Full opinion text
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RAYMOND A. JACKSON, District Judge. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Justin Michael Wolfe’s (“Wolfe” or “Petitioner”) petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner alleges that he has been imprisoned in violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. Petitioner further alleges that the trial court contravened the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by striking venireman Mock from the jury panel despite the fact that he was “plainly able and qualified to serve as a juror.” Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 148 (4th Cir.2009). For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner’s request for habeas relief is GRANTED. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 7, 2002, a Prince William County jury convicted Petitioner of capital murder (murder-for-hire), use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. As a result of his convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to death on the murder-for-hire charge and prison terms of thirty years and three years, respectively, on the conspiracy and firearm charges. Petitioner filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia on the capital murder conviction and filed an appeal in the Virginia Court of Appeals on the firearm and drug convictions. The non-death penalty cases were certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia and consolidated. The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the petition on March 10, 2005 and the United States Supreme Court denied Wolfe’s petition for writ of certiorari on July 8, 2005. On November 7, 2005, Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“§ 2254 claim”). On August 7, 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing and recommending that his petition be dismissed. On February 11, 2008, this Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed Wolfe’s petition. Petitioner then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment which this Court denied on May 20, 2008. On June 18, 2008, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. On September 12, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability on his extraneous influence, venireman, Brady, and Giglio claims. On May 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on the extraneous influence claim and the venireman-counsel subpart, and vacated this Court’s ruling on the Brady, Giglio, and venireman-court subpart claims. Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.2009). Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for a determination under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) and to decide whether an evidentiary hearing was appropriate. Id. On February 4, 2010, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order finding that Petitioner had satisfied the Schlup v. Delo standard to pursue his § 2254 claim. Furthermore, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing on his Brady and Giglio claims and reserved its ruling on Petitioner’s venireman-court claim. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s Brady and Giglio claims on November 2, 2010. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ordered both parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 18, 2011. On April 22, 2011, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Habeas Corpus to include a new legal argument regarding key government witness, Owen Barber’s, false testimony at trial. The Director filed a response in opposition to the motion on May 4, 2011; and Petitioner filed a reply in support on May 5, 2011. Having been fully briefed, these matters are now ripe for judicial determination. II. LEGAL STANDARD Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 states that “the Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” A. Legal Standard under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States The Supreme Court has held that both the withholding of exculpatory evidence from a criminal defendant by a prosecutor and the knowing use of false testimony violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. “Evidence is ‘exculpatory’ and ‘favorable’ if it ‘may make the difference between conviction and acquittal’ had it been ‘disclosed and used effectively.’ ” United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 661 (4th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). For a court to find a Brady violation, it must determine that the evidence was 1) favorable to the accused, 2) suppressed by the prosecution (either willfully or inadvertently), and 3) material. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004). Evidence that is favorable to the accused includes both exculpatory (whether requested by defendant or not) and impeachment evidence. Id.; see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (holding that the Brady rule includes impeachment evidence). In analyzing materiality, courts must determine whether there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). This showing “does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal.” Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Rather, a petitioner can fulfill the materiality standard by showing that the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435-437, 115 S.Ct. 1555. This cumulative effect analysis emphasizes the fact that when making a materiality finding, courts should consider the suppressed evidence collectively, rather than judging the materiality of each item of suppressed evidence. Id. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555; see id. at 437, n. 10, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (“We evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no other way. We evaluate its cumulative effect for the purposes of materiality separately and at the end of the discussion.”). B. False Testimony as Grounds for Habeas Relief Knowing use of false testimony violates due process. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). This rule applies regardless of whether the false testimony is solicited, or merely allowed to stand uncorrected after it appears. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Non-disclosure of evidence affecting credibility also falls within this rule “when the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.’ ” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (quoting Napue v. Illinois). As with an alleged Brady violation, a finding of materiality is required to show that “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury” in order for a petitioner to receive habeas relief. Id.; see Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Courts have similarly concluded that petitioners may receive habeas relief based on the use of false testimony when a petitioner shows that government officers knew about the falsities in the testimony at the time of the trial; and, when there is evidence, such as a credible recantation, indicating that the testimony was in fact false. Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 749 (4th Cir.1988). C. Dismissal of a qualified venireman for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois Capital defendants have a right to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 658, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). In ensuring this right, courts have held that a death sentence cannot stand when a trial court “excludes from a capital jury a prospective juror who in fact is qualified to serve.” Id. at 650-651, 107 S.Ct. 2045. This rule includes veniremen who are dismissed for cause “simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (holding that a venireman may be excused for caused based on his or her views on capital punishment if such views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath”). When such violations occur, the court does not engage in an inquiry regarding the harm imposed by such error, but rather its findings immediately render the sentence imposed invalid. Gray, 481 U.S. at 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045 (“because the Witherspoon-Witt standard is rooted in the constitutional right to an impartial jury ... and because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system” harmless-error analysis cannot apply); see Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam) (“[ujnless a venireman is ‘irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings,’ he cannot be excluded; if a venireman is improperly excluded even though not so committed, any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand.”). III. FACTUAL FINDINGS 1.The prosecutors choreographed and coordinated witness testimony through a series of joint meetings with Owen Barber and J.R. Martin, Owen Barber and Jennifer Pascquierllo and Jason Coleman and Chad Hough. Tr. 315; Am. Interr. Ans. at 3, 5; see Tr. 142 (providing Barber’s testimony that Ebert wanted to ensure that the testimonies matched); see also Tr. 294 (providing Conway’s testimony that the joint meeting between Barber and Martin was necessary to resolve a conflict in testimony and admitting that Barber conformed with Martin’s recollection on at least one instance); Tr. 762 (providing Conway’s testimony that he conducted a joint meeting with Coleman and Hough to discuss Hough’s testimony regarding conversations with Wolfe). 2. At the time of the trial, the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office had a policy of putting exculpatory (i.e., Brady) disclosures in writing. Tr. 75-76. 3. The prosecutors did not provide any reference to or information regarding the joint meetings with witnesses in their written Brady disclosure. See Tr. 702-03; see also Resp. Ex. 1. 4. Sergeant Pass, lead officer of the drug investigation relating to Wolfe and Petrole, submitted reports outlining the investigation of Petrole and others’ drug activities to both the prosecutors and homicide investigators. Tr. 384, 386. Conway did not review all of the reports dealing with the drug investigation and he did not provide them to Petitioner. Tr. 191-192. 5. Reports from the federal government (Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Agency) regarding the parallel narcotics investigation were provided to the prosecutors in preparation for the trial. Pet’r’s Ex. 30; Tr. 45 (confirming that the reports would have been part of the Commonwealth’s’ file “as a matter of practice”). Prosecutors reviewed these reports, but failed to include them in the Brady disclosure. Tr. 53 and 192. 6. The Prosecution failed to disclose Detective Newsome’s report outlining his initial interview with Owen Barber on April 14, 2001, during which he implicated Wolfe as being involved in the murder before Barber mentioned his involvement. Pet’r’s Ex. 70 at 30-31 (report); Resp’t Ex. 1 (Answer); Tr. 137. 7. On November 2, 2010, while under oath before this Court, Owen Barber made a credible recantation of his trial testimony and indicated that Petitioner Justin Michael Wolfe was not involved in the murder of Daniel Petrole. Tr. 117. 8. The Prosecution failed to disclose the tapes of multiple recorded meetings with key witnesses or the existence of such recordings to the Petitioner during trial. See Tr. 192; see also Tr. 554-55; Pet’r’s Ex, 24. 9. Prosecutors withheld evidence of Barber’s personal dealings with the victim, including a claim that Barber owed Petrole money, a claim that Petrole had a hit out on Barber and a claim that Barber and Petrole had recently associated with each other socially. Pet’r’s Ex. 41 (containing notes from an interview between a confidential informant and Detective Walburn stating: “Owen [Barber] owed Petrole money;” “Petrole had a hit out on Owen;” and that Petrole confronted Barber about the money owed and Barber refused to pay); Tr. 352 (stating that Jesse James knew both Petrole and Barber because they hung out at the same household as him in Chantilly, Virginia); Pet’r’s Ex. 61 (indicating Randall Ketcham’s statement that he had done ecstacy with Petrole and Barber). 10. The Prosecution withheld information indicating that Petrole was rumored to be an informant. Pet’r’s Ex. 57; Tr. 687 (stating that Conway was aware of the rumor but failed to share the information because he did not have anything to substantiate it). 11. The Prosecution failed to disclose evidence that Mr. Petrole (the victim’s father) was aware of the victim’s drug activities and allowed Mr. Petrole’s testimony to the contrary to remain uncorreeted. 12. The Prosecution failed to disclose that their witness, Regina Zeuner, was a confidential informant. Tr. 765:13-24. 13. The Prosecution withheld evidence of prior inconsistent statements made by its own witnesses. Pet’r’s Ex. 27 at Police-1175 (revealing Chad Hough’s statement that he did not know who made the “do whatever you have to do” comment about robbing a drug dealer). 14. The Prosecution did not disclose its off the record agreement not to prosecute witness J.R. Martin for his participation in the murder based on his cooperation with the Commonwealth. Tr. 414. IV. DISCUSSION Petitioner Justin Michael Wolfe seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In doing so, Petitioner asserts that the Commonwealth of Virginia (“Commonwealth”) violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. Specifically, Petitioner asserts, inter alia, that the Commonwealth withheld potential impeachment evidence, evidence related to alternate theories of the crime, and other government reports and notes containing exculpatory information from him during the state court criminal trial proceedings. Petitioner also alleges that the Commonwealth knowingly provided false testimony or allowed false testimony to go uncorrected in violation of Giglio and Napue v. Illinois. Petitioner also asserts that the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by erroneously dismissing a qualified juror for cause. The Court will consider each of these assertions in turn. A. Brady and Giglio Claims 1. The Prosecution’s Case In order to assess the implications of Petitioner’s assertions and the Court’s factual findings, the Court must first consider the Prosecution’s theory of the case as presented at trial. The evidence presented at trial indicates that Petitioner, Justin Michael Wolfe, was a drug dealer in Northern Virginia. Petitioner dealt mostly with