Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This dispute originates from allegations of sexual harassment by former female employees of the District of Columbia Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”) against their male supervisors. Plaintiffs Garrina Byrd, Demera Gaskins, Annette Burns, and Carmen Jean-Baptiste bring this suit against the District of Columbia seeking damages for unlawful sexual harassment and discrimination that each suffered during the course of their employment. Plaintiffs allege several violations of numerous provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964, the D.C. Human Rights Act, the D.C. Whistleblowers Protection Act, and the First and Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The severity of grievances ranges from complaints of inappropriate sexual comments to accusations of unwanted touching and fondling to allegations of the most serious kind — pervasive sexual assault. The factual narratives not only involve descriptions of abhorrent individual victimization but also collectively illustrate insidious systematic problems within DPR’s administrative body. Despite DPR’s outwardly altruistic participation in welfare-to-work programs, plaintiffs allege that DPR’s pattern of intentional neglect in providing adequate training and supervision and its willful refusal to aid disadvantaged employees evince its ongoing participation in systematic discrimination. Plaintiffs complain that gross mismanagement within DPR’s administration has significantly contributed to their injuries. They furthermore point to the lack of remedial options available to mitigate the harassment they have suffered. A review of the background of the case, the governing law, the parties’ arguments, and the Court’s reasoning in resolving any disputes is set forth below. II. BACKGROUND Because of the sheer volume of detail required in a case involving four individual plaintiffs and several multi-component counts, the parties have submitted extensive evidence in support of their arguments. The Court sets forth below only those facts and details from the procedural history necessary to resolve the arguments that follow. A. Factual History All four plaintiff-employees occupied different positions at DPR for varying durations between 2000 and 2006. During this time, DPR routinely classified its employees’ employment statuses as temporary, seasonal, or term appointments as opposed to permanent positions. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Sum m. J., ECF No. 121-3, Ex. 5, at 106-12 [“Marshall Dep.”]. Generally, seasonal employees were, hired for the summer months; temporary employees were hired for set periods outside specific seasons; and term employees were hired for thirteen-month periods. Id. Only term employees were union members of the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2741 for the Department of Parks and Recreations (“AFGE Local 2741”). Id. An employee’s manager could request the renewal of non-seasonal employment, which would be granted automatically provided that the director or associate director did not reject the request. Id.; Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-8, Ex 6, at 52-53 [“Khabo Dep.”]. DPR’s high-level management personnel transitioned several times during this period; consequently this case involves a shifting cast of individuals responsible for DPR’s administration. Project Arise — later known as Project Empowerment — was a D.C. Department of Employment Services’ welfare-to-work program responsible for the initial hire of many of DPR’s employees. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-3, Ex 1, at 34-35 [“Burns’ Dep.”]. Program participants worked for DPR as a condition of their continued receipt of governmental assistance, and after a successful probationary period were hired directly by DPR. A primary goal of the program was to promote economic self-sufficiency by transitioning economically disadvantaged D.C. residents from subsidized incomes to independent employment. 1. Darnell Thompson Darnell Thompson was the Chief of DPR’s Maintenance Division. In this capacity, he supervised the general administration of the Division. He was solely responsible for requesting the renewal of subordinate, term and temporary Maintenance Division employees, and possessed the authority to fire and hire employees provided that he afforded them “due process.” Marshall Dep., [121-3] at 106-12; Khabo Dep., [121-18] at 52-53. His principal office was at DPR’s Half Street location, but he occasionally traveled among recreation centers under his supervision, a. Allegations of Sexual Harassment i. Annette Burns Originally retained through Project Arise, DPR hired Burns directly in 2001 to work as a clerical assistant in the Maintenance Department at its Half Street location. Burns’ Dep., [121-3], at 43-45. She was appointed as a thirteen-month term employee under the day-to-day direction of clerical assistant, Joyce Roberts. Chief Thompson directly supervised both. Id,.; Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-10, Ex. 8, at 12-13 [“Roberts’ Dep.”]. While Thompson denies ever acting inappropriately toward Burns or having any sexual contact with her, Burns alleges a series of progressively inappropriate behavior by Thompson, culminating in physical assault. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-16, Ex. 14 [“Thompson Lerner Transcript”]; Burns’ Dep., [121-3], at 86-90. In late 2001, Thompson’s behavior, which Burns had previously perceived as father-like affection, began to turn too intimate. Burns’ Dep., [121-3], at 86-90. She alleges that his physical contact, including hugs and shoulder rubs, progressively became more frequent, causing her great discomfort. Id. Burns claims to have repeatedly informed him that the behavior was unwelcome. Id. She also claims that she reported an incident where Thompson kissed her on the cheek to DPR supervisor James Boone, and she testified that Boone apologized and said that “it had been an ongoing thing with Mr. Thompson .... [a]nd he [Boone] would talk to him [Thompson].” Id. at 92:17-20. After a disciplinary meeting in Thompson’s office in April 2002, when she was eight months pregnant, Burns alleges Thompson grabbed her breast and tried to put his tongue in her mouth. Id. at 96:10-12. Burns attempted to fight him off, but in the course of the struggle, he used his body weight to lean on top of her and pushed down on her pregnant stomach for several minutes. Id. at 96:15-18. On May 1, 2002, Burns informed a doctor at the Washington Hospital Center that her supervisor forced himself upon her the previous day. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-18, Ex. 12 [“Burns Medical Records”]. She then contacted James Boone, who suggested she contact the “Union.” Burns’ Dep., [121-3], at 100, 103. Upon inquiring at DPR headquarters, Burns recalls narrating her version of Thompson’s attack to receptionist, Margie Clark, and asking how to register a complaint of sexual harassment against her supervisor. Id. Shortly thereafter, Burns claims that Deputy Director Khabo contacted her and told her he would file a complaint on her behalf, which Khabo neither confirms nor denies. Id. at 105; see Khabo Dep. [121-18], For several of the following months, Burns was out on paid administrative leave per DPR’s request. Burns’ Dep., [121-3], at 105-06. She says she spoke with Director Albert to make arrangements for leave and he “ensured [her] that an investigation was going to take place.” Id. at 106:4-5, 120:7-10. Returning to DPR in the summer of 2002, she worked at the Randell and Watkins Recreation Center. Id. at 110:10-11. She had no further contact with Thompson; she suspected, however, that she remained under his supervision because she was still an employee within the Maintenance Department, of which Thompson was still the Director. Id. at 118:1-17. Thompson admitted that Director Albert told him about Burns’ allegations of sexual harassment. Thompson Lerner Transcript, [121-16] at 35:14-19. DPR Chief of Staff Neil Rodgers and DPR EEOC Counselor Terrance Reddick spoke with Burns regarding her allegations. Burns reported the harassment to Sylvia Gwathmey, the Union Steward of the AFGE Local 2741. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-11, Ex. 9, at 15 [“Gwathmey Dep.”]. Additionally, Burns relayed her allegations to Project Arise employee Leslie Greene. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-18, Ex. 16 [“Greene Dep.”]. Green testified that she told Burns to take her complaint to a different office because she was no longer a Project Arise employee. Id. DPR allegedly informed Burns that it found no merit to her complaint, however, she was neither aware of any investigation into her complaint, nor was she contacted again by anyone from DPR regarding her allegations. Burns’ Dep., [121-3], at 120-21. Burns concluded that DPR did not take her complaint seriously. Id. at 121:20-21. Burns’ final term that was set on December 3, 2003, expired on January 19, 2004 — over a year and half after the incident in Thompson’s office. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 133-1, Ex. 31 [“Burns Personnel Documents”]. Despite DPR’s unsupported assertions to the contrary, Burns claims that she never received any sexual harassment training, was never informed of DPR’s sexual harassment policies, and was not told what to do if she was sexually harassed. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-18, Ex. 21, at ¶ 12 [“Burns Decl.”]. She does not remember seeing any posted notices of her federal or local rights regarding workplace discrimination laws. Id. at ¶ 10. ii. Demera Gaskins Gaskins, whom DPR also hired through Project Empowerment as a summer employee, became a term, or “probationary,” employee in October 2004. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-19, Ex. 17, at 29-37 [“Gaskins Dep.”]. Under the authority of the Maintenance Division, Gaskins’ responsibilities included cleaning different recreation centers and the Half Street location. Id. at 42-45, 76-77. She alleges that between July 2004 and March 2005, Chief Thompson visited her assigned recreation centers and physically assaulted her by trying to force her to perform sexual acts. Id. at 63-65. When she refused, she claims that he said her “job was on the line.” Id. at 66-67. Her allegations against Thompsons also include: kissing and touching her breasts and buttocks at the Half Street location, pulling her into a closet to sexually assault her, calling her after hours on her cell phone, and video-recording images of Gaskins and other female workers’ buttocks as they cleaned. Id. at 60-61, 78, 121-22. Thompson denies ever having any sexual contact with Gaskins. Thompson Lerner Transcript, [121-16] at 45-46. Gaskins told her “Crew Leader,” James Gripper, and her “Work Leader,” Johnnie Richardson, about Thompson’s harassment, but they instructed her not to tell anyone or let Thompson know she had been talking about it. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-13, Ex. 11, at 313-16 [“Gripper Lerner Transcript”]; Gaskins Dep., [121-19] at 67, 73. There is nothing in the record to suggest either Gripper or Richardson further reported or followed up on Gaskins’ complaints. Purportedly out of fear of losing her job, Gaskins made no further complaints to DPR management during her employment. Gaskins Dep., [121-19] at 73, 68-69, 81. Gaskins’ employment was prematurely terminated in March 2005. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-20, Ex. 18 [“Gaskins Personnel File”]. Thompson informed her she had been fired for tardiness and failure to keep the Emory Recreation Center clean. Gaskins Dep., [121— 19] at 70-71. Within a week of her termination, Gaskins called Director Stanley, who instructed her to get a lawyer if she had complaints against Thompson. See Gaskins Dep. [121-19] at 74:12-20 (“After I was fired I had talked to him to ask him about, questions how I can put out sexual harassment and he said on who and I told him and []he says for me to go get a lawyer.”). Gaskins does not recall seeing any posters regarding federal employment laws or receiving any specific sexual harassment training. She did receive a one-page handout on the subject in October 2004, but cannot remember its contents. Gaskins Dep., [121-19] at 30-31, 89-92. iii. Garrina Byrd Byrd was stationed as a maintenance worker and assigned to clean DPR recreation centers through her Project Empowerment placement. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-24, Ex. 22, at 31-40 [“Byrd Dep.”]. After transitioning to direct DPR employee status in the summer of 2002, she and another female employee, Katrina Williams, were involved in an altercation with a third party over a non-work related matter. Id. at 45-50. Thompson directed them to report to his office the next day. Id. Although Thompson denies any impropriety, Byrd claims he demanded she expose her breasts or lose her job. Id. at 52-55. After she complied, Thompson assigned her to work at the Half Street office. Id. Thompson Lerner Transcript, [121-16] at 8-9. She began working as a clerical assistant under Joyce Roberts’ direction. Roberts Dep., [121-10] at 12-13. On her first day, after rebuffing Thompson’s attempts to violently grope her breasts, Byrd alleges that Thompson told her that, “in the morning I want titties and coffee.” Byrd Dep., [121— 55] at 75. According to Byrd, daily interactions with Thompson meant a stream of constant sexual comments, continual touching of her breasts and under her skirt, and repeated requests for sex and oral sex. Id. at 76-81. She claims she finally acquiesced to his demands out of fear that he would act on his threats and terminate her. Id. Byrd characterized Thompson’s behavior as “rape without force.” Id. She claims he ignored her protests and instead would “physically stand up and start pulling [her] clothes down.” Id. at 82-85, 161-62. She estimates that Thompson forced her to have sex approximately seven times and oral sex two to three times under threat of termination. Id. at 87-91, 161-68. Thompson denies any sexual contact with Byrd. Thompson Lerner Transcript, [121— 16] at 19-22. Thompson allegedly refused to give Byrd work assignments, forcing her to sit in his office all day so that she was at his beck and call. Byrd Dep., [121-55] at 102. Byrd explains that Thompson became progressively more controlling and began calling her cell phone at night after telling her at work: “If you don’t answer the phone for me tonight, don’t come in here tomorrow.” Id.; Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-26, Ex. 24, at 272 [“Byrd Lerner Transcript”]. Friend and co-worker Mario Chaney, who witnessed and occasionally answered several of Thompson’s late night calls, began to notice a sharp personality change in Byrd. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-27, Ex. 25, at 15:14-22 [“Chaney Lerner Transcript”]. Chaney says Byrd became despondent and would call from her work, “upset and crying,” and “would be disgusted ... her whole rapport, her whole frame of mind just completely changed ... she was just always upset.” Id. Chaney heard Thompson threaten to fire Byrd and call her “bitch.” Id. at 17:1-6. Another DPR employee, Tonya Kemper, witnessed Thompson make sexually suggestive comments to Byrd and hit her buttocks on several occasions despite Byrd’s protests. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121— 12, Ex. 10, at 71, 74-75 [“Kemper Dep.”]. Julie Banks, Maintenance Supervisor for the Half Street location, also witnessed Thompson yelling at Byrd. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-6, Ex. 4, at 27-29 [“Banks Dep.”]. Verified by Thompson’s later admission, Banks witnessed him say to a pregnant Byrd — who was unsure whether her baby was fathered by Thompson or her boyfriend — “[i]f you are pregnant, we can take care of that right here. Just get a coat hanger and get on the desk.” Banks Dep., [121-6] at 26; Thompson Lerner Transcript, [121-16] at 23:15-18. Byrd testified that Thompson’s response when he discovered that Kemper made complaints against him was to show Byrd a gun and ask her if she too was going to “snitch.” Byrd Dep., [121-24] at 143. Byrd’s term employment was extended several times under Thompson’s authorization. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-24, Ex. 23 [“Byrd Personnel File I”]. She suggests the harassment would intensify to its apex shortly before her term was due to end and that Thompson used his supervisory status to coerce her agreement to sexual acts. Byrd Dep., [121-24] at 80-81, 161. Thompson notified Byrd on August 1, 2002 that her employment was set to expire on September 30, 2002, and that DPR could make no commitments to continue her employment but would notify her if there was a “change in her status.” Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 133-1, Ex. 27 [“Byrd Personnel File II”]. Despite some suggestions that Thompson complained of Byrd’s work performance, he repeatedly requested the renewal or modification of her term, including the extension of her term from ninety days to thirteen months. Id.; Banks Dep., [121-6] at 22-25. Approximately one year after coming to Half Street, Byrd spoke to Roberts and told her “she was being touched by her supervisor” in a sexual way. Roberts Dep., [121-10] at 30. Roberts told Byrd she needed “to take that complaint somewhere else,” and did not direct her further. Id. According to Roberts, Byrd’s complaint occurred “before we had any sexual harassment training” and therefore she did not know of her responsibility as a manager to document and report claims. Id. at 31. Acting on lingering feelings of suspicion, Maintenance Supervisor Banks approached Byrd in early 2005 after seeing her visibly upset at work. Banks Dep., [121-6] at 31-33, 36-45. In response to Byrd’s description of Thompson’s ongoing behavior, Banks advised her to report the harassment to DPR’s Human Resources department. Id. at 37. Despite completing training as an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) counsel- or, Banks testified that she did not know where or to whom she was supposed to report harassment complaints. Id. at 109. Next, Byrd contacted Arnita Bonner from DPR’s Human Resources department. Although the precise events that followed are disputed, it appears Byrd was temporarily transferred to a different location. See Pls.’ Reply Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 135-1, at ¶ 106 [“P’s Reply SOF”]; Byrd Dep., [121-24] at 125, 127-28. On April 6, 2005, Byrd filed a complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) describing the harassment she suffered as Thompson’s longtime subordinate. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-25, Ex. 29, [“Byrd EEOC Charge”]. Byrd does not recall receiving any sexual harassment training or information regarding DPR’s sexual harassment policy prior to filing her complaint in 2005. Byrd Decl., 132-19; Byrd Dep. [121-24]. b. The Lerner Investigation and Dismissal of Darnell Thompson On April 7, 2005, the day following Byrd’s EEOC filing, Deborah Jackson, AFGE Local 2741 Union President, wrote a letter to D.C, Council Member Kathy Patterson regarding DPR management’s conscious disregard of Thompson’s persistent, inappropriate behavior. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-35, Ex. 33 [“AFGE Memo”] (“To this day, sexual harassment is on-going and Interim Director Neil Stanley is aware and reluctant to do anything to terminate this seemingly acceptable practice and behavior.”). President Jackson expressed the following concerns on behalf of the AFGE Local 2741: three to six allegations of sexual harassment against the Chief of Facility Maintenance were brought without an internal investigation during Directors Albert and Stanley’s tenures; the Union had repeatedly requested that Thompson be removed from his position; and all of the women who came forward were dismissed from their employment because they were temporary employees. Id. Ms. Patterson contacted Stanley and requested an investigation. See Pls.’ Reply SOF, [135-1] at ¶ 156. Thompson was placed on paid administrative leave, effective April 13, 2005, while an “investigation [was] pending regarding allegations of harassment.” Def.’s Opp’n PMSJ, ECF No. 129, Ex. U. Prompted by external pressure from the AFGE Local 2741 and the D.C. Council, Interim Director Stanley hired private consultant Carolyn Lerner to conduct an independent investigation into Byrd’s complaints “because there had been previous complaints against Thompson, and because of the seriousness of Byrd’s allegations.” Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 121-28, Ex. 26 [“Lerner Report”]. Many employees were interviewed through this process, including those directly implicated and those with peripheral knowledge. Id. A preliminary report issued on June 15, 2005 concluded that “Byrd’s complaint is credible.” Id. at 28. The Lerner Report advised that the termination of Thompson “would be in the best interest of the efficiency of the Department and in the interest of the safety of its employees.” Id. at 28. With regard to further DPR action, Lerner recommended: (1) “the development and Department-wide dissemination of detailed, Department-specific policies on sexual harassment, including procedures for supervisors to follow once they are on notice of a claim and options for employees who witness or are subject to harassment;” (2) “the development of a comprehensive sexual harassment prevention training program;” and (3) “separate training programs for supervisors/managers and employees on preventing and identifying sexual harassment, as well as Department policies and procedures.” Id. Thompson was subsequently fired for “disciplinary reasons” on August 9, 2005. Def.’s Opp’n PMSJ, ECF No. 129, Ex. V. Byrd continued to pursue her allegations with persistent determination despite a noticeable absence of support from her DPR supervisors and co-workers. Accompanied by her attorney, Byrd testified before the D.C. Council on December 8, 2005, explicitly detailing the harassment she endured at Thompson’s hands. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-19, Ex. 22, at ¶ 10 [“Byrd Decl.”]. DPR issued an internal personnel action — notably with an authorization signature dated December 8, 2005 — approving the final expiration of Byrd’s term, which was previously set to expire on December 31, 2005. Byrd’s Personnel File II, [133-1]. On December 29, 2005, Byrd received a letter from Deputy Director Roslyn Johnson notifying her that her employment term would not be extended when it expired. Def.