Full opinion text
OPINION JAMES P. JONES, District Judge. A Virginia jury convicted Ivan Teleguz of the murder for hire of Stephanie Sipe, his former girlfriend and the mother of his child, and sentenced him to death. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and death penalty on direct appeal and in state collateral proceedings, Teleguz now petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus. Through his appointed attorneys, Teleguz raises a number of claims asserting that his conviction and sentence were unconstitutionally obtained. Among these claims, Teleguz contends that his trial counsel was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phases, that prosecutors knowingly presented false evidence and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, and that the prosecution unfairly denied him access to consular assistance from the Ukraine, his native country. He also asserts that he is actually innocent of the murder. After a careful review of the record, I find that Teleguz’s claims are without legal merit and accordingly deny his petition. The reasons for my decision follow. I. Facts. In affirming Teleguz’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia summarized the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution as follows: During the summer of 2001, Teleguz hired Edwin Lee Gilkes, Jr., and Michael Anthony Hetrick to kill Sipe, who was Teleguz’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his young child. On July 21, 2001, Teleguz, driving his car, took Gilkes and Hetrick from their apartment in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to Harrison-burg, Virginia, where Sipe lived. Teleguz told Hetrick he wanted Sipe’s “throat cut” and “to make sure she was dead.” Once in Virginia, Teleguz waited in the car while Gilkes and Hetrick went into a Wal-Mart. Hetrick purchased a fillet knife, which Teleguz approved as a suitable murder weapon. Teleguz took the men to Sipe’s apartment complex and pointed out her apartment. They then drove the car to a parking lot near Sipe’s residence, where Gilkes and He-trick got out of the car. Teleguz told the men to “wait until he had time to get back to Pennsylvania.” After waiting several hours, Gilkes and Hetrick walked back to Sipe’s apartment complex. Hetrick approached Sipe’s apartment alone and gained entry by asking to use the telephone. Once in the apartment, Hetrick killed Sipe by cutting her throat. In the course of the attack, Hetrick injured his hand. He-trick went to the bathroom to clean his hand and was surprised to find Sipe’s infant son “in the bathtub with the water running.” Hetrick turned off the water and left the apartment. Gilkes and He-trick returned to Pennsylvania by bus. On the evening of July 23, 2001, Sipe’s mother, Pamela Y. Woods, went to her daughter’s apartment because she had not heard from Sipe during the previous two days and was unable to reach her by telephone. When Woods entered the apartment, she found Sipe’s body in the front room and began screaming for help. Woods then found Sipe’s twenty-three month-old son in the bathroom of the apartment, with the bathtub full of water. The child was unharmed. In response to Woods’ screams, Mark Edwin Moore, a neighbor, went to Sipe’s apartment and, after placing a blanket over Sipe’s body, took Woods and her grandson out of the apartment. The medical examiner testified that Sipe suffered a number of cuts described as defensive wounds, as well as three other wounds. The first, according to the medical examiner, was a superficial wound. The second wound was a “stabbing wound,” which affected the area “all the way from the left side of the neck ... to the right side of the neck” and consisted of a cut to Sipe’s windpipe and esophagus. The medical examiner also testified that the third wound, the fatal wound, was a “cutting wound” which consisted of a cut approximately two and one-half inches deep into Sipe’s trachea, larynx, and a major artery on the right side of Sipe’s neck, which was completely severed. At the crime scene, the Harrisonburg police discovered blood that did not belong to Sipe. Investigator Kevin A. Whitfield learned from Sipe’s family members that Teleguz was the father of Sipe’s son and that he was currently living in Pennsylvania. Investigator Whitfield also learned that relations between Sipe and Teleguz had been strained, and that Teleguz was upset about a court order requiring him to pay child support. On July 24, 2001, Investigator Whitfield interviewed Teleguz at Teleguz’s residence in Pennsylvania. Teleguz denied any involvement in the murder, and stated he had been in Pennsylvania since July 20, 2001. On December 14, 2001, Investigator Whitfield, assisted by Pennsylvania State Police, executed a search warrant on Teleguz. Police collected samples of Teleguz’s blood, hair, and saliva. Testing revealed that Teleguz was not the source of the blood found at Sipe’s apartment. Also in 2001, Investigator Whitfield interviewed Mark Moore who told Whitfield that he had seen an unknown person around Sipe’s apartment prior to her murder. When shown a photograph array that included a photograph of Teleguz, Moore told Investigator Whitfield he was about 70 percent certain Teleguz was the person he had seen at Sipe’s apartment. Investigator Whitfield also interviewed Ryan Ferguson, who was with Moore the night he saw the individual leave Sipe’s apartment. Ferguson was also shown a photograph array. Although Ferguson initially failed to identify Teleguz, he subsequently identified the photograph of Teleguz as the one which “most” resembled the person he had seen leaving Sipe’s apartment. No arrests were made on the basis of these interviews. The investigation stalled until February 2003, when Michael Nelson, a deputy marshal with the United States Marshal [sic] Service, contacted Investigator Whitfield with information about the Sipe murder. Aleksey Safanov, who was facing federal criminal charges, told Deputy Marshal Nelson that Teleguz had hired a black male from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to kill Sipe because Teleguz was angry about having to pay child support. According to Safanov, Teleguz said that Sipe had been murdered, and that Teleguz was upset because “[w]ho-ever killed her left blood evidence.” Safanov also told investigators that after Sipe’s murder, Teleguz wanted to rob Sipe’s parents, and that he and Teleguz had driven to Harrisonburg but ultimately did not commit the robbery. Safanov’s information led the police to Edwin Gilkes, who told the police that he refused Teleguz’s offer to murder Sipe for pay but that Michael Hetrick accepted the offer. The police then contacted Hetrick who ultimately confessed to murdering Sipe. Hetrick said Teleguz had hired him to kill Sipe for $2,000, with half to be paid before the murder. When Teleguz received confirmation of Sipe’s death, he paid Gilkes and Hetrick the remaining $1,000 plus an additional $500 for expenses. Subsequent testing revealed that Hetrick was the source of the unidentified blood found at Sipe’s apartment. Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 643 S.E.2d 708, 714-15 (2007) (“Teleguz I”). II. Procedural History. A. State Proceedings. Following Hetrick’s confession, Teleguz was arrested in Pennsylvania on July 1, 2004, and subsequently extradited to Virginia. A Rockingham County, Virginia, grand jury indicted Hetrick for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person by another for hire as an accessory before the fact, a Class 1 felony punishable by death. Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-31(2) (Supp.2010). Teleguz was appointed counsel and tried by a jury over four days in the Circuit Court of Rockingham County. The jury found Teleguz guilty of capital murder for hire on February 9, 2006. Following a separate penalty proceeding on February 13 and 14, 2006, the jury fixed Teleguz’s punishment at death. At the penalty hearing, the state presented evidence of Teleguz’s prior criminal convictions and of the likely resulting pain from Sipe’s injuries in the attack, as well as testimony by her relatives. Teleguz presented mitigation evidence, including testimony from his family members, and testimony regarding his background as an immigrant to the United States and his childhood in the Ukraine. The trial court entered a final judgment on July 20, 2006, sentencing Teleguz to death in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Teleguz appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Virginia, presenting twenty-six assignments of error. Teleguz I, 643 S.E.2d at 708. The court unanimously affirmed the conviction and sentence on April 20, 2007. Id. at 732. On May 21, 2007, Teleguz filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied on June 22, 2007. Thereafter, Teleguz sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on February 19, 2008, Teleguz v. Virginia, 552 U.S. 1191, 128 S.Ct. 1228, 170 L.Ed.2d 78 (2008), and moved for a rehearing, which was denied on April 14, 2008, 552 U.S. 1332, 128 S.Ct. 1927, 170 L.Ed.2d 785 (2008). Post-conviction counsel was appointed, and Teleguz filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Virginia on April 21, 2008. Teleguz also filed a motion for leave to exceed the court’s fifty-page petition limit established by its rules, which the court denied. Teleguz’s state habeas petition asserted twenty claims and requested expert assistance, discovery, and an evidentiary hearing. The state filed a motion to dismiss Teleguz’s petition on May 21, 2008, and in a detailed opinion issued on January 15, 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia granted the motion. Teleguz v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 279 Va. 1, 688 S.E.2d 865, 868 (2010) (“Teleguz II”). On February 16, 2010, Teleguz filed a petition for a rehearing, which was denied on April 22, 2010. The Rockingham County Circuit Court then scheduled Teleguz’s execution for June 21, 2010. B. Federal Proceedings. On June 14, 2010, Teleguz filed a motion in this court to stay his scheduled execution, a notice of intent to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006), and a motion seeking appointment of counsel. This court appointed counsel and stayed Teleguz’s execution pending determination of his federal habeas petition. Teleguz sought an extension of time to file his federal habeas petition, which was granted in part. In an Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed December 6, 2010, Teleguz asserted twelve grounds for habeas relief, which I will hereafter consider in this Opinion. The state has filed an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Dismiss has been extensively briefed and orally argued by the parties and is ripe for decision. III. Analysis. In his present federal habeas petition, Teleguz presents twelve claims for relief, several of which incorporate multiple, detailed subclaims. In support of these claims, Teleguz relies on the trial record, the record as developed during his state habeas action, and an appendix of new evidence obtained since petitioning for state habeas relief. Before addressing these claims, I will outline the legal principles governing his petition. My review of Teleguz’s application is largely governed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The AEDPA erected a legal framework designed by Congress to more carefully circumscribe federal habeas review and ensure that the responsibility of reviewing state criminal convictions remains properly, primarily, and in the first instance, with the state courts. See Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The statute generally bars federal habeas relief unless a petitioner has first properly exhausted available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that ... the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or ... there is an absence of available State corrective process.”). To meet the statute’s exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must provide the state court with the “opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance” by presenting to the state court “the operative facts and the controlling legal principles associated with each claim.” Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is also exhausted for § 2254(b)’s purposes if it is clear that a petitioner would be barred from receiving state review because the claim would be deemed procedurally barred under state law. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 161-62, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (finding that claims that are procedurally defaulted under state law are exhausted under the AEDPA because the statute only requires exhaustion of “available” state remedies). However, although exhausted under the AEDPA’s definition, a claim that is procedurally defaulted under state law provides an adequate and independent state-law ground for the conviction and sentence, and therefore it cannot be reviewed by the federal court. Id. at 162, 116 S.Ct. 2074. Thus, federal habeas review is precluded when a claim is procedurally defaulted before the state courts, unless a petitioner can demonstrate that cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice excuse the default. Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 844 (4th Cir.1998). To show cause, a petitioner must demonstrate some objective factor external to his defense that impeded his counsel’s efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that there was a possibility of prejudice, but that the error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with an error of constitutional magnitude. Id. at 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639. Alternatively, a petitioner may assert that his case falls into the narrow class of cases implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice by arguing that he is actually innocent of the crime of which he was convicted. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15, 115 S.Ct. 851,130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). To show actual innocence that would excuse procedural default, a petitioner must show that an alleged constitutional error probably resulted in his conviction although he was actually innocent. Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639). To establish the requisite probability, a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence. Id. In assessing a petitioner’s claim of actual innocence, the court may consider all relevant evidence, including evidence that was excluded or unavailable at trial. Id. Newly presented evidence may call into question the credibility of witnesses, and the habeas court may have to make credibility assessments. Id. at 330, 115 S.Ct. 851. The AEDPA does not procedurally bar a Schlup claim of actual innocence. Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir.2010). A capital habeas petitioner may also attempt to excuse a defaulted claim by showing that he is actually innocent of the death penalty. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). To demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the death penalty for the purpose of excusing a default, the petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence that, but for the alleged constitutional error, he would have been ineligible for the death penalty. Id. at 348, 112 S.Ct. 2514. If a claim was properly presented in state court and therefore not defaulted, the AEDPA provides for a deferential federal review of the state court’s decision as outlined in § 2254(d). When reviewing such claims, the AEDPA provides that a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that: (1) was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1), (d)(2). Section 2254(d)’s provisions are disjunctive and have independent meaning. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Under § 2254(d)(l)’s “contrary to” clause, a federal court may issue the writ if “the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] ha[s] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. Under § 2254(d)(l)’s “unreasonable application” clause, I may grant relief if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle but “unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” Id. The Supreme Court has stressed that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one and that a district court may not issue a writ under the unreasonable application clause simply because it “concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Rather, the state court’s adjudication must be “objectively unreasonable” for a federal court to grant habeas relief. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Furthermore, the AEDPA provides that a state court’s factual determinations are entitled to a “presumption of correctness” that may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the state court based its decision on “an unreasonable determination of the facts,” in light of the evidence as presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2254(d)(2), 2254(e)(1); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). Finally, the AEDPA addresses how this court must view evidence never presented before the state courts. Section 2254(e)(2) provides that if a petitioner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim” in the state court proceedings, this court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim” unless a petitioner shows that the claim relies on either (1) a new, previously unavailable rule of constitutional law or (2) facts that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Moreover, the newly obtained facts must be “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that[,] but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Thus, § 2254(e) incentivizes habeas petitioners to diligently investigate and pursue their claims in state court, because unless a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court,” he is prohibited from introducing new evidence in his federal petition. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). After the state’s Motion to Dismiss was argued in this case, the Supreme Court issued an important opinion clarifying the role of newly obtained evidence in federal habeas review. Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). The parties have filed supplemental briefs on the meaning of Pinholster and its effect on existing Fourth Circuit jurisprudence. As discussed above, § 2254(e) bars the introduction of new evidence by a non-diligent petitioner. However, the circuits have split on how to treat a diligent petitioner offering new evidence in his federal case that bolsters claims previously rejected on the merits by the state courts. Putting the issue in the language of the AED-PA’s provisions, the question is how to deal with the interplay between § 2254(d)(l)’s deferential standard of review and § 2254(e)’s directives regarding newly obtained evidence. The Fourth Circuit recently addressed this issue and found that, “[i]f the record [developed before the state courts] ultimately proves to be incomplete, deference to the state court’s judgment would be inappropriate because judgment on a materially incomplete record is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of § 2254(d).” Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 555-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 136, 178 L.Ed.2d 83 (2010). The Winston court accordingly found that “[n]ew, material evidence, introduced for the first time during federal habeas proceedings, may therefore require a de novo review of petitioner’s claim.” Id.; see also Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 297-98 (4th Cir.2003) (finding that the AEDPA’s deference requirement does not apply when a claim made on federal habeas review is premised on material that has surfaced for the first time during federal proceedings and citing to similar holdings by the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). Other courts of appeal, however, had found that § 2254(d)’s deferential standard continues to apply, but that so long as the evidence was otherwise admissible under the AEDPA, the new evidence was “properly considered in evaluating whether the legal conclusion reached by the state habeas court was a reasonable application of Supreme Court law.” Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 668 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); see also Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570 F.3d 490, 500 (2d Cir.2009); Pecoraro v. Walls, 286 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.2002); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 952 (5th Cir.2001). Under this approach, newly obtained evidence that met the AEDPA’s other procedural strictures could be considered, albeit with some murkiness as to how much consideration the evidence was entitled. In its recent Cullen v. Pinholster opinion, the Supreme Court spoke to this issue in a manner directly relevant to Teleguz’s petition. Pinholster was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death after killing two men during an interrupted burglary. After an evidentiary hearing on Pinholster’s federal habeas petition, the district court found that Pinholster suffered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d at 666. The holding was largely based on facts that had not been previously presented indicating that Pinholster’s trial counsel ignored or failed to pursue significant available mitigation evidence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of “whether review under § 2254(d)(1) permits consideration of evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing before the federal habeas court.