Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GERALD E. ROSEN, Chief Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On April 30, 2003, Tamara Greene was killed in a drive-by shooting in Detroit, Michigan. Her murder remains unsolved. In this case, Ms. Greene’s minor children — J. B., through his next friend Ernest Flagg; A. J., through her next friend Taris Jackson; and I. B., through her next friend Brian Greene — seek an award of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Detroit and its former mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, alleging that these Defendants deliberately obstructed the Detroit Police Department investigation into their mother’s murder, thereby abridging their right of access to the courts as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs claim that, but for this obstruction, they could have brought a state court wrongful death action against their mother’s killer, and successfully recovered an award of damages from this wrongdoer to compensate them for the loss of their mother. Through the present pair of motions filed in September of 2010, the two remaining Defendants, the City of Detroit and former Mayor Kilpatrick, seek an award of summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ § 1988 claims of denial of access to the courts. In its motion, the Defendant City argues that Plaintiffs cannot forge the requisite link between any interference with the Tamara Greene homicide investigation and a City of Detroit policy, as required to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983. The Defendant City further contends that, even if Ms. Greene’s children cannot bring a wrongful death action against their mother’s killer, a loss of consortium claim is an adequate alternative remedy that remains available to them once they reach the age of majority. For his part, Defendant Kilpatrick asserts in his motion that despite ample opportunity for discovery, Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that he took any action to obstruct or impede the investigation into Tamara Greene’s murder. Defendants’ motions have been fully briefed by the parties. In addition, the Court held an October 5, 2011, 2011 WL 4634245, hearing on these motions, at which counsel for the parties were given an opportunity to present further arguments in support of their respective positions. Having thoroughly reviewed the parties’ written submissions and accompanying, voluminous exhibits, and having carefully considered the arguments of counsel at the October 5 hearing, the Court now is prepared to rule on Defendants’ motions. This opinion and order sets forth the Court’s rulings on these motions. II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES At the outset of this opinion, the Court believes it appropriate to highlight some of the basic legal principles that govern the Court’s present inquiry, and to provide some context for the discussion and legal analysis that follow. From the inception of this litigation, the Court has emphasized its strongly held view that it was in the best interests of both the parties and the public to allow the development of a full, robust discovery record upon which to decide this case. This lengthy and sometimes contentious discovery process has garnered considerable public and media attention. Yet, as will be seen, the parties’ discovery efforts have sometimes unearthed information or revelations that, while perhaps deemed worthy subjects of media reports and public discussion, have turned out to have little or no bearing on the proper disposition of Defendants’ summary judgment motions. Against this backdrop of an exhaustively compiled and extensively reported discovery record, it is especially important to emphasize the issues that are — and are not — relevant to the Court’s resolution of the pending motions, and to describe the legal framework within which the Court will decide these issues. A. The Factual Issues of Relevance to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions Turning first to the factual record compiled during the lengthy discovery period in this case, it is fair to say that the parties — and, in particular, Plaintiffs— were given wide latitude to pursue any and all matters that were arguably relevant to their claims or defenses, and to undertake broad discovery efforts — including numerous depositions and the production and examination of a voluminous documentary record — so long as they “appeared] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). In light of the considerable and sometimes breathless coverage of this case by the Detroit media, it was perhaps to be expected that a good portion of the information unearthed in the parties’ discovery efforts would find its way into newspaper articles and television reports. Yet, the rules of discovery, by their express terms, permit the exploration of matters that may ultimately prove to be unhelpful or wholly irrelevant to the parties’ claims or defenses, and this case certainly has not been immune from this necessary byproduct of liberal civil discovery rules. Consequently, much of the information learned and exchanged among the parties in this litigation — and, in turn, much of the information found in the media reports of this case— has little or no role to play in the Court’s resolution of Defendants’ summary judgment motions. Perhaps most notably, it will be apparent from this opinion that, now that the discovery dust has settled, the Court has little need to dwell on the much-discussed, much-rumored party at the Detroit may- or’s official residence, the Manoogian Mansion, in or around the fall of 2002. In Plaintiffs’ view — backed, they say, by admissible evidence — this party actually happened, and Tamara Greene performed as a dancer at this party in the presence of then-Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick. Yet, whether or not this is so, this party’s occurrence — and Ms. Greene’s presence at this rumored party, as well as other details of what might have transpired there — has only limited relevance to this case, and even less significance to the outcome of Defendants’ motions. The rumored Manoogian Mansion party, and the salacious allegations surrounding it, are relevant here largely because they suggest a reason why Defendants might have wished to interfere with the Tamara Greene homicide investigation. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that a proper, thorough investigation into Ms. Greene’s murder invariably would have led investigators to inquire whether this party occurred, and this, in turn, would have led to embarrassing revelations — or worse, depending on what one believes about what actually transpired at this rumored party — about the conduct of Defendant Kilpatrick and, perhaps, his family and associates. All of this, however, is largely immaterial to the Court’s present inquiry. To the extent that the rumored Manoogian Mansion party might serve as a motive for Defendants’ alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right of access to the courts, motive is not an element of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, and Plaintiffs have no obligation to shed any light on Defendants’ possible reasons for violating their constitutional rights, whether now or at trial. Rather, Plaintiffs’ present task is to produce evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that their rights were violated, for whatever reason. In the remainder of this opinion, then — and in accordance with the legal principles discussed below — the Court simply assumes that the rumored party occurred, with little attention given to the evidence submitted by the parties (or the information and claims published by the Detroit media) that might tend to prove or disprove this rumor. Another example of an ultimately tangential matter to which Plaintiffs and their counsel devoted considerable attention in discovery, and that spawned a veritable wave of media coverage and editorializing, is the investigation launched by former Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox and the Michigan State Police into allegations relating to the rumored Manoogian Mansion party and purported misconduct by members of then-Mayor Kilpatrick’s security detail. Although Plaintiffs’ counsel advanced myriad theories and beliefs as to the putative relevance of Attorney General Cox’s investigation to the issues in this case, and although the Court permitted counsel to pursue some of the less fanciful of .these theories, this line of inquiry proved almost entirely fruitless in uncovering evidence that could assist Plaintiffs in establishing their § 1983 claims. As is often the case with discovery initiatives in large, complex civil suits, while Plaintiffs firmly believed that this effort had some potential to unearth admissible evidence bearing upon the pertinent issues in this case, this potential value went largely unrealized. Moreover, although Plaintiffs’ initial complaint named Attorney General Cox as a party, the Court held in an August 31, 2006 ruling that the allegations directed against the former Attorney General were “wholly inadequate” to state a viable claim, (8/31/2006 Op. at 20-21 n. 11), and Plaintiffs never sought to reinstate or otherwise pursue any such claim against Attorney General Cox in any of their several amendments to their pleadings (nor has the Court’s independent review revealed any basis for him to have been a party to this suit). These are only the most prominent examples of matters that were explored in the parties’ discovery efforts and have been raised in media reports about this ease, yet have little or no bearing on the Court’s resolution of Defendants’ motions. The specific focus of this case is the Tamara Greene homicide investigation, and this subject alone has generated an ample evidentiary record and complex legal issues for the Court to consider, as evidenced by the length of the present opinion. The Court, of course, is fully mindful of the place this litigation has occupied in the larger public debate about the conduct and transgressions of former Mayor Kilpatrick and members of his administration, and nothing in this opinion should be construed as the Court’s having turned a blind eye to the dismaying and distressing record compiled during the Kilpatrick administration, with its numerous instances of unethical conduct, criminal wrongdoing, official hubris, and utter disregard for the obligations owed by public officials. Yet, this case must be decided under its own record, and the Court’s rulings must be limited to the issues implicated by Plaintiffs’ specific claims. The Court has neither the jurisdictional charge nor the ambition to use this litigation as a forum for a wide-ranging examination of the activities of City of Detroit officials during Defendant Kilpatrick’s tenure as mayor. While this surely is a legitimate and worthy subject of public concern and media scrutiny, the Court’s present task is far more narrowly focused, as well as sharply circumscribed by the rules and principles that govern the resolution of summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the Court turns to a discussion of these rules and principles. B. The Legal Standards Governing the Court’s Resolution of Defendants’ Motions Through the present motions, the City of Detroit and former Mayor Kilpatrick seek summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ federal § 1983 claims. Under the pertinent Federal Rule, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In this case, there plainly has been “adequate time for discovery,” so if Plaintiffs’ claims are to withstand Defendants’ Rule 56 challenge, Plaintiffs must point to record evidence sufficient to establish each of the elements of the § 1983 claims they have asserted, as well as a basis for holding each of the two Defendants liable for the alleged violations of their federal constitutional rights. In deciding a motion brought under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir.2006). Yet, the requisite “favorable” review is not a wholly uncritical and unquestioning review — nothing in Rule 56 demands that the Court simply accept at face value the assertions made in the parties’ written submissions or the information found in the accompanying exhibits. Rather, to merit consideration, the parties’ factual statements in their briefs must be backed by citation to the record, and the materials offered in support of these statements must satisfy the applicable legal and evidentiary standards to be eligible for consideration by the Court. Rule 56 itself establishes many of these standards. First, the Rule dictates that the nonmoving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading,” but “must — by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule — set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). Moreover, any supporting or opposing affidavits “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1). The requirement of “personal knowledge” serves to exclude statements of a witness’s “mere belief,” as opposed to statements about matters or incidents that the witness actually “perceived or observed.” Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State Mutual Life Assurance Co. v. Deer Creek Park, 612 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir.1979) (“Affidavits composed of ... opinion evidence do not satisfy Rule 56(e) and must be disregarded.”). The limitation to facts that “would be admissible in evidence” necessarily incorporates the standards embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, including (i) the requirement that the opinion testimony of a lay witness must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness,” Fed.R.Evid. 701, and (ii) the prohibition against consideration of hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 802; see also U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1189 (6th Cir.1997). More generally, the Sixth Circuit has emphasized that “[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot use hearsay or other inadmissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Sperle v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir.2002). It cannot be said that the parties here have rigorously adhered to these standards in their briefs in support of and opposition to Defendants’ motions. Plaintiffs’ brief in response to these motions, for instance, includes the following account of the deposition testimony of Lieutenant Alvin Bowman, one of the Detroit Police Department (“DPD”) officers who investigated Tamara Greene’s murder: Based upon his role as the Lieutenant in charge of [Homicide] Squad 8 from November 2003 until March 10, 2004, Bowman believed that [Defendant] Kilpatrick, [former DPD police chief Jerry] Oliver, [former