Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONER’S AMENDED MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION AND ORDER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT AND FOR COMPENSATORY RELIEF J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION For nearly a decade, Waikiki’s Pacific Beach Hotel (the “Hotel”) has repeatedly ignored its responsibilities to comply with the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or the “Act”). Petitioner Joseph F. Frankl (“Petitioner”), Director of Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”), has filed numerous complaints asserting that HTH Corp. (“HTH”), Pacific Beach Corp. (“PBC”), and Koa Management, LLC (“Koa”) d/b/a/ the Hotel (collectively, “Respondents”) have engaged in a litany of violations of the Act — for meddling with, failing to recognize, and refusing to negotiate with the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 142, AFL-CIO (the “Union”). Despite numerous orders finding that the Hotel has violated the Act, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) asserts that Respondents continue to flout their duties, including by ignoring this court’s March 29, 2010 Injunction requiring them to comply with the Act. The Board argues, and the court agrees, that sanctions are appropriate. The March 29, 2010 Injunction stemmed from Petitioner’s allegations that Respondents had committed various NLRA violations, which was pending before the Board when Petitioner sought interim injunctive relief from this court pursuant to § 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (referred to herein as “§ 10(j)”). On March 29, 2010, the court found that the Board would likely determine, and be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, that Respondents engaged in a number of violations of the NLRA and that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Respondents’ employees and the Union (the “March 29, 2010 Injunction”). The March 29, 2010 Injunction therefore required Respondents to, among other things, recognize the Union, bargain in good faith with the Union, reinstate several employees, and rescind unilateral changes made to the terms and conditions of employment. See Norelli v. HTH Corp., 699 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.Haw.2010). On June 14, 2011, the Board largely affirmed the ALJ Decision, see HTH Corp., 356 NLRB No. 182, 2011 WL 2414720 (June 14, 2011), and on July 13, 2011, Ninth Circuit affirmed this court’s § 10(j) injunction. Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir.2011). According to Petitioner, Respondents, along with Robert Minicola (“Minicola”), HTH’s Regional Vice President and the Hotel’s acting general manager and human resources manager, have violated numerous provisions of the court’s March 29, 2010 Injunction. Although coercive contempt is not available in light of the Board’s June 14, 2011 Decision, Petitioner argues that compensatory contempt sanctions are appropriate. Based on the following, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Petitioner’s Motion. II. BACKGROUND Since the beginning of its drive to organize the Hotel’s employees in 2002, the Union has faced opposition from Respondents. A July 31, 2002 election was overturned by the Board due to Respondents’ coercive interrogation of employees and maintenance of an overly broad no-solicitation policy. HTH Corp., 342 NLRB 372 (2004). In a second election on August 24, 2004, Respondents challenged several ballots, resulting in the Board ordering those ballots to be counted and the Union winning the election by one vote. Pacific Beach Corp., 344 NLRB 1160 (2005). On August 15, 2005, the Regional Director issued a certifícate of representation in favor of the Union. After the Union was certified, Respondents continued their campaign to derail the Union, forcing Petitioner to file Complaints against Respondents from 2007 through 2008, which resulted in a September 30, 2009 decision by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) James M. Kennedy finding that Respondents had committed numerous NLRA violations, followed by a June 14, 2011 affirmance by the Board. See HTH Corp., 2009 WL 3147894 (NLRB Sept. 30, 2009). While waiting for the Board decision, Petitioner filed a Petition for § 10(j) relief, which resulted in the March 29, 2010 Injunction. See Norelli, 699 F.Supp.2d at 1176. The March 29, 2010 Injunction, attached as an Appendix to this Order, required Respondents to cease and desist from (1) withdrawing recognition of the Union; (2) refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment and other terms and conditions for bargaining unit employees; (3) discharging employees in order to discourage Union activities and membership; (4) unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees without first giving notice to, and bargaining with, the Union; and (5) in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by the NLRA. The March 29, 2010 Injunction further required Respondents to, among other things, (1) recognize and bargain in good faith with the Union with respect to rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment covering bargaining unit employees; (2) resume contract negotiations and honor all tentative agreements entered into from the point that negotiations were left off on November 30, 2007; (3) reinstate several employees, including, in particular, Rhandy Villanueva; and (4) rescind, at the Union’s request, any or all of the unilateral changes to bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment as they existed prior to December 1, 2007. After the March 29, 2010 Injunction, Petitioner filed a new Complaint against Respondents with the NLRB, and also sought in this court contempt sanctions (the subject of this order) and another § 10(j) injunction (the subject of a separate order, see Frankl v. HTH Corp., Civ. No. 11-00451 JMS/RLP). Given the substantial overlap in factual issues between the contempt and § 10(j) issues, the parties agreed to delay full briefing on the contempt motion until trial transcripts in the NLRB action were completed. In the meantime, however, on June 14, 2011, the Board largely affirmed the ALJ Decision, see HTH Corp., 356 NLRB No. 182, which resulted in Petitioner withdrawing its original Motion for Contempt filed in this action — the request for coercive sanctions was mooted by the Board decision. On July 13, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s § 10(j) injunction. Frankl, 650 F.3d at 1334. On July 8, 2011, Petitioner filed his Amended Motion for Adjudication and Order in Civil Contempt and for Compensatory Relief. On September 13, 2011, ALJ John J. McCarrick, after hearing sixteen days of testimony, issued a Decision finding that Respondents committed various violations of the NLRA (the same subject matter as the contempt issues in this action). Respondents filed their Opposition to the Amended Motion for Contempt on September 19, 2011, and Petitioner filed his Reply on October 3, 2011. A hearing was held on October 31, 2011. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Civil contempt “consists of a party’s disobedience to a specific and definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir.1993)). Although the contempt “need not be willful, [ ] a person should not be held in contempt if his action appears to be based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the court’s order.” Id. (quoting In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 695); see also Boink Systems, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sands Corp., 2011 WL 3419438, at *3 (D.Nev. Aug. 3, 2011) (“A few technical violations do not vitiate substantial compliance if a party has made reasonable efforts to comply.” (citations omitted)). Further, substantial compliance with the court order is a defense to civil contempt. In re DualrDeck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 695. The party claiming civil contempt must demonstrate a violation of the court’s order by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Accordingly, the moving party must establish that “(1) that [the alleged contemnor] violated the court order, (2) beyond substantial compliance, (3) not based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the order, (4) by clear and convincing evidence.” United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 694 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Trans. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir.2009)); see also F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.1999) (“The standard for finding a party in civil contempt is well settled: The moving party has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a specific and definite order of the court.”). If the moving party meets this initial four-part test, the burden then shifts to the alleged contemnor to demonstrate why it was unable to comply. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d at 1239; Stone v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 n. 9 (9th Cir.1992). In other words, the accused party must “show [that it] took every reasonable step to comply.” Stone, 968 F.2d at 856 n. 9 (citation omitted). To assess whether an alleged contemnor has taken “every reasonable step” to comply with the terms of a court order, the court can consider a variety of factors, including, for example, whether the contemnor has a history of noncompliance, and whether the contemnor failed to comply despite the pendency of a contempt motion. See Stone, 968 F.2d at 857. “A court has wide latitude in determining whether there has been contemptuous defiance of its order,” Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir.1984) (citations omitted); see also Stone, 968 F.2d at 856, and “retains discretion to establish appropriate sanctions.” Bright, 596 F.3d at 696. Sanctions for civil contempt may be imposed to coerce compliance with a court order and/or to compensate the injured party for losses sustained. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir.2008); Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 517 (9th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-04, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947)). “Unlike the punitive nature of criminal sanctions, civil sanctions are wholly remedial.” Whittaker Corp., 953 F.2d at 517 (citation omitted). IV. DISCUSSION The March 29, 2010 Injunction required Respondents to refrain from engaging in certain practices that violated the Act (such as refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union, discharging employees in order to discourage Union activities and membership, or unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees), as well as to take certain affirmative steps to comply with the Act (such as bargain in good faith with the Union, resume contract negotiations and honor all tentative agreements, and rescind unilateral changes). Petitioner argues that after the March 29, 2010 Injunction, Respondents committed numerous violations of the Act, "with these same alleged violations constituting violations of the March 29, 2010 Injunction. In a separate action, Frankl v. HTH Corp. et al., Civ. No. 11-00451 JMS/RLP, Petitioner sought a § 10(j) injunction for these most recent violations of the Act, which this court granted on November 21, 2011 (the “November 21, 2011 Injunction”). Because a violation of the Act may also constitute a violation of the March 29, 2010 Injunction, where appropriate, the court draws heavily from the November 21, 2011 Injunction. The court first determines that Respondents should be held in contempt and then turns to the issue of appropriate sanctions. A. Whether Petitioner Has Established That Respondents Have Violated the March 29, 2010 Injunction The court addresses each of Respondents’ alleged violations of the Act in turn. 1. Discipline, Suspension, and Termination of Villanueva Petitioner argues that Respondents’ discipline, suspension, and termination of Villanueva violated several provisions of the March 29, 2010 Injunction. a. Facts Villanueva was employed at the Hotel from May 1993 to November 30, 2007, and again from April 12, 2010 to July 28, 2010. Joint Ex. A at 102. Starting in 2003 until he was terminated in 2007, Villanueva served as a Housekeeper II working the day shift, which entailed delivering linens, answering guest calls, supporting the room attendant, and picking up trash at the end of the shift. Id. at 102-03, 106-07, 113, 185. Both before and after his 2007 termination, Villanueva was an active Union participant — he served as one of the original members of the Union negotiating committee, attended negotiating sessions between the Hotel and Union, attended Union meetings, and spoke with Hotel employees about the Union. Id. at 111-12. The March 29, 2010 Injunction found that Petitioner established a likelihood of success in proving that Respondents violated the Act by discharging Villanueva for his Union participation, and therefore ordered Respondents to reinstate him. Norelli, 699 F.Supp.2d at 1198-99, 1207. As a result, on April 12, 2010, Respondents reinstated Villanueva as a Housekeeper II on the evening shift, with duties including cleaning and servicing rooms and delivering linen, towels, and other supplies to the housekeepers’ supply closets. Joint Ex. A at 113. In comparison to his previous duties, Villanueva had not restocked the housekeepers’ supply closets since 2003 and had never cleaned rooms. Id. at 113— 14. As to training for his new duties, Villanueva shadowed a Houseman for one day, after which Villanueva worked alone. Id. at 116-17. Shortly after his reinstatement, Villanueva was disciplined for his failure to follow various unwritten rules, which resulted in his termination on July 28, 2010. i. Placement of cases of toilet paper/production log incident On May 20, 2010, Villanueva received a “written verbal warning” from Human Resource Manager Margaret Yang (‘Yang”) regarding his failure to properly store a case of toilet paper on April 27, 2010, and his failure to properly complete his production log during the first week of May 2010. Id. at 146-48. As to the storage of the case of toilet paper, on April 27, 2010, Villanueva had placed the case on the top shelf of a housekeepers’ closet while he was re-stocking. Id. at 127-28, 432. The top shelf is 60 and 5/8 inches from the floor, and the case of toilet paper weighs 37 pounds, is 23 inches wide, 17 inches high, and 18 inches deep. Id. at 53, 307. On April 28, 2010, Executive Housekeeper Christine Ko (“Ko”), Housekeeping Supervisor Bobby Hind (“Hind”), and Housekeeping Manager Sandy Lam (“Lam”) notified Villanueva that