Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge. In this case, plaintiff Darnell Goings challenges the constitutionality of sex offender conditions imposed upon him by the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (hereinafter “CSOSA”), a federal agency charged with overseeing his five-year probation term. In 2010, the plaintiff was convicted, on his plea of guilty, in a Florida state court of sexual battery for having sex with a 16-year-old female state prison inmate in 1995 while he worked at the prison as a corrections officer. He was sentenced to incarceration for less than one year, followed by five years’ probation. After completing his jail sentence, the plaintiff, a District of Columbia resident, was transferred under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision to the District of Columbia, where he was placed under the authority of CSOSA. CSOSA then unilaterally imposed seventeen special probation conditions upon him, including, among other things, banning the plaintiff from any contact with his children. On March 9, 2011, the plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit arguing that six of the conditions of his probation were imposed upon him in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin CSOSA from enforcing the challenged conditions until a ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. ECF No. 2. After reviewing the plaintiffs briefs in support of his motion for a preliminary injunction, the defendant’s opposition papers, as well as the accompanying declarations and the applicable law, and following oral argument, the Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons set forth below, the Court enjoins CSOSA from enforcing Special Condition 15, banning the plaintiff from having unsupervised contact with minors, only in so far as it applies to the plaintiffs children, but denies the plaintiffs request to enjoin enforcement of the remaining conditions. 1. BACKGROUND In 1995, when he was twenty-three years old, the plaintiff worked as a corrections officer at the Franklin County Jail in Florida. Compl. ¶ 27. While employed at the prison, the plaintiff had consensual sex with a sixteen-year old female inmate. Id.; Def.’s Opp’n PL’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Aprille Cole Decl. (hereinafter “Cole Decl.”), ¶ 13. When prison officials became aware of the inmate’s pregnancy and the plaintiffs relationship with the inmate, the plaintiff was fired from his job, but not charged with a crime or arrested at that time. Compl. ¶ 28. Several months after the plaintiff was fired, the plaintiff moved in January 1996 from Florida to the District of Columbia, where he had grown up and had a family. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Two months after he moved, on March 8, 1996, prosecutors in Franklin County, Florida charged the plaintiff with sexual battery by a person in a position of custodial authority for having sex with the 16-year old inmate, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Id. at ¶ 29. The plaintiff states that he was not aware of this warrant, and the record contains no evidence that the plaintiff attempted to evade arrest. Id. at ¶ 30. From January 1996 to November 2009, the plaintiff lived in the District of Columbia, where he fathered three children and, according to the plaintiff, “spent that time raising a family.” Id. at ¶ 31. The plaintiff entered into a long-term relationship with Anika Davis, with whom he is now engaged to be married, and helped raise his eleven-year old son, D.G.; his three-year old son, J.G.; and his two-year old daughter, A.G. Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 2, Darnell Goings Decl. (hereinafter “Goings Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-^4. During this time, the plaintiff was employed at Reagan National Airport and Walter Reed Hospital, and states that he “was active in the community as a football coach and PTA member.” Compl. ¶ 31. Between 1996 and 2009, the plaintiff was named as a respondent in two separate domestic disputes. Cole Decl., ¶ 18. Specifically, in 2002, the plaintiff was charged with simple assault after he slapped his then-girlfriend, who is the mother of one of his children. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 21; Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 10, Dennis Ramos and Celina Gates, Center for Clinical and Forensic Services, Inc., Risk Assessment/Intake Report for Darnell M. Goings, Mar. 14, 2011 (hereinafter “Def.’s Treatment Provider Report”), at 4. This charge was dropped, however, when the plaintiff agreed to enter anger management. Cole Decl., ¶ 18; Def.’s Treatment Provider Report, at 4. In 2006, the plaintiffs current fiancée, and the mother of two of his children, Anika Davis, filed for a temporary restraining order and civil protection order after the plaintiff displayed threatening behavior towards her. Cole Decl., ¶ 21; Def.’s Opp’n PL’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 4, District of Columbia Superior Court Petition and Affidavit for Civil Protective Order filed by Anika Davis, Nov. 27, 2006. Despite this incident involving the plaintiffs current fiancée, Ms. Davis asserts that the plaintiff “is a loving, dedicated, and compassionate father.” Compl., Ex. 2, Anika Davis Decl. (hereinafter “Davis Decl.”), ¶ 3. On November 20, 2009, thirteen years and ten months after the plaintiff left Florida, a D.C. Metropolitan Police officer conducted a background check on the plaintiff and discovered the outstanding 1996 warrant for the plaintiffs arrest. Compl., ¶32. The plaintiff was subsequently arrested and transported to Florida on the criminal arrest warrant. Id. at ¶ 33. The criminal investigation revealed that the plaintiff had sexual relations with two prison inmates, one of whom also served as a “look-out” for the plaintiff while he had sex with the sixteen-year old victim of the offense of conviction. Cole Deck, ¶ 13. On June 17, 2010, the plaintiff pled no contest to one count of sexual battery by a person in a position of custodial authority. Compl., ¶33. At his plea hearing, the victim testified that her relationship with the plaintiff was consensual and that the plaintiff should receive no jail time. Id. at ¶ 34. On August 27, 2010, Franklin County Circuit Court Judge James C. Hankinson sentenced the plaintiff to eleven months and twenty-nine days of jail time, with credit for 277 days of time served, and five-years’ probation. Id. at ¶ 35. Judge Hankinson also ordered that the plaintiff register as a sex offender, as required by Florida law, but specifically instructed that no sex offender conditions be placed upon him. