Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION KEEP, District Judge. On February 27, 1998, Plaintiff Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEI) filed a Complaint against Defendant Terri Welles. The Complaint consists of five causes of action: 1) Count I, trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); 2) Count II, false designation of origin and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 3) Count III, dilution of trademarks pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); 4) Count IV, trademark infringement and unfair competition under California common law; and 5) Count V, unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, et seq. On December 21, 1998, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint adding Defendants Terri Welles, Inc., the current business corporation owned and operated by Ms. Welles, whose internet on-line service comprises Ms. Welles’ business, and Stephen Huntington, the former webmaster of Ms. Welles’ website who was responsible for developing and maintaining Ms. Welles’ website prior to Defendant Mihalko’s succession to the job as webmaster. On April 1, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, supplementing the Complaint with three additional causes of action: 1) Count VI, a claim of trademark counterfeiting pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); 2) Count VII, a claim of dilution of trademark in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 14335; 3) Count VIII, a claim of breach of contract based on a document involving business relations between PEI, Pippi, Inc., and Terri Welles. In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also added two defendants: 1) Pippi, Inc., a defunct California corporation which allegedly contracted with PEI and Terri Welles; and 2) Michael Mihalko, the current webmaster of Ms. Welles’ website. On October 18, 1999, Defendant Terri Welles, Terri Welles, Inc., and Pippi, Inc. (hereafter, “Defendant Welles” or “Welles”) filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication, of all eight of Plaintiffs claims against Defendants. Also on October 18, 1999, Defendant Michael Mihalko filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the “innocent infringer” defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) barred all Plaintiffs claims against him. Defendant Mihalko also filed a joinder in Defendant Welles’ summary judgment motion. On October 18, 1999, Defendant Stephen Huntington filed a joinder in both Defendant Welles’ and Defendant Mihalko’s motions. On November 1, 1999, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Welles’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication. In addition, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant Mihal-ko’s motion for partial summary judgment, objections to Defendant Mihalko’s and Defendant Huntington’s joinders, and eviden-tiary objections. On November 8, 1999, Defendant Welles filed a reply, and Defendant Mihalko filed a separate reply. Defendant Huntington did not file a reply. I. BACKGROUND The following background facts are taken in large part from the court’s April 22, 1998 order denying Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction: Plaintiff Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEI) is an international publishing and entertainment company. Since 1953, PEI has published Playboy magazine, a widely popular magazine with approximately ten (10) million readers each month. PEI also publishes numerous specialty magazines such as Playboy’s Playmate Review, Playboy’s Playmates of the Year, and Playboy’s Calendar Playmates among other publications. In addition to its publishing ventures, PEI produces television programming for cable and direct-to-home satellite transmission and sells and licenses various goods and services including videos. PEI has established two websites. According to Plaintiff, its free website, http://www.playboy.com, has become one of the most popular sites on the Web and is used to promote its magazine, goods, and services. Its other website, called the “Playboy Cyber Club,” http://www.cy-ber.playboy.com, is devoted to promoting current and former PEI models. PEI owns federally registered trademarks for the terms Playboy, Playmate, Playmate of the Month, and Playmate of the Year. The term Playmate of the Year is sometimes abbreviated “PMOY.” PEI does not have a federally registered trademark in the abbreviation “PMOY,” although PEI argues that “PMOY” is worthy of trademark protection because it is a well-known abbreviation for the trademark Playmate of the Year. Defendant Terri Welles is a self-employed model and spokesperson, who began her modeling career with Playboy magazine in 1980. In May of 1980, Ms. Welles appeared on the cover of Playboy magazine and was subsequently featured as the “Playmate of the Month” in the December 1980 issue. Ms. Welles received the “Playmate of the Year” award in June of 1981. Since 1980, Ms. Welles has appeared in no less than thirteen (13) issues of Playboy magazine and eighteen (18) newsstand specials published by PEI. Ms. Welles claims that since 1980 she has always referred to herself as a “Playmate” or “Playmate of the Year” with the knowledge of PEI. On June 29, 1997, Ms. Welles opened a website, http://www.terriwelles.com, which includes photographs of herself and others (both nude and clothed), a fan club posting board, an autobiography section, and a listing of current events and personal appearances. The domain name for Defendant Welles’ site is “terriwelles,” the heading for the website is “Terri Welles— Playmate of the Year 1981,” and the title of the link page is “Terri Welles — Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981.” Each of the pages uses “PMOY ’81” as a repeating watermark in the background. According to Defendant, eleven (11) of the fifteen (15) free web pages include a disclaimer at the bottom of the pages, in varying font sizes depending on the page, which indicates that the website is not endorsed by PEI; the disclaimer reads as follows: “This site is neither endorsed, nor sponsored by, nor affiliated with Playboy Enterprises, Inc. PLAYBOY, PLAYMATE OF THE YEAR and PLAYMATE OF THE MONTH are registered trademarks of Playboy Enterprises, Inc.” Defendant Welles uses the terms Playboy and Playmate along with other terms within the keywords section of the meta tags, which constitutes the internal index of the website used by some search engines. The site contains link pages to other erotic, adult-oriented websites. It also contains advertising “banners” for some of those websites. Since May of 1997, Ms. Welles has been in contact with Plaintiff about the design and creation of her website. Defendant claims that Plaintiff, through Marcia Ter-rones, the director of the “Rights and Permission” department at PEI, informed her that she could identify herself as the “Playmate of the Year 1981” but that she could not reproduce the rabbit head logo on her proposed website. Various communications between Defendant and Plaintiff ensued. According to Defendant, PEI, through Hugh Hefner, initially complimented her website and encouraged her use of the title “Playmate of the Year 1981.” However, Mr. Hefner later informed Defendant that use of PEI’s trademarks were restricted; instead, he invited Defendant to join PEI’s new Cyber