Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS KAREN L. STROMBOM, United States Magistrate Judge. This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 56. The parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 and Local Rule MJR 13. After having reviewed plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, defendants’ response to that motion, plaintiffs’ reply thereto and the remaining record—including the parties’ supplemental briefing regarding standing—the Court finds that plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be denied, and that summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ have brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging RCW 42.17.200 (the section of Washington’s campaign finance, lobbying and public disclosure laws, RCW Chapter 42.17, dealing with “grassroots lobbying”) and RCW 42.17.160 (the section of RCW Chapter 42.17 setting forth certain exemptions from Washington’s lobbying registration and reporting requirements) and regulations issued by the Washington State Public Disclosure Commission (“PDC”) implementing and enforcing those provisions, are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to plaintiffs. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the above statutory provisions and regulations: (1) violate the First Amendment right of anonymous political and free speech, the right of association, the right to petition the government, and the right against prior restraint; (2) that they are overbroad and void for vagueness; and (3) that they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of a declaratory order, as well as both a preliminary and a permanent injunction. I. Washington’s Public Disclosure Laws Initiative 276 was “overwhelmingly approved” by Washington voters in 1972, receiving 72% of the vote. ECF #22, Exhibit 1, The History and Intent of Initiative 276, David Cuillier, David Dean and Dr. Susan Dente Ross (issued May 4, 2004, and updated August 24, 2004), pp. 1, 4. The Initiative also gathered “a far greater number of signatures than it needed to be placed on the ballot.” ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Jolene Unsold, p. 4. It “required disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, lobbying expenditures, and the personal affairs of various officials.” ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, p. 2; see also ECF # 22, Exhibit 1, p. 1. Initiative 276 led to what eventually became RCW Chapter 42.17, Washington’s campaign finance, lobbying and public disclosure laws. See ECF # 22, Exhibit 1, p. 1. It also created the PDC to enforce those laws. ECF # 25-2, Exhibit 1, p. 2; Voters Education Committee v. Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, 161 Wash.2d 470, 479, 166 P.3d 1174 (2007). “[T]he genesis of Initiative 276 occurred not just because of concerns about disclosure of money raised and spent on candidate campaigns and public records disclosure, but also a strong interest by the public in the disclosure of money raised and spent on legislative lobbying and ballot measure campaigns to enact legislation.” ECF # 25-2, Exhibit 1, p. 3. “The overall thrust” of Initiative 276 “was the people’s right to know, and to enable citizens to ‘follow the money’ in all sorts of campaigns” in Washington. Id. The paragraph that began the statement for Initiative 276 read as follows: Our whole concept of democracy is based on an informed and involved citizenry. Trust and confidence in governmental institutions is at an all time low. High on the list of causes of this citizen distrust are secrecy in government and the influence of private money on governmental decision making. Initiative 276 brings all this out into the open for citizens and voters to judge for themselves. ECF # 22, Exhibit 1, p. 2. The official declaration of policy contained in RCW Chapter 42.17 expressly states in relevant part as well that it is “the public policy of the State of Washington” that “lobbying contributions and expenditures be fully disclosed to the public and that secrecy is to be avoided,” and that “the public’s right to know of ... lobbying ... far outweighs any right that that these matters remain secret and private.” RCW 42.17.010(1), (10). The declaration of policy goes on to state again in relevant part that: The provisions of [RCW Chapter 42.17] shall be liberally construed to promote complete disclosure of all information respecting ... lobbying ... and full access to public records as to assure continuing public confidence of fairness of elections and governmental processes, and so as to assure that the public interest will be fully protected---- RCW 42.17.010. However, “[i]n promoting such complete disclosure,” the declaration of policy further provides that RCW Chapter 42.17: ... [S]hall be enforced so as to insure that the information disclosed will not be misused for arbitrary and capricious purposes and to insure that all persons reporting under [RCW Chapter 42.17] will be protected from harassment and unfounded allegations based on information they have freely disclosed. Id. Specifically with respect to “grass roots lobbying,” RCW 42.17.200 provides in relevant part that: Any person who has made expenditures, not reported by a registered lobbyist ... or by a candidate or political committee ... exceeding *five hundred dollars in the aggregate within any three-month period or exceeding *two hundred dollars in the aggregate within any one-month period[] in presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which is intended, designed, or calculated primarily to influence legislation shall be required to register and report, as provided in subsection (2) of this section, as a sponsor of a grass roots lobbying campaign. RCW 42.17.200(1). The term “legislation” is defined to mean: ... [B]ills, resolutions, motions, amendments, nominations, and other matters pending or proposed in either house of the state legislature, and includes any other matter that may be the subject of action by either house or any committee of the legislature and all bills and resolutions that, having passed both houses, are pending approval by the governor. RCW 42.17.020(30). In regard to registration and reporting requirements, RCW 42.17.200(2) provides in relevant part: ... Within thirty days after becoming a sponsor of a grass roots lobbying campaign, the sponsor shall register by filing with the commission a registration statement, in such detail as the commission shall prescribe, showing: (a) The sponsor’s name, address, and business or occupation, and, if the sponsor is not an individual, the names, addresses, and titles of the controlling persons responsible for managing the sponsor’s affairs; (b) The names, addresses, and business or occupation of all persons organizing and managing the campaign, or hired to assist the campaign, including any public relations or advertising firms participating in the campaign, and the terms of compensation for all such persons; (c) The names and addresses of each person contributing twenty-five dollars or more to the campaign, and the