Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET ENTRY # 25) BOWLER, United States Magistrate Judge. Pending before this court is a motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry #25) filed by defendants Barnstable Police Department, Town of Barnstable, John Klimm (“Klimm”), Chief John Finnegan (retired) (“Chief Finnegan”), Chief Paul McDonald (“Chief McDonald”), Detective Sergeant John F. Murphy (“Murphy”), Sergeant Arthur Caido (“Caido”) and Sergeant Richard Morse (“Morse”) (collectively: “defendants”) pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.CivJ?. (“Rule 56”). PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 28, 2009, plaintiff John E. Boyle (“Boyle”) filed a verified complaint (Docket Entry # 1) against defendants in which he raises various federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). Count One alleges that defendants violated Boyle’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. Count Two alleges that defendants violated Boyle’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring against him in violation of section 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (“section 1985”). Count Three alleges that defendants violated Boyle’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to prevent or neglecting to prevent harassment, a malicious prosecution and conspiracy targeting Boyle. The count also alleges that Barnstable Police Department and the Town of Barnstable had an official policy or custom of failing to instruct and supervise Caido, Morse and Finnegan to refrain from maliciously harassing and prosecuting citizens and from conspiring to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. In addition to the aforementioned federal claims, Boyle raises state law claims against defendants for malicious prosecution (Count Four); abuse of process (Count Five); conspiracy (Count Six); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Seven); and libel, slander and defamation (Count Eight). Defendants move for summary judgment on both the federal and state law claims. Defendants additionally seek to dismiss Murphy and Chief McDonald because the complaint does not make any specific factual allegations against them. Defendants also seek dismissal of the Barnstable Police Department because it is not a legal entity subject to suit and dismissal of the Town of Barnstable because a municipality cannot incur liability under a theory of respondeat superior. Finally, defendants submit that the individual defendants are subject to qualified immunity. On March 22, 2011, this court held a hearing and took the motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry #25) under advisement. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is designed “to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Davila v. Corporación De Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publico, 498 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When the record shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” summary judgment is appropriate. Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the nonmoving party.” Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir.2008). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Id. “The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) (citation, internal brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “After such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor.” Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir.1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party, who bears the ultimate burden of proof, may not rest on allegations in his briefs, see Borschow Hosp. & Med. v. Cesar Castillo, 96 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.1996), “but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.” McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995). Where, as here, a complaint is verified, it is appropriate to consider factual averments based on personal knowledge therein as the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. See Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262-1263 (1st Cir.1991). Defendants submit a LR. 56.1 statement of undisputed facts. Uncontroverted statements of fact in the LR. 56.1 statement comprise part of the summary judgment record. See Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2003) (the plaintiffs failure to contest date in LR. 56.1 statement of material facts caused date to be admitted on summary judgment); Stonkus v. City of Brockton School Department, 322 F.3d 97, 102 (1st Cir.2003) (citing LR. 56.1 and deeming admitted undisputed material facts that the plaintiff failed to controvert); see also Kenda Corp., Inc. v. Pot O’Gold Money Leagues, Inc., 329 F.3d 216, 225 n. 7 (1st Cir.2003) (citing principle that “ ‘[p]ro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law ”). The court also examines the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolves any reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Dasey v. Anderson, 304 F.3d 148, 153 (1st Cir.2002). Construing the facts in Boyle’s favor for the purpose of adjudicating the summary judgment motion, they show the following. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Boyle, a longtime resident of Hyannis, Massachusetts, served on the Barnstable Town Council for six years. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 1). At all times relevant to this action, Boyle was the owner and chief executive officer of King’s Coach, Inc. (“King’s Coach”), a sedan, van and limousine service provider licensed in the Town of Barnstable. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 1). The instant action arises out of events between Boyle and defendants in connection with the licensing and operation of King’s Coach in 2006. The Town of Barnstable Rules and Regulations for the Regulation of Taxi Cabs and the Operation Thereof (“Rules and Regulations”) dictate that an individual must obtain a permit from the Barnstable Town Manager in order to operate a livery business in the Town of Barnstable. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 2; Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). In order to acquire a permit, which the Rules and Regulations also refer to as “a vehicle for hire license,” a business must have its vehicles inspected and pay a fee. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 2; Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). Section 21 of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 40 (“section 21”) allows towns such as Barnstable to prescribe such ordinances and bylaws and affix monetary penalties not exceeding a certain amount for any breach. Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 40, § 21. The permit also designates the number of vehicles the business may use under the permit. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). The Rules and Regulations also provide that “the Chief of Police of the Town of Barnstable or any person or persons so designated by the Chief of Police” may act as the examiner for the regulations. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 8; Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations, a vehicle for hire license “shall be valid for such term as the Examiner shall determine.” (Docket Entry # 32, Ex. 2; Docket Entry # 33). The examiner may suspend or revoke a license at any time if he believes the license holder violated any of the Rules and Regulations. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 8; Docket Entry # 32; Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). The examiner must, however, notify the license holder of the suspension or revocation in writing as well as inform the licensee of his right to a hearing before the Town Manager. (Docket Entry # 32; Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). “A request for a hearing [however] shall not delay any suspension or revocation.