Full opinion text
ORDER GILMORE, District Judge. Pending before the Court is Amway Corporation’s (“Amway’s”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Instrument No. 267). Based on the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds that Amway’s should be GRANTED in PART and DENTED in PART. I. Background On July 17, 1997, Plaintiffs Proctor & Gamble Company and Proctor & Gamble Distributing Company (“P & G”) filed this action against Amway Corporation (“Amway”), Amway Distributors Association Council (“ADA”), and several other defendants. Plaintiffs asserted claims for business disparagement, defamation, violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, unfair competition, violations of the Lanham Act, tortious interference with prospective business relations, negligent supervision, negligence, vicarious liability, fraud, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). P & G and Amway compete for consumers of household products such as laundry detergent and toothpaste. Amway sells its products through a multi-level distribution plan for door-to-door sales. As it argued unsuccessfully in prior Federal Trade Commission litigation, P & G argues in this case that the Amway distribution plan is an illegal pyramid scheme. P & G alleges that since the early 1980s Amway and its distributors have circulated false statements that P & G is associated with Satanism and that profits from the sale of P & G products are contributed to the “Church of Satan.” P & G claims that it complained to Amway and Amway assured P & G that the circulation of the false statements would stop. P & G maintains that, contrary to these alleged assurances, the rumors were again circulated in 1995, beginning in Texas. P & G insists that Amway and its distributors have also issued false statements about P & G’s products. As an example, P & G alleges that Amway distributors have told potential customers that P & G’s laundry detergent causes “shudge” which clogs drain pipes and that P & G’s toothpaste contains harmful abrasives which can damage tooth enamel. In 1995, P & G sued Amway and one of its distributors in Utah challenging the Satanism rumors. An amended complaint filed in the Utah federal court also challenged Amway’s distribution method as a pyramid scheme. The amended complaint was dismissed by the Utah Court on July 15,1997. On July 17, 1997, P & G sued Amway, ADA, and other distributors in this Court again challenging the Satanism rumors and the Amway distribution plan, as well as the alleged false statements which were product-specific. Most of P & G’s claims are based on 148 statements allegedly made by Amway or its distributors since 1980. (Amway’s Motion, Instrument No. 267, Exh. 1). On November 12, 1998, the Court dismissed P & G’s claims for unfair competition, negligent supervision, negligence, and Civil RICO. (Instrument No. 156). Consequently, the seven (7) remaining causes of action in this case are business disparagement, defamation, violation of section 16.29 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, violations of the Lanham Act, tortious interference with prospective business relations, vicarious liability, and fraud. On March 11, 1999, Amway filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting several challenges to all seven (7) of the remaining claims. In particular, Amway contends that a majority of the allegations underlying P & G’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Amway also maintains that it is entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver. In addition, Amway argues that a majority of the statements are not reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning. Amway also maintains that P & G’s business disparagement claim must fail because the statements were either not “of and concerning” P & G or its products, not disparaging, not published with actual or common law malice, or not the sole cause of P & G’s damage. Furthermore, Amway continues, section 16.29 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code is inapplicable to the allegations made by P & G. Amway also contends that P & G’s tor-tious interference with prospective business relations claim is meritless since P & G fails to present evidence of specific prospective relationships that did not materialize and cannot show that Amway or its distributors interfered with any prospective relationships or that they committed an intentional of malicious act. With respect to the Lanham Act, Anway asserts that the Satanism statements are not actionable because they do not misrepresent the features of any products and do not constitute commercial speech. Moreover, Amway argues that there is no definitive evidence that the challenged statements were false or misleading or that there was any deception of a substantial portion of the intended audience. Amway also argues that P & G does not have standing to sue under the Lanham Act based on the alleged pyramid scheme. Next, Amway points out that vicarious liability does not constitute an independent cause of action, but rather is a theory used to attach liability to one party for the acts of another. Amway then claims that there is no showing of justifiable reliance by P & G, as required to establish fraud. In response, P & G argues that none of its claims are barred by statute of limitations and that the disparaging statements constitute a continuing tort. In addition, P & G maintains that Amway is estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense. P & G insists that the disparaging statements concerned P & G and its products, were made with legal and actual malice, and caused P & G to suffer pecuniary loss. P & G also contends that its claims for defamation, violation of section 16.29 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, violation of the Lanham Act, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and fraud are actionable. Lastly, P & G argues that Amway failed to prove its defenses of estoppel and waiver. II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A fact is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. If the evidence rebutting the motion for summary judgment is only colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be granted. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511; see Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1088 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857, 112 S.Ct. 171, 116 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991). Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its belief that there is an absence of a genuine issue for trial, and for identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate such absence. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1987). Where the moving party has met its Rule 56(c) burden, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Leonard, 828 F.2d at 294. To sustain the burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence admissible at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Thomas v. Price, 975 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir.1992) (“To avoid a summary judgment, the non-moving party must adduce admissible evidence which creates a fact issue.... ”). III. Statute of Limitations First, Amway argues that P & G “filed stale claims, which they have known about for years, regarding a 20-year-old Satanism rumor and allegations that Amway has, since 1959, operated an illegal pyramid.” (Amway’s Motion, Instrument No. 267, at 2). In addition, Amway continues, P & G alleges that “Amway’s independent distributors have over the past twenty years made isolated disparaging remarks about P & G’s products dating ‘prior to 1982.’ ” (Id. at 2). According to Amway, P & G’s claim are, for the most part, barred by limitations. Conversely, P & G maintains that its claims are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations; that the discovery rule and the continuing tort doctrine apply, and therefore the limitations period has not begun to run. A. Defamation With respect to P & G’s defamation claim, Amway argues that Statements 1-126 are barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. “Under Texas law, limitations is an affirmative defense on which defendants have the burden of proof.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 872 F.Supp. 1551, 1569 (N.D.Tex.1995). “When a party moves for summary judgment on limitations, it is the movant’s burden to conclusively establish the bar of limitations.” Poe v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 800 F.Supp. 1439, 1441 (E.D.Tex.1992). “However, where a non-movant interposes a tolling statute, the limitations defense is not conclusively established until the mov-ant negates the applicability of the statute.” Id. The court cannot decide an issue of material fact, but is relegated to a determination of whether a genuine issue exists. Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1182 (5th Cir.1981). “[W]hen the evidence conclusively shows that the cause of action has been barred by [statute of] limitations, judgment may be rendered for the proponents [of a summary judgment motion], but the evidence must be such that reasonable men would not differ as to its interpretation.” Id. at 1182-83 (emphasis added). P & G’s “defamation claim is based on state law, and therefore, is governed by the Texas statute of limitations. Under Texas law, any defamation claim must be brought within one-year after the defamatory statements were made.” Henderson v. AT & T Corp., 933 F.Supp. 1326, 1331 (S.D.Tex.1996). In this case, P & G filed its complaint against Amway and others on July 17, 1997. It is undisputed that Statements 1-126 were allegedly published more than one-year before P & G filed its complaint. P & G, however, contends that a number of these statements are timely under the “discovery rule.” For several of the statements, P & G indicates that the company first learned about the statement within one-year of the filing of the complaint or after P & G filed its complaint. For example, although Statement 2 was purportedly published in the early 1980’s, P & G claims that it first learned about the statement on August 4, 1997 — after the complaint was filed. “The discovery rule is an exception to the general rule that a cause of action accrues when facts come into existence authorizing a claimant to seek a judicial remedy.” Ellert v. Lutz, 930 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1996, no writ). Under the “discovery rule,” the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the defamed person learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the allegedly defamatory statement. Langston v. Eagle Publishing Co., 719 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex.App.—Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). “The discovery rule applies if: (1) the injury is inherently undiscoverable; and (2) the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable.” Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.1997) (emphasis added) (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.1996)); Ellert, 930 S.W.2d at 156. In application, the discovery rule “ ‘proves to be a very limited exception to statute of limitations.’ ” Ellert, 930 S.W.2d at 156 (quoting Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 455); see Johnson v. Abbey, 737 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (holding that the discovery rule applies to defamation that is not of public knowledge, as in a false credit report). “The determination of whether the discovery rule applies to a particular cause of action is a question of law.” Ellert, 930 S.W.2d at 156. In Ellert v. Lutz, 930 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1996, no writ), Ellert filed a gender discrimination claim in federal court against her boss, Lutz. Later, on July 18, 1994, Ellert sued Lutz in state court for defamation. Id. “The basis of Ellert’s libel claim was a memorandum from Lutz to Jerry Robinson[,] [the director of personnel at the university,] regarding Ellert’s termination.” Id. at 155. The memorandum was dated April 5, 1991, received by Robinson on that date, and placed in Ellert’s personnel file on that very same day. Id. The memorandum was not published at any other time outside the university. Id. Ellert asserted that she did not see the April 5 memorandum until it was produced in the federal litigation on or about October 6, 1993, in the course of discovery. Id. Ellert, therefore, argued that the discovery rule prevented her libel claim from being barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 156. The Texas Supreme Court, however, “conclude[d] [that] the basis of Ellert’s claim, the April 5 memorandum, was not inherently undiscoverable.” Id. at 156-57. The court stated that: To be “inherently undiscoverable”, an injury need not be absolutely impossible to discover, else suit would never be filed and the question of whether to apply the discovery rule would never arise. Nor does “inherently undiscoverable” mean merely that a particular plaintiff did not discover his injury within the prescribed period of limitations; discovery of a particular injury is dependent not solely on the nature of the injury but on the circumstances in which it occurred and plaintiffs diligence as well. An injury is inherently undiscov-erable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered loithin the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence. Id. at 156 (quoting S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (1996) (emphasis added)). The court reasoned that the basis of Ellert’s claim was not inherently undiscoverable because “[t]he undisputed summary judgment evidence show[ed] that Ellert had easy access to her personnel file and the memorandum at all time.” Id. at 157. Furthermore, the court continued, “Ellert was involved in administrative and judicial proceedings regarding her termination for several years after the memorandum was placed in her personnel file.” Id. In this case, P & G argues that “[i]t was unlikely that P & G would discover most of the incidents because they were statements at Amway rallies or at Amway meetings in peoples’ homes.