Full opinion text
POST-REMAND MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF ORLANDO L. GARCIA, District Judge. This Court denied petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition collaterally attacking his 1995 Bexar County capital murder conviction and sentence of death. Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2146119 (W.D.Tex. August 29, 2005), affirmed, 460 F.3d 638 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1283, 127 S.Ct. 1815, 167 L.Ed.2d 326 (2007). On the eve of his execution, petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., which this Court denied on both substantive and procedural grounds. Ruiz v. Quarteman, 2007 WL 2437401 (W.D.Tex. July 10, 2007). The Fifth Circuit immediately stayed petitioner’s execution. In October, 2007, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded this cause to this Court with directions that this Court consider “on the merits” petitioner’s assertions of ineffective assistance by petitioner’s trial counsel during the punishment phase of petitioner’s trial. Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523, 532 (5th Cir.2007). For the reasons set forth hereinafter, this Court finds petitioner is entitled to neither federal habeas relief nor a Certificate of Appealability from this Court. I. Defining the Claims Before this Court on Remand In his amended petition, filed January 20, 2009, docket entry no. 70, petitioner argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing during the punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial to present mitigating evidence readily available through Dr. Henry Munsinger (the state-court-appointed mental health expert who had examined petitioner) and (2) failing to conduct an adequate investigation into petitioner’s background for additional mitigating evidence (which petitioner claimed would have produced additional mitigating evidence establishing the very difficult circumstances of petitioner’s childhood, as well as petitioner’s long history of substance abuse). In subsequent pleadings, as well as during the evidentiary hearing held November 2-3, 2010, petitioner also argued his trial counsel should have retained the services of a mental health professional who could have opined regarding the impact of petitioner’s alleged cocaine addiction on petitioner’s conduct at the time of petitioner’s offense. After more than three years of extensive investigation by petitioner’s federal habeas counsel, the expenditure of thousands of dollars of investigative and expert expenses, this Court held an evidentiary hearing in this cause on November 2-3, 2010. II. The Constitutional Standard Governing Ineffective Assistance Claims The constitutional standard for reviewing petitioner’s complaints about the performance of his trial counsel is well-settled. The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to “the effective assistance of counsel,” ie., legal representation that does not (1) fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms and the circumstances of the defendant’s case (Wong v. Belmontes, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 383, 384, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009); Bobby v. Van Hook, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 13, 16, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009)); and (2) give rise to a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (Porter v. McCollum, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 447, 452-53, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009); Wong v. Belmontes, — U.S. at-,130 S.Ct. at 386). The constitutional standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, i.e., establish that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, a convicted defendant must show that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1511, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In so doing, a convicted defendant must carry the burden of proof and overcome a strong presumption that the conduct of his trial counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-66. Courts are extremely deferential in scrutinizing the performance of counsel and make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. at 2536 (holding the proper analysis under the first prong of Strickland is an objective review of the reasonableness of counsel’s performance under prevailing professional norms which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from the perspective of said counsel at the time). “No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” Bobby v. Van Hook, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 16; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. It is strongly presumed counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690,104 S.Ct. at 2066. To satisfy the “prejudice” prong, a convicted defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for the objectively unreasonable misconduct of his counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. In evaluating prejudice in the context of the punishment phase of a capital trial, a federal habeas court must reweigh all the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence (had the petitioner’s trial counsel chosen a different course). Wong v. Belmontes, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 386; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542. Strickland does not require the State to “rule out” or negate a sentence of life in prison to prevail; rather, it places the burden on the defendant to show a “reasonable probability” that the result of the punishment phase of a capital murder trial would have been different. Wong v. Belmontes, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 390-91. In those instances in which the state courts failed to adjudicate either prong of the Strickland test, this Court’s review of the un-adjudicated prong is de novo. See Porter v. McCollum, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 452 (holding de novo review of the allegedly deficient performance of petitioner’s trial counsel was necessary because the state courts had failed to address this prong of Strickland analysis); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)(holding de novo review of the prejudice prong of Strickland was required where the state courts rested their rejection of an ineffective assistance claim on the deficient performance prong and never addressed the issue of prejudice); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542 (holding the same). A habeas petitioner has the burden to prove both prongs of the Strickland ineffective assistance standard by a preponderance of the evidence. Rogers v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 483, 489 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 365, 175 L.Ed.2d 62 (2009); Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir.2008), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2383, 173 L.Ed.2d 1301 (2009); Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1067, 1261 S.Ct. 2220, 150 L.Ed.2d 212 (2001). Under the well-settled Strickland standard, the Supreme Court recognizes a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 