Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge: Plaintiffs Claudia DeSilva, Gregg Lamb-din, Kelly Iwasiuk, Eileen Bates-Bordies, Margaret Hall, and Brenda Gaines (collectively, “plaintiffs”) commenced this action on March 24, 2010, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against defendants North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc., North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Care, Inc., Peninsula Hospital Center, Forest Hills Hospital, Franklin Hospital, Glen Cove Hospital, Huntington Hospital Association, Long Island Jewish Medical Center, Long Island Jewish Hospital, Zucker Hillside Hospital, North Shore University Hospital, Plain-view Hospital, Schneider Children’s Hospital, Southside Hospital, Staten Island University Hospital, Syosset Hospital, Michael J. Dowling, Joseph Cabral, and North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System 403B Plan (collectively, “defendants” or “LIJ”), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (“RICO”), and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Plaintiffs also alleged a number of state common law claims, namely: breach of implied oral contract, breach of express oral contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and estoppel. Plaintiffs are seeking, inter alia, unpaid wages and overtime, an order enjoining defendants from engaging in the pay violations that form the basis of plaintiffs’ complaint, an award crediting plaintiffs for all hours worked, liquidated damages under the FLSA and NYLL, and an amount equal to the value that would make plaintiffs whole for defendants’ alleged violations. Defendants contend, inter alia, that plaintiffs have failed to state plausible FLSA or ERISA claims and that plaintiffs’ civil RICO and state common law claims are preempted by the FLSA, and, accordingly, defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motion and, in turn, have moved for expedited notice to all class members. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, and denies plaintiffs’ motion for expedited notice as moot. Specifically, plaintiffs’ FLSA claims — construed only as claims regarding overtime and not as claims regarding “straight time” or “gap time” pay — are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Likewise, plaintiffs’ NYLL claim is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs’ RICO cause of action is dismissed with prejudice to the extent that this claim is based upon defendants’ failure to pay plaintiffs overtime, and thus is duplicative of plaintiffs’ FLSA claim. However, to the extent that the RICO cause of action is based upon defendants’ alleged failure to pay plaintiffs for “straight time” wages, this claim is not preempted by the FLSA. Nevertheless, this remaining RICO cause of action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. As to plaintiffs’ state common law claims, these claims are dismissed with prejudice as preempted by the FLSA to the extent that they seek overtime wages and, thus, are duplicative of the FLSA claim. The surviving common law claims are construed as seeking only unpaid “straight time” pay. However, plaintiffs’ breach of implied oral contract, breach of express oral contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs’ estoppel claim is dismissed because, as pled by plaintiffs, “estoppel” is not a distinct cause of action but instead is an equitable bar to defendants’ assertion of a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiffs, however, may assert equitable estoppel at an appropriate point in the litigation, should defendants choose to assert a statute of limitations defense. Regarding plaintiffs’ ERISA claims, the claim for failure to keep accurate records is dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. As to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Court is denying defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim, but will allow defendants to renew this motion after the parties have conducted limited discovery on the issue of how benefits are determined under the controlling ERISA plans. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) is also denied at this juncture without prejudice. Finally, plaintiffs’ motion for expedited notice is dismissed with leave to renewal at a later date, if plaintiffs choose to re-plead their FLSA claims and are able to sufficiently plead a cause of action. I. Background A. Facts Named plaintiffs work or have worked for defendants in various nursing positions and in various locations. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 65-71.) According to plaintiffs, each of the hospitals and locations for which plaintiffs worked is part of the North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System (“LIJ”), which is a consortium that operates over seventy health care facilities and centers. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.) Plaintiffs purport to represent a class of over 38,000 current and former employees of the defendant hospitals and LIJ system “whose pension and 401(k) or 403(b) plans were not credited with their non-reduced weekly wages and correct overtime compensation” and “who were injured by defendants’ scheme to cheat employees out of their property and to convert the employees’ property, including their wages and/or overtime pay....” (Id. ¶¶ 7,12.) Specifically, plaintiffs contend that LIJ maintained three illegal pay policies — the meal and break deduction policy, the unpaid pre-and post-schedule work policy, and the unpaid training policy — that denied plaintiffs and class members compensation for all hours worked, including overtime hours and hours that would have been compensated at applicable premium pay rates. (Id. ¶¶74, 104, 159.) As to the meal and break deduction policy, plaintiffs note that defendants’ timekeeping system automatically deducts time from employees’ paychecks for meals and breaks. (Id. ¶ 75.) However, plaintiffs allege that they do, in fact, work during their meals and breaks and are not paid for that work. (Id. ¶ 77; see also id. ¶ 82 (“[Djefendants expect Plaintiffs and Class Members to be available to work throughout their shifts and consistently require their employees to work during their unpaid breaks.”).) Plaintiffs further allege that defendants know, or should have known, that plaintiffs work through their breaks, because, inter alia, such work has been performed in plain sight of defendants’ management and also at management’s request. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 87-88.) When asked by employees about the meal and break deduction policy, “defendants affirmatively stated that the employees were being fully paid for the work time for which they were entitled to be paid, even though defendants knew compensable work time was being excluded from the employees’ pay.” (Id. ¶ 90.) Plaintiffs claim that these representations by defendants were part of a course of conduct to defraud plaintiffs “from the pay they were owed, and to mislead them into believing they had been fully paid as required by law.” (Id.) Plaintiffs state that they are entitled to compensation for all time spent working for defendants, including during plaintiffs’ breaks, and that if all of their hours had been properly compensated, certain time spent working for defendants would have been compensated under “applicable premium pay rates.” (Id. ¶¶ 93-94.) Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that, pursuant to defendants’ “unpaid pre- and post-schedule work policy,” plaintiffs are required to perform work before and after their scheduled shifts, but are not fully and properly compensated for such work. (Id. ¶¶ 96-99.) Likewise, plaintiffs claim that, under defendants’ “unpaid training policy,” plaintiffs are required to attend compensable training programs but are not paid for all time spent attending such programs. (Id. ¶¶ 100-103.) As a result of these “unpaid work policies,” defendants required plaintiffs and class members to work hours under and in excess of forty hours per week without full compensation for those hours. (Id. ¶¶ 174-75.) Plaintiffs also contend that, through paystubs and payroll information provided to employees, defendants deliberately concealed from plaintiffs and other employees that they were not being fully compensated for all hours worked and “misled them into believing they were being paid properly.” (Id. ¶ 108.) B. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this action on March 24, 2010. Prior to defendants’ answer, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on June 16, 2010. On August 23, 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs filed a motion for expedited notice to affected employees pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA. On September 24, 2010, plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, and defendants filed their opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for expedited notice. The parties submitted their replies in support of their respective motions on October 8, 2010. The Court heard oral argument on the parties’ motions on November 22, 2010. During oral argument, the Court informed plaintiffs that their Amended Complaint clearly was deficient insofar as it did not provide sufficient information regarding the named plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court granted plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to remedy this deficiency, and directed that the complaint as amended should set forth the facilities at which the named plaintiffs worked, the positions they held, and the approximate dates of their employment. Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on December 8, 2010. The parties thereafter filed several letters to supply the Court with supplemental authority. The motions are fully submitted and the Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments. II. Motion to Dismiss A. Standard of Review In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Operating Local 619 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. — U.S. --■, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court instructed district courts to first “identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations^] a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citations omitted)). The Court notes that, in adjudicating this motion, it is entitled to consider: “(1) facts alleged in the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, (2) documents ‘integral’ to the complaint and relied upon in it, even if not attached or incorporated by reference, (3) documents or information contained in defendant’s motion papers if plaintiff has knowledge or possession of the material and relied on it in framing the complaint, (4) public disclosure documents required by law to be, and that have been, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and (5) facts of which judicial notice may properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 351, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (internal citations omitted), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 71, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 164 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006); see also Cortee Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir.1991) (“[T]he district court ... could have viewed [the documents] on the motion to dismiss because there was undisputed notice to plaintiffs of their contents and they were integral to plaintiffs’ claim.”); Brodeur v. City of N.Y., No. 04 Civ. 1859, 2005 WL 1139908, at *2-3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10865, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. May, 13, 2005) (stating court could consider documents within the public domain on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). B. Discussion 1. FLSA Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim for relief under the FLSA. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees. Under the FLSA, “no employer shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The regular, minimum rates at which employees must be paid are established by section 206 of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). In addition, the FLSA sets forth a broad civil enforcement scheme, pursuant to which “[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In an action to recover unpaid overtime wages under FLSA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he was an employee who was eligible for overtime ({i.e.,1 not exempt from the Act’s overtime pay requirements); and (2) that he actually worked overtime hours for which he was not compensated.” Hosking v. New World Mortg., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 441, 447 (E.D.N.Y.2009). Plaintiffs have identified three policies or practices of defendants that allegedly have resulted in plaintiffs not being compensated for “all hours worked.” (SAC ¶ 74.) In particular, plaintiffs have pointed to: (1) defendants’ “meal and break deduction policy,” pursuant to which defendants would automatically deduct time from employees’ paychecks for meal and break time regardless of the fact that plaintiffs and class members were often required to work through those times (id. ¶¶ 75-95); (2) defendants’ “unpaid pre- and post-schedule work policy,” pursuant to which plaintiffs and class members were not compensated for work that defendants “suffered or permitted” them to perform before and/or after their scheduled shifts (id. ¶¶ 96-99); and (3) defendants’ “unpaid training policy,” under which plaintiffs and class members were not compensated for training sessions that defendants “suffered or permitted” them to attend (id. ¶¶ 100-103). As a result of these policies, plaintiffs allege that they “regularly worked hours both under and in excess of forty per week and were not paid for all of those hours” (id. ¶¶ 159, 174-75), and, likewise, that class members were employees who were “not paid their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked” (id. ¶ 72), including for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week (id. ¶ 159). At oral argument, the Court informed plaintiffs that their Amended Complaint clearly was deficient with regard to the information provided about