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 2). Boyle founded King’s Coach in April of 2000. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 2). At its peak, the company owned 20 vehicles and employed 35 drivers and eight office staff. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 2). In 2004 and 2005, King’s Coach raised $980,000 and $880,000 in revenues, respectively. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 2). Boyle also owned and operated Shuttle King, “a shared ride shuttle service operating in 40 cit[ies] and towns” in Massachusetts. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 2). The Department of Telecommunications and Energy licensed Shuttle King, not the Town of Barnstable. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 2). On August 18, 2005, Boyle purchased Five Star Enterprises, Inc. (“Five Star”), a “rubbish and demolition and construction collection service” operating in Falmouth, Massachusetts (“Falmouth”), from a court appointed receiver. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 4). On November 16, 2005, Thomas Geiler (“Geiler”), the Town of Barnstable licensing agent, notified Boyle that he must have the livery vehicles inspected at the Barnstable police station on December 13 or 14, 2005, in order to obtain 2006 permits for King’s Coach. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 4; Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 11). Boyle did not submit the vehicles for inspection on either date. On December 20, 2005, the Town of Barnstable Office of Regulatory Services (“Office of Regulatory Services”) contacted Boyle and advised him that the permits were in jeopardy of not being renewed. (Docket Entry # 11, ¶ 10). Boyle instead applied for a limousine license in the Town of Falmouth with the hope of consolidating his business operations there. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 12). In December 2005, Falmouth Town Manager Whitenour (“Whitenour”) notified Boyle that, “King’s Coach could not obtain a license in Falmouth due to prejudice of then Falmouth Police Chief David Cusolito.” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 12). Under Whitenour’s direction, Boyle withdrew the license application. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 12). Due to ongoing bad publicity and “financial considerations,” Boyle placed King’s Coach and Five Star up for sale. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 13). He sold Five Star on or about May 1, 2006. Boyle also “contacted the Licensing Division of Barnstable who agreed to allow Boyle an extension on renewing his limousine license because of a potential sale.” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 14). Boyle met with Thomas Geiler (“Geiler”), the Town of Barnstable licensing agent, at least three times regarding the extension. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 15). Geiler assured Boyle that “things were OK” and advised him to renew his licenses “at some point.” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 15). Relying on Geiler’s assurances, Boyle continued operating King’s Coach. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 15; Docket Entry # 32, p. 9). In a letter dated June 5, 2006, the Office of Regulatory Services warned Boyle that if he did not renew his permits by June 20, 2006, the permits would be considered “null and void.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 1). The letter extended Boyle’s permits and notified him that the Town “considered his permits to be valid at least until June 20, 2006.” (Docket Entry # 32, pp. 4, 8-10). The Office of Regulatory Services, however, sent the letter to an address Boyle had not occupied in over four years. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 38). Unaware of the deadline until September 2006, Boyle did not have his vehicles inspected or his permits renewed by June 20, 2006. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 6). On June 28, 2006, Geiler sent an email to Sergeant Sean Sweeney (“Sergeant Sweeney”) of the Barnstable Police Department informing him that King’s Coach did not have valid 2006 permits. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 1; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 7). “On or about July 2, 2006, the Barnstable Police Department stopped,” towed and impounded a King’s Coach vehicle for operating without a valid registration. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 9). It was later determined that a Massachusetts Turnpike Authority vehicle transponder had malfunctioned, causing the Fast Lane to mistakenly cancel the vehicle’s registration without notice. (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 9). Following this incident, Boyle telephoned Chief Finnegan in an attempt to schedule a meeting to discuss the' impounding of the vehicle and the allegations in a recent article published by the Cape Cod Times. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 26). After approximately five days and numerous telephone calls, Chief Finnegan called Boyle back and told him he was not available for a meeting. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 27). Boyle made similar attempts to contact the Town Manager and Director of Licensing to no avail. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 28). On August 9, 2006, Caido, as the complainant, filed an application for a criminal complaint against Boyle. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 2). At his deposition, Caido, the police prosecutor along with Morse for the Barnstable Police Department in 2006, described his role as presenting “the police reports and facts to a magistrate” who “determine[s] if there is probable cause to charge somebody.” (Docket Entry #33, Ex. 5; Docket Entry # 29, Ex. 15). The Barnstable District Court (“the court”) issued a criminal complaint on August 31, 2006, charging Boyle with two counts of violating a municipal bylaw or ordinance for operating a limousine service without a license on July 10, 2006 and July 21, 2006, in violation of section 21. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 2; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 10). On February 20, 2007, Boyle pleaded guilty. The court set November 15, 2007, as the end date of probation and issued a continuance without a finding. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 2). The court ordered Boyle to pay $200 in court costs, which he paid on June 19, 2007. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 2). At the end of a probationary period on November 15, 2007, the court discharged both counts and closed the case. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 2). On August 28, 2006, Morse, as the complainant, filed an application for a criminal complaint against Boyle for two offenses allegedly committed on July 17, 2006. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). The application charged Boyle with one count of larceny under $250 in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 260, section 30 (“section 30”) and another count for violating a municipal bylaw or ordinance for operating a business without a license in violation of section 21. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 11). Morse based the larceny count on allegations made by Richard Verling (“Verling”) that King’s Coach charged his credit card $141.88 for a reservation he cancelled in advance. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). On February 20, 2007, the court dismissed the larceny count. Boyle pleaded guilty to the operating without a license charge on February 20, 2007. The court set November 15, 2007, as the end date for probation and continued the matter without a finding. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). The court also ordered Boyle to pay $100 for court costs, which Boyle paid on June 19, 2007. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). At the end of a probationary period on November 15, 2007, the court dismissed the operating without a license count and closed the case. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). On August 29, 2006, Caido, as the complainant, filed an application for a criminal complaint against Boyle for two offenses allegedly committed on August 16, 2006. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4). The application charged Boyle with two offenses, the first a larceny over $250 in violation of section 30 and the second a violation of a municipal bylaw or ordinance for operating a business without a license in violation of section 21. On the same day, the court issued a criminal complaint charging Boyle with one count of larceny over $250 and one count of violating a municipal ordinance for operating a business without a license. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 12; Docket Entry # 29, Ex. 15). Caido based the larceny charge on allegations made by Carmel Fisher (“Fisher”) that King’s Coach failed to pick her up at the Omni Parker House in Boston, Massachusetts but nevertheless charged her $407.20 for the unperformed services. (Docket Entry #26, Ex. 4; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 12). On February 20, 2007, the court dismissed the charge of larceny and held a hearing on the charge of the operating without a license. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4). Boyle acknowledged sufficient facts on the operating without a license charge and the court issued a continuance without a finding. (Docket Entry #26, Ex. 4). The court assessed Boyle a $100 fee for court costs, which Boyle paid on June 19, 2007. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4). At the end of a probationary period on November 15, 2007, the court dismissed the operating without a license count and closed the case. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4). On October 3, 2006, Morse, as the complainant, filed an application for a criminal complaint against Boyle for four offenses allegedly committed on October 2, 2006. (Docket Entry #26, Ex. 5). The court issued a criminal complaint on that same day charging Boyle with driving with a suspended license, operating a motor vehicle without an inspection, operating a motor vehicle without proper registration, and a number plate violation. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 5; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 14). On December 7, 2006, the court dismissed the driving with a suspended license charge and held a hearing on the remaining charges. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 5). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Boyle responsible for the remaining three offenses and issued civil assessments totaling $115. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 5; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 14). On December 8, 2006, Boyle paid the fee and the court closed the case. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 5). On November 2, 2006, Alan J. Green (“Green”), as the complainant, filed an application for a criminal complaint against Boyle for an offense allegedly committed on July 10, 2006. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 6). The court issued a criminal complaint on December 7, 2006, charging Boyle with a failure to obtain workers’ compensation insurance. (Docket Entry #26, Ex. 6). Following Boyle’s admission to sufficient facts on March 15, 2007, the court issued a continuance without a finding. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 6). The court ordered Boyle to pay $750 in court costs, which he paid on March 14, 2008. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 6). At the end of a probationary period on July 8, 2008, the court closed the case. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 6). On July 21, 2006, the Cape Cod Times published an article that stated Boyle “is in trouble with former employees, the state attorney general’s office, the town of Barnstable and would-be customers.” (Docket Entry # 38, Ex. 22). The article detailed that Boyle operated King’s Coach “illegally for nearly six months” and “allegedly left customers in the lurch.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). The article reported that, “The attorney general’s fair labor division” issued two citations against Boyle for failing to pay wages and the court “processed a complaint against Boyle for failure to have workers compensation insurance.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). The article states that Boyle did not “renew his permit to run a livery business in Barnstable by” December 31, 2005, “as required” and includes Boyle’s explanation that he did not have $1,500 in January for the license fee. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). The Cape Cod Times published a follow up article on September 8, 2006, outlining the various allegations raised against Boyle and King’s Coach. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). The article described Fisher and Verling’s complaints against King’s Coach “for allegedly charging their credit cards but not providing limo service.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). It also quoted similar allegations made by other King’s Coach customers. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). The newspaper also reported that the Barnstable Police Department levied “four criminal complaints against [Boyle] ... for allegedly operating his company King’s Coach without a livery license.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22). Boyle filed suit against the Cape Cod Times seeking $12,500,000 in damages for the “inaccurate, incorrect, misrepresented and untrue” content of these articles. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 25). Boyle notes in the complaint that he would introduce “approximately 30 plus criminal and administrative charges against him” as to which he was found not guilty. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 39). During one unidentified court proceeding, Boyle states that “a Judge asked the prosecutor” why Boyle was here and commented that, “[Boyle] has committed no crime.” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 39 & 40). The complaint, which is verified, also states that the Barnstable Police Department “refused to assist, and, further, outright avoided protecting [Boyle] and his family.” (Docket Entry #1, ¶ 40). For example, the Barnstable Police Department did not assist him when someone loosened the lug nuts on all four tires of his personal vehicle, stole the license plates from all of King’s Coach’s vehicles, smashed a car through his fence and burglarized his office. The police also failed to protect him from receiving threatening telephone calls. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 40). King’s Coach suspended operations on July 26, 2006. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 31). Boyle asserts that the actions taken by the Barnstable Police Department and town officials caused the suspension of operations. By letter dated November 4, 2009, Boyle wrote to the First Magistrate of the Barnstable District Court that “Police prosecutor Caido” was not dropping a criminal application scheduled for a December 4, 2009 hearing even though “ALL parties have rectified their differences.