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36; Compl., Ex. 5, Franklin Cnty., Florida Circuit Court, Court Minutes Disposition, Aug. 27, 2010. A. Transfer to the District of Columbia and to CSOSA Toward the conclusion of the plaintiffs jail term, the plaintiff requested that he be allowed to serve his five-year probation sentence in the District of Columbia, and his Florida probation officer arranged for his transfer through the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (“IC-AOS”). Compl. ¶ 37; Cole Decl. at ¶ 14; Def.’s Opp’n Pk’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 5, Darnell M. Goings, Offender’s Application for Interstate Compact Transfer, Sept. 21, 2010. ICAOS is a formal agreement between member states and the District of Columbia that “seeks to promote public safety by systematically controlling the interstate movement of certain adult offenders.” Def.’s Opp’n Pk’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 11, Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision: ICAOS Rules (hereinafter “ICAOS Rules”), at *1. Under this “little-known” compact, states may transfer offenders to other states, where the receiving state then administers the offender’s sentence. M.F. v. State of New York Exec. Dep’t. Div. of Parole, 640 F.3d 491, 492-93 (2d Cir.2011); ICAOS Rules, at *1. ICAOS provides that the state receiving an out-of-state offender “supervise an offender transferred under the interstate compact in a manner determined by the receiving state and consistent with the supervision of other similar offenders sentenced in the receiving state.” ICAOS Rules, Rule 4.101. Additionally, “the compact administrator or supervising authority in the receiving state” is authorized to impose special conditions on an out-of-state offender “if that special condition would have been imposed on the offender if sentence had been imposed in the receiving state.” ICAOS Rules, Rule 4.103. When the plaintiff requested a transfer to the District of Columbia through IC-AOS, he signed an application in which he agreed to abide by the terms and conditions of the supervision imposed upon him in the District of Columbia and recognized, if transfer were authorized, that he would be “subject to the rules of the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision.” Def.’s Opp’n Pk’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 5, Darnell M. Goings, Offender’s Application for Interstate Compact Transfer, Sept. 21, 2010. The plaintiff also signed a statement in the same application indicating that: “I understand that my supervision in another state may be different than the supervision I would be subject to in [Florida]. I agree to accept any differences that may exist because I believe that transferring my supervision to [the receiving state] will improve my chances for making a good adjustment in the community. I ask that the authorities to whom this application is made recognize this fact and. grant my' request for transfer of supervision.” Id. ■ Since the plaintiff was a District of Columbia resident at the time of his arrest and incarceration, the plaintiffs transfer to District of Columbia was mandatory under the Compact. Cole. Deck, ¶¶ 14-15. When the plaintiff was released from prison on October 19, 2010, he was transferred to the District of Columbia and placed under the authority of CSOSA. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16; Compl., ¶¶ 39-40. CSOSA is a federal agency that, inter alia, supervises “offenders on parole, probation, and supervised release from jurisdictions outside the District of Columbia who seek to reside in the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 24-133(b)(2)(I). Community Supervision Officers manage offenders in the District and are given “the same powers and authority as are granted by law to United States Probation and Pretrial Officers.” D.C.Code § 24 — 133(d). CSOSA also supervises the District of Columbia’s sex offender registration process, see D.C.Code § 24 — 133(c)(5), and has a Sex Offender Unit, which manages sex offenders on probation, parole, or supervised release. Cole Decl., ¶ 5. CSOSA’s Sex Offender Unit follows “a specific protocol” for each sex offender under its supervision. Cole Decl., ¶ 7. Sex offenders referred to the Unit undergo an “initial risk assessment,” which is used to “establish treatment and risk management plans that adequately address the offender’s risk level and needs going forward.” Id. According to the defendant, the risk assessment is “particularly crucial when CSOSA is dealing with an offender who comes to the District of Columbia from another state, because it will be the first time that CSOSA has an opportunity to assess the offender and determine the risk the offender poses to the community.” Def.’s Mem. Opp’n PL’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, (hereinafter “Def.’s Opp’n Mem.”), at 3. The assessment phase includes routine meetings with CSOSA officers and treatment providers from the Center for Clinical and Forensic Services, a contract treatment provider utilized by CSOSA, as well as a review of the offender’s sexual history, including polygraph tests to verify offender’s sexual history and tendencies. Cole Decl., ¶ 7. B. CSOSA Initial Risk Assessment and Special Conditions of Plaintiffs Probation A day after his transfer to the District of Columbia, on October 20, 2010, the plaintiff met with CSOSA’s Supervisory Community Supervision Officer Aprille Cole. Compl., ¶ 40. As part of her initial review of the case, Ms. Cole determined that the plaintiff should be subject to certain conditions pending completion of CSOSA’s initial risk assessment. Cole Decl., ¶¶ 19, 21-26. Ms. Cole verbally directed the plaintiff to move out of his house, where he was living again with his fiancée and two of his children, and further informed him that he could not have any contact with his children. Compl., ¶ 40; Goings Decl., ¶ 8. This order was the first notice the plaintiff received of any sex offender conditions being placed upon him. Compl., ¶ 40; Goings Decl., ¶ 8. On November 12, 2010, CSOSA provided the plaintiff with a Compact Action Request listing seventeen “special conditions” that were imposed on the plaintiff during completion of his initial risk assessment. Defi’s Opp’n PL’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 6, Compact Action Request dated Oct. 29, 2010. These special conditions included the following six conditions which are challenged in plaintiffs Complaint: • Special Condition 2: “You shall undergo evaluation and complete sex offender therapy, to include submitting to polygraph exams, if deemed appropriate by CSOSA....” • Special Condition 7: “You shall comply with Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring to enforce a curfew and/or exclusion zones, if deemed appropriate by CSOSA.” • Special Condition 9: “You shall not possess or use a computer with access to any online computer service at any location (including employment) without the written consent of CSOSA • Special Condition 15: “You shall have no unsupervised contact with children under the age of 18 without knowledge and permission from CSOSA.” • Special Condition 16: “You shall not spend time at or loiter near places primarily used by minor children (i.e. schoolyards, swimming pools, playgrounds, public libraries, arcades, etc.) unless approved by CSOSA.” • Special Condition 17: “You shall not be employed, volunteer, or otherwise participate in activities where you have interaction with minor children