Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT McMAHON, District Judge. Plaintiff Monica Bermudez, an officer with the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), commenced this action against the City of New York (the “City”) and seven officers of the NYPD. Bermudez asserts 21 claims against each Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, New York State Executive Law § 296, and New York City Administrative Code § 8-107. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss by Neusch, Diaz, Croke, and Bax are granted for all claims asserted by Bermudez. As against Smith and Sanabria, Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, Thirteen, Fourteen, Sixteen, Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty are dismissed. Counts Three, Six, Nine, Twelve, Fifteen, Eighteen, and Twenty-One are not dismissed and Smith’s and Sanabria’s motions for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity as to these counts are denied. As against Stroman, Counts One, Four, Five, Seven, Ten, Eleven, Thirteen, Sixteen, Seventeen, and Nineteen are dismissed. Counts Two, Eight, Fourteen, and Twenty are dismissed without prejudice as against Stroman. Stroman’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity for Counts Three, Six, Nine, Twelve, Fifteen, Eighteen, and Twenty-One is denied. I. Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all of Bermudez’s factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). Because the individual defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, Bermudez has already been deposed. To the extent that she testified about facts that go beyond the allegations in her complaint, I am considering her testimony on the motions for summary judgment based on the grounds of qualified immunity. BACKGROUND Bermudez’s claims of employment discrimination stem from incidents involving certain individuals at the NYPD between 2004 and 2007. Monica Bermudez is a Hispanic female of Puerto-Rican descent. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Bermudez became a police officer with the NYPD on January 14, 2004. (Id. ¶ 10.) Shortly after becoming an NYPD officer, Bermudez was assigned to the “Patrol Borough Bronx” and, specifically, to the Bronx Evidence Collection Team (the “BECT”). (Id. ¶ 14.) For ease of analysis, I will discuss her allegations against each Defendant individually. Taken together, Bermudez claims that they make a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of her gender, her religious affiliation, and her race, as well as creating a hostile work environment. 1. Lieutenant Donald Stroman Lieutenant Donald Stroman was at all relevant times Bermudez’s direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 15.) Soon after starting with the BECT, Bermudez alleges that Lieutenant Stroman began to sexually harass her. (Id. ¶ 16.) Specifically, Stroman “would press his body against [Bermudez’s] and other female officer’s breasts” for his own sexual gratification, and would make inappropriate sexual comments, such as “Hi, I want to give you a hug but, without your vest on.” (Id. ¶¶ 17,19-20.) In January 2004, Bermudez asked Stroman for Sundays off because she wanted to attend religious services. (Id. ¶22.) According to Bermudez, Stroman responded to her request by stating “If I set foot in a church I will be struck by lightning. But, hey, I am going to Hell anyway.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Bermudez also alleges that shortly after she was confirmed in 2004, Stroman and Defendant Denise Diaz “walked around the office hollering Praise the Lord and Alleluia!,’ whenever [Bermudez] entered a room.” (Id. ¶ 24.) In May 2004, Stroman told Bermudez, “I like the way you take care of yourself,” “You have a nice body,” and “I like the way you dress.” (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28-29.) Each time, Bermudez refused Stroman’s advances. (Id. ¶ 27, 31.) On December 14, 2004, Stroman, believing that Bermudez had slept with Police Officer Sanabria, “yelled and cursed” at Bermudez and Sanabria in a “jealous rage.” (Id. ¶¶ 53-55.) That same day, Stroman threatened to report Bermudez to the “Early Intervention Unit.” (Id. ¶ 56.) Bermudez does not explain the purpose or function of the Early Intervention Unit, or whether Stroman followed through with his threat. On December 16, 2004, Bermudez was asked to submit to a “Random Dole Test.” (Id. ¶ 57.) Bermudez does not explain the purpose for the Random Dole Test or who must submit to the test. On July 20, 2005, Stroman called Bermudez’s cellular telephone number while intoxicated to express his feelings towards her. (Id. ¶ 64.) On July 22, 2005, Bermudez complained about Stroman’s conduct to Joseph Anthony, a delegate of the Patrolman’s Benevolent Association (“PBA”). (Id. ¶ 65.) Anthony informed Bermudez that going forward with a sexual harassment complaint against Stroman would “stigmatize[ ]” her. (Id. ¶ 66.) On August 4, 2005, Bermudez again complained to Anthony about Stroman’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 67.) Bermudez alleges that Anthony never followed through on Bermudez’s complaint by reporting it to the NYPD’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity or the Internal Affairs Bureau. (Id. ¶ 68.) On July 19, 2005, Bermudez fell down a flight of stairs while on duty and injured her back. As a result of her back injury, on August 17, 2005, Bermudez was placed on “Limited Duty Capacity.” (Id. ¶70.) Bermudez claims that after August 2005, Stroman and Sergeant Charles Neusch began to scrutinize her use of the NYPD’s sick policy. (Id. ¶ 72.) On October 25, 2006, Bermudez interrupted a conversation between Stroman and another officer in the BECT. (Id. ¶ 86.) When she entered the room, Bermudez claims that Stroman began making “smart comments” about “religious fanatics.” (Id. ¶ 87.) According to Bermudez, before she entered the room, the conversation between Stroman and the other officer was not about religion. (Id. ¶ 88.) On October 27, 2006, Sergeant Myra Rann filed a complaint on Bermudez’s behalf against Stroman with the NYPD’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (“OEEO”). (Id. ¶ 91.) Bermudez was interviewed regarding the complaint on November 1, 2006. (Id. ¶ 93.) Bermudez claims that the interviewers were hostile and did not appear to believe her allegations. (Id.) At some point between October and November 2006, Stroman (and Defendants Croke and Bax) changed Bermudez’s chart from “patrol” to “administrative” because she was on restricted duty after her back injury. (Id. ¶ 95.) According to Bermudez, other officers did not have their “chart” changed by when they were on restricted duty. (Id. ¶ 96.) On December 2, 2006, based on advice from another police officer, Bermudez changed her personal cellular telephone number to avoid Stroman’s phone calls. (Id. ¶ 104.) On December 27, 2006, Stroman ordered Bermudez not to read the NYPD Patrol Guide