Club. Defendant refused this invitation, and PEI continued to demand that Defendant remove the “Playmate of the Year” title from the home page as well as remove the PMOY watermark from the background. II. STANDARD OF LAW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment for defendant is appropriate if the defendant shows that there is an absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.1998). The movant has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To make such a showing, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. However, in considering this motion, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Courts should be careful not to let a motion for summary judgment become a “trial on affidavits.” Id. Determinations regarding credibility, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences are jury functions, not appropriate for resolution by the court in a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Although the Ninth Circuit has stated that summary judgment is generally disfavored in trademark cases because of the inherently factual nature of most trademark disputes, see Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356 n. 5 (9th Cir.1985), summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate “where the party opposing the motion fails to demonstrate the existence of any material issues of fact for trial.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 949, 956 (C.D.Cal.1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir.1999) (affirming order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that Levi Strauss does not preclude the district court from determining likelihood of confusion as a matter of law, either through dismissal or summary judgment. See Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d 858, 860-61 (9th Cir.1996). Rule 56(a) and (b) provide for “summary adjudication of claims,” also called “partial summary judgment.” Partial summary judgment is appropriate when, using the standards outlined above, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a particular claim. When there is no such issue of fact, the court may grant summary judgment in the party’s favor “upon all or any part” of a claim. Rule 56(a), (b). III. DISCUSSION A. DEFENDANT TERRI WELLES, TERRI WELLES, INC., AND PIPPI, INC. 1. Counts I Through VII: Fair Use Defense Plaintiff alleges seven distinct trademark-related claims: 1) trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); 2) false designation of origin and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 3) dilution of trademarks pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); 4) trademark infringement and unfair competition under California common law; 5) unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, et seq.; 6) trademark counterfeiting pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); and 7) dilution of trademark in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 14335. Defendant Welles asserts that she should be granted summary judgment on all seven claims because there is no dispute of material fact that Ms. Welles uses the terms “Playboy” and “Playmate” in a non-trademark manner to describe her status as a recipient of titles bestowed upon her by Plaintiff and to describe the content of her website. In other words, Defendant Welles argues that because her use of the terms “Playboy” and “Playmate” on her website is a “fair use” as a matter of law, she should be entitled to summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs trademark-related claims against her. A trademark is a “limited property right in a particular word, phrase, or symbol.” New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.1992). The purpose of a trademark is limited to the identification of the source of a good or service. See id. at 305. The “wrong protected against...[has been] traditionally equally limited: [preventing producers from free-riding on their rivals’ marks” and capitalizing on their rivals’ investment of time, money, and resources. Id. Where a trademark also describes a person, place, or an attribute of a product, however, the “policies of free competition and free use of language dictate that trademark law cannot forbid the commercial use of terms in their descriptive sense.” 1 J. McCarthy, TradeMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 11.45, at 82 (1999). Thus, trademark law, as embodied in the Lanham Act, recognizes a “fair use” defense—the concept that a trademark registrant or holder cannot “appropriate a descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their goods.” New Kids, 971 F.2d at 306 (quoting Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir.1980)). Fair use is a defense to liability under the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(4) and 1125(c)(4) (1999). The assertion by an alleged infringer that it is only using the contested term, mark, or designation at issue in a non-trademark, descriptive sense has become known as the “fair use” doctrine or defense. See 1 J. MoCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11.45, at 80 (1999). Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act codifies the fair use defense and states that the “right to use the registered mark... shall be subject to the... defense[ ]... [tjhat the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark... of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) and (b)(4) (1999). A common law fair use defense incorporates the statutory elements of the Lanham Act § 33(b)(4) so that if the defendant’s use is a fair use as against an assertion of a registered trademark, then it is also fair use as against a state statutory or common law count. See 1 J. MoCar-THY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 11.49, at 93-94 (1999) (citing Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir.1984) and Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir.1983)). Section 33(b)(4) requires a defendant to prove three elements in order to establish a fair use defense: 1. Defendant’s use of the term is not as a trademark or service mark. 2. Defendant uses the term “fairly and in good faith.” 3. Defendant uses the term “[o]nly to describe” its goods or services. 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11.49, at 94.1 (1999) 0quoting 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4) (1999)). Under element one, the only type of use which suffices as a “fair use” is use by a defendant of a term, mark, or symbol in a non-trademark sense. Under element two, a lack of good faith use may be inferred from: (1) a defendant’s intentional breach of an agreement not to use the disputed mark; or (2) a defendant’s use with the intent to “trade upon and dilute the good will” of a plaintiffs mark. See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11.49, at 94.1 (1999) (citing Institute for Scientific Information, Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002 (3d. Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 302, 116 L.Ed.2d 245 (1991)). Finally, under element three, the statutory phrase “to describe the goods” is not restricted to words that describe a characteristic of the goods but rather the phrase can be applied to words that are descriptive in the broader sense. See id. Although Section 33(b)(4) makes no mention of a requirement that there be an absence of likelihood of confusion, the majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have espoused the view that it is inconsistent to find both a likelihood of confusion and fair use. See id. at § 11.47, at 85-86. According to this reasoning, because the primary purpose of trademark law is to prevent likely confusion as to the origin, sponsor, or source of a mark, a showing of likely confusion bars a defendant’s reliance on the fair use defense. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188, 105 S.Ct. 955, 83 L.Ed.2d 962 (1985). Thus, in order to comply with the statutory requirement of § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act that “Defendant’s use of the term is not as a trademark or service mark,” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1999), the Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant invoking the fair use defense must also establish that its fair use is not likely to cause confusion or did not “lead to customer confusion as to the source of the goods or services.” Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 911 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.1983)). The Ninth Circuit has articulated an eight-factor test, known as the Sleekcraft test, which the court may consider in determining the likelihood of confusion: 1) the strength of the mark; 2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; 3) similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) degree to which the marketing channels converge; 6) type of good and degree of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing them; 7) evidence of the intention of defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing name; and 8) likelihood that the parties will expand their product lines. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir.1979). Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s clear adoption of the view that a fair use cannot simultaneously be a confusing use, it recently decided in 1991 in the case of New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc. that there is a different type of fair use that “lies outside the strictures of trademark law” because it “does not implicate the source-identification function.” New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.1992). The court in New Kids described this type of fair use as a “nominative use of a mark—where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service.” Id. Under the Neio Kids standard, a court does not conduct the traditional analysis of likelihood of confusion promulgated in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir.1979) that is used in the “classic fair use ease” but rather conducts a special three-pronged analysis for the new type of fair use defense entitled “a nominative fair use defense.” Id. The court in New Kids was clear in asserting that the New Kids analysis only governs in special, atypical cases and that it did not “purport to alter the test applicable in the paradigmatic fair use case.” Id. In deciding whether Defendant Welles is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs trademark claims, the court will consider whether this case falls under the classic fair use case or the non-paradigmatic nominative fair use case; the court’s analysis of this question and the issue of likelihood of confusion will be discussed infra, in section III(A)(l)(a)(l)(iii), of this order. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Welles cannot invoke the fair use defense because her use of Plaintiffs trademarks on her website (1) is a trademark use; (2) which creates a likelihood of confusion; and (3) which “goes farther than, or is out of proportion to, a fair description of PEI or Ms. Welles on the website.” Plaintiffs Opposition, at 15, Plaintiff makes these allegations in regards to four specific uses by Defendant Welles on her website: (i) use of the Playmate term in the visual title or masthead for the website; (ii) use of the abbreviation, “PMOY ’81,” as a repetitive, decorative watermark on pages throughout her site; (iii) use of the Playboy and Playmate terms in advertising banners on her site and in other websites to attract customers to click through to Welles’ site; and (iv) use of the Playboy and Playmate terms in the HTML source code, including the HTML title, meta code description, and meta tag keywords. The HTML source code is the coding that is used for construction of a website’s pages. The court will address in turn each of these specific uses by Ms. Welles with respect to her invocation of the fair use defense. Because Plaintiffs analyses in its opposition papers regarding the uses specified in (I), (ii), and (iii) in the above paragraph are intimately interconnected, the court will group together for discussion in the first section, section (a), the visible uses of PEI trademarked terms in the title or masthead, in the repeating watermarks, and in the advertising banners. In the second section, section (b), the court will address the issue of the use of PEI trademarked terms in the HTML source code, including the source title and the meta-tags. (a) Visible Use of PEI Trademarked Terms: Title or Masthead, Watermarks, and Advertising Banners (1) Overview of Plaintiff’s Allegations This section summarizes Plaintiffs allegations. In support of its allegations, Plaintiff relies solely on the appearance of the website or on its expert witness’ (James Sterne’s) opinions regarding the website. Following this summary, in section (2), is an analysis of the sufficiency of Plaintiffs allegations in light of Defendant’s summary judgment motion. (I) Title or Masthead The visual title at the top of Ms. Welles’ website reads, “Terri Welles Playmate of the Year, 1981.” See Deck of Cynthia Johnston, PEI Legal Department Staff, Ex. J. The name “Terri Welles” is in large, filled-in block letters, overlapping and dwarfing the designation, “Playmate of the Year, 1981.” See id. The words, “Playmate of the Year, 1981,” are in slender, cursive script letters. See id. From the court’s color copy of the exhibit, it appears that all the words in “Terri Welles Playmate of the Year, 1981” are of similar coloring, but that the words, “Playmate of the Year, 1981,” appear of a slightly lighter shade than the words “Terri Welles” so that they are visible under the overlapping block letters of the name “Terri Welles.” See id. Plaintiff argues that Ms. Welles’ “prominent, stylized and memorable use of PEI’s trademarks operates to...attract the attention of consumers to defendant’s website,” “borrow[s] from the cachet of the PEI marks,” and “tradefs] off of the good will of those marks.” Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Welles’ trademark uses of the PEI marks are like “placing the marks on a sign above the entrance to a store, on the front of an advertising brochure, or on a product. They create source identification due to their context, prominence, location and stylization.” Opposition, at 10 (citing Decl. of James Sterne (“Sterne Deck”), PEI Expert Witness, ¶¶7-9). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts, through its expert witness James Sterne and in its opposition briefs, that (1) Ms. Welles’ site is a predominantly commercial site; (2) The visible title banner on the homepage is a prominent commercial use of the Playboy term; (3) The commercial theme is “Playboy Playmate of the Year”; (4) The visible use of the terms in the title banner and the subject headings along the left-hand side of the homepage (along with the repeating PMOY background watermark and the references in the HTML code and metatags) create a repetitive use of the Playboy and Playmate terms; (5) Title banners or mastheads at the top of a commercial website do not serve the same function as book titles, but rather serve to identify the “source” of the website and its products; (6) This “source identification effect” is a result of the context of the use (commercial), prominence of the use (repetition and size), the location of the use (in title banner, source code, advertising banner, and wallpaper), and the stylization of the use (in script letters as product name and repetition of PMOY). See Sterne Deck, ¶¶ 8-11, at 4-5. (ii) Watermarks Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Welles’ repeating background watermark, “PMOY ’81” is a trademark use. PMOY is an abbreviation for Plaintiffs federally-registered trademark, “Playmate of the Year.” It is undisputed that the abbreviation PMOY is not a registered trademark under state or federal law, although Plaintiffs application for registration of the PMOY trademark, filed on April 5, 1999, is currently pending in the United States Trademark and Patent Office. However, since “[i]t is not necessary that a trademark be registered in order for it to qualify for protection under the Lanham Act,” Metro Publishing v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637 (9th Cir.1993), and since Section 33(b)(4) also allows the elements of a fair use defense to be asserted against an allegation of infringement of an unregistered mark brought into federal court under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11.49, at 93-94 (1999) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), the court shall treat its discussion of Welles’ fair use of PEI’s unregistered trademarked term “PMOY” in the watermarks in the same manner as its discussion of PEI’s registered terms “Playboy,” “Playmate,” and “Playmate of the Year” in other areas of Ms. Welles’ website. The “PMOY” abbreviation is used as a watermark on the homepage as well as on the other pages throughout the website. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “PMOY” appears on the web pages on which Ms. Welles solicits paid subscriptions to the “Members Only” portion of her website, sells pictures of herself, and solicits paid promotional appearances. See Opposition, at 7. According to Plaintiff, rather than being related to any editorial comment or description of Ms. Welles or PEI, these watermarks are a “repetitive, prominent, and plainly commercial use of PEI’s marks to identify defendant’s business, goods, and services.” Id. (iii) Advertising Banners Ms. Welles has created special advertising banners for her website: rectangular-shaped boxes which contain a photograph of Ms. Welles, the name “Terri Welles,” and a designation that uses the term “Playmate” and/or “Playboy.” There are two forms of the advertising banners; both contain a semi-nude photograph of Ms. Welles, and the title or name of the website. See id. One of the titles states, “Terri Welles Playboy Playmate of the Year ’81,” and the other states, “Playmate of the Year 1981 Terri Welles.” See id. at Ex. D. In both of the banners, “Terri Welles” appears in script letters of a different coloring and of a larger size than the corresponding descriptors, “Playboy Playmate of the Year ’81” and “Playmate of the Year 1981.” See id. at Ex. D. These banners can be “borrowed” and “cut and pasted” by other website owners from her website to other websites. This process is accomplished by a user clicking on the banner on Ms. Welles’ website and copying and transporting the underlying source code to the third party website. See Opposition, at 7. Plaintiff makes several contentions regarding the use of the advertising banners: (1) Anyone can “grab” these banners from defendant’s website, and by doing so, include PEI’s trademarks on the face of their website and in the source code; (2) Defendant’s motivation for these banners is to attract click through traffic from other adult websites and increase her ranking among search engines that rank, in part, on the basis of a number of links to a website; and (3) An internet user who clicks through to defendant’s website by clicking on the advertising banner on a third party website will likely know nothing about Ms. Welles’ site other than the references on the banner—adult entertainment, the PEI trademark, and Ms. Welles’ identification as a Playmate. See Opposition, at 7-8. (2) Analysis Since Defendant Welles’ is the movant on the motion for summary judgment, she bears the burden of demonstrating that summary judgnent is proper. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598. And since Welles asserts an affirmative defense of fair use, she bears the burden of establishing sufficient facts to support a finding in her favor. See Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1122 (D.Nev.1999) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 231 (1997) and F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.1994)). If Defendant Welles meets this initial burden of demonstrating sufficient facts entitling her to a fair use defense, the burden then shifts to PEI to show that there is a genuine dispute of a material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In order to meet this burden, PEI must go beyond the conclusory allegations in its complaint and must designate specific facts showing there is a dispute as to a material issue for trial. See id. The court finds that on the papers submitted to it on the summary judgment motion, Defendant Welles has met her burden in establishing sufficient facts to support a finding that she is entitled to a fair use defense. That is, Ms. Welles has shown that under the Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), Ms. Welles’ use of PEI trademarked terms in her website is a non-trademark use, “which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe [her] goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4) (1999). Although Plaintiff makes blanket allegations, in its Opposition and through the declaration of its expert witness, James Sterne, that the “prominence and placement” and the “stylized,” “repetitive,” and “memorable” use of the contested terms “Playboy” and “Playmate” evidence an intent to “borrow from the cachet of the PEI marks,” and “trade off of PEI’s goodwill of the marks,” Opposition, at 9 and 14, upon a clearer examination of the facts supporting these allegations, the court finds that Plaintiff does not raise a material issue of fact with regards to the three elements of the fair use defense in the Lanham Act § 33(b)(4). In sum, the court finds that Defendant’s use of the terms is used (1) “only to describe the goods or services of such party;” (2) “fairly and in good faith;” and (3) “otherwise than as a trademark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1999)). Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendant is proper as to Plaintiffs trademark and unfair competition claims. (i) Only To Describe the Goods or Services There is no dispute as to the fact that the phrase “Playmate of the Year 1981” is descriptive of Ms. Welles and her on-line services in the sense that the title actually describes the product(s) being sold. Terri Welles was and is the “Playmate of the Year for 1981”—Plaintiff has conceded this fact. It was a title earned by and bestowed upon Ms. Welles as a Playboy model, a title which has become part of her identity and adds value and “prestige” to her name. Hugh Hefner, the owner and president of PEI, stated that becoming a Playboy Playmate was certainly “the first stepping stone” in establishing some women’s fame and that the advantages of a woman becoming a Playmate are “celebrity, first and foremost.” See Decl. of David Noonan, Defendant Welles’ Counsel, Ex. 1 (“Deposition of Hugh Hefner”) (hereafter, “Hefner Deposition”), at 7-8, 43. Furthermore, Mr. Hefner has admitted that PEI “has always encouraged Playmates or Playmates of the Year to use their fame to promote themselves or make a living in connection with television.. .radio .. [a]nd movies.” Id. at 54-55. Therefore, it is undisputed that the “Playmate” title of a Playmate model is a designation that either has, or is intended to have, public recognition. Ms. Welles earned the title of “Playboy Playmate of the Year” in 1981 and has used that title ever since, without objection from PEI—until the inception of this lawsuit. Although it is undeniable that the term “Playboy” and “Playmate” are suggestive trademarks in which Plaintiff has a vested property right as the senior user, it is equally indisputable that the title has become part of Ms. Welles’ identity to the public, in much the same way as her name identifies her to others. Not surprisingly, it has been noted that the fair use defense is founded upon the same principles as the defense of the right to use one’s own personal name. See 1 J. McCaRthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11.45, at 81 (1999). The concept that there should be some qualified right to use one’s own name as a mark has resulted in a great reluctance of judges to issue an absolute injunction against any use, even trademark use, of a personal name mark. See id. at § 13.9, at 17. Courts have generally refused to “wholly forbid a man to do business in his own name” since “[t]o prevent all use of it [personal name] is to take away his identity; without it he cannot make known who he is to those who may wish to deal with him; and that is so grievous an injury that courts will avoid imposing it, if they possibly can.” Id. at § 13.9, at 17 (citations omitted). As the Ninth Circuit stated in New Kids, “sometimes there is no descriptive substitute ... For example, one might refer to ‘the two-time world champions’ or ‘the professional basketball team from Chicago,’ but it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls.” 971 F.2d at 306. Likewise, given that Ms. Welles is the “Playmate of the Year 1981,” there is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her services without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. To describe herself as the “nude model selected by Mr. Hefner’s magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the year 1981” would be impractical as well as ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to the public. This is especially true since, as Mr. Hefner has admitted, “most people around the world that are familiar with Playboy magazine would refer to these women as Playmates.” Hefner Deposition, pp. 43-44. In such a case as this, use of the trademarks, “Playmate of the Year 1981,” “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981,” and “PMOY ’81,” is purely nominative and “does not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product because the marks are used only to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.” Id. Accordingly, the court finds that the use of the terms “Playmate of the Year 1981,” “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981,” and “PMOY ’81” in the visible portions of Defendant Welles’ website is descriptive of Ms. Welles; it is her services and goods being described, and the public identifies her by the titles bestowed upon her by PEI. (ii) Used Fairly and in Good Faith Plaintiff correctly points out that bad faith can be inferred from evidence of an intent to “trade upon and dilute the good will” of a defendant’s mark. See Institute for Scientific Information, Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002 (3d. Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 302, 116 L.Ed.2d 245 (1991)). Although Plaintiff implies that Ms. Welles is acting in bad faith when it asserts that she used its trademarked terms with the intent to “trade off of the good will” of PEI’s marks, Opposition at 9, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to identify any conduct of Ms. Welles that is sufficiently blameworthy. For example, Plaintiff has failed to state any facts which indicate that Ms. Welles’ use of the PEI trademarked terms was improperly motivated. Cf. Marcus v. Rowley, et al., 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.1983) (in copyright infringement case, since fair use presupposes that the defendant has acted fairly and in good faith, the propriety of the defendant’s conduct should also be weighed in analyzing the purpose and character of the use). Insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Welles’ failure to seek written permission from PEI prior to her website use of PEI trademarked terms was evidence of bad faith, the court rejects this argument. The Supreme Court stated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that being denied permission to use a work does not weigh against a finding of good faith fair use. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir.1986) The Supreme Court elaborated, “[W]e reject [plaintiffs] argument that [defendant’s] request for permission to use the original should be weighed against a finding of fair use... [The defendant’s] actions do not necessarily suggest that they believed their version was not fair use; the offer may simply have been made in a good-faith effort to avoid this litigation. If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or granted.” Id. at 585, n. 18, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Contrary to Plaintiffs unsupported allegations of bad faith, Ms. Welles provides uncontroverted evidence that she sought to take precautions to ensure that her use of PEI’s trademarked terms in her website was permitted by PEI. See Decl. of Terri Welles, ¶¶ 8-9, 17 and Exs. 2, 9-10. For example, in an effort to “avoid threatened litigation,” Ms. Welles has removed some references per Plaintiffs request and made changes to her website consisting of: (1) adding disclaimers to the bottom of most pages of her website; (2) including a hyperlink from her website to www.play-boy.com; (3) substituting the visual title of “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981” to “Terri Welles, Playmate of the Year, 1981;” (4) removing the images of three Playboy covers; (5) removing any image which PEI contended was a PEI-copyrighted image. See id. at ¶¶ 19-20. Furthermore, it is undisputed that she does not use “Playboy” or “Playmate” in her domain name, she does not use in the “Playmate of the Year 1981” title a font recognizable as a Playboy magazine font, and she does not use the classic Playboy bunny logo. These factors indicate that Plaintiff has not