Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ELLEN LIPTON HOLLANDER, District Judge. In July 2009, Joette Paulone, plaintiff, sued the Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County (the “County”), and the State of Maryland (the “State”), defendants, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as well as a common law claim for negligent training and supervision. The claims pertain to events that followed plaintiffs arrest on July 31, 2008, by City of Frederick (the “City”) police on charges that plaintiff, who is deaf, was driving while impaired by alcohol (“DWI”). Plaintiff contends that defendants discriminated against her on the' basis of her disability during her post-arrest detention, her initial appearance before a State district court commissioner, and her attendance at alcohol education classes and a victim impact panel, which were requirements of the probation sentence she received for the DWI charge. Paulone seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Id. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and have extensively briefed the issues. No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the County’s motion, and will grant in part and deny in part the summary judgment motions filed by plaintiff and the State. Factual Overview At approximately 11:48 p.m. on July 31, 2008, City Officer Scott McGregor stopped plaintiff on suspicion of DWI. Affidavit of Scott McGregor at 1 (“McGregor Aff.”) (ECF 60-1); see also Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 (“PI. MSJ”) (ECF 52-1); County’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 2-3 (“County MSJ”) (ECF 51-1). After administering field sobriety tests to Paulone, McGregor arrested her and transported her to Frederick Police Headquarters. See McGregor Aff. at 2; PI. MSJ at 2; County MSJ at 2-3. Then, at approximately 2:30 a.m., McGregor transported Paulone to the Frederick County Adult Detention Center (the “Detention Center” or “FCADC”), operated by the Frederick County Sheriffs Office. See McGregor Aff. at 2; PI. MSJ at 2; County MSJ at 3. Plaintiff was in custody at the Detention Center from approximately 2:30 a.m. until approximately 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. on August 1, 2008. The parties agree that an interpreter was not provided to plaintiff during her detention, and that any communication between plaintiff and Detention Center personnel took place by means of written notes. See County MSJ at 3-5; PI. MSJ at 2-4. The parties also agree that Detention Center personnel gave plaintiff the opportunity to make several phone calls by means of a teletypewriter (“TTY” or “T.T.Y.”). See County MSJ at 3-5; PL MSJ at 2-4. At approximately 7:00 a.m., plaintiff appeared before Maryanne Riggin, a district court commissioner. Under Maryland law, a district court commissioner is a judicial officer who is appointed by the administrative judge of the judicial district, and need not be a lawyer. See Md.Code (2006 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.), § 2-607(a)(l), (b)(1) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) (appointment and requirements of district court commissioners); Md. Rule 4-102(f) (2010) (district court commissioners are judicial officers). A district court commissioner’s responsibilities include conducting “initial appearances” for persons who are arrested without a warrant, including arrests made at times when the courts are not open. As discussed in more detail, infra, a district court commissioner must determine at the initial appearance whether there was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest, advise the defendant of various constitutional rights and procedural requirements, and determine whether the defendant will be released pretrial (and, if so, the amount of any bond). See generally C.J. § 2-607(c); Md. Rules 4-213 & 4-216. In this case, the district court commissioners’ office was located next to the Central Booking Unit at the Detention Center. County MSJ at 3. Riggin recounts in her affidavit that unsuccessful attempts were made to procure an American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter for Paulone’s initial appearance. See Affidavit of Maryanne Riggin (“Riggin Aff.”) ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 2 to Memorandum in Support of State of Maryland’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“State MSJ”) (ECF 53-3). In any event, the parties agree that plaintiffs initial appearance before Commissioner Rig-gin was not facilitated by use of an ASL interpreter, and that communication between Commissioner Riggin and plaintiff occurred by means of handwritten notes. Commissioner Riggin released plaintiff on her own recognizance at approximately 7:23 a.m., and plaintiff left the Detention Center by taxicab. See PI. MSJ at 3; County MSJ at 5-6. On October 7, 2008, plaintiff appeared with counsel in the District Court of Maryland for Frederick County. PI. MSJ at 3; State of Maryland’s Mem. in Support of Its Opp. to PI. MSJ (“State Opp.”) at 7. The hearing was facilitated by use of an ASL interpreter. State Opp. at 7. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to DWI, and was sentenced to probation before judgment, pursuant to Md.Code (2008 Repl. Vol, 2010 Supp.), § 6-220 of the Criminal Procedure Article. See Defendant Trial Summary at 1, Ex. 3A to State MSJ (ECF 53-8). As conditions of her probation, Paulone was required to attend ‘Victim Impact Panel meetings” presented by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”), and to “[sjubmit to alcohol and drug evaluation, testing, and treatment as directed” by plaintiffs probation monitors at the Drinking Driving Monitor Program (“DDMP”) of the State’s Division of Parole and Probation. Probation Summary, Ex. 3B to State MSJ (ECF 53-9). According to an affidavit of Mark Lucas, one of plaintiffs probation monitors through DDMP, plaintiff was required to undergo an alcohol treatment evaluation by a State-certified addictions counselor. Affidavit of Mark Lucas (“Lucas Aff.”) at 3, Ex. 3 to State MSJ (ECF 53-7). The monitors also instructed plaintiff to attend a MADD victim impact panel on February 4, 2009. Lucas Aff. at 4. The record reflects that plaintiffs DDMP monitors rejected her requests for State-provided ASL interpreters at the impact panel and at her evaluation, taking the position that it was plaintiffs responsibility and/or that of MADD and plaintiffs addictions counselor to provide interpreters. Lucas Aff. at 4. Plaintiff attended the MADD victim impact panel on February 4, 2009, without an interpreter. PI. MSJ at 4. Plaintiff was evaluated by Laura Dreany-Pyles, BSW, CAC-AD, a certified addictions counselor who is also deaf, and who was employed by Deaf Addiction Services at Maryland (“DASAM”), a substance abuse program for deaf or hearing-impaired individuals, based at the University of Maryland at Baltimore. PL MSJ at 15. Dreany-Pyles concluded that plaintiff did not require addiction treatment. Id. Plaintiffs DDMP monitors then directed plaintiff to enroll, no later than March 17, 2009, in a State-certified six-week or twelve-hour alcohol education