Full opinion text
OPINION SWEET, District Judge. In this action, the plaintiffs Tara Rani-ere (“Raniere”), Nichol Bodden (“Bod-den”), and Mark Vosburgh (“Vosburgh”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) have brought this action against Citigroup Inc., Citibank, N.A., and CitiMortgage Inc. (together, “Defendants” or “Citi”) to recover allegedly uncompensated overtime wages as well as liquidated damages. Plaintiffs also seek certification of a putative nationwide colleetive action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. as well as a New York class action under the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) § 190 et seq. This opinion addresses three motions: (1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, transfer or stay this action; (2) Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional FLSA certification, Court-facilitated notice to similarly situated persons, and expedited disclosure of potential collective members’ contact information; and (3) Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by plaintiffs Bodden and Raniere. Based upon the following, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, transfer, or stay is denied; and Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is denied; and Plaintiffs motion for conditional collective certification and related relief is granted. Prior Proceedings This action was commenced by Plaintiffs on April 8, 2011. On May 3, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, stay or transfer this action. On May 6, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional collective certification and related relief. On May 13, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. These motions were marked fully submitted on June 7, 2011. Facts Alleged This suit was brought by Raniere, who has been employed by Defendants as a “Home Lending Specialist” since June 8, 1981, Bodden, who has been employed by Defendants as a “Home Lending Specialist” since February 6, 1987, and Vosburgh, who was employed by Defendants as a “Loan Consultant” between October 30, 2002 and February 2, 2009. The Complaint alleges that each of the named Plaintiffs is a resident of Suffolk County, New York. According to the Complaint, Defendant Citigroup Inc. is a global financial services holding company providing financial products and services, including consumer banking and credit, corporate and investment banking, securities brokerage, and wealth management. (Compl. ¶ 18.) As alleged, Defendant Citibank, N.A. is a subsidiary of Citigroup Inc. and a global financial services company that offers financial products and services, banking, lending and investment services. Defendant CitiMortgage Inc. is likewise a subsidiary of Citigroup Inc. and provides mortgage products and services and other financial services including banking, insurance, asset management, and credit cards. Both Citigroup Inc. and Citibank, N.A. are Delaware corporations with principal places of business at 399 Park Avenue, New York, New York (Compl. ¶ 18-19), while CitiMortgage Inc. is a New York corporation (Compl. ¶ 20). Plaintiffs allege that Citi willfully violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs and other members of the putative FLSA collective the prevailing one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiffs assert that pursuant to Citi’s policies and practices, the members of the putative collective were improperly classified as exempt from the provisions of the FLSA and improperly denied overtime compensation to which they were entitled. According to Plaintiffs, while their “job titles changed frequently throughout their employment,” “their job duties have never materially changed.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) As part of their duties while employed by Defendants, Plaintiffs “would complete mortgage applications for CitiMortgage’s customers,” which were “primarily referred to Plaintiffs by other Citi employees.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs “would collect financial information and documents from a particular customer and would enter the financial information into Defendants’ computer software,” termed “Contact Manager,” which would then identify whether the customer was conditionally approved for a particular mortgage based on the provided financial information. (Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs would “notify the customer whether he or she was conditionally approved for the particular mortgage” and “[i]f the customer was conditionally approved for the mortgage, Plaintiffs would request additional financial documents from the customer to satisfy the conditions set forth from Contact Manager.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) “Plaintiffs would then notify a Processor to review the customers’ mortgage application,” and “[ajfter a review of the mortgage application and documents, the Processor would forward the mortgage application to an Underwriter for approval.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) According to the Complaint, “Plaintiffs had no authority to approve or disapprove a mortgage application; instead, Plaintiffs followed Citi’s internal processes to gather necessary information and documents for a customer’s mortgage application to be processed.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that they “did not customarily or regularly direct two or more persons” and “they had no management responsibilities.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) According to the Complaint, prior to July 18, 2010, Plaintiffs were not required to record their time spent working, and as such Defendants did not maintain records concerning Plaintiffs’ hours worked. (Compl. ¶ 85.) However, Plaintiffs allege that throughout their course of employment, they “worked substantially in excess of 40 hours per week, frequently working between 50 and 70 hours per week” (Compl. ¶ 36.), and that Defendants offered or permitted Plaintiffs to work such overtime hours. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs contend that until on or about September 1, 2010, they were not paid overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week (Compl. ¶ 38). “[0]n or about September 1, 2010, Plaintiffs began receiving some compensation for overtime hours worked,” however, “this compensation falls short of what is required under the FLSA and NYLL overtime provisions.” (Compl. ¶ 39.) Following the commencement of this action, four additional individuals — Allison Singer, David Hind, David Halasz, and Lori Lesser — filed notices of consent to opt-in to this action. (See Gilly Aff, Ex. C (Dkt. No. 18).) As of the date of the filing of this Order, four additional notices of consent have been filed: by Edward Gajdosik (Dkt. No. 65), Bissera Paskaleva (Dkt. No. 70), Karen Shuldiner (Dkt. No. 71), and Kimmy Jackson (Dkt. No. 72). Discussion I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay or Transfer this Action is Denied Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay or transfer this action on the basis that before Plaintiffs tiled their complaint, a different plaintiff in the Southern District of Florida filed an action styled as a nationwide collective under the FLSA, likewise claiming that CitiMortgage loan officers were denied overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty per work week. (Defs. MTD Mem. 1 (citing Ursula Corgosinno, on her own behalf and others similarly situated v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11-60613-CIV-COHN, S.D. Fla.) (Dkt. No. 13).) According to Defendants, the two complaints assert “nearly identical FLSA claim[s], overlapping purported class definitions and claims, and the same legal issues.” (Id.) As such, Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed under the first-filed rule or alternately transferred to the Southern District of Florida or stayed until the Corgosinno litigation is concluded. (Id.) For this proposition, Defendants cite 800-Flowers Inc. v. Intercontinental Florist, Inc., 860 F.Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y.1994); Goldberger v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 98 Civ. 8677, 2000 WL 1886605, at *2, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18714, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2000); and Comedy Partners v. Street Players Holding Corp., 34 F.Supp.2d 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y.1999). The rule referenced by Defendants, however, is not so rigid as they would have it and does not warrant dismissal, a stay, or transfer here. As a general rule, “ "[w]here there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority.’ ” First City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Motion Picture Lab. Technicians Loc. 780 v. McGregor & Werner, Inc., 804 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1986)) (alteration in original). This rule “embodies considerations of judicial administration and conservation of resources” by avoiding duplicative litigation and honoring the plaintiffs choice of forum. Id. at 80. “As part of its general power to administer its docket, a district court may stay or dismiss a suit” where it is “duplicative of another federal court suit.” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2000). In considering the “complex problems” that multiple federal filings can produce, the Second Circuit has noted that there is no “rigid test” but instead that a district court is required to “consider the equities of the situation when exercising its discretion.” Id. “A court faced with a duplicative suit will commonly stay the second suit, dismiss it without prejudice, enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or consolidate the two actions.” Id. (citations omitted). The power to dismiss duplicative suits is meant to foster judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of litigation” as well as to protect parties from the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject. Id. In assessing duplication between claims or actions, “the fact that the first and second suits involved the same parties, similar legal issues, similar facts, or essentially the same type of wrongful conduct is not dispositive.” Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.1997) (citing S.E.C. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463 (2d Cir.1996)). Instead, “[t]he true test of the sufficiency of a plea of ‘other suit pending’ in another forum is the legal efficacy of the first suit, when finally disposed of, as the ‘thing adjudged’ regarding the matters at issue in the second suit.” Curtis, 226 F.3d at 138 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 124, 14 S.Ct. 992, 38 L.Ed. 930 (1894)). As one judge in this district has noted, “[t]he sixth Circuit has adopted a similar standard, defining duplicative lawsuits as those in which the issues ‘have such an identity that a determination in one action leaves little or nothing to be determined in the other.’ ” Naula v. Rite Aid, 08 Civ. 11364, 2010 WL 2399364, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29699 (S.D.N.Y. March 23, 2010) (quoting Smith v. S.E.C, 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir.1997)); see also Alden Corp. v. Eazypower Corp., 294 F.Supp.2d 233, 235 (D.Conn.2003) (“In determining if the first-filed rule applies, the court must carefully consider whether in fact the suits are duplicative.” (citing Curtis, 226 F.3d at 136)). The Corgosinno litigation and the instant case are not identical. First, following the filing of this motion, the sole plaintiff in Corgosinno filed a notice withdrawing her FLSA collective action, stating that, “[i]n so doing, Plaintiff converts the collective action originally filed into an individual action and Plaintiff will pursue this action on her individual basis only.” (Gilly Decl. Ex. 1, at 1 n. 1 (citations omitted) (Dkt. No. 30).) At the time of that notice, discovery had progressed on Corgosinno’s claims, and a detailed pretrial schedule, including a trial date, had been set for after the August 5, 2011 discovery deadline. (See Shaulson Decl. ¶¶ 4-6 & Ex. C (Dkt. No. 12)). By that point, the individual plaintiff had taken no action to pursue her case as a collective action, and no additional plaintiffs had opted-in to her single-plaintiff case. (See Gilly Decl. Ex. 3 (Dkt. No. 30)). Because the Corgosinno plaintiff chose to pursue only her individual claims and withdraw her collective action, there is no threat of overlapping classes through the creation of “nearly identical nationwide collective actions covering the same time period and same CitiMortgage loan officers” (Defs. MTD Mem. 4), nor the possibility of inconsistent judgments and conflicting rulings on conditional certification as Defendants fear. (See Defs. MTD Mem. 6.) Furthermore, the instant action names two defendant entities — CitiBank, N.A. and CitiGroup Inc. — in addition to the single defendant, CitiMortgage Inc., named in Corgosinno, and Corgosinno does not include claims regarding a putative New York class, as Plaintiffs’ suit does, which would entail, among other things, a different statute of limitations. Defendants question the Corgosinno plaintiffs filing of her notice of withdrawal, which they describe as “curious.” (Defs. MTD Reply Mem. 1.) Specifically, Defendants point out that Corgosinno filed her Notice of Withdrawal on May 18, 2011, days after Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, transfer or stay on May 3, 2011. (See Shaulson Deck, Ex. A (Dkt. No. 54).) In addition, according to Defendants, “[l]ess than three hours after the Withdrawal filing, Plaintiffs requested that CitiMortgage withdraw the Motion.” (Id.) (citing Shaulson Deck 10-11 (Dkt. No. 54).) Defendants argue that this temporal proximity suggests collusion and forum shopping. (Id. (citations omitted).) While it is well established that a court may dismiss, transfer, or stay a case where a plaintiff “see[s] a storm brewing in the first court, [and] trfies] to weigh anchor and set sail for the hopefully more favorable waters of another district.” Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir.1970), there is insufficient ground to attribute such strategic or dilatory tactics to Plaintiffs here. The two actions were commenced by different plaintiffs who were represented by different counsel; and, according to Plaintiffs', this action was initiated without knowledge of the Corgosinno litigation. (Pls. MTD Opp’n 8.) This is therefore not a case where a Plaintiff sees a storm brewing and attempts to set sail for more favorable waters. Furthermore, in response to Defendants’ inquiry, counsel for Plaintiffs stated that “categorically ... we have made no promises or inducements to Ms. Corgosinno, either directly or through her counsel, to obtain the withdrawal of her collective action.” (Shaulson Decl. Ex. D (Dkt. No. 54).) Additionally, Defendants provide correspondence from Corgosinno’s attorney explaining that “the Withdrawal of the Consent to Join merely memorialized the procedural posture of the case as of the date of the filing: that it was and is a single Plaintiff case, to which no other employee had opted-in, and in which the jointer date had already passed.” (Shaulson Decl. Ex. E (Dkt. No. 54).) Prior to Corgosinno’s Withdrawal, she had not filed a motion for conditional certification, and Corgosinno’s Withdrawal on May 18, 2011 followed the deadline for the joiner of parties on May 12, 2011, as of which no other Plaintiff had opted-in to her action. (See Shaulson Decl. Ex. C at 2 (Dkt. No. 12); Shaulson Decl. Ex. E (Dkt. No. 54).) On these facts, the Court declines to make an inference of forum shopping. As the two suits are not duplicative, the first-filed rule does not require dismissal of this action, and a transfer or stay is not warranted. The Court accordingly does not address whether the presumption of the first-filed rule is rebutted under either of its recognized exceptions: “(1) where the ‘balance of convenience’ favors the second-filed action,” or “(2) where ‘special circumstances’ warrant giving priority to the second suit.” Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., 522 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Motion Picture Lab. Technicians Local 780, 804 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1986); Remington Prods. Corp. v. Am. Aerovap, Inc., 192 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir.1951); First City Nat’l Bank, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1989)). II. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration is Denied Defendants have additionally moved to compel the arbitration of the claims of two of the named plaintiffs in this suit, namely Raniere and Bodden. A. Legal Standard Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (“FAA”), in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitral agreements and the “jealous notion” “that arbitration agreements were nothing less than a drain on [the courts’] own authority to settle disputes.” Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir.2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). The FAA provides in part: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2. In enacting the FAA, Congress intended to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts and establish a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. See AT & T, 131 S.Ct. at 1745; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987); JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir.2004). Section 4 of the FAA provides that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. If a litigant in a court proceeding refuses to arbitrate a dispute within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, a judicial order compelling arbitration is mandatory, not discretionary. Id. The FAA requires courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (citation omitted). In particular, the Supreme Court has roundly endorsed arbitration in the employment-discrimination context: We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context. Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts .... The Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law; as we noted in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001). With this in mind, “[t]o decide a motion to compel arbitration of claims based on statutory rights, a district court must determine only: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope of that agreement; (3) if federal statutory claims are asserted, whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable.” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-28, 105 S.Ct. 3346. In addition, generally applicable state-law contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability may invalidate arbitration agreements or clauses thereto. 9 U.S.C. §2; AT & T, 131 S.Ct. at 1746; see also 9 U.S.C. § 1; Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996) (collecting cases); Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520. Likewise, arbitration of statutory rights will only be compelled “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000); see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3346; In re American Express Merchants’ Litig. (American Express I”), 554 F.3d 300, 315-20 (2d Cir.2009), vacated sub nom. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2401, 176 L.Ed.2d 920 (2010), reaff'd, 634 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir.2011) (“American Express II”); Ragone v. Atlantic Video at the Manhattan Center, 595 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir.2010). B. Agreement to Arbitrate In this action, Defendants assert that Raniere and Bodden both entered into binding arbitration agreements that encompass their claims in this suit. Defendants point to Appendix A to CitiMortage’s January 2011 U.S. Employee Handbook (the “2011 Arbitration Policy”), which includes the following: The Policy makes arbitration the required and exclusive forum for the resolution of all disputes (other than disputes which by statute are not arbitrable) arising out of or in any way related to employment based on legally protected rights (i.e., statutory, regulatory, contractual, or common-law rights) that may arise between an employee or former employee and Citi including, without limitation, claims, demands, or actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ... and any other federal, state, or local statute, regulation, or common-law doctrine regarding ... compensation .... % % * Claims covered under this Policy must be brought on an individual basis. Neither Citi nor any employee may submit a class, collective, or representative action for resolution under this Policy. To the maximum extent permitted by law, and except where expressly prohibited by law, arbitration on an individual basis pursuant to this Policy is the exclusive remedy for any employment-related claims which might otherwise be brought on a class, collective or representative action basis. Accordingly, employees may not participate as a class or collective action representative or as a member of any class, collective, or representative action, and will not be entitled to any recovery from a class, collective, or representative action in any forum. Any disputes concerning the validity of this class, collective, and representative action waiver will be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, not by the arbitrator. (Byers Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1A at 48-49 (Dkt. No. 28).) Plaintiffs do not contest that the scope of the 2011 Arbitration Policy properly encompasses the instant dispute or that Congress did not intend the underlying FLSA claims implicated here to be nonarbitrable. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to address whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346. A party seeking to enforce a collective action waiver and compel arbitration must establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate under ordinary principles of contract law. See, e.g., Ross v. American Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arb. Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.1995)). Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter is governed by state-law principles regarding contract formation. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir.2000). “It is ‘well settled’ under New York law that arbitration will not be compelled absent the parties’ ‘clear, explicit and unequivocal agreement to arbitrate.’ ” Manigault v. Macy’s East, LLC, 318 Fed.Appx. 6, 7-8 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Fiveco, Inc. v. Haber, 11 N.Y.3d 140, 144, 863 N.Y.S.2d 391, 893 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y.2008)). Where there was no “meeting of the minds,” an arbitration agreement cannot be enforced. Dreyfuss v. Etelecare Global Solutions-U.S. Inc., 349 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (2d Cir.2009), i. Bodden Defendants argue that Bodden is bound by the language of the 2011 Arbitration Policy because she acknowledged receipt of the 2011 Employee Handbook on January 14, 2011, including that it required her to submit employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. (Byers Decl. ¶4, Ex. 1A (Dkt. No. 28).) This acknowledgement and Bodden’s continued employment are sufficient to find that she consented to the 2011 Arbitration Policy, including its class and collective action waiver. See Manigault, 318 Fed.Appx. 6 (employee who continued employment after notice of dispute resolution program was mailed to her consented to arbitration, where employee submitted she did not receive notice and did not sign acknowledgement of receipt); Pomposi v. GameStop, Inc., 09 Civ. 340(VLB), 2010 WL 147196 (D.Conn. Jan. 11, 2010) (employee bound who executed a written acknowledgement of receipt of arbitration program terms); Arakawa v. Japan Network Group, 56 F.Supp.2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (arbitration agreement in handbook and acknowledgment form signed by employee created binding agreement); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613, 1996 WL 44226 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that signed arbitration agreement in employment handbook was an enforceable contract in accordance with New York law); see also Brawn v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 08 Civ. 3231(JFB)(ETB), 2009 WL 1146441 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (employee bound where he received notice of arbitration program and continued employment); Gonzalez v. Toscorp, Inc., No. 97-civ-8158 (LAP), 1999 WL 595632 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1999) (employee bound where he did not sign acknowledgement but did receive handbook and arbitration policy and continued employment); Pis. Opp’n 3-6 & n. 2 (acknowledging principle that arbitration agreements may be enforced in the absence of written acceptance based on continued employment after receipt of the arbitration policy). ii. Raniere Defendants contend that Raniere is also bound by the 2011 Employee Handbook Arbitration Policy because she acknowledged receipt of the 2009 Employee Handbook (Byers Decl. Exs. 4, 5 (Dkt. No. 28)), which included the following provision: Citi reserves the right to revise, amend, modify, or discontinue the Policy at any time in its sole discretion with 30 days’ written notice. Such amendments may be made by publishing them in the Handbook or by separate release to employees and shall be effective 30 calendar days after such amendments are provided to employees and will apply prospectively only. Your continuation of employment after receiving such amendments shall be deemed acceptance of the amended terms. (Byers Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, Ex. 5A at 48 (emphasis in original) (Dkt. No. 28).) The parties are in agreement that Raniere acknowledged receipt of the 2009 Handbook, (see Byers Decl. Exs. 4 (Dkt. No. 28).) That earlier Policy expressly excluded class or collective actions from arbitration, providing: Except as otherwise required by applicable law, this [Arbitration] Policy applies only to claims brought on an individual basis. Consequently, neither Citi nor any employee may submit a class action, collective action, or other representative action for resolution under this Policy. (Byers Decl. Ex. 5A at 44 (Dkt. No. 28).) Citi’s Arbitration Policy was modified to include the class and collective action waiver in January, 2011, following the date Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants reclassified them as non-exempt and began paying Loan Officers overtime pay in 2010. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not established that an enforceable collective action waiver exists with Raniere. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ reliance on the 2009 Handbook provision fails because Defendants have not established that Raniere received the 2011 amendments. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, arbitration agreements “may be enforced in the absence of written acceptance by an employee provided that acceptance is evidenced by something like continued employment after receipt of the arbitration policy.” (Opp’n at 3-6 & n. 2 (emphasis in original)); see also Brown, 2009 WL 1146441; Manigault, 318 Fed.Appx. 6; Gonzalez, 1999 WL 595632. “It is well settled that a non-signatory party may be subject to an arbitration agreement if his subsequent conduct indicates that he has assumed the obligation to arbitrate.” Chanchani v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9219(RCC), 2001 WL 204214, at *3, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2036, at *9 (Feb. 28, 2001) (citing Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 777). In both Brown and Manigault, courts found that an employee may consent to a modification of employment terms by continuing to work “after receiving notice” of the modification. See Brown, 2009 WL 1146441, at *6; Manigault, 318 Fed.Appx. at 8. Similarly, in Gonzalez, the court compelled arbitration absent a signed acceptance because the employee “concedefd] receipt of the [arbitration policy] and chose to continue his employment.” 1999 WL 595632, at *2. Plaintiffs argue that, here, Defendants “have produced no proof that Raniere ever received this document or was in anyway informed of its contents, let alone that she agreed to its new terms in direct contravention of the 2009 Handbook.” (Pis. Compel Mem. 4). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted that “[u]nder New York contract law, the fundamental basis of a valid enforceable contract is a meeting of the minds of the parties. If there is no meeting of the minds on all essential terms, there is no contract. This is because an enforceable contract requires mutual assent to essential terms and conditions thereof.” Schurr v. Austin Galleries of Ill., 719 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir.1983) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Opals, the Court found that while each party had signed an agreement to arbitrate, because one included a provision to arbitrate in New York and the other California, as this was an essential term, no valid agreement existed. Opals on Ice Lingerie v. Bodylines Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 371-72 (2d Cir.2003); see also Dreyfuss, 349 Fed.Appx. at 554-55 (holding that missing pages to an arbitration agreement rendered it unenforceable because the terms of the contract could not be proven). By affidavit, Citi submits that on December 14, 2011 Raniere received and opened an email with a link to the Arbitration Policy, (Gross Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1 (Dkt. No. 60).) That email stated that the 2011 Handbook “will be your primary source for employment and HR policy information” and that the “Appendix to the Handbook contains an Employment Arbitration Policy that requires you to submit employment-related disputes to binding arbitration.” (Gross Decl. Ex. 1.) The email additionally provided that By receipt of this email, you acknowledge that you’ve received the Web link to the Handbook and that it’s your obligation to read and become familiar with its terms. You further acknowledge your obligation to read the Employment Arbitration Policy carefully and that nothing in the Handbook is intended to constitute a waiver, nor be construed to constitute a waiver, of Citi’s right to compel arbitration of employment-related disputes. (Id.) From the record, it appears that had Raniere indeed followed the link to download the 2011 Handbook, she would have had to acknowledge its receipt as Bodden did, though Defendants have provided no such acknowledgement. Opening an email that contains a link to a Handbook and arbitration policy, if that link is not followed, is more attenuated and potentially significantly so, than providing an acknowledgment of receipt of the 2011 Handbook and Arbitration Policy themselves (as Bodden did). This is particularly the case because while Raniere acknowledged receipt of the 2009 Handbook and Policy, that version did not include a class or collective action waiver, and the email which Raniere received in December of 2010, while discussing binding arbitration, did not include any reference to a waiver of class or collective actions. However, although Plaintiffs submit five declarations with their opposition to the instant motion to compel arbitration, they have not submitted a declaration from Raniere stating that she did not receive the 2011 Arbitration Policy with its class and collective action waiver. It is undisputed that Raniere continued her employment after receipt of the email with the link to the Handbook and revised Arbitration Policy. On these facts, the record is sufficient to evidence Raniere’s assent to the 2011 Policy and attendant waiver. See generally, Manigault, 318 Fed.Appx. at 8 (employee’s continued employment constituted agreement to arbitrate despite her claim that she did not receive the employer mailing and never signed an acknowledgement of receipt); Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 777 (holding that a non-signatory party may be subject to an arbitration agreement if her subsequent conduct indicates that she has assumed the obligation to arbitrate); Brown v. The St. Paul Travelers Cos., 559 F.Supp.2d 288, 291 (W.D.N.Y.2008) (“while there is no signed acknowledgment of plaintiffs receipt of the handbook, ... plaintiff was advised that compliance with the arbitration policy was a condition of continued employment and that it was her responsibility to read and understand all of the company policies including regarding arbitration, and she continued her employment” despite employee’s statement that she had no recollection of having received the policy). Plaintiffs have pointed to no case holding to the contrary on similar facts. Plaintiffs additionally argue that Defendants’ “attempt to impose on Rani-ere a unilaterally altered arbitration policy, without any evidence of her actual assent ... should be rejected as unconscionable.” (Opp’n at 7.) “Under New York law, a contract is unconscionable when it is ‘so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforceable [sic] according to its literal terms.’ ” Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 1[, 10], 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d 824 (1988). Generally, there must be a showing that such a contract is both procedurally and substantially unconscionable. See id. “The procedural element of unconscionability concerns the contract formation process and the alleged lack of meaningful choice; the substantive element looks to the content of the contract[, per se].” State v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1983); see also Desiderio v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir.1999) (“A contract or clause is unconscionable when there is an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (quotation marks omitted)). Ragone, 595 F.3d at 121-22 (quoting Nayal v. HIP Network Servs. IPA, Inc., 620 F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (S.D.N.Y.2009)). Rani-ere has failed to show that Defendants engaged in high-pressure tactics or that Raniere lacked meaningful choice such as to constitute procedural unconscionability. See Ragone, 595 F.3d 115. Nor have Plaintiffs argued that the collective action waiver is substantively unconscionable. C. Statutory Rights Analysis Plaintiffs make two arguments to the effect that the collective action waiver is unenforceable because it would prevent Plaintiffs from vindicating their substantive statutory rights. The first, and broader, of these arguments is that if the waiver is given effect, the FLSA will not serve both its remedial and deterrent functions. Plaintiffs’ second, narrower, contention is that to give effect to the collective action waiver and arbitration agreement here would have the practical effect of precluding Plaintiffs from pursuing the enforcement of their statutory rights due to the costs involved. It is well recognized that employees cannot release their substantive rights under the FLSA by private agreement. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) (“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act.”); see also Bormann v. AT & T Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.1989) (“[Private waiver of claims under the [FLSA] has been precluded by such Supreme Court decisions as Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945), and D.A. Shulte [Schulte ], Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 66 S.Ct. 925, 90 L.Ed. 1114 (1946).” (citations omitted)). It is likewise well established that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ ” Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647); see also Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205-06. Arbitration of a claim of statutory rights will only be compelled if that claim can be effectively vindicated through arbitration. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3346 (noting that if arbitration clause and other contractual provisions “operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” “we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90, 121 S.Ct. 513 (noting that “even claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum the statute serves its functions.” (citations and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Federal substantive law of arbitrability requires federal courts to declare otherwise operative arbitration clauses unenforceable when enforcement would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights. American Express II, 634 F.3d at 199; see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47-48 (1st Cir.2006); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n. 14 (5th Cir.2003); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.Supp.2d 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y.2011); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.2011); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y.1997). The Second Circuit addressed this issue in American Express I, 554 F.3d 300. The Court concluded that the class action waiver in that case was unenforceable because plaintiffs had demonstrated that they otherwise would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights “in either an individual or collective capacity,” id. at 314 (emphasis in original), due to the great expense of pursuing that antitrust litigation and the small individual recovery each plaintiff could expect. As such, the waiver would have the practical effect of ensuring no claims would be brought at all, granting the defendant “de facto immunity from ... liability.” Id. at 320. The Supreme Court vacated American Express I and remanded for reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010). American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S.Ct. 2401. On remand, the Circuit again found the arbitration provision unenforceable because “the class action waiver in this case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights” due to the prohibitive cost of litigating on an individual basis. American Express II, 634 F.3d at 197-99. In Ragone, 595 F.3d 115, the Court of Appeals again confirmed the importance of the statutory rights analysis, indicating its willingness, if in dicta, to hold unenforceable an arbitration agreement containing a shortened statute of limitations and a fee-shifting provision that would “significantly diminish a litigant’s rights under Title VII.” 595 F.3d at 125-26. The Court of Appeals discussion in Ragone demonstrates “that the holdings of American Express apply not only to ‘negative value’ class action claims, that is, claims that are so small in value that it is not economically viable to pursue them as individual claims.” Chen-Oster, 785 F.Supp.2d at 408. Defendants are incorrect that the Supreme Court’s decision in AT & T, 131 S.Ct. 1740, overrules American Express and Ragone. AT & T addressed only whether a state law rule holding class action waivers unconscionable was preempted by the FAA. 131 S.Ct. 1740. The holdings of both the American Express cases and Ragone were based, in contrast and as this decision must be, on federal arbitral law, and AT & T in no way alters the relevance of those binding circuit holdings. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (holding that AT & T does not abrogate American Express or Ragone and noting that “it remains the law of the Second Circuit that an arbitration provision which precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights is unenforceable.” Id. at *4). Moreover, while the dissent in AT & T noted with concern that “agreements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate,” 131 S.Ct. at 1760, AT & T involved the vindication of state, not federal, rights. Thus, even if AT & T is read broadly to acquiesce to the enforcement of an arbitral agreement that as a practical matter would prevent the vindication of state rights in the name of furthering the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, that would not alter the validity of the federal statutory rights analysis articulated in Mitsubishi, Green Tree, American Express and Ra-gone. The Court accordingly analyses the present issues under the reasoning articulated in those cases. i. The Right to Proceed Collectively Under the FLSA Cannot be Waived The Second Circuit has not determined whether the collective action provisions of the FLSA are integral to its structure and function, and, as such, whether an agreement waiving that right can be enforced. The First Circuit has expressly reserved decision on this question. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 62 (1st Cir.2007) (“We do not need to decide if class actions under the FLSA may ever be waived by agreement.... We also do not reach the question of whether such waivers of FLSA class actions are per se against public policy under either the FLSA or the Massachusetts Fair Wage Law”). And while a number of other Circuits have accepted that, at least in principle, arbitration agreements containing waivers of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA are enforceable, those decisions were either based upon a premise rejected by the Second Circuit or did not reach the question here. See Horenstein v. Mortgage. Mkt., Inc., 9 Fed.Appx. 618, 619 (9th Cir.2001); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 297-98 (5th Cir.2004); Vilches v. Travelers Co., Inc., 413 Fed.Appx. 487, 494 n. 4 (3d Cir.2011); Catey v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir.2005); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir.2002). Specifically, the court in Caley did not address whether the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA may be waived as a matter of federal law. Instead, it addressed whether such waivers were unconscionable under Georgia state law principles. See Caley, 428 F.3d at 1377-79. The Second Circuit has rejected the reasoning relied on in Horenstein, Adkins, Carter, and Vilches. In American Express, the Second Circuit noted that the issue of whether statutorily granted collective action rights under the ADEA, which incorporates by reference the collective action rights granted in the FLSA, could be waived was not decided by Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, because “because a collective and perhaps a class action remedy was, in fact, available in that case.” American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195-96; American Express I, 554 F.3d at 314 (same). Countrywide, Adkins, Horenstein, and Vilches, the latter three