Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER HURLEY, Senior District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS TO MEMORANDUM AND ORDER INTRODUCTION...............................................................206 BACKGROUND................................................................206 I. The Patents at Issue........................................................206 II. The Special Master’s Recommendation.......................................207 III. The Objections In General...................................................208 APPLICABLE LAW............................................................208 I. Review of the R & R .......................................................208 II. Summary Judgment........................................................208 III. Summary of Substantive Law................................................210 A. Anticipation Under §§ 102(a) and 102(e)(2)................................210 B. Obviousness...........................................................211 DISCUSSION..................................................................212 I. Anticipation...............................................................213 A. Preliminary Objections..................................................213 1. The Special Master Identified and Applied the Correct Summary Judgment Standard...............................................213 2. Simple’s Supplemental Expert Declaration Will Be Admitted Into Evidence........................................................215 B. The Meininger Reference ...............................................217 1. Overview of the Meininger Reference .................................217 2. The Special Master’s Recommendations ...............................219 a. The Special Master Found that the Meininger Reference Was Admissible Prior Art..........................................219 b. The Special Master Found Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether the Meininger Reference Anticipates the Patents In Suit...............................................220 3. Simple’s Objections.................................................221 4. CA’s Objections....................................................222 5. Analysis...........................................................222 a. Admissibility of the Meininger Reference as Prior Art Under Section 102(a) of the Patent Act.................................222 (1) Meininger’s Oral Testimony Is Sufficiently Corroborated Under a Rule of Reason Analysis ..............................223 (a) The Archive CD Is Admissible and Highly Corroborative.....223 (b) The Email Sent By Meininger In May of 1998 As Well As Reply Emails From Users Who Accessed the Meininger Reference Are Admissible.....................227 (c) The Slashdot Article Is Admissible.........................228 (2) Analyzing the Reuter Factors And Applying the Rule of Reason Analysis...........................................228 b. The Meininger Reference Does Not Anticipate the Patents In Suit................................................. 229 (1) The Meininger Reference Fails to Anticipate Window Objects that Act Independently of Other Content.....................230 (a) The “What is it?” Window Element Cannot Be Restored Independently of Other Content.................230 (b) The DockTiles Cannot Be Moved Independently of Other Content.........................................231 (2) The Meininger Reference Fails to Anticipate the Solely Contained Within Requirement .............................232 (3) The Meininger Reference Satisfies the Without Refresh Requirement .....................................,.......234 6. The Court’s Rulings Regarding the Meininger Reference................235 C. The Visual DHTML Reference...........................................236 1. Overview of the Visual DHTML Reference.............................236 2. The Special Master’s Recommendations ...............................239 a. The Special Master’s Evidentiary Recommendations.................239 (1) The Testimony of Messrs. Dreyfus and Flanagan................239 (2) CA’s Documentary Evidence..................................240 b. The Special Master’s Recommendations on Anticipation..............241 3. The Parties’ Objections..............................................242 4. The Visual DHTML Reference Does Not Anticipate the Patents In Suit.............................................................243 a. The Visual DHTML Reference is Admissible Prior Art..............243 b. The Visual DHTML Reference Does Not Anticipate the Patents in Suit.......................................................243 (1) The Visual DHTML Reference Does Not Disclose Window Objects Because It Fails to Disclose Window Elements That Act Independently of Other Content....................243 (2) The Visual DHTML Reference Satisfies the Solely Contained Within Requirement.......................................244 (3) The Visual DHTML Reference Satisfies the Without Refresh Requirement .............................................246 5. The Court’s Rulings Regarding the Visual DHTML Reference............247 D. The JavaScript Bible ...................................................247 1. Overview of the JavaScript Bible .....................................248 2. The Special Master’s Recommendations ...............................248 a. The Special Master Found that the JavaScript Bible Was Eligible Prior Art....................................................248 b. The Special Master Found that there was a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the JavaScript Bible Anticipates the Patents In Suit............................................249 3. Simple’s Objections.................................................250 4. CA’s Objections ....................................................250 5. The JavaScript Bible is Enabling Prior Art ............................250 a. Legal Standard.................................................250 b. The JavaScript Bible Clearly Enables the Scripts and Supporting Text Contained Therein........................................251 c. Source Code Listings in the JavaScript Bible May Not Be Combined For Purposes of an Anticipation Determination..........252 6. The JavaScript Bible Anticipates Some of the Claims in the '563 and '882 Patents .....................................................254 a. The JavaScript Bible Discloses a Window Object that Acts Independently of Other Content....................................254 b. Unlike Listing 19-12, Listing 19-11 of the JavaScript Bible Does Not Disclose the Solely Contained Within Requirement............257 c. The JavaScript Bible Does Not Disclose Control Sections............258 d. The JavaScript Bible Discloses the Without Refresh Requirement.....259 e. The JavaScript Bible Does Not Disclose Multiple Window Objects In One Content Manifestation Environment......................259 f. An Analysis of Whether Listings 19-1 Through 19-8 and Listings 19-10 Through 19-12 Anticipate the Patents In Suit...............260 (1) Listing 19-1 Does Not Anticipate Any of the Independent Patent Claims At Issue.....................................260 (2) Listings 19-2 and 19-3 Do Not Anticipate Any of the