while at work, even though other officers in the. BECT were reading the newspaper. (Id. ¶ 105.) Between December 27, 2006 and January 9, 2007, Stroman told Anthony — the PBA delegate Bermudez had previously contacted — that Bermudez was an “Emotionally Disturbed Person.” (Id. ¶ 106.) On July 18, 2007, Bermudez was placed on “Administrative Sick.” (Id. ¶ 118.) On July 22, 2007, Stroman told Sergeant Salvatore Márchese that “under no circumstances [was] he to grant [Bermudez] any sick, vacation [or] chart days.” (Id. ¶¶ 119.) Bermudez alleges that Stroman created “special workplace rules” only for her. (Id. ¶ 120.) On October 7, 2007, Stroman and Defendant Serina Smith were having a discussion when Stroman mentioned that “he was hungry.” (Id. ¶ 121.) Smith moved away from the table where the two were sitting, opened her legs, and motioned for Stroman to “eat her vagina.” (Id. ¶ 122.) Stroman then used his tongue to simulate the performance of oral sex. (Id. ¶ 123.) Bermudez witnessed the incident. At some point between October 7, 2007, and November 29, 2007, Bermudez was transferred from the BECT to Internal Affairs. (Id. ¶ 125.) Bermudez does not explain whether she requested the transfer or allege that the transfer was a “demotion.” . On November 29, Bermudez returned to the BECT in search of a “case folder.” (Id.) During her visit to the BECT, Stroman asked her, “Why are you here? Are you on Official Business?” (Id. ¶¶ 126-27.) After explaining to Stroman that she was retrieving a folder, Stroman told her, “Well, get your folder and get the fuck out[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 128-29.) 2. Police Officer Edward Sanabria Bermudez and Police Officer Edward Sanabria worked together in the BECT. (Id. ¶ 32.) On December 6, 2004, Sanabria and Bermudez were assigned to work together in a marked “Radio Motor Patrol” (“RMP”) car. (Id.) It was at this time that Sanabria “expressed romantic feelings towards [Bermudez].” (Id.) Bermudez alleges that she told Sanabria that she was not interested in a romantic relationship. (Id. ¶ 33.) Sanabria and Bermudez were assigned to work together again on December 8 and Sanabria again expressed his feelings towards Bermudez. (Id. ¶ 34.) This time, when Bermudez explained that she was not interested in a relationship, Sanabria “started driving the RMP in a reckless manner while [Bermudez] was in the front passenger seat.” (Id. ¶ 35.) On December 9, 2004, after the NYPD’s holiday party, Sanabria called Bermudez on her cellular telephone and asked if he could come by her apartment. (Id. ¶ 38.) At first Bermudez was reluctant, but after Sanabria pleaded with her, she agreed to meet him outside her apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) When Sanabria arrived, Bermudez was walking her dog and she asked Sanabria to wait outside while she took her dog inside. (Id. ¶¶ 42^3.) According to Bermudez, Sanabria did not wait outside and instead attempted to force himself inside her apartment. (Id. ¶ 44.) During their conversation inside Sanabria’s car, Sanabria told Bermudez that he “did not appreciate the way that [Bermudez had] been treating [him], I am not going to take it anymore.” (Id. ¶ 47.) Bermudez told him that she was not interested in a relationship and Sanabria became “very irate.” (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) According to Bermudez, she fled Sanabria’s vehicle “in fear of her life and ran into her house.” (Id. ¶ 50.) Following this incident, Bermudez requested a change in shifts so that she would not have to work with Sanabria, and Stroman agreed to Bermudez’s request. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) On August 17, 2005, Sanabria made comments in front of Bermudez about police officers “scamming the system with fake injuries” (presumably because of Bermudez’s July 19 back injury). (Id. ¶ 69.) On February 3, 2006, Stroman told Bermudez that she would be working with Sanabria again. (Id. ¶ 74.) 3. Police Officer Denise Diaz Bermudez alleges that shortly after she was confirmed, Police Officer Denise Diaz and Stroman “walked around the office hollering ‘Praise the Lord and Alleluia!,’ whenever she entered a room.” (Id. ¶ 24.) It appears from the complaint that Diaz’s comments were made in early 2004. Bermudez does not allege how long this behavior lasted. Diaz witnessed the December 14, 2004, incident where Stroman yelled and cursed at Sanabria and Bermudez in a jealous rage. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54.) After the incident, Diaz told Bermudez that Stroman believed that Sanabria and Bermudez had slept together. (Id. ¶ 55.) On January 2, 2005, Diaz asked Bermudez if she was “seeing” Sanabria. (Id. ¶ 58.) Bermudez alleges that Diaz was gathering information about the status of Bermudez’s relationship with Sanabria for Stroman. (Id. ¶ 59.) Bermudez does not explain why she believed this to be the reason for Diaz’s inquiry. On May 15, 2007, Officer Diaz pushed Bermudez “out of the way” when Bermudez was signing the “Command Log.” (Id. ¶ 112.) Diaz then told Bermudez: I do not like you because you like to fabricate things against people. You are one of those people who act all innocent but really [are] not. You are a hypocrite who attends church, pretending to be a godly person hiding behind your religion. But, you are worse than the ones’ [sic] who are not religious. I am doing this because I am woman enough to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 113-16.) 4. Sergeant Charles Neusch On October 21, 2006, Sergeant Charles Neusch told Bermudez that “she was wrong” about Stroman. (Id. ¶ 75.) Bermudez does not explain what Neusch meant by his comment or what prompted his comment. Bermudez was placed on “Restricted Duty” after her July 2005 back injury. (Id. ¶ 76.) Neusch told Bermudez that Defendant Wayne Bax was giving Stroman a “hard time” because Bermudez was on restricted duty. (Id.) Bermudez also alleges that Neusch told her that Bax and Stroman wanted her to work in the “Vest Unit.” (Id. ¶77.) According to Bermudez, working in the Vest Unit, requires lifting and stacking heavy boxes of supplies and equipment. (Id. ¶ 78.) Bermudez alleges that the assignment was inconsistent with her restricted-duty status. (Id. ¶ 79.) Bermudez started working in the Vest Unit on October 23, 2006. (Id. ¶ 85.) There is no allegation about when she stopped working in the Vest Unit. Bermudez also alleges that between October and November 2006, another police officer told her that Neusch “posted copies of the Finest Message where she was transferred all over the walls through [the BECT].” (Id. ¶ 97.) Bermudez does not explain what the “Finest Message” is, but it can be inferred from the complaint that the “message” was informing other officers that she was transferred to the Vest Unit. On January Q, 2007, Neusch completed Bermudez’s “Yearly Performance Evaluation.” (Id. ¶¶ 107-09.) Bermudez claims that Neusch was going to give Bermudez a rating of 2.5, but was warned against doing so because such a low rating could be “construed as retaliation.” (Id.) Neusch instead gave Bermudez a 3.5 rating. (Id.) According to Bermudez, a 2.5 rating would have automatically placed her in the “Performance Monitoring Program” (id.). 