the named plaintiffs. In particular, the Amended Complaint failed to state where the named plaintiffs worked, what positions they held, or what their dates of employment were. Accordingly, the Court directed that plaintiffs file a Second Amended Complaint solely for the purpose of correcting these specific defects. Plaintiffs followed the Court’s direction, and submitted a Second Amended Complaint that provides the positions that named plaintiffs held with defendants, the hospitals at which they worked, and the time periods during which they were employed. The Court finds that, with the addition of these facts, the Second Amended Complaint provides sufficient information regarding the named plaintiffs. See Acho v. Cort, No. C 09-00157 MHP, 2009 WL 3562472, at *3 & n. 2 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting that “the addition of an alleged employment period is required in the complaint” and finding that plaintiff stated a claim where plaintiff “indicated the time period during which he worked for defendant,” thereby enabling defendants to review its employment records to determine “the specific number of overtime hours worked by plaintiff’); ef. Harding v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 09-cv-1212 (WQH)(WMC), 2010 WL 457690, at *5 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 26, 2010) (“The First Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations indicating when and where Plaintiff was employed by Time Warner. This is a minimal requirement necessary to enable a defendant to frame a response to a FLSA complaint.”). However, as to the specifics of the alleged FLSA overtime violations, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. Significantly, after oral argument, three district courts in this Circuit dismissed complaints that were nearly identical to the complaint brought here. See Sampson v. Medisys Health Network Inc., No. 10-ev-1342 (SJF)(ARL), 2011 WL 579155 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2011); Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., Nos. 10-cv-2661 (PAC), 10-cv-2662 (PAC), 10-ev-2683 (PAC), 10-cv-3247 (PAC), 2011 WL 321186 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011); Wolman v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc., No. 10-cv-1326 (JS)(ETB), 2010 WL 5491182 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010). The Court finds the analysis in these decisions to be persuasive. In particular, each of these courts found that plaintiffs’ complaint — which appears to be a boilerplate complaint that has been filed, with only minor variations, in at least a dozen different cases — failed to state a claim for relief insofar as it contained “no factual allegations about when the alleged unpaid wages were earned (i.e., which lunches and breaks were worked through without proper compensation), or the number of hours allegedly worked without compensation — the heart of the claim.” Nakahata, 2011 WL 321186, at *4; accord Sampson, 2011 WL 579155, at *4 (“These conclusory allegations are not sufficient to plead a violation of the overtime provision .... [Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to support the general conclusion that by working during the challenged periods they would have been working in excess of forty hours in one week period. Without alleging facts that support the claim that by working during the challenged periods plaintiffs, or the named plaintiff at a minimum, would be working compensable overtime hours, plaintiffs have not given defendants fair notice of the basis of the FLSA overtime claim as is required by Twombly and Iqbal.” (internal citations omitted)); Wolman, 2010 WL 5491182, at *4. To state a claim for relief for overtime violations under the FLSA, “the complaint should, at least approximately, allege the hours worked for which these wages were not received.” Zhong v. August August Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y.2007). Here, plaintiffs have alleged only that they “regularly” worked hours “in excess of forty” hours per week. (SAC ¶ 159.) However, as noted in Wolman, 2010 WL 5491182, it is not enough “to ‘merely allege[ ]’ that Plaintiffs worked ‘beyond forty hours per week.’ ” Id. at *4 (quoting Zhong, 498 F.Supp.2d at 630). Instead, plaintiffs must provide at least some approximation of the overtime hours that defendants required them to work and a time frame for when those hours were worked. See Connolly v. Smugglers’ Notch Mgmt. Co., No. 09-cv-131, 2009 WL 3734123, at *2-3 (D.Vt. Nov. 5, 2009) (plaintiff stated a FLSA overtime claim where she alleged that she “averaged working between 2100-2300 hours every year. As best a [sic] she can recall, Plaintiff worked 60-70 hours in some work weeks, worked 50 hours in other weeks and up to 45 hours in other weeks.”); Nichols v. Mahoney, 608 F.Supp.2d 526, 547 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (where plaintiffs alleged that they worked an average of fifty to sixty-five hours per week, plaintiffs stated an overtime violation claim because they “specified the approximate time period they were employed by defendants ... and the approximate number of overtime hours they each worked per week without receiving overtime pay”). As stated by the court in Pruell v. Caritas Christi, No. 09-11466-GAO, 2010 WL 3789318 (D.Mass. Sept. 27, 2010), in dismissing another substantially similar complaint: The plaintiffs also cannot avoid their pleading obligations by arguing that [their employer] has better access to information concerning hours worked or wages paid. Even when facts are peculiarly within the possession of a defendant, a plaintiff is not excused from his pleading obligations. The necessary facts should be pled upon “information and belief.” But that is not the case here. The facts necessary to state a claim ... are not peculiarly within the possession of [defendant]. The plaintiffs should know approximately how many hours they worked per week and their hourly rate or weekly wages. [Defendant] may have the exact records necessary to ultimately prove the wage claims, but approximations are sufficient to state a wage claim. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the burden placed on plaintiffs here is not an onerous one. They are not required to state every single instance of overtime work or to state the exact amount of pay which they are owed; instead, they are only required to provide some approximation of the overtime hours that they worked. Plaintiffs here, however, have failed to satisfy even this minimal burden. Furthermore, as to the “unpaid work policies” alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs have failed to provide any factual allegations whatsoever to support their claims regarding the “unpaid preliminary and postliminary schedule work policy” or the “unpaid training policy.” Their allegations regarding these policies consist only of four paragraphs per policy that contain nothing but vague and unfounded conclusions that plaintiffs were not being properly paid. As explained in Wolman, 2010 WL 5491182, at *2, “not all time spent on work related tasks before or after a shift is compensable.” Likewise, although time spent attending training sessions is generally compensable, there are specific statutory exceptions to this rule. Id. at *3. The Second Amended Complaint, however, contains no factual allegations that would enable the Court to determine whether the training programs that defendants “suffered or permitted” plaintiffs to attend were compensable under the FLSA. Accordingly, this Court agrees with the court in Wolman and finds that plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for relief based upon either the unpaid pre- and post-schedule work policy or the unpaid training policy. See also Sampson, 2011 WL 579155, at *4 n. 1. But see Hinterberger v. Catholic Health, No. 08-cv380S, 2008 WL 5114258, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2008) (finding plaintiffs satisfied notice pleading requirements where they identified specific policies and practices of defendants, including an automatic break deduction policy, a practice of not paying plaintiffs for work performed before and after their scheduled shifts, and a practice of not compensating plaintiffs for attendance at compensable training sessions). Thus, because plaintiffs have failed to approximate the number of overtime hours that they worked as a result of any of the “unpaid work policies,” and because they have failed to provide any specific factual allegations for their claims regarding the unpaid training policy and the unpaid pre- and post-schedule work policy, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a FLSA overtime violation and, thus, dismisses plaintiffs’ FLSA claim without prejudice. 2. RICO In addition to their claims under the FLSA, plaintiffs have also brought a cause of action for civil RICO violations. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that defendants devised a scheme to defraud plaintiffs by concealing that defendants were willfully and systematically withholding from plaintiffs their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked. (SAC ¶ 120.) In furtherance of this scheme, defendants allegedly mailed payroll checks to plaintiffs that were “false and deceptive because they misled Plaintiffs and Class Members about the amount of wages to which they were entitled, the number of hours which they had worked, and whether defendants had included all compensable time, as well as their status and rights under the FLSA.” (Id. ¶ 128.) Plaintiffs claim that these deceptive payroll checks prevented plaintiffs from discovering that defendants were not paying them properly — in other words, because plaintiffs were not experts in proper payments under labor laws, were not aware of what time is compensable for interrupted and missed meal breaks, and did not know how defendants’ computer systems determined the amount plaintiffs were being paid, plaintiffs relied upon defendants’ representations (orally and in plaintiffs’ paychecks) that plaintiffs were being properly compensated. (Id. ¶¶ 137-41.) Plaintiffs allege that the mailing of these misleading payroll checks constituted individual acts of mail fraud, which serve as the predicate acts underlying plaintiffs’ RICO claim. (Id. ¶ 126.) Defendants have moved to dismiss this cause of action on the grounds that, inter alia, plaintiffs’ civil RICO claim is preempted by the FLSA and plaintiffs lack standing under RICO because the alleged predicate acts (ie., the mailing of the paychecks) did not proximately cause plaintiffs’ claimed injuries. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the RICO cause of action is unavailable to the extent that it is duplicative of the FLSA claims seeking unpaid overtime. However, to the extent that plaintiffs are seeking unpaid wages for hours that were not overtime hours — in other words, wages that would not be covered by the requirements of the FLSA — the civil RICO claims are not duplicative of the FLSA claims and, thus, are not precluded. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with defendants that, regardless of the specific type of wages sought, plaintiffs lack standing under RICO because they cannot establish as a matter of law, given the allegations in the pleadings, that the defendants’ alleged “racketeering” activity was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs’ RICO claims also suffer from a number of other pleading defects. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth infra, the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ RICO cause of action, a. FLSA Preemption As an initial matter, it is a “well-established principle that, in most contexts, a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.” Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 506, 127 S.Ct. 2011, 167 L.Ed.2d 888 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This principle was first espoused by the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976), in which the Court held that the “careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers” set forth in Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 led “unerringly to the conclusion that [Section 717] ... provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims” falling within its scope. Id. at 833-35, 96 S.Ct. 1961. In so holding, the Court pointed to subsections (b) and (c) of the statute, which “establish[ed] complementary administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms.” Id. at 831, 96 S.Ct. 1961. Specifically, subsection (b) delegated to the Civil Service Commission full authority to enforce the provisions of the statute, while subsection (c) permitted an aggrieved employee to file a civil action and have a federal district court review his claim. Id. at 831-32, 96 S.Ct. 1961. This private right of action was circumscribed, however, by the requirement that the aggrieved party satisfy certain preconditions before exercising this private right. Id. at 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961. In addition, subsection (d) of the statute set forth requirements governing venue, the appointment of attorneys, attorneys’ fees, and the scope of relief available. Id. The Supreme Court found that the “balance, completeness, and structural integrity” of Section 717 were “inconsistent with the ... contention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717(c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief.” Id. Indeed, to allow parties “immediate access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes” would “drive[] [Section 717] out of currency.” Id. at 833, 96 S.Ct. 1961. Accordingly, the Court explained that “[i]t would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading.” Id. Applying the reasoning in Brown to the instant case, this Court finds that the FLSA sets forth a similarly detailed statutory scheme that “provides for a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers,” id. at 833, 96 S.Ct. 1961, and that, accordingly, provides the exclusive remedy for wage and hour violations that fall within the FLSA’s scope. By way of example, the FLSA’s “unusually elaborate enforcement scheme,” Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 192 (4th Cir.2007) (citation