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 12). According to P & G, “[ujnless a consumer calls P & G and reports the incident, it (and the injury to P & G) is virtually undetectable except through judicial discovery proceedings.” (Id. at 12). P & G also maintains that it “exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the incidents in questions.” (Id. at 13). In the past, P & G purportedly “hired private investigators ... to attempt to track down and discover who was repeating the Satanism [r]umor.” (Id.). Although P & G asserts that the bases of its claim, the 148 statements, were “virtually undetectable,” P & G admits that the company learned about several statements allegedly made at Amway meetings, rallies, and parties within one year of their publication. Furthermore, Ed Artzt (“Artzt”), the former Chief Executive Officer of P & G, testified that he became aware “[s]ometime between 1980 and 1990” that Amway had a significant involvement in the Satanism rumor. (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, Exh. A-14, at 34). Artzt also stated that he “had come to the conclusion, before 1990, that ... [the rumor] was having a substantial effect” on P & G’s reputation with the public. (Id. at 35). Moreover, according to Amway, P & G has already sued Amway distributors over the Satanism rumor in 1982, 1983, 1986, 1990, and 1995. (Amway’s Reply Brief, Instrument No. 292, at 4). As mentioned, “[inherently undiscovera-ble encompasses the requirement that the existence of the injury is not ordinarily discoverable, even though due diligence has been used.” Altai 918 S.W.2d at 456. Based on the evidence submitted by both parties — especially, those instances where P & G discovered the disparaging statement within one year after its publication — it is clear that the existence and nature of P & G’s injury was not ordinarily undiscoverable. While some disparaging remarks “might not [have] be[en] quickly discovered, this isolated fact does not alter the reality” that the defamatory statements generally were capable of detection within the time allotted for bringing suit. See Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 457 (holding that trade secret misappropriation is generally capable of detection within the allotted limitations period). Thus, as in Ellerb, the Court finds that the discovery rule does not apply because the bases of P & G’s defamation claim, the 148 disparaging statements, were not inherently undiscov-erable. P & G then argues that “[u]nder the continuing tort/continuing injury doctrine[,] . . . . P & G’s defamation claim is timely as to all of the 148 statements.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 15 n. 13). “Texas courts first recognized the tolling concept of continuing tort in trespass to land and nuisance cases.” Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1993). The tolling concept has since been expanded to false imprisonment cases and considered in cases involving civil rights violations. Id. A continuing tort is one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort does not accrue until the defendant’s tortious act ceases. It involves not only continuing wrongful conduct, but continuing injury as well. The continuing nature of the tort is determined by the complained-of injury; there may be either a continuing injury about which the plaintiff complains, which constitutes a continuing tort, or a single, distinct injury despite continued availment to the toH, which does not constitute a continuing tort. Engaging in wrongful conduct that causes injury and then refusing to modify, reverse, or cease that conduct for some period of time thereafter does not constitute a continuing tort; rather, the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury is first sustained. Dickson Constr., Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 960 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ) (emphasis added). P & G does not cite and the Court has not found any Texas cases applying continuing tort to defamation. Rather, in Dickson Constr., Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 960 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ), the court held that a disparaging comment made by an employee of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland in January of 1993, and any harm that may have ensued to the plaintiff because of that comment did not constitute a continuing tort. In Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 875 (D.C.1998), Katherine Wallace (“Wallace”) sued her former employer, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (“Skadden Arps”), and several of Skadden Arps’s partners and associates, alleging that her character and professional qualifications had been defamed in a number of performance evaluations and other communications. The first sixteen counts of Wallace’s complaint related to defamatory communications which the defendants allegedly made prior to November 1, 1994. Id. at 882. Since Wallace filed her complaint on November 1, 1995, the court determined that these counts were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Id. Wallace, however, argued that “the defendants’ defamatory statements were all part of a single continuing course of conduct, and that the statute of limitations therefore did not begin to run until after the conduct ceased following her discharge.” Id. The court disagreed with Wallace’s contention, emphasizing that Wallace’s complaint “allege[d] that the defendants made a number of discrete defamatory communications.” Id. The court reasoned that each of the statements constituted a new assault on Wallace’s reputation and gave rise to a separate right of action. Id. The court then stated that the “ ‘running of the statute [could not] be prevented by repetition of [defamation], although, of course, a separate action w[ould] lie for any repetition within the statutory time.’ ” Id. (quoting 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 122, at 206 (1987)). “[O]nce the plaintiff has been placed on notice of an injury and of the role of the defendants’ wrongful conduct in causing it, the policy disfavoring stale claims ma[de] application of the ‘continuous tort’ doctrine inappropriate.” Id. at 883. In Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749, 750 (1993) (emphasis added), the court stated the following: It is important to note what does not constitute a continuing tort. Wrongful acts which are separate and wholly dissimilar are separate causes of action and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the commission of each wrongful act. Thus it is important to distinguish between separate acts which may be assault, defamation, or battery, and a continuing course of wrongful conduct which constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress. Here, the Court finds that the continuous tort doctrine is inapplicable to P & G’s claim. P & G identified 148 different disparaging remarks allegedly made by Amway or its distributors. Thus, this case involves acts that are “complete in themselves[.]” Twyman, 790 S.W.2d at 821 (quoting Franzetti v. Franzetti, 120 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex.Civ.App.—1938, no writ)). Each defamatory statement gives rise to a separate cause of action. See Wallace, 715 A.2d at 882. Therefore, P & G’s allegations of defamatory remarks that were made prior to July 17, 1996, are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Only those disparaging statements that were purportedly published on or after July 17, 1996— within one year of the complaint being filed — may form the basis of P & G’s defamation claim. B. Business Disparagement In this case, P & G asserts both a defamation and business disparagement claim against Amway and others. Amway argues that the “Texas one-year ... limitations period [for defamation] applies to all other torts asserted based on the same facts as a defamation claim.” (Amway’s Brief, Instrument No. 267, at 17). Unlike a cause of action for defamation, a suit for business disparagement must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. Dwyer v. Sabine Mining Co., 890 S.W.2d 140, 142 (TexApp.