aggregate amount contributed; (d) The purpose of the campaign, including the specific legislation, rules, rates, standards, or proposals that are the subject matter of the campaign; (e) The totals of all expenditures made or incurred to date on behalf of the campaign, which totals shall be segregated according to financial category, including but not limited to the following: Advertising, segregated by media, and in the case of large expenditures (as provided by rule of the [PDC]), by outlet; contributions; entertainment, including food and refreshments; office expenses including rent and the salaries and wages paid for staff and secretarial assistance, or the proportionate amount thereof paid or incurred for lobbying campaign activities; consultants; and printing and mailing expenses. Other reporting requirements apply as well: (3) Every sponsor who has registered under this section shall file monthly reports with the [PDC], which reports shall be filed by the tenth day of the month for the activity during the preceding month. The reports shall update the information contained in the sponsor’s registration statement and in prior reports and shall show contributions received and totals of expenditures made during the month, in the same manner as provided for in the registration statement. (4) When the campaign has been terminated, the sponsor shall file a notice of termination with the final monthly report, which notice shall state the totals of all contributions and expenditures made on behalf of the campaign, in the same manner as provided for in the registration statement. RCW 42.17.200. On the other hand, certain persons are made exempt from the registration and reporting requirements of RCW 42.17.200. These persons include— with certain exceptions not relevant here— the following: (1) Persons who limit their lobbying activities to appearing before public sessions of committees of the legislature, or public hearings of state agencies; (2) Activities by lobbyists or other persons whose participation has been solicited by an agency ...; (3) News or feature reporting activities and editorial comment by working members of the press, radio, or television and the publication or dissemination thereof by a newspaper, book publisher, regularly published periodical, radio station, or television station; (4) Persons who lobby without compensation or other consideration for acting as a lobbyist: PROVIDED, Such person makes no expenditure for or on behalf of any member of the legislature or elected official or public officer or employee of the state of Washington in connection with such lobbying.... [] (5) Persons who restrict their lobbying activities to no more than four days or parts thereof during any three-month period and whose total expenditures during such three-month period for or on behalf of any one or more members of the legislature or state elected officials or public officers or employees of the state of Washington in connection with such lobbying do not exceed twenty-five dollars ... []; (6) The governor; (7) The lieutenant governor; (8) ... members of the legislature; (9) ... persons employed by the legislature for the purpose of aiding in the preparation or enactment of legislation or the performance of legislative duties; (10) Elected officials, and officers and employees of any agency reporting [with respect to legislative and lobbying activities]. RCW 42.17.160. RCW Chapter 42.17 also contains penalties for failure to comply with the requisite registration and reporting requirements. For example, RCW 42.17.390 provides in relevant part that: (2) If any lobbyist or sponsor of any grass roots lobbying campaign violates any of the provisions of [RCW Chapter 42.17], his or her registration may be revoked or suspended and he or she may be enjoined from receiving compensation or making expenditures for lobbying ... (3) Any person who violates any of the provisions of [RCW Chapter 42.17] may be subject to a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars for each such violation.... (4) Any person who fails to file a properly completed statement or report within the time required by [RCW Chapter 42.17] may be subject to a civil penalty of ten dollars per day for each day each such delinquency continues. (5) Any person who fails to report a contribution or expenditure as required by [RCW Chapter 42.17] may be subject to a civil penalty equivalent to the amount not reported as required. (6) The court may enjoin any person to prevent the doing of any act herein prohibited, or to compel the performance of any act required herein. The PDC itself may issue an order requiring any person who violates RCW Chapter 42.17 “to cease and desist from the activity that constitutes [the] violation and in addition, or alternatively, may impose one or more of the remedies provided in RCW 42.17.390(2) through (5).” RCW 42.17.395(4). On the other hand, “[n]o individual penalty assessed by the [PDC] may exceed” $1,700, and “in any case where multiple violations are involved in a single complaint ..., the maximum aggregate penalty may not exceed” $4,200. Id. Washington’s Attorney General and other state “prosecuting authorities” also “may bring civil actions in the name of the state for any appropriate civil remedy, including but not limited to the special remedies provided in RCW 42.17.390.” RCW 42.17.400(1). Under certain circumstances, a citizen of Washington may bring a private cause of action for failure to comply with RCW Chapter 42.17. See RCW 42.17.400(4). Penalties for violations that may be assessed under this statutory provision include the following: In any action brought under this section, the court may award to the state all costs of investigation and trial, including a reasonable attorney’s fee to be fixed by the court. If the violation is found to have been intentional, the amount of the judgment, which shall for this purpose include the costs, may be trebled as punitive damages.... RCW 42.17.400(5). II. The Public Disclosure Commission As noted above, the PDC “was created through the passage of Initiative 276 in 1972,” which was made “effective in 1973” and “codified in RCW Chapter 42.17,” and which “the PDC implements and enforces.” ECF # 25, ¶ 5. According to Doug Ellis, the PDC’s current Interim Executive Director, “[providing information to the public is a core mission of the PDC,” as “it enables the public to ‘follow the money’ with respect to campaigns and lobbying.” Id. at ¶ 10. “All reports filed with the PDC disclosing campaign, lobbying and other activities ... are public records,” and “[t]he PDC makes this information available to the public for inspection and copying.” Id. at ¶¶ at 10-11; see also RCW 42.17.440 (providing that all statements and reports filed under RCW Chapter 42.17 are to be treated as public records, and are to be made available for public inspection and copying). In addition, in regard to such public access: Before the mid-1990s, all reports were filed on paper. Members of the public, and especially the media, would ask the PDC to provide them copies of the paper