Full opinion text
ORDER LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, Senior District Judge. In 2008, the United States Forest Service adopted a “Public Wheeled Motorized Travel Management Decision” for the Eldorado National Forest (“Travel Management Decision” and “ENF”). This decision designates specific roads and trails within the forest as opeh to public motor vehicle use and correspondingly prohibits cross-country motorized travel. Plaintiffs, three non-profit organizations dedicated to their perception of environmental protection, challenge the Travel Management Decision. Although plaintiffs invoke a variety of statutes and legal theories, their general position is that the decision leaves too many routes open to vehicle use. Four groups representing the interests of recreational vehicle users have intervened as defendants. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court resolves these motions on the administrative record, the parties’ briefing, and after oral argument. For the reasons stated below, each motion is granted in part. The Forest Service violated its obligation under section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the decision designates routes through meadows in apparent violation of provisions of the governing forest plan, thereby violating the National Forest Management Act. I. BACKGROUND A. The Eldorado National Forest The Eldorado National Forest lies west of Lake Tahoe and east of Sacramento, in the Sierra Nevada mountain range. The ENF contains over 789,994 acres of diverse topography, soil types, vegetation, and habitat types. Plaintiffs assert that the ENF “provides habitat for numerous endangered, threatened, and sensitive wildlife species, species of concern, and management indicator species.” Pis.’ Br. 7 (Dkt. 52-1). The only particular species at issue in this order is the California red-legged frog, Rana aurora draytonii, as plaintiffs have not provided arguments regarding any other species. B. The National Environmental Policy Act Plaintiffs’ arguments turn on three statutes. The first is the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. The Forest Service’s approval of the challenged Travel Management Decision was a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Accordingly, the NEPA required the Forest Service to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the project. The Ninth Circuit recently summarized the structure and purpose of this requirement: In NEPA, Congress declared as a national policy “creating] and maintainfing] conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.” [42 U.S.C.] § 4331(a). NEPA’s purpose is realized not through substantive mandates but through the creation of a democratic decisionmaking structure that, although strictly procedural, is almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decisions____ [B]y requiring agencies to take a “hard look” at how the choices before them affect the environment, and then to place their data and conclusions before the public, NEPA relies upon democratic processes to ensure ... that the most intelligent, optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.2010) (some internal citations, quotations, and modifications omitted). NEPA specifies various information that must be included in an EIS. The “heart” of the EIS is an examination of reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. Id. at 1100 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14). “[T]he agency must ‘[rjigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,’ and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14). C. The National Forest Management Act and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act The second statute plaintiffs invoke is the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614. NFMA, together with the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (“MUYSA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531, provides the primary guidance to the management of the National Forests. Substantively, MUYSA directs the Forest Service to administer the national forests “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 528. NFMA adds “wilderness” as an additional purpose, reflecting the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(e), 1311 et seq. The Forest Service applies NFMA through several layers of management. At a broad level, NFMA requires the Forest Service to develop a forest plan for each forest. Once a forest plan is adopted, individual management actions within that forest must comply with the plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). The Forest Service evaluates a proposed project’s compliance with the applicable forest plan during the NEPA process. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir.1996). NFMA therefore injects a substantive component into the NEPA’s otherwise procedural requirements. In addition to the standard NEPA documents, the Forest service must prepare a “Biological Evaluation” for proposed actions “to determine their potential effect on sensitive species.” Forest Service Manual (“FSM”) 2670.32 ¶ 2. This document discusses species protected under the Endangered Species Act and those species the Forest Service has itself designated as sensitive. The Forest Service has promulgated a forest plan for the Eldorado National Forest. Discussion of this plan is complicated by the fact that the plan is not codified in a single document. In 1989, the Forest Service adopted what was then a comprehensive forest plan for the Eldorado National Forest. Admin. Record (“AR”) 3396. In 2004, the Forest Service promulgated the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendments (“SNFPA”), which amended the forest plans for eleven national forests in the Sierra Nevada region, including Eldorado National Forest. AR 10,938. The SNFPA did not supersede or modify any pertinent provisions of the ENF Forest Plan, but the SNFPA did add various supplemental provisions. For convenience, the court refers to the provisions adopted in 1989 as the “ENF Forest Plan” and to the provisions added by the SNFPA in 2004 as the “Sierra Nevada Forest Plan.” See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.2003) (adopting similar terminology). The court recognizes, however, that this terminology is technically inaccurate, in that both are aspects of a single forest plan. D. The Endangered Species Act Yet another statute at issue in this case is the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. The ESA “reflects ‘a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the “primary missions” of federal agencies.’ ” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agrie., 575 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978)). The ESA protects species that have been “listed” as “threatened” or “endangered.” ESA § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01. In this case, plaintiffs’ arguments pertain to a single listed species, the California red-legged frog, which is listed as “threatened.” 61 Fed. Reg. 25813 (May 23,1996). Federal agencies must ensure that their actions “[are] not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of’ habitat that has been designated as critical to the species. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The ESA provides a framework for cooperation between agencies to achieve this goal. The Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) has primary expertise regarding and authority over the California red-legged frog, and over non-marine species generally. FWS is referred to as a “Service” under the ESA. Other federal agencies, including the Forest Service, must satisfy their section 7 obligations “in consultation with and with the assistance of’ FWS. Id. In this process, the Forest Service is referred to as the “action agency.” The ESA and implementing regulations provide a procedural framework for consultation regarding proposed actions. In this case, the Forest Service was first required to prepare a Biological Assessment. ESA § 7(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12. The Biological Assessment determines, inter alia, whether the proposed action “may affect” listed species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. If the action agency determines that the action “may affect” listed species, the agency must consult with the appropriate Service. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a); see also Cal. ex rel. Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1018 (“consultation is required whenever a federal action ‘may affect listed species.’ ”). Consultation may be formal or informal. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). During informal consultation, FWS determines whether the proposed action is “not likely to adversely affect” the listed species. Id. If the Service determines that the proposal is not likely to adversely affect any species or critical habitat, then “the consultation process is terminated, and no further action is necessary.” Id. If FWS cannot reach this conclusion, then formal consultation is necessary, during which the Service prepares a Biological Opinion. Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1091-92 (9th Cir.2004). If FWS determines that the proposed action would violate Section 7’s “jeopardy” standard, FWS must set forth one or more reasonable and prudent alternatives that would avoid jeopardy. ESA § 7(b)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. A further permutation is that action agencies may engage in “programmatic consultation.” Ordinarily, the consultation process looks to a site-specific action. Programmatic consultation instead concerns planning documents and other scenarios in which an agency is preparing to undertake a number of later, similar actions, the specifics of which have not yet been defined. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.2004); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 482 F.Supp.2d 1248, 1267 (W.D.Wash.2007); Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 378 F.Supp.2d 835, 843-44 (S.D.Ohio 2005). In 2006, the Forest Service engaged in informal programmatic consultation regarding route designation in the Sierra Nevada. AR 1, 31-33. This consultation acknowledged that route designations “may affect” listed species. FWS agreed, however, that if route designations adhered to a list of six “design criteria,” then the designated routes would not be likely to adversely affect listed species, such that no further consultation would be necessary. AR 1, 3-4. Because plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the programmatic consultation or these design criteria, the court assumes that this type of consultation complies with the ESA. Section 7’s prohibition on federal actions that would jeopardize species or their critical habitat is not the only method by which the ESA seeks to protect and recover listed species. Notably, the Services must develop and implement recovery plans for listed species, which identify measures that will allow the species to be delisted. ESA § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). FWS adopted a recovery plan for the California red-legged frog in 2002. AR 15,843. E. The Travel Management Rule In addition to the above statutes, plaintiffs rely on the Forest Service’s Travel Management Rule, a regulation codified at 36 C.F.R. part 215. Plaintiffs invoke sub-parts A and B of this rule. What is now Subpart A of the Travel Management Rule was first promulgated in 2001. Administration of Forest Transportation System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3206 (Jan 12, 2001), codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 212.1 to 212.21. Subpart A requires the Forest Service to determine, for each National Forest, the “minimum road system needed for safe and efficient travel and for utilization, and protection of National Forest System lands.” 36 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(1). The notice of final rulemaking explained that this system is the minimum that will serve “forest health, emergency access, and public access needs,” and that the system must “eomplfy] with resource objectives, ... reflect likely funding, and ... minimize adverse environmental effects associated with road construction, reconstruction, and maintenance.” 66 Fed. Reg. at 3208, 3207. Subpart A further obliges the Forest Service to concurrently “identify the roads ... that are no longer needed to meet forest resource management objectives and that, therefore, should be decommissioned or considered for other uses, such as for trails.” 36 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(2). The requirement to identify roads for decommissioning is “[ejqually important” as the overall identification of the minimum road system. 66 Fed. Reg. at 3207. Both decisions must be based on “a science-based roads analysis at the appropriate scale.” 36 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(2). Subpart B of the Travel Management Rule was promulgated four years later, in 2005. Travel Management; Designated Routes and Areas for Motor Vehicle Use, 70 Fed. Reg. 68,264 (Nov. 9, 2005), codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 212.50-212.57. Underlying the pertinent portions of Subpart B, however, are executive orders dating back to 1972. In 1972, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 11,644, which recognized the potential for conflict between off-highway vehicle (“OHV”) use and other land management goals. To limit these conflicts, Executive Order 11,644 directed federal land management agencies, including the Forest Service, to adopt regulations providing for administrative designation of areas and trails open and closed to motor vehicle use. Exec. Order No. 11,-644, §§ 1, 3; 37 Fed. Reg. 2877 (Feb. 9, 1972). These designations must “be based upon the protection of the resources of the public lands, promotion of the safety of all users of those lands, and minimization of conflicts among the various uses of those lands.” Id. § 3. The executive order further provides four “minimization criteria:” (1) Areas and trails shall be located to minimize damage to soil, watershed, vegetation, or other resources of the public lands. (2) Areas and trails shall be located to minimize harassment of wildlife or significant disruption of wildlife habitats. (3) Areas and trails shall be located to minimize conflicts between off-road vehicle use and other existing or proposed recreational uses of the same or neighboring public lands, and to ensure the compatibility of such uses with existing conditions in populated areas, taking into account noise and other factors. (4) Areas and trails shall not be located in officially designated Wilderness Areas or Primitive Areas. Areas and trails shall be located in areas of the National Park system, Natural Areas, or National Wildlife Refuges and Game Ranges only if the respective agency head determines that off-road vehicle use in such locations will not adversely affect their natural, aesthetic, or scenic values. Id. This executive order was amended in 1977 to further direct land management agencies to immediately close areas or trails that “caus[ed] considerable adverse effects” upon protected resources. Exec. Order No. 11,989, § 2, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,959 (May 24,1977). In adopting Subpart B of the Travel Management Rule, the Forest Service explained that “the magnitude and intensity of motor vehicle use have increased to the point that the intent of [Executive Orders] 11644 and [] 11989 cannot be met while still allowing unrestricted cross-country travel.