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J., EFC No. 125, Ex. J [“Byrd Termination Letter from DPR”]. Deputy Johnson’s letter noted that Byrd was appointed to the position of Clerical Assistant on May 1, 2002, and that the term’s expiration date was December 31, 2005. Id. According to DPR records, Byrd’s final day at DPR was December 31, 2005. Byrd’s Personnel File II, [133-1], As rumors of Thompson’s behavior became known outside of DPR’s protective infrastructure, Burns, Gaskins, and other employees came forward with their own charges of abuse by Thompson. After speaking with an attorney during the summer of 2005 and contacting DPR for her employment records that fall, Burns filed a complaint with the DCOHR on February 3, 2006 — 746 days after the final expiration of her term. Id. at ¶ 13; Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-25, Ex. 29, [“Burns EEOC Charge”]. Byrd believes that her DPR employment ended because she was the first woman to publically acknowledge the harassment she suffered at DPR. The potential windfall of costly litigation not only implicated Thompson, but also placed the upper echelons of DPR administration under a microscope. 2. Carmen Jean-Baptiste Jean-Baptiste was hired in May of 2006, well after Thompson was fired and investigations of sexual harassment within DPR were underway. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-6, Ex. 5 [“Jean-Baptiste Dep.”] Jean-Baptiste was under the impression that she had been hired for a year-round position upon her placement as a summer lifeguard at the Takoma Pool, but DPR claims it was only a seasonal position set to expire at the end of the summer. Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 99; Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 133-1, Ex. 4 [“Jean-Baptiste Personnel File”]. Early that summer, Jean-Baptiste was assigned to report to Rodney Weaver, Assistant Pool Manager, and Robert Ford, Pool Manager. Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 100-01. According to Jean-Baptiste, Weaver began to engage in sexually harassing and demeaning behaviors, which grew progressively worse. Id. at 122-27. She alleges that Weaver: asked constant questions about her romantic life, asked her out on dates, made lewd comments about her body parts, pulled her hair while simultaneously making sexually suggestive statements, touched her inappropriately, and directed her to get out of the pool while staring at her crotch. Jean-Baptiste says she asked Weaver to stop and told him she would file a complaint if he did not. Id. at 160-64, 168-69, 176-77. After allegedly fruitless complaints to DPR’s Aquatics Director, Harold Houston, Jean-Baptiste complained to Evening Manager Margarita Cruz. Id. at 151, 156, 168-69. Cruz reported the allegations to her supervisors, Pool Managers Ford and Sean Link. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-10, Ex. 9, at 21 [“Cruz Dep.”]. Cruz, Weaver, Ford, and Link held a meeting to discuss Jean-Baptiste’s allegations. Ford told Cruz that he did not believe the complaint and was not going to do anything about it. Id. at 43. After Cruz excused herself from the room, she heard the remaining men joking and laughing about who was going to “successfully seduce” Jean-Baptiste first. Id. at 24. Weaver angrily confronted Jean-Baptiste after the meeting and told her that the accusations could have cost him his job. Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 171-72. She explains that did not report the complaints to Human Resources at that time because Weaver and Ford had threatened to transfer her, write her up for subordination, change her schedule, or have her fired. Id. at 237-38. In mid-June, Ford was demoted and Solomon Robinson was promoted to Area Supervisor. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-8, Ex. 7, at 21 [“Robinson Dep.”]. Robinson and Weaver had been friends for over 15 years. Id. at 8, 10-11, 66. Jean-Baptiste next brought her complaints to Robinson. Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 174-76. Prompted by her accusations, Robinson called both Jean-Baptiste and Weaver into his office and made her state her allegations in front of Weaver. Robinson Dep., [132-8] at 17-19, 23. Weaver did not directly dispute her story. Id. at 24. According to Robinson, summer lifeguards are generally kept on after the summer if their supervisors recommend them. Id. at 52-54. At the end of the summer, Jean-Baptiste was informed that DPR would not retain her past September 29, 2006 or consider her for a permanent lifeguarding position. Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 203. Shocked by this revelation, Jean-Baptiste — who still believed she was a year-round employee — contacted DPR Director Roslyn Johnson and Aquatics Director Harold Houston about her termination and allegations of harassment. Id. at 202-03. Jean-Baptiste was granted a two-week extension of her employment at a different pool to determine whether DPR’s budget would allow for her hire year-round. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-15, Ex. 14 [“Jean-Baptiste and DPR Correspondence”]. During this time, she periodically informed Houston and Interim Director Rodgers of her extensive qualifications to persuade them to continue her employment. Id. On October 14, 2006, she sent an e-mail to Houston, copying Rodgers and the EEOC, naming Weaver as her harasser and informing DPR that she would “be taking legal action to stop harassment.” Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-12, Ex. 11 [“Jean-Baptiste Email to Houston”]. Attached was detailed narrative of her interactions with Weaver and other DPR supervisors between April 2006 and July 2006. Following up on inquiries regarding her employment status, she emailed Rodgers on October 16, 2006 demanding an explanation for her termination and implying that DPR engages in discriminatory employment practices. Jean-Baptiste and DPR Correspondence, [132-15]. A copy of the allegations she emailed on October 14, 2006 was hand-delivered to DPR’s Human Resources department on October 17, 2006, the same day Houston informed Jean-Baptiste that he was “letting her go” and that she no longer worked for DPR. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132-13, Ex. 12 [“DPR Receipt of Hand-Delivery”]; Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 196-97. On October 18, 2006, Jean-Baptiste submitted a formal job application to DPR after meeting with Houston and Rodgers to discuss her desire to continue her employment. Jean-Baptiste Dep., [132-2] at 209-10. Although Jean-Baptiste had previously passed a swim assessment to become a summer lifeguard, Houston suggested that she needed to take another test to dispel rumors of her “weak swimming skills,” which had arisen from Link’s explanation of why Jean-Baptiste was not considered for year-round employment. Id. A swim assessment was conducted on October 19, 2006. Jean-Baptiste and DPR Correspondence, [132-15]. Despite holding water safety instructor certification, American Red Cross lifeguard certification, pool operators’ certification, and water aerobics certification Jean-Baptiste was deemed to have failed. Jean-Baptiste alleges that this assessment was unfairly conducted and deviated from DPR’s usual requirements. Id. She claims that her assessment took place in only twelve