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied). However, an action for “business disparagement is similar in many respects to an action for defamation.” Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex.1987). Under Texas law, business disparagement and defamation claims [b]oth involve the imposition of liability for injury sustained through publications to third parties of a false statement affecting the plaintiff. The two torts, however, protect different interests. The action for defamation is to protect the personal reputation of the injured party, whereas the action for injurious falsehood or business disparagement is to protect the economic interest of the injured party against pecuniary loss. Id. In distinguishing between personal defamation and disparagement of business, the type of damages claimed is significant. Libel or slander is actionable without proof of special damages; thus, no specific economic loss need be proved. In business disparagement and other “injurious falsehood claims,” special damages are “the gist of the action,” and neither damages to reputation nor consequential mental distress is recoverable. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d 83, 97 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1987). “An injured party may sue for both personal defamation and business disparagement in the same suit so long as he avoids duplication of damages.” Dwyer v. Sabine Mining Co., 890 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied); Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d at 97. Unlike Amway’s contention, Texas case law does “not go so far as to hold that the one-year statute applies whenever a false statement disparaging a business interest is also personally defamatory[.]” Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d at 98. Rather, “in determining whether the one-year statute applies to a defamatory or disparaging statement, a plaintiffs pleadings and proof must be examined to see whether the primary gravamen of the tort is an injury to the plaintiffs personal reputation, and whatever damages ensue from that injury, or whether the gravamen is a direct injury to the plaintiffs business or property.” Id. [I]f the main complaint is a false statement directly injurious to a business or property interest, and the damages alleged and proved are limited to a business or property losses established with the specificity required for these sorts of damages, then the claim may properly be considered as one for business or property disparagement, even though aspects of personal defamation may be incidentally involved. Id. In Cain v. Hearst Corp., No. H-93-614, 1993 WL 304412, *1 (S.D.Tex.1993), an unpublished opinion relied on by Amway, the plaintiff brought suit against the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, arguing that an article in the June 30, 1991 issue of the Chronicle newspaper placed him in a “false light.” According to the plaintiff, the article referred to him as a member of the “Dixie Mafia” and stated that he was “believed to have killed as many as eight people.” Id. The plaintiff claimed that the article caused “him to suffer depression, mental anguish and distress, dejection and severe humiliation.” Id. The court concluded that “irrespective of what the plaintiff may call his suit, it [wa]s nevertheless, a suit in libel” which had to be “brought within one year of the offending act.” Id. Since the offending act occurred on June 30,1991, and the plaintiff filed his suit on January 6, 1993, the court found that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the one-year limitations period. Id. Likewise, in Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d 83, 93-99 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1987), the court held that any recovery allowed for the plaintiffs’ business disparagement claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for defamation as matter of law. In Hurlbut, the plaintiffs alleged that false information “charging] ... [them] with fraud and the crime of selling unapproved insurance” that was published by the defendants caused the plaintiffs’ licenses to be revoked and caused indictments to be returned against them. Id. at 98. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued, the false information caused them to be held up to public ridicule and contempt and branded as common criminals. Id. The plaintiffs brought several claims against the defendants based on the alleged defamatory utterances, including business disparagement, tortious interference with contract rights, fraud, and conspiracy to engage in such tortious conduct, and sought damages for lost earnings, injury to their reputation, emotional distress, and lost property. Id. 87, 93. “The trial court rendered judgment for actual and exemplary damages against all defendants.” Id. at 87. The defendants then appealed the trial court’s judgment, arguing that all of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. In particular, the court of appeals determined that the plaintiffs’ business disparagement “suit ha[d] been pleaded as a slander case, proved as a slander case, and submitted to the jury as a slander case, with only formal use of the term ‘business disparagement’ instead of slander.” Id. at 99. The court of appeals stated that the statements “were defamatory to the plaintiffs’ characters and reputations personally rather than merely disparaging to their business.” Id. at 95. In other words, the “injury alleged and proved ... [wa]s a general injury to each plaintiffs personal reputation resulting from charges of fraudulent and criminal conduct rather than special injury to their business.” Id. at 98. The court of appeals reasoned as follows: Plaintiffs claimed, proved, and recovered all damages that would be recoverable in an action for personal defamation. Specifically, those damages included damages to personal reputation, alienation of friends, humiliation, and mental distress, none of which are damages allowed by law for business disparagement. Such pecuniary loss as was proved was loss of earnings in general by the individual plaintiffs rather than loss of profits from the particular business they were carrying on together. Id. at 99. Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs’ business disparagement claim was barred by the one-year limitations period for defamation. Id. at 95. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court “agreed ... that the damages proven were personal to the plaintiffs.” Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 766-67 (finding no reversible error in the judgment of the court of appeals as it pertained to the plaintiffs’ business disparagement claim). On the other hand, in Dwyer v. Sabine Mining Co., 890 S.W.2d 140, 148 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied), the court recognized that the plaintiff had asserted two distinct causes of action — defamation and business disparagement. The plaintiff claimed that several defamatory statements made by the defendants on July 13, 1991, caused a potential client to terminate contract negotiations with the plaintiff. Id. at 142. The plaintiff filed his original petition alleging defamation on September 4, 1992, and amended his complaint to add a claim for business disparagement on June 28, 1993. Id. The plaintiff “said that the statements sabotaged the prospective contract he had ... and deprived him of commissions.” Id. The court determined that the plaintiffs defamation claim was barred by the one-year limitations period. Id. at 143. However, “although limitations barred his claim for defamation,” the court found that the plaintiff had “at least raised a fact issue on his claim for special damages because of business disparagement, and [that] limitations ha[d] not barred that claim.” Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiff sought damages for injuries resulting from his loss of the contract, loss of business relationships, and his loss of commissions and pleaded special damages caused by the tortious interference. Id. Unlike the plaintiffs in Cain and Hurl-but, P & G has alleged economic loss (lost sales) to the company as well as other damages (injury to reputation, goodwill, and prestige) as a result of the 148 disparaging statements. In particular, P & G claims that: [t]he utterance and/or publication of the false, malicious, non-privileged statements by Defendants induced others not to conduct business with ... [P & G], and/or to cease purchasing ... [P & G’s] products, which proximately caused special damage, including but not limited to, loss of trade, lost sales, lost revenue, and harm to ... [P & G’s] reputation, goodwill and prestige and standing with consumers or customers in the business community. (Complaint, Instrument No. 86, ¶ 108). According to P & G, “the great majority of P & G’s injuries are lost sales, precisely the ‘loss of business’ that fits within the business disparagement [claim].” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 5). Having alleged a direct injury to P & G’s business, the Court finds the holdings in Cain and Hurlbut to be inapplicable. Instead, as in Dwyer, the Court concludes that P & G has asserted two distinct causes of action against Amway and the other defendants — defamation and business disparagement. As mentioned, “an injured party may sue for both torts in the same suit so long as he avoids duplication of damages.” Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d at 98. “[I]f the defamation claim is barred because of its shorter limitation period, the disparagement claim will not be barred by the shorter limitation period so long as the injured party does not plead allegations and proof typical of an action for defamation.” Id. General damages for injury to personal reputation, humiliation and mental anguish are typical of an action for defamation. Id. Whereas, specific damages to a particular business or property are typical of a claim for business disparagement. See id. As in Dwyer, P & G clearly alleges damage to its business, including lost sales and revenue. Thus, P & G asserts a separate claim for business disparagement against Amway and the other defendants which is not subject to the one-year limitations period for defamation. As mentioned, a suit for business disparagement must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. Dwyer, 890 S.W.2d at 142. P & G insists that the discovery rules applies to its claim for business disparagement and that the 148 statements “that neither occurred nor were discovered within two years of filing of the [c]omplaint arc actionable as part of a continuing course of tortious conduct.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 13). For the same reasons that the Court concluded that the discovery rule and the continuous tort doctrine were inapplicable to P & G’s defamation claim, the Court finds that these tolling provisions do not apply to P & G’s business disparagement claim. Consequently, only those disparaging statements that were purportedly published on or after July 17, 1995 — within two years of the complaint being filed— may form the basis of P & G’s business disparagement claim to the extent that P & G’s damages are not duplicated. C. Section 16.29 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code Under Section 16.29, “[a] person may bring an action to enjoin an act likely to injure a business reputation or to dilute the distinctive quality of a mark registered under ... Title 15, U.S.C., ... regardless of whether there is competition between the parties or confusion as to the source of goods or services.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 16.29 (West 1998). “The general limitations period for torts in Texas is two years[.]” Derrick Manu. Corp. v. Southwestern Wire Cloth. Inc., 934 F.Supp. 796, 804 (S.D.Tex.1996); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) (West 1998). Amway, however, argues that several of the 148 statements that form the basis of P & G’s cause of action under Section 16.29 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code are barred by the one-year limitations period for defamation. In support of this contention, Amway cites Cain, Hurlbut, and Martinez v. Hardy, 864 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ). The Court, however, finds these cases to be inapplicable to P & G’s claim under Section 16.29. As discussed above, Cain involves the court’s comparison of the plaintiffs “false light” cause of action to a defamation claim. Hurlbut concerns the court of appeal’s decision that the plaintiffs’ business disparagement suit was, in actuality, a defamation claim. Lastly, in Martinez, the court held that the plaintiffs tortious interference with contract claim was barred by the one-year limitation period for defamation. 864 S.W.2d at 776. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs “claim for tor-tious interference with contract [wa]s inextricably intertwined with and dependent upon her claim for slander[.]” Id. However, none of these cases cited by Amway held that the one-year limitations period for defamation should be applied to a cause of action under Section 16.29. Amway does not provide and the Court has not found any Texas cases in which the one-year statute of limitations was applied to a claim under Section 16.29. Consequently, the Court finds that Amway has not met its burden of proving that the one-year limitations period applies to this claim. Therefore, the two year limitations period applies to P & G’s claim under section 16.29. As a result, P & G’s cause of action under Section 16.29 is necessarily limited to- those statements made within two years from the time suit was filed— i.e., those statements published on or after July 17,1995. D. Tortious Interference With Prospective Business Relations As with P & G’s other claims, Amway contends that a majority of the alleged statements are barred by the one-year limitations period for defamation. Unlike the case law for causes of action under section 16.29, there is clear authority applying the one-year limitations period for defamation suits to claims for tortious interference. In Moore & Assocs. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ), an association of anesthesiologists filed suit against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Metropolitan”), a group medical insurer, for defamation, libel and tortious interference with the doctor-patient relationship. Metropolitan allegedly sent.letters to several former patients of the plaintiff. Id. “The letters advised the patients that their claims for medical services furnished by [the] plaintiff would not be paid in full because [the] plaintiffs charges were excessive.” Id. With respect to the affirmative defense of limitations, the court first concluded that those letters published more than one-year prior to the date suit was filed were barred by the one-year limitation period for libel and slander. Id. at 491. The court then determined that the plaintiffs “claims for tortious interference with the doctor-patient relationship [we]re based on the alleged false and defamatory character of the communications complained of, and therefore, [we]re indistinguishable from the claims for libel.” Id. Likewise, this Court finds that P & G’s tortious interference with prospective business relations claim is indistinguishable from its claim for defamation. In particular, P & G asserts that Amway “intentionally engaged in the foregoing non-privileged wrongful conduct which interfered with ... [P & G’s] business relationships.” (Complaint, Instrument No. 86, ¶ 139). According to P & G, “[t]he foregoing are false and misleading statements, constitute unfair competition, and unfair and deceptive trade practices and tortiously interfere with the business relations that ... [P & G] ha[s] with customers and consumers, including but not limited to, Amway distributors.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Consequently, the same one-year limitation period applies and P & G’s tortious interference claim is necessarily limited to those defamatory statements made within one year from the time suit was filed. See Martinez, 864 S.W.2d at 776 (holding that one-year limitation period applied to plaintiffs tortious interference claim that was inextricably intertwined with and dependent on her slander claim); Laird v. Texaco, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1986, no writ); Moore & Assocs., 604 S.W.2d at 491. In arguing that the general two year limitations period for torts is applicable, P & G emphasizes that its tortious interference claim is based not only on the 148 defamatory statements, but also on Amway’s “operation of an illegal pyramid as a fraudulent marketing scheme.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 47). P & G cites Paragraph 137(c) of its complaint as support for this contention. However, Paragraph 137(c) does not discuss Amway’s alleged operation of an illegal pyramid scheme, but rather identifies additional customers and consumers with whom P & G purportedly had an existing or potential economic relationship. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations applies to P & G’s tortious interference cause of action and only those disparaging statements that were purportedly published on or after July 17, 1996, may form the basis of this claim. E. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act Next, Amway insists that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation applies to P & G’s claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. As with Amway’s argument concerning P & G’s cause of action under Section 16.29, there is no authority applying the one-year limitations period for defamation to a claim under the Lanham Act. Consequently, the Court declines to hold that the one-year statute of limitation applies to P & G’s cause of action under Section 43(a) the Lanham Act. In the alternative, Amway argues that several of the statements alleged by P & G are barred by the applicable four year limitations period. The Court agrees. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act “protects against misrepresentations or false statements made in connection with the advertising and marketing of good or provision of services, misappropriation of the efforts of others, confusion or likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or association of goods or services.” Derrick Mfg. Co., 934 F.Supp. at 804. “The large majority of federal courts that have considered the limitations issue as to Section 43(a) claims have held that these claims are most comparable to fraud claims, and have applied the fraud limitations period.” Id. Therefore, this Court holds that the fraud limitations period applies to P & G’s Section 43(a) claims. See id. at 805. “In Texas, the limitations period for fraud is four years.” Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004 (West 1998)). Only those disparaging statements that were purportedly published on or after July 17, 1993, may form the basis of P & G’s Section 43(a) claim. F. Fraud Lastly, Amway maintains that P & G’s fraud claim is barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations. With respect to its fraud claim, P & G asserts that “Amway made or caused to be made ... knowing and fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts to ... [P & G] that Amway would stop the spread of the Satanic Message within its organization and other false and disparaging statements made against ... [P & G] by Amway distributors.” (Complaint, Instrument No. 86, ¶ 174). In particular, P & G lists a letter sent by Eugenie M. Rogstad, an Amway staff attorney, on September 8, 1980, and a letter sent by Casey Wondergram, Amway’s Director of Public Relations, on April 30, 1982, and correspondence written by Thomas Laco, P & G’s Executive Vice President, dated March 22, 1983, as evidence of Amway’s fraudulent conduct. In its brief, P & G discusses additional statements made by Amway’s personnel throughout 1982. According to P & G, “the representations continued through 1990” and “the assurances were repeated through August 1995 when Amway publicly pledged that its purported assistance to P & G in stopping the rumor would continue.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 24). As mentioned, the statute of limitations for fraud claims is four years. Jackson v. Speer, 974 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir.1992); Derrick Mfg. Corp., 934 F.Supp. at 804; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004 (West 1998). If, however, the injured party is not aware of the fraud or the fraud is concealed, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered by the defrauded party’s exercise of reasonable diligence. Knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry %ohich tvould lead to a discovery of the fraud is knoiuledge of the fraud itself. Jackson, 974 F.2d at 679 (emphasis added). P & G argues that its fraud claim is not barred by the four-year limitations period because the company “did not know of the fraud and continued to rely on Amway’s assurances until 1996, well within four years of the filing of the Complaint in July 1997.