Independent Patent Claims At Issue.........................261 (3) Listings 19-4 Through 19-6 Do Not Anticipate Any of the Independent Patent Claims At Issue.........................261 (4) Listings 19-7, 19-8 and 19-10 Do Not Anticipate Any of the Independent Patent Claims At Issue.........................262 (5) Anticipation Analysis of Listings 19-11 and 19-12 of the JavaScript Bible ..........................................262 (a) Listings 19-11 and 19-12 Anticipate Elements 1A, IB, 1C, 1G and II of the '493 Patent.........................262 (b) Methodology and Comparison of the Independent Claims at Issue ..............................................266 i) For the Purposes of Determining Anticipation, Elements 1A, IB and 1C of the '493 Patent are Substantively Indistinguishable from Elements 1A and IB of the '563 and '882 Patents..................266 ii) For the Purposes of Determining Anticipation, Elements ID, IE and IF of the '493 Patent are Substantively Indistinguishable from Elements 1C, ID and IE of the '563 Patent and Elements 1C Through IF of the '882 Patent...................270 iii) For the Purposes of Determining Anticipation, Elements 1G and II of the '493 Patent are Substantively Indistinguishable from Element IE of the '882 Patent.................................272 iv) For the Purposes of Determining Anticipation, Element 1H of the '493 Patent is Substantively Indistinguishable from Element IF of the '563 Patent and Element 1G of the '882 Patent............273 v) For the Purposes of Determining Anticipation, Claims 1 and 6 of the '563 Patent are Substantively Indistinguishable from Claim 1 of the '493 Patent...........................................273 vi) For the Purposes of Determining Anticipation, Claims 1 and 6 of the '882 Patent are Substantively Indistinguishable from Claim 1 of the '493 Patent...........................................276 a) The Court Will Correct a Minor Typographical Error in Claim 6 of the '882 Patent...............276 b) A Comparison of the Claims........................278 (c) Prior Art that Anticipates Claim 1 of the '493 Patent will Also Anticipate Claims 16 and 17 of the '882 Patent.....281 (d) The Claims of the '493 '563 and ' 882 Patents Cover Similar Subject Matter and Can Be Anticipated by the Same Prior Art Reference..............................282 i) The JavaScript Bible Does Not Anticipate Claim 1 of the '493 Patent or Any of Its Dependent Claims.....283 ii) The '563 Patent.....................................283 a) Independent Claim 1: the JavaScript Bible Does Not Anticipate Claim 2 of the '563 Patent but Anticipates Claim 5.............................283 b) Independent Claim 6: the JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claims 7, 8, 9,12 and 13 of the '563 Patent, but Not Claim 14 and There are Issues of Fact Regarding Claim 10......................284 1) The JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 7 of the '563 Patent..............................284 2) The JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 8 of the '563 Patent..............................286 3) The JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 9 of the '563 Patent..............................286 4) There is a Question of Fact as to Whether the JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 10 of the '563 Patent.................................287 5) The JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 12 of the '563 Patent..............................289 6) The JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 13 of the '563 Patent..............................289 7) CA Has Not Clearly Shown that the JavaScript Bible Anticipates Claim 14 of the '563 Patent.................................289 iii) The '882 Patent.....................................290 a) Independent Claim 1: the JavaScript Bible Does Not Anticipate Claim 2 of the '882 Patent but Anticipates Claim 5.............................290 b) Independent Claim 6: the JavaScript Bible Does Not Anticipate Claims 7 through 15 of the '882 Patent........................................290 c) Independent Claims 16 and 17 are Anticipated by the JavaScript Bible ............................290 7. The Court’s Ruling on the JavaScript Bible............................291 E. The Bates Patent ......................................................291 1. Overview of the Bates Patent.........................................291 2. Embodiments of the Subject Matter Claimed by the Bates Patent.........291 3. The Special Master’s Recommendations ...............................294 4. Simple’s Objections.................................................294 5. Analysis: No Reasonable Jury Could Find that the Bates Patent Anticipates the Patents In Suit.....................................294 6. The Court’s Ruling Regarding the Bates Patent........................296 II.Obviousness...............................................................296 A. The Special Master’s Recommendations...................................296 1. CA’s Level of Proof Regarding it’s Obviousness Defense.................296 2. Reference 114......................................................298 B. Simple’s Objections.....................................................299 C. Analysis ..............................................................299 1. Obviousness........................................................299 a. The Special Master Correctly Applied a Flexible Obviousness Standard ....................................................299 b. The Special Master Appropriately Denied Simple’s Motion for Summary Judgment...........................................300 (1) A Reasonable Jury Could Find That One Skilled In the Art Would Be Able To Create the Subject Matter Claimed by the '493, '563 and '882 Patents After Combining CA’s Prior Art......................................................300 (2) The Evidence Put Forth By Simple Fails to Remove All Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding CA’s Obviousness Defense ......................................303 2. Reference .........................................................304 3. The Court’s Rulings.................................................305 III.General Objections.........................................................305 A. CA is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment of Invalidity on All Asserted Claims..............................................................305 B. CA’s Requests for Summary Adjudication on Various Issues are Granted in Part..............................................................305 C. CA Is Entitled To Summary Judgment Regarding the Date Certain Printed References are Deemed Publicly Available............. 306 1. The Special Master’s JavaScript Bible Recommendation....... 307 2. The Court’s Analysis and Ruling............................ 