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 17) (capitalization in original). Boyle also noted he had requested a hearing on two citations issued by the Barnstable Board of Health that were not mailed to Boyle’s correct address. Boyle also advised the First Magistrate that Caido was “attempting to extract revenge on [him] by any means possible.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 17). By letter dated November 4, 2009, Boyle wrote to the Cape and Islands District Attorney in Barnstable, attached the foregoing letter and noted his belief that Caido was “attempting to use his position in a manner that is retaliatory” as well as unconstitutional. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 17). On December 15, 2009, Boyle transmitted by facsimile to a Cape and Islands Assistant District Attorney three requests submitted under the Massachusetts Public Records Law to the Barnstable Police Department dated August 31, 2009. The cover letter noted that Boyle had received a reply to only one of the requests and suggested that the failure to respond raised an inference of a spoliation of evidence. In a January 8, 2010 reply letter to Boyle, the Cape and Islands Assistant District Attorney stated that the office would defer any determination on Boyle’s complaint about Caido pending conclusion of Boyle’s civil litigation. The Cape and Islands Assistant District Attorney also provided Boyle the address of the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s public records division which handles requests for public records. In a January 14, 2010 reply letter, Boyle complained about the deferral. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 17 & 20). DISCUSSION I. Murphy and Chief McDonald Defendants move to dismiss Chief McDonald and Murphy because they are not named in the complaint. Boyle counters that “[c]ount 4, Paragraph 62 of the complaint reads, ‘Defendants Town of Barnstable, Klimm, Chief Finnegan, Chief McDonald, Murphy, Caido and Morse are liable under the doctrine of respondent[sic] superior or partnership by estoppels [sic].’ ” (Docket Entry # 32, p. 2). The complaint, however, fails to name Murphy and Chief McDonald in count four, paragraph 62, or elsewhere except in the caption of the case. Second, Boyle argues that each of the claims names “all defendants” thereby including Murphy and Chief McDonald which is true. The complaint makes general references to “all the defendants” in the “wherefore” paragraphs and elsewhere states that “all defendants” are subject to section 1988, violated Boyle’s rights, are liable to Boyle for compensatory damages, retaliated or conspired against him, caused Boyle injury or acted maliciously. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 42-44, 46, 52, 54, 57, 59, 64-68, 70-71, 74-77, 80-83 & 85). These statements, however, constitute no more than legal conclusions or conclusory statements and cannot withstand summary judgment. See Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.2010) (noting requirement to ignore “ ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation’ ” on summary judgment); Triangle Trading Company, Inc. v. Robroy Industries, Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (same); see, e.g., Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir.2000) (averment that “ ‘Defendant Arcilio Alvarado actively discriminated against plaintiff [sic] he was responsible for taking away his responsibilities for transferring him and was the one who clearly identified plaintiff as a member of the Popular Democratic Party ... merely repeats the conclusory allegations in the complaint” and therefore “does not establish a genuine issue of material fact”); Malloch v. Town of Hanover, 2011 WL 487787, *6 & n. 8 (D.Mass. Feb. 7, 2011) (general reference to “‘defendants’ conduct’ ” with respect to “hostile work environment claim” without “any specific actions by Barron supportive of [the] claim” did not avoid summary judgment). The complaint is likewise bereft of any facts that apply to Murphy or to Chief McDonald. Third, Boyle argues he was prevented from deposing Murphy or Chief McDonald. Boyle asserts that had he been allowed to conduct the requested discovery, he would have been able to show “a strong supervisory relationship to other named defendants and a direct wilful participation in the allegations made in the complaint.” (Docket Entry # 32). Rule 56(d), formerly Rule 56(f), addresses the circumstance in which facts are not available to the summary judgment target. By its terms, the rule requires an affidavit or declaration. Rule 56(d), Fed. R.Civ.P. Boyle’s pro se status does not insulate him from complying with Rule 56(d). See Kenda Corp. v. Pot O’Gold Money Leagues, 329 F.3d at 225 n. 7 (“ ‘Pro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law’ ”). Boyle also fails to articulate a plausible basis for his belief that a supervisory relationship and/or wilful participation existed. Murphy and Chief McDonald are therefore subject to summary judgment. II. Barnstable Police Department and Town of Barnstable Defendants also move to dismiss the section 1983 claims against the Town of Barnstable because a municipality cannot be subject to suit under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Defendants also argue there is no policy or custom sufficient to provide the requisite link between the policy or custom and the unconstitutional conduct as required for section 1983 claims. The doctrine that a municipality cannot incur liability under section 1983 based on respondeat superior is well established. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Seros., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”). Instead, a plaintiff must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiffs injury.” Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Establishing municipal liability also requires a plaintiff to establish a direct link between a policy of the municipality and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-387, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); see Kennedy v. Town Of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520, 531 (1st Cir.2010) (“Monell can impose municipal liability only for underlying, identifiable constitutional violations attributable to official municipal policy”). In Count Three, Boyle alleges the existence of an “official policy or custom” of failing “to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline” to prevent the harassment, malicious prosecution and conspiracy targeting Boyle. Boyle fails, however, to set forth sufficient facts to avoid summary judgment as to the existence of such a custom or policy that promoted or fostered the alleged harassment, malicious prosecution and/or conspiracy. Dismissal of the section 1983 claims against the Town of Barnstable is therefore appropriate. Defendants additionally seek dismissal of the Barnstable Police Department because a police department does not operate as a separate legal entity from the municipality. The legal authority defendants provide, however, only applies to liability under section 1983. Defendants’ failure to provide legal authority outside the context of a section 1983 claim thereby limits the motion to seeking summary judgment only on the section 1983 claims. See LR. 7.1(b); see, e.g., Bose BV v. Zavala, 2010 WL 152072, *1 (D.Mass. Jan. 14, 2010) (failure to cite law relevant to the claims provided basis to deny motion to dismiss due to noncompliance with LR. 7.1(b)). Like a municipality, a police department “cannot be held liable in damages under § 1983 merely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 