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. The Supreme Court held that such new evidence could not be considered and that review under § 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id. The Court reasoned that limiting the review to the evidence before the state court best comports with the language and the intent of the AEDPA and is consistent with federal review of only “what a state court knew and did.” Id. at 1399. To hold otherwise, the Court found, would be “to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court.” Id. Despite this limitation, § 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d) does not apply. Id. at 1401. The Court found that, at a minimum, § 2254(e)(2) “still restricts the discretion of federal habeas courts to consider new evidence when deciding claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. Of course, such claims continue to be subject to the strictures of § 2254(a)-(c)’s requirements, discussed above. Id. at 1401 n. 9. In his supplemental briefing, Teleguz argues that Pinholster does not fully foreclose review of new evidence in his case. Teleguz seizes on a footnote in the Pinholster opinion suggesting that, under certain circumstances, newly uncovered evidence may transform a claim previously adjudicated on the merits by the state courts into a “new claim.” See id. at 1401 n. 10 (citing id. at 1417-18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). However, the Court expressly declined to establish how to distinguish claims adjudicated on the merits from such new claims. Id. at 1401-02 ns. 10, 11. Teleguz contends that Winston v. Kelly remains good law in drawing this distinction. See Winston, 592 F.3d at 555-56 (“[Jjudgment on a materially incomplete record is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of § 2254(d).”) He contends that, because the state habeas court refused an evidentiary hearing, the record before it was materially incomplete, and his new evidence thus merits consideration under Pinholster. The state argues that Pinholster’s holding, not the footnote’s dicta, governs Teleguz’s new evidence. The state points out that the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion following Pinholster, reversed a grant of the writ that was based on evidence first heard at a federal evidentiary hearing, holding that “evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review.” Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 492 (4th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The state argues that the Jackson opinion indicates that the Fourth Circuit has retreated from Winston in light of Pinholster. Wherever the line between § 2254(d)-reviewable claims and those potentially meriting broader review, this is a distinction that need not be made here. As is evident, the new evidence presented by Teleguz to this court is cumulative in support of arguments made before and adjudicated by the state courts. Thus, Cullen v. Pinholster significantly restricts my review of Teleguz’s current claims. Whereas under this circuit’s prior precedent, I would have granted de novo review to newly obtained evidence bolstering claims previously adjudicated before the state court, Pinholster instructs me that I now may not consider this evidence. See also Jackson, 650 F.3d at 492-93. Newly obtained evidence is only pertinent in my review of claims that, while not properly procedurally presented for state adjudication, merit consideration under the procedural default exceptions. Lastly, I note that this new development in our habeas jurisprudence does not affect the requirement that a petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he can show that any constitutional error committed had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict.” Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 855 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With this legal framework in mind, I address each of Teleguz’s claims in turn. A. Claim I — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Guilt Phase of Trial. In his first claim for relief, Teleguz contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial. Specifically, Teleguz raises three subclaims roughly centered around the testimony of the state’s primary witnesses: Aleksey Safanov, Michael Hetrick, and Edwin Gilkes. Teleguz argues that these three witnesses were essential in persuading the jurors to convict Teleguz, because their testimony provided the details — including the motive, solicitation, advanced preparation, and final consummation — of Teleguz’s plot to have Stephanie Sipe murdered. Teleguz claims that two of these witnesses have since recanted much of them trial testimony, and that effective advocacy by trial counsel would have impeached their false testimony from the outset and exposed the implausibility of their stories. In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Teleguz must show both that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A deficiency is prejudicial if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As a preliminary matter, the parties contest the procedural posture of these Strickland claims. Although organized slightly differently than was presented before the state courts, I find that Teleguz has raised substantially the same arguments as were addressed in his earlier appeals, and thus these arguments have been properly adjudicated on the merits in those decisions. Any exceptions to this procedural posture are specifically addressed in pertinent part below. Finally, I note that Teleguz has substantially supplemented his claim with new evidence and affidavits not put before the state courts. As discussed above, Pinholster prohibits me from considering that evidence for the purposes' of my review under § 2254(d). 1. Aleksey Safanov. First, Teleguz claims that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to effectively impeach the testimony of Aleksey Safanov. Teleguz presented this claim to the Supreme Court of Virginia in his state habeas petition, and that court found that it met neither the performance nor prejudice prong of Strickland. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 871-72. Under § 2254(d), Teleguz is entitled to relief only if this decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of the evidence submitted before the state court. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel “does not require that representation be flawless, only that all decisions materially affecting [the] defendant’s representation be the product of informed judgment, not neglect or ignorance.” Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 640 (4th Cir.1978). In evaluating counsel’s strategic choices, judicial second-guessing is particularly inappropriate. See id. Although strategies based upon counsel’s unreasonably insufficient preparation can, in some circumstances, constitute deficient performance under Strickland, “[strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to [the] plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 202, 202 n. 6 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Teleguz argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because, although defense counsel had at hand information that would call Safanov’s credibility into question, counsel failed to use it. Namely, Teleguz asserts that his counsel failed to effectively highlight to the jury that because Safanov was facing severe criminal penalties for a federal firearms charge, he had a powerful incentive to lie to authorities. Teleguz also argues that effective investigation by counsel would have revealed that Safanov had a suspiciously intimate level of knowledge regarding the Sipe family’s involvement in drugs and other criminal activity. Teleguz contends that this evidence could have been used to show an alternative theory of the crime, such as the robbery of a drug house gone awry. Moreover, Teleguz argues that had counsel fully investigated Safanov, they would have uncovered a history of personal animus between Safanov and Teleguz, Safanov’s pattern of lying to and intimidating law enforcement, and other authorities’ general concerns regarding Safanov’s credibility as a state witness. Specifically, Teleguz refers to an audiotape and transcript of a telephone call conducted between Investigator Whitfield and an FBI agent, in which the agent made several pointed comments questioning Safanov’s credibility. Although Teleguz’s counsel had access to this call from discovery, they did not utilize it at trial. Finally, Teleguz presents new affidavits of several attorneys working on this petition relating conversations they have had with Safanov in which he has allegedly recanted much of his testimony against Teleguz. These affidavits were not part of the state court record. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial record demonstrated that counsel thoroughly cross-examined Safanov on these subjects. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 871. Furthermore, the court found that counsel made strategic decisions regarding how deeply to question Safanov about his involvement with criminal activity, as such testimony could also lend credence to Teleguz’s own supposed involvement in organized crime. Finally, the court found that counsel extensively probed Safanov regarding gaps in his recollections. Given the depth of counsel’s cross-examination, the court found that Teleguz could not demonstrate deficiency or explain how additional questioning would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 871-72. The court further rejected Teleguz’s claim of ineffective assistance based on the FBI telephone call. The court found that Teleguz failed to authenticate the evidence or show how the telephone call would have changed the jury’s verdict. Id. at 872. Because the Supreme Court of Virginia correctly identified the Strickland factors as the appropriate law governing Teleguz’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, I must now examine whether the court’s application of Strickland, was reasonable under the AEDPA’s deferential standard. I reemphasize that, in order for me to grant federal habeas relief, the state court’s determination must have been more than incorrect or erroneous; it must have been “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). The record clearly shows that a prime tenet of Teleguz’s defense strategy was to aggressively cross-examine the state’s three primary witnesses, including Aleksey Safanov, in an attempt to impeach their credibility. Furthermore, counsel’s cross-examination covered every subject that Teleguz now alleges that Safanov testified falsely to. Safanov was questioned about his criminal record, his pending charges, and any deal he hoped to strike with the state in exchange for his testimony. Counsel explored Safanov and Teleguz’s relationship, alternative theories of the crime, and the believability of Teleguz’s alleged motive as supplied by Safanov. Counsel’s cross-examination painted a picture of Safanov as a career criminal of dubious reliability, and while the FBI telephone call would have added to that picture, Teleguz has not shown it would have been dispositive. That the jury evidently believed Safanov’s testimony, despite counsel’s concerted efforts, does not demonstrate that counsel’s representation was deficient or prejudicial. Finally, I note that the state court had no evidence before it that Safanov’s testimony had changed or would change. Teleguz’s Strickland claim as presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia was restricted to the theory that his trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching the credibility of Safanov’s, at that point consistent, testimony. Therefore, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia reasonably applied Strickland to Teleguz’s ineffective assistance claim, and I must deny relief. 2. Michael Hetrick. Teleguz also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the testimony of Stephanie Sipe’s admitted murderer, Michael Hetrick. Teleguz presented this claim in his state habeas petition, but the Supreme Court of Virginia found that Teleguz did not show that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 869-72. I again review the state court’s determination for reasonableness under § 2254(d). Teleguz contends that counsel failed to capitalize on critical opportunities to undermine Hetrick’s credibility, particularly in regard to Hetrick’s account of how and why Teleguz solicited the murder. He-trick testified that his participation in the murder was solicited at the birthday party of Dave Everhart, one of Hetrick’s good friends and an acquaintance of Teleguz. Hetrick testified that Teleguz had approached him and Edwin Gilkes at the Everhart party and offered them a thousand dollars to murder Teleguz’s ex-girlfriend. He additionally testified that Teleguz had told them that he did not want to pay child support and that Teleguz had specifically requested that Sipe’s throat be cut. Teleguz also highlights inconsistencies in Hetrick’s testimony regarding the details of the murder itself. Hetrick testified substantially to the logistics of the crime, including to details of the timeline and of a phone call made by Hetrick and Gilkes to Teleguz in the days following, informing Teleguz that they had murdered Sipe according to their arrangement. Teleguz argues that effective investigation and advocacy by trial counsel would have revealed many details of Hetrick’s story to be false and that highlighting these inaccuracies would have significantly undermined Hetrick’s testimony. In support of his argument, Teleguz primarily relies upon inconsistencies between He-trick’s and Gilkes’ trial testimony and earlier interviews given to authorities over the course of the investigation. Teleguz also presents affidavits by Latesha and Dave Everhart, asserting that Teleguz was not present at the birthday party. Teleguz submits telephone records, testimony by neighbors, and medical reports that he contends refute Hetrick’s account of the time of death and undermine the prosecution’s theory that Teleguz actively planned to establish a false alibi for the murder. The state habeas court rejected Teleguz’s arguments. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 869-71. The court found that counsel cross-examined Hetrick regarding the inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his prior statements to police — including inconsistencies regarding Teleguz’s motive and alibi, Sipe’s time of death, and Hetrick’s call to Teleguz after the crime. Addressing Hetrick’s testimony regarding the murder itself, the court found that such peripheral details were especially unlikely to affect Teleguz’s case because the prosecution’s theory rested on Teleguz having hired the killers, not on Teleguz ever having been present at or having participated in the murder itself. Id. at 869. Finally, the court rejected Teleguz’s ineffective assistance claim as to the Ever-hart birthday party testimony, on the basis that Teleguz failed to show how the Ever-harts’ testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. Hetrick testified at trial and was subject to significant cross-examination, much of which focused on the inconsistencies of his testimony and Hetrick’s particularly strong motive to avoid the death penalty himself. Defense counsel’s strategy for questioning Hetrick’s credibility was one of death by a thousand cuts. That counsel did not pursue a thousand and one, particularly regarding ancillary subjects, does not show a deficient performance. Moreover, counsel’s thorough cross-examination only undermines Teleguz’s assertion of prejudice. For these reasons, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s application of Strickland was reasonable. 3. Edwin Gilkes. Finally, Teleguz contends that the testimony of Edwin Gilkes would have been vulnerable to vigorous impeachment and that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach him. Teleguz relies on the evidence described above, as well as an affidavit by Gilkes submitted before the state habeas court that recanted significant portions of Gilkes’ testimony. Gilkes’ affidavit recants his testimony that he and Hetrick were hired at the Everhart birthday party and asserts that Teleguz was not present at the party. Gilkes also recants any knowledge of Teleguz having a motive to kill Sipe. Finally, Gilkes indicates that Gene Popov and Anatoly Rymarenko, two men with personal animus towards Teleguz, assisted in setting Teleguz up for the crime. Finally, Gilkes stated that his trial testimony was based on prosecutorial pressure and his desire to avoid the death penalty. As noted above, although the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed Teleguz’s Strickland claims, he presented them differently in his state habeas action. In that petition, Teleguz challenged counsel’s effectiveness in impeaching certain substantive topics, instead of individual witnesses. The court appears to have addressed Gilkes’ recantation primarily in relation to Teleguz’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution’s theory of motive, failing to present alternative theories for the crime, and failing to impeach the testimony that Teleguz solicited the murder at the Everhart birthday party. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that counsel was not ineffective in failing to impeach Gilkes’ testimony regarding any of these subjects. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 869-71. The court held that Teleguz failed to meet the Strickland standards because he did not provide affidavits from witnesses that should have been called, and he failed to allege prejudice. Id. at 869. The court also found that, for similar reasons related to these subjects above, counsel acted strategically in their attempts to impeach Gilkes and that, particularly in regard to the peripheral issues, Teleguz could not show that effective impeachment would have changed the jury’s verdict. Although the differing structure between petitioner’s claim here and the state habeas decision somewhat obfuscates my review, I do find that the Supreme Court of Virginia was presented with and ultimately reached the substantive issues of this Strickland claim and that it applied federal law reasonably. See Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir.2004). Gilkes’ recantation, while significant, does not by itself demonstrate that counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach him at trial. Teleguz has not shown how counsel could have exposed Gilkes’ false testimony on the stand. Gilkes faced criminal liability for his own participation in the murder, and his trial testimony dealt largely with circumstantial evidence. Aside from highlighting inconsistencies and Gilkes’ motivation to testify on the prosecution’s behalf, there does not appear to be much, particularly under Strickland’s deferential review, that counsel could have done to secure Gilkes’ favorable testimony at trial. Moreover, the fact that Gilkes’ testimony provided only one of three consistent accounts of the crime undercuts Teleguz’s ability to show prejudice. Thus, I find that the state habeas application of Strickland to Gilkes’ testimony was reasonable under § 2254(d) review. 4. Claims of General Ineffectiveness. Finally, Teleguz also argues that his counsel was generally incompetent and prejudiced him at trial. He particularly singles out his lead counsel, Paul MaslakowsM, as being embroiled in personal career drama during the period in which he should have been developing Teleguz’s defense. Teleguz alleges that Maslakowski’s inattention and hostility to Teleguz’s case created a dysfunctional defense team. He contends that novice investigators and mitigation specialists were left with no effective leadership or advice to direct their efforts, and that this lack of leadership explains why weaknesses in the state’s case were not exposed at trial. The evidence supporting this claim consists of affidavits by members of Teleguz’s defense team describing Maslakowski’s deficiencies as lead counsel, the internal problems plaguing Teleguz’s defense, and the barriers these issues erected in developing an effective defense for Teleguz. These affidavits were submitted to the state habeas court. Although the Supreme Court of Virginia did not address these allegations independently, I assume that the court considered this evidence as underlying all of Teleguz’s ineffective assistance claims, and I make note that it has informed my § 2254(d) review throughout. Despite any internal strife, Teleguz’s team presented a full, thorough defense for Teleguz before the jury. For this reason, claims of internal problems do not change my assessment that the state court acted reasonably when it found that Teleguz received constitutionally sufficient counsel at the guilt phase of his trial. B. Claim II — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase of Trial-Failure to Rebut Evidence of Future Dangerousness. In his second claim, Teleguz asserts that his trial counsel’s failure to reasonably address evidence of future dangerousness, an aggravating factor that can make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of the trial. Particularly, Teleguz argues that his trial counsel should have done more to prevent the introduction of and disprove statements that he was associated with the Russian Mafia, that he was responsible for another murder, and that he could be a danger to the community even if sentenced to life imprisonment. Additionally, Teleguz argues that defense counsel did not request funds for an expert to conduct an individualized risk assessment, did not properly object to the trial judge’s answer to a question from the jury, and did not undermine Hetrick’s claim that Teleguz chose the manner of Sipe’s death. 