Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE JON PHIPPS McCALLA, Chief Judge. Pending before the Court is Defendant Shelby County’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry (“D.E. ”) 67), filed June 7, 2010. On June 26, 2010, Plaintiff Judy Blackburn (“Plaintiff’) filed a response in opposition (D.E. 70). On July 12, 2010, Defendant replied to Plaintiffs response and moved the Court to strike portions of Plaintiffs response. (D.E. 87.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s Motion to Strike on July 26, 2010. (D.E. 88.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case arises out of Plaintiffs employment with the Shelby County Sheriffs Office (“SCSO” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff is a fifty-four year old female Sergeant with the SCSO. She asserts claims for sex discrimination, age discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), TenmCode Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff filed two separate complaints against Defendant, the first on December 18, 2007 with facts related to her first EEOC charge (D.E. 1), and the second on August 29, 2008 with facts related to her second EEOC charge (D.E. 1 in Case No. 2:08-cv-02565-JPM-egb). On May 18, 2009, the Court consolidated these cases. (D.E. 17.) On July 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, consolidating the allegations from her separate complaints and including facts related to her third EEOC charge. (See generally Am. Compl. (D.E. 25).) Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Def.’s Mem. 1, 25.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celo tex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). So long as the movant has met its initial burden of “demonstrating] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and the nonmoving party is unable to make such a showing, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir.1989). In considering a motion for summary judgment, however, “the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Lmden-Mimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must support the assertion that a genuine dispute exists as to one or more material facts by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(l)(A)-(B); see also Abeita v. TransAm. Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 250 (6th Cir.1998). However, “ ‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient.’ ” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial “if the evidence [presented by the nonmoving party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52,106 S.Ct. 2505. III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs allegations center around three EEOC charges. The Court addresses these allegations in turn. A. Allegations Arising from First EEOC Charge Plaintiff began her employment with the SCSO as a deputy sheriff in 1987. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was promoted to the rank of Sergeant in February 1997. (Id. ¶ 2.) After successive assignments to the Narcotics Division from 1992 to 1997, the Internal Affairs Division in 1997, and the Detectives Division from 1997 to 2000, Plaintiff was transferred to the Narcotics Division as the Case Management Sergeant (“CM Sergeant”) on October 26, 2000. (Dep. of Judy Blackburn, March 19, 2010 (“March Dep.”) (D.E. 67-4) 28-29; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶¶ LI-13.) Plaintiff held the position of CM Sergeant in the Narcotics Division until April 22, 2006. (Id. ¶ 15.) The Narcotics Division is divided into enforcement teams and specialized units that provide support for the enforcement teams, including the Equipment/Technical Unit, the Seizure/Forfeiture Unit, the Intelligence Unit, and the Case Management and Clerical Support Unit. (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 4.) Each of these support units is supervised by a sergeant. (Id.) The position of Case Management Sergeant, to which Plaintiff was transferred in 2000, supervises the Case Management and Clerical Support Unit. (Id. ¶ 5; Def.’s Ex. No. D454.) As the CM Sergeant for the Narcotics Division, Plaintiff was in a support position, responsible for the case tracking system, narcotics state prosecutorial cases, internal clerical operations of the narcotics division, and the supervision of the civilian secretarial staff. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 8, 16.) The job description for CM Sergeant lists sixteen additional duties, the last of which is: “Available for Narcotic Enforcement Duties.” (Def.’s Ex. No. 454.) Plaintiffs allegations of sex and age discrimination in her first EEOC complaint arise from her assignment to the Narcotics Division as the CM Sergeant under the supervision of Lieutenant David Ducrest (“Lt. Ducrest”), the Executive Officer, and Captain Wayne Goudy (“Capt. Goudy”), the Commanding Officer. (April 26, 2006 EEOC Charge No. 490-2006-01126 (“First EEOC Charge”) (D.E. 25-1); Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 23; David Ducrest’s Verified Statement (“Ducrest Statement”) (D.E. 67-3) ¶ 14.) Prior to June 2005, Plaintiff was often permitted to perform enforcement duties and go out on special details. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 32.) After Capt. Goudy was assigned to Narcotics in June 2005, however, Plaintiff alleges her requests to participate on special details or to help as extra manpower for enforcement duties were denied and ignored. (Aff. of PL Judy Blackburn (“Blackburn Aff.”) (D.E. 71-1) 1; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 32.) Plaintiff identified three instances when her requests were denied: a federal roundup on October 25, 2005, a saturation on February 17, 2006, and a federal roundup on March 22, 2006. (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 33, 36.) On another occasion, when Lieutenant Richard Nelson (“Lt. Nelson”) asked Lt. Ducrest if Plaintiff could fill in for an enforcement team member who was going to be out for the week, Lt. Ducrest said no, explaining that Chiefs Odom and Wing would have a “fit” if they found out that Lt. Nelson had a “sergeant over the secretaries” out there. (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 45; Blackburn Aff. 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that, on other occasions, she was given excuses such as “[yjou’re too old to ride with the cowboys,” “you’ll get dirty,” or “you might have a heart attack.” (Blackburn Aff. 3.) On each of the dates Plaintiff alleges she was denied enforcement duties, she worked a regular eight-hour shift performing her duties as the CM Sergeant. (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 38.) Between December 2005 and February 2006, Plaintiff alleges she was denied training opportunities that other male sergeants were given, including supervisory management training in December 2005 and meth training in February 2006. (Am. Compl. 