820 (5th Cir.2007); ‘Sonnier v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948, 128 S.Ct. 374, 169 L.Ed.2d 259 (2007); Amador v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 397, 410 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 920, 127 S.Ct. 2129, 167 L.Ed.2d 866 (2007); Gonzales v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1323, 127 S.Ct. 1909, 167 L.Ed.2d 568 (2007). III. The Applicable Standard of Review The parties disagree as to whether the highly deferential standard of review applicable under the AEDPA applies to petitioner’s claims herein. Under the AEDPA standard of review, this Court cannot grant petitioner federal habeas corpus relief in connection with any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 1438, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court concludes the AEDPA has no application to petitioner’s claims herein because, notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the procedural history of this cause in its remand order, there has never been any state court ruling “on the merits” of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims herein. In those instances in which the state courts failed to adjudicate either prong of the Strickland test, such as this one, this Court’s review of the unadjudicated prong is necessarily de novo. See Porter v. McCollum, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 452 (holding de novo review of the allegedly deficient performance of petitioner’s trial counsel was necessary because the state courts had failed to address this prong of Strickland analysis); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)(holding de novo review of the prejudice prong of Strickland was required where the state courts rested their rejection of an ineffective assistance claim on the deficient performance prong and never addressed the issue of prejudice); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542 (holding the same). In this case, no state court has ever addressed the merits of either prong of Strickland analysis vis-avis any of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims herein. To understand this conclusion, it is necessary to review the highly atypical procedural history of this cause. Petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition in this Court in February, 2004, asserting therein a number of. claims, including a pair of ineffective assistance claims which both parties acknowledged at that time to be unexhausted. Docket entry no. 18. Specifically, petitioner argued his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) adequately investigate petitioner’s background for potentially mitigating evidence and (2) present Dr. Harry Munsinger’s report and opinions to the jury at the punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial. When respondent urged summary rejection of petitioner’s unexhausted ineffective assistance claims as proeedurally defaulted (see docket entry no. 22), petitioner argued the incompetence of petitioner’s state habeas counsel, in failing to recognize, identify, and assert petitioner’s unexhausted ineffective assistance claims constituted “cause and actual prejudice” sufficient to overcome petitioner’s procedural default on his unexhausted claims {see docket entry no. 25). Relying upon well-settled Fifth Circuit precedent, this Court concluded the obvious deficiencies in the performance of petitioner’s state habeas counsel did not excuse petitioner’s failure to exhaust available state remedies on his unexhausted claims and were insufficient to overcome petitioner’s procedural default on same. See Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2146119, *12-* 14 (holding the “inexplicable failure” of petitioner’s state habeas counsel to raise any of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims therein in the course of petitioner’s first state habeas corpus proceeding did not rise to the level of “cause” under the “cause and actual prejudice” exception to the procedural default doctrine). Significantly, as of the date this Court ruled initially on petitioner’s unexhausted claims, petitioner had never asked this Court to stay this cause to permit petitioner to return to state court to exhaust state habeas remedies on his then-unexhausted ineffective assistance claims. Only thereafter, in a series of post-judgment motions, did petitioner request a stay to permit petitioner to return to state court and raise for the first time his then-unexhausted ineffective assistance claims. Relying upon well-settled Fifth Circuit precedent, this Court rejected those requests, concluding petitioner was unlikely to ever obtain state habeas review on the merits on his unexhausted ineffective assistance claims. See Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2402503 (W.D.Tex. September 13, 2005)(denying motion to amend); Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2402669 (W.D.Tex. September 15, 2005)(denying motion for stay); Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2620193 (W.D.Tex. October 13, 2005)(denying in part and granting in part motion for CoA); Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 3271652 (W.D.Tex. November 17, 2005)(denying motion for reconsideration). In an opinion issued in August, 2006, the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal on procedural default grounds of petitioner’s then-unexhausted ineffective assistance claims and implicitly rejected petitioner’s arguments that this Court should have stayed this cause to permit petitioner to return to state court and file a second state habeas application. Ruiz v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 638, 644 (5th Cir.2006)(“the law of this Court is clear; ineffective state habeas counsel does not excuse failure to raise claims in state habeas proceedings.”). In March, 2007, the United States Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari. Ruiz v. Quarterman, 549 U.S. 1283, 127 S.Ct. 1815, 167 L.Ed.2d 326 (2007). Despite having been aware of his unexhausted ineffective assistance claims since not later than February, 2004, petitioner waited until July, 2007 to return to the state courts and seek to present his ineffective assistance claims. On July 6, 2007, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily dismissed petitioner’s second state habeas corpus application, citing the applicable state writ-abuse statute. When petitioner thereafter waited until the day before his scheduled July 10, 2007 execution to file a Rule 60(b) motion and a motion for stay of execution, this Court denied both motions as untimely and lacking in merit. Ruiz v. Quarterman, 2007 WL 2437401 (W.D.Tex. July 10, 2007). The Fifth Circuit immediately issued a stay of execution. In an opinion issued October 11, 2007, the Fifth Circuit concluded this Court erred in construing the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ summary order of dismissal as a summary order of dismissal and held said summary order of dismissal was “ambiguous” with regard to whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had reached the merits of petitioner’s underlying ineffective assistance claims. Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523, 527 (5th Cir.2007)(holding “the decisional basis here is uncertain” despite its conclusion only one of the seven members of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals participating in the case had attempted to address the merits of petitioner’s underlying Sixth Amendment claims). Under even the most generous construction of the procedural history in this case, no Texas state court has ever issued a ruling definitively addressing the merits of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims herein. In fact, insofar as petitioner argues his trial counsel should have retained the services of a mental health expert other than Dr. Munsinger, petitioner has not yet “fairly presented” that claim to any state court even as of this date. Thus, there is no existing state court judgment, much less any discernable state court findings of fact or conclusions of law, to which this Court could give deference under the AEDPA even if it were inclined to do so. Because no state court has ever addressed the merits of any of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims herein, the AEDPA is inapplicable to petitioner’s claims and this Court must resort to de novo review of same. Porter v. McCollum, — U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 452 (holding de novo review of the allegedly deficient performance of petitioner’s trial counsel was necessary because the state courts had failed to address this prong of Strickland analysis). IV. Evaluating the Credibility of Petitioner’s Claims of Rampant Childhood Abuse and Cocaine Addiction A. Evidence of Child Abuse During his capital murder trial, petitioner took the stand and testified he came from a “good” family and said he chose to live with his grandmother and aunt when he was growing up. Petitioner did admit, however, that (1) when he drank alcohol or used drugs, he was disrespectful to his family and (2) he had once “almost” fought with his step-father when they both came home drunk. Petitioner also admitted his mother had thrown him out of the house at least ten times (for not getting a job and not getting his life straight) and he did not get along with his step-father but he was nonetheless welcome to spend the night at his mother’s house. During the evidentiary hearing held in this cause November 2-3, 2010, petitioner’s federal habeas counsel attempted to portray petitioner’s mother as a mentally unbalanced prostitute who repeatedly abandoned petitioner. The problem with this effort was that, other than Yolanda Mendoza’s testimony that she found petitioner sleeping outside his Aunt’s apartment on two occasions when she was coming home late at night from herself working as a prostitute, there was virtually no testimony of any physical abuse of petitioner except rank hearsay testimony in which petitioner’s relatives merely repeated what petitioner had told them as a child, i.e., that he had been beaten by his step-father, forced by his mother’s boyfriend to face the wall or stay in the bath room, or there was no food at his home. There was testimony about a single incident in which a relative observed petitioner at an early age to have lice in his hair. There was also testimony that, on one occasion when petitioner was young, petitioner was beaten by his mother. This testimony was not, however, accompanied by any objective evidence showing petitioner sustained any injuries as a result of the latter incident, much less that any such injuries required medical attention. Likewise, petitioner presented this Court with no credible evidence establishing petitioner ever sustained any identifiable injury as a result of any beating or other abuse his relatives allegedly inflicted upon him or witnessed. Instead, the bulk of the abuse/neglect testimony presented to this Court through petitioner’s friends and family consisted almost exclusively of hearsay testimony given by witnesses in which they simply relating statements made by petitioner to them. There was testimony which showed the petitioner spent a lot of time with his other relatives (who lived a short distance from the home in which petitioner lived with his mother and step-father Paul Rangel) but petitioner presented no credible evidence to this Court showing that his presence at his relatives’ homes on those occasions was anything other than voluntary on his part. For instance, petitioner’s cousin Mark Molina testified petitioner was kicked out of petitioner’s home by petitioner’s mother and step-father because petitioner would not get a job. However, Molina did not specify how old petitioner was at the time of these incidents; nor did Molina claim to have witnessed these events himself. Moreover, Molina’s testimony merely corroborated petitioner’s trial testimony. There was likewise a dearth of testimony during the evidentiary hearing from persons having personal knowledge of the conditions inside the home in which petitioner apparently spent most of his formative years. Petitioner did not testify during the evidentiary hearing in this cause. Petitioner did not call his mother (Maria “Monica/Aurelia” Rangel) to testify about conditions in their family’s home. Likewise, petitioner also failed to call his second step-father (Paul Rangel) to testify despite petitioner’s federal habeas counsel’s accusations that Rangel had physically abused petitioner. The witnesses whom petitioner did present during the evidentiary hearing denied possessing any personal knowledge concerning the allegedly abusive conditions inside the household where the petitioner spent his formative years. During his capital murder trial, petitioner took the stand and denied that he had ever been abused physically or mentally as a child. Despite that fact, during the evidentiary hearing in this cause, petitioner’s federal habeas counsel attempted to portray petitioner’s step-fathers, i.e., Mike Cisneros and Paul Rangel, and petitioner’s own mother, Maria Rangel, as physically abusive toward petitioner. The problem with these efforts was that the only eyewitness testimony to any alleged physical abuse directed toward petitioner by these three persons came from (1) petitioner’s aunt Rosa Ruiz, who testified she once witnessed Mike Cisneros grab petitioner too tightly, and (2) petitioner’s cousin Mark Molina, who described a single instance, when he and the petitioner were young, in which petitioner’s aunt Rosa Ruiz and petitioner’s mother Monica beat the petitioner because Molina had left a blanket lying on the floor. There was absolutely no evidence presented to this Court establishing the precise nature of any injuries petitioner allegedly sustained in either of those alleged incidents. There is no credible evidence before this Court showing petitioner ever required or received medical treatment for any injuries sustained in any beating or other alleged abuse allegedly inflicted upon petitioner by his mother or any of his step-fathers. Petitioner’s mental health expert, Dr. Seth Silverman testified before this Court that, based upon his interviews with petitioner and petitioner’s family members, he believed (1) the petitioner grew up in a “horribly abusive” family situation in which petitioner was regularly