DPD police Chief Ella] Bully-Cummings and [former chief of staff Christine] Beatty, as well as other high ranking DPD executives, impeded the Greene homicide investigation. Bowman believed that Squad 8 would have found Greene’s killer but for the interference in the investigation. Bowman testified that the conduct of Kilpatrick, Oliver, Bully-Cummings and Beatty made it “impossible to investigate, let alone solve the murder of Tamara Greene.” Bowman testified that Kilpatrick, Oliver, Bully-Cummings and Beatty disposed of reports from the Greene homicide file and “retaliated against anyone that dared investigate anything having to do with the Manoogian Mansion party.” (Plaintiffs’ Response Br. at 61 (footnotes with citations omitted).) What Plaintiffs notably fail to mention, however, is that Lt. Bowman expressly acknowledged at his deposition that these were merely his personal opinions and beliefs, and that he was unaware of any evidence that supported these beliefs. (See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 50, Bowman Dep. at 192-98.) Such subjective beliefs, unbacked by facts within the personal knowledge of the witness, cannot assist Plaintiffs in withstanding summary judgment. See Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 605 (6th Cir.2008); Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 928 (6th Cir.1999); Cox v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 751 F.Supp. 680, 692 (E.D.Mich.1990). In addition, both sides invite the Court to rely on hearsay in deciding Defendants’ motions. As one of many examples, Plaintiffs have offered the affidavit of former DPD officer Sandy Cardenas, who states that on “[o]ne night in the fall of 2002” when she was working as a 911 dispatcher, she “received several calls to dispatch police units to a disturbance call[ ] located at the Manoogian Mansion.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 14, Cardenas Aff. at ¶ 8.) This affidavit is replete with hearsay, including (i) statements purportedly made by DPD Sergeant Shawn Gargliano over a police radio upon his arrival at the Manoogian Mansion, (ii) statements purportedly made by other, unnamed DPD officers who allegedly responded to the call, and (iii) statements purportedly made by other (again unnamed) police dispatchers that an unidentified DPD officer had come into the dispatch area on the night of the Manoogian Mansion incident and “removed all of the 911 tapes of the run.” (Id. at ¶¶ 15-19, 21, 27.) Not to be outdone, the Defendant City of Detroit has produced the affidavit of a federal prison inmate, Tommy Lee Hodges, who reports that an individual named Darrett King told him in a conversation in the summer of 2003 that he (King) “was the shooter of Tamara Greene.” (Defendant City's Motion, Ex. 33, Hodges Aff. at ¶ 4.) None of this hearsay may be considered by the Court in resolving Defendants’ motions. Indeed, a particular form of hearsay features quite prominently in Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions. Specifically, Plaintiffs frequently direct the Court’s attention to text messages purportedly exchanged among City of Detroit officials using City-issued Sky-Tel text messaging devices. (See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 31 (compilation of text messages).) Each such text message, of course, is an out-of-court statement, and therefore must be excluded from consideration as hearsay unless Plaintiffs are able to identify a ground for its admissibility. To be sure, there are theories under which at least some of these text messages could be deemed admissible — e.g., as the statements of a party (Defendant Kilpatrick), see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), or the statements of City officials concerning matters within the scope of their employment, see FecLR.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), or statements offered for a purpose other than “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” Fed. R.Evid. 801(c). Unfortunately, while Plaintiffs have made liberal use of text messages in their response to Defendants’ motions, they have left the Court largely to its own devices in identifying the legal bases upon which these out-of-court statements may properly be considered in resolving the present motions. Finally, it is worth noting that this case features an evidentiary wrinkle that typically is not present in this Court’s consideration of a summary judgment motion. Because some of the witnesses deposed by the parties — including, most notably, Defendant Kilpatrick — invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to certain questions, a trier of fact would be permitted to draw an adverse inference from this assertion of the privilege. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir.1995). Similarly, in a recent opinion, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the trier of fact be permitted to draw an adverse inference arising from the Defendant City’s destruction of e-mails sent to and received by four former high-ranking City officials, including Defendant Kilpatrick, between August 2002 and June 2003. (See 10/5/2011 Op. and Order.) Later in the present opinion, the Court will specifically address the impact of these adverse inferences upon the resolution of Defendants’ summary judgment motions. III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In the early morning hours of April 30, 2003, Tamara Greene was killed in a drive-by shooting as she sat in a car at the corner of Roselawn Street and Outer Drive in Detroit. Ms. Greene was pronounced dead at the scene, and a second passenger in the car, Eric Mitchell, was taken to a nearby hospital and treated for gunshot wounds. According to a statement Mitchell gave to the police, he had seen Ms. Greene earlier that evening at the All Stars lounge where she worked as a dancer, and he then left the lounge at around 1:00 a.m. and went to a friend’s house. Ms. Greene called Mitchell after she got off work at around 2:00 a.m. and offered to pick him up from his friend’s house and drive him home. According to Mitchell, Ms. Greene was parking her car in front of his house on Roselawn when a white sport utility vehicle drove past and the occupants of the SUV began shooting at Ms. Greene’s vehicle. Mitchell immediately ducked down in the passenger seat to avoid further injury, but Ms. Greene was fatally wounded in the gunfire, and was found slumped over the steering wheel of her car. A. The Detroit Police Department Investigation into Tamara Greene’s Murder 1. The Investigation by Homicide Squad 8 During the course of the Detroit Police Department (“DPD”) investigation into Tamara Greene’s murder, several different teams of DPD officers were given responsibility for this investigation. Initially, on the night of Ms. Greene’s murder, Sergeant Marian Stevenson of DPD’s Homicide Squad 8 was among the DPD officers called to the scene, and Sgt. Stevenson was advised the next morning that she had been designated as the officer in charge of the murder investigation. At the time, Sgt. Stevenson reported to Lieutenant Billy Jackson, the Squad 8 supervisor, and Lt. Jackson, in turn, reported to Inspector Craig Schwartz, the head of DPD’s Homicide Section. Within days after she began her investigation, Sgt. Stevenson reported in her progress notes that several anonymous tips had been received and were being investigated. (See