307 308 CONCLUSION.......................... INTRODUCTION Plaintiff CA Inc. (“CA”), formerly known as Computer Associates International Inc., commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment that three patents owned by Defendants Simple.com, Inc. and Wired Solutions, LLC (collectively “Simple”) are invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed by CA. Simple has counterclaimed for infringement. Presently before the Court are the parties’ objections to the Report and Recommendation Regarding Anticipation and Obviousness (the “R & R”) (Dkt. Nos. 591 & 592) of Special .Master Gale Peterson. For the reasons set forth herein, the parties’ objections are denied in part and granted in part. BACKGROUND I. The Patents at Issue A complete factual recitation regarding this matter is contained in this Court’s Claim Construction Memorandum & Order, dated March 5, 2009 (“Claim Constr. Mem.”), familiarity with which is presumed. For present purposes it suffices to state that the three patents at issue relate to computer technology, and are U.S. Patent Nos. 6,272,493, 6,434,563, and 6,535,882 (the '493, '563, and '882 Patents respectively). In general, the subject matter claimed in the '493, '563, and '882 Patents is meant to provide, what the patentee terms, a windowed content manifestation environment (“CME”). An exemplary CME is displayed below in Figure l. (Figure 1 herein is a reproduction of Figure 2B of the '493 Patent). According to the patentee, this was an improvement over preexisting technology because the claimed invention lets one open, view, resize, minimize, move and otherwise use multiple window objects on the same web browser screen, without: (1) triggering a refresh; (2) having to go back and forth from one web page to another; or (3) requiring the use of another web browser. For example, a user could open, resize, move, close or otherwise manipulate the “NEWS” and “TRAVEL” windows, shown above, without forcing the entire CME to be refreshed. Having briefly described the technology at issue, the Court will summarize the Special Master’s recommended disposition regarding anticipation and obviousness. II. The Special Master’s Recommendation Generally speaking, the Special Master recommended that the Court deny both CA’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity under § 102(a) of the Patent Act and Simple’s motion for summary judgment dismissing CA’s affirmative defenses of anticipation and obviousness under §§ 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. (R & R at 2, 95, 177, 205, 244, 263, 305.) The Special Master recommended denial of CA’s motion for summary judgment primarily because he found genuine issues of material fact as to whether any of the prior art references discussed therein disclosed a window object as contemplated by the patents in suit. The Special Master recommended that Simple’s motion for summary judgment be denied because he found that the record evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the '493, '563, and '882 Patents were anticipated or obvious. III. The Objections In General Both parties have filed objections to the R & R. In their objections, Simple maintains that the Special Master incorrectly: (1) applied the wrong summary judgment standard; (2) denied their motion for summary judgment on anticipation regarding the DHTML WindowMaker simulation (“Meininger reference” or “Meininger web page”), Visual DHTML reference, JavaScript Bible, and United States Patent No. 5,877,766 (“Bates Patent”) as there are at least two elements of each asserted claim in the '493, '563, and '882 Patents, which are not present in these references; (3) denied their motion for summary judgment on CA’s obviousness defense by ignoring “the requirement that evidence of a motivation to combine must be ‘clear and particular,’ and may not be the result of hindsight reasoning”; and (4) overlooked the fact that CA did not produce clear and convincing evidence that one of its prior art references was “disseminated to the public.” (Defs.’ Mem. In Supp. of Their Objections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Anticipation and Obviousness, Dkt. No. 602. 1-2 (“Simple’s Objections”).) For its part, CA argues that: (1) the Special Master failed to recognize that its prior art references anticipate each element of the independent patent claims at issue; (2) it is entitled to a judgment of invalidity on all patent claims asserted by Simple; (3) the Court should summarily adjudicate matters found to be without material issues of fact; and (4) it should be granted summary judgment regarding the date each of the 37 printed references it offered as prior art were available to the public. (CA’s Objections to Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Anticipation and Obviousness (Dkt. No. 606), at 1-2, 25 (“CA’s Objections”).) The parties’ objections will be discussed in further detail below. First, the Court shall summarize the legal standards applicable to the case at bar. APPLICABLE LAW I. Review of the R & R The Court’s Order appointing the Special Master specifically states that a “[r]e-view of and appeal from all orders and recommendations, as well as the appropriate standard of review shall be governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and the associated case law.” (Dkt. No. 152 at 4.) If objected to, both findings of fact and legal conclusions, including evidentiary rulings, recommended by the Special Master will be reviewed de novo. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas E. Hoar v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1990); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(f)(3), (4). Otherwise, the Special Master’s findings of fact or legal conclusions will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. See Benicorp Ins., 447 F.Supp.2d at 331 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)). II. Summary Judgment The standard for summary judgment in a patent case is the same as in any other case. See Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed.Cir.1998); Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1984). Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and one party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Cooper v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 677, 679 (Fed.Cir.1984). The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are material; “only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the nonmovant, that no rational jury could find in the nonmovant’s favor. See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen’l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The moving party bears the burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matters that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must then put forth evidence setting forth specific facts that show there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ... [a court must] view the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and ... draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardio. Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 672 (Fed.Cir.1990). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must also take into account the evidentiary standard of proof that pertains to the trial on the merits. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-53, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Since patent claims enjoy a presumption of validity under § 282 of the Patent Act, the party seeking to prove invalidity must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2006) (citing N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1993)). “Clear and convincing” evidence is that which gives the finder of fact “an abiding conviction that the truth of [the proponent’s] factual contentions [is] ‘highly probable.’ ” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (citation omitted). “[A] moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab. Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.2001). On the other hand, a party wishing to have its patent held not invalid on summary judgment, must show that no reasonable jury could find that the record contains clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. See Med. Instrumentation & Diag. Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1220-21 (Fed.Cir.2003); Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 962. “Anticipation is a question of fact and obviousness is a question of law based on underlying facts.” Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1220 (citations omitted); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1745, 167 L.Ed.2d 705 (2007) (“The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.”) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966)); Beckson Marine v. NFM Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Obviousness is a legal conclusion based on underlying findings of fact.”). Nevertheless, a court may rule on both when a motion for summary judgment has been made. See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom., Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted) (“Although anticipation is a question of fact, it may still be decided on summary judgment .... ”). A court that is presented with cross-motions for summary judgment regarding anticipation under § 102 is obviously not compelled to rule for either party. Rather, when both parties move for summary judgment, each motion must be evaluated on its own merits. See McKay v. United States, 199 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1999); 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2720, at 335-36 (1998) (footnote omitted) (Each motion must be ruled on separately while the court determines “for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.”). If both parties fail to meet their respective burdens of proof, the Court must deny both motions. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Bubble Room, Inc. v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 561 (Fed.Cir.1998)). Having summarized the relevant standards of review, the Court now turns to the general substantive legal standards for determining whether a patent is invalid under §§ 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. III. Summary of Substantive Law A. Anticipation Under §§ 102(a) and 102(e)(2) A patent claim is anticipated if a single prior art reference contains each and every limitation of the claimed invention. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed.Cir.1998); Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed.Cir.1987); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Pursuant to § 102(a) of the Patent Act, one is entitled to a patent unless “the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The foregoing knowledge, use, description or patenting of the claimed invention are included in what is termed prior art. Moreover, although § 102(a) uses the term “invention,” anticipation inquiries proceed on a “claim-by-claim basis.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citing Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2007)). Section 102(e)(2) provides that one is entitled to a patent unless “the invention was described in ... a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(2). Notably, for a prior art reference to be anticipatory under any subparagraph of § 102, it must meet the criteria set out below. Anticipation is a multifaceted determination. First, a court must determine whether the allegedly invalidating reference qualifies as prior art. Next, a court must determine whether every element of a patent claim is expressly or inherently disclosed in the prior art reference at issue. See Celeritas Techs. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed.Cir.1998). In addition, the prior art reference must: (1) contain a “disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim” and (2) enable the claimed subject matter so as to place it in the possession of the public domain. Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1334-35 (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed.Cir.1983) (citation and emphasis omitted)); see Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed.Cir.1986). Having broadly summarized the anticipation standard under § 102, the Court will apply specific case law as needed in its analysis. B. Obviousness Section 103 of the Patent Act proscribes the issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added). Obviousness “must be evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2006). In order to determine whether a patent is obvious, courts must conduct an objective analysis by considering both the primary and secondary considerations articulated by the Supreme Court. See KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1734 (discussing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684 and Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 11 How. 248, 13 L.Ed. 683 (1851)). The primary obviousness considerations entail resolving “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,” determining the scope and content of the relevant prior art and comparing it to the claims at issue. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1734 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684); see also DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1360. Although the primary factors are most important, courts must also consider secondary factors such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.” KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1734 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684); see also DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1360. Indeed, these secondary factors are used to guard against the hindsight application of the “teachings of the invention in issue” into prior art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 36, 86 S.Ct. 684. Some obviousness guidelines have been forged through years of precedent. For example, it is well established that a patent for ‘“a combination which only unites old elements!, according to familiar methods,] with no change in their respective functions’ ” or a patent for two or more elements “in combination” which would do “no more than they would in separate sequential operation” are obvious. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1739 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162 (1950)). On the other hand, an invention which combines elements that prior art teaches against combining, or an invention which combines familiar elements but yields exceptionally unexpected results, will usually be non-obvious. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1739 (citing Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-62, 90 S.Ct. 305, 24 L.Ed.2d 258 (1969)). Additionally, a patent “can be proved obvious ... by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.” KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1742. Although equipped with certain bedrock principles, courts must still apply a flexible approach to obviousness determinations. See id. at 1739; In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (Fed.Cir.2007); see also DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1367. For instance, “the Supreme Court suggests, [that] a flexible approach to the [teaching, suggestion, or motivation test (“TSM test”) ] prevents hindsight and focuses on evidence before the time of invention ... without unduly constraining the breadth of knowledge available to one of ordinary skill in the art during the obviousness analysis.” Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1260 (citation omitted); see Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“[A] flexible TSM test remains the primary guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight analysis.”). Under the TSM test, a patent can be proven obvious “if ‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.” KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1734 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-1324 (Fed.Cir.1999)). Such a motivation to combine need not be explicit and must be analyzed under the lens of one skilled in the art. See KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1740-41. When determining obviousness, a court must also consider the analytical prowess of one skilled in the art rather than confining its analysis to explicit teachings in prior art. A “patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1741. [Indeed, it will often] ... be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. Id. at 1740-41; Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1221-22. Although they are significant, courts must not overemphasize “the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1741. In fact, to find a patent obvious, a court “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim.” Id. Rather, “a court can [also] take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1741; see also DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed.Cir.1997)) (“[T]here is no requirement that the prior art contain an express suggestion to combine known elements to achieve the claimed invention. Rather, the suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art.”). Having broadly articulated the obviousness standard under § 103, the Court will apply specific case law as needed in its analysis. DISCUSSION In its analysis of the parties’ objections,' the Court will initially focus on claim 1 of the '493 Patent. Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter claimed by the patents in suit and if a prior art reference anticipates or renders claim 1 obvious, the same result will likely apply to the other independent claims of the patents in suit. Where necessary, the Court’s analysis will directly address the other patent claims at issue. In order to assist its analysis, the Court has divided claim 1 into nine elements, shown below by the bracketed letters added by the Court. 1. A system for facilitating a windowed content manifestation environment within a web browser, comprising: [A] a server system configured to transmit a software system and associated content via an electronic data network; and [B] a web browser client operating within a data processing system that is coupled to said server system via the electronic data network and having a content manifestation environment, [C] said web browser client operative to receive said software system and said associated content from said server system via the electronic data network, [D] to process said software system and said associated content to produce window objects solely contained within said content manifestation environment, [E] each window object of said window objects is associated with a set of controllable attributes and is configured to statically or dynamically manifest at least a portion of said associated content therein, [F] said controllable attributes configured to affect manifestation of said each window object by said web browser client within said content manifestation environment, [G] wherein said each window object executes within and is directly controlled by said web browser client which operates within said data processing system, [H] and said controllable attributes associated with said each window object permit said each window object to be controlled as a result of performing at least one of a moving operation, a resizing operation, a minimizing operation and a maximizing operation within said content manifestation environment and [I] without requiring said web browser client to refresh said content manifestation environment. When necessary, the Court will refer to a certain claim element by the designation shown above rather than repeating the relevant claim language. For example, instead of stating that a prior art reference does not disclose a window object that is “... solely contained within said content manifestation environment,” the Court will state that the reference does not disclose element ID of the '493 Patent. The Court now turns to the parties’ objections, addressing first the objections with respect to anticipation and then those related to obviousness. I. Anticipation A. Preliminary Objections The heart of the parties’ objections to the Special Master’s recommendations on anticipation relate to the following contested prior art references: the Meininger reference, the Visual DHTML reference, the JavaScript Bible, and the Bates Patent. Prior to addressing those objections, the Court will address two preliminary objections raised by the parties. They are: (1) Simple’s objections to the Special Master’s standard of review; and (2) CA’s objection to the admission of a supplemental expert declaration submitted by Simple in support of their objections to the R & R. 1. The Special Master Identified and Applied the Correct Summary Judgment Standard According to the Special Master, it would be inappropriate to grant either of the parties’ motions for summary judgment if a reasonable jury could rule in favor of the nonmoving party. (See R & R at 4 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).) As the following analysis will show, the Special Master applied the correct standard to the parties’ motions for summary judgment. In analyzing its motion for summary judgment on anticipation, the Special Master stated that in order for CA to prevail it must demonstrate that the relevant prior art references clearly and convincingly disclose each element of the relevant claims with no “genuine issue of material fact.” (R & R at 63 (stating “it is CA’s burden to prove invalidity, ... [its] evidence must meet the clear and convincing standard with respect to every limitation of the disputed claims”), 94-95, 177, 204-05, 244). For instance, in denying CA’s motion with respect to the Meininger reference, the Special Master found that “there remain unresolved genuine issues of material facts in dispute.” (See R & R at 95; see also id. at 177, 204-05, 244 (denying CA’s motion for summary judgment of anticipation regarding the Visual DHTML, JavaScript Bible and Bates Patent because