1. “Russian Mafia” References. Teleguz argues that his trial counsel failed to effectively object to and rebut statements indicating that he was involved with the Russian Mafia. Prior to trial, Teleguz’s counsel filed a motion in limine to bar references to the Russian Mafia. The motion in limine was denied. At the guilt phase of the trial, Gilkes twice stated that he feared Teleguz because he had heard that Teleguz was a member of the Russian Mafia. The court gave a limiting instruction that the testimony about the Russian Mafia was only to be considered for its effect on Gilkes’ state of mind and not for its truth. Hetrick also testified that he believed that Teleguz was involved in the Russian Mafia and had been afraid that Teleguz would kill him if he did not go through with the murder. In its closing argument at the guilt phase, the prosecution reiterated that the witnesses were afraid of Teleguz. The argument that trial counsel failed to successfully object to and rebut these statements was presented during the state habeas proceedings. The argument was supported by affidavits as well as the official presentence investigation report. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument, determining that Strickland had not been met. It reasoned that petitioner’s trial counsel was not delinquent in the failure to successfully object. Trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence about the Mafia and made cogent arguments that comments about the Russian Mafia should not be admissible. See Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 873. Furthermore, Teleguz failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s failure to question police officer Dan Comer about the Russian Mafia amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 874. Teleguz failed to present an affidavit from Comer verifying how he would have testified. Id. Teleguz also seeks to introduce additional evidence in the form of new affidavits and a report from a risk assessment expert. However, I may not consider this new evidence when determining whether the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision was reasonable. See Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Based on the evidence before the state court, the court’s decision was reasonable. Trial counsel argued that references to the Russian Mafia were irrelevant and prejudicial and asserted that Teleguz was not Russian and had no connection to the Russian Mafia or other criminal organization. Furthermore, Teleguz has not shown that additional objections would have limited the references or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. For these reasons, Teleguz has not shown that his trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective. 2. Ephrata Murder Testimony. Teleguz argues that his trial counsel failed to effectively rebut statements tying him to an alleged murder in Ephrata, Pennsylvania. Prior to trial, Teleguz’s counsel filed a motion in limine to bar references to this alleged murder. The court excluded evidence of the alleged murder during the guilt phase, but allowed it during the penalty phase. However, defense counsel asked Gilkes during the guilt phase about the alleged murder, but Gilkes denied remembering telling police about the event. The prosecution then asked Gilkes about the alleged murder, and he testified about the details. During the penalty phase, the prosecution highlighted Gilkes’ earlier testimony. Teleguz did not assert this claim before the Supreme Court of Virginia. He now offers affidavits and other evidence in support of the claim that the murder did not occur. Although Pinholster left open the option of considering new evidence when a claim was not exhausted in state court, a district court may only consider such a claim and evidence if the default is excused when the requirements of § 2254(e)(2) are met. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1400. Here, such conditions are not met. Teleguz has failed to show cause for the default and has failed to show that the facts could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Furthermore, Teleguz has not shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice that would excuse the default. Therefore, this claim may not be considered on the merits. 3. “Dial up a Murder” References. Teleguz argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the prosecution’s assertion that Teleguz could have someone killed by a telephone call from prison. During the state’s closing argument at the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor stated that Teleguz was a future danger because “he can pick up a phone ... and dial up a murder because he can call another Aleksey Safanov or another Edwin Gilkes or another Michael Hetrick.” (J.A. 3454-55.) Defense counsel responded by saying that a phone call would be insufficient because it would take money to hire a contract killer, which Teleguz would not have if incarcerated. Teleguz asserts that counsel neglected to explain telephone procedures that would apply to Teleguz while in prison, in that inmates may only call certain pre-approved individuals, and telephone calls are monitored. During the state habeas proceedings, Teleguz raised the argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s statement. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument, maintaining that the statement outlined the facts of the case and was not improper. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 875. Teleguz also argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court re-open the evidence so that he could present testimony regarding inmate phone privileges. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument because Teleguz “fail[ed] to proffer what evidence would have been gained from presenting testimony regarding inmate phone privileges.” Id. at 877. Therefore, Teleguz had not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. To the extent that the argument presented here is the same as those presented before the state courts, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision was reasonable. However, much of the substance of this claim, relating to the failure to rebut the prosecution’s statement, is different from that advocated during the state habeas proceedings. Therefore, Teleguz’s rebuttal claim was not exhausted in state court and therefore is defaulted here. Teleguz has not asserted a cause for the default, and there is no fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse that default. 4. Risk Assessment. Teleguz asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a risk assessment expert to rebut the claim of future dangerousness. Teleguz asserts that testimony from such experts is common and that such an expert would have testified that Teleguz would have been less likely to be dangerous in prison than the average inmate. Teleguz asserts that a risk assessment expert, rather than a witness to testify about prison conditions generally, could have offered individualized testimony about Teleguz’s personal propensity to be dangerous. This claim was raised during the state habeas proceedings. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument, maintaining that Teleguz failed to proffer the specific testimony such an expert would have provided. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 879. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the evidence would likely have been inadmissible because a determination of future dangerousness revolves around a specific individual, and general information about the penal system is not relevant mitigation evidence. Id. Teleguz now presents an analysis from a risk assessment expert to support his claims. However, I may not consider this new evidence when determining whether the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision was reasonable. See Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Based on the evidence presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia, its decision was reasonable. The court did not know what particular testimony such an expert would have offered because Teleguz did not provide an expert report or affidavit. The court, therefore, did not have the means to determine whether the expert testimony would have had probative value and would have been admissible. Additionally, although such experts have been used in previous cases, Teleguz has not shown that the failure to present a risk assessment expert would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under prevailing professional norms. 5. Juror Question. Teleguz argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the judge’s answer to a question from the jury. During penalty phase jury deliberations, a female juror asked a bailiff whether Teleguz knew her identity and location. The trial court addressed the comment with counsel outside the jury’s presence, observing, “Now, obviously this is a repercussion of the references to the Russian Mafia.” (J.A. 3521.) The court proposed an additional instruction: As required by law, defense counsel and the Commonwealth’s Attorney are provided with the name, address, and occupation of each person in the venire (in this case, approximately 125 individuals). In common practice, defense counsel go over this list with the client to determine if the client knows any member of the venire. As a matter of course, attorneys do not provide copies of this master list to their clients. (J.A. 3531.) Defense counsel objected to the instruction, requesting that the court include a statement that “the jury should base their decision [on] ... the evidence and the instructions of law and that this [instruction] is something outside of that.” (J.A. 3522.) The court overruled the objection, submitted the instruction, and directed the jury to continue their deliberations. This claim was raised during the state habeas proceedings. Teleguz presented an affidavit from a student in the University of Virginia Capital Post-Conviction Clinic who helped with the habeas case. The student stated that one of the jurors interviewed said that she feared personal repercussions from her involvement in the case. (Pet’r’s State App. 108.) The student also said that the juror answered, “I mean, my family, they mean the world to me. I’ll just leave it at that,” when asked if she was referring to the idea that Teleguz was a part of the Russian Mafia. (Id.) The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument that counsel was ineffective for not moving for a mistrial or timely objecting. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 873, 877. The court determined that that there was no basis for a mistrial and that Teleguz had not suggested such a legal ground. Id. Furthermore, it found that trial counsel acted reasonably in not interviewing jurors for a post-trial motion and held that Teleguz had not presented evidence to support the claim that jurors were so focused on the Russian Mafia statements that they feared for their lives. Id. at 874. The instruction should have been sufficient to quiet the jurors’ concern. Id. at 877. Therefore, counsel’s performance was not unacceptably deficient. Id. Teleguz has not shown that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s determination was unreasonable. The only evidence in support of Teleguz’s claim presented to the state habeas court was an affidavit containing inconclusive hearsay statements from a juror. The juror did not affirmatively state that the Russian Mafia references affected her decision to impose a death sentence. 6. Manner of Death. Teleguz argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not casting doubt on Hetrick’s testimony that Teleguz ordered him to cut Sipe’s throat. Teleguz asserts that the prosecution’s portrayal of Teleguz as a future danger and its contention that the crime met the definition of “vile” was enhanced by this testimony. Teleguz contends that there was unused evidence that would have shown that Hetrick had threatened to cut another woman’s throat, had killed someone in the past, and had described how he would kill someone by cutting them. He also asserts that counsel should have informed the jury that Hetrick originally stated that he cut Sipe’s throat because he was angered when she fought back and caused the knife to cut him. Teleguz raised a similar, but not identical, argument during the state habeas proceedings. There, Teleguz asserted that his counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the testimony of Kimberly Woods and Jessica Swartz, who would have testified about threats and comments made by Hetrick that would have undermined his claim that Teleguz chose the manner of death. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument that trial counsel was ineffective, maintaining that neither the performance nor the prejudice prong of Strickland had been met. Teleguz II, 688 S.E.2d at 878. The defense was unable to obtain Swartz’s appearance because a Pennsylvania court determined that Swartz would have been caused undue hardship by being compelled to travel to Virginia and testify. Trial counsel asked for a continuance to secure Woods’ presence, but the motion was denied because the trial court determined that her testimony would be irrelevant. Trial counsel argued that the testimony would be relevant because Woods would testify that He-trick had threatened to kill Woods by cutting her throat. The trial court held that the testimony would not show that it was Hetrick’s idea, and not Teleguz’s, to cut Sipe’s throat. Teleguz also asserted to the Supreme Court of Virginia that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve or adequately brief the issues relating to Woods’ proffered testimony, but the argument was rejected because Teleguz had not shown that Woods’ testimony would have been relevant. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision was reasonable. Teleguz has not shown that his trial counsel was deficient in the attempts to secure the testimony of the witnesses and has not shown that Woods’ testimony would have been admissible if it had been secured. To the extent Teleguz asserts new arguments, and presents new evidence, relating to his counsel’s failure to offer other evidence that Hetrick chose the manner of Sipe’s death, the claim is defaulted because it was not raised in state court. Teleguz has not sh