unless approved by CSOSA.” IcL (hereinafter “the Challenged Conditions”). When he was provided with the Compact Action Request, the plaintiff was orally informéd that Special Condition 15 extended to his own children. In other words, CSOSA prohibited the plaintiff from having any contact, not even by telephone, mail, or electronic communication, with his children. Goings Deck, ¶¶ 8, 12. The plaintiff was told that CSOSA’s supervising officers would determine if and when these conditions would be removed. Id. at ¶ 12. The plaintiff was required to sign the Compact Action Request and initial each of the seventeen conditions. Cole Deck, ¶ 19; Def.’s Opp’n Pk’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 6, Compact Action Request dated Oct. 29, 2010. During the plaintiffs initial risk assessment, the plaintiff met with treatment providers from the Center for Clinical and Forensic Services once per week for thirteen weeks. At the end of this assessment, on January 9, 2011, the plaintiff took a polygraph test, in which he was asked a number of questions regarding his sexual history. Cole Deck, ¶28; Def.’s Opp’n Pk’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 8, Report of Polygraph Examiner Myron A. Moore Re: Sexual History Polygraph Examination: Darnell Michael Goings, Jan. 9, 2011 (hereinafter “January 2011 Polygraph Report”). During this polygraph, the plaintiff indicated that he only had sexual relations with two minors while he was an adult. January 2011 Polygraph Report, at 4-5. According to the polygraph report, the plaintiff had deceptively answered “no” to the question: “Since becoming an adult, have you had any sexual contact with any minor that we have not discussed?” Id; Cole Deck, ¶ 29. Due to the plaintiffs deceptive answer on his polygraph examination, CSOSA did not complete the plaintiffs initial risk assessment and the special conditions imposed upon him remained in effect. Cole Deck, ¶80. On February 28, 2011, the plaintiff took another polygraph test, in which he admitted that he had sexual relations with six minors since his eighteenth birthday. Def.’s Opp’n Pk’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, Ex. 9, Report of Polygraph Examiner Myron A. Moore Re: Sexual ■ History Polygraph Examination: Darnell Michael Goings, Feb. 28, 2011 (hereinafter “February 2011 Polygraph Report”). Three of these instances took place when the plaintiff was eighteen and the minors were seventeen. Id at 2. Another took place when the plaintiff was nineteen and the minor was seventeen. Id The remaining two took place when the plaintiff was twenty-two and one of the minors was seventeen and the other was between seventeen and twenty years old. Id. On March 14, 2011, after the plaintiff had filed this lawsuit, CSOSA’s treatment providers at the Center for Clinical and Forensic Services provided the agency with their assessment of the plaintiff. Def.’s Treatment Provider Report. The report states that “the vast majority of [the plaintiffs] sexual partners have been his contemporaries, with the only exceptions having been the girls involved in the referral offense. As such, there is no evidence to suggest that he has a sexual preference for minors.” Id. at 5. The report described the plaintiff as a “situational offender” and “the most salient dynamics immediately preceding [the plaintiffs] offense seem to have been his level of immaturity, his casual approach to sex and the distress he was experiencing in his relationship at the time.” Id. The report further indicated that, based on the current information available about the plaintiff, he would receive the lowest rating for risk of recidivism. Id. As part of the clinicians’ recommendation, however, they stated that the plaintiff should, inter alia, participate in a sexual offender treatment program, and should not have unsupervised contact with minors until he engages in “the treatment process and has full understanding and management of his risk factors.” Id. at 6. They recommended that this condition, however, be “evaluated on an on-going basis.” Id. On March 22, 2011, while briefing on the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction was underway, CSOSA completed its initial risk assessment and determined that the plaintiff was a “situational offender” who “do[es] not have a primary preference for children.” Cole Deck, ¶ 32. The defendant then moved the plaintiff into “phase 2 of sex offender treatment” and lifted Special Condition 9, which prohibited the plaintiff from owning and using a computer, and modified Special Condition 15 (hereinafter the “No Contact Provision”) to allow the plaintiff to have written and oral communication with his children, as well as supervised contact with his children “once an appropriate chaperone is identified.” Id. at ¶¶ 32-40. C. Plaintiffs Legal Challenge On February 7, 2011, before completion of plaintiffs initial risk assessment, plaintiffs counsel called CSOSA to express concerns about the Challenged Conditions and to seek a review of CSOSA’s actions. Compl., Ex. 8, Letter form David Taylor to Gladys Dorgett, CSOSA Branch Chief, and Timothy Brown, Supervisor Sex Offender Unit, dated Feb. 9, 2011 (hereinafter “Pl.’s Letter to CSOSA”). The plaintiffs counsel then, at CSOSA’s request, sent the agency a letter requesting modification or removal of the challenged conditions, stating: “While I hope that we can work together informally to arrange for a more reasonable set of probation conditions, if that cannot be done in a timely fashion I will have no choice but to seek redress in the courts on Mr. Goings’ behalf.” Pl.’s Letter to CSOSA, at 3. The agency did not respond. Compl., ¶ 47. Accordingly, one month later, on March 9, 2011 the plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that CSOSA imposed Special Conditions 2, 7, 9, 15, 16, and 17 on him in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the No Contact Provision, violates his substantive due process rights in so far as it restricts his ability to interact and communicate with his children. The plaintiff further alleges that the No Contact Provision, along with the five other Challenged Conditions, were “not imposed by the order of any court, nor have they been reviewed by any court. Instead, CSOSA itself imposed the conditions without providing [the plaintiff] any opportunity to object prior to their imposition [and] CSOSA has [ ], itself claimed the right to modify, relax, or remove the conditions.” Compl., ¶ 46. The Challenged Conditions, plaintiff argues, were therefore imposed in violation of the procedural component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Along with his Complaint, on March 9, 2011, the plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from continued enforcement of the Challenged Conditions. ECF No. 2. The Court then ordered the parties to confer on a joint briefing schedule, which was subsequently adopted by the Court. Minute Order dated March 14, 2011; Joint Status Report Regarding Briefing Schedule for Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., Mar. 16, 2011, ECF No. 6; Minute Order