there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether certain elements of the '493 Patent were anticipated).) The Special Master also correctly stated that in order to prevail on their motion, Simple bore the burden of demonstrating that no reasonable jury could find that the record contains clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. (See R & R at 251-52 (applying Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1220); see also id. at 263, 272, 288, 297, 302, 304, 305.) Applying that standard, the Special Master found that, although issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in its favor, CA had put forth enough evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that the patents in suit were clearly and convincingly anticipated, thereby mandating denial of Simple’s motion. Simple’s argument that they should be granted summary judgment merely because CA’s motion failed leaves the Court underwhelmed. As the following excerpt from Eli Lilly shows, this exact issue has been addressed by the Federal Circuit and remains far from a mystery. [A] moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise. Alternatively, a moving party seeking to have a patent held not invalid at summary judgment must show that the nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial, failed to produce clear and convincing evidence on an essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could invalidate the patent. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolves all doubts in its favor. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 962; Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 249 F.Supp.2d at 231 (W.D.N.Y.2003); Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1220-21; see also generally Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2005). In short, to defeat Simple’s motion for summary judgment in on its invalidity defense, CA need only show that a reasonable jury could find that it put forth clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. Indeed, Simple’s argument misconstrues the entire point of cross-motions for summary judgment. As a subsidiary argument, Simple claims that the quality of CA’s evidence is insufficient to defeat Simple’s motion for summary judgment. According to Simple, CA’s evidence of anticipation was conelusory in nature and not sufficiently detailed to raise a genuine issue of fact. Putting aside for now the level of evidence in support of the Meininger, Visual DHTML, JavaScript Bible, and Bates Patent references, which will be discussed in great detail later on, the Court agrees with the Special Master’s determination that the evidence submitted in support of the remaining references is sufficient to create a material question of fact. As shown in excerpt below, the Special Master analogized the case at bar to the fact pattern in Medical Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1220, and found that the evidence submitted by CA created genuine issues of material fact as to the validity of the '493, '563, and '882 Patents. (R & R at 251-52.) Given the large number of asserted pri- or art references, Mr. Goodman’s approach to summarizing the invalidity contentions with respect to those references is not improper, and is sufficiently particular to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether those references anticipate the claims at issue. See Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corporation v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1220 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“Elekta’s expert testimony in this case is not of the type that we have found to be insufficient as a matter of law to raise a genuine issue of invalidity in the past. Rather than leaving the trial judge to ‘search through lengthy technologic documents for possible evidence,’ Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen v. Biorcorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2001), Elekta’s expert quoted the particular portions of the references that were relevant for each of the claim limitations. Furthermore, the expert did not simply make a conclusory statement that, in his opinion, the claims were invalid. See id. (‘It is well established that conclusory statements of counsel or a witness that a patent is invalid do not raise a genuine issue of fact.’). Rather, for each claim limitation, he connected it with disclosures in the prior art that he believed taught each particular limitation.”). (R & R at 251-52.) The Court, like the Special Master, finds that the case at bar is analogous to Medical Instrumentation and, contrary to Simple’s contention, CA’s evidence of anticipation is not conclusory. In fact, CA provides hundreds of pages of analysis and numerous exhibits regarding its invalidity claims. (See, e.g., Invalidity Expert Report of Danny Goodman (Dkt. No. 362) (“Goodman Invalidity Rpt.”).) Like the expert in Medical Instrumentation, CA’s expert, Danny Goodman, cited to specific pages, sections, and portions of prior art references and linked them to the asserted claim elements he believed they invalidated. (See, e.g., Goodman Invalidity Rpt. at Ex. D (a claim chart listing the elements of the patents in suit and citing to specific pages in CA’s prior art which purportedly invalidate them).) Having reviewed Goodman’s extensive invalidity analysis, the Court, like the Special Master, finds CA’s evidence sufficient to raise a material issue of fact. Simple’s objection to the R & R on the ground the Special Master applied the wrong summary judgment standard is denied. 2. Simple’s Supplemental Expert Declaration Will Be Admitted Into Evidence The Court now turns to CA’s objection to Simple’s use of a supplemental expert declaration. CA provided a supplemental expert declaration and accompanying video demonstrations by Danny Goodman together with its objections to the R & R. (See Decl. of Danny Goodman In Supp. Of CA International, Inc.’s Objection to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendations as to CA’s Mot. For Summ. J. of Anticipation (Dkt. No. 607) (“First Goodman Supp. Decl.”).) Simple followed suit and submitted a supplemental declaration and accompanying video demonstration from their own expert witness, Richard Belgard. (See Dkt. No. 613 (“Belgard Supp. Decl.”).) CA then submitted a second supplemental expert declaration. (See Dkt. No. 620 (“Second Goodman Supp. Decl.”).) CA now argues that, while its own supplemental evidence should be considered, Simple’s supplemental expert evidence should not, because rather than “providing new support for existing opinions” Simple provides “entirely new opinions.” (CA’s Reply in Supp. of its Objections to Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding Anticipation and Obviousness (Dkt. No. 619) (“CA’s Supp. Reply”), at 1-3.) According to CA, it has been unfairly “blindside[d]” by these entirely new opinions, in contravention of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. (Id. at 2-3.) For the reasons set forth below, CA’s objection is denied and the Court will consider Simple’s supplemental evidence. As noted earlier, because the Special Master is acting in the place of the magistrate judge, his reports and recommendations