reports. Today, thousands of campaign finance and lobbying reports are filed electronically and made available on the PDC’s website ... In addition, paper reports filed by ... lobbyists are scanned and typically made available on the website within four hours of receipt by PDC staff and within 15 minutes for electronically filed reports.... ... As a result, information from filed reports is quickly available online to the voters and to the public. The public can then use these reports to “follow the money” in campaigns and lobbying and also conduct their own analysis. ECF # 25 at ¶¶ at 11-12. Indeed, making such information available to the public electronically was mandated by the Washington State Legislature itself: By February 1, 2000, the [PDC] shall operate a web site or contract for the operation of a web site that allows access to reports, copies of reports, or copies of data and information submitted in reports, filed with the [PDC] under RCW 42.17.040, 42.17.065, 42.17.080, 42.17.100, and 42.17.105. By January 1, 2001, the web site shall allow access to reports, copies of reports, or copies of data and information submitted in reports, filed with the [PDC] under RCW 42.17.150, 42.17.170, 42.17.175, and 42.17.180. In addition, the [PDC] shall attempt to make available via the web site other public records submitted to or generated by the [PDC] that are required by [RCW Chapter 42.17] to be available for public use or inspection.[] RCW 42.17.367; ECF #25, ¶ 15. The legislature also has “directed that filing of reports with the PDC be made available through an electronic means,” and that “the PDC shall make available an electronic copy of ... reporting forms at no charge.” ECF # 25, ¶ 16; see also RCW 42.17.369; RCW 42.17.3691. With further respect to public access, “information in lobbying reports filed with the PDC is available to the public” in the following ways: • By Accessing the PDC Website. ... [A] person can view and copy lobbying reports filed with the PDC, including grassroots lobbying reports. There is no charge for accessing the website, or printing documents from it. • By Contacting the PDC by Telephone or Email. ... [A] person can also request copies of lobbying reports to be mailed to them, or emailed to them. Pursuant to [RCW 42.17.362], the PDC operates a toll-free telephone number to assist in providing easier access to the PDC by the public.... [The PDC’s] telephone numbers and email address are posted on [its] website. • By Visiting [the PDC’s] Office. ... [A] person can visit the PDC’s sole office location in downtown Olympia and ask for a copy of any filed form, and [the PDC] will provide it at [its] front desk. [The PDC’s] street address is posted on [its] website. [The PDC] also make a computer terminal and printer available to the public in [its] front lobby, so a person can search for and print reports or other information available on [its] website .... ECF # 25, ¶ 21. In addition, the filer of a report who contacts the PDC, can receive both “formal and informal assistance” provided either “by PDC staff[, including via telephone and e-mail,] or, depending upon the question, by” the PDC itself. Id. at ¶24. Training provided by the PDC “is also available.” Id. If “PDC staff are unable to answer a question or the answer is not readily available on the [PDC’s] website, and the person inquiring seeks direction from the [PDC],” that person also may submit “an informal advisory opinion request, a formal declaratory order request ..., a formal request for guidance through issuance of an interpretive statement ..., or a formal rulemaking petition.” Id. at ¶ 25; see also RCW 34.05.230(1), 34.05.240, 34.05.330; WAC 390-12-250, 390-12-255. The PDC by statute also may “respond on a case-by-case basis to ‘modification requests’ ” seeking “a modification or suspension of the reporting requirements.” Ellis Declaration, ¶ 26; see also RCW 42.17.370(10). To register and report as a grassroots lobbying campaign sponsor, a two-page form (the “L6 form”), which is available on the PDC’s website, must be filed with the PDC. See ECF # 25, ¶¶ 38-39. The following information is required to be disclosed on that form: • The sponsor’s name, address; • Topics of legislation about which the campaign is conducted (including bill, rule, rate, standard number if any); • Principal officers; • Who is organizing or managing the campaign (name, address, and occupation or business, and terms of compensation); • Expenditures made or incurred in the campaign (radio, TV, newspapers, magazines, brochures, signs, printing and mailing, consultants, public relations, office expense, travel, salaries, contributions, entertainment, other expenses); • Total expenditures; and • Contributors giving more than $25. Id. at ¶ 40. The L6 form also “provides instructions on who should file, the filing deadline, where to file (including [the] PDC address), and the PDC’s telephone numbers[,] including [its] toll-free number.” Id. at ¶ 41. Further, “guidance and instructions on how to file ... the L6 form ... is also available on [the PDC’s] website,” as is additional information concerning grass roots lobbying such as: • Links to further resources for ... filing requirements, manuals and brochures, ... electronic filing options, and training schedules ...; • Links to lobbying instruction manuals • A flow chart showing when a grassroots lobbyist is required to file a disclosure report ...; • Information on the filing deadlines for grassroots lobbying ...; and • How to contact the PDC by telephone or email, plus a description of the agency’s office hours ... Id. at ¶ 48. Links to RCW Chapter 42.17 and WAC Title 390—which contain the rules issued by the PDC—are provided on the PDC’s website as well, as are “a database of enforcement cases involving various sections of RCW 42.17, ... a summary of the cases and outcomes” and since the year 2000, “a summary of cases involving alleged violations of RCW 42.17.200.” Id. In addition, the PDC “issues declaratory orders upon request,” copies of which “are available to the public and filers on the PDC’s website,” as are scanned copies of L6 forms that are filed with the PDC. Id. at ¶¶ 51, 55, 58. III. Plaintiffs Many Cultures, One Message and Conservative Enthusiasts Plaintiff Many Cultures, One Message (“MCOM”) describes itself as “an unincorporated, nonprofit volunteer association based in Seattle.” ECF # 1, Civil Rights Complaint, ¶ 10. It has no “bylaws, articles of incorporation, or any other governing documents.” Id. at ¶ 28. MCOM is not a candidate for political office or a political committee, and does not make any expenditures on behalf of such candidates or committees or any registered lobbyist. Id. at ¶ 39. MCOM “does not pay any registered lobbyist to act on its behalf,” nor does it “expend money on behalf of any state officials.” Id. MCOM also does not reimburse its “members” for expenditures made in regard to contacting state officials or legislators, and while MCOM itself is “not ... compensated for its efforts,” it reimburses “its unpaid volunteers for expenditures made on