Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, District Judge. The case was filed as a proposed class action case under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 51 et seq. (“Unruh Act”), and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 54 et seq. (“CDPA”). Plaintiffs are physically disabled California residents who use electric scooters or wheelchairs as their primary means of mobility. Plaintiffs filed this action on December 17, 2002, against defendant Taco Bell Corp. (“TBC”), alleging that its corporate-owned restaurants in California contained architectural barriers that prevented plaintiffs’ access to and enjoyment of the restaurants, in violation of the ADA, the Unruh Act, and the CDPA On February 23, 2004, the court certified the following class: AH individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric scooters for mobility who, at any time on or after December 17, 2001, were denied, or are currently being denied, on the basis of disability, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of California Taco Bell corporate restaurants. Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 613-14 (N.D.Cal.2004). On October 5, 2004, the court granted the parties’ stipulated request to appoint Bob Evans as Special Master to conduct site visits of all TBC-owned Taco Bell restaurants in California; to determine the dimensions, values, and measurements of the customer-accessible elements at those Taco Bell restaurants, under both federal and state standards; and to make recommendations for bringing into compliance any elements whose dimensions, values, or measurements did not comply with those standards. The Special Master issued his report in mid-2005. On February 23, 2007, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment as to three types of barriers — the configuration of the queue lines in 77 restaurants, the door force in 171 restaurants, and the indoor accessible seating in 54 restaurants. In an order issued August 8, 2007, the court denied the motion as to queue fines, finding triable issues that precluded summary judgment; granted the motion as to interi- or door force and as to exterior door force for those restaurants constructed after April 1, 1994, and denied it as to exterior door force for those restaurants constructed prior to April 1, 1994; and granted the motion as to the number of accessible seating positions. See Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 2007 WL 2301778 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (“Moeller Summ. J.”) In October 2009, TBC filed a motion for partial summary judgment, addressing numerous ADA violations. At the December 16, 2009 hearing, the court denied TBC’s motion, and advised that it would conduct a trial as to one exemplar restaurant to be chosen by plaintiffs, following a period of discovery. In the follow-up December 23, 2009 order, the court set a deadline for plaintiffs to provide TBC with a fist of all ADA and Title 24 violations; a deadline for the parties to meet and confer, and prepare a fist of all the violations, for each restaurant, that had been remediated; a deadline for discovery; and a deadline for plaintiffs to select the exemplar restaurant. Plaintiffs chose Taco Bell 4518. On April 5, 2010, the court issued an order bifurcating discovery and the trial of the exemplar restaurant, advising that the first stage of the trial would be on the issues of whether there had been violations of federal and/or state law, and appropriate injunctive relief, with the remaining issues, including trial of the damages phase of the exemplar restaurant, to be scheduled thereafter. From June 6 to June 16, 2011, the court convened an exemplar trial as to Taco Bell 4518, addressing liability and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs limited their claims at the exemplar trial to the following twelve elements, as having been in violation of the ADA, the Unruh Act, and/or the CDPA during the class period: (1) the width of access aisle next to van accessible parking space; (2) signage at van accessible parking space; (3) force required to open north entry door; (4) time for north entry door to close; (5) queue line; (6) reach ranges for self-service drink lid dispenser; (7) knee and toe clearance under accessible dining tables; (8) push side maneuvering clearance at women’s restroom door; (9) height and position of water closet in the women’s restroom (height of seat and distance between centerline of water closet and nearest side wall); (10) obstructions in clear floor space at the water closets in the men’s and women’s restrooms (position or placement of movable trash cans); (11) height of soap dispenser and toilet seat cover dispenser in the men’s and women’s restrooms; and (12) lavatory insulation. Plaintiffs’ claims for both liability and injunctive relief are based on alleged violations relating to these twelve elements. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief compelling TBC to ensure that its restaurants are, and remain, in compliance with applicable standards. They also seek minimum statutory damages under the Unruh Act and/or the CDPA, and attorneys’ fees. BACKGROUND A. Customer Witnesses 1. Katherine Corbett Named plaintiff Katherine Corbett testified at trial. She has used a power wheelchair for fifteen years. Her 18-year-old daughter also uses a wheelchair for mobility. Ms. Corbett eats at Taco Bell restaurants frequently because she likes the food. She has patronized the Taco Bell restaurant 4518 in San Pablo. The first time Ms. Corbett went inside Taco Bell 4518 was in 2002. Although Ms. Corbett often uses the drive-through, she has also been inside the restaurant on a number of occasions. She estimated that she has patronized that restaurant approximately 80 times between 2002 and 2010; of these visits, she estimated she went inside two to ten times. She tends to eat inside the restaurant when she is with her daughter, and prefers to do that if she has the time. She intends to go inside Taco Bell 4518 in the future. Ms. Corbett uses a van for transportation. When she visited Taco Bell 4518 in 2002, the width of the then-existing access aisle next to the van-accessible parking space was insufficient for her to deploy the lift on her van, roll off the lift, and retract the lift back into the van. If she had parked in the designated space and a car later parked in the adjacent space, there would not have been enough space for her to deploy her ramp and enter her van. However, on this occasion in 2002, Ms. Corbett was able to park and go inside because the designated accessible parking space was unoccupied, as were the space to the left of it and the space to the right of the access aisle. Because of that, she parked her van half in the designated accessible space and half in the adjacent empty space, although it made her uncomfortable to occupy two spaces. After that experience, when she went to Taco Bell 4518 between 2002 and 2010, she parked at another store in the same mall that had wider access aisles. On her 2002 visit, although Ms. Corbett was able to open the north entry door to Taco Bell 4518, it was heavy. In addition, during that visit, she encountered a “queue line” that TBC had put in place to guide customers lining up to place their orders at the counter. The queue line was too narrow for Ms. Corbett to navigate in her wheelchair, and there was a