4; First EEOC Charge.) According to Plaintiff, though she requested to participate in training exercises that would have kept her enforcement tactics up to date, her requests were denied. (Blackburn Aff. 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that she was “denied proper supervisory evaluation process by Lt. Ducrest and Capt. Goudy.” (Blackburn Interrogs. Resp. 4.) According to Plaintiff, her “supervisory issues regarding clerical personnel were not supported and in fact ignored” even though “[o]ther male supervisors of Plaintiffs rank were given full attention for their units.” (Am. Compl. 5; Blackburn Aff. 2-3; Blackburn’s Interrogs. 3-4.) In February 2006, Plaintiff went to the Special Operations Office to meet with Insp. Allen. (March Dep. 130.) Plaintiff was very upset and explained to Insp. Allen that she was upset over the way she was being treated in the Narcotics Division. (Id. 130-31.) She also expressed her unhappiness about her supervisory and case management problems, and the unfair treatment she felt she was receiving. (Id. at 131.) Though she did not make a direct request for curative action, Plaintiff did tell Insp. Allen that she would not have come to him if she did not want him to fix all the problems she was having in the Narcotics Division. (Id.) Around March 28, 2006, Plaintiff had a meeting with Lt. Ducrest in which she complained about her working conditions. (March Dep. 141.) She informed Lt. Du-crest that she felt she was being pushed out and ignored and “if they didn’t want [her] there then all they had to do was tell [her]” and “[she] would ask for a transfer or they could transfer [her] out; one means or the other.” (Id. at 141, 178.) Lt. Ducrest responded “okay” and told Plaintiff to put in a transfer request. (Id. at 141.) Following the meeting, Plaintiff did not put in for a transfer, but instead requested a meeting with Insp. Allen and Capt. Goudy. (Id.) Lt. Ducrest contends that, during this meeting, Plaintiff indicated that she wanted to transfer out of Narcotics. (Ducrest Statement ¶ 68.) Lt. Du-crest conveyed this information to Insp. Allen and Capt. Goudy. (Id.) In the week preceding April 17, 2006, Lt. Ducrest approached Sergeant Ray Collier (“Sgt. Collier”) and asked if Sgt. Collier was willing to swap his position in the Detectives Division with Plaintiff. (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 28.) Sgt. Collier responded that he would be glad to take the position of CM Sergeant. (Id.) Lt. Ducrest advised his superiors of Sgt. Collier’s willingness. (Id.) On April 17, 2006, Plaintiff met with Lt. Ducrest, Capt. Goudy, and Insp. Allen. (Ducrest Statement ¶ 69.) Plaintiff informed her supervisors that she could not continue working under the same conditions in Narcotics Division. (March Dep. 178.) She admits that it is possible that she discussed a transfer during that meeting and referred back to her previous statement that “if they didn’t want [her] there, [she] would ask for a transfer or they could transfer [her] out.” (Id.) During this meeting, Capt. Goudy stated to Plaintiff: “If my dog has a problem, I take him to a vet. You’ve got a problem. You need to see somebody.” (Id. at 153.) On April 19, 2006, Lt. Ducrest gave Plaintiff a transfer letter dated April 18, 2006, notifying Plaintiff that she was being swapped with Sgt. Collier and being reassigned to the Detectives Division effective April 22, 2006. (Def.’s Ex. No. 421; Blackburn Interrogs. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that she was demoted to the Detectives Division and put in a less appealing position. (Am. Compl. 6; Pl.’s Resp. 5.) On April 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed her First EEOC Charge, bringing claims of sex discrimination and age discrimination, and identifying the following alleged discriminatory conduct: (1) being denied the opportunity to work on special details and perform enforcement duties; (2) being denied training opportunities; (3) being denied proper supervisory assistance; and (4) being involuntarily transferred to the Detectives Division. (First EEOC Charge.) B. Allegations Arising from Second EEOC Charge and Amendment to Second EEOC Charge Plaintiff’s allegations of sex and age discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in her Second EEOC Charge and the Amendment to her Second Charge arise from her assignment to the Detectives Division from April 2006 to August 2006 and her assignments within the Courts Division from August 2006 to September 2007. (Dec. 5, 2006 EEOC Charge, No. 490-2007-00633 (“Second EEOC Charge”) (D.E. 25-1); Am. to Second EEOC Charge.) While in the Detectives Division, Plaintiff reports that she was shunned by coworkers and the command staff, and experienced “daily feelings of being monitored.” (March Dep. 177.) She was told her whereabouts had to be accounted for at all times, and she was not permitted to leave the office unaccompanied by a partner. (Id. at 186-87.) On July 11, 2006, Plaintiff met with Inspector McEaehran and Captain Cobb, reporting that she felt harassed because of her EEOC charge and “job related issues.” (Blackburn Interrogs. 6.) In response, Inspector McEachran purportedly stated that it was all in Plaintiffs head. (Id.) On August 10, 2006, Plaintiff submitted a letter requesting reassignment from the Detectives Division due to “personal health reasons.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 65.) On August 22, 2006, Chief Oldham granted Plaintiffs transfer request and reassigned her to the General Sessions Criminal Courts Division (the “Criminal Courts Division”). (Id. ¶ 66.) Though she requested a reassignment, Plaintiff was unhappy that it was to the Criminal Courts Division and felt that she was being punished by her placement there. (April Dep. 29.) According to Plaintiff, the Criminal Courts Division is known as a punishment area and referred to as the “whipping post.” (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff admits, however, that as with any position within the SCSO, there are sergeants who like the Criminal Courts Division and sergeants that do not. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 67.) Plaintiffs supervisor in the Criminal Courts Division was Lieutenant Larry Hill (“Lt. Hill”), the General Sessions Criminal Courts Commander. On August 30, 2006, Plaintiff had a discussion with Lt. Hill regarding the details of her transfer to the Criminal Courts Division, in which she informed him of her first EEOC charge. (Blackburn Interrogs. 7.) Shortly after her reassignment, Plaintiff reports that Lt. Hill began to treat her unfairly. On one occasion, Lt. Hill ordered Plaintiff to put her gun belt back on after she took it off to clean the area under her desk, advising that it was a safety factor. (April Dep. 43-44.) On another occasion, Lt. Hill called a meeting with Plaintiff and two other sergeants in which he raised his voice and unjustly chastised her. (Blackburn Interrogs. 8.) When Plaintiff began to cry, Lt. Hill accused her of being unprofessional. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Lt. Hill treated her unfairly because Plaintiff had become a target based on her EEOC complaint and Lt. Hill wanted to ingratiate himself to Chief Young and get a promotion. (Id. at 44-45.) On October 16, 2006, Captain Terry Yarbrough (“Capt. Yarbrough”) was assigned to the Courts Division as the Courts Division Commander. (Blackburn Interrogs. 8; Def.’s Ex. No. 202.) On October 17, 2006, Plaintiff had a conversation with Chief Young about work related issues and her EEOC charge. (Blackburn Interrogs. 8.) On October 26, 2006, Plaintiff was suspended for one day without pay for violation of “SOR 111 Disobedience of an Order” after disobeying a direct order from Lt. Hill. (Def.’s Ex. No. D180). The disciplinary action arose out of a meeting on October 24, 2006 in which Lt. Hill advised Plaintiff, Sergeant R. Harrison, and Sergeant S. Jones that Capt. Yarbrough had issued a disciplinary directive requiring supervisors to address officers under their command that had been off sick without pay without any disciplinary action. (Id. at D181.) Lt. Hill instructed Plaintiff to complete a disciplinary action form for Patrolwoman Robin Lee (“Ptlw. Lee”) for violation of A.W.O.L. — SOR 1105. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff “respectfully expressed questions concerning medical documentation and short term disability procedures set forth in the SCSO Policy.” (Id. at D193.) In Plaintiffs opinion, Ptlw. Lee had followed proper procedures for her sick leave and had not violated the A.W.O.L. policy. (Id.) When she did not get a satisfactory response from Lt. Hill regarding her concerns, she refused to proceed with the disciplinary action. (Id.) Lt. Hill then delegated the disciplinary action directive to Sergeant Harrison, who completed the write up. (Id. at D182.) Plaintiff contends that the write-up was false because she did not refuse the command; rather, she explains that she asked questions regarding an order, per policy SOR 106.12 G. (April Dep. 56; SOR 106.12(G) (D.E. 78).) After receiving the disciplinary action write-up, Plaintiff hand-delivered a memo to Lt. Hill, requesting an administrative hearing regarding the disciplinary action. (Def s Ex. No. D194, D183.) Lt. Hill reported to Capt. Yarbrough that, upon handing Lt. Hill the memo, Plaintiff stated that she was going to ask for an internal investigation and file a complaint for hostile work environment. (Id. at D183.) On October 27, 2006, Lt. Hill sent Capt. Yarbrough a memo requesting that Plaintiff be transferred from under his command. (Id. at D184.) Lt. Hill explained that he was “taking a proactive approach in [sic] attempt to alleviate any negligence on behalf of the Sheriffs office, as well as for myself being in an administrative position where any legal proceedings may arise; whether factual or frivolous from Sgt. Blackburn’s actions.” (Id.) After an administrative line-level hearing on November 21, 2006, Capt. Yarbrough sustained the infraction as charged. (Id. at D201.) Although the Disciplinary Action Form memorializing her suspension for one day without pay is still in her personnel file, Plaintiff has never been suspended without pay nor has her pay ever been docked as a result of the disciplinary action. (April Dep. 56-57, 64.) Immediately following the hearing, Plaintiff hand-delivered a memo dated November 20, 2006, to Chief Young’s office, requesting an official grievance investigation and complaining of the “antagonistic work environment and harassing behavior” directed towards her by Lt. Hill. (Def.’s Ex. No. D200, D202-D203.) This was the first time that Plaintiff had complained to management regarding Lt. Hill’s behavior. (Id. at D204.) After further investigation, Capt. Yarbrough concluded that Plaintiffs grievance accusations of an antagonistic work environment and harassment were without support. (Def.’s Ex. No. D202.) After reviewing the file, Asst. Chief Young and Chief Deputy Oldham concurred. (Id. at D204, D206.) In November 2006, Plaintiff alleges that her Shelby County Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) benefits were terminated. Around January 2006, Plaintiff went to the EAP to seek assistance and was given some forms to fill out, including a release for medical information. (April Dep. 107.) Plaintiff refused to sign the release form because she was seeking treatment for work-related issues and she did not want information released to the SCSO regarding her visits. (Id.) Plaintiff received treatment from Jane Cox, PhD, until November 2006, when a review of her Plaintiffs EAP file revealed that Plaintiff declined to sign the initial authorization form for treatment. (Def.’s Ex. No. D199.) By letter dated November 6, 2006, the EAP informed Dr. Cox that the treatment authorization dated January 18, 2006 for Plaintiff was terminated and that no further sessions were authorized. (Def.’s Ex. No. D197.) On November 20, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter to the EAP, asking for an explanation as to why her benefits were terminated. (Id. at D198.) Plaintiff received a response dated November 22, 2006, explaining that an authorization for treatment could not be processed without Plaintiffs signature and, though she could seek a new authorization for treatment, she would be required to sign the authorization form for Dr. Cox to provide information to the EAP if the sessions were going to be billed to Plaintiffs county insurance. (Id. at D199.) When Plaintiff later learned that Dr. Cox was not employed by Shelby County, she contacted CIGNA and resumed her therapy under her own insurance. (April Dep. 108.) In November 2006, Plaintiff went on FMLA sick leave. (Blackburn Interrogs. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Hill instructed her to call in sick every day during the duration of her sick leave. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, this practice is not enforced with other officers. (Id.) On December 5, 2006, Plaintiff filed her second EEOC Charge, bringing a claim of retaliation, and identifying the following alleged retaliatory conduct occurring between August 8, 2006 and October 26, 2006: (1) transfer to the Courts Division; and (2) suspension for one day without pay. (Second EEOC Charge.) On February 6, 2007, Plaintiff asked to be transferred out of the Courts Division. (Blackburn Interrogs. 9.) Chief Young informed Plaintiff in the presence of Capt. Yarbrough that Chief Oldham would not sign a transfer for Plaintiff, stating that “he had me because no one else wanted me.” (Id.) On July 23, 2007, Plaintiff received her first denial to work “Special Detail FSS.” (Blackburn Interrogs. 9.) She received her second denial on October 4, 2007.(Id.) In July 2007, Plaintiff received a low performance evaluation from Lt. Hill “without evidence of any negative OBR.” (Blackburn Interrogs. 