Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER SEIBEL, District Judge. Before the Court are several motions. First, Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) moves for summary judgment dismissing the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action in Plaintiff Susan Schlenger’s Amended Complaint, (Doc. 12), the only causes of action that pertain to MetLife, and for summary judgment on MetLife’s Counterclaim. (Doc. 42.) Second, Defendant Fidelity Employer Services Company (“Fidelity”) moves for summary judgment dismissing the Second and Fourth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, the only causes of action that pertain to Fidelity, and for an award of its attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 47.) Third, Defendant International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) moves to dismiss the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, the only causes of action that pertain to it, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and failure to plead with particularity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff Susan Amy Schlenger opposes all three motions, (Docs. 36, 52, 55), and cross-moves for summary judgment on her claims against MetLife, and for an award of her attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. 58). For the reasons stated herein, MetLife’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on her claims against MetLife is DENIED; Plaintiffs motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED; Fidelity’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Fidelity’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED; and IBM’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, but Plaintiff has leave to amend as to her claims against IBM only. I. BACKGROUND For purposes of deciding IBM’s Motion, I assume the facts (but not the conclusions) as alleged in the Amended Complaint to be true, and for purposes of deciding MetLife’s and Fidelity’s Motions for Summary Judgment, as well as Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the following facts are undisputed, except where noted. While I will only briefly summarize the facts, I have read and considered all of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, and for purposes of the summary judgment motions, the materials provided in connection with those motions, and I assume the parties’ familiarity with them. Plaintiff is an attorney who previously resided and practiced in Massachusetts. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31.) She was recruited by representatives of IBM starting in October 2003 to work in its Business and Government Relations Division as a Senior Contracts Professional at its facility in Yorktown, New York. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges that during the recruitment process, IBM representatives represented to her that if she worked for IBM, she would receive “variable pay constituting an average 10% of her base salary annually,” plus a “robust relocation package that would allow her to relocate her family from Massachusetts to New York to a home suitable to her needs.” (Id. at ¶ 33.) Plaintiff claims that based on these representations she decided to accept IBM’s offer, (id. at ¶ 34), and relocate her family to New York, (id. at ¶35), but ran into difficulties with the relocation allegedly because of IBM’s failure to provide her with the “promised relocation plan,” inasmuch as the allegedly revised package she received “had no provision for an equity advance to provide a down payment on a new house,” (id. at ¶¶ 35-36). As a result of this delay and revision, Plaintiff states that by the time the corrected plan was issued in April 2004, she had expended approximately $15,000 for temporary housing, (id. at ¶ 37), lost the opportunity to bid on a suitable house for her family, (id. at ¶ 35), and was ultimately compelled to bid on a “more expensive house that failed to meet many of her criteria and that was located 20 miles further away from work,” (id. at ¶ 38). Plaintiff states that she complained of her frustrations with the relocation process to her then-manager, Ronald Rinner, who had also been her “hiring manager,” and his director, Joyce Koontz, who had “dined Ms. Schlenger during the recruiting process and confirmed the commitments made by Mr. Rinner.” (Id. at ¶ 40.) Plaintiff contends that she continued to have significant out-of-pocket expenses related to selling her prior residence (a farm) because the agent provided by IBM was inexperienced selling farm properties, and that by the time of her relocation from the temporary apartment in which she had been residing around late July or early August 2004, Ms. Schlenger had spent nearly $30,000 in rent and associated costs for the apartment, and was “forced to spend an additional $15,000 on out-of-pocket transportation and travel expenses, child care expenses, and substitute labor,” an amount in excess of the $11,000 lump sum relocation package that IBM had given her. (Id. at ¶ 43.) In the meantime, Plaintiff had started working at IBM on December 1, 2003, as a Senior Contracts Professional in the Contracts and Negotiations Division. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff maintains that during her time at IBM she “possessed a stellar work record and ... had received exceptionally good performance ratings,” but despite this never received the 10% variable pay promised to her during the hiring process or any other compensation increases whatsoever. (Id. at ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs medical problems began around May 30, 2005, when she alleges that she began to suffer “excruciating and intractable back pain.” (Id. at ¶ 48.) She was admitted to the hospital on or about May 31, 2005 and treated with pain medication. (Id.; ML 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 8; Hallford Decl. Ex. B at SCH 652.) Plaintiff advised the doctors at Vassar Brothers Hospital of various past injuries, including neck and residual spinal problems from a car accident in 1969, and injuries from falling from a horse in and around 1995. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff had a history of back complaints, and a prior history of depression. (SCH 652-55; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 12-13.) After this first hospitalization she requested and was denied a more flexible work schedule. (Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff was hospitalized a second time in November 2005, at which time she was diagnosed with progressive Facet disease (“a disorder of certain joints associated with the spine”). (Id. at ¶ 51.) Plaintiff also has been diagnosed with progressive cervical stenosis, chronic intractable back pain, related right shoulder weakness and pain, a Tarlov cyst (a fluid-filled sac in spinal canal), and coccydynia (pain of the tailbone). (Id. at ¶¶ 51, 52.) At that time, “with management’s approval and endorsement,” Plaintiff began to work from home, an option apparently available to any employee regardless of health. (Id. at ¶¶ 53, 54.) Plaintiff alleges that she continued her work from her home, taking frequent, intermittent rest when needed in light of her condition and her medications. (Id. at ¶¶ 55, 60.) Plaintiff contends that she maintained fifty-plus hour work weeks during this period and “was able to perform at a level similarly productive to her pre-June 2005 levels,” but “was unable to successfully maintain a course of prescribed medication or treatment to address her pain levels due to IBM’s continued refusal to allow her genuine flex hours.” (Id. at ¶¶ 58, 60.) In 2005 and 2006, Plaintiff submitted Medical Treatment Reports (“MTR’s”) to IBM. Plaintiffs first MTR was submitted by Daniel Richman, M.D. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 14-16; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 14-16; SCH 723.) The remainder of Plaintiffs MTRs were submitted by Ricardo Cruciani, M.D., Ph.D. (ML 56.1 ¶ 17; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 17; SCH 722, 724-29.) Dr. Cruciani diagnosed plaintiff with degenerative disc disease (“DDD”), Facet’s disease, cervical stenosis and spondylosis. (ML 56.1 ¶ 18; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was hospitalized for a third time in mid-March 2006 for further diagnosis and treatment, and upon discharge continued to work from home. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61, 62.) In August 2006, Dr. Cruciani requested that IBM provide a proof-reader to assist plaintiff in reviewing her work for typographical errors. (ML 56.1 ¶ 24; PL’s 56.1 (ML) ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that beginning around mid-May 2006, her supervisor, Gary Lipson, commenced a “six month harassment campaign” that involved “an unusual and uncustomary review process out of yearly order and out of synch with IBM’s procedural precedent.” (An. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 64.) According to Plaintiff, the culmination of this alleged campaign was “an arbitrary determination” by Lipson that Plaintiff “was too acutely ‘ill’ to work given her symptoms related to global spinal disorders and other conditions.” (Id. at ¶ 63.) Plaintiff maintains that as a result she was effectively dismissed on November 14, 2006, and did not return to work after that date. (Id. at ¶¶ 63, 67.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was “forced out” of her job in November 2006, and that her supervisor claimed that Plaintiff had “performance problems” and felt that she would “not get better.” (ML 56.1 ¶¶26-27; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 26-27, 30.) According to MetLife, Plaintiff stopped working due to an alleged physical disability caused by Facet’s disease and cervical stenosis. (ML 56.1 ¶ 30; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 30.) In response to Lipson’s decision (and perhaps to the off-cycle review, although the Amended Complaint does not specify), Plaintiff appealed to IBM’s Human Resources Department, which undertook an internal investigation to determine whether his actions were discriminatory. (Am. Compl. ¶ 64.) According to Plaintiff, the investigation characterized Lipson’s conduct as “merely being ‘isolated incidents’ of discrimination without a pattern thereto,” although Plaintiff argues that Lipson’s decision was “unjustified in light of Ms. Schlenger’s stellar work record, above-par performance ratings throughout her tenure, and performance of upwards of fifty-plus hours per week.” (Id. at ¶¶ 65, 66; see ML’s 56.1 ¶ 28 (Plaintiffs performance reports indicate that Plaintiff was “strong overall” through end of December 2005).) Plaintiff also alleges that IBM’s Human Resources Department was “complacent [sic ] in Mr. Lipson’s conduct.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 67.) After her dismissal, Plaintiff claims that she was placed on “long-term disability or ‘active, unpaid’ employee status until [IBM] made efforts to terminate her based upon her inability to obtain medical clearance.... ” (Id. ¶ 68.) IBM offers its employees various employee benefits plans, including medical and dental insurance, group life insurance, and both short-term disability (“STD”) and long-term disability (“LTD”) insurance (collectively, the “IBM Plans”), all of which are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). (Fid. 56.1 ¶ 1; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶ l.) IBM’s LTD Plan identifies the “Manager of U.S. Benefits Services, IBM Human Resources” as the “Plan Administrator,” and lists the address of the Plan Administrator as “Office of the Plan Administrator, IBM Employee Services Center, 5411 Page Road, Durham, NC 27703.” (Hallford Decl. Ex. A at SCH 077; ML 56.1 ¶6.) MetLife issued to IBM a group policy of insurance to fund benefits payable under the LTD Plan, and “was granted full discretionary authority to administer claims for benefits under the Plan, including the authority to' make all benefit determinations under the plan.” (ML 56.1 ¶ 5; PL’s 56.RML) ¶ 5; Hallford Decl. Ex. A at SCH 023-24.) IBM’s health care and life insurance plans are sponsored and maintained by IBM, and name a committee of IBM executives as the “Plan Administrator.” (Fid. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶¶2-3.) Pursuant to a Human Resources Services Agreement, dated June 27, 2002, which was amended and restated by an Administrative Service Agreement, dated August 1, 2007, “certain human resource and employee service operations and functions” related to the IBM Plans were “performed and managed” by Fidelity. (Fid. 56.1 ¶ 10; Pl.’s 56.1(Fid) ¶ 10; Diekstein Decl. Ex. 4 at 1, Ex. 5.) For instance, Fidelity (i) made available phone representatives, known as the IBM Employee Service Center (“ESC”), which IBM Plan participants could contact for help with “enrollment, general benefits information and questions,” and (ii) provided access to a website, www.netbenefits.com, which allows IBM Plan participants to obtain Plan information and perform transactions related to their coverage under the IBM Plans. (Fid. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶¶ 11-12.) As a result of her employment with IBM, Plaintiff was eligible for and enrolled in the IBM LTD Plan. (ML 56.1 ¶ 4; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 4.) According to Plaintiff, she made a claim for STD benefits following November 2006. (Am. Compl. ¶ 69.) Plaintiffs STD application was approved, and Plaintiff received STD benefits through March 13, 2007. (ML 56.1 ¶ 32; PL’s 56.1 (ML) ¶ 32.) After exhaustion of the STD benefits, Plaintiff was eligible to apply for LTD benefits if she remained “disabled.” IBM’s LTD plan states that: “[Disabled” means that during the first 12 months after you complete the elimination period, you cannot perform the important duties of your regular occupation with IBM because of a sickness or injury. After expiration of that 12 month period, disabled means that because of sickness or injury, you cannot perform the important duties of any other gainful occupation for which you are reasonably fit by your education, training and experience. (Hallford Decl. Ex. A at 014-15; ML 56.1 ¶ 36; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 36.) On December 21, 2006, Plaintiff applied for LTD benefits. (ML 56.1 ¶ 39; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 39.) On the claim form, Plaintiff stated that she was unable to perform the important duties of her job on a regular basis due to “[fjrequent hospitalizations,” that “absences due to pain interrupted] [her] job detrimentally,” and that “[u]nique stress exacerbated [her] condition.” (SCH 936.) Plaintiffs LTD application also indicated that she was unable to perform the duties of “some other job” on a regular basis, and that “[a]ny job [she] was able to take would need to be home based and flexible in terms of frequent absences,” and that “stress/personal conflict would need to be minimal.” (Id.) Plaintiff listed eight physicians who had treated her since the beginning of her disability. (SCH 937.) Plaintiff did not submit records to MetLife from three of the doctors. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 90-93; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 90-93.) Also in connection with her LTD application, Plaintiff submitted a “Reimbursement Agreement for Social Security,” (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 42-43; PL’s 56.RML) ¶¶ 42-43), and IBM provided a “Statement of Employer,” dated January 3, 2007, which listed 0% as Plaintiffs occupation’s requirements for sitting, standing and walking. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 44-45; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 44-45; SCH 913.) Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of the “Statement of Employer” form. (Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 45.) In 2008, IBM indicated that Plaintiffs job requirements were such that she “sits for about 90% of the day and walks/stands less than 5% of an 8hr day” and that she “was not required to travel.” (ML 56.1 ¶ 206; PL’s 56.1 (ML) ¶¶ 45, 206.) In January 2007, Dr. Cruciani submitted an Attending Physician Statement (“APS”), which listed the following diagnoses for plaintiffs condition: progressive Facet’s disease, degenerative disc disease, right rotator cuff, and possible cervical stenosis. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 46-47; PL’s 56.KML) ¶¶ 46-47; SCH 900, 902-04.) The APS listed Plaintiffs subjective complaints as “(i) acute pain; (ii) lack of stamina; (iii) inability to stand for substantial periods; and (iv) right-side uncoordinated, typing, drop things, etc.” (ML 56.1 ¶48; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 48.) Dr. Cruciani indicated that Plaintiff was totally disabled for her own occupation, he could not determine if she was totally disabled for “any occupation,” and he did not think she would be able to resume work activities. (SCH 903.) According to MetLife, Plaintiffs application for LTD benefits was assigned to a MetLife Case Management Specialist, Linda Potter, who requested a clinical consultant review, which was performed by Met-Life nurse consultant, Lisa Fletcher RN. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 94-96.) By letter dated March 5, 2007, MetLife advised Plaintiff that her LTD benefits application had been approved effective March 14, 2007, and notified Plaintiff that after twelve months, the definition of “disability” changes from an “own occupation” to an “any occupation” test. (Id. ¶ 99; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 99; SCH 526-29.) The letter further advised Plaintiff that MetLife “w[ould] be requesting updated medical statements periodically to certify continued disability as defined in [the LTD] plan.” (SCH 528.) The letter also explained that a 24-month limitation applied because Plaintiffs claimed disability fell within the LTD Plan’s “soft tissue” limitation, and that these benefits would be exhausted on March 13, 2009. (Id.; ML 56.1 ¶ 100; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 100.) By letter dated June 27, 2007, MetLife advised plaintiff that IBM had removed the soft-tissue limitation from the LTD Plan and that her benefits were no longer subject to the 24-month limitation, but instead would continue “for as long as [she] continue[d] to satisfy the definition of disability and all other requirements of the plan.” (SCH 540; ML 56.1 ¶ 101; PL’s 56.1 (ML) ¶ 101.) By letter dated July 19, 2007, MetLife requested information regarding a review of Plaintiffs claim for continuing LTD benefits. (SCH 542.) Specially, MetLife requested that Plaintiff provide MetLife with “current office notes from all treating physicians from last 3 office visits, including current exam findings,” “treatment plan (including medications),” “diagnostic test results/lab reports,” and “completion of provided Attending Physicians Statement.” (Id.) By letter dated July 20, 2007, MetLife requested additional information and indicated that the “information will be requested in connection with the ‘any occupation’ investigation currently being conducted on your claim.” (SCH 543.) MetLife contends that, as part of this continuing review, Ms. Potter forwarded all medical information received to date to a MetLife nurse consultant, Darsel Excell RN, who reviewed the medical information and noted that there was no diagnostic testing to support the claimed restrictions and limitations. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 109-10.) MetLife’s claim log reflects that Nurse Excell attempted to contact Plaintiff on at least three occasions. (SCH 101.) Nurse Excell drafted a letter dated October 8, 2007 to Dr. Cruciani requesting additional information and enclosing a Work Restrictions and Limitations form. (SCH 86(U63; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 110-11; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 111.) The instructions requested, among other things, that Dr. Cruciani “address [several issues] and provide work restrictions and limitations.” (SCH 860.) The form was sent to Dr. Cruciani on November 8, 2007, and Dr. Cruciani returned it on November 14, 2007. (SCH 097, 101; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 111-12; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 111-12.) Dr. Cruciani listed Plaintiffs “primary disabling diagnosis” as “cervical stenosis” and “other back symptoms,” Plaintiffs “secondary diagnosis” as Facet disease and lumbago, and Plaintiffs “eo-morbid conditions” as “depression/DJD.” (SCH 857.) Únder the heading “RESULTS OF ANY DIAGNOSTIC TESTING (we do not have any diag testing on file for patient) (EMG, NCS, MRI, CT or X RAYS) and dates performed,” Dr. Cruciani left the response space blank. (SCH 857.) Below the space provided to answer this question, but before the next question, Dr. Cruciani wrote “to be determined @ appt. on 11/27/07.” (SCH 857.) Dr. Cruciani checked “No” in response to Question 2, which asked “Is the patient able to RTW [return to work] with or without restrictions?” (SCH 859.) Dr. Cruciani left blank the space provided for answering Question 4, which instructed: “If you DO NOT feel the patient is able to return to work, EVEN WITH RESTRICTIONS then please provide current OBJECTIVE medical findings, treatment plan, functional impairments.” (SCH 859 (emphasis in original).) According to MetLife, on November 20, 2007, Nurse Excell referred all of the medical records received to date for review by an independent physician consultant (“IPC”). (ML 56.1 ¶ 114.) Lawrence Rubens, M.D., board certified in orthopedic surgery, reviewed and summarized the medical records received, as well as other documents that were part of the claim file. (Id. ¶ 116; SCH 640-41.) According to Dr. Rubens’ report, the “only clinical documentation available for [his] review consisted] of 4 clinic notes from ... Dr. Cruciani.” (SCH 641.) The report also discusses two additional “disability” forms that Dr. Cruciani filled out, and states that Plaintiff “had seen at least five other physicians but their medical records [we]re not available.” (SCH 642.) According to Dr. Rubens, “MRI’s ha[d] been done but no reports were available,” although Dr. Cruciani’s submissions, which were reviewed by Dr. Rubens, discussed the MRI findings. (SCH 642.) Dr. Rubens spoke with Dr. Cruciani by telephone. (SCH 641.) Dr. Rubens’s report also lists a variety of other documentation (totaling 112 pages) that he reviewed. (SCH 64CMT.) Dr. Rubens concluded that “[t]here [wa]s inadequate documentation of