Homicide File, Bates No. 752, 5/2/2003 Progress Note.) In one such tip received by a DPD officer on May 21, 2003, an anonymous caller inquired whether the woman shot on Roselawn a few weeks earlier was named “Strawberry” — a name evidently used by Ms. Greene in her work as a dancer — and the caller further stated that “Strawberry” was “one of the dancers at the mansion” and that she had been “complaining that she did not get paid for dancing at the party.” (Id. Bates No. 749, 5/21/2003 Homicide Tip Sheet.) Thus, from the early days of the DPD investigation, Sgt. Stevenson and her supervisor, Lt. Jackson, were aware of suggestions that there was a possible link between Ms. Greene’s death and a rumored party at the Detroit mayor’s residence, the Manoogian Mansion, that allegedly had occurred several months earlier, in the fall of 2002. (See Stevenson Dep. at 61-62; see also Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 71, Jackson Dep. at 280-81.) This possible link drew the attention of both Sgt. Stevenson’s colleagues and her superiors. Sgt. Stevenson testified at her deposition that the other members of Squad 8 “continuous[ly] teas[ed]” her and stated that they did not want to work with her as she investigated Ms. Greene’s murder, and she recounted an incident when she was walking down the hall at DPD headquarters and “someone kind of ducked and said, ‘Oh, we can’t walk too close to you. You might get shot like Tammy.’ ” (Stevenson Dep. at 62-63.) In addition, the day after a DPD officer received the May 21, 2003 anonymous tip suggesting a possible link between Ms. Greene’s death and her alleged performance as a dancer at a rumored party at the Manoogian Mansion, Commander Fred Campbell of DPD’s Central Services Bureau met with Sgt. Stevenson and Lt. Jackson to discuss the progress of the homicide investigation, and he then forwarded the tip information to Assistant Chief of Police Timothy Black and Deputy Chief Harold Cureton and briefed these superior officers on the status of the investigation. (See Homicide File, Bates No. 751, Campbell Memo.) Then-Chief of Police Jerry Oliver called Assistant Chief Black while Commander Campbell was conducting this briefing, and the Assistant Chief proceeded to brief Chief Oliver regarding the investigation. (See id.) As the Greene murder investigation progressed into the fall of 2003, Lt. Jackson was promoted to serve as the acting head of the Homicide Section, and his direct superior officer, Craig Schwartz, was promoted to Commander of the Major Crimes Division, which encompassed Homicide and a number of other sections. In November of 2003, Lieutenant Alvin Bowman was designated to take Lt. Jackson’s place as the head of Squad 8, with Sgt. Stevenson and the other members of this squad reporting to Lt. Bowman. According to Lt. Bowman, when he initially met with the members of Squad 8 to discuss the Greene investigation, they were “all apprehensive” in light of “rumors” they had heard, and they expressed concern “that there would be retaliation against them, could be career ending or transferred out of Homicide, they’d lose their good job.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 50, Bowman Dep. at 36.) Sgt. Stevenson, in particular, told Lt. Bowman that she was “scared as hell” and “afraid to work” the ease, but that she understood “it’s my job, I got to do it, and I’m in.” (Id.) Similarly, another female officer in the squad “emphatically told [Lt. Bowman] that she didn’t want to work the case at all because of fear of being retaliated against.” (Id. at 39.) During the time that Sgt. Stevenson was the officer in charge of the Greene investigation — a time period that spanned nearly a year, from the day of Ms. Greene’s murder to March of 2004 — she reported that some of the materials compiled in her investigation had been taken or were missing. In one instance, she arrived at work and discovered that the case notes she had been entering into her computer had been erased from the computer’s hard drive. (See Stevenson Dep. at 51-52.) She also discovered that four floppy disks on which she kept backup copies of computer-based information about the Greene investigation had been taken from a locked plastic case she kept on her desk. (See id. at 52-53.) More generally, when Sgt. Stevenson reviewed the copy of the homicide file that the Defendant City of Detroit produced during discovery in this case, she found that some of the materials she had compiled during her investigation were not present in this copy of the file. Sgt. Stevenson testified, for instance, that a spiral notebook in which she kept notes of her activities in the Greene investigation was missing from the homicide file. (See Stevenson Dep. at 210.) She further testified that her handwritten notes of witness interviews and other investigative activities were missing from the file, (see id. at 39-40, 158-61, 198), as well as a videotape of Ms. Greene’s funeral that she had been given by Ms. Greene’s pastor, Kenneth Hampton, (see id. at 68, 73-74). 2. The Reassignment of the Greene Murder Investigation from Homicide Squad 8 to the Cold Case Squad On March 10, 2004, the Greene murder investigation was reassigned from Homicide Squad 8 to three members of the Cold Case Squad: Sergeant Odell Godbold, Sergeant Erika Lee, and Investigator Donald Hughes. This reassignment evidently was precipitated by a meeting that day between Lt. Bowman and two Michigan State Police (“MSP”) officers, John Figurski and Mark Krebs. Lt. Bowman asked Lt. Jackson to attend this meeting with the MSP officers, and at some point during the meeting, Lt. Jackson invited Commander Schwartz to join the meeting. (See Jackson Dep. at 74-75; see also Bowman Dep. at 286-87.) During the course of this meeting, the MSP officers stated their view that the rumored Manoogian Mansion party had actually occurred. (See Jackson Dep. at 74; Bowman Dep. at 271.) There also was some discussion at this meeting about another woman who allegedly had danced at the rumored party, and who had since been killed in Georgia. (See Bowman Dep. at 287; Schwartz Dep. at 41.) In addition, Lt. Bowman advised Commander Schwartz of his belief that Ms. Greene had been killed by a member of Mayor Kilpatrick’s Executive Protection Unit (“EPU”). (See Schwartz Dep. at 41.) When Commander Schwartz asked what had led Lt. Bowman to this belief, Lt. Bowman reportedly responded by pointing to the fact that .40 caliber bullet casings had been found at the murder scene. (Id.) Commander Schwartz has testified that as this meeting continued, he became “increasingly suspicious” and “very disturbed” that he was hearing information that, in his view, “[h]ad no basis in fact, had no substantiation and was based on wild speculation.” (Id. at 42, 51.) Thus, at the conclusion of the meeting, Commander Schwartz contacted Assistant Chief of Police Harold Cureton and recounted what he had been told by the MSP officers and Lt. Bowman. Commander Schwartz then recommended to Assistant Chief Cureton that the Greene investigation be reassigned, based on his opinion that “we had a police lieutenant of the Homicide Section making what, by all appearances, was wild speculation regarding a case that had the potential to attract media attention,” and that “[w]e had police investigators that were making groundless statements without supporting evidence that called into question their objectivity to conduct