9.) The previous month, Plaintiff received a positive OBR from Lt. Hill in which “he was singing [her] praises as a supervisor.” (Id.; April Dep. 119.) According to Plaintiff, prior to her performance evaluation in 2007, she had always received “exceeds expectations” on her evaluations. (April Dep. 104.) Plaintiff admits that her performance evaluations have not caused her to lose any pay increases. (April Dep. 104.) She also testified that, during the relevant time period, she never sought a promotion with SCSO that she did not obtain. (March Dep. 29.) Plaintiff testified that, in August 2007, Lt. Hill instructed Plaintiff not to call him “sir.” (April Dep. 170.) According to Plaintiff, this was “just another way to degrade [her].” She testified that “[t]hey just looked for things.... They look[ed] for stupid things all day long to needle me with, to call me on the carpet about. Just silly little things that don’t mean nothing.” (Id. at 171.) Plaintiff reviewed her personnel file in August 2007 and saw derogatory letters from the command staff related to the October 26, 2006 disciplinary action and subsequent investigation. (Blackburn Interrogs. 10.) These included the letter from Lt. Hill asking that Plaintiff be transferred out of Courts Division, and one or two letters from Capt. Yarbrough. (April Dep. 174-175; Def’s Ex. No. D184, D201-D203.) Plaintiff complains that she was never advised that these letters were placed in her file, even though she is supposed to be advised of anything that is placed in her file. (Id. at 175.) On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed an amendment to her second EEOC Charge, bringing claims of sex discrimination, age discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment and identifying the following additional discriminatory and retaliatory conduct: (1) abusive and hostile work environment, including constant criticism and reprimands; (2) exclusion from special divisions training; (3) termination of EAP benefits; (4) lowered performance evaluation; (5) denial of transfer requests; and (6) damage to personnel file. (Am. to Second EEOC Charge.) This amended charge also identified conduct occurring while Plaintiff was in the Narcotics Division that was not alleged on the first or second EEOC complaints. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that, while assigned to the Narcotics Division, she was denied “overtime pay,” told on several occasions that she was “too old" for enforcement duties, compared to a “dog with a problem,” “called upon to organize and shop for Division parties,” and called upon to do “office cleaning and bathroom cleaning in the absence of cleaning crew.” (“Am. to Second EEOC Charge.”) As discussed infra, Part IV.A., claims based on conduct not alleged in Plaintiffs first EEOC charge are time-barred if they are not reasonably related to the discriminatory conduct stated in the charge. C. Allegations Arising from Third EEOC Charge Plaintiffs allegations of sex and age discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment in her Third EEOC Charge arise from her continued assignment to the Courts Division from February 27, 2008 to September 2, 2008. (Sept. 2, 2008 EEOC Charge, No. 490-2008-03183 (“Third EEOC Charge”) (D.E. 25-1).) On October 17, 2007, Plaintiff submitted a transfer request to Lt. Hill for transfer out of the Criminal Courts Division. (Def.’s Ex. No. D227.) Lt. Hill notified Plaintiff by memo dated October 23, 2007 that, after discussion with Chief Young and Capt. Yarbrough, her transfer request was denied because Plaintiffs performance evaluation indicated areas for improvement and there were problems with her attendance record. (Id. at D233.) On or around February 27, 2008, Plaintiff met with Capt. Yarbrough and Capt. Hill. Both Plaintiff and Capt. Hill were expressing some complaints when Capt. Yarbrough turned to Plaintiff and stated: “Sergeant Blackburn, what is it that you want? ... [Y]ou want to be fixed up[?] I can fix you up.” (March Dep. 50.) Plaintiff responded, “[I]f you’re referring to a date, I have a personal life away from this place.” (Id. at 51.) Plaintiff testified that she was so surprised by Capt. Yarbrough’s comments that she began to cry. (Id.) Capt. Yarbrough then asked Plaintiff if she had lunch and, when Plaintiff said no, he asked Plaintiff if she wanted him to take her to lunch. (Id.) As the meeting was concluding and everyone was leaving, Capt. Yarbrough stated: “[W]e all need to be, you know, just wipe the slate clean. We all need to be friends here and who knows, maybe someday we will all be doing the bump together.” (Id.) Capt. Yarbrough then started “bumping his rear end up against ... Lt. Hill’s desk.” (Id.) Plaintiff retrieved her purse and immediately left the office. (Id.) In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff explained that she did not interpret Capt. Yarbrough’s reference to “the bump” as referring to anything other than the dance. (March Dep. 52.) Plaintiff explains, however, that the dance is sexual in nature, inappropriate for work, and made Plaintiff uncomfortable. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 89.) On May 20, 2008, Plaintiff requested a meeting with a member of the SCSO’s Sexual Harassment Prevention Team (“SHPT”) in order to file a formal complaint regarding offensive behavior by Capt. Yarbrough during the February 27, 2008 meeting. (Def.’s Ex. No. D241.) The SHPT informed Plaintiff that the Bureau of Professional Standards and Integrity (“BPSI”) would investigate her complaint. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 91.) At the conclusion of the BPSI’s investigation, Detective Janice Masters issued a report outlining her findings and recommending that no action be taken against Capt. Yarbrough. (Id. ¶ 92; Def.’s Ex. No. D247-D250.) In June 2008, Plaintiff asked to be considered for reassignment to the FBI Civil Rights/Human Trafficking Task Force. (Def.’s Ex. No. D457.) Plaintiff complains that she was never considered for the position. (PL’s Resp. to Defi’s UMF ¶ 96.) The SCSO never received FBI funding for the assignment and, as a result, the SCSO never selected an officer for assignment to the task force. (Richard H. Sherman’s Verified Statement (“Sherman’s Statement”) (D.E. 67-3) ¶ 20.) On September 1, 2008, Plaintiff was transferred to the Civil Courts Division, an assignment that Plaintiff was initially pleased with. (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s UMF ¶ 97.) On June 18, 2009, however, Capt. Yarbrough was assigned as Courts Commander and, according to Plaintiff, he “picked up where he left off’ harassing her. (Blackburn Interrogs. 11.) On September 19, 2008, Plaintiff filed her third EEOC Charge, bringing claims of sex and age discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment and identifying the following discriminatory, retaliatory, and/or harassing conduct: (1) Capt. Yarbrough’s conduct during the February 27, 2008 meeting; and (2) denial of her transfer request. IV. ANALYSIS A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on certain of her allegations of discrimination while in the Narcotics Division. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on her discrimination in denial of overtime claim because the first time she alleged it was in the Amendment to the Second EEOC Charge, on September 19, 2007, more than sixteen months after she was allegedly denied overtime in the Narcotics Division. (Def.’s Mem. 17-18.) Plaintiff counters that her denial of overtime claim is reasonably related to the claims in her first charge because the performance of enforcement duties is how officers get overtime. (PL’s Resp. 7.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that her allegation that she was denied enforcement duties is, in effect, an allegation that she was denied overtime. (Id.) The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Brown v. Gen. Sens. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 823-33, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); Williams v. Northwest Airlines, 53 FedAppx. 350, 351 (6th Cir.2002). To exhaust administrative remedies, an aggrieved person in a deferral state such as Tennessee must file a formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the Tennessee Human Rights Commission within three hundred (300) days of the allegedly discriminatory action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). Once the EEOC dismisses the charge and issues a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff has ninety (90) days to file a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). This procedure notifies potential defendants of the nature of the plaintiffs claims and provides them with the opportunity to settle claims before the EEOC rather than litigate them. Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland Coll. Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1998). Conciliation serves an important purpose and is not to be easily circumvented. Vinson v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir.1987). The Supreme Court held in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), that “[discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Therefore, “[a] party must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date that a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ or lose the ability to recover for it.” Id. at 102, 122 S.Ct. 2061. If the employee fails to file an EEOC complaint related to that action within the allowed statutory period, a defendant employer is entitled to treat a past act as lawful. See United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (“A discriminatory act which is not made the basis of a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act that occurred before the statute was passed____[Separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.”) The EEOC regulations, however, expressly provide that “[a] charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including ... to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). Plaintiffs first EEOC charge, filed on April 26, 2006, brings claims of sex discrimination and age discrimination, and alleges, inter alia, that Plaintiff was not “allowed to work on Special Details (Round-ups; Federal warrants; serving warrants)” or “to go out and perform enforcement duties” between July 2005 and March 22, 2006. (First EEOC Charge.) It does not mention discrimination in the denial of overtime. Plaintiffs second EE.OC charge, filed on December 5, 2006, brings a claim of retaliation and alleges that, between August 28, 2006 and October 26, 2006, Plaintiff “was transferred to an undesired office and suspended for a day without pay.” (Second EEOC Charge.) On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination, expanding her Second EEOC Charge to allege that, among other things, she was denied “overtime pay” while she was assigned to the Narcotics Division. (Am. to Second EEOC Charge.) As an initial matter, the discrimination in denial of overtime claim in the amendment to Plaintiffs second EEOC charge, occurring while she was assigned to the Narcotics Division, does not grow out of the subject matter of the second charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). The conduct alleged in the second charge occurred between August 28, 2006 and October 26, 2006, four months after Plaintiff was transferred out of the Narcotics Division. (Def.’s Ex. No. D 421.) Thus, Plaintiffs denial of overtime claim is time-barred unless the Court finds that it is reasonably related to the discriminatory conduct alleged in her first EEOC charge. The EEOC charge “should be liberally construed to encompass all charges ‘reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 675 (6th Cir.1992). Thus, “where facts related with respect to the charged claim would prompt the EEOC to investigate a different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing suit on that claim.” Davis, 157 F.3d at 463. Courts are apt to find that the complaint relates to the EEOC charge where the plaintiff had merely failed to recognize a procedural technicality, distinguish between seemingly identical legal theories, or articulate the exact wording required in a judicial pleading. Haithcock, 958 F.2d at 675. However, courts draw a distinction between a failure to allege a specific legal claim and a failure to allege specific factual predicates. See McFagdon v. Fresh Market, Inc., No. 05-2151-D/V, 2005 WL 2768996, at *5 (W.D.Tenn. Oct. 21, 2005) (“[Generally ... [c]ourts can expect the EEOC to identify and investigate legal issues that flow from the plaintiffs factual allegations. However, this should not be misinterpreted to automatically mean that claims sharing the same subject matter (i.e., age discrimination), but different factual predicates, are ‘reasonably related.’”) (citing E.E.O.C. v. McCall, 633 F.2d 1232, 1236 (6th Cir. 1980)). A complainant is expected to specify each event in her EEOC charge which she feels was a result of unlawful discrimination. Vinson, 806 F.2d at 688 (“It does not constitute an unjustifiable burden on claimants to require them to specify each ... event” or “identiffy] that conduct which [he or she] felt was the result of ... discrimination.”). For this reason, courts have found that a plaintiffs failure to specifically allege discriminatory conduct in the EEOC charge barred plaintiff from bringing that claim. See, e.g., Moore v. Boeing Co., No. 4:02CV80 CFP, 2004 WL 3202777, at *5 (E.D.Mo. March 31, 2004) (dismissing the plaintiffs argument that alleging discrimination in compensation in the EEOC charge was reasonably related to her later claim of discrimination in denial of overtime; nothing in the plaintiffs EEOC charge would put the defendant on notice that she was complaining that she received fewer overtime assignments than her male co-workers). Plaintiffs untimely allegation that she was denied overtime is not reasonably related