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 68,265. Subpart B addresses this changed circumstance by eliminating unrestricted cross-country recreational OHV use and restricting motorized vehicle use to roads and trails designated for that purpose. 36 C.F.R. § 212.55(a). Under Subpart B, the Forest Service’s decision of which routes and areas to open to motor vehicle use must consider: effects on National Forest System natural and cultural resources, public safety, provision of recreational opportunities, access needs, conflicts among uses of National Forest System lands, the need for maintenance and administration of roads, trails, and areas that would arise if the uses under consideration are designated; and the availability of resources for that maintenance and administration. 36 C.F.R. § 212.55(a). Subpart B further codifies the Executive Order’s four “minimization criteria,” providing that the Forest Service: shall consider effects on the following, with the objective of minimizing: (1) Damage to soil, watershed, vegetation, and other forest resources; (2) Harassment of wildlife and significant disruption of wildlife habitats; (3) Conflicts between motor vehicle use and existing or proposed recreational uses of National Forest System lands or neighboring Federal lands; and (4) Conflicts among different classes of motor vehicle uses of National Forest System lands or neighboring Federal lands. 36 C.F.R. § 212.55(b). In this litigation Federal defendants argue that the “shall consider ... with the objective of minimizing” language “does not require the Forest Service to minimize these impacts.” Fed. Defs.’ Br. 21 (Dkt. 57-2). The court rejects this interpretation of the regulation. Accord Idaho Conservation League v. Guzman, 766 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1074 (D.Idaho 2011); see also Part 111(A)(2) below. The language itself does not support the Forest Service’s analysis. More importantly, this aspect of Subpart B codifies Executive Order 11,644, and the executive order plainly states that the land management agencies “shall ... minimize” the four types of impacts. Exec. Order 11,644 § 3. Accordingly, in this regard, Subpart B is equivalent to the Bureau of Land Management’s corresponding regulation interpreting Executive Order 11,644. Guzman, 766 F.Supp.2d at 1074, n. 6. See also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 746 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1075-76 (N.D.Cal.2009) (“CBD v. BLM”) (BLM’s regulation, 43 C.F.R. § 8342.1, compels BLM to minimize impacts). Finally, under Subpart B the Forest Service must consider the “[cjompatibility of motor vehicle use with existing conditions in populated areas, taking into account sound, emissions, and other factors.” 36 C.F.R. § 212.55(b)(5). F. The Challenged Travel Management Decision Plaintiffs’ suit is only the most recent chapter in two decades of litigation regarding vehicle use in the ENF. The Forest Service first promulgated an OHV plan for the ENF in 1990. That plan was challenged in court, culminating in a 2005 order by the undersigned directing the Forest Service to withdraw the 1990 plan. See Ctr. for Sierra Nevada Conservation v. Berry, No. 2:02-cv-00325-LKK-JFM (E.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2005) (Order on Remedies (Dkt. 163)) (“Berry order”). The Berry order required the Forest Service to, among other things, withdraw the 1990 Plan and to “issue a Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision on a new ENF OHV Plan (or site-specific area plans)” by December 31, 2007. Berry Order at 1. This deadline was subsequently extended to April 2, 2008. The Travel Management Decision challenged in this suit was prepared in order to comply both with Subpart B of the Travel Management Rule and the Berry order. See AR 2440 (EIS at 1-9). At the time of the Berry order, the ENF contained 2,342 miles of official National Forest System roads and trails open to public motorized use. AR 2396 (EIS at xi). These included roads at maintenance levels (ML) 1 through 5. ML-3, ML-4, and ML-5 roads are “managed for standard four wheel passenger vehicles.” Id. at 2395. ML-2 roads are “maintained for high clearance vehicles” and “are generally not suitable for standard four wheel passenger vehicles.” Id. ML-1 roads in the ENF “were designed to be intermittently used service roads and were intended to be closed to public wheeled motor vehicle use, although a majority of them are no longer physically closed.” Id. at 2396. Trails, which do not receive an “ML” classification, are distinct from roads in that trails are narrower and typically maintained only for motorcycle or all-terrain vehicle use. In addition to these official routes, the ENF contained 526 miles of “unauthorized routes” where “use [was] continuing to occur.” Id. Unauthorized routes are generally user-created routes, e.g., routes that develop as a result of repeated cross-country travel by the public. Although these routes had not received official approval, designation, or maintenance, they were not necessarily “illegal” prior to the Berry order, because off-road and cross-country travel was previously permitted in the ENF. See Guzman, 766 F.Supp.2d at 1063 n. 3 (explaining the creation of unauthorized routes in national forests). The Berry order prohibited motorized use of unauthorized routes pending release of a new travel management decision. The Forest Service released a draft EIS for the Travel Management Decision on July 20, 2007. AR 1476. The draft EIS discussed trails, ML-1 and ML-2 roads, and unauthorized routes. AR 1481. The draft EIS examined a “no action” alternative, alternative A, and four action alternatives, B through E. The “no-action” alternative would allow use to continue on all existing routes and would allow cross-country travel. AR 1487. Alternatives B through E would prohibit cross-country travel and open decreasing numbers of roads and trails to vehicle use, with B authorizing the most miles of routes and E authorizing the least. AR 1491. Each of these alternatives permitted vehicle use on some previously unauthorized routes, ranging from 17.7 to 45.8 miles of such routes. Id. The preferred alternative was D, which authorized motorized travel on 1,061 miles of routes, 34.8 