beaten by his alcoholic step-fathers, (2) petitioner began abusing drugs at age 13-14, (3) petitioner began displaying atypically aggressive behaviors shortly before his capital offense which Dr. Silverman attributed to petitioner’s cocaine addiction, (4) petitioner’s post-arrest violent conduct could be attributed to petitioner’s de-toxing from cocaine weeks and even months after arrest, (5) petitioner was abusing alcohol, marijuana, LSD, and cocaine at the time of his offense, (6) petitioner was involved in Hispanic gangs with a culture of drug abuse, (7) the only things petitioner could count on from his family were being abused, abandoned, beaten, and starved by them, (8) jail or prison life would be a stabilizing influence in petitioner’s life, and (9) petitioner’s tendencies toward drug abuse and gang membership were prompted by petitioner’s “horribly abusive childhood,” which included many missed opportunities for intervention and drug treatment. It is apparent the family members with whom Dr. Silverman spoke (including Rosa Ruiz and Mark Molina) told him something quite different from what they testified before the Court in this case. Dr. Silver-man relied on Rosa Ruiz as the primary source to corroborate petitioner’s claims he was starved, routinely beaten, and otherwise abused by his step-fathers and mother. Yet, as explained above, Rosa Ruiz denied any personal knowledge of such abuse when she testified before this Court. Numerous family members, in-eluding Rosa Ruiz, testified before this Court they never witnessed petitioner being subjected to any physical abuse during his childhood. Mark Molina was the only witness appearing before this Court who claimed to have ever personally witnessed any physical abuse directed toward petitioner and his testimony identified only a single instance of alleged physical abuse. This Court finds there is no credible evidence establishing petitioner suffered from a childhood of abuse as severe and horrific as that described by Dr. Silverman in his testimony before this Court. Undoubtedly, petitioner experienced a very disruptive childhood, stayed numerous places with many different relatives, and lacked stability in his family relationships. It appears equally clear petitioner’s family was financially stressed throughout his childhood. However, this Court finds no credible evidence supports a finding that petitioner experienced the type of severe and extreme abuse upon which Dr. Silver-man based his opinions and conclusions herein. On the contrary, the only source of information for either Dr. Silverman or petitioner’s relatives who did testify before this Court suggesting petitioner was ever severely abused or beaten as a child appears to be petitioner himself. When given the opportunity to furnish sworn testimony regarding his childhood, however, petitioner categorically denied he had been abused as a child. Petitioner chose not to testify before this Court. Petitioner’s family offered this Court no eyewitness testimony to any alleged abuse of petitioner as a child. Petitioner chose not to call any witnesses who had personal knowledge of alleged abuse inside the Rangel home. Under such circumstances, this Court finds incredible the factual basis underlying Dr. Silverman’s conclusions that petitioner suffered a “horribly abusive childhood.” B. Cocaine Addiction Dr. Silverman relied upon Mark Molina to corroborate petitioner’s claims that he (petitioner) abused cocaine prior to fatally shooting Theresa Rodriguez; but Molina gave no testimony before this Court suggesting he ever had any personal knowledge of petitioner’s alleged cocaine use and Dr. Silverman admitted even Molina was unable to confirm petitioner’s claims to have consumed massive quantities of cocaine immediately prior to murdering Theresa Rodriguez. Thus, there appear to be serious credibility issues with the factual information upon which Dr. Silver-man based his opinions and conclusions. In fact, contrary to the assumptions underlying Dr. Silverman’s conclusions and opinions, this Court finds no credible evidence exists in the record now before this Court establishing the petitioner ever used cocaine prior to the days immediately before his execution-style slaying of Theresa Rodriguez. Mark Molina never mentioned cocaine when he testified before this Court regarding petitioner’s alleged drug use. No other member of petitioner’s family who testified before this Court mentioned any alleged cocaine abuse by petitioner. Petitioner claimed in his testimony at the guilt-innocence phase of his trial that he began abusing alcohol, marijuana, LSD, and eventually cocaine. But petitioner offered neither his trial jury nor this Court any testimony establishing precisely when he first claimed to have begun abusing cocaine. Neither Rosa Ruiz nor Mark Molina nor any other eyewitness presented this Court with any testimony suggesting petitioner ever ingested cocaine prior to the date the Rodriguez brothers paid petitioner the one-thousand-dollar down-payment on petitioner’s execution of Theresa Rodriguez. There is absolutely no credible evidence now before this Court establishing petitioner began abusing cocaine prior to the days immediately before his murder of Theresa Rodriguez. There is no evidence before this Court suggesting petitioner, who worked various menial jobs at a hotel and newspaper, ever possessed sufficient financial resources to purchase cocaine on a regular basis prior to petitioner agreeing to participate in the Rodriguez brothers’ murder-for-hire scheme. Thus, this Court finds Dr. Silver-man’s conclusions regarding petitioner’s long-term cocaine use and cocaine addiction to be without sufficient evidentiary basis in the record. It should be noted that there was a significant practical problem facing petitioner’s trial counsel had they called Mark Molina to testify on this subject at trial. Molina testified before this Court at the evidentiary hearing that petitioner was actively involved in a gang when they were growing up. This testimony was contrary to petitioner’s trial testimony, in which petitioner vigorously denied being involved with gangs. At the guilt-innocence phase of petitioner’s trial, petitioner took the stand and repeatedly asserted he was high on cocaine and pot at the time of his offense. In fact, petitioner claimed he was so heavily intoxicated on the night of the offense that he could not recall committing the offense. Nonetheless, petitioner repeatedly admitted that he had shot Theresa Rodriguez. Petitioner admitted to fatally shooting Theresa Rodriguez but persistently denied he knew the Rodriguez brothers or that he had killed Theresa Rodriguez for money. Griselda Gutierrez, petitioner’s aunt, testified before this Court she visited petitioner in jail prior to his trial and the petitioner related to her (1) petitioner was friends with one of the Rodriguez brothers, (2) petitioner obtained money from the husband of his victim to get drugs, and (3) under pressure from the Rodriguez brothers to commit the murder, petitioner took large quantities of multiple drugs in the days immediately prior to the murder “to get the courage” to commit the offense. Dr. Harry Munsinger examined petitioner on