feet of water while other employees were assessed in four feet; that she was required to demonstrate back boarding skills not normally required by DPR or the American Red Cross for lifeguard certification; and that employees assigned to assist her with back boarding were improperly trained. Id. Despite the obvious existence of a record of Jean-Baptiste’s skills assessment, DPR did not produce any such record. Id. By October 21, 2006, Jean-Baptiste was informed that her application for continued employment had been rejected. Id. B. Procedural History Byrd independently filed a complaint against the District of Columbia on March 20, 2006. Her two-count action alleged that the District had sexually discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment and taking adverse employment actions in retaliation for her complaints. Pl.’s Compl., Mar. 20, 2006, ECF No. 1. She filed minor amendments to this complaint on June 20, 2006. Pl.’s Am. Compl., June 20, 2006, ECF No. 13. On October 16, 2006, Byrd filed two motions; the first requested leave to file a second amended complaint, adding Burns as a plaintiff, Pl.’s Mot. For Leave to File Second Am. Class Compl., Oct. 16, 2006, ECF No. 24., and the second sought to consolidate her case with Burns v. District of Columbia, Case No. 1:06-CV-01198 (RBW). Pl.’s Mot. Consolidate Related Cases, Oct. 16, 2006, ECF No. 25. The same day, Burns — individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated female DPR employees who were at any point supervised by Thompson — filed a class action suit against the District alleging that it maintains a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment. - Id. at [24-2], Judge Henry H. Kennedy granted Byrd leave to further amend her complaint and referred the Motion to Consolidate to Magistrate Judge Kay for his determination. Kay Order, Nov. 23, 2006, ECF No. 34. Upon receiving permission to amend her complaint, Byrd withdrew her motion for consolidation and jointly filed to dismiss Burns’ separate action. Pl.’s Notice of Withdrawal of Motion, Feb. 27, 2007, ECF No. 43. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Action Complaint asserted that the District had engaged in discrimination against Byrd and similarly situated female employees by maintaining and condoning discriminatory practices in the workplace. The complaint further alleged that because the class members’ claims involved a systematic pattern of discrimination, those claims would be most efficiently resolved together because they implicate common questions of fact concerning DPR’s' policies, procedures, and sexual harassment training. Second Am. Class Action Compl., Nov. 23, 2006, ECF No. 35 at ¶¶ 2, 59-61. The defined class consisted of “all female persons who are working, or have worked, for the District of Columbia’s Department of Parks and Recreation at any time since 2000 to the present,” and was expected by plaintiffs to include over thirty more employees — making joinder impractical. Id. ¶ 57. Plaintiffs subsequently requested leave to file a third amended complaint for the purposes of adding Gaskins and Jean-Baptiste as plaintiffs and withdrawing the class action allegations. Pl.’s Mot. For Leave to File Third Am. Compl., May 11, 2007, ECF No. 44. Magistrate Judge Kay granted leave to file in July of 2005. Kay Mem. Order, July 5, 2007, ECF No. 50. At that stage of the litigation, the Court found there was enough of a logical connection and factual overlap among the four plaintiffs’ claims to sufficiently meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)’s two-prong standard for permissive joinder. Id. at 6-7. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Kay found that (1) plaintiffs’ claims all allegedly arose from the same series of transactions through a company-wide practice of systematic discrimination; and (2) their claims all involve common questions of law and fact. Id. He also concluded that defendant’s judicial efficiency concerns that were raised before the discovery phase of litigation were premature. Id. at 8. The court did recognize the future possibility that jury confusion would cause undue prejudice to the District, but shelved that concern until the facts of the case became more fully developed. Id. Concluding that the present benefits and efficiency served by joinder during discovery outweighed any later risk of prejudice, the Court did not foreclose the District from later seeking severance. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint includes seven individual causes of action against the District. Third Am. Compl., July 5, 2007, ECF No. 41. The plaintiffs bring all the counts on behalf of all four women with the exception of Count VII, which they bring solely on behalf of Byrd and Jean-Baptiste. Specifically, plaintiffs bring the following counts: Count I: Plaintiffs allege that the District illegally subjected them to a hostile working environment, sexual harassment, and quid pro quo discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Count II: Identical to Count I, but brought under the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C.Code § 1401. Count III: Plaintiffs allege that the District violated their Fifth Amendment rights, via governmental policies or customs that tolerate ongoing sexual harassment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count IV: Plaintiffs allege that the District unlawfully retaliated against them for complaining about sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII. Count V: Identical to Count IV, but brought under the DCHRA. Count VI: Plaintiffs allege that the District violated their First Amendment rights protecting speech by retaliating against them for complaining about sex discrimination, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count VII: Byrd and Jean-Baptiste allege the District retaliated against them for complaining about sex discrimination, in violation of the D.C. Whistle-blowers Protection Act (“DCPWA”), D.C.Code § 1-615.52. In August 2007, the District moved to dismiss portions of the plaintiffs’ action. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, Aug. 6, 2007, ECF No. 54. In March 2008, Judge Kennedy granted in part and denied in part the District’s motion. Kennedy Mem. Op., Mar. 13, 2008, ECF No. 71. Having considered the District’s arguments concerning Burns and Gaskins’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court dismissed Burns and Gaskins’ DCHRA claims for exceeding the one-year statute of limitations for filing suit. But the Court allowed their Title VII claims to proceed with further discovery to determine if any factual basis existed for excusal from the time limits. Id. at 5-9. In October 2009, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment seeking (1) judgment on Burns, Byrd, and Gaskins’ Title VII and Byrd’s DCHRA hostile work environment claims; or alternatively (2) a finding that the District may not assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability with respect to those claims; and lastly (3) judgment for Burns, Byrd, and Gaskins’ Section 1983 claims through the Fifth Amendment. Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., Oct. 9, 2009, ECF No. 121, [“PMSJ”]. The District opposed plaintiffs’ motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on (1) all of Gaskins and Burns’ Title VII claims for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies; (2) Byrd, Burns, Gaskins, and Jean-Baptiste’s Title VII and DCHRA retaliation claims; (3) Byrd and Jean-Baptiste’s DCWPA retaliation claims; and lastly (4) all Section 1983 claims. Def.