this investigation.” (Id. at 43-44.) Next, Commander Schwartz and Assistant Chief Cureton “discussed what squad should handle the investigation” after it was transferred from Homicide Squad 8, and they determined that a meeting should be convened with then-Chief of Police Ella Bully-Cummings to address the reassignment of the investigation. (Id. at 43.) Accordingly, Lt. Jackson and Lt. Bowman were instructed to make two or three copies of the homicide file, and to bring these materials to a meeting later that day with Commander Schwartz, Assistant Chief Cureton, and Chief Bully-Cummings. According to Commander Schwartz, Lt. Bowman “laid out his information” at this meeting regarding his investigation, and he then left the meeting. (See id. at 54.) The remaining participants at the meeting then discussed Commander Schwartz’s recommendation that the Greene investigation be reassigned to the Cold Case Squad — which, in Schwartz’s view, “had the time and the ability to conduct that investigation” — and Chief Bully-Cummings concurred in this recommendation and approved the reassignment. (Id. at 54-55.) Lt. Jackson could not recall whether Chief Bully-Cummings said anything in particular at this meeting in response to the information presented by Lt. Bowman, but he observed that she “didn’t look very happy about it.” (Jackson Dep. at 77-78.) Lt. Bowman has testified, in contrast, that Chief Bully-Cummings stated that she “want[ed] this [Greene] file put away in a safe place,” and that “this case [wa]s not to be discussed outside of this room.” (Bowman Dep. at 292.) Following this meeting with the police chief, the Greene homicide investigation was reassigned to the above-referenced team of three Cold Case Squad officers, Sgt. Godbold, Sgt. Lee, and Investigator Hughes. In addition, Lt. Jackson was ordered by Commander Schwartz to gather up the original homicide file and the copies made for the meeting with Chief Bully-Cummings and store these materials in a file cabinet in his office. (See Jackson Dep. at 78-79, 105-06.) Lt. Jackson testified that this reassignment was “unusual,” and that “generally the officer who has that case, Sergeant Stevenson, for example, would have kept that case as long as she was in Squad 8.” (Jackson Dep. at 79-80.) Lt. Jackson further stated that the Cold Case Squad “[generally” was given only “older cases” that “weren’t being actively investigated,” and he agreed that the Greene investigation did not fit this profile. (Id. at 106-07.) Likewise, Sgt. Stevenson questioned why the case was reassigned from Squad 8 to the Cold Case Squad, and she expressed her displeasure to Lt. Bowman about this development. (See Stevenson Dep. at 77-80.) In her view, investigations were reassigned to the Cold Case Squad only in cases “that you’ve had for at least one and a half to two years and you had no leads,” and Sgt. Stevenson still had leads that she wished to pursue. (Id. at 77-78, 132-33.) In particular, Sgt. Stevenson testified that at the point the case was taken from her, she was about to pursue leads — including, for example, following up on the information gleaned from her viewing of the videotape of Tamara Greene’s funeral — that would have led her to question Officers Martin and Jones of the Mayor’s EPU, as well as members of the Mayor’s staff. (See id. at 74-76, 120-21.) More generally, Sgt. Stevenson testified that she had never before had a homicide investigation taken from her. (See id. at 130-31.) Within a fairly short time after the Greene investigation was reassigned to the Cold Case officers in March of 2004, Sgt. Stevenson, Lt. Bowman, and Lt. Jackson all were transferred under circumstances or with explanations that they deemed suspicious. In April of 2004, shortly after his meeting with Chief Bully-Cummings regarding the Greene investigation, Lt. Bowman was reassigned to work the midnight shift in the Second Precinct. (See Bowman Dep. at 296, 348-49.) According to Lt. Bowman, his direct superior, Lt. Jackson, advised him that he had been transferred because he had “been asking too many questions about the Strawberry case.” (Id. at 295.) Upon exploring this matter up the chain of command, Lt. Bowman was told by Deputy Chief Cara Best that he had been transferred for misspelling the word “homicide” in a report. (Id. at 296-97.) Lt. Bowman subsequently challenged his transfer in a state court whistleblower suit and, following a three-week trial, a jury returned a verdict in his favor and against the City of Detroit in the amount of $200,000. (See id. at 323-24.) Later in 2004, Sgt. Stevenson was transferred to the Ninth Precinct. Although she was “never given an explanation” for her transfer, she viewed it as “punishment” for investigating Ms. Greene’s murder. (Id. at 81-82, 130.) At around the same time, Lt. Jackson was reassigned to the Special Assignment Squad, and Lieutenant Roy McCallister was placed in charge of the Homicide Section. (See Jackson Dep. at 258-59, 306.) Lt. Jackson testified that it came as “kind of a shock when I was replaced with no explanation,” and he “speculate^] that after my ... meeting with the State Police, my days were numbered as being the officer in charge of the homicide section.” (Id. at 259-60, 315.) 3. The Cold Case Squad Investigation Upon assuming the lead role in the Greene homicide investigation in the spring of 2004, Sgt. Godbold of the Cold Case Squad testified that he was “dismayed” to discover that the investigative file was “so thin,” leading him to conclude that “extensive work needed to be done” and that he and his squad “needed to start from scratch.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 49, Godbold Dep. at 39, 381-82.) Like Lt. Jackson, Sgt. Godbold agreed that it was the DPD’s usual practice to transfer files to the Cold Case Squad only after they were at least two years old, and he could not recall receiving any cases that were less than two years old prior to the reassignment of the Greene investigation. (See id. at 34, 303.) Nonetheless, when he met with the squad members and asked whether they were reluctant to participate in the Greene investigation, they “looked at me like I was crazy” and advised Godbold that they had “no concerns.” (Id. at 38.) Over the next several months, Sgt. Godbold and the other members of the Cold Case Squad actively pursued various leads in the Greene homicide investigation, undertaking such tasks as re-examining the crime scene, interviewing witnesses, speaking with Ms. Greene’s family and co-workers, and administering polygraph examinations to suspects and persons of interest. Sgt. Godbold testified that as he began his investigation, he was urged by each of his superior officers at the time — Lt. Jackson, Commander Schwartz, and Assistant Chief Cureton — to investigate and endeavor to solve the case no matter what it took or where the evidence might lead. (See id. at 70-72.) When Sgt. Godbold expressed concern that his investigative efforts were being hindered by the requirement that the file be kept in Lt. Jackson’s office, Sgt. Godbold was promptly given possession of the file, and he testified that the file remained in his office throughout the time he was in charge of the investigation without any indication of tampering or materials going missing. (See id. at 32, 289, 298.) During his investigation, Sgt. Godbold elected not to pursue information he and his team received suggesting that