chain extending from the end of the queue line closest to the entrance and the counter. Ms. Corbett could not enter from the far side of the queue line because there was already a customer there. There were no signs indicating what she should do given that she could not -fit through the queue line, and she was not offered any direction by TBC employees. With some difficulty, she removed the chain and approached the counter. During a later visit, Ms. Corbett encountered the same queue line, although the chain was not in place. Nevertheless, there was no signage, and no TBC employee offered assistance. Since there were people in the queue line, Ms. Corbett attempted to keep her place in line by getting the attention of the last person then in line, and saying, “I just want you to know I am going to be over there, but I am in line behind you.” As later customers arrived, she continued to let them know where she was in line, despite the fact that she had to wait off to the side rather than in the queue with others. When it eventually came her turn, however, people were staring at her and one said to her, “Hey, ... no cutting.... You are not in line.” The second cash register was available when it came her turn. However, the presence of other customers lined up at the counter also made it difficult for Ms. Corbett to get to the second cash register in the space available between the queue line and the counter. During the 2002 visit, Ms. Corbett was also unable to reach the drink lids from the self-serve dispenser. No employee offered to assist her, so she asked another customer to hand her a drink lid. During the visit in .2002, when Ms. Corbett looked for a table, she noticed that most had fixed seats that would have prevented her from pulling her wheelchair up to the table. There was no signage indicating the location of accessible seating, but she did find a table with a removable chair. She was not, however, able to pull completely up to that table either, because the supporting post was centered under the table, blocking her feet. In 2002, Ms. Corbett had trouble using both the water closet and the sink in the restroom. The seat of the water closet was too low, making it difficult to transfer on and off. The drain pipe under the sink was not insulated, making it a risk for scalding if Ms. Corbett’s legs came in contact with it. As a result, she washed her hands in cold water. On a subsequent visit, there was a loose trash can under the sink, which meant that she could not get her legs under the sink to wash her hands. Ms. Corbett testified that it was upsetting and unpleasant to encounter so many inaccessible features at the restaurant. The queue lines made her feel like she was cutting in line and being rude, or being privileged or special. She would have used the queue line if it had been wider; indeed, she prefers “to use what everybody else uses” if possible, and “to be treated like [a] regular customer! ].” 2. Jacques Bronson Jacques Bronson testified at trial concerning his mother’s experiences at Taco Bell 4518. Mr. Bronson’s mother, former class member Elizabeth Googens Bronson, passed away in 2009. Ms. Bronson used a wheelchair and a scooter, and Mr. Bronson lived with her in order to provide assistance. In the years prior to Ms. Bronson’s death, the Bronsons patronized Taco Bell 4518, Ms. Bronson in a motorized scooter. They patronized that particular Taco Bell because it was close to a grocery store where Ms. Bronson liked to shop. She would shop there once a month, and went to Taco Bell almost every time. Each time the Bronsons patronized Taco Bell 4518, Ms. Bronson was unable to use the queue line because she could not fit her scooter through it. The chain at the queue line was in place some of the times they were there; other times it was not. Although Ms. Bronson was able to order, pay for, and carry her own food at other businesses, her son had to order for her and bring the food to her table at Taco Bell 4518, because of the queue line. There were no signs that told Ms. Bronson what to do, nor did any TBC employee ever offer assistance to either of the Bronsons. In fact, on one occasion, when Ms. Bronson pulled up to the chain to wait for Mr. Bronson to go through the queue line, a TBC employee told her that she couldn’t stay there. Mr. Bronson asked to speak to the manager, and asked if his mother could go around the far end of the queue line to go to the front of the line. The manager said, “No,” because people in line might object. Mr. Bronson observed that his mother appeared frustrated by this interaction, and resigned by the need to rely on her son. After this interaction, when the Bronsons went to Taco Bell 4518, Ms. Bronson would go straight to a table while her son ordered for her. 8. Uverda Harry Class member Uverda Harry testified at trial. She uses a wheelchair. Ms. Harry first patronized Taco Bell 4518 in 1994. She eats there because it is economical, and because it is close to her medical appointments, including physical therapy. On average, she goes to Taco Bell 4518 three times per month, and expects that she will continue to patronize Taco Bell 4518 on future days when she has physical therapy appointments. Ms. Harry testified that the north double doors close too quickly, and have closed on the leg extenders of her wheelchair and on her ankle as she was attempting to move through the doors. She has also had trouble opening the north entry door, finding it too heavy. When she had trouble opening the door, no TBC employee did anything to assist her. Ms. Harry has encountered the queue line at Taco Bell 4518, both with and without the chain. On one occasion, Ms. Harry attempted to go through the queue line in her wheelchair, but became stuck. Because of the queue line, Ms. Harry found it necessary to ask others — her children, acquaintances, and strangers — to place her order for her. On one occasion, she had to rely on a colleague, even though she was embarrassed to have to ask. Ms. Harry never attempted to proceed directly to the counter to place her order, as she thought that would be cutting in line, nor to go around the far end of the queue line, because she observed that that was where customers picked up items. She never observed any signs telling her what to do if she couldn’t use the queue line, nor did any TBC employee ever offer her assistance placing her order or instructions on what to do in light of the queue line. Ms. Harry testified that she wants to be an independent person, and that not being able to do things for herself makes her feel like a failure. Her experience with the doors made her feel futile, and having to rely on her children or a colleague to place her order made her feel a little distraught and even brought her to tears on several occasions. Ms. Harry would have preferred an accessible queue line because it would not have made her feel like she was different than other customers. Ms. Harry never used the restroom at Taco Bell 4518 because she observed that it would have been difficult for her to navigate up to the door and use the handle to open it. Several years ago, Ms. Harry complained to TBC by using their toll-free number. She voiced concerns about the doors, the queue line, and the counter, and provided her name and phone number, but never heard back from TBC. 4. Yvonne Westbrook-White Yvonne Westbrook-White testified at trial. She uses a scooter