when delivering toilet paper, he must not place it on the top shelf because it is not safe. Id. at 127-29, 432. Villanueva explained that he had done so because there was no room on the bottom shelf, and he did not want to leave the case on the floor next to the bottom shelf, which would block the housekeeper’s cart. Id. at 129, 143, 335-36. During the April 28, 2010 meeting, Ko told Villanueva that in the future, if there is no room on the bottom shelf, he should make a notation on the supply form and not deliver the case of toilet paper. Id. at 131-32. Villanueva was not told that he would be disciplined and did not again place cases of toilet paper on the top shelf of the housekeepers’ closets. Id. at 133,135. According to Villanueva, prior to the April 28, 2010 meeting with Ko, Lam, and Hind, he was not given any kind of written or verbal policy or procedure explaining where items should be stored in the housekeepers’ closets; nor was he told that he should not place the box of toilet paper on the top shelf. Id. at 130, 135, 137. Further, both Villanueva and housekeeper Cherlene Saulin Wong testified that they recalled seeing a case of toilet paper on the top shelf in other housekeepers’ closets on at least one occasion each. Id. at 135-36, 347-48. In comparison, Lam testified that Housemen are familiar with the practice of putting heavy items on the bottom shelf and are given instructions on how to stock the closets at the time of hiring. Id. at 907; see also id. at 847-48 (housekeeper Lolita Lucas testifying that the toilet paper is always placed on the floor of the closet); 1044 (Houseman Larry Edrada (“Edrada”) testifying that he places the toilet paper on the floor of the closet for safety reasons). As to Villanueva’s failure to properly complete his production log, during the first week of May 2010, Ko told Villanueva that instead of placing checkmarks next to the room numbers he had completed servicing on his production log, he should record the times he entered and exited a room. Id. at 144. Again, Villanueva had never been instructed to record the time he entered and exited a room in his production log and had no indication that he was going to be disciplined for his failure to properly complete the production log. Id. at 126-27, 143-44. After receiving these instructions regarding his production log from Ko, Villanueva complied. Id. at 541-42; Joint Ex. B at GC 14. Despite the fact that Villanueva had not violated any written rules and was not told of these “oral” rules before he was accused of violating them, on May 20, 2010, Villanueva received a written verbal warning for “violation of safety rules” and “failure to observe operating policies, procedures, and/or standards.” Joint Ex. B at GC3, p. 2. During this May 20, 2010 meeting, Union Business Agent Karl Lindo (“Lindo”) asked why Hotel management had waited so long to issue the warning and the rationale behind the warning, especially given that Yang and Ko had already instructed Villanueva as to the proper placement of cases of toilet paper, and Villanueva had followed their instructions. Joint Ex. A at 432. Ko responded that management wanted to put the warning in writing. Id. at 433. When Lindo asked Yang and Ko whether the warning was Hotel general manager Minicola’s decision — who was fully aware of Villanueva’s Union activity and has spearheaded Respondents’ efforts to derail the Union — neither responded. Id. ii. Unauthorized access into the housekeeping office After receiving the written verbal warning, Villanueva was involved in another incident regarding his access to the locked housekeeping office. The housekeeping office stores various items such as employee contact information and personnel files, work schedules, assignment logs, and guests’ lost and found items, and is locked after 8:00 p.m. Id. at 909-10. On July 5, 2010, while working his 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift, Villanueva responded to an employee call reporting that a guest had complained of a cockroach inside a hotel room. Id. at 157. Villanueva went to the security desk where the keys for the housekeeping office were kept, and asked Safety and Security Manager Eric Hangai (“Hangai”) for the keys so that he could retrieve “disinfectant.” Id. at 158-59. Although Villanueva did not say he needed to retrieve bug spray, Villanueva speaks English as a second language and has consistently referred to sprays as “disinfectant.” Id. at 150, 159-60, 228; see also Joint Ex. B at GC 14, p. 42 (reflecting that on July 3, 2010, Villanueva wrote in his production log, “spray disinfectant (Roaches).”); GC20, p. 3 (explaining to Minicola that he used “disinfectant” on roaches). Further, just two days prior on July 3, 2010, Villanueva had accessed the security office to obtain bug spray without incident. Joint Ex. A at 154-56; Joint Ex. B at GC14, p. 42. On that occasion, the Manager on Duty (“MOD”) called Villanueva, notifying him about a cockroach in a guest room and told him to go to security to request access to the locked housekeeping office to obtain bug spray. Joint Ex. A at 155-56. Villanueva went to security officer Bartolomé, who handed him the key, and Villanueva used the key to unlock the security office, get the spray, and used the spray on the cockroach. Id. Villanueva then logged the use of the spray on his July 3, 2010 production log. Id. at 156; Joint Ex. B at GC 14, p. 42. According to Hangai, although there is no written policy, he learned through his work as a security officer that entry into the housekeeping office after it was locked was allowed only by the MOD to access the lost and found. Joint Ex. A at 644-45. Housekeeping manager Lam also testified that Villanueva was not authorized to access the locked housekeeping office, and housekeeper Roselind Mad (“Mad”) and Edrada further explained that Housemen have no reason to enter the locked housekeeping office because all the housekeeping supplies (which apparently do not include bug spray) are kept in closets on each floor. Id. at 915, 1004, 1052-53. Because Villanueva referred to the bug spray as “disinfectant,” however, Hangai testified that he assumed a chemical was needed for an emergency cleanup and did not contact the MOD before opening the housekeeping office. Id. at 640-41. Hangai accompanied Villanueva to the housekeeping office, unlocked the office and let Villanueva inside, observing that Villanueva went directly to the cabinet and took a spray can. Id. at 647. Although Hangai looked at the spray can before allowing Villanueva to leave with it, he testified that he did not notice that it was an insecticide and did not ask Villanueva what the spray was for. Id. at 648. After giving the spray can back to Villanueva, Hangai asked if Villanueva needed to log that he was taking the spray can; Villanueva responded that there was no log for the spray can. Id. at 161, 649. Hangai therefore made a notation in the security log regarding the entry into the housekeeping office. Id. at 661-62; see also Joint Ex. B at GC 15, p. 3. Villanueva testified that after entering the guest room and spraying the. cockroach, he placed the spray can in his black housekeeping bag along with his keys and radio at the end of his shift, and dropped the bag off at the housekeeping office before clocking out, as he does at the end of every shift. Joint Ex. A