class, which was, under DDMP policy, required for alcohol offenders who do not need addiction treatment. Lucas Aff. at 5. DDMP provided plaintiff with a list of class providers, which included DASAM. Id. DDMP also advised Plaintiff that she was required to make arrangements for an interpreter. PI. MSJ at 4. Plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to locate a course in the Frederick area with an interpreter. She tried to contact several course providers, who either did not call her back, did not accept her insurance, or would not provide an interpreter. PI. MSJ at 4. On March 31, 2009, DDMP filed a violation of probation (“VOP”) charge against plaintiff for failure to enroll in the alcohol education class. See Statement of Charges, Ex. 5A to PI. MSJ (ECF 52-9). Prior to the VOP hearing, plaintiff learned that Ms. Dreany-Pyles (of DA-SAM) could conduct the alcohol education course in sign language, via videophone, and she enrolled in the class. PI. MSJ at 5.At the VOP hearing on June 2, 2009, the court granted DDMP’s request to dismiss the VOP charge and terminate supervision. See Tr. of VOP Hearing, Ex. 3 to State Opp. (ECF 62-4). Procedural Summary As noted, plaintiff filed suit in July 2009. In September 2009, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“State’s Motion”) (ECF 22). In a reported Memorandum Opinion and Order entered February 17, 2010 (ECF 33 & 34), Judge Quarles granted the State’s Motion, in part, and denied it, in part. Paulone v. City of Frederick, 718 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md.2010). As to plaintiffs ADA claim against the State (Count V), Judge Quarles reviewed plaintiffs contentions regarding the discrete events alleged in the Complaint. First, with respect to plaintiffs post-arrest detention and processing, Judge Quarles determined that plaintiff “stated a claim for disability discrimination ... under the ADA,” because she alleged that “necessary steps were not taken to ensure her communication”: specifically, “(1) use of a working TTY machine to call from the Detention Center, (2) help in reading and understanding forms, and (3) access to a sign language interpreter.” Id. at 635 (footnote omitted). Second, regarding court-ordered meetings with plaintiffs probation monitors through DDMP, Judge Quarles granted summary judgment in favor of the State, because the State had “shown that it provided an interpreter for Paulone during her meetings with DDMP monitors,” with the exception of her initial intake meeting, for which plaintiff had not requested an interpreter. Id. at 636. Third, with respect to plaintiffs court-ordered attendance at a MADD victim impact panel and the alcohol education classes, Judge Quarles observed that the State had denied plaintiffs requests for interpreters, id. at 636 n. 28, and rejected the State’s argument that provision of an interpreter was the sole responsibility of MADD and/or the alcohol education providers. Id. at 636. He stated: “Maryland has provided no evidence that one of the eight DUI education class providers or MADD had a deaf accessible program. Maryland may be liable if none of the programs Paulone was required to attend provided interpreters.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, he denied the State’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the provision of interpreters at the MADD panel and the alcohol education class. Judge Quarles also denied the State’s Motion with respect to plaintiffs negligent training and supervision claim (Count IX), reasoning that Paulone had complied with the notice requirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), codified at Md.Code (2009 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.), § 12-106(b) of the State Government Article (“S.G.”), and had adequately stated a claim for negligence. Id. at 636-38. However, Judge Quarles dismissed plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act claim (Count VI), on the ground that the Rehabilitation Act applies only to a “program or activity” that receives “federal financial assistance.” Id. at 634. According to Judge Quarles, “[b]e-cause Paulone failed to allege that any program or activity implicated by the complaint received federal funds, her Rehabilitation Act claims against Maryland must be dismissed.” Id. On March 3, 2010, the State filed a Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 37). As to plaintiffs negligent training and supervision claim, the State argued that it was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although plaintiff had complied with the prerequisites of suit under the MTCA, the State contended that the MTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to suits brought in state court, not federal court. With regard to plaintiffs ADA claim concerning the alcohol education classes, the State submitted a listing of the available classes, showing one that was taught in sign language, offered by DA-SAM. Judge Quarles issued an unreported Memorandum and Order (ECF 46 & 47) on July 26, 2010, 2010 WL 3000989, granting in part and denying in part the State’s Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Quarles dismissed plaintiffs negligence claim against the State (Count IX) on the ground of sovereign immunity. However, he declined to reconsider his ruling regarding the alcohol education classes, stating that the “Court does not reconsider its previous decisions based on evidence that was available but not provided with the original motion.” Mem. at 8 (ECF 46). He added: “[Although this evidence might support a motion for summary judgment on Paulone’s ADA claims against Maryland, the Court will not grant reconsideration based on omitted evidence.” Id. Therefore, Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII (with respect to Sheriff Jenkins only), and IX have been dismissed, and plaintiffs ADA claims against the State (Count V) have been dismissed in part. The following claims remain: (1) the balance of plaintiffs ADA claims against the State (Count V), which concern her post-arrest detention and processing, including her initial appearance before District Court Commissioner Riggin, and her attendance at the MADD victim impact panel and alcohol education classes; and (2) plaintiffs claims against the County, alleging violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, as well as negligent training and supervision (Counts III, IV, and VIII), all concerning her post-arrest detention at the FCADC. Standard of Review Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court must view all of the facts, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.2002). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts’ ” showing that there is a triable issue. Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting former Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042, 124 S.Ct. 2171, 158 L.Ed.2d 732 (2004). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The “judge’s function” in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” there is a dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When, as here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must consider “each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 822, 124 S.Ct. 135, 157 L.Ed.2d 41 (2003). “Both motions must be denied if the court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact. But if there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment.” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720, at 386-37 (3d ed.1998, 2010 Supp.). Discussion A. Statutory Background The ADA was enacted in 1990 “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(2). Title II of the ADA, which is at issue here, prohibits public entities, including “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government,” id. § 12131(1), from discriminating “by reason of’ disability against a “qualified individual with a disability.” Id. § 12132. For purposes of Title II, a “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as an individual with a disability “who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). There is no dispute that plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability, and that defendants are public entities subject to Title II of the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act was enacted some seventeen years before the ADA. Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are closely related, and to “the extent possible, [courts] construe similar provisions in the two statutes consistently.” Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 2002). See Rogers v. Dept. of Health & Environmental Control, 174 F.3d 431, 433-34 (4th Cir.1999) (stating that courts may apply Rehabilitation Act precedent in interpreting the ADA, and vice versa). Indeed, the statutes “share the same definitions of disability,” id. at 433, and Title II of the ADA explicitly provides that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights” provided under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights [that Title II of the ADA] provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability....” 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Pursuant to Congressional and Executive mandate, the Department of Justice has promulgated regulations interpreting and implementing both Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The regulations under the two statutes must be “consistent” with each other, 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b), and courts may not construe the provisions of the ADA “to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under [the Rehabilitation Act] or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant” to the Rehabilitation Act. Id. § 12201(a). See A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, 515 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir.2008); Rogers, 174 F.3d at 433. “Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the regulations are entitled to the full deference afforded under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984),[] the Court has counseled that the views expressed by the Department of Justice in the implementing regulations ‘warrant respect.’ ” Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 362 (quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597-98, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999)). Despite the general congruence of Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, there are at least two statutory differences. First, a plaintiff must show a different “causative link between discrimination and adverse action” under the two statutes. Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 469 (4th Cir.1999). Under Title II, a plaintiff need only prove discrimination “by reason of’ disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. But, a successful Rehabilitation Act claim requires a showing of discrimination “solely by reason of’ disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 n. 17 (4th Cir.2005) (“[W]e have recognized that the causation standards under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are ‘significantly dissimilar.’ ”) (quoting Baird, 192 F.3d at 469). In this case, however, no party claims that this distinction is material. The second significant difference between Title II and the Rehabilitation Act is that, as noted, Title II applies to any “public entity,” while § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies only to federal agencies or to “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Thus, to show a violation of the Rehabilitation Act by a state, local, or private entity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the “program or activity” at issue receives federal funding. The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not expressly provide for a private right of action. But, it is well established that private parties may sue to enforce Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184-85, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir.1994); Davis v. Southeastern Community Coll., 574 F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir.1978), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). Cf. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (establishing that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 supports a private right of action). To prevail under an ADA Title II or Rehabilitation Act § 504 claim, “a plaintiff must show that she was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, a program or service offered by a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by that entity.” Constantine, 411 F.3d at 499 (emphasis omitted). To that end, the Fourth Circuit has recognized “three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional discrimination or disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make reasonable accommodations.” Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 362. Notably, although the Fourth Circuit has held that Title II and the Rehabilitation Act require public entities to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities, see id.; see also Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 174-75 (4th Cir.2009); Constantine, 411 F.3d at 488, the phrase “reasonable accommodation” does not appear in the text of either statute. Rather, the requirement of “reasonable accommodation” in the Title II context derives from the statute’s reference to “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). See, e.g., Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriffs Dept., 500 F.3d 1185, 1195 n. 8 (10th Cir.2007) (“Title II’s use of the teim ‘reasonable modifications’ is essentially equivalent to Title I’s use of the term ‘reasonable accommodation.’ ”); McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1266 n. 3 (9th Cir.2004) (“Although Title II of the ADA uses the term ‘reasonable modification,’ rather than ‘reasonable accommodation,’ these terms create identical standards.”). The Justice Department’s interpretive regulations further elucidate the requirement of reasonable accommodations. Under 28 C.F.R § 35.130(b)(7), a public entity must “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” With regard to communication-related disabilities, the regulations require public entities to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others,” id. § 35.160(a), and to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity.” Id. § 35.160(b)(1). “Auxiliary aids or services” are defined by both statute and regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The regulation, which is more exhaustive, provides: Auxiliary aids and services includes— (1) Qualified interpreters, notetakers, transcription services, written materials, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD’s), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments; (2) Qualified readers, taped texts ... or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual impairments; (3) Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and (4) Other similar services and actions. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (italics added to show language appearing in the regulation but not in the statute). Notably, “[i]n determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities.” Id. § 35.160(b)(2). The regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are also relevant. They require that recipients of federal funding “shall insure that communications with their applicants, employees and beneficiaries are effectively conveyed to those having impaired vision and hearing.” Id. § 42.503(e). Moreover, a “recipient that employs fifteen or more persons shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills where a refusal to make such provision would discriminatorily impair or exclude the participation of such persons in a program or activities receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. § 42.503(f). Both Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contemplate respondeat superior liability. The Fourth Circuit has said: “Under the ADA and similar statutes, liability may be imposed on a principal for the statutory violations of its agent,” rather than only for an official “policy of discrimination.” Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 n. 3 (4th Cir.1997) (emphasis in original). See also T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir.2010) (stating that the ADA “permits an employer to be held liable for the actions of its agents,” and assuming, arguendo, that the Rehabilitation Act also “permits respondeat superior liability”); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 574-75 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810, 124 S.Ct. 47, 157 L.Ed.2d 22 (2003); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir.2001). Nevertheless, the statutes “cannot be read to impose strict liability on public entities that neither caused plaintiffs to be excluded nor discriminated against them.” Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 639-40 (4th Cir.2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of city, where school board, and not the city, was responsible for any ADA violation). A successful plaintiff in a suit under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is generally entitled to a “full panoply” of legal and equitable remedies. Pandazides, supra, 13 F.3d at 829-32. There are some limits to the availability of relief, however. Punitive damages “may not be awarded in suits brought under [Title II] of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Barnes, supra, 536 U.S. at 189, 122 S.Ct. 2097. Moreover, compensatory damages are available only upon proof of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment, rather than mere disparate impact. Pandazides, 13 F.3d at 829-30 & n. 9. However, “intentional discrimination” and “disparate treatment” in this context are “synonymous,” id. at 830 n. 9; a plaintiff need not show “discriminatory animus” to prevail on a claim for damages under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. It does not appear that the Fourth Circuit has specifically addressed whether compensatory damages are available for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. However, the majority of circuits that have resolved the question have held that damages may be awarded if a public entity “intentionally or with deliberate indifference fails to provide meaningful access or reasonable accommodation to disabled persons.” Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). See Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colorado, 562 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir.2009) (applying “deliberate indifference” standard to reasonable accommodation claim under ADA and § 504); Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir.2009) (applying “deliberate indifference” standard to compensatory damages claim based on allegation that federally-funded hospital violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in failing to provide ASL interpreter for deaf patient). See also M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. School Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.2006) (applying standard of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” to determine eligibility for compensatory damages under § 504 for failure to reasonably accommodate disability). But see Delano-Pyle, supra, 302 F.3d at 575 (“There is no ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applicable to public entities for purposes of the ADA or the [Rehabilitation Act]” in the Fifth Circuit.); T.W., supra, 610 F.3d at 604 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit “has not decided whether to evaluate claims of intentional discrimination under section 504 under a standard of deliberate indifference or a more stringent standard of discriminatory animus.”). Case law in this district endorses the deliberate indifference standard. Writing for this Court in Proctor v. Prince George’s Hospital Center, 32 F.Supp.2d 820 (D.Md.1998), Judge Chasanow held that compensatory damages were available to a deaf plaintiff who brought Title II and § 504 claims against a hospital for its failure to provide ASL interpreters. According to Proctor, even if the violations resulted from mere ‘“thoughtlessness and indifference’ rather than because of any intent to deny Plaintiffs rights,” the plaintiff was entitled to damages if hospital staff “acted ‘knowingly, voluntarily, and deliberately.’ ” Id. at 828 (quoting parties). In reaching her decision, Judge Chasanow adopted the explanation provided by then-District Judge Sonia Sotomayor in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 970 F.Supp. 1094, 1151 (S.D.N.Y.1997), aff'd in part, vac’d in part on other grounds, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), vac’d on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031, 119 S.Ct. 2388, 144 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999): “[T]he question of intent in accommodations cases does not require that plaintiff show that defendants harbored an animus towards her or those disabled such as she. Rather, intentional discrimination is shown by an intentional, or willful, violation of the Act itself. With this understood, it becomes clear, that while defendants may have had the best of intentions, and while they may have believed themselves to be within the confines of the law, they nevertheless intentionally violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by willfully withholding from plaintiff the reasonable accommodations to which she was entitled under the law. They had notice of the potential risk of their decision, and clearly refused the accommodation knowingly.” Proctor, 32 F.Supp.2d at 829 (quoting Bartlett). The Proctor Court endorsed the proposition that “the level of proof necessary for finding intentional discrimination under [the] Rehabilitation Act means a deliberate indifference to a strong likelihood that a violation of federal rights would result.” Id. at 829 n. 6 (citation omitted). As Judge Chasanow observed, it is “not enough merely to believe that one’s actions do not constitute a violation of the law if such a belief represents a ‘miscalculation.’ ” Id. at 829 (citation omitted). Where the hospital was “on notice that its failure to provide an accommodation [might] violate the Rehabilitation Act and intentionally opt[ed] to provide a lesser accommodation” by relying “on methods of communication other than a sign language interpreter on numerous occasions,” the hospital was liable for compensatory damages. Id. In this case, Paulone’s remaining claims pertain to four discrete events: (1) her detention at the Frederick County Adult Detention Center; (2) her initial appearance before Commissioner Riggin; (3) her mandatory attendance at the MADD victim impact panel; and (4) her attempts to enroll in a compulsory alcohol education class. Before addressing each claim, there are two preliminary matters: whether the State or the County is the proper defendant with respect to plaintiffs detention center claims; and the continuing vitality of Rosen v. Montgomery County, supra, 121 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.1997), a case that, due to its factual similarity to the case at bar, is relevant to virtually all of plaintiffs claims. B. Proper Defendant The County’s banner argument is that the State, and not the County, is liable for any violation of plaintiffs rights by Sheriffs Office personnel managing the Frederick County Adult Detention Center. The State agrees with the County that the State is the proper defendant. However, it asserts that, despite the State’s status as the proper nominal defendant, under Maryland law the County would be “responsible for paying any judgment against the State related to the Sheriffs performance of detention center functions.” State MSJ at 5 n. 4. In contrast, plaintiff contends that the County is the proper defendant (but she notes that, if she is wrong, the State is also a party to the case). Mem. in Support of PI. Response to Summary Judgment Mot. of Def. Bd. of County Comm’rs (“PI. Opp. to County MSJ”) at 6 (ECF 63-1). The question of which public entity is the proper defendant is a question of law as to which the parties have raised no material disputes of fact. Under Maryland’s Constitution, county sheriffs are constitutional officers. See Md. Const., Art. 4, § 44. It is well settled under Maryland law that, as a general rule, county sheriffs and their deputies are “officials and/or employees of the State of Maryland,” rather than their county. Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 281, 558 A.2d 399, 402 (1989). However, the Maryland Court of Appeals has allowed that, “for some purposes and in some contexts, a sheriff may ... be treated as a local government employee,” such as for issues involving “local funding of sheriff’s offices” or a sheriffs entitlement to local government employee benefits. Id. at 289, 558 A.2d at 406. For purposes of civil liability, Maryland courts ordinarily treat sheriffs as state officials. See, e.g., Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173, 935 A.2d 699, 709 (2007); Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 265-66, 863 A.2d 297, 309 (2004); Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, 374 Md. 20, 33-34 & n. 6, 821 A.2d 52, 60 & n. 6 (2003); Prince George’s County v. Aluisi, 354 Md. 422, 434, 731 A.2d 888, 895 (1999); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 357, 597 A.2d 432, 438 (1991); Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 572-73, 594 A.2d 121, 128 (1991); Penhollow v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Cecil County, 116 Md.App. 265, 296, 695 A.2d 1268, 1284-85 (1997); State v. Card, 104 Md.App. 439, 441-47, 656 A.2d 400, 401-04, cert. denied, 339 Md. 643, 664 A.2d 886 (1995). Moreover, this Court has consistently taken the view that Maryland sheriffs are State, not county, actors. See, e.g., Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 321 F.Supp.2d 642, 649-51 (D.Md.2004); Willey v. Ward, 197 F.Supp.2d 384, 387-88 (D.Md.2002); see also Lindsey v. Jenkins, Civ. No. RDB-10-1030, 2011 WL 453475, at *3 (D.Md. Feb. 3, 2011); Jiggets v. Forever 21, Civ. No. AW-08-1473, 2010 WL 5148429, at *2 (D.Md. Dec. 13, 2010); D’Alessandro v. Montgomery County, Civ. No. PJM-08-2841, 2009 WL 2596479, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 14, 2009); Hayat v. Fairely, Civ. No. WMN-08-3029, 2009 WL 2426011, at *10 (D.Md. Aug. 5, 2009). In Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.1991), however, the Fourth Circuit upheld liability of a Maryland county for a judgment against a sheriff. Dotson involved an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by inmates regarding conditions of confinement at the county jail in Dorchester County, Maryland (which, like Frederick County here, is subject to the county commissioner form of government). Id. at 921. The suit was resolved by a settlement agreement that, among other provisions, allocated the legal fees and costs incurred by the inmates between the county commissioners of Dorchester County and the county’s sheriff. Id. at 922. After the sheriff failed to pay his share of the judgment, the inmates sought to garnish the county’s bank account to satisfy the sheriffs portion of the judgment. Id. This Court ruled that the county was liable for the sheriffs portion, as well as its own, because the sheriff was “ ‘a policymaker for the county when operating the Dorchester County Jail.’ ” Id. (quoting district court). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit observed that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), counties (unlike states) can be liable under § 1983, but only for violations that “bear some relation to the county’s ‘policy or custom.’ ” Dotson, 937 F.2d at 924 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018). Therefore, the Dotson Court reasoned: “County liability for the Sheriffs operation of the County Jail depends on whether the Sheriff had final policymaking authority for the County over the County Jail.” Dotson, 937 F.2d at 924. Applying a test articulated by the Supreme Court in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Dotson Court explained that the question of who has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law, although “ ‘state law will [not] always speak with perfect clarity,’ ” and liability does not necessarily rely “on the technical characterization of an official as a state or county employee.” Dotson, 937 F.2d at 924 (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125, 108 S.Ct. 915). The Dotson Court then embarked on a lengthy survey of Maryland case law. See Dotson, 937 F.2d at 925-32. Distinguishing Rucker and other “Maryland cases discussing the employment status of the sheriff,” the Court reasoned that Rucker “does not compel the conclusion that the Sheriff, when managing the County Jail, is a state policymaker.” Id. at 926. The Court said: “The Sheriffs activities which we investigate — operating the County Jail which houses county prisoners, pursuant to county regulations, and funded by the County — differ from ‘the statewide nature’ of the Sheriffs duties involved in Rucker.” Id. at 927 (quoting Rucker, 316 Md. at 287-88, 558 A.2d at 405). The Court also recognized that “although the Sheriff ... now has custody of the County Jail, the County Jail remains a county institution and the County merely has placed final policymaking authority in the Sheriff.” Dotson, 937 F.2d at 928. It added: “Indeed, from the day the County built the County Jail, the County has been responsible for its conditions and operation.” Id. Additionally, the Dotson Court observed that, in the wake of Rucker, Maryland’s General Assembly enacted a statute, codified at Md.Code (2009 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.), § 9-108 of the State Finance & Procurement Article (“S.F.P.”), which provides that Maryland’s counties must either maintain insurance to provide “coverage and defense” of certain tort claims against sheriffs and their deputies or reimburse the State for the cost of the claims. See Dotson, 937 F.2d at 927. The statute specifically requires the counties to provide coverage for claims arising from “activities relating to performing law enforcement functions or detention center functions.” S.F.P. § 9-108(a)(6). The State has cited S.F.P. § 9-108 for the proposition that, although it is the proper nominal defendant, the County is responsible for payment of any monetary judgment awarded to Paulone. See also S.G. §§ 12-405 & 12-501 (specifying procedure for State payment of judgments and settlements against sheriffs concerning “law enforcement functions or detention center functions” from county funds). Although plaintiff does not cite Dotson, she argues that the County is liable for ADA violations at the detention center because “the obligation imposed by Title II of the ADA to ensure effective communication is not a law enforcement issue.” PI. Opp. to County MSJ at 6 (emphasis omitted). She contends that ADA compliance “is an obligation of all departments of government, not only law enforcement, just like bookkeeping standards or facility maintenance.” Id. (emphasis in original). While Dotson suggests that, in some circumstances, a Maryland sheriffs operation of a county detention center may give rise to county liability under § 1983, Dotson is distinguishable from this case in several important respects. First, Dotson did not concern identification of the proper nominal defendant in a claim based on county detention center management. Rather, the county sheriff was the defendant in Dotson, and the plaintiffs had obtained a judgment against him; the question before the Court was whether they could garnish county funds to satisfy that judgment. Here, the parties appear to agree that the County will ultimately be responsible to pay any judgment based on an ADA violation at the detention center. But, they disagree as to whether the State or the County is the proper defendant, an issue Dotson does not address. Second, and perhaps more important, Dotson was a § 1983 case, while this case arises under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. There “is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813, 125 S.Ct. 49, 68, 160 L.Ed.2d 18 (2004). A local government entity can only be liable under § 1983 for a violation of federal rights by its employees or agents if the violation arises from a policy of the entity. Therefore, the task of the appellate court in Dotson was to determine whether, under the Supreme Court’s Monell doctrine, the county had vested with the sheriff the “final policymaking authority” regarding the county jail. See Dotson, 937 F.2d at 924. In contrast, public entities are liable under principles of respondeat superi- or for their employees’ violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Rosen, supra, 121 F.3d at 157 n. 3. The Maryland Court of Appeals has made clear that sheriffs and their deputies are employees of the State, and that “counties and municipalities in Maryland are generally not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the tortious acts of State officials or State employees acting in the scope of their employment.” Rucker, 316 Md. at 292, 558 A.2d at 407. Moreover, Maryland’s high court has analyzed S.F.P. § 9-108 and its related statutory provisions, which impose upon counties the ultimate responsibility to pay judgments based on sheriffs’ management of county detention centers, and has held that “[t]hese provisions regarding the payment of judgments ... do not authorize tort actions against counties based on the negligence of State personnel acting within the scope of employment.” Boyer, supra, 323 Md. at 573 n. 10, 594 A.2d at 128 n. 10. Accordingly, the “final policymaking authority” analysis applied in Dotson under § 1983 is inapt in the ADA and Rehabilitation Act context. See Delano-Pyle, supra, 302 F.3d at 575. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that, because the Sheriff and his deputies who operate the detention center are State employees, the State is the proper defendant for plaintiffs claims regarding her treatment at the detention center. It follows that the County is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs ADA claim (Count III) and her Rehabilitation Act claim (Count IV). Additionally, the County is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs claim for negligent training and supervision (Count VIII). Under Maryland law, counties enjoy governmental immunity from tort liability with respect to “non-constitutional torts based on activity categorized as ‘governmental.’ ” Housing Auth. of Balt City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 361, 754 A.2d 367, 370 (2000); see generally id. at 358-61, 754 A.2d at 368-70 (discussing history of governmental immunity for local governments under Maryland law). Maryland law does not waive the counties’ governmental immunity from tort liability; rather, it requires each county to provide limited indemnity to county employees for non-malicious tortious acts or omissions committed in the employees’ scope of employment. See C.J. §§ 5-301 et seq. (Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act); see, e.g., Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 20, 862 A.2d 33, 43 (2004). See also Martino v. Bell, 40 F.Supp.2d 719, 722 (D.Md.1999); Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 896 F.Supp. 537, 539 (D.Md.1995). Thus, any state law tort claim would have to proceed against individual County employees, not the County itself. See Livesay, 384 Md. at 20, 862 A.2d at 43. Yet, plaintiff has not named any individual County employee as a defendant. Moreover, even if the County were not immune, the Fourth Circuit has yet to recognize a cause of action for failure to train under the ADA. Rather, it has opined that, if such liability exists, at a minimum, “the failure to train must have caused some violation” of the ADA. Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 177 n. 3 (4th Cir.2009). Because the State, and not the County, is liable for any ADA violation by the Sheriffs personnel, it follows that the State, and not the County, would be liable for any failure to train. For these reasons, the Court will also award summary judgment to the County as to Count VIII. C. Rosen v. Montgomery County The Court next considers Rosen v. Montgomery County, supra, 121 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.1997), a case that is factually similar to this case in many respects, and on which defendants rely heavily. Rosen involved ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims arising out of the DWI arrest of a deaf motorist. After the motorist failed field sobriety tests and a breath test, he was arrested and taken to the police station, where he failed a chemical test. Id. at 156. Rosen claimed “that the police made no attempt to communicate in writing and that they ignored his requests for an interpreter and for a TTY telephone so he could call a lawyer.” Id. He sought to participate in a “diversionary program” for first-time DWI offenders in Montgomery County, by which the offender would enroll in an alcohol education course offered by a variety of private operators. Id. However, he alleged that the county refused to provide an ASL interpreter for the classes, and did not tell him about a program that offered the classes in a format for hearing-impaired offenders. Id. When Rosen appeared in state court on the DWI charge, he asked the judge to order the county to provide an interpreter for the education program, but the judge denied the request. Id. Rosen was sentenced to probation before judgment and, as a condition of probation, was ordered to attend six Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings, which he did without an interpreter. Id. This Court granted summary judgment to the county (the State was not a party), and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 155. In the Rosen Court’s view, the “most obvious problem” with Rosen’s claim was that his arrest and the ensuing events were not covered by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act at all. Id. at 157. The Court explained: “Rosen clearly has a disability, but calling a drunk driving arrest a ‘program or activity1 of the County, the ‘essential eligibility requirements’ of which (in this case) are weaving in traffic and being intoxicated, strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent.” Id. (quoting ADA Title II). In support of that proposition, the Court relied on its earlier case, Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1071, 116 S.Ct. 772, 133 L.Ed.2d 724 (1996), in which the Fourth Circuit held that Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to state prisons, because “[t]he terms ‘eligible’ and ‘participate’ imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the state; they do not bring to mind prisoners who are being held against their will.” Id. at 1347 (quoting ADA Title II); see Rosen, 121 F.3d at 157 (quoting Torcasio ). At first blush, Rosen would appear to be dispositive of most, if not all, of plaintiffs claims. However, Rosen’s continued vitality is uncertain; one year after that decision, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998), in which it invalidated the reasoning of both Rosen and Torcasio. In Yeskey, a unanimous Supreme Court held that “the plain text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously extends to state prison inmates.” Id. at 213, 118 S.Ct. 1952. The Court expressly rejected the argument that “the words ‘eligibility and ‘participation’ imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the State, and thus do not connote prisoners who are being held against their will.” Id. at 211, 118 S.Ct. 1952. The Court explained that “the words do not connote voluntariness,” because “[wjhile ‘eligible’ individuals ‘participate’ voluntarily in many programs, services, and activities, there are others for which they are ‘eligible’ in which ‘participation’ is mandatory.” Id. As an example, the Court observed: “A drug addict convicted of drug possession ... might, as part of his sentence, be required to ‘participate’ in a drug treatment program for which only addicts are ‘eligible.’ ” Id,. To my knowledge, the Fourth Circuit has never cited Rosen in a subsequent decision. Indeed, in Waller, supra, 556 F.3d 171, the Fourth Circuit analyzed an ADA claim regarding alleged failure to reasonably accommodate a deaf suspect, without mentioning Rosen. The Waller Court observed that “courts have recognized” reasonable accommodation claims under Title II of the ADA in “the context of arrests,” id. at 174, and “assume[d]” the applicability of the reasonable accommodation requirement to arrests. Id. at 175. But, the Court stopped short of expressly confirming a reasonable accommodation requirement in the arrest context, concluding that any duty to reasonably accommodate was met in the case before it. Id. at 176. Rosen has also been criticized by other courts. See, e.g., Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir.2002) (Rosen’s “reasoning has now been discredited by the Supreme Court”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 1570, 155 L.Ed.2d 311 (2003); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dept. of Police, 89 F.Supp.2d 543, 556 (D.N.J.2000) (Rosen’s reasoning is “now discredited”). It is also noteworthy that, after Rosen, the Fourth Circuit joined other federal circuits in holding that, under the plain language of “the disability discrimination statutes, a plaintiff must show that she was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, a program or service offered by a public entity, or subjected to discrimination by that entity.” Constantine, supra, 411 F.3d at 499 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1084-85 (11th Cir.2007) (“[T]he final clause of [42 U.S.C.] § 12132 protects qualified individuals with a disability from being ‘subjected to discrimination by any such entity,’ and is not tied directly to the ‘services, programs, or activities’ of the public entity.... [It] ‘is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context.’ ”) (internal citations and some internal quote marks omitted); Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.2002) (“Rather than determining whether each function of a city can be characterized as a service, program, or activity for purposes of Title II, ... we have construed ‘the ADA’s broad language [as] bringing] within its scope “anything a public entity does.” ’ ”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958, 123 S.Ct. 2639, 156 L.Ed.2d 656 (2003); Regional Economic Cmty. Action Program v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.) (“The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act ... prohibit all discrimination based on disability by public entities.