intended to “misle[a]d or eonfuse[ ] [the consumer] as to the source of the different products or services.” WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir.1984) (holding that “the essential question in any case of alleged trademark infringement is whether purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source of the different products or services”). Finally, the unavailability of other phrases to accurately describe Ms. Welles and her business bolsters the court’s finding of good faith. See Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir.1984) (choice of the phrase “HiRes Adventure” when other phrases were available could indicate bad faith) (citations omitted). Therefore, the court finds that Ms. Welles has established sufficient evidence to show that under the Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), PEI’s trademarked terms in her visible website are “used fairly and in good faith only to describe [her] goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1999) (emphasis added). (iii) “Otherwise Than as a Mark” The bulwark of Plaintiffs arguments are concentrated on this prong of the fair use defense: whether Ms. Welles’ use of PEI terms is “otherwise than as a mark.” The governing law in the Ninth Circuit is that in order to constitute a non-trademark, “fair use,” the use cannot amount to a trademark infringement or unfair competition. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188, 105 S.Ct. 955, 83 L.Ed.2d 962 (1985). The keystone of whether a use constitutes trademark infringement or unfair competition is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying public. See id. at 1243; see also 1 J. McCaethy, Trademaeks anb Unfair Competition, § 2.8, at 15 (1999). Thus, the dispositive issue in deciding whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to Ms. Welles’s non-trademark use of PEI trademarked terms in her website is the likelihood of confusion. The Ninth Circuit has articulated an eight-factor test, known as the Sleekcraft test, which the court may consider in determining the likelihood of confusion: 1) the strength of the mark; 2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; 3) similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) degree to which the marketing channels converge; 6) type of good and degree of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing them; 7) evidence of the intention of defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing name; and 8) likelihood that the parties will expand their product lines. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir.1979). A party need not establish the existence of all eight factors in its favor in order to prevail on a finding of a likelihood of confusion (or lack thereof) since these factors are simply helpful guidelines for the determination of potential customer confusion, and no one factor is dispositive in every case. See Metro Pub. Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.1993). Additionally, although some factors will be much more significant than others, and the relative importance of each factor will be case-dependent, “it is often possible to reach a conclusion with respect to likelihood of confusion after considering only a subset of the factors.” Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir.1999). Although Plaintiff offered as part of its evidence of likelihood of confusion its expert witness’ opinion that there is a “likelihood of confusion,” see .Sterne Deck, ¶¶ 11, 13, 15, and 16, at 5-6, the court cannot rely on any of Plaintiffs expert witness’ James Sterne’s ultimate conclusions regarding whether there was a likelihood of confusion. Plaintiffs expert, James Sterne, makes the conclusory allegation that Defendant Welles’ repetitive use of the contested terms throughout her website, “[i]nstead of being merely descriptive of her background... create[s] a commercial ‘theme’ for the website,” and thus the “repetitive use of the Playboy marks will create confusion among a significant number of users regarding PEI’s endorsement of or affiliation with the Welles Site.” Sterne Deck, ¶¶ 9 and 11, at 5. In assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion, this court first must consider the Sleekcraft factors and then determine whether there exists a likelihood of confusion. See Alpha Industries, Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir.1980). With the analysis so structured, the determination of what is the state of affairs regarding each factor (a “foundational fact”) is a finding of fact, but the further determination of likelihood of confusion based on those factors is a legal conclusion. See id., 616 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added) (citing J.B. Williams Co., Inc. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir.1975) and AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-54 (9th Cir.1979).) Federal Rules of Evidence 704 was not intended to allow experts to offer opinions embodying legal conclusions. See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.1988). Thus, Mr. Sterne’s conclusion that Ms. Welles’ use “create[s] confusion among a significant number of users regarding PEI’s endorsement of or affiliation with the Welles Site,” Sterne Deck, ¶¶ 9 and 11, at 5, renders a legal opinion which the court will not entitle any weight. Additionally, insofar as Mr. Sterne’s con-clusory statements render legal opinions regarding whether Ms. Welles’ use of the contested terms is a “descriptive” or “fair use,” or constitutes use as “Playboy [trade]marks,” Sterne Decl., ¶¶ 9 and 11, at 5, the court likewise will not entitle them any weight. See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.1988) (holding that Fed.R. Evid. 704 was not intended to allow experts to offer opinions embodying legal conclusions). Expert testimony consisting of legal conclusions regarding the “likelihood of confusion” or Ms. Welles’ “fair” or “descriptive” use are inappropriate subjects for expert testimony and as such, are inadmissible. See Aguilar v. International Longshoremen’s Union Local No. 10, 966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1992). However, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the court assumes as true the facts and opinions of Mr. Sterne (which are based upon his expertise) which are alleged in his declaration and from which he renders these conclusory statements. With respect to the foundational facts, Mr. Sterne’s opinions are believed and “all justifiable inferences... [are] drawn in his... favor,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, as long as Mr. Sterne goes beyond the pleadings to allege specific facts regarding “the state of affairs regarding each [Sleekcraft ] factor,” Alpha Industries, Inc., 616 F.2d at 443, rather than merely assert a concluso-ry statement. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In other words, the court will assume as true Mr. Sterne’s expert opinion on what is the state of affairs regarding each Sleekcraft factor, but the court will not allow Mr. Sterne to render a legal opinion on whether, based on all the Sleekcraft factors, there is a likelihood of confusion. Applying the Sleekcraft test, the court finds that the totality of the Sleek-craft factors does not compel a finding of a likelihood of confusion. Plaintiffs mark is strong, the goods are related (online erotica), and the marketing channels (internet) converge. However, since the goods are related (online erotica), and the marketing channels (internet) converge, it is unnecessary to consider the eighth factor, whether the parties will expand their product lines so that there is even more competition; the fact that Plaintiff and Defendant Welles are in competition is not disputed. As for the sixth factor, the type of good and degree of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods, Plaintiffs expert states, without factual support, that “Internet users are easily frustrated,” and “given the relatively inexpensive nature of these [on-line erotica] products, the degree of care one would expect consumers” to have “is low.” Sterne Deck, ¶¶ 15, 18, at 6-7. The court will assume without deciding that Plaintiffs expert’s opinion is to be believed and that his opinion falls within his field of expertise in internet marketing. However, the court finds that the remaining three factors militate strongly in Defendant’s favor: similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, and evidence of the intention of defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing name. As discussed infra in this section of the court’s order, Ms. Welles’ use of the trademarked terms and PEI’s use of the trademark are certainly dissimilar in “appearance”of the marks: Ms. Welles does not use the PEI bunny logo, the PEI bunny theme, PEI trademark fonts, PEI trademark dress, or PEI trademark colors. Ms. Welles’ use and PEI’s use differ in meaning: Ms. Welles uses the contested terms in a non-trademark manner to describe herself and not to identify PEI as the source, sponsor, or affiliate of her goods; PEI’s use is in a trademark manner to identify itself as the source of the goods. Therefore, the court finds that there is no “similarity in appearance ... and meaning of the marks.” The court’s finding of dissimilarity under this Sleekcraft prong is not inconsistent with the fact that the words themselves used in Ms. Welles’ website are identical to the words in PEI’s trademarks. As the court explained in Lindy Pen, the “two marks viewed in isolation are indeed identical, but their similarity must be considered in light of the way the marks are encountered in the marketplace and the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the [products].” Lindy Pen Co. v. Bie Pen Corp., 725 F.2d at 1245. Plaintiff presents no “evidence of actual confusion,” and the court is unaware of any evidence of actual confusion. In spite of Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs expert witness’ conclusory allegations that consumers are likely to be confused, PEI has presented no facts fi'om which the court can infer that consumers have been confused or are likely to be confused. Plaintiff has presented no empirical evidence (either anecdotal or survey) to show that there is actual confusion among consumers. Plaintiffs expert admits that there is no such evidence of which he is aware. See Reply Decl. of David J. Noonan, Ex. 2 (“Deposition of James Sterne — -Volume I”) (“Sterne Deposition”), at 117-118. The factors, e.g., prominence, repetition, location, and stylization, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs expert cite as causing consumer confusion as to the source or association of Ms. Welles’ use of the contested terms will be discussed in more detail infra in this section. At this point, the court merely notes that for reasons discussed later, the court rejects Plaintiffs conclusions with respect to the factors of prominence, repetition, location, and stylization and holds that these factors as presented fail to raise a material issue of fact concerning Ms. Welles’ fair use. Although actual confusion is not essential to a finding of infringement, a mere possibility is not enough: “There must be a substantial likelihood that the public will be confused.” WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 124: F.2d at 1329 (emphasis added); see also Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d at 860-61 (confusion must be probable, not merely a possibility). The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce facts from which a “substantial likelihood that the public will be confused” can be inferred. With respect to the “evidence of the intention of defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing name” prong, the evidence weighs heavily in Ms. Welles’ favor. As previously discussed in this order, there is an absence of evidence that Ms. Welles has acted in bad faith in her selection of PEI’s trademarked terms in her website; on the contrary, there exists considerable evidence that Ms. Welles’ acted in good faith and that her use was fair and not misleading. To summarize, Ms. Welles provides evidence that she sought to take precautions to ensure that her use of PEI’s trademarked terms in her website was permitted by PEI, Ms. Welles has removed some references per Plaintiffs request and made changes to her website in order to placate some of Plaintiffs concerns, she does not use “Playboy” or “Playmate” in her domain name, she does not use in the “Playmate of the Year 1981” title a font recognizable as a Playboy magazine font, she does not use the classic Playboy bunny logo, and realistically, she is unable to identify herself as “Playmate of the Year” without using the title that PEI bestowed upon her. Thus, the court finds that notwithstanding Ms. Welles’ selection and use of the contested PEI terms in the visible portion of her website, there is no evidence of bad faith or intent to infringe. And as this court has explained, Ms. Welles is the Playmate of the Year for 1981. Her celebrity status sprang from her repeated selections as a Playboy model. Her public persona is based on these titles, and although she uses these titles, these titles fairly and accurately describe her. In short, the court’s consideration of the factors in Sleekcraft affirms its finding with regards to Ms. Welles’ fair-and-in-good-faith, nominative use of the PEI trademarked terms in the visible portion of her website. The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present any facts to show a genuine issue as to the likelihood of confusion under Sleekcraft. See, e.g., Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d at 1246 (affirming district court’s finding of absence of likelihood of confusion based on factors of weakness of mark, dissimilarity, lack of actual confusion, and lack of bad faith). Other Unnamed Variables Under the Sleekcraft Test In its attempt to make a showing of likelihood of confusion, Plaintiff largely relies on its expert witness, James Sterne, to satisfy its burden that Ms. Welles’ use of the contested terms is a use otherwise than as a trademark. The following discussion of the factors of location, commercial context, stylization, lettering, repetition, commercial theme, and prominence cannot neatly be categorized as an analysis of one, particular Sleekcraft factor, but arguably falls under the rubric of three Sleekcraft factors: similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks, degree to which the marketing channels converge, and evidence of the intention of defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing name. The court need not decide whether its discussion of the factors of location, commercial context, stylization, lettering, repetition, commercial theme, and prominence strictly falls under the Sleekcraft eight-factor test. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the Sleekcraft test is a pliant one. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d at 1053. In other words, “the foregoing list [of eight factors] does not purport to be exhaustive, and non-listed variables may often be quite important.” Id. With the pliant nature of the analysis of likelihood of confusion under Sleekcraft in mind, the court turns to a discussion of the factors enumerated by Plaintiffs expert witness as contributing to a likelihood of confusion regarding Ms. Welles’ use of PEI trademarked terms. According to his declaration, Mr. Sterne has extensive experience in the field of marketing, both in relation to the Internet and to non-Internet forms. See Sterne Deck, ¶ 2. As discussed briefly in section III(A)(l)(a)(l)(I), supra, of this order, Plaintiffs main “facts” supporting its allegations that Ms. Welles’ “prominent, stylized and memorable use of PEI’s trademarks operates to... attract the attention of consumers to defendant’s website,” “borrow[s] from the cachet of the PEI marks,” and “trade[s] off of the good will of those marks,” Opposition at 9, are as follows: (1) Ms. Welles’ site is a predominantly commercial site; (2) The visible title banner on the homepage is a prominent commercial use of the Playboy term; (3) The commercial theme is “Playboy Playmate of the Year”; (4) The visible use of the terms in the title banner and the subject headings along the left-hand side of the homepage (along with the repeating PMOY background watermark and the references in the HTML code and metatags) create a repetitive use of the Playboy and Playmate terms; (5) Title banners or mastheads at the top of a commercial website do not serve the same function as book titles, but rather serve to identify the “source” of the website and its products; (6) This “source identification effect” is a result of the context of the use (commercial), prominence of the use (repetition and size), the location of the use (in title banner, source code, advertising banner, and wallpaper), and the stylization of the use (in script letters as product name and repetition of PMOY). See Decl. of James Sterne, PEI Expert Witness, ¶¶ 8-11, at 4^5. In short, Plaintiffs expert contends that the prominence, location, stylization, and repetition of Ms. Welles’ use of PEI terms in a commercial context creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods. 1) Location and Commercial Context That Ms. Welles’ site — -and her use of the contested terms — are predominantly commercial is not contested. That the title or masthead is located at the top of the homepage and serves to identify the source of the website and its products is not disputed: Defendant Welles does not contest the location of the title or the fact that the visual title, “Terri Welles Playmate of the Year 1981,” is meant to identify the source of her products and of her website. Neither does Ms. Welles dispute the location of the advertising banners (or the words contained therein) and that the words on both forms of the banner serve to identify the name or title of her website, or the “source” of her goods. The parties also do not dispute the location of the “PMOY ’81” abbreviation used as watermarks on specific web pages. Even accepting as true Mr. Sterne’s other assessments that the title and “PMOY ’81” watermarks are “prominent” and appear “in script letters as [a] product name,” and the combined repetitive use of the contested terms throughout the website create a “commercial theme” of “Playboy Playmate of the Year,” this court holds that these facts, in combination with the factors of location (as a “sign above the entrance to a store”) and of commercial use of the PEI terms, do not rebut Defendant Welles’ showing that she has made a non-trademark use of the terms “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981,” “Playmate of the Year 1981,” and “PMOY ’81” in good faith merely to describe her products and services. 2) Stylization and Lettering The fact that the font of the Playmate of the Year 1981 title is not recognizable as a Playboy magazine font evidences a reasonable use of the term and an absence of an intent to trick or mislead customers into implying sponsorship or endorsement by Plaintiff. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir.1969). The words “Terri Welles” are in block letters which overlap and partially cover the words, “Playmate of the Year 1981,” which are in cursive script letters, in smaller size. See Deck of Cynthia Johnston, PEI Legal Department Staff, Ex. J. It is undisputed that the title trademark for “Playboy” magazine is in block, not script letters. See Decl. of Martha Lindeman, PEI Senior Vice-President of Investor Relations and Corporate Communications, Ex. D; Second Amended Complaint, Ex. C, at 37. Plaintiff indicates nothing in particular about the stylization and lettering (size, coloring, font, etc.) of the “Playmate” term in the visual title, the “Playboy” and “Playmate” terms in the advertising banners, and the term “PMOY ’81” in the watermarks which are either an imitation of PEI’s trademark style or dress or an attempt to invoke the imagery — directly or indirectly — of PEI’s well-recognized bunny logo. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschafh v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir.1969) (“Church did not use Volkswagen’s distinctive lettering style or color scheme, nor did he display the encircled ‘VW’ emblem.”). Rather, the undisputed facts indicate that Ms. Welles’ use of PEI terms do not match PEI’s use of its trademark in style, dress, or other manner. Also, it is undisputed that (1) the lettering of the name “Terri Welles” as it appears in the visual title of her homepage and in the advertising banners is larger than the lettering of the designation, “Playmate of the Year 1981” or “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981” and (2) the picture of the solo Terri Welles appears on the homepage and in the advertising banners. Thus, despite Mr. Sterne’s unsupported conclusions, there are no disputed facts that Ms. Welles’ stylization and lettering of PEI terms in her website do not create a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods: Terri Welles. Upon similar facts in the case of Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment and found that the defendant’s use of the challenged trademarked terms was not a trademark infringement, but fair use. Cosmetically Sealed, 125 F.3d at 29-30. The court in Cosmetically Sealed noted that the defendant’s product name, “Color Splash,” and its own trademark, “Cutex,” appeared in the center and top-center of the promotional display card in red block letters at least twice or three times the size of the lettering for the challenged phrase, “Seal it with a Kiss!!,” which was in script type. See id. (emphasis added). The Cosmetically Sealed court held that “the non-trademark use of the challenged phrase and the defendant’s good faith are both evidenced by the fact that the source of the defendants’ product is clearly identified by the prominent display of defendant’s own trademarks.” Id. at 30. Likewise, the court here finds that Ms. Welles’ use of PEI’s terms