dated Mar. 17, 2011. On March 25, 2011, a day before the defendant’s opposition to the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction was due, CSOSA lifted Special Condition 9, allowing the plaintiff to use and own a computer, and modified the No Contact Provision so as to allow the plaintiff to write and orally communicate with his children, and to have supervised physical contact with his children when CSOSA approves a chaperone. Cole Decl., ¶¶ 36, 40. The plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant’s opposition brief, after requesting an extension, on April 8, 2011, ECF No. 17, and the Court held oral arguments on plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction on April 15, 2011. The Court now considers the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, and, for the following reasons, grants the plaintiffs request to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the No Contact Provision, as it applies to the plaintiffs children, because the provision appears to violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights as protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. The Court denies the plaintiffs request to enjoin enforcement of the remaining Challenged Conditions because, although the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on these claims and is suffering irreparable harm, the public interest weighs against granting the plaintiff the relief he seeks because the récord before the Court is currently incomplete with regard to the potential scope and impact of a Court ruling in the plaintiffs favor. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To warrant injunctive relief, the plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 724 (D.C.Cir. 2011). The purpose of a preliminary injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). It is an extraordinary form of interim relief, however, and “should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (internal citations omitted). The court must balance the strengths of the four preliminary injunction factors, and this Circuit has typically employed a “sliding scale” approach whereby an unusually strong showing on one factor may obviate the need for a strong showing on another. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citing Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 361 (D.C.Cir.1999)); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. FEMA, 463 F.Supp.2d 26, 33 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Serono Labs. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C.Cir. 1998)); Northern Air Cargo v. U.S. Postal Service, 756 F.Supp.2d 116, 121 (D.D.C. 2010). It is unclear, however, whether the “sliding scale” approach is controlling after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. NRDC, which emphasized that irreparable injury must be likely and not just a “possibility.” 129 S.Ct. at 375-376. Although the D.C. Circuit has noted that Winter “does not squarely discuss whether the four factors are to be balanced on a sliding scale,” it has yet to decide whether the sliding-scale approach should still be employed. Davis, 571 F.3d at 1292 (declining to address validity of sliding-scale approach because plaintiffs failed even under the more lenient sliding-scale analysis); Sherley v. Sebelius, No. 10-5287, 644 F.3d 388, 393, 2011 WL 1599685, at *4 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 29, 2011) (declining to address continued validity of sliding scale approach, but stating “we read Winter at least to suggest if not to hold ‘that a likelihood of success is an independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction,’ ” quoting Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (concurring opinion)). The Court, however, need not decide whether the sliding-scale approach continues to be controlling, because the outcome for the plaintiffs claims here would be the same under either test. The plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction on his substantive due process claim under the stricter test requiring all four preliminary injunction elements. He is not entitled to a preliminary injunction on the remaining claims, even under a more lenient sliding-scale approach, because when an injunction would “adversely affect a public interest ... even temporarily ... the court may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440-41, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). The Court may thus deny injunctive relief, even when private rights are implicated, because courts in equity “may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.” Id. at 441, 64 S.Ct. 660 (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. W, 300 U.S. 515, 552, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937)). III. DISCUSSION The plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief requires the Court to assess prospectively the merits of the plaintiffs legal challenge and the need for immediate judicial intervention. The Court finds that the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success that the No Contact provision violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in so far as it restricts the plaintiffs ability to interact with his own children, and has also demonstrated a likelihood of success that Special Conditions 7, 15, 16 and 17 were imposed in violation of the plaintiffs procedural due process rights. The plaintiff has further established that without equitable relief enjoining enforcement of these conditions, he faces irreparable injury. Based on the current record, however, the Court only grants the plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief on his substantive due process claim to enjoin CSOSA from applying the No Contact Provision to restrict the plaintiffs access to his children. Regarding the plaintiffs procedural due process claim, the Court finds that significant constitutional and statutory issues regarding the scope and impact of a Court ruling on the matter remain unaddressed by the parties, and the record before the Court is incomplete, making judicial intervention prior to a full hearing on the merits of this claim inappropriate and against the public interest. Prior to discussing the preliminary injunction factors, the Court first addresses three threshold issues raised by the defendant as grounds to deny consideration of plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the defendant contends that plaintiffs claims should be barred as moot, as an improperly asserted petition for habeas relief, or under the doctrine of “unclean hands,” due to the plaintiffs omission of material facts in his moving papers. A. The Plaintiffs Challenge is Not Moot First, the defendant asserts that the plaintiffs challenge is moot given the agency’s post-Complaint filing modification of two of the Challenged Conditions. The plaintiffs challenge, however, is not moot because the defendant only modified a portion of the Challenged Conditions, and, even with respect to the modified conditions, the Court is authorized to adjudicate the plaintiffs claims because the defendant’s subsequent modification of the conditions amounts to a voluntary cessation, and thus falls squarely into an exception to the mootness doctrine. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the Court “may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.” District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 894 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)). The mootness doctrine prohibits the Court from deciding a case if “events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Id. (quoting Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc)). An exception to the mootness doctrine applies, however, when a party’s “voluntary cessation” of the challenged conduct is the basis for the mootness argument. A defendant’s “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive [a court] of power to hear and determine the case.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). “If it did, the courts would be compelled to leave the defendant free to return to his old ways.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) and United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)). Voluntary cessation will moot a case only if (1) “there is no reasonable expectation ... that the alleged violation will recur,” and (2) “interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379; Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C.Cir.2008). The defendant carries the burden of demonstrating “that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated,” and “[t]he burden is a heavy one.” Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 636 F.3d 641 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894); see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693 (“A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” (emphasis added) (quotation and citation omitted)). The application of the “voluntary cessation” exception to the mootness doctrine to both plaintiffs substantive and procedural due process claims is discussed below. 1. Plaintiffs Substantive Due Process Challenge Is Not Moot The defendant argues that the plaintiffs challenge to the No Contact Provision is moot because, since the plaintiff filed this case, CSOSA modified the condition so as to allow the plaintiff to contact his children by mail and telephone, and to have supervised physical contact with his children “once a chaperone agreement is put in place.” Cole Decl. ¶¶ 32, 36. Although CSOSA modified the No Contact Provision, the plaintiff argues that he challenges the constitutionality of the entire No Contact prohibition in so far as it restricts his ability to interact and live with his children. This prohibition is still in effect, despite the modification of the No Contact Provision, because the plaintiff remains unable to have unsupervised contact with his children and cannot reside with them on a permanent basis. PL’s Reply Mem., at 3. Even with regard to the lifted portions of the No Contact Provision, namely the prohibition of making any written or oral communication with his children, the plaintiff argues that the legal challenge is not moot because the defendant is not prevented from re-imposing those conditions at a later date. Id. at 4-5. The Court agrees that plaintiffs challenge of the No Contact Provision is not moot. The plaintiff has challenged the constitutionality of the entire No Contact Provision in so far as it restricts his freedom to interact with his children, not simply the prohibitions on written and oral communication. The plaintiffs Complaint alleges that that the No Contact Provision has “deprived Mr. Goings of his fundamental right to maintain a relationship with his children,” Compl. ¶ 49, and has forced the plaintiff to “live apart, from his fiancée, who resides with and cares for (now by herself) the couple’s two children.” Id. at ¶ 5. CSOSA still will not allow the plaintiff physical contact with his children, supervised or unsupervised, and the injury to the plaintiff from the No Contact Provision is therefore ongoing. A party’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct will become moot only if there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and interim events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. Neither requirement is met here. First, CSOSA’s Supervisory Officer, Aprille Cole, states that the conditions placed on the plaintiffs probation are assessed on “an ongoing basis” and under a “fluid” case management system, which would allow for previously lifted conditions to be reimposed. Cole Deck, ¶¶2, 6. In short, CSOSA remains free to re-impose conditions banning the plaintiff from any oral and written communication with his children and also remains free to revoke the “chaperone agreement” at any point in the future. Second, there have been no intervening events to rectify the plaintiffs alleged injury. Although the defendant will apparently allow the plaintiff to have supervised contact with his children when a chaperone agreement is in place at some point in the future, the defendant remains unable to have unsupervised contact with his children, and CSOSA’s Supervisory Officer states that there is even a “concern” about alloying the plaintiffs fiancée to serve as a chaperone. Id. at ¶ 36. Despite modification of the No Contact Provision, the plaintiffs injury has not been rectified and the defendant leaves open the possibility that it could re-impose the lifted No Contact conditions. The Court therefore finds that the plaintiffs claim that the No Contact Provision violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is not moot, despite CSOSA’s modification of those conditions, and the Constitution does not bar the Court from adjudicating the plaintiffs substantive due process claim. 2. Plaintiffs Procedural Due Process Challenge Is Not Mloot The defendant contends that the plaintiffs procedural due process claim regarding the Challenged Conditions is moot because the plaintiff had an opportunity to be heard and provide input and information during CSOSA’s initial risk assessment. Def.’s Opp’n Mem., at 17-18. The defendant claims that the plaintiff met regularly with treatment providers and CSOSA officers, and, additionally, had opportunities to provide information “through counsel.” Id. at 18. Thus, according to the defendant, there is “[n]o question that plaintiff was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time before CSO-SA imposed the current conditions.” Id. As the plaintiff correctly notes in his Reply brief, the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs claim is moot is “not a mootness argument at all.” PL’s Reply Mem., at 6. The defendant does not assert that there is no longer an on-going controversy regarding whether the plaintiff was afforded sufficient process before CSOSA imposed the Challenged Conditions, almost all of which remain in effect. Rather, the defendant contends that the plaintiff was afforded sufficient process. This is an argument on the merits of the plaintiffs claim, which is precisely the dispute that the Court is tasked with deciding. Therefore, the