of which were previously unauthorized. Id. In conjunction with the draft EIS, the Forest Service released a draft Biological Evaluation (under NFMA) addressing each alternative’s impacts on sensitive species, AR 12,638, and a Biological Assessment (under the ESA) assessing alternative D’s impacts on listed species, including the California red-legged frog. AR 12,869. The Forest Service submitted the draft Biological Assessment and draft EIS to FWS for informal consultation. AR 13. FWS concluded that alternative D was “not likely to adversely affect” listed species. AR 2354-55. In its concurrence, FWS stated that the ESA would require no further action “[u]nless new information reveals effects of the proposed action that may affect federally listed species in a manner or to an extent not considered, or a new species or critical habitat is designated that may be affected by the proposed action.” Id. The Forest Service released its final EIS and Record of Decision (“ROD”) in March of 2008. AR 2387, 3270. Rather than adopt the previously preferred alternative, the ROD adopted a modified form of alternative B. Like the original alternative B, Modified B authorized a greater number of routes than any of the other action alternatives. AR 2389. Modified B differed from B as to the particular routes authorized, however, incorporating changes intended to protect environmental resources. Id. In total, Modified B authorized 1,212 miles of trails, ML-1, and ML-2 roads, of which roughly 23 miles were previously unauthorized. AR 2475. The ROD selected alternative Modified B “because it provides a balanced response to the public comments by satisfying many recreation and social benefit criteria while providing increased protection for resources.” AR 3277. The ROD also adopted a “non-significant” amendment to three provisions of the ENF Forest Plan, exempting twenty enumerated routes from compliance with these provisions. AR 3273-35. In connection with the final EIS, the Forest Service also issued an updated Biological Evaluation and Biological Assessment, The new Biological Assessment again concluded that the proposal was “not likely to adversely affect” any listed species. The Forest Service relied on the 2006 programmatic consultation and did not further consult with FWS. Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal challenging the ROD and FEIS. On June 27, 2008, this appeal was denied. AR 321, 804. On September 4, 2009, plaintiffs submitted a notice of intent to sue under the ESA to both the Forest Service and FWS. This suit followed. II. STANDARD Plaintiffs argue that the Travel Management Decision violated NEPA, NFMA, the Travel Management Rule, and the ESA. Plaintiffs’ NEPA, NFMA, and Travel Management Rule claims are brought under section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.2005) (NFMA and NEPA claims are brought under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)); Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (9th Cir.2005) (claim that Forest Service violated its own regulation is brought under 5 U.S.C. § 706). Under section 706(2), the court will set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” or that is undertaken “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (2)(D). Plaintiffs’ ESA claim, which argues that the Forest Service violated an obligation to consult with FWS, is brought under the ESA’s citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir.2011); Wash. Toxics Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.2005). The ESA claim is nonetheless reviewed under the same APA standards of review. W. Watersheds Project, 632 F.3d at 495-96. Ml parties have moved for summary judgment. Under APA section 706(2) review, the court does not employ the usual summary judgment standard. Conservation Cong. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 555 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1100 (E.D.Cal.2008). This is because the court is not generally called upon to resolve facts in reviewing agency action. Occidental Eng’g Co. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir.1985). Instead, the court’s function is to determine whether or not, as a matter of law, the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did. Id. An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious where the agency “relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 987 (quotations omitted). The agency “must articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions reached.” Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Midwater Trawlers Co-op. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 716 (9th Cir.2002)). Especially in a case such as this one, where the agency must comply with a multitude of obligations, many of which pull the agency in competing directions, and which collectively lead to a record of tens of thousands of pages, this standard extends beyond mere deference to the agency’s considered judgment. The court will additionally overlook minor gaffes in the record. This added deference is demonstrated by the instruction to “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Under NEPA in particular, a court “may not ‘fly-speck [the EIS] and hold it insufficient on the basis of inconsequential, technical deficiencies.’” Friends of the Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir.1996)). The inquiry is “ ‘whether claimed deficiencies in a FEIS are merely flyspecks, or are significant enough to defeat the goals of informed decision making and informed public comment.’ ” Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Fuel Safe Wash. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 389 F.3d 1313, 1323 (10th Cir.2004)). III. ANALYSIS The parties seek summary judgment on five claims. Plaintiffs argue (1) that the Forest Service was required to identify a minimum road system under Subpart A of the travel management rule before reaching a travel management decision under Subpart B; that the Forest Service violated NEPA by (2) failing to consider an adequate range of alternatives and (3) failing to include sufficient site-specific information; (4) that the travel management decision designates routes in violation of the governing forest plan, violating NFMA; and (5) that the Forest Service failed to adequately consult with FWS regarding the California red-legged frog, violating the ESA. Defendants do not challenge plaintiffs’ standing to bring these claims, and the court has reviewed plaintiffs’ standing declarations and determined standing to be proper. A. Plaintiffs’ “Subpart-A” Claim Plaintiffs’ primary argument in this suit is that the Travel Management Rule required the Forest Service to complete the Subpart A identification of a minimum road system before the Subpart B designation of roads for public use. This claim turns primarily on a question of regulatory interpretation. The Ninth Circuit has held that an agency’s interpretation of the agency’s own regulation is ordinarily controlling, such that courts will defer to the agency interpretation “unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the agency’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 930-31 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997)). This raises the question of what counts as an agency interpretation. In