to her allegation that she was denied enforcement duties, such that SCSO would have been put on notice of this claim. Davis, 157 F.3d at 463 (noting that the exhaustion requirement notifies potential defendants of the nature of the plaintiffs claims and provides them with the opportunity to settle claims before the EEOC rather than litigate them). Though Plaintiff states that the performance of enforcement duties is how officers get overtime in the Narcotics Division, she offers no competent evidence to support this assertion. In fact, the overtime reports that Plaintiff filed show that she received twenty-five hours of overtime between June 26, 2005 and March 5, 2006 for such tasks as “Mandatory Meeting,” “Payroll/State Cases,” “Fed Crt,” and “Ext Duty.” (Division Overtime Detail Reports (D.E. 82) 1, 75.) This evidence contradicts Plaintiffs assertion and demonstrates that overtime in the Narcotics Division is earned in numerous ways, not just on special details and enforcement duties. Plaintiffs conclusory allegation that the two claims are essentially identical is insufficient to permit Plaintiff to avoid the exhaustion requirements of Title VII. The Court finds that Plaintiffs discrimination in the denial of overtime claim cannot be maintained; it is time-barred because it was raised more than 300 days from its occurrence. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as it relates to Plaintiffs discriminatory denial of overtime claim. B. Title VII Sex Discrimination Claim Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). In order to establish a prima facie claim of sex discrimination, Plaintiff must offer evidence showing that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the class or that a “comparable non-protected person was treated better.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir.1992) (quotation marks omitted); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish the second and fourth prong of a prima facie case — she failed to show that she suffered an adverse employment action and failed to identify a male sergeant who was treated more favorably than she. (Def.’s Mem. 13, 16.) Plaintiff counters that the following events/conduct constitute materially adverse acts of discrimination based on her sex: (1) being denied enforcement duties while in the Narcotics Division; (2) being denied training opportunities while in the Narcotics Division; (3) being denied adequate supervisory assistance while in the Narcotics Division; and (4) being involuntarily transferred to the Detectives Division. In order to satisfy the fourth prong of a prima facie claim, a plaintiff must put forth sufficient facts to show that she was replaced by a person outside her protected group or that similarly situated employees outside the protected class “were treated differently ..., not simply that plaintiffs circumstances were unique.” Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.1999); see also Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir.2002). In order to satisfy the second prong, Plaintiff must put for the sufficient facts to show that she was subjected to an adverse employment action. In the Sixth Circuit, “employment actions that are de minimis are not actionable under Title VII.” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795-96 (6th Cir.2004)(quoting Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2000)). “To prevent lawsuits based upon trivial workplace dissatisfactions, the Sixth Circuit requires a plaintiff prove the existence of an ‘adverse employment action’ to support a Title VII claim.” Id. (quoting Hollins v. All. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.1999)). An “adverse employment action” is defined as a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. Such a change usually includes “a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662. It “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Id. (citation omitted). “Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Sands v. Jackson State Cmty. Coll., No. 1-03-1333-T-An., 2006 WL 1174469, at *5 (W.D.Tenn. April 29, 2006) (quoting Davis v. Toum of Lake Park Florida, 245 F.3d 1232,1239 (11th Cir.2001)). With regard to Plaintiffs charge of discrimination in the denial of training, Plaintiff has put forth no evidence from which a jury could conclude that a male sergeant in Narcotics received training opportunities that she was purportedly denied. Virostek v. Liberty Township Police Dept., 14 Fed.Appx. 493 (6th Cir.2001) (upholding summary judgment in favor of defendant on the plaintiffs claim of unequal training opportunities because she failed to produce evidence showing that similarly situated males received approval to attend training seminars that were denied to her and she failed to specify the training for which she requested and was denied attendance). Similarly, with regard to Plaintiffs allegation of discrimination in the denial of proper supervisory process, Plaintiff has put forth no evidence from which a jury could conclude that similarly situated, non-protected employees were treated more favorably. Plaintiff identifies no male sergeants in Narcotics who were provided assistance with problem employees when she was denied. “An employee has the burden of producing specific, substantial evidence of disparate treatment, such that a reasonable jury relying on that evidence could find in favor of the employee.” Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983). Without evidence specifying similarly situated male sergeants that received more favorable treatment, Plaintiffs conclusory statements provide no credible and specific evidence of disparate treatment on these claims. With regard to Plaintiffs claims that she was denied enforcement duties, Plaintiff has arguably satisfied the fourth prong of a prima facie claim by putting forth some evidence from which a jury could conclude that, on the specified dates, male sergeants participated in enforcement duties for which she was denied. Nevertheless, this claim fails to create a genuine issue of material fact because it does not amount to a materially adverse employment action. There is no evidence that being denied enforcement duties had any tangible impact on Plaintiffs employment. Plaintiffs primary duties were largely administrative and, as the CM Sergeant, she admits that she was in a support position. On each of the dates that Plaintiff identifies that she was denied enforcement opportunities, she worked a full eight hours performing her primary duties as the CM Sergeant. Being restricted from a task that, as the CM Sergeant, Plaintiff was expected to be “available for,” but which was not included in her regular duties, is not a “tangible employment action [that] constitutes a significant change in employment status.... ” Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); (Def.’s Ex. No. D454 (noting that the Case Management Sergeant is expected to be “[available for