are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (See Dkt. No. 152 at 4.) Pursuant to Rule 72(b)(3), “a district judge may ... receive further evidence” while resolving objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); see also Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 656-57 (2d Cir.1998) (finding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in considering supplemental evidence presented on an objection to a magistrates’s report and recommendation); Perez v. Hewitt, 2008 WL 780628, *3-4, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22980, *9-12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2008) (considering supplemental evidence in reviewing a magistrate’s report and recommendations); Kendall v. Vives, 2007 WL 959507, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22414, *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007) (same). The facts at hand are highly analogous to instances in which other courts have properly exercised their discretion in considering additional evidence under Rule 72(b)(3). For instance, in Perez, the district court considered additional evidence when reviewing a magistrate’s report and recommendations because: (1) there was no indication that the evidentiary submission was a “dilatory tactic” or timed in order to gain a “strategic advantage”; (2) there was no indication that the new evidence lacked reliability; and (3) the new evidence was “highly relevant.” 2008 WL 780628, *3-4, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22980, *9-12. As CA was able to submit a second supplemental expert declaration in response, Simple has gained no strategic advantage by waiting until they responded to CA’s objections to the R & R to present Belgard’s supplemental declarations. Nor is there an indication that the timing of Belgard’s report was dilatory in nature. Belgard’s supplemental declaration is also particularly relevant because it contains pictorial and video demonstrations directly relating to issues raised by the R & R. See Perez, 2008 WL 780628 at *4, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22980 at *11-12 (citing Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985)). There is no question of CA “being blindsided by another party with new opinions never before discussed.” Cary Oil Co. v. MG Refining & Mktg., Inc., 2003 WL 1878246, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2003). In this case, (1) Belgard’s report addressed points raised in CA’s prior supplemental expert report on the same topic; (2) Belgard had already discussed most of the opinions and arguments he raised in his supplemental report in his rebuttal report submitted in August of 2004; and (3) CA was able to counter Belgard’s supplemental testimony with yet another supplemental report of their own, ensuring that Simple’s supplemental evidence would not go unaddressed. Nor does the case law cited by CA compel exclusion of the supplemental declaration. For instance, Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 77 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1060-61 (D.Minn.1999), is distinguishable because the sanctioned party in that case used its supplemental expert reports to raise obviousness and non-infringement arguments for the first time at the summary judgment stage. Similarly, Revlon Consumer Products Corp. v. Estee Lauder Cos., Inc., 2008 WL 21751833, *4-5, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13004, *11-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003) and Cary Oil, 2003 WL 1878246 at *4, fail to advance CA’s argument because here, unlike those cases: (1) the opinions expressed in the supplemental declaration are not new arguments that CA was unaware of, and (2) CA was able to submit its second supplemental declaration in rebuttal. In sum, the Court will exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) and consider the supplemental evidence put forth by CA and Simple. Having addressed the preliminary objections, the Court now turns to the heart of the parties’ objections, determining whether the Meininger, Visual DHTML, JavaScript Bible, and Bates Patent references anticipate the patents in suit. The Court will address each of the references separately. In determining whether each of these references anticipates the '493, '563, and '882 Patents, the Court will first describe the reference in question, summarize the Special Master’s recommendations and the parties’ objections thereto, and finally set forth its own analysis and ruling. The Court will begin with an analysis of the Meininger reference. B. The Meininger Reference 1. Overview of the Meininger Reference The Meininger reference is a web page which simulates a windowed content manifestation environment. (R & R at 15.) Shown below in Figure 2, is a screen shot of the Meininger reference from the Invalidity Expert Report of Danny Goodman. (Goodman Invalidity Rpt. at 30.) The Court will limit its discussion to those aspects of the Meininger reference which relate directly to the parties’ objections. As Figure 2 shows: the “upper left quadrant of the screen” contains “a [Window-Maker] menu with various buttons,” the “upper right quadrant of the screen” contains three elements stacked on top of each other, the bottom left hand quadrant contains a window entitled ‘What is it?,” and the bottom right hand quadrant contains a set of tiled items. (R & R at 26-27, 30-33.) If a user were to click any of the buttons in WindowMaker menu found in the upper left quadrant of the screen, a corresponding window would appear. For example, the bottom most button on the menu is labeled “Other Stuff.” Consequently, if a user were to click on this button, a window labeled “Other Stuff’ would appear on screen and could be manipulated by the user. In this context, manipulation includes moving, closing, restoring, and minimizing. {See R & R at 30-33.) Notably, the windows in the Meininger reference can be dragged outside their content manifestation environments. As such, the windows in the Meininger reference can be analogized to the draggable modules (“DMODs”) disclosed in the '493, '563, and '882 Patents and the screen in the Meininger reference could be analogized to the content manifestation environment described by the patents in suit. {See Claim Constr. Mem. at 22-24 (describing DMODs).) The “What is it?” window can be moved around the content manifestation environment of the Meininger reference. However, unlike the claimed subject matter of the patents in suit, certain windows in the Meininger reference can be dragged off the computer screen. {See R & R at 87; Decl. of Nittin Subhedar in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity (Dkt. No. 332-2) (“Subhedar Deck”), at Ex. 43, Confidential Rebuttal Report of Richard A. Belgard ¶ 90 (pointing out that the windows in the Meininger reference could be dragged entirely off the web browser screen).) Additionally, when windows in the Meininger reference are minimized, they are made invisible and can only be restored when the user clicks on the corresponding button in the separate Window-Maker menu. Having described the Meininger reference, the Court will summarize the Special Master’s recommendations most relevant to the parties’ objections. 