behalf of petitioner’s trial counsel but, other than being advised by petitioner that petitioner was intoxicated at the time of his offense due to ingestion of an unspecified substance, Dr. Munsinger never discussed the facts of petitioner’s crime with the petitioner. Likewise, Dr. Mun-singer made no effort to obtain information concerning the circumstances of petitioner’s offense from any third-party. Thus, all the statements in Dr. Munsinger’s report suggesting the petitioner was suffering the effects of intoxication at the time of the offense appear to mimic statements made to Dr. Munsinger by petitioner. Likewise, Dr. Munsinger’s conclusions in his report that the petitioner tends to retreat into fantasy when confronted with stress were not explored by either party except insofar as Dr. Munsinger testified the petitioner reported a history of “blackouts,” i.e., amnesiac episodes of less than a day, which petitioner attributed to his own heavy drinking. In sum. Dr. Munsinger’s conclusions in his report were based solely on information related to him by the petitioner and petitioner’s psychological test results. Dr. Munsinger did conclude, based upon petitioner’s clinical interview and psychological test scores, that petitioner was suffering from diminished capacity at the time of his offense attributable to petitioner’s ingestion of unknown substances. Significantly, the factual information upon which Dr. Munsinger relied in reaching his conclusions appears to have come exclusively from the petitioner and to be greatly at odds with the petitioner’s own sworn testimony at his trial, during which petitioner categorically denied any history of childhood abuse. Moreover, Dr. Munsinger admitted petitioner may very well have omitted significant information from his clinical interview, including any mention of petitioner’s mother’s suicide attempts. Other than petitioner’s own trial testimony, virtually all of the factual evidence now before this Court regarding petitioner’s drug abuse at the time of his offense comes from the petitioner himself and was related to this Court through Dr. Henry Munsinger’s testimony and the largely hearsay testimony of Dr. Seth Silverman. Dr. Silverman testified, in part, that the petitioner related to him that the petitioner had a long history of multiple substance abuse and had ingested cocaine prior to committing the offense. This aspect of Dr. Silverman’s hearsay testimony merely repeats the same self-serving allegations petitioner made during his own trial testimony, which petitioner’s jury implicitly rejected. Dr. Silverman opined that petitioner’s “atypical” violent behavior immediately before and immediately after the offense (while in custody) was the product of petitioner’s cocaine intoxication and the process of petitioner “detoxing” from cocaine abuse. Significantly, Dr. Silverman did not address the substantial trial evidence establishing petitioner’s violent behavior during pretrial detention in the months following petitioner’s arrest was gang-related. Mark Molina testified he and the petitioner abused alcohol (with Rosa Ruiz’s approval) starting in their early-teens to mid-teens. Molina also testified he and the petitioner used marijuana almost daily when they lived together at an apartment off San Pedro. Molina claimed petitioner had used LSD but admitted he had never seen the petitioner do so. It was likewise unclear from Molina’s testimony before this Court whether he claimed to have any personal knowledge of petitioner’s alleged cocaine abuse. Molina specifically denied that the petitioner was addicted to any drugs when they were residing together. Undaunted, petitioner’s federal habeas counsel elicited hearsay testimony from Dr. Silverman to the effect that Molina told Dr. Silverman the petitioner was using cocaine heavily in the weeks prior to the offense. For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds Molina’s hearsay testimony in this regard wholly incredible Thei-e is no credible evidence now before this Court establishing petitioner ever used cocaine prior to the days immediately leading up to petitioner’s execution of Theresa Rodriguez, i.e., after Mike Rodriguez made the down-payment for petitioner’s murder of Theresa Rodriguez. With regard to petitioner’s claims that he had a long history of drug abuse, this Court is confronted with testimony from Molina and hearsay testimony from petitioner’s mental health experts which is largely cumulative of the testimony petitioner himself gave at trial. Other than suggesting petitioner was addicted to cocaine, neither Dr. Munsinger nor Dr. Silverman offered any significant testimony before this Court regarding petitioner’s history of substance abuse beyond that contained in petitioner’s own trial testimony. This Court has disregarded a vast amount of rank hearsay testimony offered by petitioner’s federal habeas counsel during the evidentiary hearing herein because, under the retrospective lens of Strickland analysis, petitioner’s trial counsel cannot reasonably be faulted for failing to discover, develop, and present inadmissible hearsay testimony. Petitioner’s family members, other than Molina, categorically denied any personal knowledge regarding petitioner’s alleged drug abuse when they testified before this Court. Insofar as those same family members furnished affidavits or gave Dr. Silverman interviews in which they furnished very different information concerning their knowledge of petitioner’s alleged drug abuse than the facts to which they testified under oath during the evidentiary hearing in this Court, this Court considers Dr. Silverman’s conclusions to be unsupported and entitled to very little evidentiary weight. It was unreasonable for Dr. Silverman to have relied upon the affidavits of petitioner’s family members in forming his conclusions herein when those same family members repudiated their own affidavits during their testimony before this Court. Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing in this cause to show the existence of admissible additional mitigating evidence which might have impacted the outcome of the punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial. As is explained at length hereinafter, there is simply no credible evidence before this Court establishing the existence at the time of petitioner’s trial of additional admissible mitigating evidence sufficient to raise doubts as to the validity of the outcome of the punishment phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial. V. Analyzing Petitioner’s Strickland Claims A. The Context 1. Overview The facts and circumstances surrounding petitioner’s offense are set forth in detail in this Court’s original Memorandum Opinion and Order denying federal habeas relief issued August 29, 2005. Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2146119, *l-*2 (W.D.Tex. August 29, 2005), affirmed, 460 F.3d 638 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1283, 127 S.Ct. 1815, 167 L.Ed.2d 326 (2007). To summarize, shortly after his arrest for Theresa Rodriguez’s fatal shooting, on three separate dates, petitioner gave three written statements to police in which he described (1) negotiating with Theresa’s husband Michael and her brother-in-law Mark to murder Theresa in exchange for the sum of two thousand dollars and (2) fatally shooting Theresa in the presence of Michael and Mark inside the garage of Theresa and Michael’s residence on the evening of July 14,1992. Id. At trial, however, petitioner took the stand and repeatedly denied he had ever executed any of his written statements, denied he knew either Theresa Rodriguez’s husband or brother-in-law, denied he murdered Theresa for remuneration, and instead, claimed his fatal shooting of Theresa was a random act of violence he had committed while in a drug-induced stupor. 2. Guilt-Innocence Phase of Trial The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence at both phases of petitioner’s capital murder trial. At the guilt-innocence phase, the prosecution presented three written statements executed by petitioner, all implicating petitioner in Theresa Rodriguez’s fatal shooting and explaining petitioner fatally shot Theresa in exchange for what ultimately amounted to approximately thirteen hundred dollars. More specifically, the evidence showed that, on the same date he was arrested, i.e., July 23, 1992, petitioner gave police a written statement in which he asserted that (1) shortly after petitioner left jail on an unrelated charge, Mark Rodriguez approached petitioner and offered to pay petitioner to kill his brother’s wife, (2) petitioner then got into a car with Mark and Mark’s brother Mike, who drove them to Maearoni’s restaurant in Northwest San Antonio, showed petitioner the location where the Rodriguez brothers and the victim would park the following evening, and instructed petitioner to kill the victim as soon as the trio arrived at the restaurant, (3) the Rodriguez brothers then drove petitioner back to the location where they had picked him up and instructed petitioner to call them the next morning to ensure the plan was still on, (4) along the way, the Rodriguez brothers promised to pay petitioner two thousand dollars, one thousand up front and one thousand after, to kill Michael’s wife, (5) the following morning, petitioner telephoned one of the Rodriguez brothers, who directed petitioner to commit the offense as they had outlined it the evening before, (6) that evening, when the petitioner arrived at the restaurant, he saw a security guard and left the scene, (7) petitioner telephoned one of the Rodriguez brothers and informed them that he would not kill Michael’s wife at the restaurant because there were too many people and a security guard there, (8) the following date, petitioner again spoke with one of the Rodriguez brothers, who informed petitioner the murder would take place outside a movie theater in North San Antonio the following Monday evening, (9) petitioner went to the movie theater at the designated time on Monday but never saw the Rodriguez brothers’ vehicle and left, (10) when petitioner telephoned Mark that night, he was informed that something had come up and that he should call back later, (11) when petitioner did so, Mark informed petitioner the murder would take place at the same movie theater on Thursday, (12) when petitioner telephoned Mark at 7:00 p.m. on Thursday to verify that the plan was still on, Mark informed petitioner that the trio were at the movie theater, (13) Mark directed petitioner to park by the side of the theater and, if petitioner did not feel he could execute the murder there, to follow the Rodriguez brothers and the victim home, (14) petitioner went to the theater Thursday night, saw the Rodriguez brothers and Theresa come out of the theater, and followed them home, (15) petitioner saw them pull into their driveway, (16) petitioner drove to the next house over, parked, and walked to the Rodriguez’s driveway, where he pretended to ask directions from Mark, (17) Mike got out of the car, opened the trunk, and handed Mark a gym bag, (18) petitioner asked Mark “Do I do it?” and Mark replied “Yes,” (19) Mike got back in the car, pulled it into the garage, and parked it, (20) petitioner walked up to the passenger side of the car, pointed the gun at head of “the lady” as she stepped out of the car, and shot her once, (21) petitioner fled the scene without taking her purse, (22) Mark paid petitioner the first thousand dollars on the Friday before the murder, (23) the day after the murder, Mark informed petitioner that he could not get to his brother because there were a lot of people around him, (24) the following Thursday, Mark promised to pay petitioner the other thousand but failed to do so, but (25) the next day, a Friday, Mark did finally deliver the second thousand dollars to petitioner. On July 24, 1992, petitioner gave a second written statement to a different San Antonio Police Detective in which petitioner stated that (1) Mark Rodriguez had approached petitioner the week before the murder at the home of their mutual friend Sam Perez to discuss petitioner killing Mike’s wife, (2) during their discussion, Mike Rodriguez drove up in a yellow Mercedes Benz and took them to the Taco House, where they discussed the killing, (3) after they ate, they left, (4) the Rodriguez brothers gave petitioner a .45 caliber automatic pistol during their drive to Macaroni’s grill to scout out the location, (5) Mark took out the clip, which contained bullets, to show petitioner the gun and petitioner forgot to ask for the clip when the Rodriguez brothers dropped him off at the home of Chris Villarreal, (6) when petitioner arrived at Macaroni’s the next evening to perform the murder, he saw a security guard, (7) on the night of the murder, Theresa looked at him and smiled before petitioner shot her, (8) after petitioner shot Theresa, Mike said “Oh my God” and Mike began yelling, (9) petitioner used a .357 revolver to shoot Theresa because the .45 caliber automatic the Rodriguez brothers had given him, which bore an Italian brand name, still had a serial number on it, (10) on the night of the murder, petitioner’s Smith and Wesson .357 was loaded with a mixture of .38 and .357 caliber bullets, (11) after the murder, petitioner took his .357 to a friend named Pascual, who sold it for $100, which he and petitioner split, (12) the Sunday after the murder, petitioner left the .45 automatic at the home of his friend Rudy Espinoza, (13) petitioner spent all the money he received for killing Mike’s wife on clothes and partying, (14) when his mother got suspicious as to why he had so much money, she threw him out of her house, and (15) the mother of petitioner’s friend Chris saw petitioner counting his money and also appeared suspicious. Acting on the information petitioner furnished in his statement of July 24, 1992 regarding the two handguns, all of which proved to be accurate, San Antonio Police officers subsequently recovered both the .357 handgun petitioner had used to shoot Theresa Rodriguez, as well as the .45 caliber pistol sans clip. On July 27, 1992, petitioner requested to speak with a San Antonio Police Detective and gave a third written statement in which petitioner stated that (1) Joe Ramon knew what petitioner was going to do and drove with petitioner to Macaroni’s restaurant on the night petitioner was first instructed to murder Theresa