relying on Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 (3d Cir.2000), assumed that Gilmer resolved whether collective enforcement rights were waivable. See Vilches, at 494 n. 4 (citing Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377)); Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377); Countrywide, 362 F.3d at 298 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32, 111 S.Ct. 1647). Under the Second Circuit’s precedents, Gilmer does not. See American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195-96. Accordingly, the issue presented by Plaintiffs here, namely whether the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unwaivable — beyond such a clause being unenforceable were Plaintiffs to demonstrate that to do so would have the practical effect of denying them their substantive rights — is an open question in this Circuit. This issue is fundamentally distinct, and more nuanced, than that presented in Gilmer, which addressed whether ADEA claims are arbitrable at all. Here, Plaintiffs do not contest that individually filed FLSA claims are generally arbitrable or that were the agreement to permit proceeding as a collective in arbitration, as the parties could in Gilmer, see American Express II, 634 F.3d at 195-96, that such a provision would be enforceable. Accordingly, this case does not oppose the strong federal policy favoring arbitration with the rights granted in the FLSA, but instead only questions whether the right to proceed collectively may be waived. There are good reasons to hold that a waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is per se unenforceable— and different in kind from waivers of the right to proceed as a class under Rule 23. Collective actions under the FLSA are a unique animal. Unlike employment-discrimination class suits under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act that are governed by Rule 23, Congress created a unique form of collective actions for minimum-wage and overtime pay claims brought under the FLSA. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and its original collective action provision, was a product of the forces that gave rise to what has been termed the constitutional revolution of 1937, marking a high point in the clash of the federal courts with President Roosevelt and New Deal legislators. The original FLSA collective action provision, passed in the wake of the “switch in time that saved nine,” provided that [a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant and costs of the action. Fair Labor Standards Act, 75 Cong. Ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938). As the Supreme Court has noted, this provision appeared for the first time in the bill reported by a Conference Committee of both Houses. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 705 n. 15, 65 S.Ct. 895 (citing H. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong.3d Sess., at 33). The bill that later became the FLSA took over thirteen months to become law and went through a variety of iterations, creating a veritable raft of legislative history. Within this, however, “[t]he only reference to Section 16(b) was by Representative Keller....” Id. at 705 n. 16, 65 S.Ct. 895. Representative Keller stated in relevant part: Among the provisions for the enforcement of the act an old principle has been adopted and will be applied to new uses. If there shall occur violations of either the wages or hours, the employees can themselves, or by designated agent or representatives, maintain an action in any court to recover the wages due them and in such a case the court shall allow liquidated damages in addition to the wages due equal to such deficient payment and shall also allow a reasonable attorney’s fees and assess the court costs against the violator of the law so that employees will not suffer the burden of an expensive lawsuit. The provision has the further virtue of minimizing the cost of enforcement by the Government. It is both a common-sense and economical method of regulation. The bill has other penalties for violations and other judicial remedies, but the provision which I have mentioned puts directly into the hands of the employees who are affected by violation the means and ability to assert and enforce their own rights, thus avoiding the assumption by Government of the sole responsibility to enforce the act. Id. (citing 83 Cong. Rec. 9264). This collective action provision was amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, the history of which has been described by the courts in the following manner: In 1947, in response to a “national emergency” created by a flood of suits under the FLSA aimed at collecting portal-to-portal pay allegedly due employees, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal amendments to the FLSA. 61 Stat. 87 (1947). The original, stated purpose of the bill containing these amendments was: “To define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts, to regulate actions arising under certain laws of the United States, and for other purposes.” 93 Cong. Rec. 156 (H.R. 2157). To this end, the amendments, among other things, barred unions from bringing representative actions under the FLSA. Arrington v. Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 531 F.Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C.1982) (citations omitted); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 of N.M. v. Albertson’s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1200-01 (10th Cir.2000) (noting the Arrington court’s “exhaustive survey of the legislative history of the 1947 amendments”). As amended, FLSA collective actions allow “plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged” unlawful activity. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (describing the collective action provisions under the ADEA, which are by reference those of the FLSA). More specifically, the revised collective action provision that resulted from these amendments limited representative suits to those workers who submit written opt-in notices. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought”). FLSA actions are, consequently, not true representative actions as under Rule 23, but instead those actions brought about by individual employees who affirmatively join a single suit. These collective action provisions were crafted by not one but over the course of several Congresses to balance the need to incentivize the bringing of often small claims by way of collectivization in order to ensure the statute’s function, while barring actions “brought on behalf of employees who had no real involvement in, or real knowledge of, the lawsuit.” Arrington, 531 F.Supp. at 501. The Act’s, and more specifically this provision’s, lengthy legislative history evidences Congress’ precise determination of how this balance should be struck in order to ensure the statute’s remedial and deterrent functions. In addition, as the Supreme Court has described, [t]he legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate commerce. The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency as a result of the free movement of goods in interstate commerce. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 706-07, 65 S.Ct. 895. Although the right to sue under the FLSA is compensatory, “it is nevertheless an enforcement provision.” Id. at 709, 65 S.Ct. 895. Not the least integral aspect of this remedy is the ability of employees to pool resources in order to pursue a collective action, in accordance with the specific balance struck by Congress. The particular FLSA collective action mechanism was additionally a Congressional determination regarding the allocation of enforcement costs, as the ability of employees to bring actions collectively reduces the burden borne by the public fisc, as Representative Keller noted. See 83 Cong. Rec. 9264. Moreover, prohibition of the waiver of the right to proceed collectively accords with the Congressional policy of uniformity with regard to the application of FLSA standards, see H. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 6-7, because an employer is not permitted to gain a competitive advantage because his employees are more willing to assent to, or his human resources department more able to ascertain, collective action waivers than those of his competitors. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections.” Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). It is not enough to respond that such a waiver should be upheld in the name of the broad federal policy favoring arbitration, simply because the waiver was included in an arbitration agreement. An otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement should not become the vehicle to invalidate the particular Congressional purposes of the collective action provision and the policies on which that provision is based. In sum, a waiver of the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unenforceable as a matter of law in accordance with the Gilmer Court’s recognition that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647. See also Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (holding arbitral provision waiving right to proceed as a class unenforceable as to Title VII pattern and practice claims). ii. If Compelled to Arbitrate Their Claims Individually, Raniere and Bodden Would Not be Precluded from Enforcing Their Statutory Rights Due to Cost A party that seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92, 121 S.Ct. 513; American Express II, 634 F.3d at 191 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 315). Here, Plaintiffs have established that were they to be forced to arbitrate their claims individually, their costs including attorneys’ and expert fees would total approximately $640,000. Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that the attorneys’ fees likely to be incurred through an individual arbitration would likely exceed $526,000 with costs in excess of $19,000. (See Gilly Decl. ¶¶ 12-25 (Dkt. No. 48).) Plaintiffs state that they additionally require an institutional expert as well as an economic damages expert (See id. at ¶¶ 20-21 (Dkt. No. 48)), costs for which they estimate in excess of $95,300. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21, 25 (Dkt. No. 48).) In support of this they have provided the declaration of Mark Killingsworth, an economics professor and Plaintiffs’ economic damages expert, who estimates his fees at $45,300. (Killingsworth Decl. at ¶ 13 (Dkt. No. 49).) Plaintiffs additionally note that the plaintiffs’ institutional expert in Sutherland, who was engaged to determine whether accountants were nonexempt, estimated fees of $33,500. Sutherland, 768 F.Supp.2d at 551-51. Citi submits that these attorneys’ fee estimates are “unreasonably high” and question the need for an industry expert. (Shaulson Decl. ¶¶ 16-20 (Dkt. No. 61).) However, Defendants have not submitted opposing estimates of attorneys’ fees, other than to note the estimates of the plaintiffs counsel in another overtime exemption case recently litigated by the defense here. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs estimate the amount of overtime compensation potentially owed to Bodden at approximately $28,950 using the fluctuating work week method and assuming the relevant period is set by the FLSA’s two-year limitations period for nonwillful violations — plus an equal amount in liquidated damages, or roughly $57,900. (Gilly Decl. ¶ 8 (Dkt. No. 48).) Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence regarding Raniere’s potential damages or calculated her or Bodden’s damages on a time and a half basis. Citi estimates Bod-den’s overtime loss at approximately $84,875 applying the fluctuating workweek method and assuming the six year statute of limitations period of, not the FLSA, but the NYLL, or $350,000 applying the time- and-a-half method over that time — each potentially increased by liquidated damages. (See Shaulson Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, Exs. I and J (Dkt. No. 61); Bridgeford Decl. ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 59).) Defendants assert that for Raniere, those numbers would be approximately $149,750 and $617,500, respectively, each potentially increased by liquidated damages. (See Shaulson Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, Exs. K and L (Dkt. No. 61); Bridgeford Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 59).) Neither party has pointed to a case addressing the proper scope of the limitations period to apply in a case such as this, where the question presented is the practical ability of a plaintiff to bring a federal claim (with a shorter statute of limitations), where she has also alleged a parallel state claim (with a longer limitations period). The Court of Appeals in American Express emphasized that the nature of its inquiry under the statutory rights analysis was the “practical effect” of the enforcement of such a waiver. 634 F.3d at 196. With this in mind, this Court is of the view that where state claims might act, in a practical sense, to bootstrap otherwise smaller federal claims, such that the latter could be vindicated in the arbitral forum, the longer state limitations period should be considered in assessing whether a plaintiff has met her burden under American Express. Use of the six year New York statute of limitations period is therefore appropriate. Accordingly, Bodden’s potential recovery can be estimated at approximately $84,875 applying the fluctuating workweek method or $350,000 applying the time and-a-half method, and Raniere’s potential recovery can be estimated at approximately $149,750 or $617,500, each potentially doubled during the federal statutory period and increased by either 25% or 100% for the state limitations period. Plaintiffs argue that the reasoning in Sutherland, 768 F.Supp.2d 547, is apposite here. In that case, likewise involving alleged nonpayment of overtime wages, the Court found that the plaintiff had “substantially demonstrated that an inability to prosecute her claims on a class basis would be tantamount to an inability to assert her claims at all.” Id. at 553 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the plaintiff could only expect