals whom he knew to be jihadists also casts doubt on his motivations for going to Afghanistan. Finally, there is the fact, discussed below, that the end point of the petitioner’s travel route was an alQaida guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. See infra Part IY.B.2.b. Thus, the evidence that the petitioner followed travel routes frequented by the foreign jihadists entering Afghanistan and traveled with individuals who admitted to the petitioner that they intended to become martyrs provides additional support for the government’s allegation that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida. e. Conclusion In summary, the evidence indicates that before the petitioner left for Afghanistan, he developed significant and meaningful relationships with both veteran and future jihadists in Yemen. The evidence also indicates that the petitioner was influenced to travel to Afghanistan by [redacted] a veteran Taliban fighter who told the petitioner about training and fighting with the Taliban and who provided the petitioner a route to Afghanistan that funneled him into the al-Qaida/Taliban military apparatus. Furthermore, the petitioner admits that he was influenced to go to Afghanistan by a religious fatwa that likely called for him to go to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. Finally, the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan along a route used by jihadists and traveled with individuals who admitted that they were going to engage in jihad and become martyrs. Based on this evidence, the court concludes that it is more likely than not that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. 2. The Petitioner Stayed at al-Qaida and Taliban Guesthouses The government contends that the petitioner stayed at numerous al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses during his time in Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 2-68. The government asserts that this fact strongly supports its contention that the petitioner was “part of’ Taliban or al-Qaida forces. Id.; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 30-62. Although the petitioner does not dispute that he stayed at guesthouses in Afghanistan, he denies that these guesthouses were necessarily affiliated with al-Qaida or the Taliban and contends that the fact that he stayed at these guesthouses provides no support for the government’s allegation that he was part of al-Qaida or the Taliban. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 69-74; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 3-27 This Circuit has stated that evidenc