omitted), establishes criminal penalties for willful violations of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a), and specifies the damages that can be sought against employers who violate the FLSA, namely, unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and, in retaliation cases, appropriate legal and equitable relief, including reinstatement and promotion. See id. § 216(b). In addition, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to seek unpaid wages and liquidated damages, injunctive relief, and appropriate equitable relief, and to supervise the payment of any unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation. See id. §§ 216-217. An employee may also institute an action against an employer in either federal or state court to recover unpaid wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, but, significantly, this private right of action terminates upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor. See id. § 216(b)-(c). Although the Second Circuit has not yet spoken to the precise question raised in this case, this Court’s analysis regarding the comprehensive nature of the FLSA scheme is supported by the Second Circuit’s decision in Herman v. RSR Security Services, Ltd., 172 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.1999). In Herman, the Court of Appeals addressed whether employers had a right to the remedy of contribution or indemnification under either the FLSA or through state law based on a violation of the FLSA. In evaluating whether the FLSA barred the remedies of contribution and indemnification, the Court noted that the FLSA had “a comprehensive remedial scheme as shown by the express provision for private enforcement in certain carefully defined circumstances,” and found that “[s]uch a comprehensive statute strongly counsels against judicially engrafting additional remedies.” Id. at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, with regard to whether the employers could use state common law to pursue contribution or indemnification claims for a violation of the FLSA, the court held that “the FLSA’s remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive as to preempt state law in this respect.” Id. Furthermore, the First and Fourth Circuits, and several district courts, have similarly held that the FLSA’s broad remedial scheme is exclusive and can preclude parallel actions brought under federal and state law. For example, in Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, Virginia, 174 F.3d 437 (4th Cir.1999), the Fourth Circuit held that “the elaborate remedial scheme provided in the FLSA demonstrates a congressional intent to prohibit § 1983 actions to enforce ... FLSA rights” to overtime compensation. Id. at 439. In Kendall, the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant City of Chesapeake had fraudulently induced plaintiffs to accept payments and sign releases that concealed defendant’s liability for wrongfully withheld overtime compensation and for liquidated damages. Id. at 440. This fraudulent conduct, according to plaintiffs, violated § 1983 insofar as defendant had “acted ‘to disregard, dishonor, and defeat’ [plaintiffs’] rights under the FLSA.” Id. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with plaintiffs’ assessment of their claim, however, and found that although plaintiffs “suggested] that their claim is in some sense independent of the FLSA ... [they] identified] no source for the right giving rise to their § 1983 claim other than the FLSA.” Id. at 441. In holding that “the FLSA implicitly precludes the [plaintiffs’] § 1983 claim by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983,” id. at 442 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the court pointed not only to the comprehensiveness of the FLSA scheme, but also to the fact that a plaintiffs private right of action is terminated upon commencement of an action by the Secretary of Labor. Id. at 443. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit explained: [I]n the FLSA Congress manifested a desire to exclusively define the private remedies available to redress violations of the statute’s terms, for the FLSA mandates that the commencement of an action by the Secretary of Labor terminates an employee’s own right of action. [29 U.S.C.] § 216(b). If parallel § 1983 actions were allowed, this provision would become superfluous. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because plaintiffs had “cited nothing indicating a Congressional intent to permit a plaintiff to circumvent the carefully tailored statutory scheme created in the FLSA,” the court held that “Congress has evinced a clear intent to preclude the use of § 1983 for the protection of overtime compensation rights secured by the FLSA,” and accordingly dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1983 action. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Other courts have likewise held that the FLSA sets forth the exclusive remedy for wage and hour violations that fall within the statute’s scope, thus precluding the use of other statutes or common law actions to remedy alleged FLSA violations. See, e.g., Anderson, 508 F.3d at 194 (“Congress’s intention to create exclusive remedies was clear in that ‘the FLSA mandates that the commencement of an action by the Secretary of Labor terminates an employee’s own right of action’ — a special feature of the FLSA’s enforcement scheme, found in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and (c), that would be rendered superfluous if workers were able to circumvent that scheme while pursuing their FLSA rights.... Because the FLSA’s enforcement scheme is an exclusive one, we further conclude that the Class Members’ FLSA-based contract, negligence, and fraud claims are precluded under a theory of obstacle preemption.” (quoting Kendall, 174 F.3d at 443)); Roman v. Maietta Constr., Inc., 147 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled under state law to damages in excess of those provided by the FLSA because “the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for enforcement of rights created under the FLSA” and a “plaintiff cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy prescribed by Congress by asserting equivalent state claims in addition to the FLSA claim” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Petras v. Johnson, No. 92-cv-8298 (CSH), 1993 WL 228014, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1993) (dismissing plaintiffs common law tort claims for fraud on the ground that “Congress had created a very detailed and carefully defined right of action to enforce the FLSA overtime rules” and finding that “[c]ourts have consistently held that the [Section 216(b) of the FLSA] is the exclusive remedy for enforcing rights created under the FLSA” (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases)). Applying the analysis of these cases (which the Court finds persuasive) to the current context, the Court finds that allowing plaintiffs to recover under civil RICO for claims that are, at their core, FLSA claims would thwart the careful and comprehensive scheme established by Congress to