Full opinion text
OPINION J. FREDERICK MOTZ, District Judge. Plaintiff Dennis Glynn (“Glynn”) filed suit against Defendants, Impact Science & Technology, Inc. (“1ST”) and EDO Corporation (“EDO”), on June 21, 2007, alleging, inter alia, retaliation in violation of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), post-termination FCA retaliation, declaratory judgment, and a Haddle claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). In turn, 1ST filed counterclaims against Glynn and Saltwhistle Technology, LLC (“SWT”) on April 11, 2008, which would eventually include breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, defamation, tortious interference, violation of New Hampshire’s consumer protection statute, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Now pending is Glynn and SWT’s Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that this Court enter judgment that as a matter of law, Glynn engaged in protected activity and there is direct evidence of retaliation against Glynn by 1ST. In addition, Glynn and SWT move for summary judgment on IST’s breach of the Employment Agreement (Count I), breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”) (Count II), misappropriation of trade secrets (Count III), breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV), conversion (Count V), tortious interference (Count VII), violation of New Hampshire’s consumer protection statute (Count VIII), unjust enrichment (Count IX), and civil conspiracy (Count XI) counterclaims. Also pending is IST’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs FCA retaliation (Count I), post-termination FCA retaliation (Count V), declaratory judgment (Count VI), and Haddle (Count VII) causes of action, as well as summary judgment on IST’s breach of contract (Counts I and II) and tortious interference with advantageous relations (Count VII) counterclaims. A hearing on these motions was held on July 15, 2011. For the following reasons, I deny Glynn’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the protected activity and retaliation claims, and I grant IST’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Glynn’s FCA retaliation, post-termination FCA retaliation, declaratory judgment, and Haddle claims (Counts I, V, VI, and VII). I also grant summary judgment to 1ST on its counterclaim for breach of the Employment Agreement (Count I), and deny its Motion for Summary Judgment as to its counterclaims for breach of the APA and tortious interference (Counts II and VII). I grant summary judgment to Glynn on IST’s counterclaims for breach of the APA, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy (Counts II, IV, V, VII, IX, and XI), and deny Glynn’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to IST’s counterclaims for breach of the Employment Agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and violation of New Hampshire’s consumer protection statute (Counts I, III, and VIII). The result of this decision is that solely IST’s counterclaims for misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, and violation of New Hampshire’s consumer protection statute (Counts III, VI, and VIII) survive summary judgment and will proceed to trial. I. Background A. Glynn began working for 1ST in February 2004 after 1ST acquired Dedicated Electronics, Inc. (“DEI”), a privately held company owned, in part, by Glynn. (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 17, 78.) Glynn worked as a Principal Engineer for 1ST, in the Information Warfare Group (“IW Group”), with the primary responsibility of designing various modules and components for IST’s Mobile Multi-Band Jammer systems (“MMBJs”), which counter Improvised Explosive Devices (“IEDs”) by interfering with signals sent to trigger the IEDs. (See id., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 17-19, 21.) Each MMBJ system contains a component part known as a “module,” which is designed to emit a radiofrequency that jams the receivers of nearby IEDs and prevents them from receiving signals that would cause them to detonate. As 1ST continued to tweak and develop its designs over the years, it regularly created updated versions of the modules used in its counter-IED (“C-IED”) systems. For example, an earlier module, known as the MBTNS module, was used by 1ST until 2005. At that point, an updated module design, the DDS module, was introduced to replace the MBTNS module. (Id., Ex. 45, 1ST Dep. 181:9-183:1, Nov. 17, 2010.) Although the DDS module was thought to be superior to the MBTNS module in terms of performance, it'encountered “producibility issues” and was replaced by the DRU module in 2007. (Id., Ex. 55, Murrin Dep. 154:7-155:20, Nov. 16, 2010.) The DRU module was used by 1ST “into the 2008 time frame and possibly beyond.” (Id., Ex. 45, IST Dep. 183:14-15.) Beginning in 2004, Glynn alleges that he became concerned with the C-IED technology 1ST was developing because Glynn believed the MMBJ devices would fail under extreme temperatures. (See id., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 22-23.) Glynn claims that he brought his concerns to the attention of his supervisors and 1ST management at various points throughout 2004, 2005, and 2006. (Id., Ex. .1 ¶¶ 23, 25, 31, 37-39.) On September 13, 2006, Glynn contacted the U.S. Attorney’s office to raise his concerns. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 59.) Glynn also met with a government investigator from the Department of Defense (“DOD”) (id, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 60-66), prompting DOD personnel to make an unannounced visit to 1ST to test IST’s products in October 2006. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 68.) On December 14, 2006, 1ST terminated Glynn’s employment. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 94.) The reasons for this termination are the subject of intense dispute: 1ST alleges Glynn engaged in “continued and escalating bad behavior,” creating a “toxic” environment, “all while exhibiting pervasive negativity, disrespect, and insubordination at 1ST.” (1ST Mem. 1.) Glynn alleges he was terminated by 1ST in retaliation for his whistleblowing. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.) B. At the commencement of his. employment at 1ST, Glynn entered into an Employment Agreement which, among other things, included noncompete, nonsolicitation, and nondisclosure provisions. (See IST’s Rule 56 Statement of Facts at ¶ 36). The terms of these provisions expressly stated that they would remain in effect beyond the termination of Glynn’s employment with 1ST. (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 37, Employment Agreement §§ 6, 7.) On January 4, 2007, approximately three weeks after his termination, Glynn incorporated Saltwhistle Technology, LLC, his own company that, like 1ST, focused on designing C-IED devices for use by the United States government. (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 9, Saltwhistle Technology Press Release.) Over the next two years, Glynn and SWT collaborated with Foster-Miller Inc. (“FMI”) to secure two government contracts to supply C-IED devices to Naval Sea Systems Command (“NAVSEA”), a specific acquisition group within DOD. (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 15, FMI Dep. 106:2-109:13, June 18, 2008.) Around the time that Glynn was setting up SWT, 1ST began attempts to recover copies of proprietary electronic files that had been retained by Glynn after his termination. Following a court-ordered computer forensics protocol, which involved a search of Glynn’s computers, hard drives, and storage devices, 1ST eventually recovered numerous 1ST files with titles such as “1ST — Transceivers,” “1ST — NOISE-SOURCE — MODULE,” and “1ST — MUL-TI-BAND — TUNABLE—NOISE-SOURCE.” (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 118, Fowler Decl. ¶ 53.) The protocol also turned up copies of DEI design schematics and a file entitled “dei library,” which clearly dated back to Glynn’s prior company, DEI, that was sold to 1ST in 2004.