Ms. Greene might have danced at the rumored Manoogian Mansion party. On one occasion, for instance, Sgt. Godbold was told by one of Ms. Greene’s relatives that Ms. Greene had “expressed some fears and she was fearful for her life,” and that she had told this relative that “she had danced at the mansion and that there was a fight.” (Id. at 388-89.) Sgt. Godbold testified that he “wasn’t interested” in this information and made little or no further inquiry concerning Ms. Greene’s presence at the rumored party because he “didn’t think that Ms. Greene was the target” of the drive-by shooting in which she was killed, but instead believed that Ms. Greene’s fellow passenger, Eric Mitchell, was the shooter’s intended target. (Id. at 389-90.) Likewise, Sgt. Godbold did not place any notes in the homicide file regarding his discussion with Ms. Greene’s relative about Ms. Greene having reportedly danced at the rumored party, based on his belief at the time that this alleged party was not relevant to Ms. Greene’s death or the murder investigation. (See id. at 392-94.) Similarly, Sgt. Godbold received other information relating to the rumored Manoogian Mansion party that he elected not to pursue, but that nonetheless led, in his view, to his removal as officer in charge of the Greene investigation. At some point in the summer of 2004, a retired DPD officer, Bryan Turnbull — a member of former Chief Oliver’s staff in 2002 — approached Sgt. Godbold while he was at lunch in Greektown and told him that an active DPD officer had danced at the Manoogian Mansion party and had been assaulted. (See id. at 127-29, 134.) Turn-bull further stated that this DPD officer had shown up to work injured and had been sent home with pay for three weeks, after which “they hid her, in [Turnbull’s] words,” in another department. (Id. at 129.) Later, in the fall of 2004, the DPD officer who allegedly danced at the party called Sgt. Godbold and asked him to meet her outside of DPD headquarters, where she approached Sgt. Godbold with “watery eyes” and told him, “I’m scared. I don’t know what to do.” (Id. at 86-89.) Sgt. Godbold responded that he did not “want to hear about no party” and “could care less,” and he advised her to “[j]ust keep your mouth shut.” (Id. at 89.) Sgt. Godbold testified that he did not pursue this matter and “didn’t care” whether this DPD officer had danced at a Manoogian Mansion party because “[i]t had nothing to do with [the Greene investigation], as far as I was concerned at that point in time.” (Id. at 132-33,141.) Later in 2004 and into the first half of 2005, Sgt. Godbold’s then-superiors — Lieutenant James Tolbert, the head of the Homicide Section; Deputy Police Chief Tony Saunders, the head of the Major Crimes Division; and Assistant Chief of Police Walter Martin — took a number of steps and issued orders that, in Sgt. Godbold’s view, impeded his investigation, prevented him from exploring various leads, and ultimately led to his removal from the Greene investigation and the disbanding of the Cold Case Squad. First, for about two or three months in late 2004 and early 2005, Sgt. Godbold was assigned to a newly-formed Special Long-Term Investigative Section, an eight-man team that was tasked to undertake narcotic-related homicide investigations. (See id. at 74.) In this position, Sgt. Godbold was relocated to work in the basement of the Fisher Building, while the Greene file remained in the Cold Case Squad offices at DPD headquarters. Sgt. Godbold came to believe that this assignment was a “ruse” to ensure that he “could not work the Tamara Greene homicide investigation,” because an existing squad already was responsible for investigating the same sorts of narcotics-related homicides to be handled by the new unit, and because this new group was given little or no work to do. (Id. at 75, 166, 221, 423.) During this period when Sgt. Godbold worked at the Fisher Building, he was told by Deputy Chief Saunders that “I don’t want you coming over” to DPD headquarters, even though he remained the officer in charge of the Greene investigation, and he testified that only “[m]inimum” work was done on this investigation while he carried out his new assignment. (Id. at 325, 423-25.) After he was ordered to return to DPD headquarters and the Cold Case Squad offices in early 2005, Sgt. Godbold resumed his investigative efforts on the Tamara Greene ease, but only for a few more months. At some point in the late spring or early summer of 2005, the then-acting head of the Major Crimes Division, Inspector William Rice, asked Sgt. Godbold to bring him the Greene homicide file for his review, and Sgt. Godbold complied with this request from a superior officer. (See id. at 212-15.) Upon learning of this, Assistant Chief Martin became angry and told Sgt. Godbold that he had disobeyed an order not to show the Greene file to anyone, and Martin subsequently ordered Godbold in July of 2005 to deliver the file to his (Martin’s) office. (See id. at 176-78, 215, 433-34.) Sgt. Godbold testified that this essentially brought his investigation to an end, because “you could not even begin to conduct a thorough investigation” with the file in “someone else’s office.” (Id. at 263.) A short time later, in August of 2005, the Cold Case Squad was shut down, with Sgt. Godbold arriving at work one day to discover that the squad’s offices had been emptied and its computers taken away. (See id. at 264-65.) Sgt. Godbold testified that he did not know who made this decision or why it was made. (See id.) Sgt. Godbold was reassigned to Squad 6, which he viewed as a demotion to a position without supervisory authority. (See id. at 267.) In Sgt. Godbold’s view, the various above-referenced steps taken by his superiors to impede his investigation into Tamara Greene’s murder — including his transfer to a new unit at a different location, the relocation of the file to Assistant Chief Martin’s office, and the disbanding of the Cold Case Squad — were motivated by a desire to protect the DPD officer who allegedly had danced at the rumored Manoogian Mansion party. (See id. at 437-41.) Sgt. Godbold ultimately elected to retire from the DPD in 2006, explaining at his deposition that “there was a conspiracy to undermine the integrity of ... Ms. Greene’s investigation,” and that he “wanted no part of it.” (Id. at 442.) Following his retirement as a DPD officer, Sgt. Godbold worked for approximately six months for “Crime Stoppers,” a nonprofit organization based in southeast Michigan that encourages and gathers anonymous reports of criminal activity. Upon reviewing the organization’s files, he discovered that Crime Stoppers had received a number of tips over the years relating to the Tamara Greene homicide that he had not seen in his role as the DPD’s lead investigator of this crime. (See id. at 205.) For at least some of these tips, the Crime Stoppers records indicated that they had been faxed to DPD at the time they were received, but Sgt. Godbold testified that these tips had not been forwarded to him for use in the DPD investigation. (See id. at 217-19.) While at Crime Stoppers, Sgt. Godbold re-transmitted these tips to DPD, but he reported that he saw only “[s]ome of them” upon reviewing the copy of the homicide file produced by the City in discovery. (Id. at 207.) 