positive object [sic] physical findings to support a functional limitation from [Plaintiffs] normal sedentary duties on a physical basis,” and that “[t]he impairments and medical are not severe enough to cause functional limitations preventing the employee from performing her sedentary job.” (SCH 643.) Dr. Rubens also found that “[t]he restrictions and limitations provided by Dr. Cruciani are not consistent with the medical findings,” and that “the restrictions and limitations appear to be a response to [Plaintiffs] self reported complaints without the support of positive objective physical findings of a significant nature' to preclude the duties of her own occupation.” (Id.) With regard to whether Plaintiff was receiving appropriate treatment, he stated that “(j]ust giving opioids alone, without some type of cognitive intervention, is not an ideal treatment.” (Id.) Because his training is as an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Rubens declined to assess Plaintiffs psychiatric limitations. (Id.) On December 3, 2007, Nurse Excell faxed Dr. Rubens’s report to Dr. Cruciani for comment, and Dr. Cruciani sent a response, dated December 5, 2007, wherein he stated his objections to the report, but did not include any additional medical records. (SCH 645-46; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 121-26; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 121-26.) On December 17, 2007, Ms. Potter faxed Dr. Cruciani’s response to Dr. Rubens, (ML 56.1 ¶ 129; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 129), and on December 21, 2007, Dr. Rubens provided an addendum report, which found that no new objective evidence of impairments was presented and that his opinion that plaintiff was physically able to perform her sedentary job remained unchanged, (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 130— 31; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 130-31; SCH 839). Dr. Rubens did amend his statement from “just giving opioids” to “just treating with medications.” (SCH 839.) On December 28, 2007, the addendum report was sent to Dr. Cruciani for comment, and he submitted a response dated January 2, 2008. (SCH 647-48; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 132-33; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 132-33.) Dr. Cruciani’s response was forwarded to Dr. Rubens, who after review, continued to adhere to his prior determination in an addendum report dated January 14, 2008. (SCH 649; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 135-36; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 135-36.) Plaintiffs claim also was referred to MetLife’s Special Investigation Unit (“SIU”), which performed requested surveillance of Plaintiffs home. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 137-38; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 137-38.) The surveillance results were unremarkable. (SCH 598-601; ML 56.1 ¶ 139; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 139.) The investigator also performed internet research, which indicated that Plaintiff was breeding and showing dogs as late as May 28, 2007. (ML 56.1 ¶ 140; SCH 595.) Plaintiff disputes this finding, and states that she “had not shown a dog since 2003 or bred a dog since 2004.” (PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 140; but see SCH 657 (Dr. O’Leary’s July 20, 2005 exam notes: “She breeds dogs”); SCH 082 (January 2007 MetLife claim log entry: “EE [employee, i.e., Plaintiff] and husband also raised show dogs but now just has [sic] 2 dogs for breeding purposes”); SCH 500 (July 21, 2008 Appeal letter from Plaintiffs counsel attaching the surveillance report, noting that it was improper for Dr. Rubens to ignore the findings in the surveillance report, and that “the investigator’s report supports Ms. Schlenger’s disability claim.”); SCH 665 (Dr. Hansraj’s September 28, 2005 exam notes: “For recreation the patient reports gardening, breeding dogs.”).) According to MetLife, on January 23, 2008, Potter reviewed all of the information in Plaintiffs file, and concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the definition of disability under the terms of IBM’s LTD Plan. (ML 56.1 ¶ 141.) Potter forwarded her recommendation to terminate Plaintiffs LTD benefits to MetLife Unit Manager, Christine Parent, who agreed with Potter’s recommendation. (ML 56.1 ¶¶ 141-43; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 141-43.) On January 28, 2008, MetLife informed Plaintiff that she no longer qualified to receive payments under IBM’s LTD Plan. (SCH 813; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 145-46; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 145-46.) The January 24, 2008 denial letter stated that “no current exam findings or rationale was provided that would indicate a severity of an impairment that would prevent you from performing the essential duties of your own job as a Senior Contract Professional as well as any occupation according to your education, training and experience.” (SCH 814.) The letter further explained that if Plaintiff appealed the decision, Met-Life “suggested] that [she] provide clinical documentation that includes: physical exam findings, abnormal diagnostic testing results and current restrictions/limitations that documents an impairment in functional abilities that would prevent you from performing the essential duties of your own job.” (SCH 814.) Meanwhile, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) had approved, on August 12, 2007, Plaintiffs claim for Social Security Disability Income (“SSDI”) benefits in the amount of $1,812.00 per month from August 2007. (ML 56.1 ¶ 102; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 102.) The SSA also approved a retroactive lump sum award of $5,436.00 for May, June and July 2007. (ML 56.1 ¶ 103; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 103.) The Notice of Award did not include any rationale or explanation for the SSA’s decision. (ML 56.1¶ 104; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 104.) MetLife sent Plaintiff a letter dated September 5, 2007, identifying $7,109.38 due to MetLife under the LTD Plan as a result of over-payments of LTD Plan benefits caused by the SSA’s retroactive award of SSDI benefits. (ML 56.1 ¶ 105; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 105.) The letter set forth MetLife’s calculation of the amount of overpayment owed by Plaintiff. (SCH 177-78.) Plaintiff submits that she objected to the calculation. (PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 107. But see id. ¶ 220; ML 56.1 ¶ 220.) In February 2008, Plaintiff contacted IBM about “employment” and requested that she be put back on STD. (SCH 115; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 14849; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 148-49.) IBM informed Plaintiff that that would not be possible, and advised Plaintiff of the documentation that she should provide for her appeal. (SCH 115.) Later that year, Plaintiff (through her husband and attorney) requested reconsideration of Met-Life’s decision, without going through the formal appeals process. (E.g., SCH 116— 18; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 150-60; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 150-60.) Plaintiff formally appealed MetLife’s decision by letter dated July 21, 2008. (SCH 491.) The letter raised various issues, including, but not limited to the following: (i) MetLife relied on an improper definition of Plaintiffs job requirements; (ii) Dr. Cruciani’s opinion