for mobility. Ms. Westbrook-White patronized Taco Bell 4518 approximately twice per month between 2001 and 2005. She stopped going in 2005 because she was trying to eat a healthier diet. However, she plans to go back because she likes the tacos. On her first visit in 2001, Ms. West-brook-White encountered the queue line; the chain was in place at that time. She saw that the queue line was narrow and the turn area appeared too small for her to get in. She did not, however, see any signs indicating what she was supposed to do as a person using a scooter, nor did any TBC employee provide instructions. Assuming it was the way to place her order, Ms. Westbrook-White attempted to use the queue line but got stuck at the turn. By that time there were customers lined up behind her in the queue, whom she had to interrupt in order to back all the way out of the queue line. She observed that the customers behind her appeared disgusted and impatient. When TBC employees saw her backing out, they told her to go to the far end of the line. She testified that the experience made her feel less than a person, because “everyone else could get through the queue line, order their food, and go about their business” while she had to “interrupt the people who that were trying to do just that, and move them out of the way so [she] could get preferred treatment.” She did not like getting preferred treatment, as she wants to be treated like everybody else. Thus, she would have preferred an accessible queue line. She did not try to use the queue line after that first visit, but instead went off to the side. After she got her order, Ms. West-brook-White was unable to reach the drink lids, and ended up having to ask an employee for help, though she would have preferred to do this herself. When she tried to sit down at one of the accessible dining tables, she found that the table leg made it impossible for her to get under the table. This caused her to have to sit sideways to the table to eat. This is not her preferred way of eating because she would like “to face [her] food like everybody else.” Ms. Westbrook-White spoke with employees of Taco Bell 4518 about the issues described above but got, as she described it, a “typical kid reaction — ‘Okay, ma’am,’ and on about their business.” 5. Curtis Cone Class member Curtis Cone testified by deposition. Ms. Cone uses a wheelchair. She has patronized Taco Bell 4518 because it is close to an area where she shops. Ms. Cone’s major difficulty at Taco Bell 4518 was the queue line, which was too narrow for her wheelchair. She didn’t try to use the queue line at Taco Bell 4518 because she had become stuck in a Taco Bell queue line in the past. Instead, she asked the person she was with to order for her, though she does not like to do that. However, she feels that if she goes to the front of the line herself, it looks like she’s cutting in front of people, which she finds embarrassing and upsetting. Although Ms. Cone is living temporarily in North Carolina, she testified that she will probably patronize Taco Bell 4518 after she returns to the Bay Area. B. Special Master In 2004, the parties agreed to have Bob Evans, a Certified Access Specialist, survey twenty Taco Bell restaurants as part of a “Pilot Program,” which he did in June and July 2004. In September 2004, the parties jointly proposed to the court that it appoint Mr. Evans as a Special Master. On October 5, 2004, the court issued an order appointing Mr. Evans Special Master to survey the remaining Taco Bell restaurants at issue in this action. Mr. Evans is the principal of Equal Access, which specializes in all matters related to accessibility. He is a licensed architect, and, as a Certified Access Specialist in California, was required to pass an exam administered by the state designed to ensure that those who hold themselves out as access consultants in fact know the applicable codes and standards. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 4459.5-4459.8; Cal-Code Regs. tit. 21, § 111, et seq. Mr. Evans surveyed approximately 223 Taco Bell restaurants. The purpose of the site visits was for Mr. Evans to use his expertise under the Department of Justice Standards for Accessible Design (“DOJ Standards” or “ADAAG”), 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, and Title 24 of the 2002 California Building Code (“Title 24 (2002)”) to determine the dimensions, values and measurements of the customer accessible elements at the California Outlets under the ADAAG and/or Title 24 (2002) at the time of the site visit and to make recommendations as he saw fit for bringing into compliance those elements whose dimensions, values or measurements do not comply with ADAAG and/or Title 24. Mr. Evans worked with an assistant, Larry Recht, to conduct the surveys in this case. Mr. Evans trained Mr. Recht in conducting the Special Master survey, instructed him to take photos of certain conditions in the restaurants he surveyed, and reviewed Mr. Recht’s field notes and photos before incorporating them into the typewritten Special Master survey forms. Mr. Recht surveyed Taco Bell 4518 on April 26, 2005, and the Special Master’s report concerning that restaurant was sent to the parties in or about June 2005. Among other things, the Special Master found as follows with respect to Taco Bell 4518: (1) the access aisle adjacent to the single designated accessible parking space was 60 inches wide; (2) the force required to open the north entry door (the primary entrance) was ten pounds on the left side and seven and a half pounds on the right; (3) the closing time of the north entry door was three seconds on the left and two seconds on the right; (4) the width of the queue line was 21 3/4 inches at the entrance, 22 1/4 to 22 3/8 inches along the first lane, 22 inches at the turn, and 22 to 22 1/4 inches along the second lane; (5) the reach range to the drink lids— which was over an obstruction — was 52 inches high and 28 1/4 inches laterally; (6) the depth of the knee clearance at the two designated accessible tables was 10 1/2 to 11 inches, and the required depth of 19 inches was obstructed by the center support pole under the table; (7) the maneuvering clearance at the push side of the women’s restroom door was four inches beyond the strike jamb; the door had a closer and a latch; (8) the centerline of the water closet in the women’s restroom was 20 inches to the near wall; (9) the height of the water closet seat in the women’s restroom was 15 1/2 inches; (10) the height of the soap dispenser in the women’s restroom was 45 inches; (11) the height of the toilet seat cover dispenser in the women’s restroom was 52 inches; (12) the height of the soap dispenser in the men’s restroom was 46 inches; (13) the height of the toilet seat cover dispenser in the men’s restroom was 52 1/2 inches; (14) the distance from the water closet to the far wall in the men’s restroom was 38 inches; a trash can obstructed that area; (15) the distance from the front of the water closet to the wall in front of it in the women’s restroom was 46 5/8 inches; a trash can obstructed that area. C. Later Conditions at Taco Bell 4518 In the summer of 2006, TBC retained Alianza Development International, LLC (“Alianza”) to serve as project manager over the modification of approximately 140 California corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurants that are at issue in this litigation, to enhance their accessibility for individuals with mobility impairments. Alianza surveyed Taco Bell 4518 in February 2007, and subsequently oversaw accessibility modifications at Taco Bell 4518 between February and June 2007. In 2007, Alianza stated that it had restriped the access aisle adjacent to the accessible parking space to be eight feet wide; added new door closers to the double north entrance doors; completely wrapped the drain pipes and hot water supply line in the men’s restroom; and removed the floor trash can from the women’s restroom. When Alianza restriped the parking space in the spring of 2007 to provide a compliant van accessible space, it did not install a van accessible sign at the new space. When the restaurant was surveyed by plaintiffs’ experts in March 2008, there was still no van accessible sign. Photographs produced by TBC show that there was no sign in the summer of 2009. TBC argued that these photos were taken just before a new sign was installed. However, Steve Allen Elmer, TBC’s Director of ADA Compliance, testified at trial that TBC’s maintenance vendor, Maintco, was supposed to take photos both before and after performing modifications, and while there is an “after” photo of the van accessible sign from the summer of 2009, TBC did not provide a photo showing that sign in 2007 or 2008. Mr. Elmer’s testimony demonstrates that there was no sign in place when Maintco inspected Taco Bell 4518 in the summer of 2009 — that is, before it added the sign — and other photos show that there had been no sign on two prior occasions approximately a year apart. Plaintiffs conducted site inspections attended by one or more of their retained accessibility experts at approximately 180 corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurants throughout the fall of 2008 and spring of 2009. Plaintiffs’ accessibility expert Eric McSwain — who has extensive experience surveying facilities for compliance with the ADAAG and Title 24 — surveyed approximately 190 Taco Bell restaurants. Among those restaurants was Taco Bell 4518, which Mr. McSwain surveyed on March 17, 2008. However, in his May 1, 2009 expert report, Mr. McSwain did not address all twelve of the above-listed barriers at Taco Bell 4518. Mr. McSwain’s report addressed only the lack of a van accessible parking sign, the door closing speed of the entrance door, whether the lavatory drain pipe and hot water supply line were insulated or covered in the men’s restroom, and whether the loose trash can in the women’s restroom posed an obstruction to the clear floor space at either the water closet or toilet seat cover dispenser. When Mr. McSwain surveyed Taco Bell 4518 in March, 2008, despite the fact that the north entry door closer had been replaced in 2007, the door closing time of its two leaves was 2.5 seconds and 2.75 seconds, respectively. When Mr. McSwain surveyed Taco Bell 4518 in March, 2008, the insulation on the men’s restroom lavatory pipes was gone, despite the fact that it had been replaced by Alianza in 2007. Photographs produced by TBC show that there was no insulation on the men’s restroom lavatory pipes on several subsequent occasions in 2009. Although Alianza stated that the floor trash can had been removed in the spring of 2007, when Mr. McSwain surveyed Taco Bell 4518 in March 2008, it had returned to the location in which the Special Master observed it to be an obstruction, and it was in that same location in photographs taken in the summer and fall of 2009. The van accessible parking sign, the men’s restroom lavatory insulation, and the trash can in the women’s restroom were out of compliance in summer and fall of 2009 despite the fact that Mr. McSwain’s report was issued on May 1, 2009, informing TBC of these violations. Mr. Evans surveyed Taco Bell 4518 on June 3, 2011 and did not find any of these violations. D. Construction and Relevant Alterations at Taco Bell 4518 Taco Bell Restaurant 4518 was constructed on November 18, 1991. Although the building was issued a certificate of occupancy, TBC did not produce any evidence at trial that it had applied for, or been granted, an unnecessary hardship or any other exemption from the local building department in connection with the construction or any later alterations of Taco Bell 4518 that would have excused any deviations from Title 24. In addition, while TBC submitted building plans stamped by the City of San Pablo Building Department, and while Mr. Elmer testified concerning the general practices of building departments concerning plan review and inspections, TBC did not offer testimony from any individual with first-hand knowledge of the San Pablo Building Department’s plan review or inspection process with respect to Taco Bell 4518. TBC admitted in its responses to plaintiffs’ requests for admissions that the parking lot at Taco Bell 4518 was re-striped in about 2003, and again in about 2004; and that the restroom doors and the toilet in the women’s restroom were removed and replaced in about 2003. E. Readily Achievable Barrier Removal Plaintiffs rely on the ADA’s readily achievable barrier removal requirement for two of the violations at issue in Taco Bell 4518: the door closing time of the north entry doors, and the knee clearance under the two accessible dining tables surveyed in 2005. Plaintiffs’ expert James Terry estimated the cost (in 2001 dollars) of replacing the door closer and replacing the bases of two accessible tables to achieve compliant knee clearance at $1,386.04. He testified further that because this type of modification could be done while the restaurant was closed, there would be little impact on operations. Plaintiffs’ expert D. Paul Regan, a Certified Public Accountant, testified that it would have been easily accomplishable without much difficulty or expense for TBC to have incurred the cost of $1,386.04 to replace the door closers and table bases in 2001. Mr. Regan based this conclusion on an analysis of the profits from Taco Bell 4518 in 2001, from all California corporate-owned restaurants, from Taco Bell Corp., and from Yum!, TBC’s parent corporation. TBC did not offer any evidence relating to the cost, financial analysis, or impact of barrier removal at Taco Bell 4518. F. TBC’s Access Policies 1. Policies in place prior to 2005 Mr. Elmer became Director of ADA Compliance for TBC in 2005, and he currently holds that position at Yum! Brands, TBC’s parent company. In September 2005, plaintiffs took Mr. Elmer’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition as TBC’s “person most knowledgeable” about the company’s practices and policies concerning accessibility of architectural features at corporate restaurants in California. At his 2005 deposition, Mr. Elmer testified that TBC had no policies in place to monitor whether certain elements that change frequently remained in compliance with accessibility requirements, including entrance and restroom door force, door closing time, and restriping of parking lots. Mr. Elmer also testified that Facility Leaders were responsible for a number of accessibility tasks. Facility Leaders, for example, were responsible for ensuring that all repairs, and all minor construction that did not rise to the level of a restaurant remodel, complied with accessibility requirements. Facility Leaders were also responsible for providing “informal” training to restaurant employees about accessibility. Mr. Elmer testified that accessibility regulations are “highly technical, ha[ve] a number of different aspects, [are] in many cases beyond the expertise level of a facilities leader ...” Nevertheless, TBC did not provide Facility Leaders with accessibility training until 2005. For example, Jamie de Beers, the Facility Leader for Northern California from 1997 to 2005, testified in her deposition that she had not received any formal accessibility training until she attended an accessibility meeting in 2005. As a result, Ms. de Beers testified that, prior to the 2005 meeting, she had “no clue” about various accessibility requirements. She thought access regulations simply required being “able to get to the counter and be served. That, to me, was access and have a parking spot. And, now, it’s so confusing with the inches and the height.” 