Full opinion text
OPINION BROWN, District Judge. Table of Contents I. Introduction. 480 II. Factual Background and Procedural History. 480 III. Discussion. 481 A. Motion to Dismiss Standard. 481 B. Defendants’Motion to Dismiss. 481 1. Plaintiffs’ Federal Statutory Claims. 481 a. Adoption Assistance Act and MPA. 482 i. Adoption Assistance Act. 482 1. right to pre-placement preventive services program. 484 2. right to timely written case plans. 485 3. right to placement in the least restrictive, most family-like setting . 489 4. right to nationally recommended professional standards 490 5. right to adequate information system. 492 n. MPA. 493 b. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. 496 c. EPSDT . 497 d. ADA and RHA. 499 2. Plaintiffs’ Federal Common Law Claim. 502 3. Plaintiffs’ Federal Constitutional Claims. 504 a. Substantive Due Process . 504 i. non-custodial children . 505 ii. custodial children. 506 b. Procedural Due Process. 508 c. First and Ninth Amendments. 512 4. Abstention . 514 IV. Conclusion 514 I. Introduction This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Defendants, Christine Todd Whitman, as Governor of the State of New Jersey, Michele K. Guhl, as Commissioner of the Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”), and Charles Venti, as Director of the Division of Youth and Family Services (hereinafter “DYFS”) of the State of New Jersey (hereinafter “Defendants”), to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (hereinafter “Complaint” or “Compl.”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (hereinafter “Def. Motion”). For the reasons set forth herein, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Counts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Moreover, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part as discussed more fully herein with respect to the First and Seventh Counts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. II. Factual Background and Procedural History There is no term other than tragic to summarize the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs. The Complaint discusses twenty named Plaintiffs: Charlie and Nadine H., siblings aged eleven and nine who have been in DYFS custody for over five years; Jason, Jennifer, and Patti W., siblings aged ten, eight, and six who were removed from their mother’s custody three years ago; Dennis M. and Denise R., siblings aged eight and seven who were removed from their mother’s custody in 1995; Marco and Juan C., siblings aged eight and ten who were removed from their mother’s care for the second time in 1995; Ricardo 0., age thirteen-and-a-half who has been in DYFS custody since June 1997; Dolores arid Anna G., siblings aged four and seventeen months who have been in DYFS custody since August 1998; Kyle J., age one- and-a-half who has been in foster care since birth; Ryan, Christopher, and Melissa H., siblings who currently live with their mother despite numerous reports of abuse and neglect; Ricky, Daniel, and Thomas M., siblings who currently live with their mother, but have spent most their lives in DYFS custody; and Barry M., age seventeen who has been in and out of DYFS custody since the age of four (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”). Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19. Moreover, the Complaint also seeks to maintain a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of approximately 9,250 children who are in the legal and/or physical custody of DYFS and on behalf of more than 50,000 children who currently have open DYFS cases for services. Id. at ¶¶ 34-36. Generally speaking, Plaintiffs allege systemic failure on Defendants’ part to protect both the individual Plaintiffs and the purported class and to provide them and their families with services which failure has jeopardized their health and safety by subjecting them to significant harm. Id. at ¶27. Plaintiffs attribute this systemic failure on. Defendants’ part to poor management and gross overburdening of the child welfare system in New Jersey. Id. at ¶ 28. Moreover, Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants have failed to provide effective leadership or the resources and support necessary to ensure that the child welfare system provides adequate protection and services to New Jersey’s most vulnerable children. Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiffs also allege that this failure in leadership and resources has, in turn, led to high turnover rates for front-line caseworkers, which further jeopardizes New Jersey’s children. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that while Defendants are well-aware of the institutional shortcomings, as documented in a 1998 report submitted to Governor "Whitman by a Blue Ribbon panel of social service administrators and service providers, lawyers and court personnel, children’s advocates, and medical experts, they have failed to engage in aggressive reform efforts. Id. at ¶¶ 31 and 32. See also Compl. at ¶¶ 205-400. More specifically, the Complaint explores the circumstances surrounding Plaintiffs’ interaction with DYFS and DHS in heart-wrenching detail. For example, the Complaint alleges instances in which Plaintiffs were sexually, physically, and psychologically abused, and in at least one instance, nearly killed, while in DYFS custody. See, e.g. Compl. at ¶¶ 84, 85, 108, 127, 134, and 74. Moreover, the Complaint alleges instances in which the Plaintiffs have not received medical treatment while in DYFS custody. Id. at ¶¶ 93 and 132. Finally, the Complaint alleges instances in which the Plaintiffs’ special needs have not been addressed while in DYFS custody. Id. at ¶¶ 105, 107, 122, 131, 139, and 180. Given all of these alleged institutional deficiencies, Plaintiff seek: i) to be allowed to maintain a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; ii) a declaration that Defendants’ actions and inac-tions are unconstitutional and unlawful; hi) a permanent injunction requiring Defendants’ to cease practices that violate Plaintiffs’ rights; iv) appropriate remedial relief to ensure Defendants’ future compliance with legally mandated services to Plaintiffs; v) appointment of an expert panel with full-access to Defendants, their records and their personnel, to develop and oversee the implementation of a plan for reform; vi) an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees; and vii) other equitable relief. See Compl. at pp. 129-130. In response, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. III. Discussion A. Motion to Dismiss Standard A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, accepting all allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to a plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.1986). The Plaintiffs’ nine causes of action may not be dismissed unless Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Importantly, “[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). In setting forth a valid claim, a party is required only to plead “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 1. Plaintiffs’ Federal Statutory Claims Plaintiffs allege five causes of action pursuant to various federal statutes. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they are being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (hereinafter “AACWA” or “Adoption Assistance Act”) and the federal Multieth-nic Placement Act of 1994, as amended by the Interethnic Adoption Provisions of 1996 (hereinafter “MPA”). See Compl. at Fourth Count and Seventh Count.. Plaintiffs also allege that they are being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (hereinafter “CAPTA”). Id. at Fifth Count. Plaintiffs also allege violations of the federal Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment provisions of the of the federal Medicaid Act (hereinafter “EPSDT”). Id. at Eighth Count. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that they are being deprived of rights conferred upon them by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter “ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter “RHA”). Id. at Ninth Count. Plaintiffs’ statutory claims are brought pursuant to 42 United States Code § 1983 which imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). Section 1983 safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes. Id. (citation omitted). However, in order to seek redress under Section 1983, Plaintiffs “must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Id. (citation omitted). In order to determine whether “a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right,” courts have “traditionally looked at three factors.” Id. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than prec-atory terms. Id. (citations omitted). With this framework in mind, each of the Plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims shall be considered in turn. a. Adoption Assistance Act and MPA Plaintiffs’ MPA claim appears to fall within a subset of the code. provisions Plaintiffs cite in support of their AACWA claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627 and 670-679a in support of their Adoption Assistance Act claim and 42 U.S.C. §§ 622(b)(9), 671(a)(18), and 674(d) in support of their MPA claim. See Compl. at ¶ 39. Therefore, these claims and their respective code provisions shall be examined in conjunction with each other. However, generally speaking, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627 deal with the program established to supply federal funds to states for child welfare services and 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679a deal with the program established to supply federal funds to states for foster care and adoption assistance. More specifically, these code sections fit into the larger scheme of funding established in Parts A through E of Sub-chapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Social Security Act, which generally deals with grants to states for aid and services to needy families with children and for child-welfare services.. For example, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627 fall within Part B, Subpart 1 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679a fall within Part E of Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Social Security Act. i. Adoption Assistance Act Plaintiffs allege that, under the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, states, including New Jersey, receive federal money so long as they have submitted a plan approved by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, certify that the plan provides the child welfare services required by the Adoption Assistance Act, and comply with the terms of the plan. See Compl. at ¶ 61. Without citing any specific statutory provisions, Plaintiffs allege that they are being deprived of the following rights conferred upon them by the Adoption Assistance Act: i) right to have Defendants implement a pre-placement preventive services program designed to help children remain with their families or be returned to their families when appropriate; ii) right to timely written case plans that contain mandated elements and to the implementation and review of these plans; iii) right to placement in foster homes or facilities that conform to nationally recommended professional standards; iv) right to placement in the least restrictive, most family-like setting; v) right to proper care while in custody; vi) right to be freed for adoption in accordance with the time frames established by law; vii) right to planning and services to secure their permanent placement at the earliest possible time; viii) right to regular judicial and administrative reviews of their foster care placements; ix) right to dispositional hearings within twelve months of entering custody and periodically thereafter; and x) right to receive services in a child welfare system with an adequate information system to permit decision-makers to make fully informed choices in the children’s best interests. Id. at ¶ 404. With respect to each right asserted, Defendants argue that under the Blessing framework, the Adoption Assistance Act provisions at issue are not so clear' and unambiguous so as to create rights enforceable under § 1983. See Def. Motion at p. 4. Plaintiffs counter that under “established standards of statutory interpretation, the statutes create specific, enforceable rights.” P1.0pp. at p. 19. In their reply, Defendants reiterate their disagreement under the Blessing framework. Initially, Defendants argue that any analysis of the Adoption Assistance Act provisions at issue must begin with the Supreme Court’s analysis and decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), which reviewed an attempt to enforce a private right pursuant to § 1983 for an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). See Def. Motion at p. 6. Specifically, § 671(a)(15) provides that in order for a state to be eligible for federal payments for foster care and adoption assistance under § 670, the state shall have a Plan approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services which provides that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B). The Suter Court noted that the pertinent inquiry under the Blessing framework with respect to § 671(a)(15) was did “Congress, in enacting the Adoption Act, unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce the requirement that the State make ‘reasonable efforts’ to prevent a child from being removed from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his family.” Suter, 503 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. 1360. The Suter Court found that § 671(a)(15) did not unambiguously confer an enforceable right on individual children within the child welfare system because only “a rather generalized duty” was imposed upon the state, “to be enforced not by private individuals, but by the Secretary” in the manner set forth in the AACWA. Id. at 363, 112 S.Ct. 1360. Thus, the Suter Court found that the subject class of plaintiffs could not use § 1983 to enforce § 671(a)(15) of the AACWA. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 363, 112 S.Ct. 1360 (holding that “[cjareful examination of the language relied upon by [plaintiffs], in the context of the entire Act, leads us to conclude that the ‘reasonable efforts’ language does not unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act’s beneficiaries”). To the extent that Suter may, have intimated that § 671(a)(15), or any other section of the Adoption Assistance Act for that matter, did not confer a private right enforceable under § 1983 simply because of its inclusion in a section requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of such a plan, Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1994, specifically mentioning Suter. This amendment noted [i]n an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; provided however, that this section is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(15) of this title is not enforceable in a private right of action. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2. However, this amendment did not overrule Suter. The amendment only forecloses the refusal to find a federal right enforceable under § 1983 because the statutory provision may be included in a section requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of such a plan. See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1002 (11th Cir.1997) (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 “does not purport to reject any and all grounds relied upon in Suter; it purports only to overrule certain grounds—i.e., that a provision is unenforceable simply because of its inclusion in a section requiring a state plan or specifying the contents of such a plan”). Therefore, with this important guideline in mind, each of Plaintiffs’ asserted rights is examined in the context of whether, as noted in Suter, the provision at issue unambiguously confers a private right enforceable pursuant to § 1983 under the Blessing framework. 1. right to pre-placement preventive services program Plaintiffs allege that the Adoption Assistance Act “requires defendants, as a condition to receiving federal funds, to implement and operate in New Jersey a pre-placement preventive services program designed to help children remain with their families, when safe and appropriate.” Compl. at ¶ 63a. See also Compl. at ¶ 63b (alleging that the Adoption Assistance Act “requires defendants, as a condition to receiving federal funds, to implement and operate in New Jersey a service program designed to help children, when safe and appropriate, return to the families from which they have been removed, and when this is not possible to be placed for adoption, for legal guardianship, or in some other planned, permanent living arrangement”). In this regard, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants’ “actions and inactions,” Plaintiffs are being deprived of their right “to have defendants implement a pre-placement preventive services program designed to help children remain with their families or be returned to their families when appropriate.” Id. at ¶404. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiffs are relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(iii)(I) or 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(iv) in support of this right, these subsections create no right enforceable under § 1983. See Def. Motion at p. 9. Plaintiffs respond that the Complaint “alleges that the lack of an operating preplacement preventive services program is demonstrated by the fact that there are virtually no available preventive services available, that DYFS has failed to promote and secure access to such services, and that there is no coordination of preventive services at either the state or county level.” P1.0pp. at p. 36 (citation omitted). Defendants reply that there is “no objective measure for the adequacy of pre-placement services contained in AACWA,” and therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B) does not unambiguously confer upon Plaintiffs the right enforceable pursuant § 1983 to a pre-placement preventive services program designed to help children remain with their families or be returned to their families when appropriate. Def. Reply at p. 8. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach plan for child welfare services under [42 U.S.C. § 622(a) ] shall—provide assurances that the State— is operating, to the satisfaction of the Secretary—a service program designed to help children—where safe and appropriate, return to families from which they have been removed ...; and a preplacement preventive services program designed to help children at risk of foster care placement remain safely with their families.” 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(iii)(I) and 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(iv). First, the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B) indicates that such pre-placement preventive services programs must be operating “to the satisfaction of the Secretary.” Clearly, this Court does not sit to oversee New Jersey’s child welfare system to determine whether certain components of the system are “operating, to the satisfaction of the Secretary.” See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 and 345, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (noting that a request by plaintiffs for a “broad injunction requiring the director of Arizona’s child support agency to achieve ‘substantial compliance’ ” and “[attributing the deficiencies in the State’s program primarily to staff shortages and other structural defects” inappropriately “invited the District Court to oversee every aspect of Arizona’s Title IV-D program”) (citation omitted). Moreover, under the Blessing test, 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B) does not unambiguously confer upon Plaintiffs the right enforceable pursuant § 1983 to “pre-placement preventive services program designed to help children remain with their families or be returned to their families when appropriate.” See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (holding that “[i]t is difficult to know what is meant by providing ‘appropriate treatment’ in the ‘least restrictive’ setting”); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D.Ill.1989) (examining purpose of Title IV-B [of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628b,] as set forth in language of 42 U.S.C. § 620(a) in light of “similar language [set forth in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act] in Pennhurst” and holding that “Congress intended Title IV-B to be an expression of goals and guiding principles rather than an enactment that creates enforceable federal rights ” and that “[n]othing in Title IV-B can be said to intend the creation of the kind of rights to which a remedy in favor of persons such as plaintiffs could attach”) (emphasis added). See also Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F.Supp. 303, 312 (D.N.H.1994) (holding that “plaintiffs enjoy no enforceable rights under” 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(C), which is the predecessor to, and contains nearly the identical language as, 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(iii)(I) and (II)). Therefore, for these reasons, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B) for a “pre-placement preventive services program designed to help children remain with their families or be returned to their families when appropriate” is dismissed. 2. right to timely written case plans Plaintiffs also allege that “[t]he Adoption Assistance Act and relevant regulations further require that if defendants accept federal funds, they shall take steps necessary to ensure that each foster child is provided with a written case plan, containing specified elements, that is reviewed and updated at specified intervals, and that services are provided in accordance with that plan.” Compl. at ¶ 64d. In this regard, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants “actions and inactions,” Plaintiffs are being deprived of their right “to timely written case plans that contain mandate elements and to the implementation and review of these plans.” Id. at ¶ 404. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiffs are relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) in support of this right, this subsection does not create a right enforceable under § 1983. See Def. Motion at p. 12. Specifically, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs do not complain that New Jersey has failed to provide case plans.” Id. Instead, Plaintiffs disagree “with the contents and ‘implementation’ of these plans.” Id. For example, Defendants note that Barry M. is the only Plaintiff to allege that Defendants have faded to provide him a written case plan. Id. However, on closer examination, Defendants also note that Barry M. alleges “that DYFS has failed ‘to provide a written case plan, reviewed annually, to prepare him for self-sufficient living.’ ” Id. (citing Compl. at ¶ 204) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that such disagreement is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) pursuant to § 1983. Plaintiffs respond that not only do Plaintiffs have a right to “an enforceable written case plan and a case review system” under 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16), and 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) and (5), but Plaintiffs also have an “enforceable right to implementation of case plan services.” PI. Opp. at pp. 22-26 and 26-29. Defendants reply that even if there is a right to a case plan and/or review system, there is no right of each individual child to enforce the particulars of his or her plan, because to do so would require a court to act without an objective measure against which to gauge a state’s actions. See Def. Reply at pp. 4-5.' Therefore, Defendants argue that the AACWA does not unambiguously confer upon Plaintiffs the right enforceable pursuant § 1983 to “timely written case plans that contain mandate elements and to the implementation and review of these plans.” Id. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach plan for child welfare services under [42 U.S.C. § 622(a) ] shall — provide assurances that the State — is operating, to the satisfaction of the Secretary — a case review system (as defined in section 675(5) of this title) for each child receiving foster care under the supervision of the State.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n order for a State to be eligible for payments under [42 U.S.C. § 670], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which — provides for the development of a ease plan (as defined in section 675(1) of this title) for each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under the State plan and provides for a case review system which meets the requirements described in section 675(5)(B) of this title with respect to each such child.” Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) and (5) define, in detail, “case plan” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) and “case review system” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii). .Specifically, “case plan” means a written document which includes at least the following: (A) A description of the type of home or institution in which a child is to be placed, including a discussion of the safety and appropriateness of the placement and how the agency which is responsible for the child plans to carry out the voluntary placement agreement entered into or judicial determination made with respect to the child in accordance with section 672(a)(1) of this title. (B) A plan for assuring that the child receives safe and proper care and that services are provided to the parents, child, and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in the parents’ home, facilitate return of the child to his own safe home or the permanent placement of the child, and address the needs of the child while in foster care, including a discussion of the appropriateness of the services that have been provided to the child under the plan. (C) To the extent available and accessible, the health and education records of the child, including— (i) the names and addresses of the child’s health and educational providers; (ii) the child’s grade level performance; (iii) the child’s school record; (iv) assurances that the child’s placement in foster care takes into account proximity to the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement; (v) a record of the child’s immunizations; (vi) the child’s known medical problems; (vii) the child’s medications; and (viii) any other relevant health and education information concerning the child determined to be appropriate by the State agency. (D) Where appropriate, for a child age 16 or over, a written description of the programs and services which will help such child prepare for the transition from foster care to independent living. (E) In the case of a child with respect to whom the permanency plan is adoption or placement in another permanent home, documentation of the steps the agency is taking to find an adoptive family or other permanent living arrangement for the child, to place the child with an adoptive family, a fit and willing relative, a legal guardian, or in another planned permanent living arrangement, and to finalize the adoption or legal guardianship. At a minimum, such documentation shall include child specific recruitment efforts such as the use of State, regional, and national adoption exchanges including electronic exchange systems. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1). Moreover, “case review system” means a procedure for assuring that— (A)each child has a case plan designed to achieve placement in a safe setting that is the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available and in close proximity to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child, which— (i) if the child has been placed in a foster family home or child-care institution a substantial distance from the home of the parents of the child, or in a State different from the State in which such home is located, sets forth the reasons why such placement is in the best interests of the child, and (ii) if the child has been placed in foster care outside the State in which the home of the parents of the child is located, requires that, periodically, but not less frequently than every 12 months, a caseworker on the staff of the State agency of the State in which the home of the parents of the child is located, or of the State in which the child has been placed, visit such child in such home or institution and submit a report on such visit to the State agency of the State in which the home of the parents of the child is located, (B) the status of each child is reviewed periodically but no less frequently than once every six months by either a court or by administrative review (as defined in paragraph (6)) in order to determine the safety of the child the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to project a likely date by which the child may be returned to and safely maintained in the home or placed for adoption or legal guardianship, (C) with respect to each such child, procedural safeguards will be applied, among other things, to assure each child in foster care under the supervision of the State of a permanency hearing to be held, in a family or juvenile court or another court (including a tribal court) of competent jurisdiction, or by an administrative body appointed or approved by the court, no later than 12 months after the date the child is considered to have entered foster care (as determined under subparagraph (F)) (and not less frequently than every 12 months thereafter during the continuation of foster care), which hearing shall determine the permanency plan for the child that includes whether, and if applicable when, the child will be returned to the parent, placed for adoption and the State will file a petition for termination of parental rights, or referred for legal guardianship, or (in cases where the State agency has documented to the State court a compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return home, be referred for termination of parental rights, or be placed for adoption, with a fit and willing relative, or with a legal guardian) placed in another planned permanent living arrangement and, in the case of a child described in subparagraph (A)(ii), whether the out-of-State placement continues to be appropriate and in the best interests of the child, and, in the case of a child who has attained age 16, the services needed to assist the child to make the transition from foster care to independent living; and procedural safeguards shall also be applied with respect to parental rights pertaining to the removal of the child from the home of his parents, to a change in the child’s placement, and to any determination affecting visitation privileges of parents; (D) a child’s health and education record (as described in paragraph (1)(A)) is reviewed and updated, and supplied to the foster parent or foster care provider with whom the child is placed, at the time of each placement of the child in foster care; (E) in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or, if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law) or has made a determination that the parent has committed murder of another child of the parent, committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent, the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition), and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption, unless— (i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative; (ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan (which shall be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or (iii)the State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home, if reasonable efforts of the type described in section 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) of this title are required to be made with respect to the child; (F) a child shall be considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of— (i) the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect; or (ii) the date that is 60 days after the date on which the child is removed from the home; and (G) the foster parents (if any) of a child and any preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child are provided with notice of, and an opportunity to be heard in, any review or hearing to be held with respect to the child, except that this subparagraph shall not be construed to require that any foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative providing care for the child be made a party to such a review or hearing solely on the basis of such notice and opportunity to be heard. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). Initially, as noted above and as will be repeated herein, this Court does not sit to oversee New Jersey’s child welfare system to determine whether the implementation of case plans is “appropriate” or “successful.” See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 and 345, 117 S.Ct. 1353. This is especially true where “[wjhether a child has a plan satisfying [each] provision is as individual as each child” and “there is no way to measure the normal or average needs of a child in foster care.” Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F.Supp. 1297, 1309 (E.D.La.1991). Moreover, regardless of the detailed nature of the definitions of “case plan” and “case review system,” the statutory provisions relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their alleged right “to timely written case plans that contain mandate elements and to the implementation and review of these plans” are not so unambiguous so as to confer upon Plaintiffs a right enforceable under § 1983. See Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F.Supp. 308, 312 (D.N.H.1994) (holding that “plaintiff enjoy no enforceable rights” to “compel New Hampshire’s full implementation of the programs” under 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(B), the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), because the provision “places no direct obligation on the state”); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F.Supp. 320, 328 (E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that the language of § 627(a)(2)(B), the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), “examined in the context of the entire Adoption Act” does not “unambiguously confer an enforceable right on behalf of its beneficiaries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F.Supp. 1297, 1308-09 (E.D.La.1991) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(B), the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), and 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) “so vague and amorphous as to evade judicial enforcement” of plaintiffs’ claim for “case plans that address specific issues in their placements and care” because “[tjhere is no objective benchmark” against which compliance with these provisions can be measured). Finally, as discussed below in connection with Plaintiffs’ MPA claim, both parties have failed to note the important point, which hinders Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) with respect to case plans, that Congress specifically examined the numerous State plan elements required under 42 U.S.C. § 671 and determined that only one such required element confers a private right enforceable pursuant to § 1983. Specifically, in 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 674 by adding subsection (d) which explicitly provides that “[a]ny individual who is aggrieved by a violation of Section 671(a)(18) of this title by a State or other entity may bring an action seeking relief from the State or other entity in any United States district court.” 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3)(A) (emphasis added). That Congress recently chose to amend 42 U.S.C. § 674 to include a private right of action under § 1983 for a state or other entity’s failure to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18), but did not include the other various elements enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) and relied upon by Plaintiffs, is strong evidence that Congress did not intend these other various State plan elements in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) to confer rights enforceable pursuant to § 1983. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (noting that a court may look to “other specific evidence from the statute itself’ to determine whether § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action). Therefore, for this and the other reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim to “an enforceable written case plan and a case review system” under 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16), and 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) and (5) and an “enforceable right to implementation of case plan services” is dismissed. 