MCOM’s behalf.” Id. at ¶¶ 41-42. MCOM is “dedicated to preserving the diverse and vibrant neighborhoods of Southeast Seattle.” Id. at ¶ 10. More specifically, it was “formed to resist efforts by the City of Seattle to use Washington’s Community Renewal Law (CRL) ... to declare portions of Southeast Seattle a ‘Community Renewal Area,’ ” which “would have given the City [of Seattle] the power to take, via eminent domain, private homes and businesses in the area to transfer to private entities.” Id. at ¶ 29. MCOM “successfully mobilized public opposition to [the City of Seattle’s CRL efforts] and the City halted its efforts in 2007.” Id. at ¶ 30. Those efforts included distributing fliers, organizing community meetings, contacting “City agencies,” and “otherwise informing citizens about how to oppose use of the CRL in Southeast Seattle.” Id. at ¶31. Since “these efforts were directed largely at City officials regarding a City proposal,” though, MCOM “was not required to register under” RCW 42.17.200. Id. at ¶ 32. MCOM also states in relevant part as follows in regard to its prior efforts/activities: 33. In the 2010 session of the Washington [State] Legislature, legislators introduced bills to reform the CRL and to prohibit eminent domain for economic development. 34. Similar bills had been considered in the 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 sessions of the Legislature. These bills did not pass. 35. In 2009, a bill promoting Transit Oriented Development (TOD) was introduced in the Legislature. 36. MCOM was concerned that TOD would rely on use of the CRL. 37. Prior to the 2010 Legislative session, MCOM anticipated the need to mobilize local residents and business owners to contact their legislators and the Governor to (i) urge reform of the CRL and eminent domain laws, and (ii) ■to reject any TOD bill that did not foreclose reliance on the CRL. MCOM anticipated that a successful effort to promote its message would require expenditures of at least $1[,]000 in three months if these bills progressed. 38. The bills about which MCOM intended to mobilize grassroots activism in the 2010 session of the Washington [State] Legislature died in their respective committees by January 27, 2010. Id. at ¶¶ 33-38. With respect to future activities, MCOM goes on to state in relevant part: 40. MCOM anticipates communicating with people who are not its members regarding eminent domain abuse. 41. MCOM ... will not be compensated for its efforts. 42. ... Although MCOM members may also contact state officials and legislators, they ... will not be reimbursed for any expenditure related thereto. 43. MCOM anticipates that [Legislation reforming the CRL and implementing TOD will be considered by future sessions of the Legislature. 45. MCOM will seek to develop support for eminent domain reform and against the implementation of TOD premised on a use of the CRL in the coming months and during the 2011 Legislative session and beyond. Id. at ¶¶ 40-43, 45. Plaintiff Red State Politics, d/b/a “Conservative Enthusiasts” (“CE”) describes itself as a “501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation” and/or “volunteer organization” registered “under the Internal Revenue Code,” and is based in Seattle. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 55. It is “run by unpaid volunteers,” has “no employees” and is “dedicated to educating the public about the benefits of lower taxes, less regulation, and smaller government.” Id. In terms of past activities, CE states it “has advanced its political goals by (1) speaking with elected officials; (2) establishing a public website; and (3) hosting monthly meetings and speakers about public policy issues.” Id. at ¶ 58. CE further states it “has not spent $500 in the aggregate in any one month or $1,000 in the aggregate in any three months on presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which was intended, designed, or calculated primarily to influence legislation, as those terms are defined in” RCW 42.17.020. Id. at ¶ 56. CE states it “anticipates ... that in future sessions of the [Washington State] legislature, legislators will seek to raise taxes, increase regulation, and grow the size of the State government,” and “wants to take an active role in opposing these efforts, including urging its supporters to contact state officials about these issues.” Id. at ¶¶ 56-57. Specifically with respect to future activities: 59. As it grows, [CE] plans to take the following additional actions to advance its goals: (1) establish an electronic contact system with interested individuals; (2) encourage individuals to send letters and e-mails to state officials; (3) create a database to leverage resources and effectively manage its contacts; (4) mobilize and educate its members and the public about legislation; (5) run advocacy ads in direct response to political activity by opposing groups; (6) hire several staff members to support its efforts; (7) further develop its website to assist with its education and advocacy efforts; and (8) participate in strategic litigation efforts. 60. It will solicit contributions and all contributions are and will be placed in a general fund. 61. [CE] anticipates that if its ability to engage in advocacy were not affected by operation of [RCW] 42.17.200, it would spend at least $500 in the aggregate in one month or $1,000 in aggregate in three months organizing efforts regarding these initiatives. Id. at ¶¶ 59-61. Similar to MCOM: 62. [CE] is not a candidate or a political committee and no registered lobbyist, candidate, or political committee has or will report any expenditures made by [CE]. [CE] does not pay any registered lobbyist to act on its behalf and does not endorse political candidates. It does not make any expenditures on behalf of state officials. 63. [CE] intends to communicate with people who are not members of [CE] about its legislative initiatives. [CE] reimburses its volunteers for expenditures made on [CE’s] behalf. Although its members may make contact with state officials concerning speaking engagements and pending legislation, such volunteers will not be reimbursed for any expenses incurred. [CE] will not be paid for its political activities. Id. at ¶¶ 62-63. IV. Plaintiffs’ Involvement with Washington’s Laws Governing Grassroots Lobbying and the Public Disclosure Commission Sometime between April and August 2009, “an Institute for Justice[] representative met with” CE “to discuss Washington State’s grassroots lobbying requirements.” ECF # 31-1, Exhibit 11, Defendants’ First Set of Requests for Admission, ¶ 20. Included in the agenda for an August 5, 2009 meeting between CE and IJ was discussing “[a]ffiliating with a litigation effort that seeks to overturn some State and National legislations that erodes [sic] participation and oversight of our governance.” Id. at ¶ 22. It is not clear whether CE was planning to challenge Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying prior to its first contact with IJ, but no evidence in the record indicates it was. See ECF # 24, Exhibit 6, Deposition of Mark Sussman