at 266-67, 286-87. Villanueva testified that he placed the spray can in the housekeeping bag because he felt Ko was watching him and thought that the bag was the safest place to leave the spray. Id. at 409-10. The next day, on July 6, 2010, Hangai informed Ko that Villanueva had entered the office and removed a spray can of “565 Plus,” and that Hangai had secured the office after Villanueva left. Id. at 1173. Ko said she was not aware of Villanueva’s entry and would look into it. Id. On July 7, 2010, Ko notified Hangai that the spray can was missing from the housekeeping office. Id. at 1173-74. She also notified Hangai, after calling the manufacturer Orkin, that the “disinfectant” was commercial-grade insecticide, and that an employee had to be trained to use it, which Villanueva was not. Id. at 1175-77. iii. The July 12, 2010 suspension and the July 28, 2010 termination On July 12, 2010, Ko notified Villanueva that he was being suspended without pay, pending an investigation. Although Villanueva asked Ko why he was being suspended, Ko did not give Villanueva any specifics. Id. at 149. On July 20, 2010, the Union and Hotel held an investigatory meeting, which was attended by Villanueva, Union representatives Brian Tanaka (“Tanaka”) and Eadie Omonaka (“Omonaka”), Minicola, Yang, Ko, and note keeper Lan Yao. Id. at 1278-79; see also Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Ex. 15. The meeting started by Tanaka asking Minicola to explain the subject matter of the Hotel’s investigation of Villanueva, Joint Ex. B at GC20, p. 1; Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Ex. 15, p. 1, to which Minicola responded that Villanueva was suspended pending investigation regarding an infraction that occurred on July 5, 2010 and that they would not discuss the nature of the infractions at this point. Joint Ex. B at GC20, p. 1. Minicola proceeded to ask Villanueva a series of questions including whether anything unusual happened on his shift on July 5, 2010, whether Villanueva asked security for the key to the housekeeping office, and how many times he had accessed the housekeeping office since starting work on the night shift. Joint Ex. A at 1281-83; Joint Ex. B at GC20, pp. 1-2; Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Ex. 15, pp. 1-3. Villanueva explained that he obtained access to the housekeeping office to spray a cockroach with “disinfectant” in a guest room, that the MOD, Mad, had instructed him to spray cockroaches on other occasions, and that he had previously gained access to the housekeeping office. Joint Ex. B at GC20, pp. 1-3. Indeed, had Minicola reviewed Villanueva’s production log, he would have seen that Villanueva had sprayed “disinfectant” and/or serviced rooms for insects on at least five occasions between April 21 and July 5, 2010. Joint Ex. B at GC 14, p. 12 (“spray tub for ants”), 25 (“spray disinfectant”), 32 (“cacaroach [sic]”), 42 (“spray disinfectant (Roaches)”), 45 (“spray dis/bugs”). Further, although not asked at this meeting, Villanueva testified before ALJ McCarrick that he was unaware of any requirement that he receive authorization to gain access to the housekeeping office and that he had not dealt with a locked housekeeping office during his previous tenure working the day shift. Joint Ex. A at 172-73. Minicola next asked Ko about the normal procedure for employees to access the locked housekeeping office, and she answered that employees are supposed to see the MOD and/or call a manager, and that requests for access occur infrequently and only for emergencies. Joint Ex. B at GC20, p. 3. Ko further explained that Villanueva did not call a MOD on July 5 or leave a note, and that Villanueva was not trained to use the bug spray. Id. Minicola then brought Hangai into the meeting and asked him questions about what happened when Villanueva accessed the housekeeping office and whether Hangai thought the events of July 5, 2010 were unusual. Id. at p. 4. Hangai responded that he thought it was unusual that Villanueva requested access to the locked housekeeping office because usually only a supervisor or manager can make this request. Id. at 5. Omonaka also asked Hangai why he did not follow the purported proper procedure regarding access to the housekeeping office, and Hangai provided no response. Id. at p. 4; Joint Ex. A at 785-86. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mini-cola stated that Villanueva was not logging what .he was taking, that Villanueva should not be accessing the office, and that Villanueva may have stolen the can of bug spray. Joint Ex. B at GC20, p. 6. Minicola asserted that he was particularly concerned about Villanueva’s use of the chemical bug spray and how he got access to it. Id. Minicola concluded the meeting by notifying Tanaka that he was unsure of what would happen and that the Hotel would make a decision on the discipline and notify the Union. Id. After the July 20, 2010 meeting, Minieola received a written incident report and statement prepared by Hangai, and a statement from Yang that the spray can was not found in the housekeeping bag. Joint Ex. A at 1007-08, 1300. Minicola also received a written statement from Mad, asserting that she provided Villanueva deodorizer, not bug spray, on June 17, 2010. Specifically, Mad’s statement provided: On 6/17/10 Room 2151 I (Rose) called Rhandy to spray room w/ deodorzer [sic]. He ask where can I (Rhandy) get the spray[.] I (Rose) said maids closet. I (Rose) never give him 565 Plus to spray room. Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Ex. 26. After collecting this additional information, Minicola made the final decision to terminate Villanueva and notified Villanueva and Lin-do of this decision at a July 28, 2010 meeting. Joint Ex. A at 1299-1302; Joint Ex. B at GC-4, p. 1. Villanueva’s termination document states that he was terminated based on his violation of the following House Rules: # 1 — Falsification or giving misleading information on employment application or falsification of Company records or reports.... # 2 — Theft or misappropriation of property (such as food, beverage or keys).... # 12 — Loitering or straying into areas not designed as work areas, or where your duties do not take you. # 30 — Not reporting damaged or lost items belonging to the Company, guests, or outside agencies properties; refusing to cooperate with the Company in obtaining true and factual statements; dishonesty in any form. # 42 — Not complying with your respective Departmental Rules and Procedures. Joint Ex. B at GC 4, p. 1. Although Minicola did not provide any explanation at the July 28, 2010 termination meeting as to how Villanueva violated these rules, Minicola testified before ALJ McCarrick that he believed Villanueva had violated House Rule # 1 for falsifying statements by saying that (1) he had previously gotten the bug spray from Mad; (2) he needed “disinfectant” rather than bug spray; (3) Villanueva uses the bug spray all the time; (4) he left the bug spray in the black housekeeping bag; and (5) he did not need to leave a note about what he took from the housekeeping office. Joint Ex. A at 70-72. Minicola further explained that Villanueva violated House Rule # 2 when he failed to return the bug spray, and violated House Rule # 12 when Villanueva accessed the housekeeping office after hours. Id. at 72-73. Minicola claimed that