this case, many of the purported “interpretations” cited by defendants are not of the types that have previously received Auer deference. Nonetheless, as the court explains below, the Forest Service Manual suggests that the Forest Service may address Subparts A and B in any order, and plaintiffs have not shown that the language of the Travel Management Rule “compels” plaintiffs’ interpretation. It follows that the Forest Service’s decision not to first complete the Subpart A analysis was neither arbitrary nor in violation of the procedures required by law. 1. The Travel Management Rule Is Ambiguous The Ninth Circuit has articulated two different frameworks for regulatory interpretation. Bassiri used a two-step process, beginning with the agency interpretation and then looking to whether an alternative interpretation was “compelled.” Other courts begin with the plain language, looking to agency interpretation only if the regulation is ambiguous, and then looking to whether the interpretation is unreasonable. See, e.g., Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir.2004); Hells Canyon Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir.2000). These two frameworks are presumably equivalent. Here, the court concludes that the Travel Management Rule is ambiguous, because no language in the rule specifically addresses the timing of the Forest Service’s obligations under Subparts A and B. Plaintiffs’ contention that the structure of the rule compels plaintiffs’ interpretation is better discussed through the prism of reasonableness. 2. The Agency’s Purported Interpretations of The Travel Management Rule The Forest Service argues that it has interpreted the Travel Management Rule as permitting the Forest Service to begin with Subpart B. The Forest Service appears to argue that the EIS, the Forest Service Manual, and the Forest Service’s own litigation position are all interpretations warranting deference. Plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service overstates the degree to which it is entitled to deference. More significantly, plaintiffs cite some of the same language in the record as indicating that the Forest Service had itself adopted plaintiffs’ interpretation of the regulation. Below, the court reviews the law underlying deference to agency interpretation of regulations and then examines the potential interpretive documents identified by the parties. The EIS neither meaningfully interpreted the Travel Management Rule nor conceded that Subpart A must precede Subpart B. The agency’s litigation position is not entitled to deference. The Forest Service Manual is the type of agency statement entitled to deference, and although this manual does not address the sequencing question in the most explicit of terns, the manual provides implicit support for the Forest Service’s position. a. Deference to Agencies under Auer The law regarding agency interpretation of regulations may be best understood in juxtaposition with the law regarding agency interpretation of statutes. As to statutes, courts have recognized two distinct forms of deference to agency interpretations of statutes. Courts defer to agencies under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) where Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to the agency and the agency has interpreted a statute in the exercise of this authority. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). If the statute is ambiguous, the agency properly exercised its delegated authority in reaching the interpretation, and the agency interpretation is reasonable, then courts must adhere to the agency interpretation. Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc), amended by 360 F.3d 1374 (2004). Numerous cases have addressed which agency actions warrant Chevron deference. For example, in the Ninth Circuit, an agency interpretation only receives Chevron deference when it is adopted in a document that has a precedential effect that binds third parties. MarmolejoCampos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc). A second form of deference to agency interpretation of statutes exists under, 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). While Chevron deference takes its force from an assumed Congressional delegation of authority to the agency, Skidmore deference reflects the fact that the agency has experience with the statute and is likely to reach a reasoned interpretation regardless of whether Congress intended the agency’s interpretation to be binding. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164. In contrast with Chevron deference, Skidmore deference is not all-or-nothing. “The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. An agency need not adhere to any particular procedures in order to receive Skid-more deference. Returning to agency interpretation of regulations, it appears that -with regard to underlying justifications, Auer deference is more akin to Chevron than to Skidmore. Tautologically, where an agency is interpreting its own regulation, the agency is speaking on a subject for which “Congress [has] delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Additionally, Auer and Chevron provide essentially the same de gree of deference: under each, where the agency has satisfied the procedural prerequisites for deference, agency interpretation of an ambiguous law will be upheld so long as the interpretation is reasonable. But see Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Chater, 163 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining, as an additional ground for deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, that the agency’s “expertise makes it well-suited to interpret its own language.”). Auer may share Chevron’s justification, but it differs with regard to procedural prerequisites. As noted, an agency interpretation will only receive Chevron deference if it was adopted through procedures with some formality. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30, 121 S.Ct. 2164; Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). Agency interpretation of a regulation may receive Auer deference even when the interpretation was adopted through informal procedures that would not suffice under Chevron. Bassiri, 463 F.3d at 930. Nonetheless, it cannot be the case that courts must defer to any interpretation of a regulation uttered by any agency official. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized: Just as varying degrees of deference are appropriate for regulations or other forms of guidance issued by agencies, so too are different levels of deference appropriate for interpretations of regulations offered by agencies. When the agency speaks formally, Auer holds that the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. An off-the-cuff response to an interpretive question from the first person who answers the telephone would be quite a different matter. Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir.2009). Although “formal” procedures are not required in the Ninth Circuit, Joseph’s observation that some agency employees lack the power to speak for the agency cannot be denied. This principle is further illustrated by Auer itself. Auer looked to the circumstances surrounding the particular agency document at issue before concluding that deference was warranted. Auer concerned a regulation promulgated under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Secretary of Labor had filed an amicus brief before the Supreme Court offering the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation. The Court held that this briefs interpretation of the regulation was entitled to deference because it was “in no sense a post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack” and there was “no reason to suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905. More recently, the Court applied a similar analysis in deferring to an amicus brief filed by the Federal Reserve Board, resting on these factors and the fact that “[t]he board [was] not a party to [the] case.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 871, 880, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011). In Chase Bank, the Court specified that it deferred to the particular amicus brief “in light of ‘the circumstances of this case,’ ” and that the Court was not holding that all informal interpretations were entitled to Auer deference. Id. at 884, citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905. Thus, although the Ninth Circuit has stated that an agency’s use of informal procedures does not itself preclude Auer deference, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that not every document or statement issued by an agency representative is entitled to Auer deference. Neither court has articulated more specific guidance as to when deference is warranted. The Ninth Circuit’s practice, however, is to extend Auer deference to general statements of policy offered outside the context of litigation against the agency. The Ninth Circuit has granted Auer deference to: agency opinion letters, Bassiri, 463 F.3d at 930; interpretations published in the federal register, Strom v. U.S., 641 F.3d 1051, 1063-64 (9th Cir.2011), Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir.2008) and S.E.C. v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 903-04 (9th Cir.2007); amicus briefs filed before the circuit court, Dreiling v. Am. Exp. Co., 458 F.3d 942, 953 n. 11 (9th Cir.2006) and Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Whittier Props. Inc., 356 F.3d 1132, 1137 n. 27 (9th Cir.2004); and an agency’s “internal memorandum,” L.A Closeout, Inc. v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 513 F.3d 940, 941-12 (9th Cir.2008). b. The Forest Service’s Litigation Position Auer and Chase Bank held that the fact that the agencies were not parties to the litigation indicated that the agencies’ amicus briefs “reflected] the agencies’] fair and considered judgment.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905, Chase Bank, 131 S.Ct. at 884. Mirroring this reasoning, other courts have conversely declined to defer to interpretations offered in the course of litigation against the agency. Robinson Knife Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 600 F.3d 121, 134 n. 11 (2nd Cir.2010) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905). See also Pierre v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 2009 WL 2591625, *12-13, 133 T.C. No. 2, 2009 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21, *34-*36 (2009) (Cohen, J., concurring). The circumstances of this case demonstrate that the Forest Service’s litigation position is not itself entitled to Auer deference. c. The EIS and Related Documents As noted above, each party purports to support its interpretation of the Travel Management Rule by citing statements made in the record. As the court explains, the record’s limited discussion of this rule does not support either party’s position. The record discusses the relationship between Subparts A and B in only two passages, both of which are responses to plaintiffs’ sequencing argument. The first is the Forest Service’s response to a comment plaintiffs had submitted regarding the draft EIS. AR 2898 (final EIS C-14). The response stated that “[t]he analysis of effects from implementing each of the alternatives presented in Chapter 3 of the FEIS informs the Forest Supervisor in making a decision regarding the minimum system ... In making his determination, the Forest Supervisor will consider the direction provided in the ENF LRMP.” Id. The second passage occurs in the response to plaintiffs’ administrative appeal. Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal asserted their minimum road system argument. AR 822. The appeal deciding officer first stated that the EIS’s alternatives analysis “informs the Forest Supervisor in making a decision regarding the minimum road system,” repeating the Forest Service’s earlier response to comments. Id. The officer went on to state, however, that “The Forestwide Roads Analysis completed in 2003 also helped identify this minimum system____I find that the FEIS and ROD succeed in designating a minimum system as required by the Travel Rule ....” Id. (emphases added). Plaintiffs argue that these two passages demonstrate that the Forest Service’s decision to adopt the Travel Management Decision was based on the belief that the Decision satisfied the Forest Service’s obligations under both Subparts A and B. All parties now agree, however, that the Travel Management Decision did not identify a minimum road system. Plaintiffs argue that this warrants reversal, because “an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50, 103 S.Ct. 2856. The EIS’s response to comments defies plaintiffs’ characterization, since the response refers to subpart A in the future tense. The resolution of the administrative appeal presents a more difficult question. The decision stated that a minimum road system had already been identified. The denial of the administrative appeal is the final agency action, 36 C.F.R. § 215.1(b), and in light of Federal Defendants’ insistence on the importance of administrative exhaustion, there would be a “poetic justice” in holding the Forest Service to statements made in the administrative appeal. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. County of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.2009). Nonetheless, it is clear that, as Federal Defendants argue, the appeal deciding officer simply wrote in error. Not a single statement in the Record of Decision or EIS indicates that a minimum road system had been or was being identified. Cf. Guzman, 766 F.Supp.2d. at 1078-79. In light of the facts that plaintiffs’ argument is supported by a sole statement, that the error of this statement should have been plain to all readers, and that this statement therefore did not meaningfully interfere with public comment, judicial review, or the other purposes of NEPA and the APA, the court declines to hold that this statement represents the “basis articulated by the agency” for purposes of Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. The Forest Service has not conceded that Subpart A must precede Subpart B. On the other hand, the court also rejects defendants’ contention that these two passages meaningfully interpreted the Travel Management Rule as permitting the Forest Service to begin with Subpart B. Although the FEIS’s response to comments implies the interpretation now advocated by the Forest Service, the final agency action, insofar as it interpreted the regulation at