plaintiffs procedural due process claim is not moot. B. The Plaintiffs Complaint is a Not “Effectively” a Writ of Habeas Corpus As a second threshold issue, the defendant argues that the Court should not grant the plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief because the Court should treat the plaintiffs Complaint as a petition for habeas corpus subject to the rules set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq. The defendant does not explain how the Court’s review would be limited by these rules or why, if the defendant were correct, the Court’s review of the plaintiffs complaint would be barred. In any event, the defendant is wrong. The plaintiffs claim is not “effectively [ ] a writ of habeas corpus,” Def.’s Opp’n Mem., at 20, and the defendant’s argument that the Court should refuse to grant the plaintiff relief based on a mischaracterization of the Complaint is unavailing. Habeas corpus provides a means for individuals held in government custody to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and to secure release from illegal custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”). In the instant case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff is in government custody. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (“While petitioner’s parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough to keep him in the ‘custody1 ... within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute ...”); Ramsey v. Reilly, 613 F.Supp.2d 6, 9 (D.D.C.2009) (“An individual who is on parole is considered to be ‘in custody’ for the purposes of habeas corpus relief ... ”). The plaintiff, however, does not challenge the validity of his underlying conviction, nor does he seek a general release from his five-year probation sentence. Rather, the plaintiff asserts that the specific conditions which were imposed upon him are unconstitutional, either because they are not reasonably related and narrowly tailored, or because the plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to be heard before those conditions were imposed. See Compl. ¶¶ 48-57. If the Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, he would remain under CSOSA’s authority, and CSOSA would be free to impose any probation condition upon the plaintiff, provided that those conditions are appropriate and pass constitutional muster. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (discussing availability of § 1983 claims and stating that “if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed----”). The defendant mischaracterizes the plaintiffs Complaint as a habeas petition since the plaintiff does not seek to secure his general release or invalidate his underlying conviction. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (“constitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of that core [of habeas corpus]”); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (“Because neither prisoner’s claim would necessarily spell speedier release, neither lies at the core of habeas corpus.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court therefore finds that the plaintiffs Complaint is not a habeas petition. C. Unclean Hands Does Not Preclude the Plaintiffs Legal Challenge As a final threshold argument, the defendant argues that the plaintiff should be precluded from seeking a preliminary injunction because of the doctrine of unclean hands, which generally states that “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381 (1945). Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to include “several material facts” regarding the plaintiffs criminal and sexual past. Def.’s Opp’n Mem., 13. These facts are that the plaintiff had sexual contact with a second underage inmate while working as a corrections officer in the Florida prison, that the plaintiff had sexual relations with five other minors since he became eighteen, that the plaintiff was involved in two instances of domestic violence, and the fact that he was deceptive in answering one question in his January 2011 polygraph test. Id. at 13-14. CSOSA contends that omission of these facts corroborates the agency’s determination that the plaintiff is “ ‘extremely manipulative’ and ‘selective about the information he divulges.’ ” Id. at 19. The basis for the defendant’s argument about “unclean hands” is the plaintiffs failure to include these facts in his Complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, but the defendant omits important context for the plaintiffs purported material omissions. The plaintiffs failure to provide the omitted information identified by CSOSA to the Court would be troubling if the plaintiff had any indication that CSOSA relied upon these facts to justify the Challenged Conditions and that the omitted information could therefore be relevant for the Court’s review of the agency’s action. CSOSA, however, provided the plaintiff no information regarding its rationale for implementing the Challenged Conditions until he filed a Complaint with this Court. In fact, the defendant did not even respond to the plaintiffs letter asking CSO-SA to explain the imposed conditions and consider modification. Pl.’s Letter to CSOSA. The plaintiff certainly cannot be accused of unclean hands when the defendant refused to provide any information regarding the justification of the imposed conditions and left the plaintiff speculating about what information the defendant relied upon that should be addressed in his briefs. Accordingly, the Court rejects the defendant’s contention that unclean hands should prevent the Court from granting the plaintiff an injunction. D. Plaintiffs Likelihood of Success on the Merits To determine whether judicial intervention prior to a full hearing on the merits of the plaintiffs claim is warranted, the Court must assess whether that the plaintiff has a likelihood of success when his claims are ultimately decided. The Court therefore evaluates the plaintiffs prospect of success for each of his constitutional claims, but first addresses the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff will not be successful because he “consented” to the imposition of the Challenged Conditions. See Def.’s Opp’n Mem., at 28-30. 