4. The Investigation by the Reconstituted Cold Case Squad In late 2005, shortly before his retirement as a DPD officer, Sgt. Godbold was ordered by Assistant Chief Martin to deliver the Greene homicide file to Wayne County Prosecutor Kym Worthy. (See id. at 66-69.) At some point, the file was returned to DPD custody, and in December of 2007, the Greene investigation was assigned to Sergeant Michael Russell, the officer in charge of DPD’s reconstituted Cold Case Unit. (See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 51, Russell Dep. at 11.) Sgt. Russell testified that the active phase of his investigation spanned from December of 2007 to approximately September of 2008; while the case remained under his purview after that time, he explained that there were “no new witnesses or no new information that came forward to cause me to investigate any further.” (Russell Dep. at 11-14, 82-85.) Sgt. Russell testified that he never perceived any reason to look into the rumored Manoogian Mansion party or to explore whether Ms. Greene might have danced at any such party. He explained that, in his view, “[t]he focus of my investigation was not to see if there was a party,” but instead was “trying to figure out who killed” Ms. Greene and attempted to kill the other passenger in her car, Eric Mitchell. (Id. at 44.) Upon reviewing the materials in the homicide file — including, among other items, a report of a Michigan State Police investigation into the rumored Manoogian Mansion party — Sgt. Russell opined that “there was no evidence in that file that said there was a party.” (Id. at 44-45.) Moreover, while Sgt. Russell acknowledged that “[t]here’s people who state she danced here [or] danced there,” and that the homicide investigators had been advised of “a bunch of rumors” about such activities, he stated that, in his view, no evidence had been uncovered that any such party “had something to do with” the murder of Ms. Greene and the attempted murder of Mr. Mitchell, or that the shootings were “the result of a party at someone’s house [or] at the mansion.” (Id. at 45-48, 97-99.) According to Sgt. Russell, the Greene investigation remained essentially inactive from September of 2008 until the spring or early summer of 2010, when the file was forwarded to the Violent Crimes Task Force for “another review.” {Id. at 12-13, 85.) He testified that “things slowed down on the case” in the fall of 2008, with “nothing there for us to do” and no “new evidence or new witnesses.” {Id. at 82-84.) So far as the record reveals, Ms. Greene’s murder remains unsolved, and no suspects have been charged or prosecuted in connection with her death. B. Plaintiffs’ Other Evidence of Alleged Interference in Law Enforcement Activities by Defendant Kilpatrick and Other Senior City of Detroit Officials Plainly, the most direct means by which Plaintiffs can establish the requisite interference with or obstruction of the Tamara Greene homicide investigation is through evidence of purported irregularities in the Greene investigation itself. Beyond this evidence, however, Plaintiffs also seek to establish a de facto City of Detroit policy or custom to interfere with law enforcement investigations — or, at least, investigations that raised concerns for high-ranking City officials — by pointing to a number of instances where, in their view, senior City of Detroit officials attempted to obstruct such investigations or otherwise influence law enforcement operations This evidence as to other alleged instances of obstruction or interference is summarized below. 1. Defendant Kilpatrick’s Alleged Interference with a DPD Internal Affairs Investigation into the Rumored Manoogian Mansion Party and Wrongdoing by Members of Former Mayor Kilpatrick’s Executive Protection Unit Plaintiffs’ primary example of alleged interference by senior Detroit officials with a law enforcement investigation will no doubt be familiar to many Detroit-area residents. In February of 2003, DPD Officer Harold Nelthrope was transferred out of Mayor Kilpatrick’s Executive Protection Unit (“EPU”). Shortly thereafter, Officer Nelthrope met with officers in the DPD’s Internal Affairs (“IA”) Section to report alleged misconduct by two EPU members, Officers Loronzo Greg Jones and Mike Martin. At a subsequent meeting with an IA officer in late April of 2003, Officer Nelthrope expanded on these allegations by reporting a “rumor” he had heard about a party at the Manoogian Mansion, at which a dancer had been assaulted by Mayor Kilpatrick’s wife, Carlita Kilpatrick. (.See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 22, Nelthrope Dep. at 94-96.) Officer Nelthrope’s allegations were summarized in a memo prepared by an IA officer, Lieutenant Brian Stair, with the intention that this information would then be forwarded to Deputy Chief Gary Brown, the head of the DPD’s Professional Accountability Bureau (“PAB”). Deputy Chief Brown, in turn, incorporated this information into a memo to Chief of Police Oliver dated April 24 and April 30, 2003. {See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 38 (memo to Chief Oliver reporting Nelthrope’s allegations).) Notably, during this same time period, a number of high-ranking City of Detroit and DPD officials — including May- or Kilpatrick’s Chief of Staff, Christine Beatty, the City’s Corporate Counsel, Ruth Carter, then-Assistant Police Chief Ella Bully-Cummings, and Chief Oliver’s Chief of Staff, Inspector Shereece Fleming-Freeman — exchanged text messages expressing their dislike for Deputy Chief Brown. (See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 31, Text Messages at 133-34.) The events that followed have been widely reported in the media, and were the subject of extensive trial testimony in the state court whistleblower suit brought by Deputy Chief Brown and Officer Nelthrope against Defendant Kilpatrick and the City of Detroit. (See Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 41, Complaint in Brown v. City of Detroit, Case No. 03-317557-NZ.) First, on approximately May 2, 2003, Inspector Fleming-Freeman advised Deputy Chief Brown that Christine Beatty was “now in charge” of the Mayor’s EPU, and that Beatty was to be informed of any efforts to investigate or interview EPU members. (See Brown Dep. at 15, 80-81.) Deputy Chief Brown testified that this was “totally inappropriate,” and that never before, in his 26-year history with the DPD, had he been aware of such involvement by the Mayor’s staff in DPD affairs. (Id. at 15.) On May 5, 2003, Deputy Chief Brown met with Chief Oliver to discuss Officer Nelthrope’s allegations and the IA investigation. Chief Oliver requested that Deputy Chief Brown prepare a brief bullet-point memo summarizing the information Officer Nelthrope had provided to the IA investigators. (See id. at 38-39; see also Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 42 (5/6/2003 Memo).) The next day, May 6, 2003, Chief Oliver shared this memo with Christine Beatty. (See Oliver Dep. at 120.) On May 7, 2003, Beatty directed the City of Detroit’s information technology staff to back up Deputy Chief Brown’s computer files and deny him access to these files, and she sent a text message to Defendant Kilpatrick confirming that this had been done. On May 9, 2003, Mayor Kilpatrick, Christine Beatty, and Chief Oliver met in the Mayor’s office, and Chief Oliver was instructed to fire Brown. Chief Oliver has testified that he was “shock[edj” by this directive and told Beatty it was a “major mistake,” and that Mayor Kilpatrick and Beatty refused