all, implies the opposite. The Forest Service cannot point to any articulation of its purported interpretation of the Travel Management Rule in the record. These fleeting statements on the issue do not bear the hallmarks of the agency’s “fair and considered judgment” and are not entitled to Auer deference. Ultimately, the Forest Service appears to argue that by acting, the Forest Service implicitly interpreted all applicable regulations as permitting the agency’s choice of action. This is a post-hoc rationalization, not the type of considered exercise of delegated lawmaking authority that underlies Auer. At the very least, if the agency wishes for its interpretations to receive Auer deference, the agency must articulate those interpretations. d. The Forest Service Manual After the 2005 promulgation of the Travel Management Rule, the Forest Service updated the Forest Service Manual. The Forest Service Manual, a document published and updated through notice-and-comment proceedings and which guides the entire agency in applying the regulation, is plainly the type of document entitled to Auer deference. The Forest Service Manual requires “responsible officials to use travel analysis to consider the criteria in 36 C.F.R. § 212.55 [Subpart B] and contribute towards identification of the minimum road system needed for safe and efficient travel and for administration, utilization, and protection of [national forest] lands (36 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) [Subpart A].”). 72 Fed. Reg. 10,632, 10,635 (March 9, 2007). “Travel analysis for purposes of identification of the minimum road system is separate from travel analysis for purposes of designation of roads, trails, and areas for motor vehicle use. Travel analysis for both purposes may be conducted concurrently or separately.” FSM 7712. ¶ 2. The same section of the manual states that “[a]ny proposals resulting from travel analysis for either purpose may be addressed in the same or different environmental analyses.” Id. ¶ 3. These sections of the manual do not explicitly address the timing of Subparts A and B. Nonetheless, the manual’s statement that the travel analysis underlying Subpart B may occur “separately” from the travel analysis for Subpart A suggests that Subpart B itself may precede Subpart A. Accordingly, the court concludes that for purposes of Auer, the manual interprets the Travel Management Rule as allowing the agency to begin with Subpart B. The court must defer to this interpretation if it is reasonable. 3. Reasonableness of the Forest Service Manual’s Interpretation of the Rule The Travel Management Rule contains no explicit statement regarding the timing of Subparts A and B. Plaintiffs argue that the structure of the regulation is such that Subpart A is the “essential prerequisite” to Subpart B, and that prior completion of Subpart A is “logically necessary.” Plaintiffs argue that if B is done first it will be impossible to do A properly, and that A provides information necessary to B. Plaintiffs additionally discuss the ENF’s road maintenance backlog. None of these arguments compel plaintiffs’ interpretation of the rule. First, an essential aspect of the Subpart A analysis is the identification of roads to be decommissioned. Plaintiffs contend that if the agency first designates roads under Subpart B, the agency will have prejudged whether those roads should be decommissioned under Subpart A. The court agrees that during the Subpart A analysis the Forest Service will need to evaluate all roads, including any roads previously designated as open under subpart B, for decommissioning. Plaintiffs have not shown that prior completion of Sub-part B gives rise to dangers of “[b]ureaucratic rationalization and bureaucratic momentum” so great that this re-examination will be meaningless. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.1988). Second, plaintiffs argue that Subpart A provides information essential to Subpart B. Although the chain of reasoning underlying plaintiffs’ “logical necessity” argument is unclear, plaintiffs appear to argue that Subpart B obliges the Forest Service to minimize the adverse effects of roads, that the effects of roads are correlated with the amount of roads, and that Subpart A identifies the minimum amount of roads necessary to satisfy the National Forest’s purposes. Of course, the Forest Service may consider minimizing the amount of roads during the Subpart B analysis as well. Plaintiffs apparently contend that Subpart A facilitates this analysis by revealing potential multiple-use roads. Whereas Subpart B looks only to recreation, Subpart A considers the needs of recreation as well as forest administration, fire protection, and other national forest purposes. 36 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(1); 66 Fed. Reg. at 3208. Plaintiffs argue that considering these purposes all at once will enable the Forest Service to evaluate a comprehensive system and thereby more fully minimize road impacts. At most, this argument suggests that beginning with Subpart A may be prudent. This is too slender a reed to support plaintiffs’ assertion that the structure of the Travel Management Rule compels completion of Subpart A before Subpart B. In an apparent extension of the preceding argument, plaintiffs emphasize the ENF’s road maintenance backlog. The record demonstrates a maintenance backlog in the ENF. Subpart A presumes that this backlog will be addressed in part by decommissioning roads. Plaintiffs argue that the Subpart B analysis must be informed by knowledge of which roads will be removed. Again, this argument merely provides a reason why the agency might be better off completing Subpart A first. Finally, in an argument not obviously connected to Subpart A, plaintiffs argue that designating roads that the Forest Service cannot afford is itself arbitrary and capricious. When roads do not receive the required level of maintenance their environmental impact increases. See, e.g., AR 2522-26 (EIS 3-25 to 3-29). Preservation of the environment, however, is only one of many goals the Forest Service must consider in managing the national forest, and on this issue, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Forest Service’s balancing of these goals was arbitrary. Plaintiffs offer an illustrative car analogy. Plaintiffs contend that road maintenance is akin to getting an oil change every 5,000 miles, and that deferring an oil change until 12,000 miles would be arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service must either change the oil more often or stop driving. One can easily imagine, however, circumstances in which driving 12,000 miles before changing oil is the best available option. A driver who cannot afford more frequent maintenance, but who needs to drive in order to work, might defer the oil change despite the knowledge that it is not the best of maintenance. Similarly, the Forest Service recognized the importance of maintenance and the chronic problems with funding maintenance, but the Forest Service concluded that in light of its budget and the multiple mandates the agency faced, designating roads in excess of the maintenance budget was the best option. In summary, although plaintiffs’ arguments have identified various reasons why it might be preferable to conclude Subpart A before Subpart B, plaintiffs have not shown that the language of the regulation compels this ordering. On arbitrary and capricious review, the court will not reverse the agency merely based on the court’s perceptions of prudence. The court therefore grants summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs’ Travel Management Rule claim. B. Plaintiffs’ NEPA Alternatives Analysis Claim Plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service should have fully examined an alternative that would not have opened any previously unauthorized routes to public motor vehicle travel. As noted above, examination of alternatives “is the heart of the environmental impact statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The agency must “[rjigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives [to the proposed action], and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). The “touchstone” is “whether [the] selection and discussion of alternatives fosters informed decision-making and informed public participation.” Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 876 F.Sd 858, 872 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir.1982)). An EIS “cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device thought conceivable by the mind of man.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). Still, “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate.” Westlands Water Dist., 376 F.3d at 868 (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir.1998)). The scope of “viable” or “reasonable” alternatives is determined by the “the purpose and need statement articulated by that agency.” ‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coal. v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir.2006). This statement inevitably narrows the scope of alternatives, but the agency cannot “define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms.” Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 177 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting City of Carmel-by-The-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir.1997)). Here, the statement of purpose largely recounts the goals and obligations imposed on the agency by statute, and is therefore reasonable. AR 2436-37. These competing goals include conservation and various types of recreation, as explained in part 1(C) supra. In balancing competing uses the Forest Service faces a spectrum of choices, with one end representing greater motorized vehicle access and the other representing greater conservation and non-motorized recreation. The Ninth Circuit has twice invalidated agency decisions where the EIS “did not consider alternatives that sufficiently explored the ‘trade-off between wilderness use and development’ ” in similar land management dilemmas. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 625 F.3d at 1123 (quoting Block, 690 F.2d at 767). In these cases a broad range of options were left unexplored. Oregon Natural Desert Association concerned, in pertinent part, off-highway vehicle use on lands managed by BLM. BLM “did not consider any alternative that would have closed more than 0.77% of the planning area to [OHVs].” 625 F.3d at 1124. The Ninth Circuit rejected the EIS, holding that BLM “must consider closures of significant portions of the land it manages.” Id. Block concerned allocation of roadless National Forest lands into three management categories. 690 F.2d at 758. The Forest Service did not “seriously consider[ ]” allocating more than a third of the acreage as wilderness; conversely, all alternatives contemplated significant development. Id. at 765, 767. This impermissibly “uncritically assume[d] that a substantial portion of the ... areas should be developed and considered] only those alternatives with that end result.” Id. at 767. The Northern District of California recently followed these cases in invalidating an EIS in which every alternative allowed some vehicle use on every mile of the existing 5,098 mile route network. CBD v. BLM, 746 F.Supp.2d at 1087-88. This case is distinguished from Block and Oregon Natural Desert Association by the range of options explored together with the agency’s explanation as to why a “no unauthorized routes” alternative would be unreasonable. The Forest Service considered five action alternatives, which would designate between 5% and 9% of the existing unauthorized road network as open to vehicle use. AR 2408, 2410. Thus, the Forest Service considered closing “significant portions” of the unauthorized road network, Natural Desert Ass’n. The 5% of the unauthorized road network that all alternatives leave open is less than the “substantial portion” of land the Forest Service assumed should be developed in Block. Furthermore, the Forest Service explained why these routes were necessary. The Forest Service held that the project’s multiple-use purpose would not be met by a “no previously unauthorized routes” alternative. AR 2469. As the EIS explains, Some dispersed recreation activities are dependent on foot or horseback access and some are dependent on motor vehicle access. Those activities accessed by motor vehicles consist of short spurs that have been created and maintained primarily by the passage of motorized vehicles. Many such user-created routes are not currently part of the National Forest Transportation System .... Without adding them to the [transportation system], the [prohibition on cross-country travel] would make continued use of such routes illegal. AR at 2397. Elsewhere, the EIS explains the benefits afforded by some of the specific previously-unauthorized routes that would be designated under Modified B. The added routes “will enhance motorized recreation in the Gold Note area” and will “provide[ ] a number of dispersed camping opportunities in the Capps Crossing area.” AR 2794. As a whole, this explanation demonstrates that assumption. C.f. Block, 690 F.2d at 767; accord Guzman, 766 F.Supp.2d at 1070-71 (although no alternative considered closing all routes in recommended wilderness areas, the Forest Service had adequately explained that such a closure would fragment transportation network and therefore be unreasonable). Accordingly, the Forest Sendee properly explained why a “no unauthorized routes” alternative would be unreasonable, and the exclusion of such an alternative from analysis did not violate NEPA. The court therefore grants summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs’ NEPA Alternatives Analysis Claim. C. Plaintiffs’ NEPA Site-Specific Data Claim Plaintiffs’ third claim is that the EIS failed to include adequate site-specific data. Plaintiffs argue that the data the EIS used was inappropriate and that the EIS lacked site-specific data regarding a number of particular issues. The court rejects both arguments, and accordingly grants summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs NEPA Site-Specific Data Claim. 1. Scope of NEPA’s ‘Hard Look’ Requirement NEPA “requir[es] that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at how the choices before them affect the environment.” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 625 F.3d at 1100. This ‘hard look’ requires a “reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences. This standard is not susceptible to refined calibration.... [A]