1. The Plaintiff Did Not Consent to the Challenged Conditions The defendant contends that by requesting a transfer to the District of Columbia under the ICAOS, and by signing and initialing each of the seventeen special conditions set forth in the Compact Action Request, the plaintiff “knowingly waived any constitutional rights he may have had.” Id. at 28. The plaintiff counters that by requesting transfer to the District of Columbia, he did not consent to the enforcement of unconstitutional probation. Pl.’s Reply Mem., 10-12. The Court agrees with the plaintiff that he did not consent to the imposition of unconstitutional conditions and the defendant’s argument is therefore unavailing. “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). By signing the Interstate Compact Transfer Application on September 21, 2010, and requesting a transfer to the District of Columbia, the plaintiff acknowledged that the District of Columbia could impose different conditions upon him. The plaintiffs awareness that the District of Columbia could impose different conditions is a far cry from being on notice that the receiving jurisdiction would impose conditions directly contrary to the Florida judge’s express order that “no sex offender conditions while on probation]” were to be imposed. Compl., Ex. 5, Franklin Cnty., Florida Circuit Court, Court Minutes Disposition, Aug. 27, 2010. Moreover, plaintiffs acknowledgement of the District of Columbia’s authority to impose different conditions did not constitute consent to CSOSA’s imposition of sex offender conditions without affording him sufficient process or in violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. In short, the plaintiff did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to contest the constitutionality of conditions imposed upon him by applying for transfer because he could not have known CSOSA would modify the sentencing court’s order without sufficient process and deny him his Fifth Amendment due process rights. See Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 99 n. 2 (3d Cir.2008) (offender transferred under the Interstate Compact did not waive his right to contest conditions of his probation that he was not informed of until several months after his transfer). The defendant relies on Stephenson v. Taylor, No. 06-816, 2007 WL 1068247 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2007) and State of Iowa v. Warner, No. 8-864, 2008 WL 5009279 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 26, 2008) as support for the broad proposition that offenders seeking transfer under the Interstate Compact waive the right to contest the conditions imposed upon them by the receiving state. These cases are inapposite. In Stephenson, the petitioner, who was incarcerated for a revocation violation, challenged, inter alia, a no-contact-with-minors probation condition imposed by a receiving state, following his transfer under the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers. The court held that “these issues were not raised in the direct appeal and are thus barred.” Stephenson, 2007 WL 1068247 at *4. In dicta, the court pointed out that the petitioner had acknowledged when he applied for supervision in the receiving state that there may be “certain differences” in supervision. The court did not discuss in detail the “fundamentally protected civil rights” that may be implicated by the no contact condition in circumstances where the petitioner married an underage girl, noting only that his “probation was not revoked for the marriage itself,” but rather for violations of the original standard conditions of probation imposed by the sentencing court. Id. at *5. Thus, this case simply does not stand for the legal holding urged by the defendant that offenders requesting a transfer of probation waive their constitutional rights to any new probation condition unilaterally imposed by the receiving state. Likewise, in Warner, the defendant pleaded guilty to practicing medicine without a license and was sentenced, inter alia, to three-years’ probation. The sentencing court declined to impose the condition that the defendant be evaluated for placement in a sex offender treatment program. Warner, 2008 WL 5009279 at *2. Nevertheless, upon transfer, the receiving state placed the defendant on a sex -offender registry. The court in the.sending state refused to order the receiving state not to “require him to complete a sexual evaluation” since under the ICAOS the receiving state is “free to supervise [defendant] as they see fit.” Id. at *5. The court noted that the defendant had been alerted at his sentencing hearing that he would be subject to the receiving state’s supervision conditions. Id. The court did not otherwise make any findings about the constitutionality of the probation conditions imposed by the receiving state or about whether the defendant waived his constitutional rights by requesting transfer of his probation. In short, neither of the cases relied upon by the defendant address the issue at stake in this case: namely, whether a request for transfer under the ICAOS constitutes a complete waiver of constitutional rights and consent by an offender to any probation condition imposed by a receiving state, regardless of its appropriateness or constitutionality. Finally, the defendant’s reliance on the fact that the plaintiff initialed and signed the Compact Action Request delineating the seventeen special conditions on November 12, 2010, as grounds that the plaintiff consented to or waived any challenge to those conditions is also unavailing. According to CSOSA Officer Cole, the plaintiff “specifically put his initials next to each condition [to] demonstratef ] that he understood and agreed to abide by each condition.” Cole Decl., ¶ 19. The plaintiff was not informed that he was waiving his rights to contest these provisions, and it appears that CSOSA requested the plaintiffs signature not as a waiver, but rather as a means of ensuring that the plaintiff was aware of the conditions imposed upon him and could not, at some later date, disavow knowledge of the probation conditions. This does not constitute a waiver of any right to challenge those conditions. Accordingly, the Court now addresses the plaintiffs specific constitutional claims. 2. The Plaintiff is Likely to Succeed on His Claim that the No Contact Provision Violates the Substantive Component of the Due Process Clause The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST, amend. V. The Due Process Clause includes a “substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (emphasis in original). Conditions of supervised release or probation that implicate fundamental liberty interests must comply with this standard. See United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that a supervised release condition “that restricts fundamental rights must be narrowly tailored.”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir.2001) (“a condition that restricts fundamental rights must be narrowly tailored and directly related to deterring the defendant and protecting the public.” (internal quotation omitted)). In its brief, CSOSA urges the Court to apply the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) in evaluating the legality of the probation conditions imposed on out-of-state offenders transferred to the District of Columbia under the ICAOS. Def.’s Opp’n Mem., 31-32. Generally, federal supervised release conditions must conform to the three-part standard delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir.2010); United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (D.C.Cir.2004). This statutory standard requires, inter alia, that a supervised release condition must be “reasonably related” to the nature and circumstances of the offense and other pertinent factors, that it impose “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to advance deterrence, the protection of the public, and the defendant’s correctional needs, and that it be