was not fully considered; (iii) MetLife ignored the SSA’s determination that Plaintiff was disabled; (iv) Dr. Rubens’ report was flawed because he was not qualified to consider Plaintiffs cognitive impairments, he reviewed non-medical information, and he never examined or saw Plaintiff; and (vii) the initial review failed to consider the results of the surveillance. (SCH 491-502.) Plaintiffs attorney also requested “copies of all documents (including the Plan document), records and other information relevant to Ms. Schlenger’s claim (SCH 501.) MetLife assigned the appeal to MetLife Appeals Specialist, Shelly D’Amico. (ML 56.1 ¶ 167.) As part of the appeal, D’Amico sent Plaintiffs records to two independent physicians, Peter Sugerman, M.D., board certified in adult psychiatry, and Dr. Arousiak Varpetian, M.D., board certified in internal medicine and neurology. (ML’s 56.1 ¶¶ 168-69; 173-74.) Dr. Sugerman determined that the “file does not provide any current evidence of a significant psychiatric condition beyond 2/23/08 that would be ... causing impairment,” nor does the file “detail why [ ] current psychiatric symptoms would prevent the employee from performing work tasks.” (SCH 273-74.) Dr. Varpetian concluded that “[e]xtensive medical records show that [Plaintiff] has complained of pain without any corresponding objective findings,” that the “neurological examination has been inconsistent throughout the time that she was followed by multiple clinicians,” and that “[t]here [we]re no objective tests other than the imaging study,” but the “results of the imaging studies do not consistently correlate with the complaints or the objective findings.” (SCH 279.) Dr. Varpetian spoke to Dr. Cruciani. In his report, Dr. Varpetian said that Dr. Cruciani “agreed that [Plaintiffs] symptoms were only subjective” and that “there was no atrophy or weakness over many years of radicular complaints.” (SCH 276.) Dr. Sugerman’s and Dr. Varpetian’s reports were provided to Drs. Cruciani and Hansraj, as well as Plaintiffs attorney. (SCH 191-93; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 183-84; Pl.’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 183-84.) By letter dated August 20, 2008, Dr. Cruciani responded to the reports. (SCH 212-15; ML 56.1 ¶ 188; Pl.’s (ML) ¶ 188.) MetLife contends that it never heard from Dr. Hansraj. (ML 56.1 ¶ 176.) By letter dated August 22, 2008, Plaintiffs attorney voiced objections to the independent physician reports, (SCH 192-93), requested certain documents, and requested an accounting of the alleged overpayment. (SCH 191-93.) By letter dated September 8, 2008, Plaintiffs attorney complained that Plaintiff had not received all of the plan documents, nor an accounting for overpayments of LTD benefits. (SCH 185; ML 56.1 ¶ 198; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 198.) By letter dated September 11, 2008, D’Amico advised Plaintiffs attorney of the procedure for requesting LTD Plan documents and provided the attorney with another copy of MetLife’s September 7, 2007 letter showing the overpayment. (SCH 128, 175-76; ML 56.1 ¶ 199; PL’s 56.RML) ¶ 199.) After receiving Dr. Cruciani’s August 20, 2008 letter, Dr. Varpetian noted by supplemental report dated September 22, 2008 that Dr. Cruciani’s letter provided “no new information.” (SCH 160-61.) On October 17, 2008, MetLife requested clarification from IBM of Plaintiffs job description, and IBM responded on November 3, 2008 by stating that Plaintiff “sits for about 90% of the day and walks/stands less than 5% of an 8hr day [and that she] was not required to travel.” (SCH 132; ML 56.1 ¶¶ 203, 206; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶¶ 203, 206.) By letter dated November 3, 2008, MetLife advised Plaintiffs attorney that MetLife had determined to uphold its original decision following review on appeal. (SCH 147-51.) The letter also advised that Plaintiff had exhausted the Plan’s administrative appeals and that she had the right to commence an action for benefits under ERISA Section 502(a). (SCH 151.) Further, the letter stated that: The IBM Employee Services Center (ESC) has been advised of the termination of your client’s LTD benefits. It is IMPORTANT that she immediately contact the ESC ... regarding her status, since her IBM medical benefits are affected by this change.... If she does not contact the ESC within 30 days from the date of this letter, IBM will consider her to have voluntarily resigned, and all benefits will cease. (SCH 151 (emphasis in original).) On December 16, 2008, Plaintiffs employment with IBM ended, although Plaintiff does not say how. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 67-68, 147; Fid. 56.1 ¶ 30; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶ 30.) Plaintiff continued receiving health insurance coverage under the IBM Plans until December 31, 2008. According to Plaintiff, MetLife’s denial of her LTD benefits claim “had the effect of terminating all other benefits, including [her] health insurance and life insurance.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 82.) Plaintiff received two notifications, one dated December 19, 2008 and another dated January 9, 2009, on IBM letterhead notifying Plaintiff of her right to elect continuation of group health coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”) for up to eighteen (18) months. (Fid. 56.1 ¶ 32; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶ 32; Dickstein Decl. Exs. 13, 14.) The notifications make clear that in addition to Plaintiff, her husband and son also were eligible for COBRA continuation coverage. (E.g., Dickstein Deck Ex. 13 at Fidelity 507.) The letters further stated that if Plaintiff elects coverage under COBRA, the premiums would be “102% of the applicable premium of the plans(s) for the current plan year.” Plaintiff contacted Fidelity and claimed that she was entitled to a subsidy for the continued health insurance coverage under COBRA. (Fid. 56.1 ¶ 33; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶33.) Fidelity referred Plaintiff to the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) for IBM’s health care plan, which explains that the cost of COBRA coverage is 102% of the applicable premiums for the plan for the current year, and does not provide for any subsidy. (Id.) Fidelity referred Plaintiff to the IBM Plan Administrator. (Id.) During a call with the ECS, Plaintiff stated, among other things, that “I think Fidelity should be covering their bases by going to their own attorneys and saying, look, this is what was sent to this woman, and this is the only way we can administer it. But that’s up to Fidelity, I don’t care, you know, if I ... have to go through the trouble of putting together a discrimination lawsuit, I’m just going to put everybody’s name in, and I don’t really care who gets dinged. I really don’t. I’m so disgusted.” (Fid. 56.1 ¶ 42; PL’s 56.1(Fid) ¶ 42.) On April 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed her complaint against MetLife and Fidelity. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff added Defendant IBM in the Amended Complaint, filed on November 13, 2009. (Doc. 12.) IBM served its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) on February 22, 2010, (Doc. 32); Plaintiff opposed on March 15, 2010, (Doc. 36); and IBM replied on March 29, 2010, (Doc. 35). MetLife served its Motion for Summary Judgment on July 2, 2010, (Doc. 42); Plaintiff opposed and cross-moved for summary judgment, and moved for attorneys fees, on August 13, 2010, (Docs. 55, 58); and MetLife replied and opposed plaintiffs cross-motion on August 27, 2010, (Doc. 63). Fidelity served its Motion for Summary Judgment and attorneys fees on July 2, 2010, (Doc. 47); Plaintiff opposed on August 13, 2010, (Doc. 52); and MetLife replied on August 27, 2010, (Doc. 59). II. METLIFE’S AND FIDELITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[T]he dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law .... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. On a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and, if satisfied, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to present evidence sufficient to satisfy every element of the claim. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and he “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials .... ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). In the event a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may,” among other things, “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion” or “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials- — -including the facts considered undisputed- — -show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2), (3). B. Analysis Count One and MetLife’s Counterclaim — Social Security Defendant MetLife moves for summary judgment dismissing Count One of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which alleges that MetLife wrongfully confiscated Plaintiffs social security benefits, and MetLife further seeks summary judgment on its counterclaim to recover an alleged $4,726.05 overpayment of LTD benefits pursuant to IBM’s LTD Plan and the Reimbursement Agreement signed by Plaintiff and submitted as part of her application for LTD benefits. Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment on Count One of her Amended Complaint. According to MetLife, it is entitled to offset the LTD benefit payments it made to Plaintiff by the amount of social security benefit payments that Plaintiff received from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) based on a specific provision in IBM’s LTD Plan and the Reimbursement Agreement that Plaintiff signed and submitted together with her application for benefits. Plaintiff argues that MetLife is not entitled to offset her LTD benefits by the amount of her social security benefits, and that the $4,726.05 that MetLife seeks is not recoverable because the Reimbursement Agreement “is a contract of adhesion,” and “contravene[s] the anti-alienation provisions under ERISA and the Social Security Act providing that ... benefits received under the statutes are not subject to assignment or other forms of alienation.” (Pl.’s Opp’n (ML) 23 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1)).) Plaintiff claims that Met-Life’s counterclaim also “must fail for its failure to identify the particular funds from which its overpayments must be restored,” because “[i]n equitable actions for restitution of insurer overpayments, ... ‘the restitution must involve the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular funds or property in the [insured’s] possession.’ ” (Id. at 23-24.) According to Plaintiff, “[b]ecause Met-Life’s alleged overpayment cannot clearly be traced or segregated ... its counterclaim should be dismissed.” (Id. at 24.) I disagree. Section 502(a) (3) of ERISA permits a plan fiduciary to obtain “appropriate equitable relief,” and an action for overpayment of plan benefits is such “equitable relief.” Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361, 126 S.Ct. 1869, 164 L.Ed.2d 612 (2006) (plan fiduciary seeking alleged overpayment of plan benefits was seeking “equitable relief’ available under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA authorizing “appropriate equitable relief’); Mugan v. Hartford Life Grp. Ins. Co., 765 F.Supp.2d 359, 374 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“[Fiduciaries of ERISA plans may bring suit under section 502(a) (3) to recover payments to beneficiaries that are later offset by a retroactive award of Social Security benefits.”). The plan fiduciary must, however, “seek not to impose personal liability on the [claimant], but to restore to the [Plan] particular funds or property in the [claimant’s] possession.” Id. (alterations in original). Courts in the Second Circuit routinely have enforced SSDI offset provisions in ERISA Plans as written, as well as Reimbursement Agreements similar to that at issue here, and have not found them to be contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Mugan, 765 F.Supp.2d at 373-75; Fortune v. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan for Emps. of Keyspan Corp., 637 F.Supp.2d 132, 145-46 (E.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 391 Fed.Appx. 74 (2d Cir.2010); see also Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d Cir.1989) (any benefits available to plaintiff under applicable LTD plan would be offset by worker’s compensation and social security benefits plaintiff was already receiving). The plain and unambiguous import of the IBM LTD Plan provision is that MetLife is permitted to offset Plaintiffs long-term disability benefits by the amount in SSDI benefits that she received. The IBM LTD Plan states that: The benefits payable under the LTD Plan will be reduced by ... the actual or estimated ... Social Security Disability Income benefits ... which you, your spouse or your child(ren) ... are entitled to by reason of your disability .... ” [The] monthly benefit will not be reduced by estimated Social Security disability benefits if ... (1) [plaintiff] provide^] proof that [she] ha[s] applied for Social Security Disability benefits; (2) [plaintiff] sign[s] the reimbursement agreement which confirms that [she would] repay all overpayments that are due to the IM LTD Plan [and] (3) [plaintiff] sign[s] the form authorizing the Social Security Administration to release information on awards directly to [Met-Life]. (Hallford Deck Ex. A at 017-18.) Here, as in Mugan, there is no dispute that MetLife is a fiduciary under the LTD Plan or that, as provided for in the LTD Plan, the Reimbursement Agreement, dated December 21, 2006, permits MetLife to recoup overpayment of LTD benefits due to a failure to offset. The Reimbursement Agreement states that Plaintiff “will repay all overpayments that are due to IBM Long Term Disability Plan.” (SCH 941.) Because MetLife’s counterclaim asserts an interest in MetLife’s overpayment of benefits, as opposed to an interest in Plaintiffs social security disability benefits, I reject Plaintiffs argument that MetLife’s counterclaim must be dismissed because the social security benefits that Plaintiff received are not subject to assignment or other forms of alienation. See Mugan, 765 F.Supp.2d at 374-75. I also find unavailing Plaintiffs argument that MetLife’s counterclaim “must fail for its failure to identify the particular funds from which its overpayments must be restored.” (Pl.’s Opp’n (ML) 23); see Solomon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 628 F.Supp.2d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“[T]he Plan fiduciary is entitled to relief in the form of a constructive trust on the overpayment amount specifically identified in the Plan, as distinct from [the insured’s] general assets.”); Sereboff 547 U.S. at 364-65, 126 S.Ct. 1869 (no strict tracing requirement for equitable liens by agreement). For the reasons stated above, MetLife’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count One of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is GRANTED, its Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim for equitable restitution is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Count One is DENIED. It does not appear that Plaintiff disputes the amount of the overpayment, (e.g., PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 220), but she should advise the Court if she disputes the $4,726.05 calculation. Count Two — Fidelity’s and MetLife’s Alleged Failure to Furnish LTD Plan Documents Upon Demand Defendants Fidelity and MetLife argue that this Court should grant summary judgment in their favor dismissing Count Two of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which alleges that Fidelity and Met-Life failed to furnish to Plaintiff upon demand all LTD Plan documents. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112-17.) Plaintiffs Amended Complaint indicates that she seeks “[payment of the full statutory amount due for failure to timely furnish Plan documents.” (Id. at 29 (Prayer for Relief ¶ E).) Section 502(c)(1) of ERISA permits the imposition of statutory penalties against an “administrator” in the event that it “fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). Section 3(16)(A) of ERISA defines an “administrator” as “the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated ....” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i). If there is no person designated as the plan administrator in the plan documents, the plan’s sponsor is deemed to be the administrator. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii). Here, the LTD Plan identifies “Manager of U.S. Benefits Services, IBM Human Resources” as the “Plan Administrator,” not Fidelity or MetLife. (Hallford Deck, Ex. A at SCH SCH 077; see id. Ex. A at SCH 023.) Since neither Fidelity nor MetLife is “the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated,” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i), neither is the plan “administrator” within the meaning of Section 502(c)(1) of ERISA, and Plaintiff therefore is precluded from recovering “statutory damages” under Section 502(c)(1) for their alleged non-disclosure of documents. See Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 418 F.Supp.2d 416, 434 (S.D.N.Y.2005), aff'd, 517 F.3d 614, 631 (2d Cir.2008). Plaintiff raises for the first time in her Memoranda of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment that the relief she seeks in Count Two is “equitable” in nature and pursuant to Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. (Pl.’s Opp’n (ML) 21; PL’s Opp’n (Fid) 2, 13-15.) Under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, a “participant, beneficiary or fiduciary” may bring a civil action “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). According to the Supreme Court, “where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which ease such relief normally would not be ‘appropriate.’ ” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). “Equitable relief” under Section 502(a)(3) refers to “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity,” but “something less than all relief.” Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 502(a)(3) is a “catchall” that “offer[s] appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that [ERISA] does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” Varity, 516 U.S. at 512, 116 S.Ct. 1065. “Since Varity, courts have found [Section 502(a)(3)] applicable when ERISA does not elsewhere provide a remedy for a wrong suffered by plaintiff, or when plaintiff seeks additional equitable relief that differs from monetary relief sought according to the specific remedies provided in ERISA’s other sections.” Klecher v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 331 F.Supp.2d 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (collecting cases). Plaintiffs claim under Section 502(a)(3) for Defendants’ alleged failure to provide plan documents fails. First, Plaintiff does not seek “equitable relief.” As noted above, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint seeks “[p]ayment of the full statutory amount due for failure to timely furnish [LTD] Plan documents.” (Am. Compl. at 29.) Money damages, however, “are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.” Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 210, 122 S.Ct. 708 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff in her Memoranda of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment appears to have abandoned her claim for money damages, but does not identify the nature of the “equitable” relief that she seeks pursuant to Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA in that event. (Pl.’s Opp’n (Fid) 15; PL’s Opp’n (ML) 21-22.) Second, the relief Plaintiff seeks is not “appropriate.” Congress provided plan participants with a remedy in Section 502(c) for a plan administrator’s failure to provide plan documents; thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief under Section 502(a)(3) to remedy the same injury, the relief is not “appropriate.” Varity, 516 U.S. at 515, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (“[Wjhere Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be ‘appropriate’ [under Section 502(a)(3) ].”). Indeed, Plaintiff provides no reason why the relief available under Section 502(c) is not adequate, where the specific relief requested in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is the very relief available under Section 502(c). Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks the equitable relief of an order directing production of missing documents, Plaintiff has not identified the LTD Plan documents she does not have, and it appears that Defendants have produced them. “Fidelity sent a copy of the LTD Plan in effect for employees hired as of December 31, 2003,” and while Plaintiff was hired before that date, “Fidelity later sent summary plan descriptions (“SPDs”) of the LTD Plan for 2002-2005.” (Pi’s 56.1 CtrStmt. to ML ¶ 264; Fid. 56.1 ¶¶ 36-38; Pi’s 56.1 Ctr-Stmt. to Fid. ¶¶ 37-38.) “In November 2009, MetLife produced to Plaintiff a copy of the SPD governing IBM’s LTD Plan for year 2006.” (Fid. 56.1 ¶ 39; Pi’s 56.1 Ctr-Stmt to Fid. ¶ 39.) Further, “MetLife sent a copy of the administrative record relating to the Plan documents to [Plaintiff] in or around early November 2009.” (PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 265; Hallford Decl. Ex. B (Administrative Record).) In addition, the administrative record itself reflects that on August 7, 2008, MetLife sent to Plaintiffs counsel a letter that enclosed “[a] complete copy of Ms. Schlenger’s claim file” as of that date. (SCH 195.) Thus, it appears that Plaintiff has received the requested documents relating to the LTD Plan. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Fidelity’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count Two of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and Defendant MetLife’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count Two of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment against Met-Life as to Count Two of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. Count Three — Denial of Benefits by MetLife Defendant MetLife moves for summary judgment dismissing Count Three of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which alleges that MetLife wrongfully terminated Plaintiffs benefits under the LTD Plan. Section 502(a) of ERISA permits the beneficiary of an employee benefit plan to bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan, [and] to enforce [her] rights under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). According to the Supreme Court, “a denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 128, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008), in which case the court “will not disturb the administrator’s ultimate conclusion unless it is ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ ” Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir.1995)). The IBM LTD Plan states that MetLife “shall have discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the LTD Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to LTD Plan benefits in accordance with the terms of the LTD Plan.” (SCH 024.) I find, and the parties agree, that MetLife’s decision denying Plaintiffs LTD claim should be reviewed under the “arbitrary and capricious standard.” (ML Mem. 14-16; PL’s Opp’n (ML) 4.) Under that standard, the question is whether the administrator’s decision to deny benefits was “without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.” Messina v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, No. 03-0338, 2005 WL 2346085, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2005) (quoting Pagan, 52 F.3d at 441). “Substantial evidence” means “such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the administrator and requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Fortune, 637 F.Supp.2d at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the “scope of review is narrow,” and the Court is “not free to substitute [its] own judgment for that of [the insurer] as if [the Court] were considering the issue of eligibility anew.” Hobson, 574 F.3d at 83-84 (internal citation omitted) (second alteration in original). “ ‘[A] plan under which an administrator both evaluates and pays benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of interest that courts must take into account and weigh as a factor in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion, but does not make de novo review appropriate.’ ” Id. at 82-83 (quoting McCauley v. First Unurn Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir.2008)). Rather, a showing that the administrator’s conflict of interest affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation is one of “several different considerations” that judges must take into account when “review[ing] the lawfulness of benefit denials.” Id. at 83 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). “No weight is given to a conflict in the absence of any evidence that the conflict actually affected the administrator’s decision.” Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2010). The Court finds that MetLife operated under a structural conflict of interest as MetLife both determined the validity of an employee’s claims under IBM’s LTD Plan and was responsible for paying benefits to claimants. Weighing this conflict as a factor, I conclude that MetLife’s determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Plaintiff argues that MetLife’s denial of her LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious because it is not supported by substantial evidence. Further, Plaintiff argues that MetLife’s “decision is based on multiple pieces of faulty evidence” and thus, “the decision cannot be said to have been ‘reasoned to survive arbitrary and capricious review.’ ” (Pl.’s Opp’n (ML) 14) (citations omitted). I find that MetLife’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious, and address each of Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary below. First, Plaintiff argues that IBM’s LTD Plan required MetLife to apply an “own occupation” definition of disability to Plaintiffs claim, but that MetLife instead applied an “any occupation” standard. (PL’s Opp’n (ML) 9-15.) I disagree. The administrative record makes clear that Met-Life applied an “own occupation” definition of disability requiring Plaintiff to establish an inability to perform the essential duties of her own regular occupation as an IBM Senior Contracts Professional. For instance, MetLife’s January 24, 2008 denial letter explains that MetLife had Plaintiffs file reviewed by an Independent Physician Consultant (“IPC”) “to provide clarification of [Plaintiffs] ability to perform the essential duties of [her] own job,” and that “[t]he clinical information that was reviewed does not support [Plaintiffs] inability to perform the essential duties of [her] sedentary job as a senior contract professional.” (SCH 813-14.) The letter further states that “no current exam findings or rationale was provided that would indicate a severity of an impairment that would prevent [Plaintiff] from performing the essential duties of [her] own job as a Senior Contract Professional as well as any occupation according to [her] education, training and experience.” (SCH 814.) MetLife’s November 3, 2008 appeal denial letter specifically states that MetLife found “that there is no objective clinical evidence to support restrictions and limitations that preclude your client from performing her own occupation .... ” (SCH 151.) Thus, I find that MetLife applied the proper definition of disability. Second, Plaintiff argues that her occupation was more physically taxing than described by IBM, which originally listed 0% as Plaintiffs occupation’s requirements for sitting, standing and walking, (SCH 913), and later indicated that Plaintiffs job requirements were such that she “sits for about 90% of the day and walks/stands less than 5% of an 8hr day,” that she “was not required to travel,” and that the job was sedentary. (SCH 151; ML 56.1 ¶ 206; PL’s 56.1(ML) ¶ 206.) According to Plaintiff, her job as a Senior Contract Professional required her to “negotiate and draft contracts” in a “high volume, quick paced” environment and that she was expected to “interface heavily both with internal customers and external third party customers,” requiring “her to be available at all hours, even on weekends.” (Pl.’s Opp’n (ML) 5-6.) According to Plaintiff, the job required her to perform eight or more hours of continual typing of contractual documents, correspondence, and emails. (SCH 492.) Based on these duties, Plaintiff claims that her job was not “sedentary,” but that MetLife assessed her ability to perform a sedentary job. The evidence in the administrative record establishes that Plaintiffs job was sedentary: it could be done from a desk with a telephone and computer and did not require physical exertion of any sort. Thus, I do not find that MetLife acted arbitrarily and capriciously by regarding Plaintiffs job as sedentary. Third, Plaintiff argues that MetLife improperly required her to provide “objective evidence” of her pain, failed to consider her subjective complaints, and, when it informed Plaintiff of its decision, failed to identify the type of evidence that would be sufficient to support Plaintiffs claimed disability. The administrative record makes clear, however, that MetLife did consider Plaintiffs subjective complaints, {e.g., SCH 147-51), but found that Plaintiffs subjective complaints of low back pain, chronic cervical pain and right shoulder pain were not consistent with the objective evidence. Even Plaintiffs Seating physician, Dr. Cruciani, who supported her disability claim, acknowledged the subjective nature of her Complaints. {See SCH 276 (“When questioned about findings, [Dr. Cruciani] stated that there was no atrophy or weakness over the many years of radicular [ie., radiating pain] complaints. He stated that Ms. Schlenger was impaired for the last two years. He agreed that the s