(Id.) C. On June 21, 2007, Glynn filed suit against 1ST alleging retaliation under the FCA and wrongful discharge. (See Compl. ¶¶ 79-97.) On April 11, 2008, 1ST filed counterclaims against Glynn and SWT. (ECF. No. 60.) IST’s claims would eventually include breach of contract (Counts I and II), misappropriation of trade secrets (Count III), breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV), conversion (Count V), defamation (Count VI), tortious interference (Count VII), violation of New Hampshire’s consumer protection statute (Count VIII), unjust enrichment (Count IX), and civil conspiracy (Count XI). (See 1ST Mot. Leave to File Second Am. Countered. and Cross-cls., Ex. C, ECF No. 145.) II. Standard of Review Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility,” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.2002), but the court also must abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). III. Glynn’s Claims Glynn moves this Court for summary judgment on “several issues related to Glynn’s retaliation claims.” (Glynn Mem. 1.) Specifically, Glynn requests that this Court enter judgment that as a matter of law, Glynn engaged in protected activity and there is direct evidence of retaliation against Glynn by 1ST. (See Glynn’s Proposed Order 1-2, Ex. 59.) At the same time, 1ST moves this Court for summary judgment on all of the claims in Glynn’s Fourth Amended Complaint that have survived my earlier rulings: FCA Retaliation (Count I), Post-Termination FCA Retaliation (Count V), declaratory judgment (Count VI), and Haddle claim (Count VII). I take up each of these claims separately. A. FCA Retaliation (Count I) The FCA is a statutory scheme designed to discourage fraud against the federal government. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir.1994). It was promulgated during the Civil War in response to contractors who perpetrated “massive frauds” against the Union Army, and continues to serve as a safeguard against unscrupulous government contractors. See Wilkins v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 314 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir.2002). The key provision of the FCA prohibits any person from presenting “a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). There are two enforcement mechanisms to police this prohibition. First, the Attorney General can bring a civil action to remedy violations of § 3729. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). Second, a private party can bring a qui tam action, which is an action brought in the name of the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 412, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 162 L.Ed.2d 390 (2005). Congress amended the FCA in 1986, adding an anti-retaliation provision to protect whistleblowers. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-562, § 4, 100 Stat. 3153, 3157-58. The relevant part of this provision states: Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The purpose of § 3730(h), or the whistleblower provision, is to promote enforcement of the FCA by “assur[ing] those who may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retaliatory acts.” S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 34 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5299 (1986). In amending the FCA, Congress sought “to halt companies and individuals from using the threat of economic retaliation to silence ‘whistleblowers.’ ” Id. Accordingly, section 3730(h) creates a cause of action for employees who experience retaliation for their efforts to prevent contractor fraud against the United States. Employees seeking to bring a cause of action under § 3730(h) must meet three elements derived from the statutory text. Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., 630 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir.2010). An “employee must prove that (1) he took acts in furtherance of a qui tam suit [i.e., engaged in protected activity]; (2) his employer knew of these acts; and (3) his employer took adverse action against him as a result of these acts.” Id. In the instant action, all three elements are at issue and, therefore, are discussed in turn. 1. Protected Activity Glynn claims that he engaged in protected activity by “performing an investigation of IST’s submission of defective MMBJ devices to [United States Special Operations Command (“SOCOM”) ], opposing IST’s submission of false claims to SO-COM, [and] initiating government investigations of IST’s fraudulent conduct....” (Glynn Mem. 7.) 1ST flatly denies that Glynn engaged in protected activity, maintaining that Glynn never subjectively believed that he was investigating fraud or false claims by 1ST (1ST Reply 14), any concerns of fraud that Glynn now claims he had were not objectively reasonable (id. at 15-22), and the disclosures Glynn made to the Government were not objectively reasonable (id. at 22). For purposes of the FCA whistle-blower provisions, to take action in furtherance of an FCA claim, a plaintiff-employee need not actually file a qui tam suit. Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 867 (4th Cir.1999). Perhaps the most typical conduct that is considered action in furtherance of an FCA claim occurs when a plaintiff investigates conduct by his employer. See Eberhardt, 167 F.3d 861 (4th Cir.1999) (plaintiff formally investigated fraudulent billings); United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731 (D.C.Cir.1998) (plaintiff collected evidence from other employees to corroborate his claims of false billing and took pictures of property that plaintiff believed was being appropriated for personal use). Of course, investigation is not the only manner in which an employee can act in furtherance of an FCA claim, Section 3730(h) contains a non-exhaustive list of actions that employees may take, including, “investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Courts draw the line, however, when plaintiffs simply report their concerns to a supervisor, finding that such conduct does not raise a “distinct possibility” of a suit under the FCA. See Zahodnick v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 914 (4th Cir.1997) (plaintiff who reported his co-workers’ false billings to his supervisor did not take acts “in furtherance of a qui tam suit” as “the record disclosed that [he] merely informed a supervisor of the problem and sought confirmation that a correction was made.... Simply reporting his concern of a mischarging to the government to his supervisor does not suffice to establish that Zahodnick was acting ‘in furtherance of a qui tam action”); McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 516 (6th Cir.2000) (plaintiff who informed supervisors, union stewards, and BellSouth auditors about the falsification of repair records was not engaged in protected activity because “[although internal reporting may constitute protected activity, the internal reports must allege fraud on the government” and legal action was not a reasonable or distinct possibility where the plaintiff was “merely reporting wrongdoing to supervisors”). An employee-plaintiff claiming protected activity must show not only that his acts were in furtherance of an FCA claim, rather than mere reporting of concerns to supervisors, but also that these acts raised a “distinct possibility” of a qui tam suit. Id. at 515 (citations omitted); see also Eberhardt, 167 F.3d at 870 (adopting the “distinct possibility” standard in the Fourth Circuit). The “distinct possibility” standard serves a gatekeeping function, permitting only “situations in which litigation could be filed legitimately” and excluding those in which “an employee ... fabricates a tale of fraud to extract concessions from the employer, or ... just imagines fraud but lacks proof.” Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir.1994), abrogated, on other grounds by Graham Cnty., 545 U.S. at 416-17, 125 S.Ct. 2444. “The distinct possibility standard is an objective one.... [T]he consensus view is that this standard requires that protected activity relate to company conduct that involves an objectively reasonable possibility of an FCA action.” Mann, 630 F.3d at 344. Although the distinct possibility standard is objective, it is applied from the perspective of the employee at the time of the alleged protected activity. See id. Analysis of the protected activity element of an FCA retaliation action can thus be distilled to the requirement that an employee-plaintiff make two showings: (1) the employee took action in furtherance of an FCA claim that (2) raised a distinct possibility of suit, from the perspective of the employee at the time. Here, Glynn claims that he engaged in protected activity by: (i) investigating and opposing IST’s provision of defective MMBJ devices to SOCOM, (ii) investigating and opposing IST’s false certification of compliance with the requirements in the MMBJ contract, and (iii) initiating government investigations of IST’s fraudulent conduct. (Glynn Mem. 7.) a. IST’s provision of “defective” MMBJ devices to SOCOM Though the archetypal qui tam action is filed by an employee who discovers that his employer has falsely billed under a government contract, FCA actions have also been sustained in situations where a contractor knowingly supplies the government a substandard product. See United States v. Aerodex, 469 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir.1973) (contractor supplying deliberately mislabeled aircraft bearings to Navy that did not meet the specifications required by contract was liable for full amount of contract under the FCA). Glynn therefore claims that his investigation of the performance of the MMBJ-la devices at high temperatures is protected activity under § 3780(h). (Glynn Mem. 8.) In stating that conclusion, Glynn skips the intermediate but necessary steps of demonstrating that he was in fact engaged in an investigation and that this investigation raised a distinct possibility of an FCA suit. Therefore, the first inquiry is whether Glynn’s actions, expressing concerns about the performance of a device to his supervisors and suggesting a recall, can be characterized as an investigation of company conduct. Or whether, consistent with the Zahodnick and McKenzie opinions, Glynn was simply reporting concerns to his supervisors. If Glynn was investigating company conduct, the follow-up inquiry is whether that conduct raised a distinct possibility of an FCA action from Glynn’s perspective at the time he was performing the investigation. With regard to Glynn’s actions, there is no dispute that Glynn was vocal about his temperature testing concerns. Glynn claims he began reporting his concerns about the impact of high temperatures on the performance of the MMBJ devices as early as 2004. (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 357:5-357:15, June 30, 2008.) On August 23, 2005, Glynn wrote an email to Program Manager, Mike Caprario; Head of the IW Group, Dean Puzzo; and Lead Systems Engineer, Scott Traurig regarding power amplifier testing that Glynn had been conducting. Glynn reported that, [wjithin a few minutes after the RF is turned on the temperature of the plate the amplifier is mounted to gets hot. Since the MMBJ units already have temperature sensors located close to the power amps, a simple confidence test (software only) could be developed that would measure the temperature rise in the power amps when the RF was turned on.... It is my recommendation that a test of this nature be developed and shipped with the systems as quickly as possible. This will give the operator the means to evaluate if the system is functional out in the field. (Id., Ex. 19.) Glynn continued to raise his concerns about the performance of the MMBJ units at high temperatures in 2006. (See id., Ex. 10, Caprario Dep. 119:8-120:10, June 17, 2008; Ex. 20, Murrin Dep. 47:5-9, Nov. 16, 2010; Ex. 8, Traurig Dep. 48:17-49:18, July 23, 2008.) 1ST first performed the temperature testing that Glynn recommended in June 2006. (1ST Rule 56 Statement Facts ¶ 59.) 1ST responds that many of the decisions its management made regarding temperature testing boiled down to “producibility,” which is distinct from performance. Producibility refers to the cost-effective rate at which a module or system can be produced such that it passes all tests on the first pass without need for rework. (1ST Mem. 4.) Indeed, both 1ST and Glynn were concerned with producibility. Glynn explained during his deposition that though 1ST required that the MBTNS module be tested at 85 degrees Celsius, Glynn had instructed one of the employees he supervised to pass the MBTNS modules at less than 85 degrees Celsius. (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 61, Glynn Dep. 395:13— 396:15, June 30, 2008.) Glynn did so in order to increase producibility. (Id. at 395:13-396:15.) Because some MBTNS modules were failing their RF output level requirements, in June 2006, 1ST performed testing on the MMBJ devices to determine whether there was adequate RF output power on the A, B, and E-bands. (Id., Ex. 61, Glynn Dep. 398:3-399:5; Ex. 51, Traurig Dep. 32:12-33:6, July 23, 2008.) The tests revealed that though the MMBJ systems met the internal 1ST and government specifications at the system level, many MBTNS modules were failing their module test before going to system level assembly because the E-band level was not driving the output power amplifier appropriately, while the A- and B-bands were likely being overdriven. (See id., Ex. 61, Glynn Dep. 398:3-399:13; Ex. 51, Traurig Dep. 171:16-172:13.) As a result, “[t]here was a change made to the MBTNS module whereby a particular component was added into the design to provide improved producibility.... [I]t involved placing a temperature-sensitive component into the — into the path that involves the generation of the E-band signal.” (Id., Ex. 51, Traurig Dep. 35:3-6, 19-22.) An Engineering Change Order (“ECO”) was issued to add this temperature-sensitive component to the MBTNS, making the MBTNS module and the MMBJ device more producible. (Id., Ex. 51, Traurig Dep. 35:16-22.) 1ST asserts that it did not inform SOCOM of this ECO because it only affected producibility, not performance, and it was IST’s practice to only inform the government of ECO’s that affect performance. (See id., Ex. 76, December 12, 2006 email from 1ST to members of SOCOM documenting a discussion that “as agreed, [DOD-SOCOM is] to receive notification of any significant ECO, i.e., an ECO that changes unit performance in some manner. [DOD-SOCOM] will not be receiving ECOs ... unless they change unit performance.”) Glynn told Caprario that based on test data, 1ST should recall the units. (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 418:1-419:7; Id., Ex. 25, Dokmo Dep. 83:1-6, June 18, 2008.) 1ST concluded there was no need to recall the MMBJ-la systems, however, because all the shipped systems and their MBTNS modules had been fully tested. (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 51, Traurig Dep. 36:14-18.) That is, while testing demonstrated that the producibility could be increased, the performance of the systems that had already been shipped had not been compromised and 1ST concluded there was no reason for a recall. It is important to consider the context: the MMBJ devices were part of a quick-reaction design, development, and deployment process that was subject to continuous improvement. In the engineering field, it is common practice to continually improve and modify a device or system in order to provide a better product. (See, e.g., id., Ex. 15, FMI Dep. 105:18-22.) Glynn was concerned that the MMBJ devices were not being sufficiently tested at elevated temperatures. He raised these concerns with his supervisors and 1ST management. 1ST was not immediately responsive, but eventually conducted temperature testing in 2006. That testing revealed that though the producibility of the MMBJ devices could be improved, the performance of the devices was satisfactory. As such, 1ST decided to not recall the devices it had already shipped to SOCOM. 1ST issued an ECO in order to add a temperature-sensitive component to the MBTNS to make it more producible and did not inform SOCOM as it was not an issue affecting performance. Noticeably absent from this chain of events is the appearance of fraud on the government. The FCA is intended to protect the treasury against the claims of unscrupulous contractors, not to penalize employee disagreements over matters of commercial judgment. See United States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen. Trading & Contr. Co., 612 F.3d 724, 734 (4th Cir.2010). Simply put, false statements sufficient to support a claim of fraud are different from honest disagreements and routine adjustments. “Bad math is no fraud, proof of mistakes is not evidence that one is a cheat, and the common failings of engineers and other scientists are not culpable under the [FCA].” Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). I do not find that Glynn, by introducing concerns over temperature testing, or suggesting a recall of the MMBJ devices shipped before the temperature testing in 2006, was investigating fraud on the government. Rather, Glynn appears to have been performing his job function as a Principal Engineer by reporting concerns and suggesting modifications to his supervisors. Such activity is not protected by the FCA whistleblower provision. See Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 914. Accordingly, I deny Glynn’s Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as he moves this Court to find that he engaged in protected activity by investigating and opposing IST’s provision of “defective” devices to SOCOM. b. IST’s false certification of compliance with the requirements in the MMBJ contract As Glynn emphasizes, qui tarn actions under the FCA have been sustained under the theory of false certification. See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 791 (4th Cir.1999); United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 349 (3d Cir.1977). Glynn must demonstrate, however, that he acted in furtherance of a qui tarn suit based on false certification to invoke the protection of the FCA whistleblower provision. Again, these actions must have raised a “distinct possibility” of such litigation in order to be protected under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). 1ST had two contracts with SOCOM: Contract No. USZA26-03-C-1002, which was awarded on April 16, 2003; and Contract No. H92236-05-D-1001, which was awarded on December 17, 2004. (See Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 2 & 3.) Contract No. USZA26-03-C-1002 required that 1ST “prepare an Acceptance Test Plan to assess [the] effectiveness of the MMBJ system.” (Id., Ex. 2 at Bates No. EL000986.) The contract also required that 1ST “provide a monthly status report that detailed progress made and any issues encountered during the reporting period that have any impact on production, quality, or delivery of the jammers.” (Id., Ex. 2 at Bates No. EL000993.) Additionally, 1ST was required to prepare an Acceptance Testing Report to certify that it had conducted “performance validation tests and system’s performance during testing of prototype and subsequent production tests.” (Id., Ex. 2 at Bates No. EL000996.) Contract No. H92236-05-D1001 contained similar requirements. Glynn claims that he “investigated and opposed IST’s failure to meet [the contract] requirements” and therefore engaged in protected activity. (Glynn Mem. 13.) In support, Glynn cites to his own deposition and the depositions of other employees and supervisors at 1ST stating that Glynn raised concerns about the lack of temperature testing. (Id.) As discussed above, however, raising concerns about the lack of temperature testing alone does not raise a distinct possibility of litigation. Importantly, though, Glynn claims that in addition to his requests that 1ST perform temperature testing on the MMBJ devices, he raised concerns over IST’s lack of specifications for the design and manufacture of the MMBJ device. (Id.) Glynn claims that in 2004 he complained to Puzzo about the lack of specifications and he asked Traurig to see the contract specifications for the modules he was designing. (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 367:6-20; 369:16-17.) Again in 2006, Glynn claims that he requested the contract specifications from Puzzo and Caprario, who refused Glynn’s request. (Id. at 421:14-422:14.) Caprario, however, had a different recollection of Glynn’s request to see the contracts. During his deposition, he testified, “[h]e basically came into my office and asked to see the contract documents. I don’t remember the exact substance, but I offered to open the safe and show him whatever was available in there in terms of the statement of work or the spec or that kind of thing, but I told him as far as contracts go, that was really up to the front office to make that determination.” (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 49, Caprario Dep. 218:16-219:1, June 17, 2008.) Similarly, Warren Murrin, President of 1ST, testified that, Dennis [Glynn] had been offered to see the specifications and statement of work, which are classified, that Dean [Puzzo] offered to open up the safe and show them to him. Dennis [Glynn] wanted to see the contract. Like I said, the first few pages of a contract, all they are are pricing information, contact information, signature pages. There’s no need for anyone to see that type of information— for the general employee to see that type of information. But the bulk of the work — the bulk of the document in a contract is the specifications, statement of work that the engineers are building to, how many units, what is it supposed to do, what temperatures, what’s this, what environment should it be tested in, what is the quality plan supposed to be like.... All that. So he had access to all that. (Id., Ex. 5, Murrin Dep. 50:4-21, Nov. 16, 2010.) Further, it is IST’s contention, through its corporate designee, that “Mr. Puzzo asked Mr. Glynn if you want to see those specifications, to actually send him a request in writing and that he would provide them. And, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Glynn never asked via E-mail or via written request.” (Id., Ex. 4, IST Dep. 120:13-18, November 17, 2010.) While there is a factual dispute regarding whether Glynn was permitted to see the contract specifications, it is undisputed that Glynn made a verbal request to see them. By raising concerns about temperature testing and asking to see the contract specifications, Glynn was engaged in more than simple reporting of a concern to supervisors. Glynn’s actions constituted an investigation. The inquiry thus becomes whether this investigation was aimed at conduct that raised a distinct possibility of an FCA action for false certification, given what Glynn knew at the time of his investigation. It is undisputed that Glynn never saw the contract specifications before discovery commenced. However, Glynn claims that, he knew from his approximately 19 years of working for defense contractors that 1ST would have been required by its military customer to adopt and maintain a written Quality Assurance Program. Glynn also knew that defense contractors were required to implement configuration management plans to track revisions to designs and therefore he reasonably believed that 1ST was defrauding the Government by billing for CIED jammers that were produced without both a quality assurance and configuration management plan. (Glynn Opp’n 16.) During his June 30, 2008 deposition, Glynn testified regarding his perception of the management of the contract that, “I didn’t believe adequate configuration control or quality assurance was being performed on those systems, and I can’t imagine that any government contract wouldn’t require those types of things.” (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 434:15-19.) During Glynn’s deposition on June 19, 2008, Glynn was shown four documents, which he claimed he had never seen prior to his FOIA request. Glynn described one as “related to the quality assurance plan and the acceptance test procedure for the MMBJ-1A,” another as “one of the appendixes to the Quality Assurance Manual.” (1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 24, Glynn Dep. 193:3-5; 197:21-22, June 19, 2008.) When asked if he had been involved in the drafting of a quality assurance plan, Glynn responded, A. No I was not. Mr. Caprario used— I believe used the boiler plate of Dedicated Electronics quality assurance plan when he crafted this ATP Q. And what leads you to believe that he did that? A. Because I recall giving him a copy of mine and then in the time period, he indicated to me that he had to submit one to the government and I remember seeing remnants of a modified plan by the copy machine, so I believe that he did. Q. And did you ever — other than what you saw around the copy machine, did you ever see the [quality assurance plan] that Mr. Caprario prepared? A. No, I hadn’t, and that was surprising ... (IST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 24, Glynn Dep. 196:18-197:10.) Glynn admitted that when it came to what he perceived to be a loosely managed contract, “I didn’t know whether or not it was a problem with 1ST or whether or not it was a problem at SOCOM” and that he “wasn’t necessarily complaining that 1ST was doing something wrong. I was definitely complaining that the result were systems that would likely put our troops in harm’s way.” (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 434:19-435:2.) These admissions cast doubt on whether Glynn’s investigation of false certification raised a distinct possibility of an FCA suit from his perspective. See Green v. St. Louis, 507 F.3d 662, 668 (8th Cir.2007) (“[I]f [employee] had no reason to believe there was a false or fraudulent statement, he is not protected from retaliation under the False Claims Act” even if he thought employer’s certifications were “flawed”). It is undisputed that Glynn did not see the contracts and the specifications they contained. Without knowledge of the contract requirements, it is very difficult to characterize as objectively reasonable Glynn’s belief that 1ST was falsely certifying its compliance with the contract requirements. See, e.g., Mann, 630 F.3d at 345 (“[plaintiffs] admission that he never read the final version of the bid until the onset of this litigation casts some doubt on his claims ... [his belief of purported fraud] may well be his sincere belief, but it is not an objectively reasonable one.”) Glynn’s position is that based on his experience in the industry, he believed that 1ST would be required to have a quality assurance and configuration management plan in place. Glynn claims that he believed that 1ST had not established such plans because he was never provided any contract specifications with which to work. The objective reasonableness of Glynn’s belief is severely undermined, however by Glynn’s testimony that he provided Caprario with a boilerplate Quality Assurance Plan and that he saw a modified version of this plan around the copy machine. Combined with the fact that Glynn had never seen the contracts, Glynn’s testimony compels my decision to deny Glynn’s Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as he claims he engaged in protected activity by investigating IST’s false certification of compliance with the MMBJ contracts. c. Initiation of government investigations into IST’s fraudulent conduct The plain language of § 3730(h) protects employees who initiate actions under the FCA. Additionally, “supplying information that set[s] off an investigation” is considered an investigatory activity. Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir.1994). Glynn contacted the U.S. Attorney’s office to raise concerns about IST’s device testing on September 13, 2006. (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 425:14-19.) Glynn then met with investigators from the Inspector General’s office of DOD, during which Glynn claims to have “raised the concerns related to the fraud that I believe IST has committed on the MMBJ contracts.” (Id., Ex. 9, Glynn Dep. 223:3-8, June 19, 2008.) Glynn was referred to Agent Benjamin Hochberger, a Special Agent with the Inspector General’s office of DOD, with whom he had frequent contact during October 2006. (Id., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 440:21-441:6.) Glynn claims that he communicated to Agent Hochberger his concerns over: 1) IST’s falsely billing SOCOM for research and development costs by ‘amortizing the development cost into the unit price’ of the dual band transceiver and then billing ‘the government for the units at the inflated price’; 2) IST’s failure to test the MMBJ devices; 3) IST’s failure to implement a quality control system with respect to the MMBJ devices; 4) IST’s failure to recall MMBJ-1A devices shipped prior to July 25, 2006 and retrofit them to ensure they met the operating requirements at temperature for the E-band; and 5) IST’s failure to inform SOCOM,of the inability of the MMB J-1A to perform at its operating requirements for temperature. (Glynn Mem. 15.) Certainly, by communicating with the U.S. Attorney’s office and the Inspector General’s office of DOD, Glynn engaged in either initiation of an action or an investigatory activity. But the question remains whether Glynn’s acts were aimed at company conduct that raised a distinct possibility, of an FCA action given what Glynn knew in September 2006. By that time, 1ST had performed temperature testing on the MMBJ devices and found that the MMBJ systems met the internal 1ST and government specifications at the system level. (See id., Ex. 51, Traurig Dep. 171:16-172:13.) Glynn was aware that the MMBJ systems that had shipped before the temperature testing in June 2006 had passed the tests. (See 1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 77.) Therefore, given what Glynn knew at the time he contacted the U.S. Attorney’s office in September 2006, the company conduct alleged by Glynn — that 1ST failed to test, failed to recall, and failed to inform SOCOM of defects — did not raise an objectively reasonable, distinct possibility of an FCA action. Regarding the portion of Glynn’s report that claimed 1ST falsely billed SO-COM for research and development costs by “amortizing the development cost into the unit price” of the dual band transceiver and then billed “the government for the units at the inflated price,” the only evidence presented on the summary judgment record concerning the reasonableness of this allegation is Glynn’s own email sent to Agent Hochberger asserting false billing. It is well-settled in this Circuit, however, that a mere self-serving opinion is insufficient at the summary judgment phase. See Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 433 (4th Cir.2004) (citing Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. Barnes, 201 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir.2000); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir.1996)). Importantly, it is undisputed that Glynn himself had not seen the contract before making this report of false billing to Agent Hochberger. Glynn has thus introduced no evidence, aside from his own opinion stated in his email to Agent Hochberger, regarding whether IST’s billing raised an objectively reasonable, distinct possibility of an FCA action. Without knowledge of the terms of the contract, and no other stated basis for his belief that 1ST was engaged in false billing, Glynn’s report of false billing cannot be labeled objectively reasonable and, therefore, could not have raised the distinct possibility of an FCA action. That leaves only Glynn’s report to Agent Hochberger that 1ST failed to implement a quality control system with respect to the MMBJ devices. As discussed above, the fact that Glynn had provided a boilerplate for a Quality Assurance Plan to Caprario and saw “remnants of a modified plan” around the copy machine belies the existence of an objectively reasonable basis for Glynn to believe in late 2006, when he communicated with Agent Hochberger, that IST’s conduct raised a distinct possibility of an FCA action. I therefore deny Glynn’s Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as he claims he engaged in protected activity by initiating government investigations of IST’s conduct. In sum, Glynn has failed to demonstrate that as a matter of law he engaged in protected activity that raised a distinct possibility of an FCA suit. Accordingly, I deny Glynn’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the protected activity element. It follows from this conclusion that summary judgment for 1ST on Glynn’s FCA retaliation claim is proper. See Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., 630 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir.2010) (“Employees seeking to bring a cause of action under § 3730(h) must meet three elements derived from the statutory text.”) (citation omitted); Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1051 n. 12 (N.D.Ill.1998) (“[I]f the first element, which requires an employee to engage in ‘protected activity,’ is not met, then neither the second nor the third elements, which assume ‘protected activity,’ can possibly be met.”), aff’d, 183 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.1999). Nevertheless, I will discuss the remaining two elements of a prima facie claim under § 3730(h). 2. IST’s Knowledge The second element of a cause of action under § 3730(h) is that “the employer knew of these acts [taken by the employee in furtherance of a qui tarn suit].” Mann, 630 F.3d at 343. Knowledge is required because “[w]ithout evidence of any knowledge on the part of [the employer], [an employee] cannot establish the necessary causal connection between the alleged protected activity and [the employee’s] termination of employment....” Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 914. The employer must have knowledge of more than the employee’s acts; the employer must have known that these acts raised a distinct possibility of a FCA suit. See Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 742 (“[T]he kind of knowledge the defendant must have mirrors the kind of activity in which the plaintiff must be engaged. What defendant must know is that plaintiff is engaged in protected activity as defined above-that is, in activity that reasonably could lead to a False Claims Act case.”); Luckey, 2 F.Supp.2d at 1051 n. 12 (“[W]ith respect to the second element, it is easy for the employer to know about an employee’s activities, but the element requires more. The employer must also know that these activities constitute ‘protected activity.’ ”) At the time Glynn was conducting what he labels an investigation of IST’s provision of substandard MMBJ devices to SOCOM, 1ST had no knowledge that Glynn suspected fraud or illegality. Glynn admits that he did not tell 1ST management that he felt the company was making false claims to the government (IST Mot. Summ. J, Ex. 61, Glynn Dep. 382:21-383:3, 386:11-387:11, 423:8-14), although Glynn did make his concerns about temperature testing known to IST management (see id., Ex. 10, Caprario Dep. 119:8-120:10; Ex. 20, Murrin Dep. 47:5-9; Ex. 8, Traurig Dep. 48:17-49:18). 1ST expected Glynn “to suggest technical improvement and raise concerns related to technical performance” as an engineer tasked with designing key modules and components. (1ST Mem. 24.) 1ST management thus understood Glynn to be raising concerns inherent to his engineering responsibilities, not concerns about fraud. See Owens, 612 F.3d at 735 (“Any enterprise depends on communication, so it is hardly surprising that [plaintiff] at times reported problems he thought he saw on the site. That he did so does not, of itself, indicate an investigation into possible wrongdoing.”); Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir.1999) (“An employer is entitled to treat a suggestion for improvement as what it purports to be rather than as a precursor to litigation.”). On June 9, 2006, Glynn told Lewis Dokmo, Vice President of IST, that Glynn and other employees were having trouble sleeping at night because they worried that soldiers’ lives were being put at risk. (Glynn Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 419:22-420:5; Ex. 27, Notes of June 9, 2006 Meeting.) However, Glynn also told Dokmo that he did not want Dokmo to relay his concern to other members of 1ST management. (See 1ST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 4, 1ST Dep. 119:1-2 [“Mr. Glynn said 1 do not want you to do anything at this time.’ ”].) Of course, a few months later, in the fall of 2006, several employees at 1ST learned second- or third-hand that Glynn had raised concerns with the government over the performance of the MMBJ units at high temperatures. (See e.g., Glynn Mot. Summ. J, Ex. 11, Dokmo Dep. 54:14-21, June 13, 2008; Ex. 16, Puzzo Dep. 37:12-39:9, June 16, 2008.) Therefore, 1ST management at least had knowledge that Glynn had reported his concerns about temperature testing and the quality of the MMBJ devices to the government in late 2006. See Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 743 (“Merely grumbling to the employer about job dissatisfaction or regulatory violations does not satisfy the requirement — just as it does not constitute protected activity in the first place. Threatening to file a qui tam suit or to make a report to the government, on the other hand, clearly is one way to make an employer aware.”). When Glynn requested the MMBJ contracts, engaging in what he maintains was an investigation of IST’s false certification of compliance with the MMBJ contract requirements, Glynn did not express a concern to management that 1ST was engaging in fraud or failing to comply with its contractual requirements. (See IST Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 49, Caprario Dep. 218:7-11; Ex. 5, Murrin Dep. 51:8-15.) 1ST management thus had no knowledge that Glynn was investigating what he perceived to be false certification. In fact, Puzzo testified that he became concerned when Glynn requested the MMBJ contracts that Glynn might be trying to compete with 1ST because Glynn requested not just the technical portions of the contract, but the entire contract, which contained pricing, cost, and customer information. (See id., Ex. 36, Puzzo Dep. 42:12-43:6, June 16, 2008.) Regarding Glynn’s initiation of a government investigation, as stated above, prior to Glynn’s termination, several employees at 1ST learned that Glynn had raised concerns with the government over the performance of the MMBJ units at high temperatures. (See, e.g., Glynn Mot. Summ. J, Ex. 11, Dokmo Dep. 54:14-21; Ex. 16, Puzzo Dep. 37:12-39:9.) The 1ST employees were informed of Glynn’s actions by Phil Joseph, in whom Glynn had confided, asking Joseph to not disclose the information to anyone at IST. (See id., Ex. 17, Glynn Dep. 426:10-429:15.) Puzzo testified that he was told around the end of September or early October 2006 that Glynn had made a disclosure to the government “questioning the integrity of the MMBJ system.” (Id., Ex. 16, Puzzo Dep. 37:12-39:9.) Puzzo explained that Caprario immediately told his point of contact with the customer, SOCOM, that there was a potential claim of this nature and the customer came to do an assessment, so Puzzo felt there was no need to initiate any further action to address Glynn’s concerns. (Id., Ex. 16, Puzzo Dep. 40:9-21.) Indeed, while 1ST management knew that Glynn had contacted the government regarding the quality of the MMBJ devices, as of November 8, 2006, 1ST management does not appear to have had any knowledge that Glynn had initiated an investigation of an FCA claim. Agent Hochberger wrote to Glynn on that day: [W]e haven’t done anything overt yet to signal to the company that we’re interested in them at all. In fact, they don’t know anybody in the government is interested in them, beyond the customer who they notified themselves. As far as they know, the customer has tested their products based upon the concerns 1ST initiated itself. The only thing I can pass along is already known to the company and perhaps to yourself. The customer recalled a sample of earlier versions of the unit (prior to design modifications) and ran that sample through the same temperature testing protocol as the first sample. Those units passed as well. (1ST Mot. Summ. J, Ex. 177 at Bates No. EL000251) (emphasis added). Accordingly, though members of 1ST management knew that Glynn had reported to the government concerns over the integrity of the MMBJ devices, 1ST did not have knowledge that Glynn was initiating a government investigation in furtherance of a qui tam suit. In sum, even were Glynn to have demonstrated that he engaged in protected activity and therefore acted in furtherance of a qui tam suit, the facts appear undisputed that except for knowledge of Glynn’s communication with the government over the quality of the MMBJ devices, 1ST did not have knowledge of what Glynn labels his protected activity. At most, then, 1ST knew that Glynn had reported to the government his concerns over temperature testing and what he perceived to be defective devices. To make out a claim for FCA retaliation, however, Glynn must demonstrate that not only did 1ST have knowledge of Glynn’s reports of concern to the government, but also that 1ST took adverse action against Glynn as a result. 3. Causation The third element of a cause of action under § 3730(h) requires an employee-plaintiff to prove that “his employer took adverse action against him as a result of these acts.” Mann, 630 F.3d at 343. The FCA’s legislative history requires an employee to show that “the retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s engaging in protected activity. Once [this] element[ ][has] been satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove affirmatively that the same decision would have been made even if the employee had not engaged in protected activity.” S.Rep. No. 99-345 at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300. The Sixth Circuit has thus observed that “[a]n employee must supply sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the employee was discharged because of activities which gave the employer reason to believe that the employee was contemplating a qui tam action against it.” United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir.1997). In other words, an employee must provide some evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to draw the required causal inference. Such evidence is absent on the summary judgment record. Glynn asserts he has ample direct evidence of retaliation in his Motion for Summary Judgment. Yet the evidence he trots out in his motion is neither ample nor direct. Glynn claims the following: (1) IST’s Program Manager Mike Caprario was “angry” and “disappointed” by the fact that Glynn had made a disclosure to the Department of Defense. (2) Mike Caprario was “frustrated” by Glynn’s complaint and Caprario indicated to John Joseph that Caprario thought it was inappropriate for Glynn to go to the DOD. (3) IST’s CEO Warren Murrin was also “upset” at learning that Glynn had raised concerns with the Government. (4) Murrin admitted that his reason for terminating Glynn’s employment from 1ST was because of the “resentment” other 1ST employees, including Puzzo, Caprario and Traurig, harbored for Glynn. (5) 1ST Supervisor John Joseph conveyed to Lorraine Wolfram that IST’s decision to bar Glynn from entering the assembly room and from directly communicating with the assemblers was because Glynn had reported his concerns to the government that the MMBJ devices were faulty. (Glynn Mem. 16.) Unfortunately for Glynn, stray or isolated comments unconnected to the employment decision do not constitute direct evidence of retaliation. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 548-49 (4th Cir.1995) (“[T]he decisional law clearly reflects that isolated and ambiguous statements are too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a finding of [ ] discrimination.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). Glynn claims that “[w]ith the foregoing direct evidence, [he] has demonstrated enough to show that his protected activity was a motivating factor in his termination from 1ST.” (Glynn Mem. 17.) I disagree. Even assuming arguendo that Glynn engaged in protected activity, and that 1ST had knowledge of Glynn’s protected activity, the fact that members of 1ST management expressed feelings of disappointment, frustration, or anger upon learning of this activity does not supply sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the employee was discharged because of the activity. See Owens, 612 F.3d at 736 (“To suggest that a coworker’s taking umbrage at [plaintiffs] criticism of his work is sufficient to show that [the employer] was attempting to punish [plaintiff] for investigating fraud borders on the frivolous.”). Moreover, even had Glynn provided some evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to draw a causal inference between Glynn’s discharge and the acts he claims were protected, 1ST easily demonstrates that it had a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for terminating Glynn: his bad behavior. Of course, Glynn claims that IST’s allegation of bad behavior is pretextual and that 1ST discharged him in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. (See Glynn Opp’n 22.) Glynn asserts that he can make this showing in “at least twenty different ways.” (Id.) Of Glynn’s twenty points, however, several serve only to rehash arguments made separately in his motion, and others are undeserving of analysis. Glynn’s point that most directly contests IST’s stated reason for his termination, that his “Alleged Performance and Behavior Issues Only Arose After Glynn Engaged in Protected Activity,” (id. at 26) is belied by the record. Glynn cites his two positive performance evaluations in 2005 and 2006 to support his position that 1ST never took issue with his behavior before he engaged in protected activity. (See Glynn Opp’n 26.) However, these performance evaluations took place in April of each year, and April 2006 came a full eight months before Glynn was terminated and four months before the Director of Human Resources, Gloria Jacobson and Puzzo received complaints about Glynn from two of the assemblers he supervised. (See 7/15/2011 Mot. Hr’g Tr. 21:6-22.) “A satisfactory performance review may be used to show that an employee was meeting expectations. But, [the employee] must also show that he was meeting expectations at the time of the adverse employment action.” Pilger v. D.M. Bowman, Inc., 2011 WL 2269342, at *5, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59720, at *14-15 (D.Md.2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1995) (employee’s 1989 performance review was irrelevant to determination of whether his performance was satisfactory when he was terminated in 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). Glynn’s behavior became increasingly problematic throughout the course of 2006, prompting 1ST to terminate him in December 2006, and rendering Glynn’s April 2006 performance review only marginally relevant. In August of 2006, two assemblers, Michele Russell and Lindsey Monahan, requested an off-site meeting with Puzzo, and then met with Jacobson to lodge complaints about Glynn. Jacobson’s notes from these meetings state that the assemblers complained that Glynn was obsessed with control, would not allow them to make suggestions, refused to allow them to help others, was a chauvinist, yelled at them, and created a very difficult work environment. (See 1ST Mot., Ex. 93 at Bates No. D-00000122-124.) Jacobson called Ted Gorski, an outside behavior analyst, to work with the IW Group in the Spring of 2006. Gorski asked managers at 1ST, including Glynn, to participate in an online assessment, which evaluated the managers’ personality traits, communication style, and interactive abilities. (See 1ST Mot., Ex. 98, Gorski Deck ¶ 5.) The April 12, 2006 online assessment found that, among other traits, Glynn has a tendency to have trouble delegating, be argumentative, lack tact and diplomacy, and push and pull rather than motivate in directing people. (Id., Ex. 98, Gorski Deck ¶ 6.) After meeting Glynn, Gorski states that he believed the online assessment accurately described Glynn’s negative attributes. (Id., Ex. 98, Gorski Deck ¶ 6.) Gorski contends that he had phone conversations with Jacobson in August about Glynn’s negative attitude and behavior. (Id., Ex. 98, Gorski Deck ¶ 7.) On August 23, 2006, Jacobson sent Puzzo and Murrin a memo stating, among other things, that “Dennis [Glynn] is no longer worthy of remaining as Team Leader.... He demonstrates behaviors that are not only against company policies, but may also be considered illegal. His autocratic behavior is counter-productive and not representative of the way we treat people here at 1ST. It affects our professionalism and the production of our workforce.” (1ST Mot., Ex. 92 at Bates No. 00000279.) It is undisputed that on September 12, 2006, Jacobson, Puzzo, and Gorski met with Glynn to remove him as supervisor over the three assemblers and Dan Rice. (See 1ST Statement of Facts ¶ 116; Glynn Opp’n, Ex. 2, Glynn Response to 1ST Facts ¶ 116.) The next day, September 13, 2006, Glynn began his external reporting to the government. (See 1ST Statement of Facts ¶ 119; Glynn Statement of Facts ¶ 56.) This series of events ranging from Spring through Fall of 2006, contradicts Glynn’s assertion that his “Alleged Performance and Behavior Issues Only Arose After Glynn Engaged in Protected Activity.” (Glynn Opp’n 26.) 1ST employees and decisionmakers viewed Glynn’s behavior as problematic well before Glynn first reported his concerns to the government, severing the nexus between Glynn’s termination and his reports to the government, which he alleges to be protected activity. See Horne v. Reznick Fedder & Silverman, 154 Fed.Appx. 361, 364 (4th Cir.2005) (“[A]ny inference of causation that might arise out of the temporal proximity is more than rebutted by the facts that, prior to the protected activity, [plaintiff] had been told that her performance was sub-par and that she should prepare to leave....”); Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 Fed. Appx. 341, 348-51 (6th Cir.2007) (affirming summary judgment for employer with respect to employee’s FCA retaliation claim and finding no pretext where employer had several reasons to terminate plaintiff based on numerous complaints about plaintiffs conduct both before and after alle