2. Policies from 2005 to present Beginning in 2005, and ending in late 2010, TBC issued a series of documents setting forth its accessibility policies. TBC’s access policies are centralized — policies in place at Taco Bell 4518 are also in place at all other California corporate Taco Bell restaurants. Over time, provisions in later policies contradicted provisions in earlier policies, and omitted architectural elements that had been covered by earlier policies. For example, TBC’s policy concerning door force changed from 8 pounds in 2005, to 5 pounds in 2006, to 5 pounds or 8.5 pounds in April 2009, depending upon the permitting date of a restaurant. By 2010, there were three policies in effect, each of which set forth a different standard for exterior door force. TBC’s “DMA Ops Leader” Erich Moxley testified at trial that it was his understanding that it is TBC’s policy that door opening force should be 8.5 pounds regardless of when the store was built, and a form dated October 2010 asks only whether the exteri- or doors open with 8.5 pounds of pressure or less. Similarly, although TBC’s 2005 policy covered closing time on restroom and entrance doors, Mr. Elmer testified that that issue had been omitted from TBC’s 2006 and 2009 policies. In addition, the evidence submitted at trial demonstrated that TBC had repeatedly violated its own policies. For example, Mr. Elmer testified that it has been TBC’s policy since 2005 to have accessible signs designating accessible parking spaces. Nevertheless, photographs admitted at trial demonstrated that there was no such signage at Restaurant 4518 in June 2007, March 2008, and the summer of 2009. Mr. Elmer also testified that it has been TBC’s policy since December 2006 not to locate trash cans in front of restroom accessories. However, photographs admitted at trial demonstrated that there was a trash can in front of the toilet seat cover dispenser in the women’s restroom of Restaurant 4518 in March 2008, in the summer of 2009 and at some point between August and October 2009. Mr. Elmer testified further that it has been TBC’s policy since at least at least 2007 to insulate water supply and drain pipes under restroom lavatories, yet photographs admitted at trial demonstrated that the pipes under the lavatory in the men’s restroom at Restaurant 4518 were not insulated in March 2008, in the summer of 2009, and at some point between August and October 2009. 3. Current policies concerning maintaining access. During the trial, Mr. Elmer identified four TBC policies that are intended to ensure that accessibility is maintained at its restaurants: (a) the Maintenance Technician Checklist; (b) Maintco surveys and the “3rd Party ADA Maintenance Vendor Checklist,” which is meant to be used during the surveys; (c) “Success Walks”; and (d) Pre-Opening “Access for the Disabled Walks” and the checklist of items that are supposed to be checked during those walks. According to Mr. Elmer, these four policies are in place at Taco Bell 4518, as well as all other California corporate Taco Bell restaurants. a. Maintenance Technician Checklist. According to testimony from Mr. Elmer, each time a Maintenance Technician visits a restaurant, he or she is supposed to check each of the 34 items listed on the ADA Maintenance Technician Checklist. The Maintenance Technician for Taco Bell 4518 is Doug Henry. TBC did not call Mr. Henry as a witness at trial. Nevertheless, during his deposition, Mr. Henry testified that he had never seen the ADA Maintenance Technician Checklist, that he did not understand what some of the items on the Checklist meant, and that his standard practice was to check only five of the 34 items on the Checklist. The ADA Maintenance Technician Checklist includes the following language in bold: “If a deviation from an applicable guideline is detected following an inspection, these item(s) shall be reviewed by our ADA Compliance team to determine whether certain limited exceptions to the guidelines apply, which will be evaluated on an item-by-item basis.” b. Maintco twice-yearly surveys According to Mr. Elmer, TBC has entered into a year-to-year contract with Maintco to perform twice yearly surveys of its restaurants. Those surveys began in mid-2009. Each time it surveys a Taco Bell restaurant, Maintco sends an invoice to TBC, and also sends a completed Maintco Checklist. At trial, TBC submitted invoices from Maintco for surveys of Taco Bell 4518. Based on those invoices, there was no Maintco survey at Taco Bell 4518 between June 12, 2009 and August 3, 2010. Based on Mr. Elmer’s testimony that Maintco began its surveys of Taco Bell 4518 by at least June 2009, there should be at least four, and possibly five, Maintco Checklists for that restaurant. At trial, TBC submitted only two such checklists for Taco Bell 4518. The Maintco Checklist includes the following language in bold: “If a deviation from an applicable guideline is detected following an inspection, these item(s) shall be reviewed by our ADA Compliance team to determine whether certain limited exceptions to the guidelines apply, which will be evaluated on an item-by-item basis.” c. Success walks According to Mr. Elmer, every 30 minutes, the manager in charge of a Taco Bell restaurant conducts a “success walk” through the restaurant, during which “they check for access for the items that the plaintiffs have raised here.” TBC did not submit the checklist used for the Success Walks at trial. Jeffrie Kuan-Bone, who for the last two years has been the Restaurant General Manager (“RGM”) at Taco Bell 4518, testified during his deposition that success walks do not address disability or ADA issues. TBC did not call Mr. Kuan-Bone as a witness at trial. d. Pre-opening “Access for the Disabled Walks” According to Mr. Elmer, each morning before a Taco Bell restaurant opens, the manager in charge is supposed to check each of the accessibility items on Ex. A-50, the “Access for the Disabled Walk.” Taco Bell RGMs were responsible for making sure that these walks occurred. Taco Bell did not call any employees at Taco Bell 4518 who were involved in the process of opening the restaurant, or whose responsibilities included conducting the preopening Access for the Disabled Walk. The only Taco Bell 4518 employee to testify in person, Ms. Contreras, testified that her shift started after the restaurant opened. Mr. Kuan-Bone testified during his deposition that he had never heard of a disabled walk, that he had never been given a checklist with specific disability issues, and that the pre-opening walk did not include any accessibility issues. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Having considered the evidence introduced at trial and the arguments made by counsel, the court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. A. Legal Standards The plaintiff class brings claims under the ADA, the Unruh Act, and the CDPA, alleging violations of applicable accessibility standards throughout the class period. 1. Title III of the ADA Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To state a claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; that the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and that the plaintiff was denied public accommodation by the defendant because of his or her disability. Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir.2010). The class is limited to individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters, and thus plaintiffs satisfy the first element. It is undisputed that the Taco Bell restaurants are places of public accommodation, which satisfies the second element. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B). The third element — whether plaintiffs were denied public accommodations on the basis of disability — is met if there was a violation of applicable accessibility standards. See, e.g., Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir.2011); Donald v. Cafe Royale, 218 Cal. App.3d 168, 183, 266 Cal.Rptr. 804 (1990). There are three categories of accessibility requirements under Title III of the ADA — the “new construction” provisions, which apply to public accommodations constructed after January 26, 1993; the “alteration” provisions, which apply to post-January 26, 1992 alterations to buildings that existed as of that date; and the “readily achievable” provisions, which apply to unaltered portions of buildings constructed before January 26,1993. All facilities built for first occupancy after January 26, 1993 are required to be “readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities, except where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to meet the requirements of the ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). All facilities built for first occupancy after January 26, 1993 must comply with the ADAAG. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406. Because Taco Bell 4518 was constructed in 1991, it is not governed by the “new construction” provisions of Title III. However, both the “alteration” and the “readily achievable” provisions do apply. Under the “alteration” provisions, the altered portion of any existing building altered after January 26,1992 is required, to the maximum extent feasible, to be “readily accessible to and useable by” individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). To meet this standard, alterations must comply with the ADAAG. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a). In existing but unaltered facilities, barriers must be removed where it is “readily achievable” to do so. The removal of barriers is “readily achievable” when it is “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(9), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The Ninth Circuit has not decided whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden of proof in showing that removal of an architectural barrier in a non-historic building is readily achievable, but various district courts throughout the Circuit have applied the burden-shifting framework set forth in Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. Partnership I, 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.2001). See, e.g., Johnson v. Beahm, 2011 WL 3665114 at *2 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); Vesecky v. Garick, Inc., 2008 WL 4446714, at *2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008). In Colorado Cross, the Tenth Circuit held that the “[pjlaintiff bears the initial burden of production to present evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable” and that if plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant, who “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding its affirmative defense that a suggested method of barrier removal is not readily achievable.” Id., 264 F.3d at 1006. Under either the “alterations” or “readily achievable” provision, whether an architectural element denies full and equal access to persons with disabilities is determined based on the ADAAG. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. 2. The Unruh Act and the CDPA The Unruh Act and the CDPA prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in the full and equal access to the services, facilities, and advantages of public accommodation. Public accommodations constructed subsequent to July 1, 1970 are subject to the requirements of Division 13, Part 5.5 of the California Health & Safety Code, relating to access to public accommodations by physically handicapped persons; and to the provisions of Chapter 7 (commencing with § 4450) of Division 5 of Title 1 of the California Government Code (access to public buildings by physically handicapped persons). Since December 31, 1981, the standards governing the physical accessibility of public accommodations in California include those set forth in Title 24 of the California regulatory code (“California standards” or “Title 24”). The California Standards apply to all alterations to facilities, requiring that the altered portion — including a primary entrance to a building, the primary path of travel to the altered portion of the facility, and restrooms serving the altered area — be brought into compliance with the then-applicable standards. See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 24 (1981) § 2-105(b)(ll)(B)(4); id. (1984) § 2-105(b)(ll)(B)(4); id. (1987) § 2-110(b)(ll)(B)(4); id. (1989) § 110A(b)(ll)(B)(4); id. (1994) § 110(11)(B)(4); id. (1989) § 1134B.2.1. Because Taco Bell 4518 was constructed in 1991, all elements must comply with Title 24, and the applicable standards are those promulgated in 1989. Cal.Code Regs., tit. 24 (1989). Title 24 also applies to alterations, requiring that the altered portion be brought into compliance with the then-applicable standards. See id. (1989) § 110A(b)(ll)(B)(4); id. (2002) § 1134B.2. A violation of the standards in Title 24 constitutes a violation of both the Unruh Act and the CDPA. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 433, 439 (N.D.Cal.1994). In addition, the Unruh Act, since 1992, and the CDPA, since 1996, have also provided that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] ... constitute^] a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ.Code §§ 51(f), 54(c). 3. Maintenance of accessible features Both the ADA and state law require TBC to “maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 36.211; Cal.Code Regs., tit. 24 (2002) § 1101B.3. B. Standing TBC argues that because it has remediated the numerous barriers found by the Special Master and plaintiffs expert, and because it has implemented new policies since the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiffs have no standing to seek injunctive relief, which is the only remedy available to private parties for violations of the ADA. Standing is a threshold matter central to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir.2007); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1148, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (Article III limits judicial power to “cases” and “controversies”). Constitutional standing has three elements. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered or is threatened with an injury that is both “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” that there is a causal link between the injury and the conduct of which the plaintiff complains — that is, that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged conduct; and that the injury is “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Bates, 511 F.3d at 985 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quotations omitted)); see also Skaff v. Meridien North America Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir.2007). The evidence relevant to the standing inquiry consists of “the facts as they existed at the time the plaintiff filed the complaint.” D’Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Skaff 506 F.3d at 838); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2130. A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Bates, 511 F.3d at 985. In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th Cir.2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504-05, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005). Under the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an accessibility barrier violating its provisions, it is not necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely preclude the plaintiff from entering or from using a facility in any way. See Doran v. 7-Elev-en, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 n. 4 (9th Cir.2008) (the ADA “does not limit its anti-discrimination mandate to barriers that completely prohibit access”). Rather, the barrier need only interfere with the plaintiffs “full and equal enjoyment” of the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Once a disabled individual has encountered or become aware of ADA violations that interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation, “he has already suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant’s conduct and capable of being redressed by the courts, and so he possesses standing under Article III.” Doran, 524 F.3d at 1042 n. 5. In addition, an ADA plaintiff who has Article III standing as a result of at least one barrier at a place of public accommodation may, in one suit, challenge all barriers in that public accommodation that are related to his or her specific disability. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950-51 (citing Doran, 524 F.3d at 1047). Thus, a plaintiff need not have encountered all the barriers that impede his or her access in order to have standing to seek an injunction to remove those barriers. Id. at 951-53. In addition, in evaluating whether a civil rights litigant has satisfied the requirements set forth in Lujan, the court should take a broad view of standing, “especially where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.” Doran, 524 F.3d at 1039-40 (citation and quotation omitted). Here, TBC does not argue that plaintiffs lacked standing at the time the original complaint was filed in 2002. Indeed, testimony at trial established that in 2002, named plaintiff Katherine Corbett personally encountered barriers at Taco Bell 4518, which impaired her full and equal enjoyment of the facility due to her particular disability — as did other members of the class. Thus, Corbett and the class members had standing to sue as to those barriers in addition to other barriers related to their disability. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. However, because “a disabled individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage of the litigation,” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946, TBC argues that plaintiffs do not currently have standing to seek injunctive relief. In the alternative, TBC asserts that because Taco Bell 4518 is currently compliant, plaintiffs’ claims have become moot. The argument that plaintiffs do not currently have standing to seek injunctive relief appears to be a challenge to the second prong of the “injury in fact” requirement — the requirement that the injury be “actual or imminent” — or, possibly, to the “redressability” requirement — the requirement that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. When a plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, the requirement that the injury be “actual and imminent” can be satisfied only where the plaintiff demonstrates “a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way;” that is, he “must establish a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” D’Lil, 538 F.3d at 1036-37; Bates, 511 F.3d at 985; see also Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946, 948. Here, TBC argues, because plaintiffs have conceded that Taco Bell 4518 is currently a compliant facility, they lack standing to seek injunctive relief because they cannot show that the injury is likely to recur. In Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit described two ways in which a plaintiff can show that an injury is likely to recur. First, a plaintiff may show that the defendant had, at the time of the injury, a written policy, and that the injury “stems from” that policy. Id., 275 F.3d at 861. “[W]here the harm alleged is directly traceable to a written policy, there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate future.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Second, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the harm is part of a “pattern of officially sanctioned ... behavior, violative of the plaintiffs’ [federal] rights.” Id. (quoting LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.1985)). “[W]here the defendants have repeatedly engaged in the injurious acts in the past, there is a sufficient possibility that they will engage in them in the near future to satisfy the ‘realistic repetition’ requirement.” Id. Later, in Chapman, the Ninth Circuit identified additional ways in which a plaintiff can show a likelihood of future injury. First, he can demonstrate an intent to return to a noncompliant accommodation. Id., 631 F.3d at 948-49. Evidence of past injury is particularly relevant to making this showing. Id. Second, he can demonstrate that he was deterred from visiting a noncompliant accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his disability there. Id. at 949-50. TBC contends that because Taco Bell 4518 is currently compliant, plaintiffs cannot establish standing to pursue injunctive relief by demonstrating an intent to return to a noncompliant facility. TBC asserts further that the trial record is devoid of any evidence indicating that named plaintiff Katherine Corbett had the specific intention to return to Taco Bell 4518 to re-encounter the noncompliant barriers that she encountered during her pre-lawsuit visit to Taco Bell 4518. The court finds, however, that plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief in this case. First, named plaintiff Ms. Corbett, and class members Ms. Harry, and Ms. Westbrook-White, all testified at trial that they plan to patronize Taco Bell 4518 in the future. In her deposition, class member Ms. Cone also testified that she plans to patronize Taco Bell 4518 once she has returned to California from her temporary stay in North Carolina. Whether plaintiffs will encounter barriers on those return trips cannot be known with certainty. However, the court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently established a likelihood that the injury will recur by showing that TBC “repeatedly engaged in injurious acts in the past.” See Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 861. Finally, to the extent that TBC argues that the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because the violations have been remediated, and the claims are therefore moot, the court notes that while the doctrine of mootness requires that an actual, ongoing controversy exist at all stages of the federal court proceeding, the mootness doctrine is “applied ... flexibly, particularly where the issues remain alive.” Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.2011). This issue is addressed, below, in the discussion of TBC’s voluntary cessation defense. C. Findings regarding twelve elements at Taco Bell 4518 Both the ADAAG and Title 24 provide that “all dimensions are subject to conventional building industry tolerances for field conditions.” ADAAG § 3.2; see also, e.g., Cal.Code Regs., tit. 24 (2002) § 1101B.4. In this case, the parties stipulated in their February 1, 2005 Joint Status Conference Statement that once plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of a violation, TBC would bear the burden of proof to put on expert testimony regarding applicable conventional building industry tolerances. The parties subsequently stipulated to a number of specific tolerances, and TBC provided others in responses to interrogatories. The only elements not covered by either stipulations or interrogatory responses are door force, door closing time, and knee clearance. Following the exemplar trial, and the parties’ submission of their proposed findings, TBC submitted additional argument to the court, in which it asserts that based on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Company, 654 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.2011), any findings by the court in this action with respect to barriers that violate the ADA must be limited to specific barriers alleged in the first amended complaint (“FAC”), which is the operative complaint. TBC contends that because the FAC identified only two barriers at Taco Bell 4518—the narrow queue line and inaccessible parking—plaintiffs failed to give TBC “fair notice” of the claims asserted against it, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). The court does not agree that Oliver controls this case. As an initial matter, Oliver is distinguishable because it was not a class action. To apply the reasoning in Oliver to a class action would arguably vitiate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. While the named plaintiffs know which barriers they encountered, they do not necessarily know which of the barriers that existed at the time the suit was filed posed a problem for the unnamed class members. At most, Oliver would require the named plaintiffs to list the barriers they themselves encountered, which the have done. Nor does the court agree that plaintiffs failed to give TBC notice of the specific claims asserted against it. This case, which was filed in December 2002, has been pending for nearly nine years. TBC took the depositions of the named plaintiffs in 2003, at which time the plaintiffs described encountering the following barriers: inaccessible parking, inadequate parking signage, path of travel to entry doors, heavy and otherwise inaccessible entry and restroom doors, narrow queue lines, inaccessible self-service items, insufficient accessible seating, low toilet seats, uninsulated lavatory pipes, and inaccessible restroom amenities. TBC acknowledged many of these claimed barriers in its opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. TBC was also put on notice of the claimed barriers when it received the report of Bob Evans, the Special Master, in mid-2005. Mr. Evans is an accessibility expert who was jointly retained by plaintiffs and TBC to conduct a survey of all the Taco Bell restaurants (starting with a pilot program of 20 stores). He was instructed jointly by the parties as to which elements he should survey in each restaurant. It is undisputed that Mr. Evans provided a complete survey of all the barriers existing in TBC’s corporate restaurants in 2004-2005. Many of the barriers were also documented by plaintiffs’ own expert Eric McSwain in his May 2009 report, to which TBC provided a line-by-line response, and by TBC’s contractors in 2007 and 2009. For TBC to argue, based on the facts in Oliver, that it was not placed on notice of the claimed violations because not all the barriers were listed in the FAC, is to elevate form over substance. Moreover, when it denied TBC’s 2009 motion for summary judgment, the court ordered an exemplar trial as to a single store, and ordered plaintiffs to submit a list showing remediated, unremediated, and recurring violations, which plaintiffs did on June 23, 2010. Further, in preparation for the trial of the exemplar store, the parties filed a Joint Pretrial Statement on April 7, 2011, in which plaintiffs listed the barriers at Taco Bell 4518, relying on their June 23, 2010 filing. At the pretrial conference, TBC objected and attempted to limit the barriers, but the objection was overruled, on the basis that TBC had been on notice for a year (since June 23, 2010) of all the barriers, including those at Taco Bell 4518. The court indicated that the barriers listed on pages 29 and 30 of the Pretrial Statement would be the ones that would be tried during the exemplar trial. Pleadings are superceded by a pretrial order, see DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace & Def. Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2001), and parties are therefore held to be on notice that issues set forth in a pretrial order are the issues to be tried. 1. Van accessible parking space Wheelchair vans generally have lifts or ramps that fold out of the passenger side; thus, they require a wider access aisle to permit the user to wheel down and then off the lift or ramp, and then to retract the lift or ramp into the van. See United States Dep’t of Justice, ADA Technical Assistance, Design Details: Van Accessible Parking (“Design Details”), http:// www.ada.gov/adatal.pdf at 15. Although the 1989 version of Title 24 did not require van accessible spaces, both the ADAAG and Title 24 (2002) require that one out of every eight spaces be van accessible, defined as an accessible space adjacent to a 96-inch-wide access aisle. ADAAG § 4.1.2(5)(b); CabCode Regs., tit. 24 (2002) § 1129B.3.2. Because the parking lot at Taco Bell 4518 was restriped in 2003 and 2004, the alterations provisions of both laws required that TBC bring the parking lot into compliance with the ADAAG and Title 24. The Special Master measured the access aisle at 60 inches in 2005. The parties have stipulated that the ADAAG tolerance for the width of the access aisle is 94 inches, and TBC stated in interrogatory responses that the same tolerance applies under Title 24. The access aisle is thus out of compliance with the ADAAG and Title 24 (2002). TBC argues that restriping is not an alteration sufficient to invoke the requirement that it provide a van accessible space with required access aisle. However, the Special Master testified that each time the parking lot was restriped constituted an alteration and TBC was thus requir