3. right to placement in the least restrictive, most family-like setting Further, based upon the definition of “case review system” in 42 U.S.C. § 675(5), Plaintiffs allege that, “if defendants accept federal funds, they shall take steps necessary to ensure that each child in need of a foster care placement is placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting available, consistent with her best interests and individual needs.” Compl. at ¶ 64b. In this regard, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ “actions and inactions” deprived them of the right to “placement in the least restrictive, most family-like setting.” Id. at ¶ 404. Having already determined that 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), which incorporates the definition of “case review system” in 42 U.S.C. § 675(5), does not confer rights upon Plaintiffs enforceable pursuant to § 1983, it is not necessary to go further to determine whether 42 U.S.C. § 675(5), standing alone, confers a right upon Plaintiffs enforceable pursuant to § 1983. See B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D.Ill.1989) (noting “[i]t would be strange for Congress to create enforceable rights in the definitional section of a statute” and holding that while the “AAA creates an enforceable right to an individualized ‘case plan’ and ‘case review system,’ ... [bjeyond the narrow requirements of a case plan and case review system, the AAA does not impose on the state the sweeping duties alleged by plaintiffs” and specifically holding that “we do not believe Congress intended to create an enforceable individual right of placement in the least restrictive (most family-like) setting”). Moreover, it is important to note that several courts have rejected similar claims under § 1983 to enforce the right to placement in the least restrictive, most family-like setting because such a right is too vague and amorphous to be judicially enforceable. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 1531 (holding that “[i]t is difficult to know what is meant by providing ‘appropriate treatment’ in the ‘least restrictive’ setting”); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F.Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D.Ill.1989) (holding that the “right to be placed ‘in the least restrictive, most family like setting’ ... [is] amorphous and not subject to precise definition”) (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 1531). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii) and/or 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) to placement in the least restrictive, most family-like setting is dismissed. 4. right to nationally recommended professional standards Plaintiffs allege that the Adoption Assistance Act and “relevant regulations” require “that if defendants accept federal funds, they shall take the steps necessary to ensure that foster family homes and child care institutions are licensed, relicensed and operated in conformity with appropriate national standards.” Compl. at ¶ 64a. In this regard, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants’ “actions and inactions,” Plaintiffs are being deprived of their right “to placement in foster homes or facilities that conform to nationally recommended professional standards.” Id. at ¶ 404. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiffs are relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) in support of this right, this Court should agree with the number of courts that have held that because the Adoption Assistance Act and any relevant regulations do not specify any such national standards, § 671(a)(10) does not support such a right. See Def. Motion at p. 14 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs respond that § 671(a)(10) “refers explicitly to external, objective standards: ‘recommend standards of national organizations concerned with standards for such institutions or homes’ ” and that “[sjince such standards are routinely promulgated by national organizations such as the Child Welfare League of America, § 671(a)(10) is sufficiently clear to be enforceable.” P1.0pp. at p. 32. Defendants reply that the plain language of § 671(a)(10) does not allow the “state [to be] subject to suit in federal court,” as Plaintiffs have alleged, where “a single ‘foster family home’ or ‘child care institution’ is not in compliance with the state-promulgated standards.” Def. Reply at p. 6. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n order for a State to be eligible for payments under [42 U.S.C. § 670], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which — provides for the establishment or designation of a State authority ... which shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for foster family homes and child care institutions which are reasonably in accord with recommended standards of national organizations concerned with standards for such institutions or homes, including standards related to admission policies, safety, sanitation, and protection of civil rights, and provides that the standards so established shall be applied by the State to any foster family home or child care institution receiving funds under this part or part B of this subchapter.” Plaintiffs’ alleged right to “placement in foster homes or facilities that conform to nationally recommended professional standards” based upon 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) is too vague and amorphous under the Blessing test to be enforced pursuant § 1983. First, the very provision relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their claim “to placement in foster homes or facilities that conform to nationally recommended professional standards” has been flatly rejected as the basis for such a right enforceable under § 1983. See Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep’t of Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883, 889, 890 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that “[t]he language of § 671(a)(10) by itself does not support ... a cause of action [for a right to care in a foster home with standards reasonably in accord with those of national organizations]. It only references ‘standards of national organizations concerned with standards for such institutions or [foster] homes.’ That is the type of vague and amorphous language identified in Wilder ... and Wright ... that cannot be judicially enforced.