Villanueva violated House Rule # 30 when he was dishonest about his statements to Hangai and other statements he made during the investigation, characterizing Villanueva’s statements as “vague, evasive, and unresponsive.” Id. at 73. Lastly, Minicola testified that Villanueva violated House Rule # 42 when he failed to get proper authorization to access the housekeeping office, removed the bug spray from the office without logging it, and sprayed an occupied guest room. Id. at 73-74; 1325-26. Minicola admitted that he was previously unaware of any procedures for accessing the housekeeping office, and was also unaware if anyone had informed Villanueva regarding the access procedure. Id. at 977, 1353-54. Further, although Hangai testified that he believed Ko claimed that some individuals were trained to use the 565 Plus (the specific bug spray Villanueva used), see id. at 677, Respondents did not present Ko to testify before ALJ McCarrick, none of Respondents’ witnesses has identified any specific individual trained to use the bug spray, and there is no evidence that anyone ever informed Villanueva that use of the bug spray required training. Id. at 677-78, 979-80, 1357-58. Finally, Minicola never reviewed Villanueva’s production logs to determine whether they substantiated Villanueva’s assertions that he had used bug spray on other occasions. Id. at 1364-65. b. Application Petitioner argues that the facts recited above establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents violated §§ 1(c) and 1(e) of the March 29, 2010 Injunction requiring Respondents to cease and desist from “discharging employees in order to discourage Union activities and membership,” and “in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.” See Appendix (§§ 1(c) and 1(e) of injunctive language). In other words, the March 29, 2010 Injunction ordered Respondents to refrain from violating §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act, which make it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title,” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), or “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization____” Id. § 158(a)(3). As the court previously explained in its March 29, 2010 Injunction, Norelli, 699 F.Supp.2d at 1197-98, to determine the employer’s motivation in disciplining an employee, “the General Counsel must make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer’s action.” In re Caruso Elec. Corp., 332 NLRB 519, 522 (2000) (discussing Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980)). “The elements commonly required to support such a showing [that protected conduct was a motivating factor] are union or protected activity by the employee, employer knowledge of that activity, and union animus on the part of the employer.” Intermet Stevensville, 350 NLRB 1270, 1274 (2007). If this initial showing is made, “the burden then shifts to the employer to prove, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the employee’s union activity.” Id. (citing Manno Elec., 321 NLRB 278, 280 n. 12 (1996)). Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that Villanueva’s Union participation was a motivating factor in his discipline, suspension, and termination. First, Villanueva was an active Union participant, promoting the Union even after he was terminated the first time in November 2007, and continuing his activities after he was reinstated in April 2010. Joint Ex. A at 111-12; see also Norelli, 699 F.Supp.2d at 1198 (describing Villanueva’s participation on the negotiating committee and other Union activities); HTH Corp., 2009 WL 3147894, at *27-28 (NLRB Sept. 30, 2009) (acknowledging that Villanueva served continuously on the Union’s negotiating committee from 2005 to 2007). Second, as outlined and specifically found in previous orders, Respondents were aware of Villanueva’s Union activity and harbored great animus toward the Union, even terminating Villanueva once for his Union activity. See HTH, 2009 WL 3147894 (finding that Respondents failed to rebut Petitioner’s “prima facie case, fraught with animus”), affirmed by HTH Corp., 2011 WL 2414720, at *2; see also supra (discussing the various Board decisions finding violations of the NLRA by Respondents). And Respondents have not established that they would have taken these actions in the absence of Villanueva’s Union activity. Rather, the evidence presented supports the singular inference that Respondents disciplined and ultimately terminated Villanueva based on rules (to the extent they actually existed) that were neither well-established nor known by Villanueva. Indeed, as early as Villanueva’s May 20, 2010 discipline for failing to properly stock toilet paper and fill out his production logs, it appears that Respondents were looking for reasons to discipline Villanueva and contoured the Hotel rules to suit their needs. Specifically, as to Villanueva’s stocking of the toilet paper on the top shelf of the housekeeping closet, Respondents provided Villanueva only one day of training when he began as Housekeeper II on April 12, 2010, Villanueva had last stocked the closets in 2003, and Villanueva was never told before the April 28, 2010 meeting that he should not place the toilet paper on the top shelf. Simply put, the evidence supports a finding that Villanueva was not told — and did not know — that he should not place the toilet paper on the top shelf, making his May 20, 2010 discipline unwarranted. In opposition, Respondents assert that this discipline was appropriate in light of the safety concern created by placing the toilet paper on the top shelf — Hotel employees testified that toilet paper should always be stored on the bottom for safety concerns, and Villanueva even admitted that in retrospect, placing the toilet paper on the top shelf was not safe. Joint Ex. A at 335. This testimony does not change, however, that there were no written policies stating how to properly stock a housekeeping supply closet, and toilet paper had previously been placed on the top shelf. Further, it is not a matter of common sense (as Respondents argue) that the toilet paper should be placed on the bottom shelf — the box weighed only 37 pounds and was 23 inches wide, 17 inches, and 18 inches deep, and any housekeepers that felt unsafe retrieving the toilet paper could have called a Houseman for assistance. See Joint Ex. A at 885-86. In sum, although it was perfectly appropriate for Respondents to give Villanueva directions on how to stock the shelves, the facts presented provided Respondents absolutely no reason that would support a written disciplinary measure where Villanueva was not previously told the rules. Accordingly, this incident evinces Respondents’ animus towards Villanueva. As to Villanueva’s failure to record on his log the times he started and finished each guest room that he cleaned, Respondents do not even offer an explanation for why this incident warranted a verbal written warning. Rather, the evidence presented establishes that Villanueva was not previously told to indicate the times on his log, and that others had similarly failed to denote the times on their cards and received no discipline whatsoever. See Joint Ex. B at GC21(A), Al-2, A30-81; GC21(B), B4-47; GC21(C), C5; GC21(D), Dl-6. Accordingly, the court concludes that this alleged violation of Hotel rules, like the toilet