to give any reasons for this decision. (Oliver Dep. at 128-29.) Upon relaying this decision to Deputy Chief Brown, Chief Oliver stated that he “didn’t know why [Brown] was being fired” and that it “wasn’t his idea,” and he “pretty much apologized for having to do it.” (Brown Dep. at 116.) In Deputy Chief Brown’s view, however, his termination was attributable, at least in part, to a desire to forestall an IA investigation that might have uncovered evidence of the rumored Manoogian Mansion party and other questionable activities by then-Mayor Kilpatrick. (See Brown Dep. at 127.) The day after Deputy Chief Brown’s dismissal, Chief Oliver met with the remaining executive staff and membership of the PAB in order to better understand the reason for this decision. In the course of this meeting, Chief Oliver was shown a memo — evidently, the memo from Deputy Chief Brown dated April 24 and April 30, 2003 — reflecting Officer Nelthrope’s allegations about a Manoogian Mansion party, and this led him to conclude that the IA investigation into these allegations had led to Deputy Chief Brown’s removal as head of the PAB. (See Oliver Dep. at 97, 137.) According to one IA investigator who was present at this meeting, Chief Oliver became “very agitated” upon reading this memo, expressing his amazement that “you guys are investigating the mayor,” stating “[t]hat’s the dumbest s* * * I ever heard of,” and opining that “you don’t have the sense of an amoeba ... to conduct this type of investigation.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 47, Parshall Investigative Subpoena Testimony at 44-45.) As noted earlier, following his dismissal, Deputy Chief Brown, along with Officer Nelthrope, brought a state court whistle-blower suit against the City of Detroit and Defendant Kilpatrick. Following a lengthy trial in August and September of 2007, a jury awarded a combined $6.5 million in damages to Brown and Nelthrope. Later that fall, the City and Defendant Kilpatrick agreed to a settlement calling for Brown and Nelthrope to receive $8.4 million. It was subsequently learned, however, that the settlement included a provision mandating the non-disclosure of text messages revealing an intimate personal relationship between Defendant Kilpatrick and his Chief of Staff, Christine Beatty. When these text messages were publicly disclosed through the investigative efforts of the Detroit Free Press, it was discovered that they contradicted the sworn testimony given by Defendant Kilpatrick and Beatty during the Brown/Nelthrope whistleblower trial. This led to criminal charges of perjury and obstruction of justice against Defendant Kilpatrick and Beatty, both of whom pled guilty to a subset of these charges and served prison terms, and both of whom resigned from their positions with the City of Detroit. 2. The Alleged Effort to Influence an Investigation by the Michigan State Police and Former Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox into the Rumored Manoogian Mansion Party and Alleged Misconduct by Members of the Mayor’s EPU The next example cited by Plaintiffs of interference by former Mayor Kilpatrick and his administration in a law enforcement investigation rests on evidence revealing, in Plaintiffs’ view, that Defendant Kilpatrick and other senior City of Detroit officials attempted to influence the course of an investigation launched by then-Miehigan Attorney General Mike Cox and the Michigan State Police (“MSP”) into the rumored Manoogian Mansion party and alleged misconduct by members of the mayor’s EPU. In the immediate aftermath of the removal of Deputy Chief Brown as head of the PAB, efforts were begun to identify an outside law enforcement agency that would be given the task of investigating the allegations made by Officer Nelthrope to the DPD’s Internal Affairs Section. In mid-May of 2003, it was announced that Attorney General Cox and the MSP would conduct this investigation. During this time period, a number of text messages were sent and received by senior City of Detroit officials — including Police Chief Oliver, Chief of Staff Beatty, and Corporate Counsel Ruth Carter — discussing which outside agency would or should be given this investigative task. In one such message sent on May 19, 2003, Ruth Carter reported to Defendant Kilpatrick that she had spoken to Attorney General Cox in the wake of news stories that he and the MSP would be conducting this investigation, and that he had asked “who we would rather be cleared by,” “him or [Wayne County Prosecutor Mike] Duggan.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 31, 5/19/2003 text message.) In Plaintiffs’ view, Defendant Kilpatrick and his administration preferred Attorney General Cox to lead this investigation because, among other reasons, Carter and Cox were former co-workers in the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office. As further support for this inference, Plaintiffs point to text messages sent by Carter later that day, stating that “I don’t think we’ll be ambushed by” the Attorney General, and that “I spoke to Cox a few ago and he and I will coordinate the investigation.” (Id., 5/19/2003 text messages.) After the Attorney General and the MSP commenced their investigation, Kilpatrick administration officials continued to exchange text messages regarding this investigation. On May 21, 2003, for example, Carter sent Defendant Kilpatrick a text message asking whether he was “comfortable with shifting the ‘focus’ [of the investigation] from you to the DPD ie EPU,” and Defendant Kilpatrick responded that he was “[v]ery [c]omfortable” with this. (Id., 5/21/2003 text messages.) Carter then sent Defendant Kilpatrick another text message promising to “get that started.” (Id.) Carter also sent a text message to Christine Beatty inquiring whether certain witnesses were “friends” that she should “work with” before they spoke to the Attorney General. (Id., 5/28/2003 text message.) In Plaintiffs’ view, the strongest indication of the Kilpatrick administration’s influence over the MSP investigation was the Attorney General’s decision to personally interview Defendant Kilpatrick, without the participation of the MSP officers who had conducted most of the activities in this investigation. Only Attorney General Cox, his assistant Thomas Furtaw, Defendant Kilpatrick, and Ruth Carter were present for this interview, and the session was not recorded. One of the MSP investigators, Detective Sergeant Mark Krebs, testified that this treatment of Defendant Kilpatrick differed from that of “every other investigative participant,” and that the circumstances of his interview were “completely unheard of.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 57, Krebs Dep. at 78.) Likewise, MSP Colonel Robert Bertee described this interview process as “ridiculous” and “unprecedented in [his] 30 years [with] the Michigan State Police.” (Plaintiffs’ Response, Ex. 56, Bertee Dep. at 42.) When Col. Bertee expressed this concern to Thomas Furtaw, he was told to “consider it a meeting between two elected officials.” (Id. at 42-43.) Shortly after this interview, the MSP investigators were told that Attorney General Cox had decided to conclude the investigation. Sgt. Krebs has testified to his belief that Thomas Furtaw was “under a strain to get this closed out quickly because Mike Cox wanted it done.” (Krebs Dep. at 40.) Similarly, Col. Bertee testified that he proteste