Rodriguez, (2) when he explained to Joe Ramon that he planned to kill Mike Rodriguez’s wife, petitioner offered to give Ramon half of the money the Rodriguez brothers had promised petitioner and Ramon accepted, (3) Ramon went with petitioner to the movie theater the night the Rodriguez brothers failed to show up, (4) the night of the murder, petitioner, Ramon, and two girls went to the theater to kill Mike’s wife, (5) Mike’s Mercedes is a diesel and has a sun roof that had to be closed by hand, and (6) petitioner gave Ramon $300 of the first thousand petitioner received and $400 from the second thousand. In addition to the petitioner’s three, highly inculpatory, written statements summarized above, the prosecution presented evidence showing that (1) the Rodriguez brothers behaved very suspiciously on the night of the murder and falsely told police that the person who shot Theresa had also stolen her purse, (2) the evening that petitioner had been directed to shoot Theresa at Macaroni’s restaurant, the Rodriguez brothers behaved very strangely while they and Theresa ate dinner at that establishment, (3) shortly before petitioner’s arrest, the mother of petitioner’s friend saw petitioner counting hundred dollar bills that appeared to her to total between $800 and $1,000, and (4) shortly after his arrest, petitioner telephoned his Mend from jail, spoke with his friend’s mother, and confessed to her that he had killed “the girl from USAA” for the money. The medical examiner testified that Theresa Rodriguez died as a result of a single, close-range, gunshot wound to the head. A firearms and tool mark expert testified that (1) the bullet removed from Theresa Rodriguez’s body during her autopsy was, in his opinion, fired from the .357 handgun police recovered following petitioner’s confession of July 24, 1992 and (2) the Smith and Wesson .357 was in good working condition and would not have fired accidentally. Taking the stand against his trial counsel’s advice, petitioner testified in pertinent part that (1) he never planned to kill anyone at Macaroni’s restaurant and did not even know where it was located, (2) he had not given any of the three written statements introduced into evidence by the prosecution but, instead, had merely signed blank statement forms to acknowledge that he had been given his Miranda warnings, (3) he did not place his initials next to any of the corrections on the three statements, (4) he had no contact with either Rodriguez brother until the night of the murder, (5) while he shot Theresa Rodriguez, he did so because he had ingested narcotics heavily that night and not because he had been paid to do so, (6) he had no motive for killing Theresa but did so simply because he was drunk, (7) all three of the written statements introduced against him were false, (8) he was not a member of the Texas Syndicate prison gang, although he had grown up with several persons who are members, and (9) the money he was seen counting around the time of the murder had been given to him by his family for his birthday or by his father to help him hire an attorney in an unrelated matter. In rebuttal, the prosecution presented a Bexar County Sheriffs Department employee who witnessed petitioner’s signatures on the written statements given on July 24 and July 27, 1992 and who testified that (1) she had never witnessed any inmate sign a blank statement form, (2) petitioner’s statement forms were not blank when she witnessed his signatures on same, and (3) the standard practice is for officers to have her and other witnesses physically present when an inmate reads and corrects a written statement. A Clerk with the Bexar County Sheriffs department who witnessed petitioner’s signature on his written statement given July 27,1992 testified that she had never signed a blank statement form as a witness. The San Antonio Police Detective who took petitioner’s statements on July 23 and July 27 testified that (1) at the time petitioner gave police his statement on July 23, 1992, police were not aware the Rodriguez brothers and Theresa had been to Macaroni’s restaurant on the Friday evening before the murder but subsequent investigation following petitioner’s statement confirmed that fact, (2) at the time petitioner informed police that he had not stolen Theresa’s purse, police believed the shooter had taken same from the crime scene, and (3) only after petitioner gave his statement on July 24, 1992 identifying the locations of the murder weapon and the .45 handgun the Rodriguez brothers gave to petitioner were police able to recover either of those weapons. Another San Antonio Police Detective testified that (1) until petitioner gave police his statement on July 24, 1992, police knew nothing regarding the caliber of the murder weapon, (2) petitioner’s statement given that date led directly to the recovery of the murder weapon and the .45 caliber handgun, (3) inmates do not sign blank forms to acknowledge they have received their Miranda warnings but, rather, inmates sign and date a separate warning card, as petitioner before he gave each of his three written statements, and (4) two civilian employees of the Sheriffs department witnessed petitioner correct and sign his statement on July 24,1992. A Bexar County Adult Detection Center (“BCADC”) classification officer testified that (1) petitioner informed the officer that petitioner had become affiliated with the Texas Syndicate gang in May, 1992, (2) petitioner was experiencing problems in his unit with the Mexican Mafia prison gang and requested to be moved to a location within the BCADC where he would be housed with other Texas Syndicate gang members, (3) after conducting research, including interviewing known Texas Syndicate gang members, he approved petitioner’s transfer to another part of the BCADC which housed Texas Syndicate gang members. Thus, there was overwhelming evidence showing not only that petitioner fatally shot Theresa Rodriguez in exchange for payment of a modest sum by Theresa’s husband but also that petitioner testified falsely when he denied knowing the Rodriguez brothers, denied receiving money for killing Theresa, and denied being a gang member. On January, 18, 1995, after deliberating barely over two hours, the jury returned its verdict, finding petitioner guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment. 3. Punishment Phase of Trial At the punishment phase of trial, the prosecution presented a 19-year-old female friend of petitioner’s testified that (1) in the days immediately after the murder, petitioner confessed to her that he had killed Theresa Rodriguez and (2) after petitioner’s arrest, she successfully smuggled several marijuana joints into petitioner during her visits to petitioner at the Bexar County Adult Detention center (“BCADC”). Three close friends of the petitioner testified the petitioner (1) knew and associated with Mark Rodriguez before Theresa Rodriguez’s murder, (2) liked to fight, and (3) sometimes carried a gun. A police officer and an eyewitness testified about an incident on June 8, 1992 during which petitioner (1) pulled his girlfriend Roxanne Conway out of her vehicle, (2) beat and kicked Conway before throwing her to the ground, (3) stole