paper incident, appears to be due to Respondents’ animus towards the Union such that Respondents would not have given Villanueva the written verbal warning but for his Union activity. As to Villanueva’s access to the housekeeping office and use of the bug spray, there was no question as to why Villanueva sought access to the housekeeper’s office (to retrieve the bug spray), and no question as to what Villanueva took (Hangai visually confirmed that Villanueva had taken the spray can and marked this activity on his security log). Villanueva’s action of entering the housekeeping office can hardly be viewed as a violation of Hotel rules given that (1) Hangai, who purported to know the Hotel policy against access, allowed Villanueva access; (2) Respondents presented no evidence of any written policy regarding access to the housekeeping office; and (3) there is no evidence suggesting that Villanueva, who had previously worked the day shift when the office was open, knew of any Hotel policy that Housemen were not allowed access to the housekeeping office after it closes. Further, there is ample evidence that despite any assertion by Respondents of a policy against spraying chemicals in occupied guest rooms, see Joint Ex. A at 66, Housemen were not aware such policy existed. See, e.g., id. at 152-57, 159-60, 1062. Indeed, Villanueva had previously used bug spray in guest rooms on a number of occasions and indicated such use on his log, and was not corrected and/or disciplined. Joint Ex. B at GC14 pp. 12, 25, 32, 42. Given that Villanueva’s infractions of Hotel policies (to the extent those policies actually existed) were minor and at best caused by Respondents’ failure to properly establish policies and/or train its employees, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Villanueva’s suspension and the following investigation and termination were based on Union animus, and that these actions would not have been taken by Respondents but for that animus. That is, but for Villanueva’s Union activity, Respondents would not have terminated him. Indeed, Minicola’s “investigation” and July 20, 2010 meeting bordered on farcical. Minicola did not seek to determine whether the “rules” proffered by his managers were written (they were not), whether staff was informed of them (even Minicola admitted he was not aware of them), and whether Villanueva was told of them (he was not). Instead, Minicola asked Villanueva a series of ambiguous questions without giving Villanueva any advance notice of the precise alleged rules violations at issue. Minicola also gathered only the evidence that he knew would support a finding of rules violations by Villanueva— Minicola relied on testimony and statements of his managers and did not review any objective evidence such as Villanueva’s production logs. Had Minicola reviewed Villanueva’s production logs, he would have seen that Villanueva had documented his use of bug spray on several occasions, calling into serious question whether any of these “rules” that Villanueva allegedly violated actually existed. Further, none of Minieola’s explanations of the rules that Villanueva violated stands up to scrutiny; and these explanations certainly do not suggest that Minicola terminated Villanueva in good faith or that he took reasonable steps to comply with the March 29, 2010 Injunction. Specifically, Minicola found that Villanueva had violated House Rule # 1 by falsifying statements when he said that he (1) had previously gotten the bug spray from Mad; (2) needed “disinfectant” rather than bug spray; (3) uses the bug spray all the time; (4) left the bug spray in the black housekeeping bag; and (5) did not need to leave a note about what he took from the housekeeping office. These conclusions are simply not supported by the record. If Minicola had only reviewed Villanueva’s production logs, he would have seen that Villanueva sprayed for insects on several previous occasions, referred to bug spray as “disinfectant” on his logs, and had logged that he sprayed on July 5. Further, Villanueva’s failure to leave a note stating what he took from the housekeeping office did not violate any Hotel rule that Respondents can point to, and leaving a note would appear redundant given that Hangai personally escorted Villanueva to confirm what was taken and Villanueva recorded spraying for bugs on his July 5, 2010 production log. Id. at p. 45. Minicola’s (and now Respondents in their Opposition) assertions that Villanueva falsified statements only serves to highlight that Respondents were guided by the outcome they sought (terminating Villanueva) as opposed to the process (determining what really happened). For example, as to Villanueva’s statement that he had previously obtained bug spray from Mad, Mad provided Minicola a statement that on June 17, 2010, she provided Villanueva deodorizer, not bug spray, to use in a room. Villanueva’s production logs confirm this statement — his production log on June 17, 2010 states “spray deodorizer” in room 2151. See Joint Ex. B, GC Ex. 14, at 37. As a result, it appears that Mad was asked to provide a statement regarding a date separate from when Villanueva asserts she provided him with the bug spray. Further, Mad’s statement that she “never give him 565 Plus to spray room,” Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Ex. 26, is ambiguous — it is unclear whether Mad’s statement means she never gave Villanueva the bug spray on June 17, 2010 (as opposed to any of the other occasions he used the spray), or that she never gave him bug spray on any date. Given that Villanueva had sprayed for insects on multiple occasions, see Joint Ex. B at GC 14 pp. 12, 25, 32, 42, and 45, Mad’s statement hardly establishes that Villanueva was dishonest. At the very least, a simple review of Villanueva’s production logs should have led Minicola to further investigation. Instead, Minicola jumped to the conclusion that Villanueva had lied. As another example, Minicola’s conclusion that Villanueva lied about needing “disinfectant” to gain access to the housekeeping office is spurious. The record makes clear that Villanueva consistently used the term “disinfectant” to refer to aerosol sprays. Respondents nonetheless insist that Villanueva knew the difference between bug spray and disinfectant because he also used the term “disinfectant” to refer to deodorizers. See Resp’t Opp’n at 21. But Villanueva’s testimony establishes that he used this term indiscriminately to refer to aerosol sprays, which is not surprising given that English is his second language. And a simple review (again, which Minicola did not do) confirms that Villanueva believed that the term “disinfectant” in fact included bug spray — his July 3, 2010 production log (created prior to the time Villanueva would have any motive to lie) states “spray disinfectant (Roaches).” Joint Ex. B, GC 42. Thus, any argument that Villanueva intentionally deceived Hangai is absurd. As to Minicola’s assertion that Villanueva violated House Rule # 2 prohibiting theft when he failed to return the bug spray, Minicola had no evidence that Villanueva stole the spray can. Given that Villanueva felt that Hotel management was watching him, Joint Ex. A at 409-10, Villanueva was especially careful in placing the spray can in his housekeeping bag at the end of the night and it would make no sense that