a high-grade marijuana, commonly known as “chronic,” which the victim, Daniel Petrole supplied to him. Petitioner was close friends with another local drug dealer named Owen Barber. The Prosecution presented evidence that Petitioner arranged for Barber to rob/kill victim Petrole, who was Petitioner’s drug supplier. More specifically, the Prosecution introduced testimony from Barber stating that he spoke with Wolfe about murdering his drug supplier and that he met with Wolfe on the day before the murder to discuss the plan. On March 15, 2001, Owen Barber waited outside Regina Zeuner’s apartment in Centreville, Virginia while the victim, Petrole, conducted a drug transaction with the Petitioner. Barber knew that Petrole was Wolfe’s drug supplier and was aware of the transaction taking place after speaking with Wolfe on the phone. J.A. 1602. Barber then followed Petrole to his townhouse near Bristol, Virginia and fired ten rounds of ammunition through the passenger side of Petrole’s vehicle, killing him. J.A. 563. At trial, the Prosecution presented evidence, in the form of witness testimony, that Barber acted under a murder-for-hire scheme with Petitioner. J.A. 1687. Specifically, Barber testified that he agreed to kill Petrole for Wolfe in exchange for a half-pound of chronic marijuana, four pounds of lower grade marijuana (“schwag”), forgiveness of a $3,000 debt and $10,000 in cash. J.A. 1645. In an effort to link Petitioner to Barber, the Prosecution presented phone records from the Petitioner and Barber to show that they were in contact around the time of the murder. Barber’s testimony provided the context for these phone calls as he described calling Wolfe while he was following Petrole to keep him abreast of the status of the pursuit. J.A. 1651-53. Petitioner presented a contrasting version of the events explaining that the phone calls and any other conversations were either in the normal context of their friendship (e.g., meeting up socially) or related to a drug transaction. See J.A. 2094-97. Motive then emerged as the critical factor on which the Prosecution based its theory of the case. The Prosecution argued that Barber would have no reason to kill Petrole, other than his agreement with Wolfe. The Prosecution further argued that Wolfe had motive to kill Petrole because: 1) he owed Petrole $60,000 and did not like paying his debts (J.A. 2175, 1463-64); 2) he wanted to make more money by decreasing the amount of chronic dealers (J.A. 577); and 3) Petrole was upset with him (Wolfe) for not paying down his debt (J.A. 2178). The Commonwealth established their theory of the case through the testimony of several witnesses, primarily Owen Barber, Chad Hough, Jennifer Pascquierllo, Ian Wiffen and J.R. Martin. J.A. 2247 (identifying these witnesses as the individuals whose testimonies cast the most doubt on Wolfe’s testimony that he had no involvement in the murder). Owen Barber provided the only evidence directly connecting Wolfe to the murder. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth Attorneys, Mr. Paul Ebert (“Ebert”) and Mr. Richard Conway (“Conway”), unapologetically employed an unusual practice of coordinating and choreographing the testimony of four of the five key witnesses, the other testimonies primarily served to corroborate Barber’s story, albeit often through rank speculation and double hearsay testimony. See e.g., J.A. 1758 (presenting speculation testimony from J.R. Martin that Barber did not tell him why he killed Petrole but that it was “obvious” to him); J.A. 1874, 1877-79 (presenting double hearsay testimony from Jennifer Pascquierllo describing what Barber told her that Wolfe told him and other general hearsay testimony about what Barber told her); J.A. 1399 (presenting testimony from Hough stating that he did not know that Wolfe was involved in the murder and then speculating that “maybe it could be linked to somebody”); J.A. 1399-1400 (indicating that Hough was not sure about a connection and that he did not speak to his attorney until he spoke with Jason Coleman who stated that “he [Coleman] thought it could be linked”). The Prosecution also used circumstantial evidence such as phone records, private conversations between Barber and Wolfe, and facts indicating that Wolfe gave individuals such as J.R. Martin (person whose car was used for the murder) and Jennifer Pasequierllo (Barber’s girlfriend) money during the aftermath of the murder to string together its theory of the case. While the Petitioner admitted many of these circumstantial facts in his own trial testimony (e.g., admitted to speaking with Barber on the phone throughout the night of the murder, admitted to being in debt to Danny Petrole, admitted to giving Pascquierllo money and posting her bond, admitted to giving Martin a discount on marijuana after he indicated that he knew what Wolfe had done), he has maintained his testimony that all of these acts occurred in the context of his drug conspiracy and not in relation to a murder-for-hire scheme. After hearing all of the evidence, a jury found Wolfe guilty on all three charges and recommended a sentence of death for the capital murder conviction. 2. Prosecution’s suppression of impeachment evidence a. Evidence regarding Owen Barber’s Relationship with Petrole Most of the Prosecution’s direct evidence came from the testimony of Owen Barber. J.A. 2530. During the course of Barber’s direct examination, the Prosecution established the development and execution of the murder-for-hire agreement between Barber and Wolfe and its claim that but for Wolfe’s request, Barber would not have killed Petrole. J.A. 1601-02. Notably, Barber testified that he did not know the victim, thus allowing the Prosecution to establish its theory that Barber only killed the victim at the direction of Wolfe. See id. On cross-examination, Wolfe’s counsel attempted to impeach Barber’s testimony that he had no relationship with the victim, and therefore no other reason to kill him. J.A. 1691-93. Ultimately, Wolfe’s counsel was unsuccessful in impeaching Barber’s testimony and the jury convicted Wolfe of capital murder with Barber’s testimony standing as the primary source of direct evidence. The post-conviction evidentiary hearing uncovered the fact that the Prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence from the Petitioner that could have assisted the trial counsel in impeaching Barber’s testimony. First, this Court finds that the Commonwealth withheld information regarding the relationship between Barber and Petrole in violation of Brady. As indicated in the factual findings, Prosecutors were in possession of various forms of evidence indicating that Barber had a personal relationship with the victim prior to his death. This evidence included statements from a confidential informant that Barber owed Petrole money, that Petrole had a hit out on Barber and notes from Detective Walburn (lead homicide detective) indicating that Barber was “tight” with the victim’s roommate, Paul Gunning. Pet’r’s Exs. 39, 41. The evidence also included a statement from Jesse James indicating that he, Petrole and Barber hung out at the same household (Tr. 352) and a statement from Randall Ketcham indicating that he had done drugs with Petrole and Barber (Pet’r’s Ex. 61). In finding that the Commonwealth failed to disclose evidence indicating that Barber had a relationship with Petrole, the Court considers the three factor Brady analysis. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691,124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004). In this case, the evidence was favorable to Wolfe in that it would have impeached the key witness’ testimony and possibly established an alternative motive for the crime. It was withheld from the Petitioner during trial as established by the fact that it was only submitted to Wolfe in the discovery ordered by this Court in its habeas inquiry as well testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Finally, as discussed in more detail below, the evidence was material because when combined with the circumstantial nature of the case and the importance of weighing Barber’s credibility as the primary source of direct evidence, it reasonably undermines confidence in the verdict by contradicting a central aspect of the Prosecution’s theory of the case (i.e., the idea that Barber did not know Petrole and would have no other reason to kill him). See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Confidential Informant’s Statements about Barber and Petrole relationship Respondent (“Director”) characterizes the confidential informant’s statements (as contained in Detective Walburn’s notes) as rumor and speculation and asserts that the Prosecution’s failure to disclose this evidence is not material because there was no evidence to corroborate the statements. Director’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 19-21. In United States v. Moussaoui, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed a similar assertion, albeit outside of the Brady context. In Moussaoui, the court considered whether a defendant asserting his Sixth Amendment right to depose enemy combatant witnesses could rely on obviously inadmissible statements to show that the testimony of certain witnesses was material. The Government asserted that petitioners could rely only on admissible evidence to establish the materiality of witness testimony. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 472 (4th Cir.2004) (emphasis added). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that petitioners should not be allowed to rely on obviously inadmissible statements (e.g., statements of belief rather than personal knowledge); however, it expressly stated that “many rulings on admissibility ... can only be made in the context of a trial” and therefore cannot be meaningfully assessed outside of that context. Id. (also noting that statements that may not have been admissible during the guilt phase, may nonetheless be admissible during the penalty phase) (emphasis added). The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v. Bartholomew which held that inadmissible materials that are not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible exculpatory evidence are not subject to disclosure under Brady. Id.; Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6, 116 S.Ct. 7,133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). This Court emphasizes the Supreme Court’s consideration of whether certain materials are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible exculpatory evidence in making its materiality findings. In discussing the confidential informant statements, Detective Walburn indicated that the statement that Petrole owed Barber money and the statement that Petrole had a hit on Barber were both pieces of information that the confidential informant said he had heard. Tr. 571-572. While the Director asserts that this type of testimony would not have been admissible at trial, this Court cannot state that such third party statements would be obviously inadmissible given the proliferation of other hearsay evidence that the Prosecution presented (and the trial court allowed) during Petitioner’s criminal proceedings. See Moussaoui 382 F.3d at 472. More-important, had the statements been disclosed, the Petitioner would have had the opportunity to use the information to investigate alternate theories and discover other exculpatory evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the confidential informant’s statements should have been disclosed to the Petitioner under Brady because they are not obviously inadmissible given the context of the trial and because they would have likely led to other admissible exculpatory evidence had the Petitioner been afforded an opportunity to investigate the truthfulness of the statements. James and Ketcham’s Statements about Barber and Petrole relationship However, even if the Court assumes that the confidential informant’s -statements would not be admissible at trial, the Commonwealth’s suppression of both Jesse James’ and Randall Ketcham’s statements undoubtably constitute a Brady violation. The Director again asserts that the Prosecution’s failure to disclose the James and Ketcham statements is not material because the statements were speculative and lacked corroborating evidence. Director’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 19-21. However, both James and Ketcham made statements to the police based on their own experiences and knowledge. The Court also notes that the Prosecution’s actions stifled any efforts Petitioner could have made to corroborate the statements. Furthermore, the Court finds no legal authority that indicates exculpatory statements must be corroborated before they can be considered as Brady evidence. To the contrary, the Court finds case law that indicates exculpatory evidence, particularly that which would be admissible at trial, should be provided to the defendant under Brady. See Wood, 516 U.S. at 6, 116 S.Ct. 7. Had the Commonwealth not suppressed this' evidence, Petitioner would have been able to impeach the Government’s key witness by calling both individuals as witnesses to directly refute Barber’s testimony. The jury would have been allowed to weigh an admitted murderer’s testimony (corroborated only by Martin, who provided him with a ear on the night of the murder) against two other individuals that were wholly unrelated to the murder. The Commonwealth’s suppression, therefore, undermines confidence in the verdict because it allowed Barber’s testimony to stand unrefuted as opposed to providing not one, but two additional witnesses to challenge Barber’s credibility. See Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 315 (4th Cir.2003) (“A live witness directly contradicting [key witness’] testimony ... would have given the jury strong reason to doubt [key witness’] veracity. Significantly, the jury, had it been shown that a major prosecution witness was testifying falsely, is likely to have been more sympathetic to [defendant’s] entire case”). Furthermore, if provided during trial, James and Ketch-am’s testimonies would have undermined the Prosecution’s theory of the case because they would have challenged the notion that Barber did not have a personal relationship with Petrole and therefore had no other reason to kill him. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). For these reasons, the Court finds that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose this evidence meets the three factor test that the Supreme Court articulated in Banks v. Dretke. Hence, the Prosecution unconstitutionally withheld exculpatory evidence regarding Barber’s potential relationship with the victim in violation of Brady v. Maryland. b. Newsome’s Interview with Barber Prosecutors also failed to disclose a report from Detective Newsome which contained Newsome’s initial interview with Barber. Newsome told Barber the police knew that Wolfe was involved in killing Petrole. He also told Barber that implicating the “higher up” (i.e., Wolfe) could mean the difference between execution or life in prison. Pet’r’s Ex. 70 at 30-31. This information is favorable to Wolfe because it documents the fact that detectives first mentioned Wolfe in connection to the murder and presented Barber with the option of execution or life imprisonment in exchange for implicating someone else, well before Barber began cooperating with the Commonwealth or implicating Wolfe in the murder. Prosecutors do not dispute the fact that the report was not provided to the Petitioner. Furthermore, the report is material because it reflects that Barber had a motive to misrepresent the facts regarding Petrole’s death. c. Barber’s statement that he acted alone The Prosecution also withheld evidence indicating that Barber told his roommate, Jason Coleman, that he acted alone on the night of Petrole’s murder. During the evidentiary hearing, Coleman testified that he had a conversation with Barber after the murder where Barber admitted to him that he murdered Petrole and acted alone. See J.A. 456-61 (recounting the conversation with Barber and Coleman’s disclosures to the prosecutors and investigators regarding what Barber had told him). This evidence is favorable to Wolfe because it is a prior statement from the shooter indicating that he [the shooter] did not act in concert with another person, let alone Wolfe. It is material to the case because it is important impeachment evidence. In fact, during the criminal trial, Wolfe’s counsel cross-examined Barber regarding his conversation with Coleman on the Sunday after police first questioned him. See J.A. 1701-02. In an attempt to uncover more information about Barber’s actions and admissions after the murder, Wolfe’s trial counsel asked Barber, “what did you say to him [Coleman]” to which Barber responded “I can’t recall.” J.A. 1703-04. Counsel then followed up with the question “you’re about to take off running from the police and you don’t remember what you said” and Barber responded, “no.” J.A. 1704. Had the Petitioner been in possession of this information, he would have been able to impeach Barber on his allegations regarding Wolfe’s involvement or seek to refresh his recollection, based on a conversation that he admitted having with Coleman. Although this evidence is both favorable and material, the Director disputes the allegation that the Commonwealth withheld it. Coleman testified that he told Ebert that Wolfe was not involved in the murder during a meeting held the week after the murder. Tr. 463. The Director asserts that Coleman never told prosecutors or police that Barber acted alone. Director’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7. In support of this notion, the Commonwealth notes that both Ebert, Conway and Det. Walburn’s testimonies suggest that Coleman did not make the statement. Tr. 790 (containing Ebert’s testimony that Coleman did not make that statement, Tr. 550 (containing Det. Walburn’s denial that Coleman made that statement), Tr. 693 (containing Conway’s denial that Coleman made that statement). During the evidentiary hearing, the Commonwealth attempted to buttress this position by asking Sgt. Pass, Det. Moore and Det. Newsome whether they remembered Coleman making that statement during their own separate interactions with him. Both Sgt. Pass and Det. Newsome indicated that they did not recall Coleman making that statement and Det. Moore indicated that Coleman did not make the statement in front of him (yet conceded that he was not in all of the interviews conducted by Det. Walburn). See Tr. 551, 534, 668 (containing Det. Moore, Det. Pass and Det. Newsome’s testimonies, respectively, regarding their recollection of Coleman’s statement). During the evidentiary hearing, Coleman testified that he told Ebert that Wolfe was not involved in the murder and he testified that he believed that Sgt. Pass was also in the room. During the evidentiary hearing, Sgt. Pass stated that he did not remember Coleman making the statement that Barber acted alone. Tr. 534. He did not state unequivocally that Coleman did not make the statement. The Court had an opportunity to examine Coleman on the stand and recalls his unequivocal testimony indicating that he told Ebert about Barber’s statement and describing the circumstances under which he told him. Tr. 458. The Court finds Coleman’s testimony to be credible. In light of Coleman’s testimony, the Court concludes that the Commonwealth suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady by not disclosing the fact that Barber told Coleman he acted alone in committing the murder to the Petitioner during the trial phase. d. J.R. Martin In addition to the suppressed evidence relating to Owen Barber, the Prosecution also withheld exculpatory evidence relating to J.R. Martin, a prosecution corroborating witness. Martin was a close friend of Barber and provided him with a car to use on the night of the murder. After Barber testified, the Prosecution called Martin to corroborate Barber’s testimony. Having had his testimony coordinated in a joint meeting with prosecutors, Martin provided testimony very similar to Barber’s testimony. Martin admitted to being friends with and getting drugs from both Barber and Wolfe. J.A. 1730, 1733-34. He corroborated Barber’s testimony that Barber had private conversations with Wolfe before the murder (at Back Yard) and after the murder (at Bridges), although he could only speculate about the content of the conversations. J.A. 1740-42, 1759. While corroborating other facts relating to Barber’s actions, Martin also testified that Wolfe told him not to say anything [about what happened] and that he [Wolfe] commented that he was about to make a lot of money. J.A. 1760. Wolfe’s counsel was unable to effectively impeach Martin’s testimony because the Prosecution withheld an off the record agreement not to prosecute J.R. Martin if he cooperated with the Commonwealth. The information was suppressed during the trial phase because the presence of this agreement was only discovered during this Court’s habeas hearing. During the evidentiary hearing, Martin’s attorney, Robert Horan, testified that months into the investigation, the Prosecution indicated to him that Martin would not be charged if he cooperated with the Commonwealth. Tr. 414. When the Court explicitly asked him whether he had an off the record “gentleman’s agreement” with the prosecutors, Horan initially responded, “no.” However, he quickly clarified that response and admitted that while there was no agreement during the initial meetings, one later took form. Tr. 