consistent with pertinent policy statements issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3). D.C. law, however, does not mandate that CSOSA be guided by the standard set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), nor does it provide any guidance to CSOSA itself in determining what conditions are appropriate to impose on probationers. This is for the simple reason that CSOSA is not permitted to exercise this discretion for instate offenders; rather, the agency only has authority to enforce conditions set by the D.C. Superior Court. See D.C.Code § 24-133(c)(3) (“The Agency shall carry out the conditions of release imposed by the Superior Court ... ”). Similarly, CSO-SA does not have authority to set conditions of release for in-state offenders on supervised release following incarceration. Thus, in contrast to in-state offenders whose conditions of probation or supervised release are set by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the U.S. Parole Commission, respectively, out-of-state offenders are subject to conditions set by their original sentencing court and, according to the defendant, by CSOSA as the “compact administrator” under the IC-AOS. Def.’s Opp’n Mem., 26-27. The Court need not determine whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3583 standard guides CSOSA when modifying conditions of probation because, even under this standard, when conditions of probation or supervised release implicate fundamental liberty interests, courts have recognized that the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) standard must be applied in harmony with the requirements of the constitutional substantive due process standard. As the Second Circuit explained in a 2005 opinion authored by now-Justice Sotomayor: If a special condition implicates a fundamental liberty interest, we must carefully examine it to determine whether it is “reasonably related” to the pertinent factors, and “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and our application of these criteria must reflect the heightened constitutional concerns. If the liberty interest at stake is fundamental, a deprivation of that liberty is “reasonably necessary” only if the deprivation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Myers, 426 F.3d at 126 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (discussing substantive due process analysis)). The due process protections of the U.S. Constitution must apply equally to federal and state actions that impose supervised release or probation conditions on individuals, whether they are in-state or out-of-state. Accordingly, the Court evaluates whether the No Contact Provision is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The No Contact Provision at issue here implicates the plaintiffs fundamental liberty interest in raising and interacting with his children. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (“The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential, basic civil rights of man, and rights far more precious ... than property rights.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”) (O’Connor, J.). Thus, the Court must assess whether the deprivation of the plaintiffs liberty interest by imposition of the No Contact Provision is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Myers, 426 F.3d at 126; Loy, 237 F.3d at 256. At the outset, the Court recognizes that CSOSA has a compelling interest in protecting the public generally and children, in particular, from sex offenders. The agency and its officers are tasked with the onerous responsibility of rehabilitating sex offenders and other criminals, while simultaneously ensuring that these offenders do not harm members of the general public. The plaintiff does not dispute that CSOSA has a compelling interest in imposing special probation conditions on sex offenders, even ones that restrict liberty interests. Rather, as the plaintiff himself states, “[t]he sole question dispositive of [the] substantive due process claim [ ] is whether the deprivation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Prelim. Inj., at 9. The defendant argues that the No Contact Provision is narrowly tailored because it was based on “the plaintiffs specific facts.” Def.’s Opp’n Mem., at 33. The “specific facts” underlying the decision by the CSOSA officer responsible for imposing the No Contact Provision are as follows: (1) “his conviction for having sex with a minor over whom he had a custodial relationship,” id.; (2) concern about the plaintiffs previous domestic issues, including that it “appeared that the mother of [plaintiffs] children was unable to protect herself ... which raises concerns about her ability to safeguard the welfare of her children,” Cole Decl., ¶ 21; (3) the CSOSA officer who initially interviewed the plaintiff described him as “extremely manipulative” and someone who “asks too many questions,” id. at ¶ 17; and (4) sexual offenders have the potential to “crossover” and “may even have sexual contact with underage members of their own family, including their children.” Def.’s Opp’n Mem., at 34-35; Cole Decl., ¶¶ 2-4. Even though the plaintiff does not have a history of abusing his children or show any sexual interest in prepubescent children, the defendant asserts that restricting the plaintiff from interacting with minors is “the least restrictive means of ensuring that all children in the District of Columbia, including plaintiffs own children, [are] safe from an unknown threat.” Def.’s Opp’n Mem., at 33. The defendant’s justification for restricting the plaintiff from interacting with his children is undercut by evidence in the record currently before the Court. First, with respect to the plaintiffs prior sexual history and offense conduct, treatment providers, including the agency’s own medical experts, describe the plaintiff as engaging in sexual liaisons with his “contemporaries,” noting “the most salient dynamics immediately preceding the offense seem to have been his level of immaturity, his casual approach to sex and the distress he was experiencing in his relationship at the time.” Def.’s Treatment Provider Report, at 5. Indeed, all of the plaintiffs acts of sexual conduct with minors occurred when he was between the ages of 18 and 23 and the minors involved were fairly close in age and certainly not pre-pubescent. Sixteen years have passed since the plaintiffs offense conduct and there is no allegation that he has engaged in any sexual behavior with minor girls in the intervening years. Second, the record is bare of any indication that the plaintiff is attracted to any underage children, let alone his own children. Indeed, the defendant’s treatment providers state that “[t]here is no evidence to suggest that he has a sexual preference for minors.” Id. These same providers state that the plaintiff displays a low risk of recidivism. Id. Moreover, the plaintiff supplied the Court with an affidavit from another treatment provider who, after examining the plaintiff, states that the plaintiff “presents a low risk for sexual reoffense.” PL’s Reply, Ex. 2, Daniel Murrie Aff