at 50. For its part, MCOM was not aware of Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying until informed thereof by the IJ. See ECF # 24, Exhibit 11, Declaration of Patricia Murakami at 14, 21. Plaintiffs’ claim in their complaint that they reviewed “the agency materials concerning grassroots lobbying on the PDC’s website, but were unable to determine if the statutes applied to them.” ECF # 1, ¶ 74. Neither MCOM or CE, though, requested any of the following from the PDC, although, as noted above, they could have done so: • Training on reporting grassroots lobbying; • An informal advisory opinion, an interpretive statement or a rulemaking petition; • A modification or suspension of the grassroots lobbying reporting requirements; or • A rulemaking petition seeking to increase the monetary threshold reporting amounts. See ECF #25, ¶¶ 24-26, 35, 49-50, 69. Nor had MCOM or CE prior to the filing of their petition for a declaratory order, discussed in greater detail below, “contacted PDC staff indicating any confusion or uncertainty” on their part regarding their filing under Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying. Id. at ¶ 68. On December 3, 2009, plaintiffs filed a petition for a declaratory order with the PDC. See ECF # 1, ¶ 75; ECF # 25-3, Exhibit 21. While plaintiffs were given a “draft” of the petition to see “perhaps ahead of time,” and although it was prepared for them and filed on their behalf, the idea for pursuing that course of action “more or less” came on the legal advice IJ provided. ECF # 22, Exhibit 6 at 58-59; see also ECF # 22, Exhibit 11 at 26. Indeed, the first contact the PDC had with plaintiffs was through the filing of the petition by IJ legal counsel, not plaintiffs themselves. See ECF # 25, ¶ 71; see also ECF # 28, Declaration of Lori Anderson, ¶ 10, ECF # 29, Declaration of Tony Perkins, ¶ 7. The petition states in relevant part: Question the Declaratory Order Is To Answer: Assuming [MCOM and CE] engage in the activities described below, are MCOM and CE required to (i) register with the [PDC], and (ii) file monthly statements, pursuant to RCW 42.17.200? Statement of Facts Which Raise the Question: Our clients hereby state the following facts regarding their organizations and activities. 1. MCOM. MCOM is an unincorporated group dedicated to preserving the diverse and vibrant neighborhoods of Southeast Seattle. MCOM was initially formed to combat efforts by the City of Seattle to use Washington’s [CRL] ... to declare portions of Southeast Seattle a Community Renewal Area and authorize the taking of private homes and businesses for transfer to private entities. MCOM successfully mobilized public opposition to this and the City halted its efforts to use the CRL in 2007. In the past, MCOM has not spent $500 in the aggregate in any one month or $1,000 in the aggregate in any three months on presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which was intended, designed, or calculated to influence legislation, as those terms are defined in RCW 42.17.020. However, MCOM anticipates that, in the coming session of the Legislature, a bill will be introduced to substantially reform the CRL. MCOM also anticipates that a bill promoting Transit Oriented Development (TOD) will also be introduced in the coming session and MCOM is concerned that such development may be premised on use of the CRL. For these reasons, MCOM anticipates mobilizing the residents and business owners of Southeast Seattle to contact their legislators and the Governor to urge them to support reform of the CRL and to stop any TOD bill that relies upon the CRL. MCOM anticipates it will spend at least $500 in the aggregate in one month or $1,000 in aggregate in three months organizing efforts regarding these Legislative initiatives. MCOM is not a candidate or a political committee and anticipates that no registered lobbyist, candidate, or political committee will report any expenditures made by MCOM on this effort. MCOM does not pay any registered lobbyist to act on its behalf. It anticipates communicating with people who are not members of MCOM regarding these legislative initiatives. MCOM will reimburse volunteers for expenditures made on MCOM’s behalf. MCOM anticipates that its volunteers will each spend more than four days or parts thereof during any three month period and that its expenditures will exceed $25. MCOM will not be paid for its efforts. 2. CE. CE is a 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to educating the public regarding the benefits of lower taxes, less regulation, smaller government, and strong national defense. In the past, CE has not spent $500 in the aggregate in any one month or $1,000 in the aggregate in any three months on presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which was intended, designed, or calculated primarily to influence legislation, as those terms are defined in RCW 42.17.020. However, CE anticipates that, in the coming session of the Legislature, numerous bills will be introduced to raise taxes, increase regulation, and grow the size of the State government. CE anticipates changing the nature of its organization to allow it to take a more active role in opposing these Legislative efforts, including contacting people on its email list and visitors to its website and urging them to contact state officials regarding these issues. CE anticipates it will spend at least $500 in the aggregate in one month or $1,000 in aggregate in three months organizing efforts regarding these Legislative initiatives. CE is not a candidate or a political committee and anticipates that no registered lobbyist, candidate, or political committee will report any expenditures made by CE on this effort. CE does not pay any registered lobbyist to act on its behalf. It anticipates communicating with people who are not members of CE regarding these legislative initiatives. CE reimburses volunteers for expenditures made on CE’s behalf. CE anticipates that its volunteers will each spend more than four days or parts thereof during any three month period and that its expenditures will exceed $25. CE will not be paid for its efforts. Uncertainty Necessitating Resolution Exists: It [sic] unclear whether MCOM or CE must register as sponsors of a grassroots lobbying campaign under RCW 42.17.200. In that regard, each organization is uncertain whether any of the exemptions to registration contained in RCW 42.17.160 would apply to their anticipated activities, specifically the exemption for uncompensated lobbying contained in RCW 42.17.160(4). An Actual Controversy Arises from Such Uncertainty: MCOM and CE do not wish to register and submit monthly reports as sponsors of a grassroots lobbying campaign. Neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes to report, or otherwise make public, the names, addresses, or titles of the controlling persons responsible for managing their respective ... affairs or organizing and managing the[ir] respective ... campaigns. Neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes to report, or otherwise make public, the names