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813, 123 S.Ct. 74, 154 L.Ed.2d 16 (2002); Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir.1998) (finding that “the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does”). Moreover, the Justice Department’s interpretive regulations confirm that “title II applies to anything a public entity does.” 28 C.F.R. part 35, App. B. I recognize that Rosen has not been expressly overruled and that “arguing that a precedent has been overruled through a court’s silence is a disfavored enterprise within this circuit.” In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 139-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036, 119 S.Ct. 2394, 144 L.Ed.2d 794 (1999). Nevertheless, the weight of subsequent authority, in the Supreme Court as well the Fourth Circuit and other courts, calls into question the reliance on Rosen for the broad proposition that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are inapplicable to arrests. I will consider the applicability of Rosen’s other holdings and dicta in the context of the parties’ particular claims, to which I now turn. D. Detention Center As noted, the parties dispute the facts with respect to Paulone’s detention. Therefore, the Court must identify the parties’ factual disagreements and determine whether they are material, which would necessarily prevent entry of summary judgment. Plaintiff was held at the detention center in the early morning hours of August 1, 2008, from approximately 2:30 a.m. until her appearance before the district court commissioner at around 7:00 a.m. Defendants have submitted an affidavit of Corporal Jason Cave (“Cave Aff.”), Ex. D to County MSJ (ECF 51-17), who staffed the Central Booking Unit at the detention center and interacted with plaintiff during that time, as well as affidavits from two other officers who did not interact personally with plaintiff but describe the policies and procedures at the detention center. Plaintiff has described her version of events in deposition testimony. Corporal Cave was on duty at the detention center from 8:00 p.m. on July 31, 2008, until 8:00 a.m. on August 1, 2008. Cave Aff. ¶ 3. He “assisted in the processing” of Ms. Paulone, “who was booked into the ADC facility at 2:53 a.m. on August 1, 2008.” Id. ¶ 4. Cave claims that he “immediately acknowledged that Ms. Paulone was hearing-impaired and informed the District Court Commissioner of that circumstance once processing was completed.” Id. ¶ 5. He also claims that he “communicated with Ms. Paulone by way of written notes of [sic] numerous occasions throughout her detention.” Id. ¶ 6. According to Cave, “Ms. Paulone had several questions in reference to the detention process and concerning her appearance before the District Court Commissioner.” Id. ¶ 11. He asserts: “Despite my various other duties, I checked-in on Ms. Paulone, whose cell was visible from my desk, at every opportunity and answered every one of her questions via written notes.” Id. Cave also states that he “retrieved an Ultratec Minicom IV T.T.Y. machine from the shift supervisor’s office and hooked it up on a staff line in the Central Booking Unit ... for [plaintiffs] use.” Id. ¶ 7. He claims that he “observed Ms. Paulone use the T.T.Y. machine on at least three separate occasions during her detention,” but that “Ms. Paulone informed [him] by written note that her roommate, who she was attempting to contact via the T.T.Y., was also deaf, apparently sleeping and unaware that she was calling.” Id. ¶ 8-9. Cave asserts: “The T.T.Y. device was working, and I do not recall Ms. Paulone complaining that it was malfunctioning in any way.” Id. ¶ 10. Defendants also submitted an affidavit of Lieutenant Timothy Selin, who is the “Commander of Technology” at the FCADC. Affidavit of Timothy Selin (“Selin Aff.”) ¶ 2, Ex. F to County MSJ (ECF 51-19). Selin states that since “early July 2008” (i.e., less than a month before plaintiffs arrest and detention), the Central Booking Unit at the detention center maintained three TTY devices “for the convenience of the hearing-impaired.” Id. ¶ 3. Selin avers that he has “personally operated T.T.Y. devices on several occasions to assist deaf or hearing-impaired detainees,” although he does not allege that he was present at the detention center on the night of Paulone’s detention. Id. ¶ 4. He claims that the TTYs used at the detention center “become[ ] operable as soon as [they are] plugged into an electrical socket,” and do not “require the use of batteries.” Id. ¶ 6. As an attachment to Selin’s affidavit, defendants submitted a log of calls to and from the telephone extension to which the TTY was connected on August 1, 2008. Ex. F2 to County MSJ (ECF 51-21). The log shows four outgoing calls to the phone number for Paulone and her housemate, Virginia Borggaard (who is also deaf), at 4:37 a.m., 4:44 a.m., 6:59 a.m., and 7:02 a.m. The duration of each call was less than a minute (the first call was half a minute, the latter three were each nine-tenths of a minute). As another attachment to Selin’s affidavit, the defendants submitted the manual for the Ultratec Minicom IV, the particular model of TTY used at the detention center. See Ultratec Manual, Ex. FI to County MSJ (ECF 51-20). Defendants note that the manual does not indicate that the TTY’s batteries need to be charged before the TTY can be used with AC power from a wall outlet. Indeed, they point out that the manual states that the “Minicom IV uses batteries when you unplug the AC adapter or the power fails,” id. at 16 (emphasis added), and also instructs: “All you need to do to set up the Minicom IV is plug it in!” Id. at 6. Finally, defendants submitted an affidavit of Lieutenant Michael Cronise, who is the “Commander of Special Operations” for the Sheriffs Office. In that capacity, he “oversee[s] the intake and processing operations of the Central Booking Unit.” Affidavit of Michael Cronise (“Cronise Aff.”) ¶ 3, Ex. E to County MSJ (ECF 51-18). Although Cronise was not on duty during Paulone’s detention, he describes generally the post-arrest detention procedures of the detention center. According to Cronise, detainees are detained until their initial appearances before a district court commissioner, and the “process of hearing and release is in no way accelerated by a detainee being able to reach a family member or friend by way of a telephone call from the [FC]ADC.” Id. ¶ 7. Cronise further avers: “The Sheriffs Office exercises absolutely no control over the District Court Commissioner and has no influence with respect to the order or duration of detainees’ appearances before the District Court Commissioner.” Id. ¶ 8. Moreover, he states that the “average lag time, from initial intake at the ADC to hearing before a District Court Commissioner, is between three and four hours. Delays of five or more hours are not unusual during the nighVearly morning shifts.” Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs version of events is significantly different. Ac