414. The fact that Horan turned over attorney-client privileged information during the course of police interrogations further supports the existence of an oral off the record agreement. Tr. 418-20; Pet’r’s Ex. 29 at Prosecution 466. The Director alleges that this information was never withheld from the Petitioner during trial because no such agreement existed. Director’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 (citing testimony from Martin denying that an agreement existed (Tr. 633-35, 655-56) as well as similar testimony from the Prosecutors (Tr. 286, 708, 820)). The hearing testimony confirms that the Prosecution never executed a written agreement not to prosecute Martin. However, the Court finds Mr. Horan’s testimony regarding an understanding not to prosecute that emerged months after the investigation began and before Martin testified at trial to be credible and persuasive; this is particularly so, considering Horan’s willingness to provide attorney client privileged information to the police prior to the trial. This evidence qualifies as impeachment evidence worthy of Brady disclosure because it reveals a potential source of bias of the witness in favor of the Commonwealth’s case (i.e., if the witness would not be prosecuted for his crimes, he had more incentive to cooperate with the Government and provide testimony consistent with their theory of the crime). See United States v. Shelton, 200 Fed.Appx. 219, 221 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a defendant has the right to cross-examine witnesses about potential sources of bias under the Confrontation Clause); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (indicating that evidence used to impeach a Government witness qualifies as favorable for the purpose of Brady inquiry). Furthermore, it is material because it calls into question a key corroborating witness’ motive for testifying at trial. Put in the appropriate context, Martin was not simply another corroborating witness. Rather, he was the person who provided the car that Barber used to commit the murder; the first person to see Barber after he committed the murder; the first person to whom Barber confessed committing the murder; and the person who was present to observe the meetings between Barber and Wolfe after the murder. During cross-examination, Wolfe’s counsel asked Martin whether he was facing charges; however, without knowledge of the informal agreement, Petitioner’s trial counsel could not fully probe the scope of the witness’ cooperation and arrangement with the Commonwealth. See J.A. 1805. At trial, Martin testified that the only deal he had with the Prosecution was that they would not use his truthful statements against him. J.A. 1780-81. While the jury had some impeaching testimony available to determine Martin’s credibility, the Prosecution deprived the jury of an opportunity to fully assess the Martin’s potential bias by failing to disclose its off the record agreement not to prosecute Martin. In light of the importance of Martin’s testimony as corroboration for Barber’s account of the events and given the Petitioner’s inability to fully cross-examine Martin with all of the impeachment evidence available, this Court finds that the cumulative effect of the Prosecution’s suppression of the. existence of the informal agreement, combined with the circumstantial nature of the case and the impact of other withheld impeachment evidence, undermines confidence in the verdict. Having considered all of these factors, the Court finds that the Prosecutors unlawfully withheld impeachment evidence from the Petitioner in violation of Brady. e. Chad Hough Petitioner asserts that the Prosecution also withheld impeachment evidence regarding Chad Hough in violation of Brady. During Petitioner’s trial, the Prosecution used Hough’s testimony to corroborate Barber’s account of the murder for hire plot. Hough testified that at various times, he discussed the idea of robbing drug dealers with Jason Coleman and Petitioner Wolfe. More specifically, Hough testified about one particular conversation with Coleman and Wolfe where Wolfe advised him to “do what you have to do” if things went wrong during the course of a robbery. J.A. 1895. On cross-examination, Petitioner’s trial counsel attempted to impeach Hough’s testimony with the limited information available to him. He asked about Hough’s steroid use with Jason Coleman (J.A. 1408), he inquired about whether Hough took the robbery conversations seriously (J.A. 1412-13) and he inquired about Hough’s impending drug charges. However, he was unable to cast doubt on Hough’s credibility surrounding the drug robbery statement. Discovery during this habeas action revealed a prior conversation with the Commonwealth during which Hough made inconsistent statements regarding his exchange with Wolfe and Coleman. During a December 5, 2001 taped interview in the Commonwealth Attorney’s office (in the presence of Conway, his attorney and Detective Walburn), Hough stated that he remembered the comment “you [have] to do whatever you [have] to do” and explicitly stated that he did not recall exactly who made the comment. Pet’r’s Ex. 27 at Police 1175. However, the Prosecution did not turn over the recording of the interview. See Tr. 192, 554, 555. They also failed to disclose this inconsistent statement in the written Brady disclosure which summarized information from each witness the Commonwealth interviewed. Resp. Ex. 1 at Prosecution 330. Rather, at trial, the Prosecution led Hough’s testimony by asking what the Defendant told him to do and then allowed Hough to attribute the comment to Wolfe despite Assistant Commonwealth Attorney Conway being present in the interview when Hough made the prior inconsistent statement. See J.A. 1395. This information is favorable to Wolfe because it provides a basis upon which to impeach a corroborating witness’ testimony that attributes a potentially damaging statement to the Petitioner. Had Wolfe’s counsel known about the prior inconsistent statement, he could have challenged Hough’s testimony with his own statements. In a case based primarily on circumstantial evidence, impeaching one of the Commonwealth’s key corroborating witnesses would have likely impacted the outcome of the trial. When evaluated for cumulative effect, it provides yet another example of the Prosecution withholding valuable impeachment testimony regarding its five key corroborating witnesses. The Commonwealth’s Brady violations constrained the Petitioner’s ability to fully cross-examine at least three of the five key witnesses in this case (including Barber who provided the only direct evidence in the case). In light of these facts, considered cumulatively with other evidence in the case, the Court finds that the Prosecution unconstitutionally failed to disclose Hough’s prior inconsistent statement in violation of Brady. 3. Prosecution’s suppression of evidence undermining its theory of the case Petitioner further alleges that the Commonwealth withheld evidence of alternate theories of the crime. Pet’r’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 11. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the Prosecution withheld the following exculpatory evidence: 1) drug investigation reports revealing conflicts in Petrole’s drug enterprise; 2) statements indicating that Petrole was rumored to be an informant; and 3) witness statements indicating that a second car was at the crime scene shortly after the murder. The Court will address each alleged suppression in turn. First, Petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth suppressed the government reports about the parallel drug investigation accompanying the investigation of Ptrole’s murder. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that prosecutors suppressed a DEA report by TFO S.M. Straka and Sgt. Pass (Pet’r’s Ex. 30), an email indicating that one of Petrole’s suppliers accrued charges at a local hotel days before the murder (Pet’r’s Ex. 40), a report narrating an interview with Jennifer Scott (victim’s girlfriend) indicating that one of the victim’s drug associates was aware that he was cut out of a deal (Pet’r’s Ex. 54), and a transcript of an interview with Gunning (victim’s roommate) outlining the victim’s recent drug associations and operational conflicts in detail (Pet’r’s Ex. 55). During the habeas evidentiary hearing, Attorney Ebert admitted that the Commonwealth produced the interview with Paul Gunning (victim’s drug associate and roommate) particularly for the habeas proceeding. Tr. 44 (referring to Petitioner exhibit 55 containing transcripts from a March 16 police interview with Gunning). At the evidentiary hearing, both of the prosecutors (particularly Conway in his capacity as lead prosecutor on the case) and Sgt. Pass (head of drug investigation),- testified that each of these items was part of the Prosecution’s file during the state trial phase. See e.g, Tr. 52-53 (containing Ebert’s testimony about the DEA report). Conway then acknowledged that the Commonwealth’s written Brady disclosure did not include any of these documents. The Court, therefore, finds that the Commonwealth suppressed these materials during the trial phase. Despite the fact that Wolfe faced both murder and drug conspiracy charges at trial, Mr. Conway testified he that did not review all of the reports related to the “separate” drug investigation in preparation for Wolfe’s criminal trial. Tr. 191-92. However, later in his testimony, Conway admitted that there was communication back and forth between the drug and homicide investigations and further stated, “I understand that we are charged with information that came through either.” Tr. 272. Conway then testified that it was the Commonwealth’s theory of the case that Petrole’s death was a result of his drug activities. Tr. 273. The Court finds the Commonwealth’s admissions in and of themselves to be indicative of a Brady violation. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including' the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Conway’s evidentiary hearing testimony reveals a failure to uphold his duty as a prosecutor to learn of the favorable evidence known by government actors. Naturally, if a prosecutor fails to uphold the Supreme Court’s mandate to simply review his files to learn of any favorable evidence known by government actors, the prosecutor cannot feign surprise when he violates a defendant’s due process right by failing to disclose the same evidence that he could not bring himself to review. These facts are particularly troublesome in light of the fact that the Commonwealth’s whole theory of the case was that Wolfe hired Barber to kill his drug supplier because he owed him money and wanted to decrease market competition. At the least, Conway’s failure to even review all of the files, let alone turn them over, further supports this Court’s finding that these materials were suppressed at the trial phase. The Court further finds that the drug investigation reports and interviews were not only suppressed but were also favorable to the Petitioner. Each of the documents reveals aspects of Petrole’s drug operation that call into question the Prosecution’s theory that Wolfe was the person who orchestrated Petrole’s murder. In addition to casting doubt on the Prosecution’s theory of the case, the suppressed evidence points to other named individuals with motive to kill Petrole. Thus, in the hands of competent defense counsel, the evidence could have been used to either cast reasonable doubt on the Prosecution’s theory of the case, establish a defense strategy pointing to other suspects, or impeach witness testimony. For example, the suppressed Drug Enforcement Administration report (“DEA report”) summarizes Gunning’s description of Petrole’s drug operation. It names other drug suppliers, describes Petrole’s various trips to purchase drugs, outlines the prices that Petrole charged for his drugs, and specifically discloses intermediaries’ commissions for helping Petrole secure his drug supply. Gunning also described a potential conflict in Petrole’s drug operation that stemmed from a recent decision to cut one intermediary, Brandon Patterson, out of a deal between Petrole and his major supplier of high-grade marijuana, Bill Hemenway. Pet’r’s Ex. 30 at Prosecution 2027, 2029 (stating that Patterson would charge a commission of $500-$600 per pound). In addition to evidence indicating that there was a conflict between Patterson and Petrole, the Government also had information indicating that Patterson (who lived in Washington State) was in the Northern Virginia area just a few days before the murder. Pet’r’s Ex. 40 (containing Trish Harman’s August 20, 2001 email to Det. Walburn and Sgt. Pass stating that subpoena information of Patterson’s bank account indicated that he was in Northern Virginia at the Dulles Hyatt “just days before Petrole’s murder”). Petrole’s girlfriend, Jennifer Scott, then confirmed that Patterson became aware that he had been cut out of a recent deal. Pet’r’s Ex. 54 at Police 899. She also told the police that Petrole had become worried and was concerned that something bad would happen as a result of cutting Patterson out. Id. All of this information is favorable to Wolfe because it shows that there were conflicts in Petrole’s drug operation that could have created motive for Petrole’s death without Wolfe being involved. Additionally, the information is material to the case because it undermines the Government’s theory that Wolfe was the only person with motive to harm Petrole. Equipped with this information, a competent defense counsel could have impeached witnesses who suggested that Petrole had no enemies; developed a defense strategy that implicated Petrole’s other drug associates (e.g., Patterson) in the murder rather than Wolfe; and/or called Gunning to the stand to inquire about the conflicts in the drug operation and then called Jennifer Scott to corroborate Gunning’s testimony. The Petitioner also could have called Scott to testify about the fact that Petrole expressed a fear that something bad was going to happen as a result of Patterson being cut out of the deal. Even if Gunning denied his own statements at trial, competent defense counsel could have used the DEA report and other suppressed items to impeach Gunning on the stand, thus calling into question the credibility of another government