remedy wage and hour violations falling under the FLSA’s scope. In particular, allowing plaintiffs to pursue a civil RICO claim grounded in the same facts as plaintiffs’ FLSA claim would, essentially, create a new private right of action that would allow plaintiffs to seek treble damages — instead of merely seeking unpaid wages and liquidated damages — and would render meaningless the Secretary of Labor’s right to terminate any private party’s suit should the Secretary decide to file a complaint. Accordingly, having concluded that FLSA’s remedial scheme is exclusive for violations falling under its purview, the key question for the Court to resolve is whether, and to what extent, plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims are duplicative of their FLSA claims. As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, defendants’ scheme to defraud “consisted of illegally, willfully and systematically withholding or refusing to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked.... ” (SAC ¶ 120 (emphasis added).) In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendants concealed from plaintiffs “the amount of wages to which they were entitled, the numbers of hours which they had worked, and whether defendants had included all compensable work time, as well as their status and rights under the FLSA.” (Id. ¶ 123 (emphasis added).) Thus, from the face of plaintiffs’ complaint, it is plain that their RICO claims rely, at least in part, on plaintiffs’ statutory right to overtime pay under the FLSA. Plaintiffs’ argue that their RICO claims stem not from defendants’ failure to properly compensate plaintiffs for all overtime hours, but instead from defendants’ mailing of deceptive paychecks and consequent “interfere[nce] with [plaintiffs’] legal rights to recover all wages due.” (Pis.’ Opp. at 9.) However, plaintiffs would not have any claim for mail fraud or interference with their rights if they did not have an independent right under the FLSA to compensation for all overtime hours worked. Indeed, as noted supra, plaintiffs’ complaint clearly states that the paychecks mailed by defendants were allegedly false and deceptive, in part, because they misled plaintiffs regarding “their status and rights under the FLSA.” (SAC ¶ 123.) Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims stem from defendants’ failure to pay overtime due under the FLSA, and from their concealment thereof, the Court finds that the civil RICO claims are precluded under the exclusive remedial scheme set forth in the FLSA. The Court notes that two other district courts — including the only other court in this Circuit to address this precise issue-have similarly found that the FLSA preempts duplicative actions brought under RICO. For example, in Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., No. 05-cv-463, 2006 WL 2631791 (E.D.Va. Sept. 11, 2006), plaintiffs brought an action alleging that defendants failed to properly compensate plaintiffs for minimum wage and overtime compensation due under the FLSA. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs also brought both a common law fraud claim, alleging that defendants misrepresented to plaintiffs that they were being appropriately compensated for minimum and overtime wages, and a RICO claim, based on the predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. Id. In opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs argued that their RICO claims should survive because “the FLSA was intended to remedy ‘pedestrian’ violations by employers, [while] RICO [was] designed to address the grand systematic scheme present in this instant case.” Id. at *6. The court, however, rejected plaintiffs’ argument, and noted that “[b]ut for the proscriptions of the FLSA, the Defendants[’] conduct would not constitute the fraudulent scheme Plaintiffs allege.” Id. at *1. Accordingly, because the FLSA provides “direct relief’ for the violations alleged by plaintiffs, the court held that “the FLSA preempts the assertion of RICO claims.” Id. Likewise, in Eldred v. Corn-force Corporation, No. 08-cv-1171, 2010 WL 812698 (N.D.N.Y. March 2, 2010), the court dismissed plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims, which were based in part on “mail and wire fraud stemming from the issuance of union cards, withholding of union dues, and failure to pay prevailing wages, overtime, and work-relate travel-time.” Id. at *10. In holding that much of plaintiffs’ RICO claim was duplicative of their FLSA claim and accordingly should be dismissed, the court noted that “[t]his approach ensures that the ‘[a]rtful invocation of controversial civil RICO, particularly when inadequately pleaded’ does not endanger the uniform administration of core concerns of the primary enforcement scheme.” Id. (quoting Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir.1989)). But see Kuznyetsov v. W. Penn. Allegheny Health Sys., No. 09-cv-379, 2009 WL 2175585, at *3 (W.D.Pa. July 20, 2009) (“[B]ecause ... the general goals of RICO and the FLSA vary, [the court does] not find that the FLSA can preempt the RICO claim in this case.”). Furthermore, other courts, including the Second Circuit, have found civil RICO claims to be precluded where another federal statute has set forth a broad remedial scheme and where the RICO claims are based on the same facts that would allow recovery under that alternative scheme. In Norman, 873 F.2d at 636, plaintiffs brought a RICO cause of action against defendant, alleging that defendant “engaged in a pattern of racketeering in furtherance of a scheme to conceal ... largely unspecified construction deficiencies, excessive costs and management failures.” However, in reality, plaintiffs’ claims stemmed not from these unspecified deficiencies and management failures, but from defendant’s retaliation against plaintiffs after plaintiffs had attempted to bring various violations and defects to the attention of defendant’s management. Id. at 635-36. Accordingly, although plaintiffs had labeled their claims as arising under RICO, the Second Circuit noted that the claims were, in fact, harassment claims that fell directly under the scope of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act. In particular, the Court noted that Section 210 not only “provides a remedy for an employee who has been discriminated against or discharged for making safety complaints” but also “creates a procedural framework for vindication of this right.” Id. at 637. The remedy set forth in the statute, the court held, was exclusive and covered plaintiffs’ RICO complaint, which “distilled to its essence, alleged] no more than that appellants were discriminated against for having made complaints about safety.” Id. at 637-38. In so holding, the court explained that “[ajrtful invocation of controversial civil RICO, particularly when inadequately pleaded, cannot conceal the reality that the gravamen of the complaint herein is section 210 harassment.” Id. at 637. Moreover, in Danielsen v. Bumside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc., 746 F.Supp. 170 (D.D.C.1990), affd 941 F.2d 1220 (D.C.Cir.1991), the district court noted that