711 (1st Cir.1986); accord Lumpkin v. Lucey, 2010 WL 1794400, *2 (D.Mass. May 4, 2010) (“a municipal police department is not subject to suit under Section 1983”); see also Henschel v. Worcester Police Dept., 445 F.2d 624, 624 (1st Cir.1971) (dismissing section 1983 suit against police department because it is not a suable entity apart from the municipality). The section 1983 claims against the Barnstable Police Department are therefore subject to summary judgment. III. Malicious Prosecution Defendants move for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim (Count Four) because: (1) Klimm and Chief Finnegan did not institute criminal proceedings against Boyle; and (2) Caido and Morse had probable cause to file the applications for the criminal complaints. Defendants argue that the court dismissed the larceny charges and Boyle admitted to sufficient facts or plead guilty to the charges of operating a business without a license. Boyle maintains that Klimm and Chief Finnegan are liable under a theory of vicarious liability and that Caido and Morse lacked probable cause to file the applications for the criminal complaints. To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the defendants instituted the criminal prosecution. See Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir.2009); Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2001) (enumerating elements in prima facie case for malicious prosecution). Thus, there must be some involvement by the defendant in instituting the charges. Boyle’s argument that vicarious liability applies is therefore misplaced. It is nevertheless “well established that a person need not swear out a criminal complaint in order to be held answerable for malicious prosecution.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 572 N.E.2d 7, 10 (1991). Thus, in certain circumstances, “an individual who transmits untruthful information to an official with power to charge sometimes may be said to have instituted an ensuing criminal proceeding brought by that official.” Limone v. U.S., 579 F.3d at 89. The summary judgment record, however, is devoid of facts connecting either Klimm or Chief Finnegan to the criminal proceedings in a sufficient manner to allow a finder of fact to find that either individual instituted the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, Klimm and Chief Finnegan are not liable under the malicious prosecution claim in Count Four. Turning to defendants’ second argument, it is well established that a plaintiff must set out sufficient facts that the defendant acted without probable cause to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim. See Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir.2009); see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 257, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (courts should presume prosecutors commence litigation on legitimate grounds). “The probable cause standard,” however, presents “a ‘relatively low threshold’ for police officers to establish.” Sietins v. Joseph, 238 F.Supp.2d 366, 375 (D.Mass.2003) (citing White v. Town of Marblehead, 989 F.Supp. 345, 349 (D.Mass.1997)). Probable cause turns upon “whether the defendant acted reasonably in swearing out a complaint against the plaintiff on the basis of the information and knowledge which he possessed at that time.” Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1972). Probable cause “is ‘such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty.’” Id.; see also Zullo v. Town of Framingham, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 1112, 2002 WL 1868147, *1 (Mass.App.Ct.2002) (quoting Lincoln, 277 N.E.2d at 702). Defendants also correctly maintain that a malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to establish termination of the underlying proceedings in the plaintiffs favor. See Limone, 579 F.3d at 89; see also Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1999) (“[sjuccessful termination of the underlying action is a ‘threshold requirement’ of the claim” for malicious prosecution). Defendants point out that Boyle either pled guilty or admitted to sufficient facts. (Docket Entry # 26). The complaint described four charges levied against Boyle: (1) the larceny perpetrated against Fisher in violation of section 30; (2) the August 16, 2006 ordinance violation for operating a business without a license in violation of section 21; (3) the larceny perpetrated against Verling in violation of section 30; and (4) the July 17, 2006 ordinance violation for operating a business without a license in violation of section 21, As to the first charge, the Barnstable Police Department learned about the alleged improper charges to Fisher’s credit card when she contacted the department on August 21, 2006. On August 22, 2006, a police detective conducted another conversation with Fisher as part of the pre-filing investigation of the complaint. (Docket Entry #26, Ex. 4). The facts provided gave rise to strong suspicion that Boyle had unlawfully taken money from Fisher without providing the service or a refund. Caido filed the charges against Boyle on August 29, 2006, after the Barnstable Police Department learned about the facts in the case. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4, p. 2). Caido’s reliance on the police records and the reports made by the victim provide the necessary probable cause to bring the charge. See Galvin v. McManus, 2011 WL 2738176, *1 (Mass.Super. April 20, 2011) (“information from an identified individual provides a reasonable belief that a crime was committed” and therefore “the pursuit of a criminal complaint against the plaintiff was supported by probable cause”); see also White v. Town of Marble-head, 989 F.Supp. at 350. As the summary judgment target, Boyle fails to provide facts to suggest that Caido lacked probable cause. As to the second charge, the Barnstable Police Department knew that King’s Coach’s vehicles did not have a valid 2006 permit to operate as early as June 28, 2006, when Geiler emailed Sweeney. In fact, the email asked Sweeney to “make the patrol force aware that King’s Coach has no valid 06 permits.” (Docket Entry #26, Ex. 1 & 11). Caido filed charges against Boyle thereafter on August 29, 2006, for operating a business without a license. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 4). On February 20, 2007, Boyle admitted to sufficient facts and the court continued the matter without a finding. Boyle’s admission to sufficient facts contradicts his claims of innocence regarding the charge of violating a municipal bylaw or ordinance for operating a business without a license. Accordingly, the court did not terminate the proceeding on this charge in Boyle’s favor as a matter of law. See Wynne v. Rosen, 391 Mass. 797, 464 N.E.2d 1348, 1351 (1984); see also Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d at 31 (noting there is “successful termination of the underlying action as long as the circumstances ‘compelled] an inference that there existed a lack of reasonable grounds to pursue the prosecution’ ”) (quoting Wynne, 464 N.E.2d at 1351); Simmons v. City of Brockton, 1994 WL 725181, *1 (D.Mass. Dec. 15,1994) (dismissal of criminal case when the plaintiff “stipulated that she would not run an illegal boarding house in the future” was not favorable termination for purposes.of malicious prosecution claim). As to the third charge, Verling independently contacted the Barnstable Police on July 18, 2006, to complain about the unauthorized charge on his credit card. According to police records, Verling spoke to a detective on July 18, 2006, and explained he had made a reservation with King’s Coach on July 12, 2006, for a July 18, 2006 pick-up at Logan Airport. He later canceled