witness. When considering the cumulative effect of all of the suppressed evidence, the jury would have been able to consider a properly impeached key witness (Barber) combined with direct evidence implicating an alternative theory of the case (namely conflicts in the drug enterprise wholly unrelated to Wolfe), as well as other evidence impeaching the corroborating witnesses’ version of events at trial. The fact that the jury was never presented with this information undermines confidence in the trial verdict. Consequently, the Court finds that the Commonwealth suppressed the drug investigation reports and interviews relating to victim Petrole in violation of Brady. Second, Petitioner alleges that the Prosecution withheld information indicating that Petrole was rumored to be a government informant. See Pet’r’s Ex. 57. In an interview with Sgt. Pass on August 20, 2001, Jesse James indicated that he believed Barber killed Petrole due to a rumor that Petrole was a police informant. Id. This information was memorialized in a narrative information report. When asked about the report during the habeas proceeding, Prosecutors indicated that they were aware of the statement but did not disclose the information because it was a “rumor” and had not been substantiated by other evidence. Tr. 687; see Tr. 59 (Ebert’s testimony that he did not recall turning the report over to Petitioner’s counsel). This admission, along with the statement’s absence from the written Brady disclosure, shows suppression of evidence for the purpose of Brady analysis. Furthermore, the evidence is favorable to Wolfe because it creates yet another potential motive for Petrole’s death that does not involve Wolfe. Despite being favorable, the Director asserts that the Commonwealth had no obligation to disclose the statement or the report because it was, merely an uncorroborated rumor. Director’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Law at 24-25. In support of this notion, the Director references the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Illinois. In Moore, the police failed to disclose a police report indicating the outcome of a fruitless investigation of another potential suspect. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Supreme Court held that failure to disclose an early lead did not violate Brady where, an eyewitness to the killing and witnesses to defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime were later discovered, thus exonerating the other suspect. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972). Moore is easily distinguishable from the case at bar because there are neither eyewitnesses to Petrole’s murder nor witnesses at the scene of the crime to directly contradict the suppressed evidence or render it clearly immaterial in light of other evidence. The Director also asserts that the Commonwealth’s suppression does not violate Brady because James’ admission to the police that most of his information was either speculation or from third party sources supports its argument that suppression was acceptable under Brady. See Pet’r’s Ex. 57. Had James’ statement about the Petrole rumor been mere fourth-hand speculation as Conway asserts, the Commonwealth may have a stronger argument. However, here, the individual specifically identified the names of the persons from whom he heard the information, thus providing a traceable path to discovering its source. Moreover, as Sgt. Pass testified, the fact that the rumor existed alone, would be enough to “place a target on [the rumored informant’s] back.” Tr. 543; see e.g., Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). Therefore, the report is material because the fact that the rumor existed may have been probative in value itself and would not qualify as hearsay under the Virginia laws of evidence. See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Scott, 236 Va. 116, 122, 372 S.E.2d 383 (1988) (defining hearsay as “testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter”). As Sgt. Pass testified, and this Court finds, the value of James’ statement that Petrole was rumored to be an informant does not turn on whether the statement is in fact true, but rather the fact that the rumor existed at all would be enough to create an ulterior motive for Petrole’s death. Having determined this report/statement to have been suppressed, favorable and material, the Court determines that the Prosecution withheld this information from the Petitioner in violation of Brady. Third, Petitioner alleges that the Prosecution unconstitutionally suppressed witness statements indicating that a second car was at the crime scene shortly after the murder. The habeas inquiry revealed that the Commonwealth was in possession of at least three independent statements from witnesses at the scene of the crime indicating that there was a second car at the crime scene. Both Holly Reid and Peter Shanz stated on the night of the murder that a few minutes after they heard the gunshots, they observed a small dark colored car slowly pass the victim’s car and leave the neighborhood. Pet’r’s Exs. 35, 36; Tr. 369, 374. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Shanz testified that he spoke with Mr. Conway and related the same statements to him directly. Tr. 376-77. He also testified that he spoke with Conway a few weeks before the trial about testifying, but that Conway never followed up with him. Id. Kimberly Miller also made a statement to police on the night of the murder indicating that after the red car left (later found to be J.R. Martin’s car), she observed a blue or black vehicle come in, drive to the end of the court, and then leave the area. Pet’r’s Ex. 28. During the evidentiary hearing, Ebert admitted that he considered this information in preparing for Petitioner’s trial. Yet, none of these statements were included in the written Brady disclosures and there is no evidence to suggest that they were provided to Petitioner’s counsel. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner only discovered these statements in light of the Court’s habeas inquiry. The statements are favorable to Petitioner because they indicate the possibility that there may have been additional actors involved in Petrole’s murder. This notion would not only undermine the Prosecution’s theory that Barber acted only at the direction of Wolfe, but it would also refute Barber’s trial testimony that only he and Wolfe were involved in the murder for hire scheme. Properly disclosed to competent counsel, this information would have been material when considered alongside other suppressed evidence impeaching Barber’s testimony. See Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 300 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that suppressed evidence of witness identities and statements indicating that they saw a suspicious vehicle speeding away from the crime scene at the time of victim’s death was favorable to the defendant and ultimately concluding that the prosecution’s suppressions violated Brady ). The witness statements and identities could have drastically altered Petitioner’s trial strategy. Rather than relying primarily on Wolfe’s own testimony denying the allegations, compet