Villanueva would steal a spray can that Hangai specifically watched him take for use in the Hotel. Thus, Minicola’s speculative conclusion that Villanueva stole the bug spray provides further support that Respondents were motivated by Union animus and would not otherwise have taken the same disciplinary actions. As to Minicola’s finding that Villanueva violated House Rule # 12 prohibiting entry into non-designated areas when he accessed the housekeeping office after hours, even Minicola admitted that he was not aware of any specific rules regarding entry into the housekeeping office. Given the particular circumstances — that Hangai escorted Villanueva to the housekeeping office and allowed Villanueva to enter, and Villanueva was new to working the evening shift — this “violation” lacks support and reflects not a neutral application of the House Rules, but a specific animus towards Villanueva because of his Union support. As to Minicola’s claim that Villanueva violated House Rule # 30 by being dishonest at the July 20, 2010 meeting, the minutes of the July 20, 2010 meeting reveal that Minicola asked Villanueva a series of vague questions that Villanueva did not fully understand, see Joint Ex. B at GC20, and Omonaka described Minicola’s questioning as confusing. Joint Ex. A at 780. This single interview with Villanueva hardly supports a finding that Villanueva tried to impede Minicola’s investigation and/or otherwise was dishonest given that Minicola refused to tell Villanueva and the Union officials up front the precise subject matter of the meeting, English is not Villanueva’s first language, and Minicola did not make much effort at all to clarify his questions. Further, although Minicola did receive some evidence suggesting that Villanueva may have violated some rules on use of the bug spray, there is no dispute that Villanueva had sprayed for insects on multiple occasions and did not know of these rules such that his actions did not warrant the harsh discipline of termination meted out by the Hotel. Finally, as to Minicola’s assertion that Villanueva violated House Rule #42 requiring employees to follow Hotel rules when he failed to get proper authorization to access the housekeeping office, removed the bug spray from the office "without logging it, and sprayed an occupied guest room, as explained above, there were no established Hotel rules on these issues. Indeed, even Minicola admitted that he was unaware of any written policies or procedures regarding access to the locked housekeeping office. In opposition, Respondents argue that there were multiple instances in which Villanueva was dishonest, supporting his termination. For example, Respondents assert that Villanueva (1) lied to Hangai when he sought the “disinfectant” from the housekeeping office; (2) could not identify who had given him the work order to spray the cockroach; and (8) lied about spraying because no guests were moved from their rooms and Villanueva’s description of the guests did not match the guests that stayed in the room he allegedly sprayed. As explained above, the court rejects that the record suggests that Villanueva was dishonest and Respondents’ assertions to the contrary are offensive in light of the record. Throughout his logs and testimony, Villanueva has consistently used the term “disinfectant” to refer to aerosol sprays (whether bug or deodorizer) such that his use of this word with Hangai does not support any inference of deceit. Most importantly, prior to July 5, he referred to spraying “disinfectant” to kill roaches. See Joint Ex. B, GC 14 at 42. Further, that Villanueva could not identify who gave him the work order and/or possibly described the room’s occupants incorrectly should come as no surprise — Villanueva had used bug spray on several other occasions, and he was questioned about the July 5, 2010 event over two weeks after it occurred. Finally, there is no evidence that Villanueva actually lied about spraying for a cockroach — he obtained the bug spray and wrote on his log “spray dis/ bugs.” Respondents further argue that Villanueva was treated the same as other employees, and that some employees were terminated for infractions that were even less severe than those committed by Villanueva. Resp’t Opp’n at 69. Again, the court disagrees. As explained above, Villanueva was ultimately terminated for violating a handful of unwritten rules of which he was not aware and where not otherwise intuitive. Under these circumstances, Villanueva’s termination does not appear similar in kind to terminations of other employees. Further, Respondents terminated Hotel employees for violations that were far more serious than Villanueva’s alleged violations, including, among others, the termination of (1) B.F. for failing to report to work for three days; (2) S.J. for failing to report for work for six days; (8) B.T. for sleeping during his shift; (4) K.C. for completing his time card for a day he did not work; and (5) J.B. for a repeated refusal to follow directions of his supervisor and failure to perform his job duties. Joint Ex. B at GC25(G), p. G8; Joint Ex. C at Resp’t 12, pp. 3, 12, 27, and 71. In sum, there is no evidence of any established rules that Villanueva violated, no evidence that Villanueva was aware of the rules he allegedly violated, and scant evidence supporting Minicola’s conclusion for termination. Rather, the evidence strongly supports the singular conclusion that Respondents disciplined and terminated Villanueva to discourage Union participation. It is inexplicable how, especially after Respondents had terminated Villanueva once out of Union animus, Respondents could possibly believe that these trumped up Rules violations would support Villanueva’s termination. The court therefore concludes that Respondents did not act in good faith in disciplining and terminating Villanueva, and certainly did not take reasonable steps to comply with March 29, 2010 Injunction. Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents disciplined and terminated Villanueva in violation of §§ 1(c) and 1(e) of the March 29, 2010 Injunction. 2. Change in housekeeper room cleaning requirements Petitioner argues that Respondents violated the March 29, 2010 Injunction when they unilaterally changed the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean without bargaining. a. Facts In December 2007, Respondents unilaterally changed the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean from 15 to 17 rooms per day in the Beach Tower and 16 to 18 rooms per day in the Ocean Tower. See HTH Corp., 2011 WL 2414720, at *2, *6. The March 29, 2010 Injunction required Respondents to rescind this (and multiple other) unilateral changes upon the Union’s request. Appendix (at § 2(e) of injunctive relief). Accordingly, upon the Union’s request, on April 18, 2010, Respondents restored the original room cleaning assignments. Joint Ex. A at 1509; Joint Ex. B at GC36. At a June 24, 2010 meeting between Minicola and Union representatives, Mini-cola gave notice that effective July 1, 2010, Respondents were again increasing the room cleaning requirements from 15 to 17 rooms per day in the Beach Tower and from 16 to 18 rooms per day in the Ocean Tower. Joint Ex. A at 1501, 1503; Joint Ex. B at GC54. Minicola explained that the increase was due to, among other things, economic hardship and the changing