5. Inspector Wayne Bax Bermudez alleges that Bax threatened to transfer her from the BECT if she did not return to full active duty. (Id. ¶ 73.) Bermudez does not say when this threat was made or whether Bax acted on it. As discussed, between October and November 2006, Bax, Stroman, and Croke changed Bermudez’s chart from “patrol” to “administrative” because she was on restricted duty. (Id. ¶¶ 95-96.) 6. Lieutenant Brandon Croke Bermudez claims that on October 23, 2006, Lieutenant Brandon Croke ordered her to begin working in the Vest Unit, even though Bermudez told Croke that she could not lift anything over ten pounds and that any impact to her back could result in paralysis. (Id. ¶¶ 80-82, 85.) According to Bermudez, Croke ordered her to work in the Vest Unit while wearing her uniform (including the vest and gun belt), despite knowing that her back injury prevented her from wearing those items. (Id. ¶ 83.) Bermudez alleges that she was the only officer in the Vest Unit working in uniform; the other officers in the unit were allowed to work in “street clothes.” (Id. ¶ 84.) On October 31, 2006, Bermudez reported to work wearing “street clothes,” and Croke ordered her to put on her uniform. (Id. ¶ 92.) Between October and November 2006, Bax, Stroman, and Croke changed Bermudez’s chart from “patrol” to “administrative” because she was on restricted duty. (Id. ¶¶ 95-96.) 7.Police Officer Serina Smith There is only one allegation concerning Police Officer Serina Smith-the October 7, 2007 sexually explicit incident involving Stroman and Smith. (Id. ¶¶ 121-23.) Bermudez alleges that she witnessed Smith opening her legs while Stroman simulated the performance of oral sex. (Id.) PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 16, 2010, Bermudez commenced the present action against the City and Defendants Wayne Bax, Donald Stroman, Brandon Croke, Charles Neusch, Denise Diaz, Serina Smith, and Edward Sanabria (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), in their official and individual capacities. Bermudez asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the City and the Individual Defendants for racial discrimination (Count One), retaliation (Count Two), and hostile work environment (Count Three); under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for racial discrimination (Counts Four), gender discrimination (Count Five), sexual harassment (Count Six), religious discrimination (Count Seven), retaliation (Count Eight), and hostile work environment (Count Nine); under the New York State Human Rights Law, NY. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., (“NYSHRL”) for racial discrimination (Count Ten), gender discrimination (Count Eleven), sexual harassment (Count Twelve), religious discrimination (Count Thirteen), retaliation (Count Fourteen), and hostile work environment (Count Fifteen); and under the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq., (“NYCHRL”) for race discrimination (Count Sixteen), gender discrimination (Count Seventeen), sexual harassment (Count Eighteen), religious discrimination (Count Nineteen), retaliation (Count Twenty), and hostile work environment (Count Twenty-One). Bermudez’s 21 claims under federal, state, and city law are identical; Bermudez asserts all 21 claims against all of the Defendants. On April 9, 2010, the City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Bermudez’s claims were time barred and, alternatively, arguing for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On May 13, 2010, the Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, raising arguments similar to those raised by the City. On June 11, 2010, the Individual Defendants filed a separate motion for summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity. DISCUSSION A.Standard For Motion To Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). Thus, unless a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations have “nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the plaintiffs] complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950-51. The Court must liberally construe all claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003); see also Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 510 (2d Cir.2007). B. Standard For Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court will grant summary judgment if the evidence offered shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolves all ambiguities and draws all reasonable inferences against the movant. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Commn’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987). Additionally, the Court is permitted to rely on evidence outside of the complaint, including Bermudez’s deposition testimony. C. Statute Of Limitations Bermudez’s claims under Section 1983, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (applying three-year statute of limitations to Section 1983 claims); Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir.2007) (applying three-year statute of limitations to claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL); Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907 (2d Cir.1997) (three-year statute of limitations for NYSHRL claims); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (NYSHRL claims); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d) (NYCHRL claims). Claims under Section 1981 are subject to a four-year statute of limitations period. See White v. City of New York, 2010 WL 2697054, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.2010). Bermudez commenced this action on February 16, 2010. Accordingly, her Section 1983, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL claims based on conduct that occurred before February 16, 2007, are time-barred unless Bermudez can successfully invoke an exception to the limitations period. Similarly, Bermudez’s Section 1981 claims are barred if based on conduct occurring before February 16, 2006. 1. The Continuing-Violation Exception The continuing-violation exception is most often invoked by plaintiffs alleging claims under Title VII, but it is also applied by courts in employment discrimination cases brought under Sections 1981 and 1983, and under New York state and city law. See, e.g., Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 317-18 (2d Cir.2004) (in the context of Sections 1981 and 1983 claims); Drew v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 688 F.Supp.2d 270, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (New York state and city anti-discrimination laws). Under the continuing-violation doctrine, “if a plaintiff has experienced a continuous practice and policy of discrimination, ... the commencement of the statute of limitations period may be delayed until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of it.” Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359 (2d Cir.2001). “To bring a claim within the continuing violation exception, a plaintiff must at the very least allege that one act of discrimination in furtherance of the ongoing policy occurred within the limitations period.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir.2004). In Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-15, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court explained that, “Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify,” and are “not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” “Instead, ‘Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act,’ and even serial violations — a series of discrete but related acts of discrimination — do not warrant application of the continuing violations doctrine.” Milani v. International Business Machines Corp., Inc., 322 F.Supp.2d 434, 452 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113-14, 122 S.Ct. 2061). The standard for applying the continuing-violation doctrine to claims under the NYCHRL and the NYSHRL is also governed by Morgan. See, e.g., Bartman v. Shenker, 5 Misc.3d 856, 786 N.Y.S.2d 696, 702 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2004) (applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan to determine whether the continuing-violation doctrine saved plaintiffs otherwise untimely hostile work environment and discrimination claims under the NYCHRL and the NYSHRL); accord Sculerati v. N.Y. Univ., 2003 WL 21262371, at *3 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. May 16, 2003) (same); see also Lu v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 2009 WL 4670922, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (same). D. The Law Of Employment Discrimination 1. Section 1983 Claims of Employment Discrimination To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Individual Defendants, Bermudez must allege that: (1) the Individual Defendants were acting under color of state law, and (2) the Individual Defendants’ conduct deprived Bermudez of a constitutional or a federal statutory right. See Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.2004). The deprivation alleged by Bermudez is race, gender, and religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. Employment discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whether based on race, religion, or gender, are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir.2008). Bermudez must allege the following four elements: (1) she falls within a protected class, (2) she was performing her duties satisfactorily, (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000). Although “an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination” in order to survive a motion to dismiss, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), Bermudez must allege sufficient facts showing that she is entitled to relief. See, e.g., Alleyne v. American Airlines, Inc., 548 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir.2008); Leibowitz v. Cornell University, 445 F.3d 586, 591 (2d Cir.2006). When the defendant sued for discrimination under § 1983 is a municipality or an individual sued in his official capacity, the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225-227 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. at 733-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702; Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, to bring a claim within the continuing-violation exception, the plaintiff must allege the occurrence of at least one discriminatory act during the statute of limitations period. See, e.g., Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir.1998); Browne v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 8 Fed.Appx. 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2001). a. Section 1983 Claims alleging Retaliation To recover under Section 1983 for a deprivation of her equal protection rights — stemming from retaliation for complaining about discrimination — Bermudez must plead facts from which the Court can infer that she suffered a “materially adverse employment action.” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2007): see also Gatto v. Jet Blue Airways, 2010 WL 125974, at **1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010). Bermudez must also allege facts from which to infer that she participated in a “protected activity” and that the adverse action taken by the defendant is “causally connected” to her participation in the protected activity. See, e.g., Broich v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 2011 WL 284484, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2011). A plaintiff engages in a protected activity when she “ ‘oppose[s] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [she] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].’ ” Murdaugh v. City of New York, 2011 WL 798844, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a “materially adverse change” in the terms and conditions of employment. See Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.1999) (relying on Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). A materially adverse change is a change in working conditions that is “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Crady, 993 F.2d at 136). Examples of a materially adverse change include the “termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.” Id. 2. Section 1981 Claims of Employment Discrimination Section 1981 provides that [a]ll persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Claims of employment discrimination under Section 1981 are analyzed under the same framework that applies to Title VII claims and claims under Section 1983. See, e.g., Patterson, 375 F.3d at 225; see also Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.2000) (§ 1981); Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.1996) (§ 1983); Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department, 888 F.2d 4, 6-7 (2d Cir.1989) (same). When the defendant is a state actor, Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of rights guaranteed under Section 1981. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); see also Gladwin v. Pozzy 403 Fed.Appx. 603, 604-05 (2d Cir.2010) (explaining that plaintiffs section 1981 claims are “encompassed” by her section 1983 claims and analyzed under Section 1981); Sullivan v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 281 F.Supp.2d 689, 707 (S.D.N.Y.2003). Thus, claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacity or against the City, must be brought under Section 1983. To the extent that Bermudez alleges such claims under Section 1981, those claims are dismissed as against the City and the Individual Defendants in their official capacity. Retaliation claims under Section 1981 are treated similarly to retaliation claims under Section 1983. See, e.g., Schiano v. Qual. Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir.2006); see also Broich v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 2011 WL 284484, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2011). 3. Claims of Employment Discrimination under the NYSHRL Claims of employment discrimination under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas framework applied to Section 1983 and Title VII claims of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.2010) (in the context of a NYSHRL claim); Vargas v. Morgan Stanley, 2010 WL 3911494, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.2010). Moreover, retaliation claims under the NYSHRL are treated the same as retaliation claims under Section 1983 and Section 1981. See, e.g., McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 283 n. 1 (2d Cir.2001) (NYSHRL claims). Under New York law (as is true under federal law), a plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a “materially adverse change” in the terms and conditions of employment. See Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.1999) (relying on Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). A materially adverse change is a change in working conditions that is “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Crady, 993 F.2d at 136). Examples of a materially adverse change include the “termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.” Id. 4. Claims of Employment Discrimination under the NYCHRL Similarly, claims of employment discrimination under the NYCHRL are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas framework applicable to Title VII, Section 1983, and NYSHRL claims. See Spiegel, 604 F.3d at 80; see also Pilgrim v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 599 F.Supp.2d 462, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“[T]he standard for all Title VII, section 1981, [New York State Human Rights Law] and [NY]CHRL employment discrimination claims is the same.”). Moreover, an adverse employment action under the NYCHRL is defined the same as under the NYSHRL and Section 1983: “A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.” Hanna v. New York Hotel Trades Council, 18 Misc.3d 436, 851 N.Y.S.2d 818, 825 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (quoting Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2nd Cir.2000)). Unlike retaliation claims under Section 1983 and NYSHRL, the retaliation complained of under the NYCHRL “need not result in an ultimate action with respect to employment ... or in a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment.” Instead, the retaliatory act that the plaintiff complains of must “be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.” Kumaga, 2010 WL 1444513, at *15 (quoting N.Y. Admin. Code. § 8-107). For claims of retaliation, the plaintiff must show a “causal link” between the protected activity and the retaliatory act. Id.; see also Williams v. N.Y. City Housing Auth., 335 Fed.Appx. 108, 110 (2d Cir.2009) (NYCHRL claims); Nettles v. LSG Sky Chefs, 28 Misc.3d 1206(A), 2010 WL 2695640, at *8 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2010) (NYCHRL); Albunio v. City of New York, 67 A.D.3d 407, 889 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9-10 (2009) (listing the elements of a retaliation claim under NYCHRL). 5. Claims of Employment Discrimination against a Municipality In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities are “persons” subject to damages liability for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by municipal officials. A municipality may only be liable for constitutional claims under section 1983 if the alleged offending conduct was undertaken pursuant to “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the municipal] officersf,] ... [or] governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the ... [municipality’s] official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir.2004). To hold a municipality liable, that liability cannot be premised on the mere fact that the municipality employed the offending official— meaning that liability cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); see also Banushi v. City of New York, 2010 WL 4065414, at *11 (E.D.N.Y.2010). Moreover, “if the police officer[s] [are] not liable to plaintiff for any constitutional violation, then the City cannot be liable on a Monell theory.” Thompson v. Tracy, 2008 WL 190449, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986)). E. Hostile Work Environment Claim 1. Hostile work environment claims under Section 1988, Section 1981, and NYSHRL To establish a hostile work environment claim under federal and New York state law, Bermudez must show that her workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 227 (2d Cir.2004); see also Kumaga v. New York City School Constr. Auth., 27 Misc.3d 1207(A), 2010 WL 1444513, at *8 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Apr. 2, 2010) (NYSHRL); Forrest v. Jewish Guild for Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305, 310-11, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998, (N.Y.2004) (applying standard for New York state law claim of hostile work environment). Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” and should consider the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s “work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. Plaintiffs evidence, if any, must show that the conduct at issue created an environment that is both objectively and subjectively hostile. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir.1999); White v. Fuji Photo Film USA, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d 144, 154-155 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Bermudez must demonstrate not only that she found the environment offensive, but that a reasonable person also would have found the environment to be hostile or abusive. Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367. Even when a plaintiff establishes that she was exposed to an objectively and subjectively hostile work environment, “she will not have a claim ... unless she can also demonstrate that the hostile work environment was caused by animus towards her as a result of her membership in a protected class.” Sullivan v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist. Clarence Cooper, 281 F.Supp.2d 689, 704 (S.D.N.Y.2003). This is true for claims under Section 1981, Section 1983, and the NYSHRL. See, e.g., Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir.2006); Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.2006). “An environment that would be equally harsh for all workers, or that arises from personal animosity, is not actionable under the civil rights statutes.” Forts v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., 2003 WL 21279439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003). “Hostile work environment claims are meant to protect individuals from abuse and trauma that is severe. They are not intended to promote or enforce civility, gentility or even decency.” Ennis v. Sonitrol Mgmt. Corp., 2006 WL 177173, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2006) (citations omitted). 