2. The Special Master’s Recommendations Overall, the Special Master found that the Meininger reference was admissible prior art but that there were material issues of fact relevant to whether it anticipated the '493, '563, and '882 Patents, a. The Special Master Found that the Meininger Reference Was Admissible Prior Art First, the Special Master addressed whether the Meininger reference was admissible prior art under § 102(a) of the Patent Act. (R & R at 58.) Applying the “rule of reason” analysis, “under which all pertinent evidence is examined when determining the credibility of an inventor’s testimony,” the Special Master found that: “(1) Meininger’s testimony, (2) date-stamped computer files, (3) email and (4) an online article about Meininger’s website,” were sufficient to establish that the Meininger reference was a printed publication, which was known or used by others in the United States prior to January 21, 1999. (R & R at 36-58 (citation omitted).) Specifically, the Special Master found that Meininger’s testimony was corroborated by substantial physical evidence. According to the Special Master, the computer generated date stamps on a CD containing the Meininger reference (the “archive CD”) established that the Meininger reference was “created in May of 1998.” (Id. at 43.) This finding, along with Meininger’s testimony, was corroborated by a series of emails sent between Meininger and others who used the Meininger reference before January, 21, 1999. (Id. at 44-53.) The Special Master found that an email sent by Meininger, describing the Meininger reference and soliciting feedback from a community of web developers was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), “at least,” to rebut a charge of improper motive. (Id. at 48.) With regards to the emails sent from others who used the Meininger reference, the Special Master found that they were “clearly admissible” because: (1) they were not offered for the truth of their contents, but rather “to show that others accessed and viewed the” Meininger reference; and (2) even if they were hearsay, they would be admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and 803(2) as presence sense impressions and excited utterances. (Id. at 48, 52-53.) As the following excerpt shows, based in part on the addresses associated with some of the emails offered to corroborate Meininger’s testimony, the Special Master reasoned that certain emails were sent from within the United States, indicating that the Meininger reference was used domestically: Some of the foregoing emails bear addresses that are clearly foreign, such as “fatal@pc23-c801.uibk.ac.at” (Austria) and “nv96wgzg@Katedral. SE” (Sweden), but others are of clearly domestic origin. The email “wkoffel@MIT.EDU,” for example, obviously refers to a Massachusetts Institute of Technology email server, and suggests that Meininger’s website was not only known in the United States, but also used in the United States. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“A presentation indicative of the state of knowledge and use in this country therefore qualifies as pri- or art for anticipation purposes under § 102.”). Likewise, “kilpatds@erols. com” refers to the server run by the Erols Internet Company, which was a domestic company internet services provider at the time. Also, CA provides a printout of the personal website of “CmdrTaco,” aka Rob Malda, which indicates that “CmdrTaco” was born, raised and still lives in the United States, and launched and presently serves as the editor-in-chief of www. slashdot.org. See (Martiniak Deck), Exh. 3 (printout from http://cmdrtaco. net/rob.shtml). (R & R at 55 (footnotes omitted).) The Special Master also reasoned that the Meininger reference was used in the United States because: (1) it formed a complete system over a network once it was accessed by a user and (2) Meininger benefited by gaining publicity every time the Meininger reference was accessed by a remote user. (Id. at 56-57 (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,1 317 (Fed.Cir.2005))). Next, the Special Master found that Meininger’s testimony was corroborated by an article found on the Internet (the “Slashdot article”), which praised the Meininger reference as “excellent” and provided users with a “link” to it. (Id. at 53-54.) Previously, users could click on this “link” to access the Meininger reference. According to the Special Master, the Internet article was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of its contents but merely to show that the Meininger reference was known and used prior to January 21, 1999. (R & R at 54.) In view of the foregoing, the Special Master concluded that the Meininger reference was a publicly accessible printed publication as of May, 1998. (Id. at 57-58 (citing Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1335-37 (Fed.Cir.2005)).) Having found that the Meininger reference was admissible prior art, the Special Master then addressed whether it anticipated the '493, '563, and '882 Patents, b. The Special Master Found Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether the Meininger Reference Anticipates the Patents In Suit The Special Master focused his anticipation analysis on claim 1 of the '493 Patent, and determined that CA’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of anticipation, as it pertained to the Meininger reference, should be denied because there were material issues of fact regarding whether the Meininger reference disclosed the: (1) “acts independently” requirement of a window object; (2) multiple window objects requirement of element ID of the '493 patent; and (3) without refresh requirement of element II of the '493 Patent. (Id. at 81-82, 84, 94-95.) In particular, the Special Master found that CA’s evidence did not compel the conclusion that the window elements in the Meininger reference, which it claimed were window objects, acted independently of “all of the ‘other content’ ” in its respective HTML document. (R & R at 81-82.) Specifically, the Special Master stated: Mr. Goodman did not, however, demonstrate that the “What is it?” element could be “dropped” to cover the left-side menu or demonstrate that the “What is it?” element could be dragged and dropped over the right-side stack of elements. Thus, while Mr. Goodman demonstrated that the “What is it?” element “acts independently” with respect to the block of four elements in the middle of the CME, it is not clear that the “What is it?” element may do so with respect to all of the “other content” of the CME.... There remains a genuine issue of material fact, therefore, whether the “What is it?” element qualifies as a “window object.” ... In other words, the foregoing demonstration is not sufficient to compel the conclusion that the element acts independently of all “other content.” (Id.) The Special Master found issues of material fact as to whether the Meininger reference could simultaneously host multiple window elements because CA’s invalidity demonstration only opened the “What is it?” window element. (Id. at 84.) Finally, the Special Master found issues of material fact as to whether the Meininger reference satisfied the “without ... refresh” limitation of element II of the '493 Patent because there was a q