and addresses of people or organizations contributing more than $25 to their efforts. Neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes to report, or otherwise make public, any expenditures made by such organizations in seeking to effectuate political change. This Uncertainty Adversely Affects [MCOM and CE]: As noted above, neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes to be considered sponsors of grassroots lobbying campaigns. On the other hand, neither wishes to risk violating the registration and reporting requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200 and being subject to any attendant fines or penalties. Without a clear resolution, [MCOM and CE] may curtail [their] expressive activity to avoid having to register and report as the sponsor of a grassroots lobbying campaign. ECF #25-3, Exhibit 21, pp. 1-3. The petition was signed by IJ legal counsel. See id. at p. 3. Subsequent to the filing of the petition, the PDC continued to communicate with IJ legal counsel regarding the petition process, not plaintiffs. See ECF # 25, ¶ 80; ECF # 25-3, Exhibit 22. The petition was scheduled to be considered at the next PDC meeting on January 28, 2010. See ECF # 25, ¶ 80. Prior to that meeting, plaintiffs were sent “a series of questions about their organizational makeup and activities,” to which they “provided timely responses.” ECF # 1, ¶ 77. Although IJ legal counsel addressed the PDC at that meeting, no representative from MCOM or CE appears to have attended the meeting, nor did any representative therefrom address the PDC or provide any testimony concerning the petition. ECF # 25, ¶¶ 86, 94. Following this meeting, a declaratory order was drafted by the PDC and sent to IJ legal counsel for comment. Id. at ¶ 89. That draft declaratory order was scheduled for review at the PDC’s February 26, 2010 meeting. See id. A copy of the order and the agenda for the February 26, 2010 meeting was posted on the PDC’s website. See id. In the order, the PDC “unanimously agreed that based upon the facts presented” in IJ legal counsel’s written materials and by IJ legal counsel at the January 28, 2010 meeting, and presented in the PDC staffs written materials and by the PDC staff at that meeting, none of the exceptions contained in RCW 42.17.160 applied “to exempt [MCOM and CE] from registering and reporting under RCW 42.17.200.” ECF #25-3, Exhibit 24, p. 1. IJ legal counsel “submitted written comments on the draft declaratory order to the [PDC] in a letter dated February 25, 2010,” asking that the PDC amend the order “to fully apply the exemptions listed in RCW 42.17.160.” ECF #25, ¶ 89. On February 26, 2010, though, the PDC “determined that it would enter [its final] declaratory order [concerning the petition] as drafted.” See ECF # 1, ¶ 81; ECF # 25, ¶ 91. V. Proceedings in this Court On April 15, 2010, plaintiffs filed their civil rights complaint with this Court. See ECF # 1, # 1-2, # 1-3. As was the case with the proceedings before the PDC, IJ legal counsel continues to represent plaintiffs in this matter. On April 6, 2011, plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment. See ECF #22. On May 9, 2011, defendants filed their response to plaintiffs’ motion (see ECF #24), and on May 13, 2011, plaintiffs’ filed their reply thereto (see ECF # 32). On May 24, 2011, the Court directed the parties to file additional briefing regarding the issue of plaintiffs’ standing in this case. See ECF # 33. The parties have filed their briefing in response thereto (see ECF # 35-# 38, #40), and thus plaintiffs’ motion is now ripe for review. Although plaintiffs have requested oral argument in this matter, the Court finds such argument to be unnecessary in order to effectively resolve the issues presented here. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding whether summary judgment should be granted, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” and draw all inferences “in the light most favorable” to that party. T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). When a summary judgment motion is supported as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his or her response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). If the nonmoving party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against that party. See id. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Mere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists does not preclude summary judgment. See California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987). A “material” fact is one which is “relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit,” and the materiality of which is “determined by the substantive law governing the claim.” T.W. Electrical Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Mere “[disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts,” therefore, “will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” Id. Rather, the nonmoving party “must produce at least some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505); see also California Architectural Building Products, Inc., 818 F.2d at 1468 (“No longer can it be argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact precludes the use of summary judgment.”). In other words, the purpose of summary judgment “is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case, and thus that entry of summary judgment is appropriate here. In addition, such judgment may be entered for the non-moving party “[e]ven when there has been no cross-motion for summary judgment,” since “a district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte against a moving party,” if the moving party “has had a ‘full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.’ ” Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir.1982)). Because “[t]he salient issues” on which summary judgment is being granted for defendants were presented in plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, and because plaintiffs have had a full and fair opportunity to ventilate those issues, the Court does “not commit reversible error by acting sua sponte” for defendants absent a cross-motion for summary judgment. Id.-, Commission on Independent Colleges and Universities v. New York Temporary State Commission on Regulation of Lobbying (“CICU”), 534 F.Supp. 489, 501 (N.D.N.Y.1982) (while defendants had not made cross motion for summary judgment, because there were no disputed facts and record was adequate regarding constitutional question presented, summary judgment could be granted for non-moving party). II. Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Evidence and Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 12 Plaintiffs include with their motion for summary judgment the declaration and report of Jeffrey Milyo, Ph.D., a tenured professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, Missouri, who describes his area of “academic expertise” as “American political economy, including the empirical analysis of the effects of political regulations and institutions.” ECF #22, Declaration of Jeffrey Milyo (“Milyo Declaration”), ¶¶ 15-16, Exhibit B. In his declaration, Dr. Milyo states there is “no scientific evidence” that laws governing grassroots lobbying “provide any public benefit” (such as increasing public confidence in government or providing useful information to legislators or the public), that those laws are “redundant or over-broad” given the existence of other laws that deal with lobbying, and that they “impose real costs on ordinary citizens.” Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 13, 45, 47, 59-60, 66-67. Dr. Milyo based his conclusions in part on his review of the text of Chapter 42.17 and of the L6 form and instructions, as well as a number of “external sources,” including United States Supreme Court case law and publications concerning such topics as public opinion, lobbying, collective action, campaign disclosure, and political speech and political participation in general. Id. at ¶¶26, 34-36, 38, 42-43, 48-58, 61-63, 66, 70, 72-73, Exhibit A, Expert Report of Dr. Jeffrey Milyo (“Milyo Report”), Exhibit C, Source List of Dr. Jeffrey Milyo. Dr. Milyo also based his opinions and report in part on “earlier research” he conducted, which consisted of “an experiment to evaluate the ability of ordinary citizens to comply with the campaign finance disclosure laws of different states,” although it “did not examine” Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 73-86, Exhibit A, pp. 14-16. In their response to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, defendants have moved to strike the evidence provided by Dr. Milyo, pursuant in part to Federal Rule of Evidence (“Fed.R.Evid.”) 702 and the failure of that evidence to comply with the criteria for relevance or reliability set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See ECF # 24, p. 2, n. 1. Defendants also challenge the propriety of Dr. Mylo’s declaration on the basis that it “is.replete with legal conclusions, case law and legal arguments.” Id. Defendants, furthermore, object to Exhibit 12 attached to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, asserting that because it is a law review article authored by an employee of IJ—specifically, the “director of strategic research” at IJ—it “does not qualify as evidence.” Id.; see also ECF #22, Exhibit 12, Mandatory Disclosure for Ballot-Initiative Campaigns, Dick M. Carpenter II, The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 4, p. 567 (Spring 2009). A. Daubert and the Court’s “Gatekeeping” Role Plaintiffs argue the Court should deny defendants’ motion to strike, complaining that no analysis or explanation for their objection to the evidence from Dr. Milyo, or as to why it fails to comply with the criteria in Daubert, was provided. Plaintiffs argue that “[without more,” they are not able to respond to defendants’ motion, and that defendants’ assertions “do not amount to a ‘Daubert’ challenge for this Court’s consideration.” ECF #32, p. 11 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1)). What plaintiffs fail to realize, however, is that “[i]t is the proponent of the expert” witness—not the objecting party—“who has the burden of proving admissibility” here, which “must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1154 (E.D.Wash.2009) (quoting Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir.1996)) (emphasis added); see also Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 942 (9th Cir.2007); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir.2001). More specifically, and as discussed in greater detail below, “[t]he party presenting the expert must demonstrate that the expert’s findings are based on sound principles and that they are capable of [some objective,] independent validation.” Henricksen, 605 F.Supp.2d at 1154 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (“Daubert II”), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.1995)); see also Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942. The Court itself, furthermore, has an initial duty to ensure the requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 702 have been met, which are as follows: If scientific, technical, or other knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Thus, far from being “disabled from screening” expert testimony or evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 702, the district court “must ensure that any and all [such] testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see also Henricksen, 605 F.Supp.2d at 1153 (“Before a witness may come ‘before the [trier of fact] cloaked with the mantle of an expertf]’ under [Fed.R.Evid.] 702, ... ‘care must be taken to assure that a proffered witness truly qualifies as an expert, and that such [witness’s] testimony meets the requirements of [that] Rule[.]’ ”) (quoting Jinro America Inc. v. Secure Investments, Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir.2001)). “[A]s a threshold matter,” therefore, the Court “must determine whether the proffered witness is ‘qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[.]’ ” Id (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702). In other words, the district court at the outset has a “gatekeeping role” to perform with respect to evidence submitted as expert testimony. Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“[T]he Rules of Evidence— especially Rule 702—... assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”)); see also Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942 (“The trial court acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude expert testimony that does not meet the relevancy and reliability threshold requirements.”); Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir.2002); Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199 (trial judges act as gatekeepers under Fed.R.Evid. 702 to ensure any and all expert testimony not only is relevant, but reliable). Thus, “[a] trial judge, faced with a proffer of expert ... testimony, must conduct ‘a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.’ ” Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786); see also United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1110 (9th Cir.2010) (district court correct to require showing of foundation for proffered expert testimony). “[T]his basic gatekeeping obligation” of the district court, furthermore, applies not only to “scientific” testimony, but “to all expert testimony.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (noting that language of Fed.R.Evid. 702 “makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge,” but instead “[i]t makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony”). Further, “judges are entitled to broad discretion when discharging their gatekeeping function.” Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1017 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized the obligatory nature of the initial “gatekeeping” inquiry, by noting the “trial court’s broad latitude to make the reliability determination [regarding expert witness testimony or evidence] does not include the discretion to abdicate completely its responsibility to do so” Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir.2000) (“While ... the trial court is accorded great latitude in determining [admissibility of] expert testimony, Kumho and Daubert make it clear that the court must, on the record, make some kind of [admissibility] determination.”) (emphasis in original). “The trial court’s ‘special obligation’ to determine the relevance and reliability of an expert’s testimony ... is vital to ensure accurate and unbiased decision-making by the trier of fact.” Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1063 (citing and quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (“Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement ... make[s] certain that an expert ... employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”)); see also Cooper, 510 F.3d at 943; Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 200. As the Supreme Court stated in Daubert, this is because: ... Unlike an ordinary witness, ... an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation .... Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge—a rule which represent “a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information,’ ”... is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R.Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 755 (citation omitted)). As indicated above, Fed.R.Evid. 702 embodies “the twin concerns of ‘reliability’ ... and ‘helpfulness.’ ” Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted); see also Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir.2002) (“Whether testimony is helpful within the meaning of Rule 702 is in essence a relevance inquiry”); Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1063 n. 7 (“Encompassed within the determination of whether expert testimony is relevant is whether it is helpful ... a ‘central concern’ of Rule 701.”) (citation omitted). Expert testimony that “does not relate to any issue in the ease is not relevant, and ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see also Stilwell, 482 F.3d at 1192 (“[Reliable testimony must nevertheless be helpful”). To this end, the Court “must determine whether there is ‘a link between the expert’s testimony and the matter to be proved.’ ” Stilwell, 482 F.3d at 1192 (citation omitted); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (helpfulness standard requires valid connection to pertinent inquiry as precondition to admissibility). Testimony “that falls short of achieving either” concern may be excluded. Stilwell, 482 F.3d at 1192. More specifically in regard to relevance, expert testimony sought to be admitted “must logically advance a material aspect of the [proponent] party’s case,” and “must be ‘tied to the facts’ ” of that case. Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315, and quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167); see also Henricksen, 605 F.Supp.2d at 1154 (“The relevance prong under Daubert means that the evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.”). As for reliability, “Rule 702 demands that expert testimony relate to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, which does not include unsubstantiated speculation and subjective beliefs.” Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir.1997). This twin inquiry into relevance and reliability is succinctly described by the district court in Henricksen: The court need not admit an expert opinion that is connected to the underlying data “only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). It may exclude such testimony if it determines “that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. “The trial court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply taking the expert’s word for it.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.1995) (“Daubert II”). In addition, “any step that renders [the expert’s] analysis unreliable ... renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.... ” In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 318 F.Supp.2d 879, 890 (D.C.Cal.2004). Something doesn’t become [expert] knowledge just because it’s uttered by a[n expert]; nor can an expert’s self-serving assertion that his conclusions were derived by the [proper, reliable] method be deemed conclusive. Daubert II, at 1315-16. “[T]he expert’s bald assurance of validity is not enough. Rather, the party presenting the expert must show that the expert’s findings [have a sound basis], and this will require some objective, independent validation of the expert’s methodology.” Id. at 1316. 605 F.Supp.2d at 1153-54; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“[T]he word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term ‘applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.’ ”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986)); see also Redlightning, 624 F.3d at 1112 (“Because [social science expert] did not reasonably point to any evidence in the record or other factors or data reasonably relied on by experts in his field ... [he] could not provide any relevant testimony to assist the jury.”); United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 761 (9th Cir.2007) (facts and data relied on by expert must be reasonably relied on by experts in particular field). As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he Supreme Court in Daubert identified several factors that may bear on a judge’s determination of the reliability of an expert’s testimony.” Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199. They include: ... (1) whether a theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication[]; (3) whether[, in the case of a scientific technique, the] technique has a high known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling its operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientifie[, technical or specialized knowledge] community.[] Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786); see also Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064. These factors are “neither definitive, nor exhaustive,” though, and “particular factors may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199-200. The Daubert inquiry, furthermore, is “a flexible one,” with “[i]ts overarching subject” being the “validity” and, accordingly, the “evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court’s “focus” thus “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Such focus entails an “assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying” the expert witness testimony is “valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In addition to the four factors identified by the Supreme Court in Daubert, another “very significant” factor to be considered is whether the proffered expert witness developed his or her opinion “expressly for the purpose of testifying.” Cabrera, 134 F.3d at 1422 (citation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has described it: One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. That an expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliabilit