Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN, Chief Judge. I. SUMMARY On June 2, 2011, the Alabama Legislature approved House Bill 56 (H.B. 56), the “Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,” Ala. Laws Act 2011-535, hereinafter H.B. 56. On June 9, 2011, Governor Robert Bentley signed the Act into law, with the majority of its provisions to become effective on September 1, 2011. On August 29, 2011, this court temporarily enjoined the Act until September 29, 2011. On August 1, 2011, the United States filed a Complaint against the State of Alabama and Governor Robert J. Bentley seeking declaratory and injunctive relief contending that various provisions of H.B. 56 are preempted by federal law, and, therefore, violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1.) On the same date, the United States filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (doc. 2), seeking to preliminarily enjoin the following sections of H.B. 56: 10, 11(a), 12(a), 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, and 30. The Act declares it “a compelling public interest to discourage illegal immigration by requiring all agencies within [Alabama] to fully cooperate with federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.” H.B. 56 § 2. The term “alien” is defined in the Act as “[a]ny person who is not a citizen or national of the United States, as described in 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., and amendments thereto.” H.B. 56 § 3. H.B. 56 includes a severability provision, stating that “If any part of this act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, that declaration shall not affect the part which remains.” H.B. 56 § 33. Therefore, the court will address the challenges to H.B. 56 on a section-by-section basis. The following sections are challenged by the United States: H.B. 56 § 10, which creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) and is unlawfully present in the United States. H.B. 56 § 11(a), which makes it a misdemeanor crime for an unauthorized alien to apply for, solicit, or perform work. H.B. 56 § 12(a), which requires a law enforcement officer to make a reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine the citizenship and immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested when reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States. H.B. 56 § 13, which makes it unlawful for a person to 1) conceal, harbor or shield an alien unlawfully present in the United States, or attempt or conspire to do so; 2) encourage an unlawful alien to come to the State of Alabama; or 3) to transport (or attempt or conspire to transport) an unlawful alien. H.B. 56 § 16, which forbids employers from claiming as business tax deductions any wages paid to an unauthorized alien. H.B. 56 § 17, which establishes a civil cause of action against an employer who fails to hire or discharges a U.S. citizen or an alien who is authorized to work while hiring, or retaining, an unauthorized alien. H.B. 56 § 18, which amends Ala.Code 32-6-9 to include a provision that if a person is arrested for driving without a license, and the officer is unable to determine that the person has a valid driver’s license, the person must be transported to the nearest magistrate; a reasonable effort shall be made to determine the citizenship of the driver, and if found to be unlawfully present in the United States the driver shall be detained until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities. H.B. 56 § 27, which bars Alabama courts from enforcing a contract to which a person who is unlawfully present in the United States is a party. This section does not apply to contracts for lodging for one night, contracts for the purchase of food, contracts for medical services, or contracts for transportation for an alien to return to his or her country of origin. H.B. 56 § 28, which requires every public elementary and secondary school in Alabama to determine if an enrolling student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an unlawfully present alien and qualifies for assignment to an English as second language class or other remedial program. H.B. 56 § 30, which makes it a felony for an alien not lawfully present in the United States to enter into a “business transaction” with the State of Alabama or any political subdivision thereof. As discussed more fully below, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit has noted When a federal court before trial enjoins the enforcement of a municipal ordinance adopted by a duly elected city council, the court overrules the decision of the elected representatives of the people and, thus, in a sense interferes with the processes of democratic government. Such a step can occasionally be justified by the Constitution (itself the highest product of democratic processes). Still, preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments — because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits — must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict legal and equitable principles that restrain courts. Id. (emphasis added). Upon consideration of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the memoranda submitted in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the arguments of counsel, the Amici briefs accepted by the court, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion, as more fully discussed below, that the United States has not met the requirements for a preliminary injunction on its claim that Sections 10, 12(a), 18, 27, 28, and 30 of H.B. 56 are preempted by federal law. Therefore, the motion for preliminary injunction as to these sections will be denied. However, the court is of the opinion, as more fully discussed below, that there is a substantial likelihood that the United States will succeed on the merits of its claim that Sections 11(a), 13, 16, and 17 of H.B. 56 are preempted by federal law. The court further finds that the United States will suffer irreparable harm if these sections of H.B. 56 are not enjoined, the balance of equities favors the entry of an injunction, and its entry would not be adverse to the public interest. Therefore, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be granted as to these sections. II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)(internal quotations and citations omitted). In this Circuit— In order to prevail on an application for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must clearly establish all of the following requirements: (1) ... a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir.2011)(quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir.2009)). “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982)). III. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW The Third Circuit in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.2010), clearly set forth the current federal law regarding immigration and immigrants: 1. The Immigration and Nationality Act The primary body of federal immigration law is contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-537, enacted in 1952, and amended many times thereafter. The INA sets forth the criteria by which “aliens,” defined as “any person not a citizen or a national of the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), may enter, visit, and reside in this country. Under the INA, there are three primary categories of aliens who may lawfully enter and/or spend time within the United States: (1) “nonimmigrants,” who are persons admitted for a limited purpose and for a limited amount of time, such as visitors for pleasure, students, diplomats, and temporary workers, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); (2) “immigrants,” who are persons admitted as (or after admission, become) lawful permanent residents of the United States based on, inter alia, family, employment, or diversity characteristics, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151; and (3) “refugees” and “asylees,” who are persons admitted to and permitted to stay for some time in the United States because of humanitarian concerns, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-58. Aliens wishing to be legally admitted into the United States must satisfy specific eligibility criteria in one of these categories, and also not be barred by other provisions of federal law that determine inadmissibility. Congress has determined that non-citizens who, inter alia, have certain health conditions, have been convicted of certain crimes, present security concerns, or have been recently removed from the United States, are inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and if detained when attempting to enter or reenter the country, may be subject to expedited removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Despite the carefully designed system for lawful entry described above, persons lacking lawful immigration status are obviously still present in the United States. As the Supreme Court explained almost thirty years ago: “[s]heer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country ... has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ ... within our borders.” Plyler [v. Doe], 457 U.S. [202,] 218, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 [ (1982) ]. Such persons may lack lawful status because they entered the United States illegally, either by failing to register with immigration authorities or by failing to disclose information that would have rendered them inadmissible when they entered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. In addition, aliens who entered legally may thereafter lose lawful status, either by failing to adhere to a condition of admission, or by committing prohibited acts (such as certain criminal offenses) after being admitted. See id. Persons here unlawfully are subject to removal from the country. Removal proceedings are initiated at the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). [footnote] See Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir.2010)(“[T]he decision when to initiate removal proceedings is committed to the discretion of immigration authorities.” (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti—Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999))). Although certain aliens are subject to more expedited removal proceedings, for all others, section 240 of the INA sets forth the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3). [Footnote:] Prior to 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), which operated under the Department of Justice, administrated both immigration services and immigration enforcement. On March 1, 2003, Congress abolished the INS. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, that agency’s functions were transferred to three separate agencies within the newly created Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), which performs immigration and naturalization services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which enforces federal immigration and customs laws, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), which monitors and secures the country’s borders. Older documents may continue to refer to the pre — 2003 administrative structure, and citations to them should be understood in that context. Under section 240, an alien facing removal is entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge and is provided numerous procedural protections during that hearing, including notice, the opportunity to present and examine evidence, and the opportunity to be represented by counsel (at the alien’s expense). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. At the conclusion of a removal hearing, the presiding immigration judge must decide, based on the evidence produced during the hearing, whether the alien is removable, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A), and if so, whether s/he should be ordered removed, or should be afforded relief from removal. Such relief can include postponement of removal, cancellation of removal, or even adjustment of status to that of lawful permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4), 1229b. In sum, while any alien who is in the United States unlawfully faces the prospect of removal proceedings being initiated against her/him, whether s/he will actually be ordered removed is never a certainty until all legal proceedings have concluded. Moreover, even after an order of removal issues, the possibility remains that no country will accept the alien. Under such circumstances, the Constitution limits the government’s authority to detain someone in anticipation of removal if there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). The INA, as amended, also prohibits the “harboring” of aliens lacking lawful immigration status. It provides that any person who “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection ... such alien in any place, including any building or any means or transportation” shall be subject to criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). For decades, the INA contained no specific prohibition against the employment of aliens lacking legal status. Rather, regulation of the employment of aliens not lawfully present was at most a “peripheral concern.” DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976). This changed in 1986, when Congress amended the INA through enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1324b). IRCA “forcefully made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of immigration law.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137, 147, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271(2002) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 2. The Immigration Reform and Control Act IRCA regulates the employment of “unauthorized aliens,” a term of art defined by the statute as those aliens neither “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” nor “authorized to be ... employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3). IRCA makes it unlawful to knowingly hire or continue to employ an unauthorized alien, or to hire anyone for employment without complying with the work authorization verification system created by the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)-(2). This verification system, often referred to as the “1-9 process,” requires that an employer examine certain documents that establish both identity and employment authorization for new employees. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). The employer must then fill out an 1-9 form attesting that s/he reviewed these documents, that they reasonably appear to be genuine, and that to the best of the employer’s knowledge, the employee is authorized to work in the United States. See id. Although employers are required to verify the work authorization of all employees, Congress did not extend this requirement to independent contractors. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(making unlawful the knowing “employment”, of an unauthorized alien, and the hiring of an employee for “employment” without verifying the employee’s work authorization); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f)(specifically excluding “independent contractors” from the definition of “employee”); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g) (specifically excluding a “person or entity using ... contract labor” from the definition of “employer”). The 1-9 “verification system is critical to the IRCA regime.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147-48, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Not only is failure to use the system illegal, but use of the system provides an affirmative defense to a charge of knowingly employing an unauthorized alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3). Thus, employers who use the 1-9 process in good faith to verify the work authorization of employees are presumed not to have knowingly employed someone unauthorized to work in this country. In enacting IRCA, Congress required the President to monitor the security and efficacy of this verification system. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(d). Congress also imposed limits on the President’s ability to change it. Id. In addition to relying on the 1-9 verification system, IRCA uses public monitoring, prosecution, and sanctions to deter employment of unauthorized aliens. IRCA provides for the creation of procedures through which members of the public may file complaints about potential violations; it authorizes immigration officers to investigate these complaints; and it creates a comprehensive hearing and appeals process through which complaints are evaluated and adjudicated by administrative law judges. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)-(3). Under IRCA, an employer who knowingly hires an unauthorized alien shall be ordered to cease and desist the violation, and to pay between $250 and $2000 per unauthorized alien for a first offense, between $2000 and $5000 per unauthorized alien for a second offense, and between $3000 and $10,000 per unauthorized alien for a third or greater offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4). An employer who fails to verify the work authorization of its employees can be ordered to pay between $100 and $1000 for each person whose authorization it failed to authenticate. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5). Employers who engage in a “pattern or practice” of hiring unauthorized aliens shall be fined up to $3000 per unauthorized alien, imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1). IRCA expressly pre-empts states and localities from imposing additional “civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). Because of its concern that prohibiting the employment of unauthorized aliens might result in employment discrimination against authorized workers who appear to be foreign, Congress included significant anti-discrimination protections in IRCA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. [Footnote] The statute provides that, with certain limited exceptions, it is an “unfair immigration-related employment practice” to discriminate in hiring on the basis of national origin or citizenship status. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1). Congress put teeth into this provision by creating the office of a “Special Counsel” to investigate and prosecute such offenses, and it required that the President fill that position “with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c). Congress also authorized immigration judges to punish those who violate IRCA’s anti-discrimination mandate by imposing civil fines equivalent in amount to those imposed for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). [Footnote:] 8 U.S.C. § 1324b provides in relevant part that: [with certain limited exceptions, it] is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity to discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien, as defined in section 1324a(h)(3) of this title) with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the individual from employment— (A) because of such individual’s national origin, or (B) in the case of a protected individual ... because of such individual’s citizenship status. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a). Any person adversely-affected by an unfair immigration-related employment practice “may file a charge respecting such practice or violation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(1). 3. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act In 1996, Congress again amended the INA by enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.). In IIRIRA, Congress directed the Attorney General, and later the Secretary of Homeland Security, to conduct three “pilot programs of employment eligibility confirmation” in an attempt to improve upon the 1-9 process. IIRIRA § 401(a), 110 Stat. 3009-655. Congress mandated that these programs be conducted on a trial basis, for a limited time period, and in a limited number of states. See IIRIRA § 401(b)-(c), 110 Stat. 3009-655-66. Two of these trial systems were discontinued in 2003. However, the third — originally known as the “Basic Pilot Program” but since renamed “E-Verify” — was reauthorized and expanded to all fifty states in 2003. See Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§ 2, 3, 117 Stat. 1944. It has been reauthorized several times since, and its current authorization will expire, absent congressional action, on September 30, 2012. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat. 2177; Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div. A, § 143, 122 Stat. 3580. E-Verify allows an employer to actually authenticate applicable documents rather than merely visually scan them for genuineness. When using E-Verify, an employer enters information from an employee’s documents into an internet-based computer program, and that information is then transmitted to the Social Security Administration and/or DHS for authentication. See IIRIRA, as amended, § 403(a)(3). These agencies confirm or tentatively nonconfirm whether the employee’s documents are authentic, and whether the employee is authorized to work in the United States. See IIRIRA, as amended, § 403(a)(4). If a tentative nonconfirmation is issued, the employer must notify the employee, who may contest the result. See id. If an employee does not contest the tentative result within the statutorily prescribed period, the tentative nonconfirmation becomes a final nonconfirmation. See id. If the employee does contest it, the appropriate agencies undertake additional review and ultimately issue a final decision. See id. An employer may not take any adverse action against an employee until it receives a final nonconfirmation. See id. However, once a final nonconfirmation is received, an employer is expected to terminate the employee, or face sanctions. With only a few exceptions, federal law makes the decision of whether to use E-Verify rather than the default I-9 process entirely voluntary. See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(a). Federal government employers and certain employers previously found guilty of violating IRCA are currently required to use E-Verify; all other employers remain free to use the system of their choice. See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(e). Significantly, in enacting IIRIRA, Congress specifically prohibited the Secretary of Homeland Security from requiring “any person or other entity to participate in [E-Verify].” See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(a). Congress also directed the Secretary to publicize the “voluntary nature” of the program and to ensure that government representatives are available to “inform persons and other entities that seek information about [E-Verify] of [its] voluntary nature.” IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(d). Those employers who elect to use E-Verify and actually do use the system to confirm an employee’s authorization to work are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they did not hire that employee knowing that s/he lacks authorization to work in this country. See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(b)(1). Employers who elect to use E-Verify, but in practice continue to use the 1-9 process, are not entitled to the E-Verify rebuttable presumption, but can still claim the 1-9 affirmative defense. See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(b)(2). Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 196-201 and nn. 21, 24 (3d Cir.2010)(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted except where otherwise indicated, parallel Supreme Court citations omitted), cert. granted and judgment vacated, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2958, 180 L.Ed.2d 243 (2011) (Mem.). IV. DISCUSSION A. PREEMPTION AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE The United States argues that Sections 10, 11(a), 12(a), 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28 and 30 of H.B. 56 are preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and federal immigration law. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 69-70, 72.) The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are “the Supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. In certain instances, the Constitution — in its own right — can preempt state action in a field exclusively reserved for the federal government. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-56, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976) (“[The constitutional] [p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”), superceded by statute as stated in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1975, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011). The Supremacy Clause also “vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” Stephen v. Am. Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir.1987); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Therefore, this court’s analysis of preemption claims must be guided by two cornerstones of [the Supreme Court’s] pre-emption jurisprudence. First, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case. Second, [i]n all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, ... [courts] start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194-95, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009)(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996))(internal quotations and citations omitted). Preemption may be express or implied, Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion), and “is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Express preemption occurs when the text of a federal law is explicit about its preemptive effects. Fla. State Conference of N.A.A C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir.2008)(“Express preemption occurs when Congress manifests its intent to displace a state law using the text of a federal statute.”). Implied preemption falls into two categories: field preemption and conflict preemption. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000)(“Even without an express provision for preemption, we have found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two circumstances.”); see Browning, 522 F.3d at 1167 (“Field and conflict preemption in turn have been considered under the umbrella term ‘implied preemption.’ ”). Field preemption exists when: Congress’ intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it, because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject, or because the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn., 461 U.S. 190, 203-04, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983)(internal quotations omitted). “Conflict preemption” occurs when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). These “categories of preemption are not ‘rigidly distinct,’ ” however, as “field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict preemption.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990)). In their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the United States argues that some sections of H.B. 56 are due to be enjoined on the basis of express preemption by federal statutes and that other sections are due to be enjoined because the United States contends they are impliedly preempted by federal law. B. SECTION 10 Section 10(a) of H.B. 56 states: (a) In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), and the person is an alien unlawfully present in the United States. H.B. 56 § 10(a). An “alien unlawfully present in the United States” who violates Section 10 is “guilty of a Class C misdemeanor and subject to a fíne of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than 30 days in jail.” Id. § 10(f). For the purposes of enforcing Section 10, “an alien’s immigration status shall be determined by verification of the alien’s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).” H.B. 56 § 10(b). Section 10 “does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to be present in the United States.” Id. § 10(d). To understand H.B. 56 § 10, it is necessary to consult certain provisions of the INA, namely 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304(e), and 1306(a). As with any question of statutory interpretation, the court “begin[s] by examining the text of the statute to determine whether its meaning is clear.” United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir.2002)). Section 1302 provides that “every alien now or hereafter in the United States, who (1) is fourteen years of age or older, (2) has not been registered and fingerprinted ..., and (3) remains in the United States for thirty days or longer” must “apply for registration and to be fingerprinted before the expiration of such thirty days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a). Section 1302 also provides that “every parent or legal guardian of any alien now or hereafter in the United States, who (1) is less than fourteen years of age, (2) has not been registered ..., and (3) remains in the United States for thirty days or longer” must “apply for the registration of such alien before the expiration of such thirty days.” Id. (b). An alien described in Section 1302(b) who “attains his fourteenth birthday in the United States” must, “within thirty days thereafter, apply in person for registration and to be fingerprinted.” Id. Section 1304 provides that “[e]very alien in the United States who has been registered and fingerprinted ... shall be issued a certificate of alien registration or an alien registration card.... ” 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d). Section 1304 also provides that “[ejvery alien, eighteen years of age and over, shall at all times carry with him and have in his personal possession any certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card issued to him.... ” Id. § 1304(e). An alien who violates Section 1304(e) is “guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction for each offense be fined not to exceed $100 or be imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.” Id. Section 1304(e) presupposes that the alien has registered pursuant to § 1302 and been provided documentation pursuant to Section 1304(d). An alien who has never registered or applied for a certificate of alien registration cannot, by the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(a), be charged with a crime for failure to have in his or her personal possession any registration documents issued to him or her. Section 1306 provides: Any alien required to apply for registration and to be fingerprinted in the United States who willfully fails or refuses to make such application or to be fingerprinted, and any parent or legal guardian required to apply for the registration of any alien who willfully fails or refuses to file application for the registration of such alien” is “guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). Essentially, H.B. 56 § 10 creates two Alabama state crimes related to the INA’s alien registration scheme. The first state crime has two elements and arises when an alien is “unlawfully present in the United States” and “in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e).” H.B. 56 § 10(a). The second state crime has two elements and arises when an alien is “unlawfully present in the United States” and “in violation of ... 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a).” Id. Although it is a federal crime to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) and 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), the state crimes for violating H.B. 56 § 10 arise in a narrower set of circumstances than the federal crimes for violating either 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). In other words, there may be circumstances when an alien would be in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) but would not, under the same circumstances, be in violation of H.B. 56 § 10(a). Section 1304(e) applies to “[e]very alien,” whether lawfully present or not, who has registered under Section 1302 and been issued documentation under Section 1304(d) but who fails to carry the documentation as required by Section 1304(e). See, e.g., Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 546 (6th Cir.2002) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e))(“Failure to carry one’s green card on his or her person can subject a legal resident alien to criminal sanctions.”); Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1444 (2d Cir.1991) (“The INA mandates that the Attorney General provide [lawful permanent residents] who register with proof of their legal status.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d))). Section 10(a) of H.B. 56, on the other hand, applies only to aliens who are “unlawfully present in the United States” and who fail to carry documentation as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e). Unlike 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), H.B. 56 § 10(a), by its plain language, does not apply to aliens lawfully present in the United States, such as legal permanent residents, who fail to carry their registration documents. The same reasoning applies to the second state crime created by H.B. 56 § 10(a). Section 1306(a) applies to “any alien,” whether lawfully present or not, who has failed to register or be fingerprinted as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1302. Section 10(a) of H.B. 56, on the other hand, applies only to an alien who is “unlawfully present in the United States” and has failed to register and be fingerprinted in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). Unlike Section 1306(a), H.B. 56 § 10(a), by its plain language, does not apply to aliens lawfully present in the United States who fail to register or be fingerprinted in violation 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). The United States argues that H.B. 56 § 10 is conflict preempted because it interferes with the federal alien registration scheme. (Doc. 2 at 28-31.) As noted, every preemption analysis “must be guided by two cornerstones.” Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1194. The first is that “ ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.’ ” Id. (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240.) The second is that a presumption against preemption applies when “Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Id. Because the states have not traditionally occupied the field of alien registration, the court applies no presumption against preemption for H.B. 56 § 10. The current federal registration system set forth in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304, and 1306, creates a comprehensive scheme for alien registration. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 74, 61 S.Ct. 399. The federal system requires aliens to register, 8 U.S.C. § 1302, and requires registered aliens to obtain a certificate of alien registration or an alien registration card, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d). The INA provides criminal penalties for aliens who fail to carry a registration card or certificate, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), and who willfully fail to register, notify the federal government of a change of address, make fraudulent statements, and produce counterfeit documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)-(d). The United States relies primarily on Hines to support its assertion that H.B. 56 § 10 is preempted. (See doc. 2 at 28-30.) In Hines, the Supreme Court considered whether the federal Alien Registration Act, the precursor to the INA, preempted the Alien Registration Act adopted in Pennsylvania. Hines, 312 U.S. at 56, 61 S.Ct. 399. The subject of both the federal Act and the Pennsylvania Act was the registration of aliens. Id. at 61, 61 S.Ct. 399. The Court stated: [Wjhere the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in [the] field [of immigration], has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations. Id. at 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399 (emphasis added). On that basis, the Court found that its “primary function” was “to determine whether ... Pennsylvania’s law [stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment ... of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in enacting the federal Act. Id. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399. Although compliance with both the Pennsylvania Act and the federal Act was not impossible, the Court nonetheless found that the Pennsylvania Act could not be enforced because it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 67, 71-74, 61 S.Ct. 399. First, the Pennsylvania Act established a separate, state-specific alien registration scheme that was independent from the federal Act. Id. at 59-61, 61 S.Ct. 399. Pennsylvania’s state-specific registration scheme stood in clear conflict with Congress’s objective of having a “uniform national registration system,” and “a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and all-embracing system” through the federal Act. Id. at 74, 61 S.Ct. 399. Second, the Pennsylvania Act created registration requirements that were different from those provided by Congress in the federal Alien Registration Act. Id. at 59-61, 61 S.Ct. 399. For example, the Pennsylvania Act required aliens to carry their registration cards with them at all times. Id. at 60-61, 61 S.Ct. 399. Congress had considered and rejected such a provision in the federal Act. Id. at 72-73, 61 S.Ct. 399. This case is distinguishable from Hines. As the State Defendants note “there was a clear conflict between Pennsylvania law and the federal scheme” in Hines and “[i]n contrast, no such conflict exists between Section 10 of [H.B. 56] and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a).” (Doc. 38 at 65-66.) First, unlike the Pennsylvania Act in Hines, H.B. 56 § 10 does not create an independent, state-specific registration scheme, attempt to register anyone, or create registration requirements in addition to the rights established by Congress in the INA. The standard for registration provided by Congress remains uniform. H.B. 56 § 10, consistent with the Court’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, expressly defers to the federal alien registration scheme and federal immigration status determinations. See Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1981. It does so by: (1) requiring that “an alien’s immigration status ... be determined by verification of the alien’s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c),” H.B. 56 § 10(b); (2) exempting “a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to be present in the United States,” id. (d); and (3) providing penalties that closely track those provided by federal law, compare 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (providing that a person who willfully fails to register is “guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both”) and 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (providing that a person who fails to carry his registration documents is “guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction for each offense be fined not to exceed $100 or be imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both”) with H.B. 56 § 10(f) (providing that an alien unlawfully present in the United States and who is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) is “guilty of a Class C misdemeanor and subject to a fíne of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than 30 days in jail”). Second, the current federal alien registration scheme requires that aliens carry their registration documents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e). In 1952, Congress amended the alien registration laws to require aliens to carry their registration documents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e). When Congress passed the 1952 law making an alien’s failure to carry his registration documents a crime, it stated, “the provisions have been modified ... to require ... the registration ... and fingerprinting of all aliens in the country and to assist in the enforcement of those provisions.” See H.R. Rep. 82-1365, 2d Session, 1952, 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723. Congress explicitly recognized that the 1952 amendments to the scheme made it a crime for aliens not to carry their registration documents. See 98 Cong. Rec. 4432-33 (1952)(“Alien registration cards are not new in the law, yet this is the first time where it becomes a necessity for an alien to carry the card with him and, if he does not, it becomes a crime.” (statement of Rep. Chudoff)). As a result, H.B. 56 § 10 does not suffer the same obstacle preemption problem as the Pennsylvania Act. Although the penalties provided by H.B. 56 § 10 “complement” the INA’s registration provisions by making it a state crime for “alien[s] unlawfully present” to violate 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) or 1306(a), this “complementing]” is not “inconsistent ] with the purpose of Congress.” See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399. The penalties provided by H.B. 56 § 10 apply in narrow circumstances that are completely encompassed by the federal scheme. It is already a crime under the federal alien registration scheme for an unlawfully present alien to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). Unless Congress has occupied the field through the INA — a conclusion the Supreme Court appears to have rejected, see DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358, 96 S.Ct. 933; United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980, 999 (D.Ariz.2010) (“[In DeCanas ] the Supreme Court rejected the possibility that the INA is so comprehensive that it leaves no room for state action that impacts aliens.”) — it is not “inconsistent[ ] with the purpose of Congress” to do that which Congress has already done. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66, 61 S.Ct. 399. The Court has uniformly held that the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each State’s power to prosecute is derived from its own ‘inherent sovereignty,’ not from the Federal Government. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985). The fact that states can enact laws which impose state penalties for conduct that federal law also sanctions, without being preempted, is “too plain to need more than statement.” Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258, 47 S.Ct. 629, 71 L.Ed. 1036 (1927). The United States argues, “The federal alien registration scheme has been held by the Supreme Court to represent the quintessential example of a pervasive and comprehensive scheme of federal regulation that leaves no room for state legislation in this area,” and, “Hines squarely held that Congress intended the federal government to exercise exclusive control over all issues related to alien registration.” (Doc. 2 at 29.) However, it does not address whether the provisions of H.B. 56 § 10 are “inconsistent! ] with the purpose of Congress.” See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66, 61 S.Ct. 399. The court does not read Hines as holding that Congress has “occupied the field” of alien registration. Id. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399 (“Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”) (emphasis added); see also Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring). The United States has not directed this court to any authority for the proposition that Congress intended exclusivity, rather than uniformity. “[Sjilence on the part of Congress alone is not only insufficient to demonstrate field preemption, it actually weighs in favor of holding that it was the intent of Congress not to occupy the field.” Frank Bros., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 409 F.3d 880, 891 (7th Cir.2005)(emphasis added). Although the Hines Court “relied on the comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme[ ] in finding” intent to preempt a state-specific alien registration scheme, see DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 362-63, 96 S.Ct. 933, this court does not interpret the comprehensiveness of the federal alien registration scheme as evidence of Congress’s intent to preempt state laws that do not affect the uniformity of the national standard for alien registration. Consequently, the court sees no reason why Alabama, pursuant to its dual sovereignty, cannot, consistent with the purpose of Congress, make violations of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a) by unlawfully present aliens, state crimes in Alabama. The United States contends, though not in certain terms, that the court should follow the recent decision in United States v. Arizona. (Doc. 2 at 29, 31 [citing United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 354-57 (9th Cir.2011) ].) In that case, the United States had challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and moved to enjoin the Act. See Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980. Section 3 of the Arizona Act, A.R.S. § 13-1509(A), which is substantially similar to H.B. 56 § 10(a), was among the challenged provisions. Id. at 998-99. Section 3 of the Arizona Act provides: “In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 United States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a).” Id. at 998. This section of the Arizona Act did not, as H.B. 56 § 10 does, apply only to those “unlawfully present.” The district court preliminarily enjoined Section 3, reasoning that: Section 3 attempts to supplement or complement the uniform, national registration scheme by making it a state crime to violate the federal alien registration requirements, which a state may not do “inconsistently with the purpose of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399; see also A.R.S. § 13-1509(A). While Section 3 does not create additional registration requirements, the statute does aim to create state penalties and lead to state prosecutions for violation of the federal law. Although the alien registration requirements remain uniform, Section 3 alters the penalties established by Congress under the federal registration scheme. Section 3 stands as an obstacle to the uniform, federal registration scheme and is therefore an impermissible attempt by Arizona to regulate alien registration. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d at 999 (parallel citations omitted). Arizona appealed. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 354-57. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to enjoin Section 3. Id. at 357. The Ninth Circuit reasoned: S.B. 1070 Section 3 plainly stands in opposition to the Supreme Court’s direction: “where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399. In Hines, the Court considered the preemptive effect of a precursor to the INA, but the Court’s language speaks in general terms about “a complete scheme of regulation,” — as to registration, documentation, and possession of proof thereof— which the INA certainly contains. Section 3’s state punishment for federal registration violations fits within the Supreme Court’s very broad description of proscribed state action in this area— which includes “complementing]” and “enforcing] additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355-56 (alteration in original; footnote and parallel citations omitted). This court is not persuaded by the decisions in the Arizona cases regarding Section 3 of the Arizona Act. The Arizona district court and the Ninth Circuit both found that “Section 3’s state punishment for federal registration violations fits within the Supreme Court’s very broad description of proscribed state action in this area — which includes ‘complementing]’ and ‘enforcing] additional or auxiliary regulations.’ ” Arizona, 641 F.3d at 356 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399); Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d at 999. Neither court, however, explained how the “additional or auxiliary regulations” were “inconsistent!] with the purpose of Congress.” See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “Nothing in the text of the INA’s registration provisions indicates that Congress intended for states to participate in the enforcement or punishment of federal immigration registration rules.” Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355 (emphasis added). However, this lack, of affirmative evidence that Congress intended the states to participate is not dispositive of the preemption issue. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 24 (D.C.Cir.2009)(“Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court’s most recent preemption case, further reflects the Court’s unwillingness to read broad preemptive intent from congressional silence.”). Affirmative evidence that Congress intended the states to participate would negate any inference of preemptive intent, but the absence of such affirmative evidence does not, without more, support a finding of any inference of preemptive intent. The fact that “Congress provided very specific directions for state participation” in matters not relating to alien registration, Arizona, 641 F.3d at 355 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1357), “demonstrating that it knew how to ask for help where it wanted help,” id., says very little about Congress’s preemptive intent regarding state penalties for violations of the federal registration scheme. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997)(“[E]ven where Congress has legislated in an area subject to its authority, our pre-emption jurisprudence explicitly rejects the notion that mere congressional silence on a particular issue may be read as preempting state law”) (emphasis in original). The court declines to construe Congress’s silence in this instance as evidence of its preemptive intent. H.B. 56 § 10 creates Alabama state crimes for unlawfully present aliens who engage in conduct that constitutes existing federal crimes under the INA. Section 10 does not criminalize mere unlawful presence because it also requires a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), both of which carry criminal penalties under federal law. Although “unlawful presence in the United States is not a federal crime,” see Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d at 988, and criminalizing mere unlawful presence might impair or impede the United States foreign policy goals, (see doc. 2-1 ¶¶ 9, 35), the Supreme Court has recognized that “entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984)(eiting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306, and 1325) (emphasis added; citations omitted). That “there [is no] federal criminal statute making unlawful presence in the United States, alone, a federal crime,” Martinez-Medina v. Holder, — F.3d -, -, 2011 WL 855791, *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011), is of little moment here. As noted above, an alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) is not necessarily “unlawfully present” under federal law. Mere unlawful presence may subject an alien to ciyil removal, but not criminal penalties, in a narrow set of circumstances, such as where an “alien has overstayed a valid visa or otherwise remains in the country after the expiration of a period authorized by the Department of Homeland Security.” Martinez-Medina, — F.3d at-n. 4, 2011 WL 855791 at *6 n. 4. Section 10 does not seek to alter those narrow circumstances. The court finds H.B. 56 § 10 does not stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399. For all these reasons, the court finds that the United States is not likely to succeed in showing that H.B. 56 § 10 is impliedly preempted. The United States also argues that Section 10 is unlawful because it seeks to criminalize unlawful presence and this creates an obstacle to the accomplishment of the foreign policy goals of the United States. (Doc. 2 at 31-33.) The court rejects this argument. The United States argues that H.B. 56 inherently interferes with the Federal Government’s foreign policy objectives concerning international diplomatic relations as well as the uniform enforcement of national immigration laws. (See doc. 2 at 12-13, 18, 25, 33-34, 56, 81-83.) In support of this argument the United States submitted the Declaration of William J. Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, (doc. 2-1), who states that H.B. 56 threatens to disrupt “uniform foreign policy regarding the treatment of foreign nations” and “risks negative reciprocity of the treatment of U.S. citizens abroad, among other deleterious effects.” (Doc. 2 at 32-33 [citing doc. 2-1 at ¶¶ 9, 35; quoting id. ¶ 35].) Legislation affecting the treatment and movement of another country’s citizens living abroad necessarily touches the foreign relations between the visiting and the host nations; however, something more is required before the court can enjoin an otherwise valid state law on foreign policy grounds. The United States has not cited the court to a specific conflict between Section 10, or any other Section of H.B. 56, and some Congressionally-granted Executive Branch authority directly relating to foreign policy. Nevertheless, it argues that H.B. 56 interferes with the Executive Branch’s “fundamental authority to conduct foreign affairs.” (Doc. 2 at 33.) However, Supreme Court cases that have found conflict preemption when a state law obstructs the Executive Branch’s authority to conduct foreign affairs are limited to instances where the Executive Branch’s action has been specifically authorized by Congress and is intended as a means of achieving key national foreign policy goals. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420-25, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380-85, 120 S.Ct. 2288. The Supreme Court has taken varying positions regarding the weight to be given statements of Executive Branch officials seeking to preempt a state law on the basis of foreign policy. Compare Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328-31, 114 S.Ct. 2268, 129 L.Ed.2d 244 (1994) (rejecting Executive Branch statements and amicus filings in deciding that state tax law with international implications was not preempted), with Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424-25, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (considering letters from the Deputy Secretary of State as well as statements submitted by other foreign governments in the Court’s decision to preempt a state law in conflict with executive agreements between the United States and European nations); and Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385-88, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (distinguishing Bar-clays and finding statements by Executive Branch officials and foreign powers persuasive in deciding that a state law, which limited transactions with a foreign nation, was preempted by a conflicting federal statute). These decisions demonstrate that, in a conflict preemption analysis, the Supreme Court will rely on statements of Executive Branch officials to invalidate an otherwise valid state law based on preemption only when there is evidence that such statements demonstrate a national foreign relation policy. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (noting preemption was properly grounded on the “national position, expressed unmistakably in the executive agreement” between the President' of the United States and the German Chancellor). Statements from Executive Branch officials and other evidence of foreign discontent or threats of reprisal are insufficient to establish the national position. See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 327-28, 114 S.Ct. 2268. The evidence must show that the foreign policy concerns expressed by the Executive Branch are within “Congress’s express command to the President to take the initiative for the United States among the international community,” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380-81, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (emphasis added), as demonstrated by statements from Congress, ratified treaties, or international agreements. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420, 123 S.Ct. 2374 (emphasis added); see also Arizona, 641 F.3d at 381 (Bea, J., concurring