Narcotics Enforcement Duties”).) Even if Plaintiff was called on to perform enforcement duties at some point during her tenure as the CM Sergeant, a mere change in her responsibilities does not amount to an adverse employment action. See Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662 (finding that an adverse employment action “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities”) (citation omitted). The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action when she was denied the opportunity to perform enforcement duties. Regarding the reassignment to the Detectives Division, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the reassignment was an adverse employment action affecting the terms and conditions of her employment. Plaintiff maintains that the reassignment from the Narcotics Division to the Detectives Division was materially adverse because: (1) her supervisory responsibility over five clerical employees in the Narcotics Division was eliminated; (2) it eliminated her benefits including a private office, and SCSO-provided take-home vehicle, fuel for that vehicle, pager, and cell phone; (3) she was assigned an “old” and “unkept” [sic] vehicle; (4) she was assigned an “oppressive caseload,” which included some pending cases from transferred detective Sgt. Collier; (5) her duty hours changed to 0800-1630 with a 10-day workweek, purportedly longer hours than her position in Narcotics Division; (6) she had to account for her whereabouts at all times and she was not allowed to leave the office without someone accompanying her; and (7) she was not trained on the use of the crime scene kit issued to her or on the new computer procedures necessary to conduct investigative cases. (Am. Compl. 6; Pl.’s Resp. 4-5; Blackburn Interrogs. 5; First EEOC Charge.) Plaintiff complains that she had “limited duties [and] very little assistance----” (Am. Compl. 6.) An adverse employment action requires a loss of pay or benefits, a detrimental change in responsibilities, a negative change in the terms or conditions of employment, or some other actual or unfavorable change in job status. Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir.1996). “Reassignments and position transfers can qualify as adverse employment actions, particularly where they are accompanied by [adverse] salary or work hour changes.” Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 391 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 885-86) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven if a reassignment is not paired with a salary or work-hour change, it can nonetheless be considered an adverse employment action where there is evidence that the employee received a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Id. (citing Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 886) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and ‘should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, considering all the circumstances.’ ” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (holding that Title VII does not create “a general civility code for the American workplace”)). It has been held that “[transfers intended to respond to and resolve an employee’s problems with another employee do not constitute adverse employment action.” Kasprzak v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 431 F.Supp.2d 771, 777 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (citing Walker v. Nat’l Revenue Corp., 43 FecLAppx. 800, 805 (6th Cir.2002)). Lt. Hill’s response to Plaintiffs complaints was to transfer her to the Detectives Division, the unit Plaintiff was in prior to her transfer to the Narcotics Division. Plaintiff presented no evidence that the reassignment from the Narcotics Division to the Detectives Division involved a change of her wages, benefits, or rank. The loss of her private office and SCSOprovided pager, cell phone, gas allowance, and take-home vehicle merely correlated to the change in Plaintiffs job duties due to her reassignment. Lloyd v. City of St. Charles, No. 4.-07CV01935 JCH, 2009 WL 485078, at *5 (E.D.Mo. Feb. 26, 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs loss of his cell phone, take-home car, and clothing allowance upon his reassignment from Detective Bureau to Patrol Division did not constitute adverse employment actions); O’Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 912-13 (7th Cir.2004) (finding that, where the plaintiff was transferred and kept the same pay rank and benefits, but lost her cell phone, pager, vehicle, parking space, and schedule with open holidays and weekends, the changes fell short of an adverse employment action). In addition, the assignment of an older vehicle does not constitute an adverse employment action. Market v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 911-12 (7th Cir.2002) (The denial of “ ‘better’ equipment” was “not [a] readily quantifiable loss[] Title VII was meant to redress.”). Furthermore, Plaintiffs loss of her supervisory responsibilities and her increased case load and job responsibilities are not actionable as adverse employment actions; there was no difference in base pay and benefits between the Detectives Division and the Narcotics Division, Plaintiffs rank remained the same, and Plaintiff presented no competent evidence that the position in the Detectives Division was objectively less prestigious. Freeman v. Potter, 200 FedAppx. 439, 445 (6th Cir.2006); see also Benefield v. Fulton Co., GA, 130 Fed.Appx. 308, 313 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the plaintiffs lateral transfer to a fire station and the removal of her duties and staff as an EMS Coordinator amounted to changes in work assignments, not conduct that altered the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment) (citing Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 578-89 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that a university’s refusal to give a professor desired work assignments, at desired hours and locations, did not constitute an adverse employment action)). Moreover, though a change in work hours can constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, the unique circumstances presented here lead the Court to conclude that the shift change was not materially adverse. Plaintiffs duty hours changed when she was reassigned to 0800-1630 with a 10-day workweek. Plaintiff alleges that her reassignment also included an increase in her work hours. (April 26, 2006 EEOC Charge; PL’s Resp. 4.) The weekly time records and weekly roll call report for the Narcotics Division show that Plaintiffs regular duty hours were from 0700, 0730, or 0800 to 1600 with a 5-day workweek. (Def.’s Ex. No. D470-D473.) Thus, in both the Narcotics Division and the Detectives Division, Plaintiffs duty hours totaled eight (8) hours, but in the Detectives Division, there was a longer time between her days off. The Sixth Circuit has held that an “inconvenience resulting from a less favorable schedule can render an employment action ‘adverse’ even if the employee’s responsibilities and wages are left unchanged.” Spees, 617 F.3d at 392. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence that the new schedule was less favorable or resulted in any inconvenience. Moreover, as Defendant correctly points out, it is inconsistent for Plaintiff to complain that she was discriminatorily denied overtime in the Narcotics Division and then complain that she was discriminatorily forced to work more hours in the Detectives Division. Importantly, there is no evidence that the reassignment was made for any reason other than to respond to Plaintiffs problems in the Narcotics Division. “Transfers intended to respond to and resolve an employee’s problems with another employee do not constitute adverse employment action.” Kasprzak, 431 F.Supp.2d at 777 (citing Walker, 43 Fed. Appx. at 805); see also Moling v. O’Reilly Automotive, Inc., No. 09-1100, 763 F.Supp.2d 956, 2011 WL 112586 (W.D.Tenn. Jan. 13, 2011) (finding that employer’s proffered reason for the plaintiffs transfer to the only other store in order to separate her from her supervisors about which she had complained was not pretext for retaliation); Cromer-Kendall v. District of Columbia, 326 F.Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C.2004) (holding that the plaintiff was not subjected to an adverse employment action when employer attempted to improve the plaintiffs work environment by transferring her to a location away from a sergeant about whom the plaintiff had complained). The same reasoning applies to a transfer intended to respond to and resolve an employee’s problems with her supervisors and her working conditions. Plaintiff informed the command staff in the Narcotics Division that she was unhappy, that she could not continue to work under the same conditions, and that there were two options, i.e., she would ask for a transfer or they could transfer her out of the division. The command staff acted on Plaintiffs complaints and suggestion, and transferred her to the Detectives Division, the unit she was in prior to arriving in Narcotics and, importantly, the unit she testifies that she was happy in prior to her transfer. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence which would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that she was demoted by her reassignment to the Detectives Division. Though Plaintiff felt that the Detectives Division position was “less appealing,” this is not actionable under Title VII. An “employee’s subjective impressions as to the desirability of one position over another are not relevant,” Policastro, 297 F.3d at 539, and a “ ‘bruised ego’ is simply not enough to constitute an adverse employment action.” Mitchell v. Vanderbilt University, 389 F.3d 177, 182 (6th Cir.2004). Plaintiffs reassignment to Detectives Division was not an adverse employment action because it involved no change in pay, rank, or benefits. Moreover, it was intended to respond to and resolve Plaintiffs problems with her supervisors and working conditions in the Narcotics Division. The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to present evidence of adverse treatment sufficient to survive summary judgment on this basis. Therefore, Plaintiff having failed on this essential element of her claim, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED. C. Title VII Retaliation Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~3(a). In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, courts analyze Title VII retaliation claims at the summary judgment stage using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir.2008). After the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason offered by the defendant was not its true motivation, but rather, a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth, 389 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir.2004). As with Plaintiffs sex discrimination claim, because she has not established a prima facie case, the remaining stages of the analysis as to the Title VII claim are unnecessary. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show the following: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew she engaged in the protected activity; (3) the defendant subsequently took an adverse action against her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Singfield, 389 F.3d at 565. Alternatively, Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by proving that she was “subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor” and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the harassment. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff maintains that the SCSO retaliated against her for her EEOC charges. The parties’ dispute centers on the presence of an adverse employment action and causation. Plaintiff identifies the following retaliatory actions taken by the SCSO as adverse: (1) shunned by co-workers and the administration staff while in the Detectives Division; (2) reassigned to the Criminal Courts Division; (3) an unjust disciplinary action; (4) termination of her EAP benefits; (5) denial of her transfer requests; (6) a low performance evaluation; (7) unjust damage to her personnel file; (8) exclusion from training; and (9) unfair and unjust treatment by Lt. Hill, including constant criticism and reprimands which created an abusive and hostile work environment. 1. Adverse Employment Action Not every employment action disliked by an employee is sufficient to satisfy the adverse action element of the retaliation claim. The standard for whether an act of retaliation rises to the level of material adversity is an objective one, requiring a showing that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which ... means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the Sixth Circuit, “de minimis employment actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable.” Bowman, 220 F.3d at 462. The Supreme Court has limited “adverse employment actions” to something more than “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to an adverse employment action in retaliation for her protected conduct. Plaintiffs allegations that she was shunned by co-workers after her reassignment to the Detectives Division, even if true, is not sufficient to show a retaliatory adverse employment action. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (explaining that “petty slights,” “minor annoyances,” and “snubbing” by supervisors and co-workers is not actionable under Title VII). The reassignment to the Courts Division is also insufficient to establish an adverse action. Plaintiff requested a reassignment out of the Detectives Division, which was granted. Though Plaintiff claims that the Courts Division was a “punishment area,” she does not allege that she suffered a change in pay, benefits, seniority, rank, or job status as a result of her assignment to the Courts Division. T