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F.Supp. 320, 326-327 (E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that “ § 671(a)(10) fails to unambiguously confer upon [plaintiffs a private right of enforcement under this provision” because “[t]he language of this section does not confer upon [plaintiffs a ‘right’ to foster homes or institutions which are in accord with recommended standards of national organizations but clearly states that the state plan must provide for the designation of a state authority or authorities lohich shall establish and maintain such standards. Moreover, ‘reasonably in accord’ is as vague and ambiguous as ‘reasonable efforts’ under § 671(a)(15).”) (emphasis added); Doe v. Johnson, 1993 WL 50845, *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb.24, 1993) (dismissing plaintiffs action “to the extent that it seeks private relief for an alleged violation of § 671(a) of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act” because “the Act places its enforcement mechanism in hands other than those of private plaintiffs under § 1983”); Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F.Supp. 1297, 1310 (E.D.La.1991) (comparing “reasonably in accord with” language of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) with “reasonable efforts” language of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) and holding that the “provision requiring placement in foster homes and institutions that are ‘reasonably in accord with’ national standards is vague and unenforceable”). Moreover, as discussed above, that Congress recently chose to amend 42 U.S.C. § 674 to include a private right of action under § 1983 for a state or other entity’s failure to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18), but did not include the other various elements enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) and relied upon by Plaintiffs, is strong evidence that Congress did not intend these other various State plan elements in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) to confer rights enforceable pursuant to § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) for “placement in foster homes or facilities that conform to nationally recommended professional standards” is dismissed.. 5. right to adequate information system Plaintiffs allege that the Adoption Assistance Act requires Defendants, “as a condition to receiving federal funds, to implement and operate in New Jersey an information system from which the status, demographic characteristics, location and goal of every foster child can readily be determined.” Compl. at ¶ 63c. In this regard, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants’ “actions and inactions,” Plaintiffs are being deprived of their right “to receive services in a child welfare system with an adequate information system to permit decision-makers to make fully informed choices in the children’s best interests.” Id. at ¶ 404. In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that numerous courts have- rejected such a right to an- “information system” to the extent Plaintiffs are relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B) in support of this right. See Def. Motion at p. 21 (citing Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F.Supp. 303) (D.N.H. 1994); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F.Supp. 320 (E.D.Pa.1993)). Plaintiffs respond that the decisions relied upon by Defendants are “no longer good law” for various reasons, including Suter and the 1994 amendment to the Social Security Act. See P1.0pp. at p. 35. Defendants reply that, while cases such as Eric L. and Baby Neal may have been decided prior to Suter and the 1994 amendment to the Social Security Act, such cases should still be considered for their general holdings that this section of the Adoption Assistance Act “simply does not demonstrate a congressional intent to benefit individual children.” Def. Reply at p. 7. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B) provides, in relevant part, that “[ejach plan for child welfare services under [42 U.S.C. § 622(a) ] shall ... provide assurances that the State- ... is operating, to the satisfaction of the Secretary — a statewide information system from which can be readily determined the status, demographic characteristics, location, and goals for the placement of every child who is ... in foster care.” 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(i). Plaintiffs’ alleged right to “receive services in a child welfare system with an adequate information system to permit decision-makers to make fully informed choices in the children’s best interests” based upon 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(i) is too vague and amorphous under the Blessing test to be enforced ünder § 1983. First, this Court does not sit to oversee New Jersey’s child welfare system and determine whether a state information system “operating, to the satisfaction of the Secretary,” is also “adequate.” See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 and 345, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (noting that a request by plaintiffs for a “broad injunction requiring the director of Arizona’s child support agency to achieve ‘substantial compliance’ ” and “[attributing the deficiencies in the State’s program primarily to staff shortages and other structural defects” inappropriately “invited the District Court to oversee every aspect of Arizona’s Title IV-D program” and holding that enforcement of “such an undefined standard” as the right to a “sufficient staff’ would “certainly ‘strain judicial competence’ ”) (citation omitted). Moreover, similar attempts under § 1983 to enforce the right to information systems provided for in federal funding statutes have been flatly rejected. For example, in Blessing, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act laid out “detailed requirements for the State’s data processing system.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 344, 117 S.Ct. 1353. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 654a and implementing regulations required “[ajmong other things, [that] this system must sort information into standardized data elements specified by the Secretary; transmit information electronically to the State’s AFDC system to monitor family eligibility for financial assistance; maintain the date necessary to meet federal reporting requirements; and provide for the electronic transfer of funds for purposes of income withholding and interstate collections.” Id. (citations omitted). Despite the fact that this provision and its implementing regulations “may ultimately benefit individuals who are eligible for Title IV-D services,” the Blessing Court found that such benefit was only achieved “indirectly,” and held that “these complex standards do not give rise to individualized rights to computer services.” Id. at 344 and 345, 117 S.Ct. 1353. Indeed, the Blessing Court held that the provision for computer services did “not fit our traditional three criteria for identifying statutory rights,” but instead, was “simply intended to improve overall efficiency of the States’ child support enforcement scheme.” Id. Finally, the very provision relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their claim “to receive services in a child welfare system with an adequate information system to permit decision-makers to make fully informed choices in the children’s best interests” has been flatly rejected as a basis for the “right to an information system” enforceable under § 1983. See Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F.Supp. 1297, 1305-06 (E.D.La.1991) (holding that the “information system [under 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(i) ] clearly serves only an administrative tool and is not intended as a benefit to the putative plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs have no enforceable right to an information system.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(i) for an “adequate information system” is dismissed. For all these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the Fourth Count of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ii. MPA As noted, some of the general code provisions cited by Plaintiffs in support of their claims under the Adoption Assistance Act include those provisions identified by Plaintiffs in support of their claims under the federal Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, as amended by the Interethnic Adoption Provisions of 1996. In this regard, Plaintiff allege that the MPA “requires that public agencies engage in aggressive efforts to recruit potential foster and adoptive parents who reflect the racial and ethnic diversity of the children for whom such foster and adoptive placements are needed.” Compl. at ¶ 69. Further, Plaintiffs allege that the MPA “prohibits ... [the denial to] any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent on the basis of the race, color or national origin of the child or adoptive or foster parent and prohibits the delay or denial of the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care on that same basis.” Id. Plaintiffs specifically cite 42 U.S.C. §§ 622(b)(9), 671(a)(18), and 674(d) in support of their claims under the MPA and allege that due to Defendants’ “actions and inactions,” Plaintiffs are “being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the [MPA],” including, but not limited to, “the right not to have adoptive or foster placements delayed or denied on the basis of the race, color or national origin of the foster or adoptive parent or of the child.” Id. at ¶¶ 39 and 407. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(9) provides that, in order to be eligible for the federal funding provided in 42 U.S.C. § 620 to states for “establishing, extending, and strengthening child welfare services,” see 42 U.S.C. § 620(a), each plan for child welfare services developed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 622(a) shall “provide for the diligent recruitment of potential foster and adoptive families that reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of the children in the State for whom such foster and adoptive homes are needed.” Section 671(a)(18) provides that, in order to be eligible for federal funding provided in 42 U.S.C. § 670 to states for “foster care and transitional living” and “adoption assistance for children with special needs.” each State plan for foster care and adoption assistance developed pursuant to Section 670 shall provide that “neither the State nor any other entity in the State that receives funds from the Federal Government and is involved in adoption or foster care placements” may “deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, on the basis of the race, color or national origin of the person, or of the child, involved,” or “delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care” on that same basis. Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 674(d) provides that if a state is found to have failed to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18), “the Secretary shall reduce the amount otherwise payable to the State under this part ... until the program is found ... to have implemented a corrective action plan with respect to such violation....” 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(1). With respect to these provisions, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a claim under the MPA because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that: i) they have been “injured by the purported lack of adoptive parents of all races;” or ii) there has been discrimination in foster care placements or they have been injured as a result of discrimination in foster care placements. See Def. Motion at p. 25. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs cannot stand in the shoes of the Secretary and demand a reduction in the amounts otherwise payable to the State for child welfare services. Id. Plaintiffs counter that they have alleged a “quintessential violation” of the MPA and provide by way of example the placement of Marco and Juan C., “who are Hispanic, [and] were placed in foster home with foster parents that speak almost exclusively Spanish, despite the fact that the boys speak only English.” PI. Opp. at p. 43. Given this, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made a foster placement decision “based on an ethnic ‘match’ between Juan and Marco and the foster parents.” Id. Defendants reply that the sections of the MPA relied upon by Plaintiffs specifically' prohibit “delay or denial of placement becaüse of race or ethnicity.” and Plaintiffs have not alleged that Juan and Marco C., or any other Plaintiffs, have experienced any delay or denial of foster or adoptive placement because of race or ethnicity. See Def. Reply at p. 10. With respect to 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)(A), which requires that a State plan provide that the State may not “deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive parent or a foster parent, on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the person, or of the child, involved,” Plaintiffs do not assert a claim on behalf of any person who was denied the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent because of race, color, or national origin. See Compl. at ¶407 (asserting claim on behalf of _“the"plaintiff children .. 1 being deprived of ... the right not to have adoptive or foster placements delayed or denied on the basis of race, color or national origin of the foster or adoptive parent or of the child”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs fail to allege a cause of action on behalf of any person who was denied the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent because of race, color, or national origin, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. However, with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)(B),- which requires that a State plan provide that the State may not “delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved,” an examination of the language and structure of Part E of Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Social Security Act compels a determination that Plaintiffs may assert a right under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)(B) pursuant to § 1988. Specifically, as noted above, 42 U.S.C. § 674(d) explicitly provides that “[a]ny individual who is aggrieved by a violation of Section 671(a)(18) of this title by a State or other entity may bring an action seeking relief from the State or other entity in any United States district court.” 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3)(A). Thus, while it may present a statute of limitations question to be addressed in the future, to the extent Plaintiffs allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)(B) on behalf of Marco and Juan C., which requires that a State plan provide that the State may not “delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved,” under § 1988, and as permitted in 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(3)(A), Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Therefore, for these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part to the extent as noted herein with respect to the Seventh Count of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. b. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Similar to their claim