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 25). In particular, P & G states the following: P & G relied upon Amway’s false assertions that it would do all it could to assist P & G in refraining from commencing litigation against Amway until 1996. Beginning in the early 1980s, it was P & G’s policy to refrain from asserting a claim against Amway for the false and misleading statements made by Amway’s distributors about P & G. P & G’s policy of forbearance was in reliance on, and based upon, the assurances made by Amway management to P & G from 1980 into the 1990s that Amway would do all in its power to prevent its distributors from repeating the false and misleading statements about P & G and P & G’s products. P & G’s policy of forbearing from litigation against Amway continued until the Spring of 1996. (Id.). According to P & G, the company “first suspected that the representations made by Amway ... were false in or about July 1995, when it discovered that Defendant Haugen was a member of the Executive Committee of the ADA[] and agent of Amway.” (Complaint, Instrument No. 86, ¶ 177). Haugen purportedly, “transmitted the Satanic Message via the Amvox system to thousands of his downline distributors.” (Id. at ¶ 72). John E. Pepper (“Pepper”) testified that after this incident, P & G was not able to rely on Amway to handle the situation in good faith. (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, Exh. A-34, at 124). Pepper stated that: [t]o have this happen again, after all the discussion that had gone on, and have a leading member of this — of your corporation or on this council participate in a rumor going out, with his knowledge of what had gone before, you know, it — -you just — it really left us feeling very hopeless in being able to get this thing controlled by the Amway Corporation and by these folks. It’s not like it was a new subject. (Id.). In the spring of 1996, P & G claims that the company discontinued its usual “policy of forbearing litigation against Amway[.]” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 25). However, other testimony suggests that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, P & G could have discovered the fraud in the late 1980s. John G. Smale, P & G’s Chief Executive Officer from 1981 to 1986, testified as follows: Q. [Amway’s counsel] Okay. Were you satisfied with the way the Proctor & Gamble responded to the [S]atanism rumor over the years? A. [Smale] Satisfied in the sense of whether we should have done less or more or what? Q. Yes. A. I don’t understand what you mean. Q. Right, okay. Fair enough. It was a vague question. Yeah, if you had to do it all over again, would you do anything differently? A. We sure would at this point in time. We would be going after Amway a hell of a lot sooner than we did. I mean, you know, that’s pretty self-evidence at this point. Q. Why didn’t you go after Amway sooner? A. Well, because the feeling — we just didn’t initially believe that there was an attempt by that company to propagate this rumor. And, initially, I didn’t know the people who headed it, but one of our executives did, Tom Laco, and he thought well of them. And there were contacts with Amway from the early stages because of the identification of Amway agents doing this. And so — and we got the response that they were concerned about it, and they would try to stop it. But, nothing ever happened. I mean, it just ivent on over period of years. So, with hindsight, yes, we would have, I think, certainly changed that aspect of it, but we didn’t. Q. When did you first come to the realization that you should have gone after Amway sooner? A. I don’t — I suspect in the — I don’t know, towards the late ’80s, as these rumors continued and as we got more and more lack of response from Amway. (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, Exh. A-32, at 36-37) (emphasis - added). Later, Smale stated the following: Q. [Amway’s counsel] ... But, if I understand your testimony, initially you were satisfied with the response of Amway Corporation, but by the late 1980s, you felt you should have sued them or taken action against them sooner. My question is: Was there an earlier time, the mid-’80s, at which you became dissatisfied with the response of Amway Corporation? A. [Smale] Well, I think we were dissatisfied on a continuing basis. That is, we would be^ — initially the feeling was, well, we’re going to try to put a stop to this, but it kept going on and on. And so, I don’t think there was a specific point in time. It just seemed that it just didn’t stop. It just kept going on and on. {Id. at 56). In response, P & G does not offer any competent summary judgment evidence disputing that fact that, had P & G exercised reasonable diligence, the company could have known about Amway’s allegedly fraudulent conduct at least by the late 1980s. Instead, P & G emphasizes its policy of refraining from initiating litigation against Amway and the company’s decision to rely on Amway’s assurances. Apparently, P & G became completely dissatisfied with Amway’s lack of effort to eliminate the rumor when P & G learned about Haugen’s purported “widespread dissemination of the Satanism [r]umor on Amway’s Amvox system.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 26). This explains what activity precipitated P & G to file suit against Amway for fraud, but does not suggest that P & G could not have known about Amway’s fraudulent conduct in the late 1980s had the company exercised reasonable diligence. As indicated by Smale, even though Amway gave P & G repeated assurances that it would assist in dispelling the rumor, the rumor allegedly continued to spread to P & G’s existing and potential consumers and customers. In the late 1980s, P & G could have exercised reasonable diligence and discovered that Amway “had done little or nothing to stop its distributors from making the aforesaid false statements about” P & G and its products. (Complaint, Instrument No. 86, at ¶ 177). Even in the light most favorable to P & G, the Court, therefore, finds that Amway has proven as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact about when P & G could have known about Amway’s fraudulent conduct in the exercise of reasonable diligence. “[T]he evidence ... [is] such that reasonable men would not differ as to its interpretation.” Fusco, 643 F.2d at 1183. P & G’s fraud claim is DISMISSED as it is barred by the four-year statute of limitations. IV. Estoppel In addition to its affirmative defense of limitations, Amway argues that P & G is estopped from claiming that Amway is liable for Satanism statements made by Amway distributors. According to Amway, at a meeting in March of 1983, P & G agreed that “Amway’s role in addressing the rumor among distributors would be to ‘track them down and try to stop them if [P & G] would tell [Amway] the particulars of the incidents coming to [P & G’s] attention’ and that P & G would contact Amway periodically to pass on further incidents.” (Amway’s Brief, Instrument No. 267, at 47-48). Amway purportedly relied on this agreement and believed that it was doing what needed to be done to deal with the Satanism rumor. In order to prove the affirmative defense of estoppel, Amway must establish five elements: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts, (3) to a party without knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of those facts, (4) with the intention that it should be acted on, and (5) the party to whom it was made must have relied or acted on it to its prejudice. LaRue v. LaRue, 832 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1992, no writ). Since Amway bears the burden of proof on its defense of estoppel, it must establish all elements of the defense to prevail on summary judgment. See United States v. Home Health Agency, 862 F.Supp. 129, 133 (N.D.Tex.1994). Amway, however, does not even discuss how the defense of estoppel applies to the facts in this case. It simply asserts that there was some alleged agreement between Amway and P & G to disclose incidents involving the rumor so that Amway could act accordingly. Amway does not suggest that any of P & G’s statements in the March 1983 meeting were false or that Amway relied on this alleged agreement to its prejudice. Consequently, the Court finds that Amway fails to establish its affirmative