courts have particularly refused to apply civil RICO where, as in this case, “a comprehensive administrative scheme exists to remedy violations of federal labor law.” Id. at 176. In Danielsen, the fraudulent scheme alleged by plaintiffs was the “underpayment of wages and fringe benefits due them pursuant to the [Service Contract Act (“SCA”) ].” Id. Because plaintiffs’ RICO claims were “all premised on alleged violations of the SCA,” the court held that the RICO claims could not proceed given the comprehensive scheme established in the SCA. Id. As explained by the district court, “[a]doption of plaintiffs’ arguments would, in effect, allow a private right of action under the SCA with a treble damage remedy,” and accordingly, “[b]ecause the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ RICO claims are inextricably intertwined with wage determinations under the SCA,” the court dismissed plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims. Id. at 177. See also Brown v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 680 F.Supp. 1212, 1224-26 (N.D.I11.1988) (plaintiff’s civil RICO claim that defendants “fraudulently deprived them of their employment benefits” was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act because “the underlying conduct is wrongful only by virtue of the labor laws”); Butchers’ Union Local No. 198 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 631 F.Supp. 1001, 1011 (E.D.Cal.1986) (plaintiffs’ RICO claims based on violations of mail and wire fraud were preempted by National Labor Relations Act because “but for the proscriptions of the labor law, defendants’ conduct simply would not be either mail or wire fraud.... Bluntly put, no matter how you cut the complaint, the only conceivable ‘fraud’ is the deprivation of plaintiffs rights under the labor law.” (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that, to the extent plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims have merely re-cast plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for unpaid overtime wages under a different label, those RICO allegations are precluded by the exclusive remedial scheme set forth in the FLSA. Plaintiffs, in opposition, point to the FLSA’s Savings Clause as evidence that the FLSA provides “a non-exclusive remedy [that] ... allows for similar claims under both federal and state law.” (Pis.’ Opp. at 7.) However, the Court disagrees that the language of the Savings Clause should be construed to allow plaintiffs to use civil RICO to seek treble damages for what is, in essence, a FLSA violation. Section 218(a) of the FLSA provides, in relevant part, that, “[n]o provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (emphasis added). By the plain language of this provision, the Savings Clause applies only to laws that establish either a higher minimum wage or a lower maximum workweek. In other words, the Savings Clause operates only to allow states, municipalities, or the federal government to pass more protective wage and hour laws in the labor law context. Thus, based upon the face of the statute, the Savings Clause indicates simply that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire labor law field — in the context of labor law statutes, the FLSA merely sets the floor for wages owed and the ceiling for hours that can be worked. However, “field preemption” and “obstacle preemption” are different concepts. “Field preemption,” which applies when “Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law,” New York SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), is not at issue in this ease. It is clear that New York and other states are free to legislate in the labor law context in order to set a higher minimum wage or a lower maximum workweek. Indeed, no one is arguing in this case that plaintiffs’ claims based upon the New York Labor Law are preempted by the FLSA. Instead, the question here is one of obstacle preemption, a concept which applies, for example, “when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Here, the Court is analyzing RICO, a federal statute rather than a state law, which, as explained supra in note 6, makes the application of the term “preempt” slightly unusual in this context. Nevertheless, the concept is the same — in this case, allowing plaintiffs to pursue a RICO claim to remedy violations of their FLSA rights plainly would stand as an obstacle to enforcement of the FLSA. As explained supra, if plaintiffs were allowed to circumvent the remedies set forth in the FLSA and pursue a RICO cause of action instead, the provisions in the FLSA that set forth the damages that employees may seek (which do not include treble damages) and that allow the Secretary of Labor to terminate a plaintiffs private right of action should the Secretary choose to institute a suit would both be rendered superfluous. The Court finds that the Savings Clause should not be read to allow such an illogical result. Cf. Sosnowy v. A. Perri Farms, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 457, 464-68, 2011 WL 488692, at *6-9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (noting that although the Savings Clause “indicates that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field of wage law,” the Savings Clause did not operate to allow a plaintiff to pursue remedies for a breach of contract action because “through the comprehensive remedial scheme, Congress struck the intended balance between the purpose of the FLSA and the vindication of its provisions, and therefore allowing additional remedies for duplicative claims would serve as an obstacle to the enforcement of the FLSA”). Moreover, far from undermining the Court’s conclusion, the Court finds that the plain language of the Savings Clause clearly supports its holding here. As already described, the Savings Clause is carefully circumscribed and operates only to allow states, municipalities, or the federal government to pass more protective wage and hour laws in the labor law context. The Clause, however, says nothing to indicate that parties are allowed to circumvent the enforcement scheme established in the FLSA in order to pursue their wage and hour violation claims under other statutes that have no specific connection to labor laws whatsoever. Clearly, Congress knew how to draft a savings clause to provide that the enforcement of certain types of laws — as in, more protective wage and hour laws — would not be preempted by the requirements of the FLSA. In other words, Congress knew how to define the boundaries of a savings clause when it so desired, and the fact that it chose to specifically limit the applicability of Section 218(a) to labor laws that were more protective than the FLSA indicates that the Savings Clause was only intended to cover those types of laws and was not meant to allow plaintiffs to seek protection for FLSA violations under statutes that have no specific relevance to the labor law context. Cf. 0 & G Indus., Inc. v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp., 537 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (“[I]f Congress intended [49 U.S.C.] § 28103(b) to apply only to passenger claims, it would have included such qualifying language in the definition of the term ‘claims.’ Congress did not do so____ Because the language is unambiguous on this point, we cannot supply that which is omitted by the legislature.” (footnotes, citations, and quotation marks omitted)); CaHoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir.2008) (“If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute that would have this effect.”). The Court declines to extend the language of Section 218(a) to allow plaintiffs to bring parallel federal and state claims alongside an FLSA action where the plain language of the statute indicates that Congress had no such extension in mind. Thus, to the extent that the factual basis for plaintiffs’ RICO claim is, ultimately, defendants’ failure to properly compensate plaintiffs for all overtime hours worked, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ RICO claim is preempted. However, plaintiffs also allege that defendants withheld from plaintiffs their regular rate of pay for all hours worked. (SAC ¶ 120.) In other words, construing the complaint in favor of plaintiffs for purposes of defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ claims are not solely based on defendants’ failure to comply with the FLSA’s overtime compensation requirements, but also are based on defendants’ alleged failure to comply with their contractual obligation to pay plaintiffs for all hours worked, including non-overtime hours that fall outside of the FLSA’s scope. Accordingly, such claims based on unpaid “straight” or “regular” time are not duplicative of the FLSA claims and, accordingly, are not preempted by the FLSA. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in the following subsection, the Court finds that, regardless of the type of wages that form the basis for plaintiffs’ RICO claims, plaintiffs’ RICO claims suffer from a variety of pleading defects and, accordingly, must be dismissed. b. Failure to State a Claim i. RICO Standing RICO provides a private cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). “From this language, courts have extracted the conditions a plaintiff must meet to satisfy RICO’s standing requirements: (1) a violation of section 1962; (2) injury to business or property; and (3) causation of the injury by the violation.” First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 767 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Standing” under RICO, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, is not a jurisdictional concept, but instead is analyzed as a merits issue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lemer v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 116-17 & 129-30 (2d Cir.2003) (“We hold that lack of RICO standing does not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the action, because RICO standing, unlike other standing doctrines, is sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the RICO claim that such a rule would turn the underlying merits questions into jurisdictional issues____In sum, despite describing the proximate causation requirement as ‘RICO standing,’ such standing is not jurisdictional in nature under Fed.R.CivJP. 12(b)(1), but is rather an element of the merits addressed under a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.”). The Second Circuit has described RICO standing as “a more rigorous matter than standing under Article III.” Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 266 (2d Cir.2006). Moreover, “as a general rule, a cause of action does not accrue under RICO until the amount of damages becomes clear and definite,” and the RICO claims thus become ripe for review. First Nationwide Bank, 27 F.3d at 768; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 322 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that amount of damages alleged was not “clear and definite” and holding that “Plaintiffs lack statutory standing under RICO because their claims are unripe”). Under this rule, a claim will be dismissed for lack of statutory standing, “where the extent of damages are still unknown, [and therefore] a RICO injury remains speculative and unprovable.” DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Kontogiannis, 726 F.Supp.2d 225, 237 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, as to the causation element, a plaintiff “must allege that the defendant’s violations were a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, i.e., that there was a direct relationship between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant’s injurious conduct.” First Nationwide Bank, 27 F.3d at 769 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is not enough for a plaintiff to merely allege that a defendant’s actions were the “but-for” cause of plaintiffs injuries; instead, the plaintiff must also allege that the alleged RICO violation was the legal or proximate cause. Id. (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992)). As recently explained by the Supreme Court, “proximate cause ... requires ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’ A link that is ‘too remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirect]’ is insufficient.” Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, N.Y., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 983, 989, 175 L.Ed.2d 943 (2010) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 271, 274, 112 S.Ct. 1311). In other words, focusing on “the directness of the relationship between the conduct and the harm .... the compensable injury flowing from a RICO violation necessarily is the harm caused by the predicate acts.” Hemi Group, 130 S.Ct. at 991 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Here, plaintiffs have attempted to allege RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d), and have alleged mail fraud as the predicate act underlying each of those violations. (See RICO Case Statement ¶ 1.) As a result of defendants’ alleged RICO violations, plaintiffs claim to have suffered two injuries: first, plaintiffs allege that the fraudulent mailings “concealed] from employees the fact that defendants were defrauding them,” which consequently “prevent[ed] employees from discovering that they were being cheated out of their wages” and thus “interfer[ed] with their ability to recover on the legal claims for unpaid wages due to statutes of limitations,” and, second, plaintiffs claim that the mail fraud “made it possible for defendants to continue defrauding employees out of their wages,” thus reducing plaintiffs’ wages (Pis.’ Opp. at 12.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that neither of these alleged injuries provides plaintiffs with statutory standing under RICO. (1) Interference with Plaintiffs’ Right to Recover Plaintiffs’ claimed injury for interference with their right to recover for unpaid wages is not ripe for review. “Perhaps the most important consideration in determining whether a claim is ripe for adjudication is the extent to which the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dwpre, 903 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the injury plaintiffs