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J., Oct. 16, 2009, ECF No. 123, [“DMSJ”]. Not long after these motions were fully briefed, the District filed a motion asking the court to sever the action into four separate actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, or alternatively order four separate trials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42. Def.’s Mot. Sever, Sept. 16, 2010, ECF No. 155 [“DMSA”]. The case was reassigned to this Court on May 4, 2011. III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Courts grant summary judgment when the “materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)-(c). This standard requires more than the mere existence of some factual dispute between the parties to defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). A fact is material if, under the substantive law applicable to the case, it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id. A dispute is a “genuine” for summary judgment purposes if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Doe v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 706 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). In seeking summary judgment, the moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those potions [of the evidence in the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once this burden has been met, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [her] own affidavits, or by [the evidence in the record] designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quotations omitted). The non-moving party’s opposition “must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Doe, 706 F.Supp.2d at 5; see also Freedman v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 845 (D.C.Cir.2001) (holding that plaintiff must have more than “a scintilla of evidence to support [her] claims”). In other words, the non-moving party is required to point to evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor. Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987). Additionally, because “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inference from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,” the “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where cross-motions for summary judgment are at issue, the question for the Court is whether the evidence presented by either side is such that no material issue of fact remains. Fowler v. Dist. of Columbia, 404 F.Supp.2d 206, 209 (D.D.C.2005). Because it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish proof in cases involving discrimination, the D.C. Circuit has instructed district courts to view summary judgment motions with special caution, applying a heightened degree of scrutiny. Turner v. Dist. of Columbia, 383 F.Supp.2d 157, 166 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citing Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879-80 (D.C.Cir.1997)); see also Thomas v. Vilsack, 718 F.Supp.2d 106, 115 (D.D.C. 2010); Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 124 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2000). IV. ANALYSIS A. Title VII and DCHRA Claims Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating against its employees in hiring decisions, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of an individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A claim of sexual harassment is cognizable under the Act if it explicitly or constructively alters the terms or conditions of an individual’s employment. Curry v. Dist. of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C.Cir.1999). Because it is well-established that the DCHRA and Title VII employment discrimination actions are evaluated under the same legal standard, the following analysis applies, to both claims where implicated. See, e.g., Elhusseini v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 578 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 n. 4 (D.D.C.2008) (“[W]hen construing the DCHRA courts should look to precedent construing Title VII.”); Regan v. Grill Concepts-D.C., Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 131, 134 (D.D.C.2004). 1. Gaskins and Burns may not pursue their Title VII claims against the District because they failed to properly exhaust their administrative remedies or provide any basis to waive the procedural requirements The District argues the Court should grant judgment in its favor with respect to Burns and Gaskins’ Title VII claims because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by timely filing a complaint with D.C. Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) or the EEOC. Burns and Gas-kins concede that they did not make a charge within the 300-day deadline from the date of the discrimination — the last day of their individual employment at DPR. Thus, the only issue here is whether the Court should apply its equitable discretion to toll the statute of limitations. Before filing a Title VII suit against an employer, an employee must adequately exhaust her administrative remedies within the manner and time limits prescribed by statute. Baird v. Snowbarger, 744 F.Supp.2d 279, 286 (D.D.C. 2010). Due to a work sharing agreement between the EEOC and the DCOHR, an employee in the District of Columbia is required to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of alleged discrimination. Tucker v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 764 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564, 568-69 n. 13 (D.C.2007)). The procedural requirements governing a plaintiffs right to bring a Title VTI claim are “part and parcel of the congressional design” to give employers an opportunity to first handle matters internally whenever possible, and to ensure that federal courts are burdened only when reasonably necessary. Winston v. Clough, 712 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2010) (internal citations omitted); see also Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (“Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of ... sympathy for particular litigants.”). At the same time, administrative time limits created by the EEOC do not create a jurisdictional bar to bringing a Title VII suit, but function as a statute of limitations. Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997). A plaintiffs untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus an affirmative defense, and the defendant first bears the burden of proving the inadequacy of the plaintiffs actions. Id. The plaintiff then bears the burden of pleading and proving facts supporting any reason for an equitable extension of administrative time limits. Hines v. Bair, 594 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Armstrong v. Reno, 172 F.Supp.2d 11, 21 (D.D.C.2001)). It is solely within judicial discretion to apply equitable considerations to excuse a plaintiffs failure to meet administrative time limits. Smith-Haynie v. Dist. of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C.Cir.1998). Title VU’s remedial purpose permits time limits to be “subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling ‘when equity so requires.’ ” Winston, 712 F.Supp.2d at 7 (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). The D.C. Circuit has firmly established that this discretion is applied sparingly and exercised only in “extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances.” Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 579 (citing Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Under specific circumstances, a court may alternatively apply the “single filing exception” to allow a plaintiff who failed to adhere to administrative requirements to vicariously exhaust her filing responsibilities via another plaintiffs timely filed EEOC claim. Brooks v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., 606 F.3d 800, 807 (D.C.Cir.2010) (citing Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C.Cir.1981)). Counsels’ arguments, and select applicable jurisprudence, conflate the equitable tolling and equitable estoppel doctrines. Although both operate in a practical sense to toll a limitations period, each has distinct criteria; “[wjhereas equitable tolling allows a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the limitations period if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim, equitable estoppel prevents a defendant from asserting untimeliness where the defendant has taken active steps to prevent the plaintiff from litigating in time.” Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C.Cir.1998) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)) (emphasis in original) (citing Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 579). a. Burns failed to exhaust her administrative remedies or produce sufficient evidence for equitable avoidance Burns filed an EEOC complaint on February 3, 2006, more then 700 days after the expiration of her last term of employment. Burns argues that she failed to timely file due to DPR’s actions (or inactions), and that the 300-day time limit should toll until she first learned of Title VII via her attorney in August 2005. Burns urges the Court to extend the time period during which she was permitted to file a charge by applying the doctrine of equitable tolling, or alternatively, equitable estoppel. Because equitable tolling permits the extension of the limitations period if a plaintiff lacked information essential to her claim, Burns argues that her unawareness of either a legal right to redress or the time limit restraining an ability to do, prevented her from timely filing a complaint. See, e.g., Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 579 (finding the equitable tolling doctrine encompasses cases where a plaintiff was unable to obtain information because of a disability) (citing Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir.1990)). She contends that her ignorance was a consequence of DPR’s failure to conspicuously post required EEOC notices or otherwise inform its employees of federal laws and procedures protecting them from harassment. Thus, she argues, administrative requirements should be tolled until she was educated of her rights. Burns is partially correct: employers do have a statutory duty to post EEOC notices. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-10(a)-(b). But this Circuit has yet to squarely address in what circumstances a non-federal employer’s violation of EEOC posting requirements affects the application of common law equitable tolling principles. Burns urges the Court to follow other circuits’ holdings that an employer’s failure to post EEOC notices tolls the filing deadline. See, e.g., Mercado v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, Spa & Casino, 410 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir.2005) (“[W]here appellants have asserted that no informational notices were posted and that they had no knowledge of them legal rights until informed by their attorney, they have met the threshold requirements for avoiding dismissal of their Title VII suit.”); accord EEOC v. Ky. State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086, 1096 (6th Cir.1996); Callowhill v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 832 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir.1987); McClinton v. Ala. By-Prod. Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir.1984). In response, the District emphasizes that courts that have permitted tolling due to a violation of federal posting requirements have done so only until a plaintiff had actual knowledge of her rights or retained an attorney. Id. In this instance, the parties disagree over the extent and nature of Burns’ knowledge; while the District argues that she generally knew of her right to seek legal redress, Burns asserts that she only knew that Thompson’s behavior was wrong, and not illegal. The Court need not speculate about the distinctions in Burns’ mind as to the quality of wrongness — legal or moral— of the discrimination she allegedly suffered, because her requests must be denied in light of her failure to meet the due diligence requirement for equitable tolling. See generally Norman v. United States, 467 F.3d 773, 776 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (1990)). The Supreme Court applies equitable tolling “only sparingly” and generally denies relief where a plaintiff has “failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (citing Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723). Even assuming that Burns did not specifically know of her legal right to file suit, she did not take reasonable steps to obtain the knowledge she lacked. Burns felt as though DPR had ignored her complaints and had retaliated against her because of them, but she did not attempt to follow up with anyone at DPR or any other organization after making her initial complaints. See Johnson v. Holder, 598 F.Supp.2d 50, 54 (D.D.C.2009) (explaining that a plaintiffs failure to act on suspicions that he had been a victim of harassment was sufficient to start the clock on the applicable filing deadline). After she spoke with Albert in 2002, no one from DPR contacted Burns regarding her complaint, leading her to conclude that DPR had not conducted an investigation and did not take her complaint seriously. Despite feeling greatly wronged, Burns made no effort to further inquire about the status of her complaint or to follow up with the AFGE Local 2741 or Project Arise staff during the time she continued to work for DPR after the incident. More then a year after her termination from DPR, Burns sought counsel in August 2005. It was at this time that she claims to have first learned that “she had legal rights protecting her from sexual harassment” and promptly “proceeded with due diligence to pursue them.” Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132, at 7. Despite being newly enlightened as to the illegality of discrimination, Burns waited over three months until November 2005 to contact DPR and request her personnel records and records of her internal complaint. She then waited until February 3, 2006 to file her charge with the EEOC — 746 days after her last day at DPR, 466 days after the lapse of the filing deadline, and nearly four years after the April 2002 incident in Thompson’s office. Considering this timeline and the circumstances surrounding Burns’ complaints, the facts do not amount to “extraordinary and carefully circumscribed circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1057. Although DPR defaulted on its statutory duties and arguably failed to effectively respond to Burns’ complaints, an employee may not remain complacent in the face of discrimination, nor is she relieved of a duty to diligently pursue her charges. See Marshall v. Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc., 536 F.Supp.2d 59, 68 (D.D.C.2008) (concluding that even if the plaintiff was misinformed, due diligence was not established where the plaintiff filed 735 days after the discriminatory act and 435 days after the lapse of the limitations period); see generally Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723. The Court must draw the line at some point; in this instance, Burns simply waited too long. Turning to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the general rule is that a defendant must engage in “affirmative misconduct” for equitable estoppel to apply. Moore v. Chertoff, 424 F.Supp.2d 145, 150 (D.D.C.2006); White v. Geithner, 602 F.Supp.2d 35, 38 (D.D.C.2009) (requiring a plaintiff to “come forward with specific proof of an employer’s affirmative acts or misleading statements that prevented her from filing an EEO complaint.” (quoting Klugel v. Small, 519 F.Supp.2d 66, 73 (D.D.C.2007))). According to Burns, the “affirmative action” that prevented her from asserting her legal rights was DPR’s intentional withholding of information. On this line of reasoning, DPR’s “multiple acts of wrongdoing” include: failing to post requisite EEOC notices, failing to disseminate any sexual harassment policy, and failing to respond to Burns’ complaints or inform her how to proceed with an EEOC charge. Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132, at 16. Even assuming that all of these assertions are true, DPR’s deficient employment practices — while unwise and perhaps unjust — do not amount to affirmative misconduct. This Court has applied equitable estoppel when an employer’s actions interfered with an employee’s complaints; here, DPR’s inaction allegedly prevented Burns from filing a complaint. See, e.g., Smith-Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d 123, 132 (D.D.C.2009) (“Such misconduct typically involves ‘acts of wrongdoing such as hiding evidence or promising not to rely on a statute of limitations defense.’ ” (quoting Hedrich v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 274 F.3d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir.2001))); Currier, 159 F.3d at 1368 (“[Ejmployer’s affirmatively misleading statements that a grievance will be resolved in the employee’s favor can establish an equitable estoppel.”); Sanders v. Veneman, 131 F.Supp.2d 225, 230 (D.D.C.2001) (applying equitable estoppel where a plaintiffs supervisor made repeated promises of an eventual promotion). Burns relies on the holding in Smith-Thompson to support her claim for estoppel, arguing that both she and the plaintiff in that case lacked legal counsel yet “proceeded diligently in their attempts to protect their rights despite their lack of knowledge of how to do so.” Pls.’ Opp’n DMSJ, ECF No. 132, at 17. But Burns omits a key factor in the Smith-Thompson court’s reasoning: the plaintiff alleged that her employer told her that she was not allowed to file a complaint elsewhere prior to following internal grievance procedures. 657 F.Supp.2d at 133. Viewing the facts most favorable to Burns, the Court cannot find that DPR actively did anything to mislead or misinform Burns, and therefore will not apply equitable estoppel, b. Gaskins failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and did not produce sufficient evidence for equitable avoidance or vicarious exhaustion Gaskins, whose DPR employment was terminated in March 2005, never filed an EEOC complaint before joining this lawsuit. She asks the Court to similarly apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or alternatively to permit her to “piggyback” on Byrd’s EEOC filing under the “single filing exception.” Although the D.C. Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of whether equitable estoppel is available to plaintiffs who never file a complaint with the EEOC, a court in this district very recently concluded that it is. Dahlman v. American Ass’n of Retired Persons, 791 F.Supp.2d 68, 75-76, 2011 WL 2383966 at *5 (June 13, 2011 D.D.C.) (finding that a Court may consider equitable excuses even when a plaintiff failed to file any complaint with the EEOC). This Court need not address the question, however, because the outcome will be the same: Gaskins cannot invoke equitable estoppel. Following the same reasoning outlined above, DPR did not engage in any affirmative action or misconduct to mislead Gaskins as to her legal rights. Indeed, when Gaskins called Interim Director Stanley and threatened to take legal action days after her termination, his response was to “go get a lawyer.” Gaskins Dep. [121-19] at 74:12-20. Gaskins’ claims that DPR prevented her from pursuing litigation, or lulled her into a state of inaction by failing to instruct her of her legal rights, are thus unpersuasive. As explained above, the ordinary rule requires a plaintiff to individually lodge a timely complaint with the EEOC or offer a basis for an equitable excuse for the time limit. However, the “single-filing exception,” aka “vicarious exhaustion,” allows a non-filing party to join the lawsuit of a filing party if she possesses claims against the same defendant “so similar to those asserted by the original plaintiff that no purpose would be served by requiring them to file independent charges.” Brooks, 606 F.3d at 807 (citing Foster, 655 F.2d at 1323). The similarity of two claims is evaluated for whether the original filing performs the principal notice function of the EEOC filing requirement, thus rendering a second filing by a similarly situated plaintiff unnecessary and wasteful. See Moore, 424 F.Supp.2d at 150. An original claim must: (1) put the employer-defendant on notice of all charges by the similarly situated plaintiff, and (2) provide the employer and the EEOC with an opportunity for administrative consolidation and resolution. Foster, 655 F.2d at 1322 (applying the single-filing exception where similarly situated litigants alleged the same discriminatory treatment as the basis of their claims, making two EEOC charges redundant). In sum, where complaints differ such that there is a real possibility that one claim may be settled administratively while the other may be resolved only in the courts, plaintiffs must file separate EEOC charges. See, e.g., Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1466 (D.C.Cir.1985) (allowing vicarious exhaustion where there was no possibility that only one claim could be settled administratively because both plaintiffs needed to demonstrate the same pattern of racial discrimination in promotion and advancement to prove their allegations). Gaskins and Byrd’s complaints are not sufficiently similar to support the single-filing exception. They allege that they are “victims of the same discriminatory practices” because (1) both woman were harassed through “repeated instances of forced sexual touching and intercourse upon threats of termination” inflicted by the same supervisor; (2) the harassment occurred at the approximate same time; and (3) both were unlawfully terminated in retaliation for reporting and resisting the harassment. Because Gaskins was named as a potential victim in the Lerner Report — which was later submitted to the EEOC in relation to Byrd’s claims on June 22, 2006 — Gaskins contends that DPR was on notice of her forthcoming complaints of sexual harassment and knew that it was subject to potential liability. But the Court agrees with the District’s argument that the EEOC charge and the Lerner Report are not precise enough to serve the purposes of vicarious exhaustion because they did not put the District on notice of the extent of Gaskins’ alleg