defense of estoppel as a matter of law. V. Waiver Next, Amway maintains that P & G waived its pyramid allegations under its Lanham Act cause of action. According to Amway, during discovery in lawsuits filed by P & G against Amway’s distributors in the 1980s, P & G interrogated several Amway distributors about Amway business structure and methods. P & G also allegedly collected information on Amway’s business structure and methods between 1982 and 1990. Furthermore, one of P & G’s counsel purportedly referred to Amway’s business structure as a “pyramid-type organization” in 1986. (Amway’s Brief, Instrument No. 267, at 49). As with the affirmative defense of estoppel, Amway must establish all of the element of waiver in order to prevail on summary judgment. See Home Health Agency, 862 F.Supp. at 133. Under Texas law, [t]he affirmative defense of waiver can be asserted against a party who intentionally relinquishes a known right or engages in intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.... A party’s express renunciation of a known right can establish waiver. Silence or inaction, for so long a period as to show an intention to yield the known right, is also enough to prove waiver. Tenneco, Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex.1996). “Waiver is ordinarily a question of fact[,]” but “[w]here the facts and circumstances are admitted or clearly established ... the question becomes one of law.” Id. In this case, there is no evidence that P & G intentionally relinquished its right to bring suit against Amway for engaging in an illegal pyramid scheme. P & G’s opportunity to investigate Amway’s structure and business methods and one attorney’s reference to Amway’s structure as a “pyramid-type organization” in 1986 followed by years of inaction by P & G does not prove that P & G intentionally yielded its right to sue Amway for allegedly operating a pyramid scheme. Furthermore, P & G emphasizes that there is no showing by Amway that P & G knew that Amway was an illegal pyramid scheme in the 1980s. The Court, therefore, concludes that based on the record Amway cannot establish its affirmative defense of waiver as a matter of law. VI. P & G’s Remaining Claims In addition to the affirmative defenses discussed above, including statute of limitations, estoppel, and waiver, Amway presents several arguments as to why P & G’s remaining claims must fail as a matter of law. A. Defamation First, Amway maintains that P & G’s defamation claim is not actionable because P & G is libel proof as a matter of law. Under Texas law. [i]t has long been the rule ... that the plaintiffs tarnished reputation may be shown in mitigation of damages. The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the principle underlying that rule: where there is no reputation it cannot be damage[d] and without damage to reputation there is no actionable defamation. Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1987, writ dism’d w.o.j.). “The libel-proof doctrine,” which is based on the premise that defamation is not actionable without damage to the plaintiffs reputation, was first announced in Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.1975). A libel proof plaintiff, by definition, has “suffered minimal, if any, damage to his reputation by a defamatory communication.” Langston v. Eagle Publishing Co., 719 S.W.2d 612, 621 (Tex.App.—Waco 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). “The libel-proof doctrine has developed into two distinct pathways.” Id. The first path, called “issue-specific,” “bars libel claims of plaintiffs who have tarnished reputations on particular issues or on a specific behavior.” Id. The second path, referred to as the “incremental” approach, “requires the court to evaluate the defendant’s communication in its entirety and to consider the effects of the challenged portion of the communication on the plaintiffs reputation in the context of the entire communication.” Id. at 622. “The cases that most compellingly invite ... [the application of the libel-proof doctrine] are those cases ... in which criminal convictions for similar behavior to that alleged in the challenged communication are urged as a bar to the claim.” Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 515. “[A] substantial majority of the reported cases [probably] relate to the specific issue of the plaintiffs criminal conduct.” Id. Thus, “it is clear that the doctrine should have only a limited application^]” Id. at 516. Under Texas law, [t]o justify applying the doctrine, the evidence of record must show not only that the plaintiff engaged in criminal or antisocial behavior in the past, but also that his activities were widely reported to the public. The evidence on the nature of the conduct, the number of offenses, and the degree and range of publicity received must make it clear, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs reputation could not have suffered from the publication of the false and libelous statement. McBride v. New Braunfels Herald-Zeitung, 894 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, writ denied). “There are few so impure that cannot be traduced. Although a person’s general reputation may be so bad as to render him libel-proof on all matters, ordinarily even the public outcast’s remaining good reputation is entitled to protection.” Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 516. Here, Amway contends that P & G’s reputation prior to the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements was so deplorable that the statements could not have further injured P & G’s reputation. For example, Amway discusses a book written by Aleda Swasy (“Swasy”) in 1993 entitled Soap Opera in which Swasy criticizes P & G’s treatment of its female employees and accuses P & G of manipulating and abusing it employees, consumer and competitors. In addition, Amway offers an editorial from the August 13, 1991 edition of the Wall Street Journal that protested P & G’s “use of the local police to root out the source of news leaks.” (Aimway’s Brief, Instrument No. 267, at 13). Lastly, Amway references a 1997 article in Forbes that examines P & G’s purported attempts to “ 'financially paralyze’ ... [its competitor] with ‘predatory’ behavior[.]’” Id. at 14 (quoting Robert Lenzer, The Battle of the Bottoms, FORBES, Mar. 24, 1997, at 101). In response, P & G maintains that Amway’s evidence only consists of “unproven, hearsay, largely from newspaper articles.” (P & G’s Opposition, Instrument No. 279, at 20-21). P & G also provides the Court with a list of awards bestowed upon P & G in 1998, including Fortune Magazine’s 100 Best Companies to Work for in America, Second Harvest’s Donor of the Year, and the National Society of Black Engineers’s Number 1 in Recruiting and Retention. In the light most favorable to P & G, the Court finds that Amway has not proven that P & G is libel-proof as a matter of law. See McBride, 894 S.W.2d at 10-11. The evidence presented by Amway does not conclusively show that P & G engaged in criminal or anti-social behavior in the past or that P & G’s alleged activities were widely reported to the public. One Texas court stated that “[a] kernel of truth and common sense underlies the libel-proof doctrine: the reputation of an Adolph Hitler or Charles Manson could not be damaged as a matter of law, and therefore a court’s time and resources should not be expended in litigating their spurious libel