nature of the hotel occupancy. Joint Ex. A at 1501, 2658-59, 2660-61. In a June 25, 2010 letter confirming this meeting, Mini-cola told Union representative, Dave Mori (“Mori”), that the Hotel would be increasing the room assignment requirements as discussed, and that the Hotel is willing “to bargain over the effects of the changes.” Joint Ex. B at GC54. Also in a June 25, 2010 letter, Mori demanded that Minicola not implement any unilateral changes until, among other things, the Hotel bargains with the Union. Joint Ex. B at GC55. As promised by Minicola, the increase to the room cleaning requirements went into effect on July 1, 2010. Joint Ex. A at 2664. In a September 13, 2010 letter, Minicola stated that Respondents were implementing the original 15 room requirement for the Beach Tower and the 16 room requirement for the Ocean Tower. Joint Ex. B at GC76. Minicola explained that the increase did not work — “[w]hile the housekeepers were scheduled with the 17-18 rooms in mind, the Hotel found it unworkable and the so-called quota 15-16 rooms never really changed despite that notice and the attempts to schedule with 17-18 rooms.” Id. Minicola therefore reasoned that “the 15-16 rooms quota is back in place and in fact has never changed.” Id. Despite Minicola’s September 13, 2010 letter asserting that the room assignment requirements were restored, the housekeeping logs reflect that Respondents did not restore the room requirements as promised in Minicola’s September 13, 2010 letter. Specifically, housekeeper Virginia Recaido’s (“Recaído”) logs reveal that since September 13, 2010, she had cleaned rooms according to the higher requirements. Joint Ex. [ A XXXX-XXXX ], 2235-46, 2247-54, 2251-61, 2262-76, 2282-86; Joint Ex. B at GC93; Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Exs. 29-32. Further, even Minicola now asserts that “[f]or a few months during the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011, the number of rooms assigned to housekeepers to clean fluctuated due to economic demands of the Hotel’s operations,” resulting in times where housekeepers were assigned either more or less than the agreed-to number depending on the Hotel’s needs. See Doc. No. 37-1, Minicola Decl. ¶ 3. Minicola further asserts that “[a]s of April 2011, the housekeeping room assignments remained at 15 per day for the Beach Tower and 16 per day for the Ocean Tower.” Id. ¶ 4. b. Application Petitioner argues that Respondents’ unilateral increase of the Hotel room cleaning assignments violated several provisions of the March 29, 2010 Injunction, including: § 1(b) requiring Respondents to cease and desist from refusing to recognize or bargain in good faith with the Union with respect to the terms and conditions of employment for its bargaining unit employees; § 1(d) requiring Respondents to cease and desist from unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees; § 1(e) requiring Respondents to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by the Act; § 2(a) requiring Respondents to recognize and bargain in good faith with the Union; § 2(b) requiring Respondents to honor all tentative agreements entered into as of November 30, 2007; and § 2(d) requiring Defendants to immediately rescind, at the Union’s request, any or all of the unilateral changes to bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment as they existed prior to December 1, 2007. These provisions in the March 29, 2010 Injunction are co-extensive with §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act, which prevents and employer from making “a unilateral change in a term or condition of employment — so-called ‘mandatory subjects’ of bargaining — without first bargaining to impasse over the relevant term.” Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.2008) (discussing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962)); Richmond Elec. Servs., 348 NLRB 1001, 1002 (2006). “A bargaining impasse occurs at the point in time when the parties would be warranted in believing that continued bargaining would be futile.” Richmond Elec. Servs., 348 NLRB at 1002. And where the parties are negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, “an employer’s obligation to refrain from unilateral changes extends beyond the mere duty to give notice and an opportunity to bargain; it encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” Bottom, Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: “[w]hen a union, in response to an employer’s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.” Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Employees’ workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that Respondents violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act unilaterally changing the housekeepers’ workloads by adding two additional rooms to clean per day); see also Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 NLRB 953 (1958) (explaining that workloads such as the number of machines assigned to an employee are mandatory subjects of bargaining). The evidence clearly establishes that Respondents unilaterally changed the number of rooms that housekeepers were assigned to clean without bargaining to impasse on a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, unless Respondents’ conduct falls within a recognized exception, Respondents had no excuse for making this unilateral change in violation of the Act and the March 29, 2010 Injunction. None of Respondents’ justifications for making this unilateral change withstands scrutiny — they neither establish that their actions fell within a recognized exception nor suggest that Respondents took every reasonable step to comply with the March 29, 2010 Injunction. For example, Respondents argue that the change was de minimis — and therefore not subject to mandatory bargaining — because the changes lasted for only several months and the actual number of rooms housekeepers cleaned fluctuated such that the change did not affect the housekeeper’s overall workload. Resp’t Opp’n at 73-74. As an initial matter, Respondents’ assertion that the increase in rooms did not affect housekeeper workloads is not supported by the evidence — although Minicola generally asserts that the number of rooms housekeepers were required to clean fluctuated, the more specific and objective evidence (ie., Reciado’s testimony and logs), establishes that she was consistently assigned to clean rooms based on the higher room requirement. Further, the room assignment requirement was not de minimis — it materially and significantly affected the terms and conditions of employment of the housekeepers by increasing the number of rooms they may need to clean on a given day. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see also EAD Motors E. Air Devices, Inc., 346 NLRB 1060, 1065 (2006) (“[T]he Board has made clear that in order to constitute a unilateral change that violates the Act, an employer’s action must effect a material, substantial, and significant change in terms or conditions of employment.”); Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.1971) (“A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.”). That the increase was not de minimis is confirmed by the fact that Respondents disciplined housekeepers who failed to clean their assigned number of rooms. See Joint Ex. C at Resp’t Ex. 14, p. 58 (disciplini