2. Hostile Work Environment Claims under the NYCHRL The standard for maintaining a hostile work environment claim is lower under the NYCHRL. “The New York City Human Rights Law was intended to be more protective than the state and federal counterpart.” Farrugia v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 13 Misc.3d 740, 820 N.Y.S.2d 718, 724 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2006). The NYCHRL imposes liability for harassing conduct that does not qualify as “severe or pervasive,” and “questions of ‘severity’ and ‘pervasiveness’ are applicable to consideration of the scope of permissible damages, but not to the question of underlying liability.” Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38 (2009) (citing Farrugia, 820 N.Y.S.2d at 725). Thus, to survive summary judgment, Bermudez need only adduce evidence of “the existence of unwanted gender-based conduct” because liability under NYCHRL is “determined by the existence of unequal treatment.” Id. at 38, 39. Nonetheless, even under the NYCHRL, “ ‘petty, slight, or trivial inconvenience^]’ are not actionable.” Kumaga, 2010 WL 1444513, at *14 (quoting Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 38). 3. Hostile Work Environment due to Sexual Harassment. There are two types of sexual harassment claims: (1) claims based on direct discrimination (also called quid pro quo sexual harassment), and (2) claims based on a hostile environment due to sexual harassment. See Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir.1989). The so-called quid pro quo sexual harassment, “occurs when an employer alters an employee’s job conditions or withholds an economic benefit because the employee refuses to submit to sexual demands.” Id. The second type of sexual harassment, called hostile environment, “occurs when an employer’s conduct ‘has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.’ ” Id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Bermudez’s allegations go to the latter type of sexual harassment — one that creates a hostile work environment — and, as such, her hostile work environment and sexual harassment claims will be analyzed together. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (actionable sexual harassment occurs when the workplace is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). F. Qualified Immunity 1. Federal Standard for Qualified Immunity Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity “from federal constitutional claims ... as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The inquiry is a two-step one, although the steps no longer need to be taken in any particular order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The Court must determine whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the answer to that question is no, then the officer defendant will be entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint, but not on the ground of qualified immunity. Rather, he will be entitled to dismissal of the claim against him because he did nothing wrong. Stephenson v. John Doe, Detective, 332 F.3d 68, 78-81 (2d Cir.2003). Only if the officer defendant violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights will the Court have to decide whether a reasonable officer in defendant’s position (as that position is described by plaintiff) ought to have known that he was violating plaintiffs constitutional rights by doing what plaintiff alleges he did. 2. New York’s Version of Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity is generally understood to only protect government officials from federal, not state, causes of action. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir.2007). New York common law, however, fills this gap by providing government officials with a similar form of protection against state law claims. Id.; see Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 63 (2d Cir.2006). “New York law ... grant[s] government officials qualified immunity on state-law claims except where the officials’ actions are undertaken in bad faith or without a reasonable basis.” Jones, 465 F.3d at 63 (citing Blouin ex rel. Estate of Pouliot v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 364 (2d Cir.2004) and Arteaga v. State, 72 N.Y.2d 212, 216-17, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57, 527 N.E.2d 1194 (N.Y.1988)). “To be entitled to qualified immunity, it must be established that it was objectively reasonable for the police officers involved to believe that their conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, or that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether their conduct was proper.” Allen v. City of New York, 03 Civ. 2829, 2007 WL 24796, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, as is true of federal law, an officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity under New York law depends on the reasonableness of his ultimately illegal actions. Jones, 465 F.3d at 64 (citing cases). However, the reasonableness of an officer’s action is judged with references to state law and the state, not the federal, constitution. Allen, 2007 WL 24796, at *24 (citing Doyle v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 3 A.D.3d 669, 670-71, 770 N.Y.S.2d 480 (N.Y.App.Div.2004)). The Individual Defendants A. Lieutenant Donald Stroman 1. Count One — Race Discrimination under Section 1981 In her First Cause of Action, Bermudez alleges that Stroman discriminated against her on the basis of race (Puerto Rican). (Compl. ¶ 9.) Claims under Section 1981 have a four-year statute of limitations. White v. City of New York, 2010 WL 2697054, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.2010). Thus, any conduct that occurred before February 16, 2006 is barred by the statute of limitations unless the continuing-violation exception applies. Bermudez alleges that the following incidents occurred after February 16, 2006: (1) In October 2006, Stroman made a comment about “religious fanatics” in Bermudez’s presence (Compl. ¶ 87); (2) In October or November 2006, Stroman changed Bermudez’s patrol chart to an administrative chart (id. ¶ 95); (3) In December 2006, Stroman ordered Bermudez not to read the NYPD Patrol Guide at work (id. ¶ 105); (4) In July 2007, Stroman ordered another officer not to grant Bermudez any sick or vacation days (id. ¶ 119); (5) In October 2007, Stroman and Smith engaged in a sexually explicit act in front of Bermudez (id. ¶ 121-23); and (6) In November 2007, Stroman yelled and cursed at Bermudez when she returned to the BECT to obtain a case folder (id. ¶¶ 125-29). Although all six of these allegations involving Stroman are timely, there are no allegations connecting Stroman’s conduct to animus against Bermudez because of her race. Although Bermudez states in conclusory fashion that the “City and its agents have a long history of discriminating against female minority officers” (Compl. ¶ 11), Bermudez does not provide any details or examples to support her allegation, or explain how Stroman in particular has a long history of such discrimination. It cannot be inferred from Bermudez’s allegations that Stroman’s actions were due to Bermudez’s race. None of the incidents have anything to do with race. Additionally, none of the allegations involving Stroman alleges that Bermudez suffered an adverse employment action because of her race — an essential element of an employment discrimination claim under federal law. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000). Bermudez does not allege that she was terminated, that she was demoted, or that her salary or benefits were decreased because she is Puerto Rican. See, e.g., Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Grady, 993 F.2d at 136 (providing examples of adverse employment actions)). Moreover, Bermudez does not allege that Stroman was in any way involved in her transfer to Internal Affairs. The pleading of Count One as against Stroman — as is true of the pleading of many claims against many defendants — is nothing more than the recitation of a false syllogism: (1) I am (insert name of a protected class); (2) something bad happened to me at work; (3) therefore, it happened because I am (insert name of protected class). Absent allegations of fact tending to show that Stroman made these statements because of Bermudez’s, she fails to state a claim. Grillo v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 291 F.3d 231 (2d Cir.2002). Accordingly, Count One as against Stroman is dismissed. 2. Count Two — Retaliation Under Section 1981 In her Second Cause of Action, Bermudez alleges that Stroman retaliated against her because she filed a complaint about Stroman’s conduct with Joseph Anthony, a PBA delegate, and the NYPD’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (“OEEO”). Bermudez alleges that on July 22, 2007, Stroman told another officer “that under no circumstances is he to grant [Bermudez] any sick, vacation and/or chart days.” (Compl. ¶ 119.) However, Bermudez does not specifically allege that she actually loss any sick and vacation days. The loss of all vacation and sick days— material benefits of her employment with the NYPD — is sufficient to allege a materially adverse employment action under Section 1981. See, e.g., Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 (listing a “material loss of benefits” as an example of a materially adverse employment action). Thus, Count Two is dismissed as against Stroman without prejudice. Bermudez may amend her complaint to allege facts that would support an inference that Stroman’s actions cost her a material benefit of employment with the NYPD, such as sick and vacation days. 3. Count Three — Hostile Work Environment Under Section 1981 a. Statute of Limitations In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court explained that “a hostile work environment claim ... will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls within the time period.” The Court in Morgan explained that the continuing-violation exception should be applied to hostile work environment claims because such claims challenge “repeated conduct” that “occurs over a series of days or perhaps years ...” (id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061) and not — as is the case with claims of discrimination — “conduct that is a discrete unlawful act” id. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061. See also Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir.2009). Therefore, for hostile work environment claims, so long as one act is within the limitations period, all of the acts can be relied on to show a hostile work environment. Shomo, 579 F.3d at 181; see also Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir.2004). Bermudez has alleged at least one act of sexual harassment that occurred within the limitations period and involved Stroman. Specifically, on October 7, 2007, Stroman and Smith performed a sexually explicit act in Bermudez’s presence. (See Compl. ¶¶ 121-24.) Other allegations in the complaint also support an inference that Bermudez was subject to harassing conduct throughout her tenure in the BECT. For instance, beginning in 2004, Stroman made inappropriate sexual comments, gestures, and acts that lasted at least until late 2006 and between 2004 and 2005, and again in 2006 and 2007, Stroman and Diaz made comments involving Bermudez’s religion. Thus, when taken as a whole, Bermudez’s allegations are sufficient to plead the existence of a hostile work environment due to Stroman’s actions that began when she arrived at the BECT in 2004 and lasted until she left in 2007. See, e.g., Bartoli v. City of New York, 2010 WL 1539055, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010) (applying Morgan’s continuing violation exception to hostile work environment claims under § 1983, § 1981, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL). Moreover, because the continuing-violation exception is applied in the same way whether the claim is under federal, state, or city law, all of Bermudez’s hostile work environment claims as against Stroman (whether under Section 1981, Section 1983, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL) are timely. I will thus turn to whether the allegations state a claim against Stroman. b. Hostile Work Environment Claim According to Bermudez, once Stroman found out that she was a practicing Catholic, he would “say things like praise the Lord or halleluiah” approximately “six to eight times a week” when Bermudez entered a room. (O’Connor Decl. Ex. A, 40:17-25, 41:1-2, 41:8-11.) Bermudez admits that she never asked Stroman to stop making these comments, but that Stroman stopped the comments after Bermudez filed her 2006 OEEO complaint. (Id. at 42:4-6, 41:12-17.) Bermudez testified that Stroman invited her to his house on five to ten different occasions between January 2004 and November 2007. (Id. at 55:6-14.) Each time, Bermudez told him that she would accept the invitation only if he agreed to attend mass with her. (Id. at 55:15-18.) According to Bermudez, Stroman responded that “he would burn in hell if he set foot in church, there was no way he could go to church, that he loved the alcohol and women too much to attend church.” (Id. at 42:9-20.) Bermudez also testified that she overheard Stroman telling another police officer during a conversation, ‘You know those fanatics, religious fanatics.” (Id. at 43:15-23.) Shortly before Bermudez transferred to Internal Affairs in November 2007, Stroman told her that she should be “worried” about her position in the BECT. (Id. at 44:3-19.) Bermudez told