Conway’s vehicle, (4) within minutes thereafter led police on a brief chase before surrendering Conway’s vehicle, which was missing both its air conditioner and stereo, and (5) casually told his arresting officer that he could do whatever he wanted to his girlfriend. The prosecution presented numerous witnesses who testified regarding petitioner’s gang-related activities while in custody awaiting trial, including multiple incidents in which petitioner and other Texas Syndicate gang members acted in concert to assault other inmates or jail guards. More specifically, a BCADC classification officer testified that, on August 8, 1992, (1) petitioner informed him that he was a member of the Texas Syndicate prison gang, (2) petitioner requested to be moved to a part of the BCADC where members of that gang were housed, and (3) other Texas Syndicate gang members housed in the BCADC verified petitioner’s claim to membership in that gang. A pair of BCADC guards testified about an incident on September 6, 1992 in which petitioner and other Texas Syndicate inmates assaulted guards and attempted to assault a black inmate who was being escorted through the day room in handcuffs. A quartet of BCADC guards testified about an incident on April 21, 1993 in which petitioner and two other Texas Syndicate gang members refused to return to their cells and, when confronted by jail guards, assaulted a trio of BCADC guards, seriously injuring one of the guards. Another BCADC guard testified about an incident on June 9, 1993 in which Petitioner charged out of his cell, attempted to assault another inmate, vigorously resisted the attempts of several guards to restrain him, and had to be wrestled to the floor. Finally, the prosecution presented a witness with over nine years experience investigating and helping to prosecute felony offenses committed in the Texas prison system, who testified that (1) he was very familiar with the Texas Syndicate prison gang, one of the more successful prison gangs in Texas, (2) the Texas Syndicate is organized along racial lines with primarily Hispanic and a few Anglo members and exercises its influence through fear and intimidation, (3) the Texas Syndicate is a deeply rooted, violent, prison gang that exercises influence both inside and outside the prison system, (4) a hired killer or someone who had a record of having killed would be considered a valuable asset to a prison gang like the Texas Syndicate, (5) while death row inmates are severely restricted and carefully scrutinized, inmates in the general prison population are allowed much greater freedom, and (6) prison gangs thrive on members who possess reputations for violence because it helps the gangs intimidate others. Petitioner’s trial counsel presented a long-time friend of petitioner’s family and one of petitioner’s former high school teachers, both of whom testified they had never known petitioner to be violent and they were shocked by his arrest for capital murder. Petitioner’s former girlfriend Roxanne Conway testified that (1) petitioner was always “very sweet” and “caring” toward her, (2) petitioner had written her a letter apologizing for having assaulted her and stolen her vehicle, (3) she had forgiven petitioner because he had a drug problem, and (4) she did not believe petitioner deserved the death penalty. On cross-examination, however, Conway was forced to admit (1) she had suffered severe facial and dental injuries in petitioner’s assault upon her, which required her to receive five stitches in her mouth and undergo multiple dental surgeries, (2) she told police who arrived at the scene of her assault that she felt as if she had been fighting petitioner for her life, (3) for a while after petitioner assaulted her, she did not trust men, (4) she had gone to the District Attorney’s office to demand petitioner be prosecuted for assaulting her and had never asked that those charges be dismissed, and (5) when police recovered her stolen vehicle only minutes after petitioner assaulted her and took her vehicle, her vehicle’s radio had been removed, several music disks had been taken, and the bumper was damaged. Petitioner’s trial counsel also called a veteran Bexar County defense attorney who testified about her observations the night she attended the execution of one of her clients. Petitioner’s uncle and cousin testified they had never known petitioner to be violent, they were unaware of his drug problems, and they did not believe petitioner deserved to die. Finally, petitioner’s mother testified petitioner (1) had a “normal” childhood and had displayed no behavior problems as a child, (2) began having problems at age 17 when he began abusing drugs, (3) was always a very respectful son and had once baked a cake for her, and (4) had expressed remorse for his crime, knew right from wrong, and was still a good person inside who deserved to live. On cross-examination, however, petitioner’s mother admitted that (1) when petitioner telephoned her from jail, he confessed to killing Theresa Rodriguez and (2) she had once kicked petitioner out of her house because she wanted him to get a job and be responsible for himself. Thus, petitioner’s capital sentencing jury had before it overwhelming evidence showing petitioner’s (1) history and demonstrated propensity for extreme violence, even against those with whom he was close, (2) propensity for violence even while incarcerated, (3) abject refusal to accept any responsibility for his murder-for-hire, and (4) history of drug abuse. On January 20, 1995, after deliberating slightly more than ninety minutes, the jury returned its verdict, finding (1) beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability the petitioner would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society and (2) taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the petitioner’s character and background, and the petitioner’s personal moral culpability, there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence. B. Failure to Fully Investigate Petitioner’s Background Petitioner argues his trial counsel should have engaged in a more searching inquiry into petitioner’s background to locate potentially mitigating evidence, i.e., admissible evidence which diminished petitioner’s moral culpability or which would have otherwise assisted petitioner’s trial counsel in obtaining a favorable jury verdict on any of the Texas capital sentencing special issues. 1. Deficient Performance In support of this contention, petitioner furnished the state habeas court and this Court with a series of affidavits from friends and family members purporting to establish the allegedly “horrific” nature of petitioner’s childhood. When called to testify at the evidentiary hearing held in November, 2010, however, all but a handful of these witnesses refused to offer any information based on personal knowledge supporting the statements contained in their affidavits. On the contrary, with the exception of Mark Molina, this Court heard from none of petitioner’s friends or family who were willing to support the claims in their affidavits with any specific facts of which they possessed personal knowledge. Instead, petitioner’s family members testified