the pick-up by telephoning King’s Coach and speaking to a clerk who assured Verling he would note the cancellation and Verling would receive a credit for the existing July 17, 2006 charge of $141.88 for the July 18, 2006 pick-up. The police records also note that on August 7, 2006, Verling contacted his credit card company and “was advised that King’s Coach had not sent in a notification to credit his account.” (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). As a result of this information, Morse filed the application for the criminal complaint on August 29, 2006, charging Boyle with larceny under $250. (Docket Entry 26, Ex. 3; Docket Entry # 28, ¶ 3). Examining the totality of the circumstances, Morse had probable cause to file the application for a criminal complaint for the larceny charge as a matter of law. See Galvin v. McManus, 2011 WL 2738176, at *1; see also White v. Town of Marblehead, 989 F.Supp. at 350. As to the fourth charge, Morse filed the application for a criminal complaint charging Boyle for operating King’s Coach without a license in violation of a municipal bylaw or ordinance. Boyle pleaded guilty to the charge on February 20, 2007. The court set a probationary period and continued the matter without a finding. (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 3). Boyle’s guilty plea regarding the charge of violating a municipal bylaw or ordinance for operating a business without a license contravenes his claim of innocence. Hence, insufficient facts exist to avoid summary judgment relative to the required element that the proceedings terminated in Boyle’s favor. See Alphagary Corp. v. Gitto, 2007 WL 1829396, *2 (Mass.Super. May 21, 2007) (“the initial or underlying case is the criminal proceeding which did not end in Newline’s favor; it resulted in a guilty plea” and the malicious prosecution “cause of action fails as a matter of law”). In sum, as the summary judgment target, Boyle fails to meet his underlying burden of showing sufficient facts to avoid summary judgment on the malicious prosecution elements of lack of probable cause and termination in his favor. Further, any claim of malicious prosecution against Klimm and Chief Finnegan fails to survive summary judgment given the absence of sufficient facts that either instituted the criminal proceedings at issue. IV. Abuse of Process Defendants seek summary judgment on the abuse of process claim (Count Five) because: (1) Klimm and Chief Finnegan did not participate in any proceedings involving Boyle; and (2) Caido and Morse did not have an improper motive. Turning to the first argument, an abuse of process claim requires that the defendants participate in judicial proceedings against the plaintiff. See Piccone v. McClain, 720 F.Supp.2d 139, 146 (D.Mass.2010) (citing Gutierrez v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 772 N.E.2d 552, 563 (2002)) (enumerating elements in prima facie claim for abuse of process). The summary judgment record does not include sufficient facts to create a genuine issue concerning either Klimm or Chief Finnegan’s participation in the criminal proceedings at issue. Thus, Klimm and Chief Finnegan are not liable under the abuse of process claim in Count Five. Turning to the second argument, in order to establish an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must provide evidence of an ulterior purpose. See McCarthy v. City of Newburyport, 252 Fed.Appx. 328, 333-34 (1st Cir.2007); Piccone, 720 F.Supp.2d at 146. As recently reiterated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, an ulterior purpose exists when the defendant uses process “ ‘ “to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.” ’ ” Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 947 N.E.2d 520, 534 (2011) (quoting Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 187 N.E.2d 859, 861 (1963)). The tort “ ‘has been described as a “form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money.” ’ ” Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 781 N.E.2d 780, 783 n. 3 (2002). Filing a groundless claim “is relevant because it may “ ‘tend to show that the process was used for an ulterior purpose.”’” Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 947 N.E.2d at 534 (quoting Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1383 (1986)). On the other hand, “the ulterior purpose element is not satisfied merely by a showing that a person commenced litigation knowing it was groundless.” Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 947 N.E.2d at 534; accord Empire Today, LLC v. National Floors Direct, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 7, 23 (D.Mass.2011) (filing “groundless claim or having an improper motive of ‘vexation, harassment, or annoyance’ is relevant but does not alone suffice to demonstrate ulterior purpose”). Boyle argues that defendants initiated process knowing it was groundless in revenge for “(a) Speaking publicly against an investigation, (b) Being the subject of libelous media coverage, (c) Addressing police officers in the same manner and effect in which they opted to address plaintiff, and (d) Political and personal reasons.” (Docket Entry #32, § III(D); Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 66). The first and second assertions do not allow a finder of fact to find ulterior purpose. There is little if any evidence that Caido or Morse knew about Boyle’s comments regarding the unsolved murder. The record fails to contain any specifics about the content of Boyle’s scenarios that ran counter to the prevailing thought in law enforcement or that Caido and Morse shared this prevailing thought. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence that Caido or Morse used the August 28 and 29, 2006 filings of the applications for the criminal complaints as a means to punish or as retribution against Boyle for the public comments he made that were contrary to the prevailing thought of law enforcement regarding a 2005 unsolved murder. There is also insufficient evidence of an ulterior purpose in the filing of the applications because Boyle addressed police officers in a certain manner or because Caido or Morse sought personal gain. See Empire Today, LLC v. National Floors Direct, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 7, 23 (D.Mass.2011) (“[a]n ulterior purpose ‘is not simply the intent to harm the other party directly by bringing the suit’ ”). In addition to the foregoing, the complaint depicts the defendants’ ulterior purpose as using process “for personal political vendetta and published name recognition.” (Docket Entry #1, ¶ 68). These statements fail to sufficiently connect Caido or Morse to a political vendetta or connect the political vendetta to the applications for criminal process that Caido and Morse initiated. Moreover, any use of process by Caido or Morse to gain name recognition or an unidentified political advantage does not provide sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment that Morse or Caido acted with an ulteri- or purpose. See Stacey v. Stacey, 2006 WL 2848670, *5 (Mass.Super. Aug. 25, 2006) (finding no ulterior purpose even though “Mary’s motives may not have been pristine and there may have been some measure of vindictiveness in her institution of the lawsuit”). In addition, both Caido and Morse initiated the applications for a criminal complaint based in part on information provided by an independent third party, Fisher or Verling. The complaint also notes that defendants launched “multiple investigations” targeting Boyle “by use of confidential informants and electronic means designed to entrap Boyle.” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 67). The investigations noted in the complaint as well as those identified by defendants, however, were not groundless. Geiler informed the police that King’s Coach was operating without a valid 2006 permit in the Town of Barnstable. Fisher and Verling reported false charges on their credit cards. Furthermore, the use of confidential informants or electronic means are common investigatory tools. See United States v. Childs, 447 F.3d 541, 542 (7th Cir.2006). Boyle additionally cites the November and December 2006 letters he wrote or faxed to the Cape and Islands District Attorney, the First Magistrate and the Cape and Islands Assistant District Attorney, which included the Board of Health citations, as well as the January 2009 response by the Cape and Islands Assistant District Attorney to support the abuse of process claim. (Docket Entry # 32, pp. 14-15). The November 2009 letter to the First Magistrate notes Caido’s desire in the fall of 2006 not to drop the Board of Health matter. (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 17). Caido’s expressed desire for Green to continue proceeding[s] against Boyle (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 18) does not, without more, translate into an ulterior purpose. See Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 947 N.E.2d at 536 (“the desire to litigate a dispute, by itself, does not translate into an ulterior purpose for bringing the action, even when, as here, many of the claims were groundless”). Boyle also fails to causally connect the actions of the Board of Health with the actions of Caido, a member of the Barnstable Police Department. See Piccone v. McClain, 720 F.Supp.2d at 147 (dismissing abuse of process claim given attenuated chain of causation of ulterior motive based on one agency beginning investigation within a week of lawsuit involving second agency). In sum, Caido and Morse are entitled to summary judgment given the absence of sufficient facts to allow a reasonable fact finder to find that Caido or Morse acted with an ulterior purpose. Accordingly, the abuse of process claim in Count Five against Caido and Morse is subject to summary judgment. V. Libel, Slander and Defamation Defendants next seek summary judgment on the libel, slander and defamation claims in Count Eight because: (1) Boyle failed to identify any statements that amount to slander or libel; (2) the complaint fails to show any statements made by Klimm, Morse and Finnegan; (3) Caido’s statement that he did not want “to drop anything” is privileged and/or does not establish defamation; and (4) Caido’s and Morse’s statements in the applications for criminal complaints are likewise privileged. (Docket Entry #26). Captioned “Libel, Slander, Defamation,” Count Eight alleges that the two articles in the Cape Cod Times contained inaccurate, false, malicious and libelous facts “of and concerning” Boyle that defendants knew or should have known were false. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 82-85). The complaint additionally identifies Caido’s statement to Green that he did not want “to drop anything.” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 37). Boyle therefore relies on both the articles in the Cape Cod Times and Caido’s statement as the basis for the claims in Count Eight. (Docket Entry # 1, ¶¶ 37 & 82-85). In opposing summary judgment, Boyle maintains that defendants are responsible for the defamatory statements in the two Cape Cod Times articles and that the articles would not have existed but for defendants’ unlawful acts. (Docket Entry # 32). The two Cape Cod Times articles published on July 21 and September 8, 2006, describe the complaints made by Fisher, Verling and other customers about charges for limousine services Boyle never provided. The articles also note complaints made by unpaid employees and the charges relating to both operating without a license or permit and failing to carry workers’ compensation insurance. The September 8 article obliquely references Caido and Morse by referring to the criminal complaints for larceny and that Boyle “also faces charges of operating the business without a required town license.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22; Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 8). With the exception of a reference to Finnegan seizing certain property after police took Boyle “into protective custody,” the articles do not identify any defendant by name. The allegations attributed to members of the Barnstable Police Department include the following: “Barnstable Police Department officials have also taken out four complaints against Boyle ... for allegedly operating his company King’s Coach without a livery license”; “Barnstable police pull[ed] over a King[’]s Coach limo on Main Street” on July 10, 2006; and “Barnstable Licensing Authority director Tom Geiler notified police in June that the company was in violation.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 22; Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 7 & 8). Turning to the first and second arguments, “Defamation encompasses the torts of libel and slander.” Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d at 867 n. 4. “To withstand a motion for summary judgment for defamation, a plaintiff must show” inter alia that “[t]he defendant made a statement, concerning the plaintiff, to a third party.” Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627, 782 N.E.2d 508, 510 (2003). The articles do not identify any statements made by Klimm and the reference to Finnegan concerns his seizure of property rather than any statements he made. Accordingly, because the articles fail to identify statements made by Klimm or Finnegan concerning Boyle, both defendants are entitled to summary judgment for the defamation, libel and slander claims in Count Eight. See Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 782 N.E.2d at 510 (recognizing there must be statement made by a defendant concerning the plaintiff). The articles also reference the charges against Boyle for operating King’s Coach without a license and two criminal complaints against Boyle for larceny. Even if the articles referenced statements made by Caido or Morse in the applications for the criminal complaint, such statements are absolutely privileged and cannot support a defamation claim. “Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding which pertain to that proceeding are ... absolutely privileged and cannot support a claim of defamation, even if uttered with malice or in bad faith.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 572 N.E.2d 7, 10 (1991). “An application for a criminal complaint is generally considered as involving ‘a form of judicial proceeding and the statements made therein are absolutely privileged.’ ” Roselle v. Melrose Police Officer Crowley, 2005 WL 1155139, *5 (Mass.Super. March 31, 2005) (quoting Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d at 10); see also Chiras v. Right One, 2008 WL 2345797, *2 (Mass.Super. May 27, 2008) (“libel law is quite clear that there is a legal privilege to bring and to state both criminal and civil charges, which defense is absolute”). The Roselle court therefore found that the officer’s “statements made in his application for the criminal complaint against Roselle are absolutely privileged.” Roselle v. Melrose Police Officer Crowley, 2005 WL 1155139 at *5 (allowing summary judgment). The statements made by Morse and Caido in the applications for the criminal complaints are therefore absolutely privileged. They are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the defamation, libel and slander claims in Count Eight to the extent Boyle based these claims on the Cape Cod Times articles. See Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d at 13 (affirming summary judgment on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in light of absolute privilege afforded to the defendants for defamation claim because “privilege which protects] an individual from liability for defamation would be of little value if the individual were subject to liability under a different theory of tort”). Turning to Caido’s statement to Green, the exhibit containing the statement includes a series of entries made by Green during the course of his investigation of King’s Coach and Boyle, its owner. Green’s notations for September 13, 2006 reflect that Caido spoke to Green and “Atty. Crowley” that he did not “want us to drop anything on this John Boyle because everybody in the department knows all about him and his going ons.” (Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 9). Defendants argue that Caido’s statement to Green is absolutely privileged. As previously noted, “Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding” pertaining to the proceeding are “absolutely privileged and cannot support a claim of defamation, even if uttered with malice or in bad faith.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d at 10. This long standing rules applies to statements made by a witness, party or attorney. See Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d at 10 (noting “longstanding rule” that “statements made by a witness or party” receive “an absolute privilege against an action for defamation”); Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 345 N.E.2d 882, 883-884 (1976) (applying absolute privilege to statements sent to the plaintiffs bank and to the plaintiff that attorney made accusing the plaintiff of misconduct and threatening a lawsuit). “[M]any cases” exist, however, “which hold that the report of a crime is only conditionally privileged. In most of those cases, however, the defendants went to the police, or communicated with others, on their own initiative and published an accusation which might otherwise never have been known.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d at 12. The record fails to clarify the particular context for Caido’s statement or the reason why Caido was present when he spoke to Green. It is also not clear whether Caido sought out Green to tell him not to drop anything or whether Caido or Green initiated the conversation. Viewing the record in Boyle’s favor, summary judgment on the defamation, slander or libel claim against Caido is therefore improper. See generally Santosus v. Valley Free Radio, Inc., 2011 WL 2363512, *4 (Mass.App.Div. May 31, 2011) (“court must examine a challenged statement in its totality and in the context in which it was made” and consider “all the circumstances surrounding the statement”). Citing Correllas, defendants also contend that Boyle fails to establish that the statement is defamatory. (Docket Entry # 32) (“[t]he only statement identified in the complaint” is Caido’s and “there are no statements pled that are defamatory”). “Defamation is the publication of material by one without a privilege to do so which ridicules or treats the plaintiff with contempt.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d at 10. “The test whether a publication is defamatory is whether, in the circumstances, the writing discredits the plaintiff ‘in the minds of any considerable and respectable segment in the community.’ ” Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d at 866 (quoting Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 400 N.E.2d 847, 851 (1980)). Moreover, when “a communication is susceptible of both a defamatory and nondefamatory meaning, a question of fact exists for the jury.” Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d at 866. Here, Caido’s statement is susceptible to both a defamatory and nondefamatory meaning. See, e.g., id., 626 N.E.2d at 866-867 (false statements to newspaper in which the defendant “‘confirmed that the allegations against ... Draghetti were referred to the district attorney’s office after being checked out by the department’ ” were susceptible of defamatory meaning and properly submitted to jury). Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate based on the argument that “there are no statements pled that are defamatory” (Docket Entry # 26, p. 12). In sum, Count Eight is subject to summary judgment except for the claims against Caido based on the statement he made to Green and Crowley that he did not want them “to drop anything on this John Boyle because everybody in the department knows all about him and his going ons.” (Docket Entry # 33, Ex. 18; Docket Entry # 26, Ex. 9). VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Defendants move for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in Count Seven because Boyle fails to establish any of the four elements of a prima facie case. (Docket Entry # 26, § 111(F)). Boyle disagrees with respect to each of the four elements. (Docket Entry # 32). In order to succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show (1) “he suffered ‘severe’ emotional distress”; (2) the defendant either “ ‘intended to inflict emotional distress or he knew or should have known’ ” his actions would cause emotional distress; (3) the defendant’s behavior “‘was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community’ ” and (4) causation. Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520, 530 & n. 9 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Howell v. Enterprise Publishing Co., 455 Mass. 641, 920 N.E.2d 1, 29 (2010)); accord Limone, 579 F.3d at 94. Severe emotional distress “means the kind of distress that ‘no reasonable man could be expected to endure.’ ” Kennedy, 617 F.3d at 530 (quoting Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976)). Emotional responses such as “ ‘anger, sadness, anxiety, and distress,’ ” while “ ‘blameworthy,’ are ‘often not legally compensable.’” Kennedy, 617 F.3d at 530 (quoting Quinn v. Walsh, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 696, 732 N.E.2d 330, 338 (2000)). Beyond the conclusory statement that the emotional distress “was severe and of a nature that no reasonable man could be expected to endure” (Docket Entry # 1, ¶ 79), Boyle fails to provide sufficient facts that would allow a fact finder to find the requisite level of severity that no reasonable man could be expected to endure. At best, Boyle proffers the foregoing accompanied by a generalized statement that he suffered and will continue to suffer “mental pain and anguish, severe emotional trauma, embarrassment, and humiliation.” (Docket Entry #1, ¶ 81). These conclusory statements are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. See Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d at 30 (noting requirement to ignore “ ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation’ ” on summary judgment); Triangle Trading Company, Inc. v. Robroy Industries, Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (same); see, e.g., Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir.2000). They also fail to demonstrate the degree of severe emotional distress that Massachusetts caselaw demands. Cf. Kennedy, 617 F.3d at 530-531 (summarizing case in parenthetical that found sufficient severity where the plaintiff had evidence “of severe depression, suicidal thoughts, and loss of sleep for more than a month”). Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment given the absence of facts to support a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct. Police officers who merely carry “out their obligations as law enforcement officials and their conduct ‘as a matter of law cannot be deemed extreme and outrageous. Neither applying for an arrest warrant, nor making an arrest pursuant to an issued warrant can be