Stroman, “I don’t need to be afraid or worried ... there [is] only one person that I would be worried [about] and that would be my chief.” (Id.) In response, Stroman asked, ‘Your chief?” and Bermudez explained, ‘Yes, God.” (Id.) Bermudez states that following this conversation, Stroman told Joe Anthony, a PBA delegate, that Bermudez was “an emotionally disturbed person.” (Id.) Bermudez also testified that Stroman called her to “express his romantic feelings” and to tell her that she had a “beautiful body,” that he “loved” her, and that he wanted to “make love” to her. (Id. at 55-56.) Stroman would also tell Bermudez that she “had a great body, that he liked the way [she] dressed, the way that [she] looked, the way [she] carried [her]self.” (Id. at 56:14-17.) Bermudez stated that on various occasions, between May 2004 and 2006, Stroman told her that she should take her vest off so that he could “hug” her. (Id. at 59:1-11, 59:12-15.) Bermudez testified that Stroman never attempted to touch her in a sexually suggestive way and that he never attempted to kiss or force himself on her. (Id. at 60:6-11.) In October 2007, Stroman and Smith engaged in a sexually explicit act in front of Bermudez. Bermudez testified that while she was on medical leave in 2007, Stroman called her once a week to ask when she would return to work. (Id. at 97:3-21.) When Bermudez returned to work, she was placed on restricted duty and Stroman repeatedly asked her whether she was “cleared” to return to full duty. (Id. at 99:10-16, 100:6-12.) Bermudez also testified that she overheard Neusch and Stroman say that they believed she was “faking” her injury, but that neither individual told her this directly. (Id. at 101:7-19, 101:11-13.) According to Bermudez, Stroman assigned her to work in the Vest Unit in 2006 — an assignment that was inconsistent with her restricted duty status. (Id. at 109:11-20.) Bermudez must “show that the complained of conduct: (1) ‘is objectively severe or pervasive' — that is, creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’; (2) creates an environment ‘that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive’; and (3) ‘creates such an environment because of the plaintiffs sex.’ ” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir.2001)). “This test has objective and subjective elements: the misconduct shown must be ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment,’ and the victim must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). As the Second Circuit has explained: While the standard for establishing a hostile work environment is high, we have repeatedly cautioned against setting the bar too high, noting that “[w]hile a mild, isolated incident does not make a work environment hostile, the test is whether ‘the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.’ ” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir.2000)); see also Potito v. Tri-Wire Engineering Solution, Inc., 699 F.Supp.2d 480, 495-96 (E.D.N.Y.2010). “The environment need not be ‘unendurable’ or ‘intolerable.’ ” Terry, 336 F.3d at 148. Moreover, “the fact that the law requires harassment to be severe or pervasive before it can be actionable does not mean that employers are free from liability in all but the most egregious cases.” Id. (quoting Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Based on Bermudez’s testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that Stroman’s comments and actions between 2004 and 2007 were sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to create a hostile work environment. Bermudez testified that Stroman — her direct supervisor — repeatedly invited her to his house, made comments about her body, expressed romantic feelings towards her in person and over the phone, and repeatedly expressed a desire to “hug” her. In October 2007, Stroman also engaged in a sexually explicit gesture in front of Bermudez. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Bermudez, it appears that Stroman’s offensive comments lasted for the entire time that Bermudez was in the BECT. At a minimum, Bermudez has pleaded sufficient facts from which a reasonable juror could find that she was subject to a workplace permeated with harassment that was sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of her work environment. There is no basis on which to dismiss this Count as against Stroman. c. Qualified Immunity In this circuit, an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace is well-settled, and has been for some time. See Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.1989) (recognizing claim for hostile environment sexual harassment under the Equal Protection Clause): see also Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1996); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 130 (2d Cir.2004). No reasonable supervisor in Lieutenant Stroman’s position could have thought that he was permitted to make sexual advances and sexually-charged comments to an employee in the workplace. If Stroman did as Bermudez alleges, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity under federal law. Accordingly, Stroman’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Count Three on the grounds of qualified immunity is denied. 4. Count Four — Race Discrimination Under Section 1988 In her Fourth Cause of Action, Bermudez alleges that Stroman discriminated against her on the basis of her race in violation of Section 1983. As discussed in the context of Bermudez’s Section 1981 race discrimination claim, Bermudez makes certain timely allegations involving Stroman: (1) In July 2007, Stroman ordered another officer not to grant Bermudez any sick or vacation days (id. ¶ 119); (2) In October 2007, Stroman and Smith engaged in a sexually explicit act in front of Bermudez (id. ¶ 121-23); and (3) In November 2007, Stroman yelled and cursed at Bermudez when she returned to the BECT to obtain a case folder (id. ¶¶ 125-29). Because the statute of limitations for claims under Section 1983 is three years, all of the other allegations against Stroman (occurring before February 16, 2006) are untimely, and they are not revived by the continuing-violations doctrine. Section 1983 and Section 1981 employment discrimination claims based on race are treated similarly. See, e.g., Gladwin v. Pozzi, 403 Fed.Appx. 603, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y.2010). Thus, Count Four is dismissed as against Stroman for the reasons Bermudez’s race discrimination claim in Count One is dismissed. In both instances, Bermudez has failed to state a claim of employment discrimination based on race. 5.Count Five — Gender Discrimination under Section 1983 Section 1983 claims may be brought within three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). Thus, any conduct occurring before February 16, 2007 is untimely. As discussed, in the context of Bermudez’s race discrimination claim in Count Four, only three acts by Stroman occurred after February