Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER BABCOCK, District Judge. Plaintiff, CIVIX-DDI, LLC (“CIVIX”), asserts claims for infringement of United States Patents Nos. 4,974,170 (“ 170 patent”) and/or 5,682,525 (“ ’525 patent”) against seven remaining Defendants, Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), De-Lorme Publishing Company, Inc., d/b/a DeLorme Mapping Company (“De-Lorme”), InfoUSA, Inc. (“InfoUSA”), Zip2 Corporation (“Zip2”), Infoseek Corporation (“Infoseek”), Lycos, Inc. (“Lycos”), and Excite, Inc. (“Excite”) (collectively “Defendants”). CIVIX moves for summary judgment against each Defendant. Defendants plead the affirmative defenses of non-infringement and invalidity. All Defendants, except Microsoft and Info-seek, cross-move for summary judgment on grounds of non-infringement. Pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), I held a hearing on December 10, 1999, and permitted the parties to brief the interpretation of the claims in question. I have reserved the question of invalidity pending determination on the cross-motions for summary judgment on infringement/non-infringement grounds. Having the benefit of the Markman hearing to construe the claims in question, and for the following reasons, I deny CIVIX’ motions for summary judgment and grant the moving Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the issue of invalidity is moot as to these Defendants. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338. I. Background The following facts are undisputed. The T70 patent, entitled “Electronic Directory for Identifying a Selected Group of Subscribers,” was issued November 27, 1990 to Lincoln Bouve and Edward Holmes. The ’170 patent matured from an application filed on January 25, 1990, Application No. 470,221 (“’221 application”). The ’221 application is a continuation from a parent application, Application No. 07/146,692, filed January 21, 1988, now abandoned. The ’170 patent contains seven claims, three of which are at issue in this Order. As explained in the T70 patent’s specification: Travelers are typically unaware of the locations of businesses or historical sites and must use directories to find such. Commonly, a tourist bureau provides a list of historical sites, or a Chamber of Commerce may provide a directory of businesses. Generally, one must first find a visitor’s center or other location which distributes this kind of directory. This is quite time consuming, their having to know where the directories are distributed before they can have access to the information. (’170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 15-24). The T70 patent sought to address this problem by providing publicly accessible “user stations” with electronic directories and methods for locating businesses within the directories. (’170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 25-32). Figures 1 and 2 of the T70 patent illustrate a preferred embodiment of a base or user station. The invention can be used to identify and locate selected “subscribers” within a fixed geographical region surrounding the user station. (T70 Patent, Col. 1 lines 35-42). The user can query the database for the identification and location of subscribers with desired characteristics. (T70 Patent, Col. 1 lines 45-55). For example, a person can query the database for the names and locations of drugstores within a one mile radius of the user station. A map showing the locations of these subscribers is then provided to the user. Figure 6 of the ’170 patent is an illustration of a map produced by the user station. The ’525 patent, entitled “System and Methods for Remotely Accessing a Selected Group of Items of Interest from a Database,” was issued October 28, 1997 to Lincoln Bouve, William Semple, and Steven Oxman. The ’525 patent matured from an application filed on January 11, 1995, Application No. 371,425 (“ ’425 application”). The ’525 patent contains thirty-seven claims, eight of which are specifically at issue in this Order. As explained in the “Background of the Invention” section of the ’525 patent, this newer invention was created, in part, to overcome limitations inherent in the T70 patent: Electronic directories for identifying selected subscribers within a city are known in the prior art. For example, U.S. Pat. No. 4,974,170 [the ’170 patent] describes one system which includes a fixed kiosk with an internal memory for storing locations such as businesses and historical sites within a predetermined distance from the kiosk.... However, such a system is inflexible. The map generated by the system is predefined; and thus the user cannot access or select information about businesses and historical sites outside of the predefined map. A user of the system must also know the exact location of the kiosk in order to use the system. Tourists and business travelers to the city are unlikely to know of the kiosk; and thus the kiosk system is of little use to such users. Further, a user must be physically present at the kiosk in order to access the information about the businesses and/or sites in the surrounding area. (’525 Patent, Col. 1 lines 19-38). The ’525 patent addresses these insufficiencies by allowing remote access to select items of interest from a database, and for displaying the location of items of interests to the user at the remote location. (’525 Patent, Col. 1 lines 48-52). A user can access a common data base from a remote location to generate a map which locates selected items of interest. For example, a user in Denver, from a personal computer with a modem, can select a display of drugstores in the area surrounding the Chicago O’Hara International Airport. (’525 Patent, Abstract). A user can also display locations of items of interest relative to the user’s own position. The Defendants manufacture and sell various types of mapping technology and services. Each Defendant’s product and/or service will be discussed, as relevant, in the respective summary judgment sections. CIVIX commenced this action on January 26, 1999, alleging that Defendants’ individual products and/or services infringe either the ’525 or the ’170 patents. II. Summary Judgment Standards The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether trial is necessary. See White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1995). Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The non-moving party has the burden of showing that issues of undetermined material fact exist. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of genuine issues for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., Inc., 971 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir.1992). Once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in the complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried. Rule 56(e); see also Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.1980). These facts may be shown “by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment is also appropriate when the court concludes that no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party based on thé evidence presented in the motion and response. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The operative inquiry is whether, based on all documents submitted, reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment should not enter if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Mares, 971 F.2d at 494. Unsupported allegations without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint” are insufficient, see White at 360 (citations omitted), as are conclusory assertions that factual disputes exist. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where, as here, the parties file cross motions for summary judgment, I assume that no evidence need be considered other than that filed by the parties. Nevertheless, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts. See James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 124 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is appropriate in cases alleging patent infringement. “It is no longer debatable that the issues in a patent case are subject to summary judgment.” Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1988). As will be explained below, summary judgment of non-infringement employs a two-step approach: construction of claims and comparison of the devices. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed.Cir.1999). The first step is a question of law and the second is generally a question of fact. See id. A mere dispute over the meaning of a phrase or term does not create an issue of fact. See Rutgers v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 764 (Fed.Cl. 1998) (citing Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1989). This is true even when the meaning cannot be determined without resort to extrinsic evidence. See id. Thus, summary judgment of non-infringement is properly granted if, “after viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue whether the accused device is encompassed by the claims.” Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1304. III. Claim Construction CIVTX and most of the Defendants cross-move for summary judgment, on grounds of infringement and non-infringement respectively. However, prior to determining issues of summary judgment, I construe the claims and decide the meaning and scope of any disputed terms in the claims as a matter of law. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Barber-Colman Holdings Corp., 62 F.3d 1433, 1995 WL 453120 (Fed. Cir.1995). Determining infringement is a two-step process: “First, the claims of the patent must be construed to determine their scope. Second, a determination must be made as to whether the properly construed claims read on the accused device.” Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1304 (citing Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1993)). Thus, only after construing the disputed claims do I apply these claims to summary judgment infringement analysis. A. Standards of Claim Construction Claim construction is a matter of law exclusively for the court’s determination. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 379, 116 S.Ct. 1384. In interpreting a patent’s claims, I first look to the intrinsic evidence of record, including the claims of the patent, the written description, and the prosecution history. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 870 (Fed.Cir.1998). Such evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). Only if the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous in delineating the scope of the patent should I resort to extrinsic evidence. See Phillips Petroleum, 157 F.3d at 870. I must read the claims in the context provided by the patent specification. Two canons of claim construction assist in this reading: (a) one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written description to define a term already in a claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. These two rules lay out the general relationship between the claims and the written description. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998); see also Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“an attribute of the preferred embodiment cannot be read into the claim as a limitation.”). The specification contains a written description of the invention which may also act as a dictionary explaining the invention and defining terms in the claims. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979; Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.1999) (“a patentee can act as his own lexicographer to specifically define terms of a claim contrary to their ordinary meaning”). Additionally, I consider the prosecution history in construing the claims. See Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 862 (Fed.Cir.1991). Although the doctrine of prosecution estoppel applies only to the doctrine of equivalents and not claim construction, reference to prosecution history may be instructive of the meaning of disputed claim language. See id. For example, during prosecution a patentee may disclaim a particular interpretation of claim language to avoid replicating prior art. See id. at 863; see also Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“Prosecution history is relevant not only for purposes of prosecution history estoppel but also for construing the meaning and scope of the claims.”). Furthermore, I may receive extrinsic evidence to correctly interpret the true meaning of the patent’s language. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Nevertheless, the type of extrinsic evidence considered and the extent of its use are circumscribed. In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit criticized a district court for relying on expert testimony in interpreting the claim language: Had the district court relied on the expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence solely to help it understand the underlying technology, we could not say the district court was in error. But testimony on the technology is far different from other expert testimony, whether it be of an attorney, a technical expert, or the inventor, on the proper construction of a disputed claim term, relied on by the district court in this case. The latter kind of testimony may only be relied upon if the patent documents, taken as a whole, are insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms. Such instances will rarely, if ever, occur.... Even in those rare instances, prior art documents and dictionaries, although to a lesser extent, are more objective and reliable guides. Unlike expert testimony, these sources are accessible to the public in advance of litigation. They are to be preferred over opinion testimony, whether by an attorney or artisan in the field of technology to which the patent is directed. Indeed, opinion testimony on claim construction should be treated with the utmost caution, for it is no better than opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. Ultimately, “the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.” See Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1251. I begin with the language of the claims, specification, and prosecution history and will only resort to extrinsic evidence if the disputed claim terms are not clear in that context. B. Claim Construction of the ’170 Patent The ’170 patent contains the following disputed claims with disputed terms underlined: [Claim 1] Apparatus for identifying locations within a predetermined region of a selected group of a set of a plurality of subscribers relative to the location of a user station comprising, a user station within said predetermined region for interrogating said apparatus, means for generating a map of said predetermined region, data base means having data regarding each subscriber of said set of subscribers, said data including coordinates of said map identifying the location for each subscriber in said predetermined region of said set of subscribers and a characteristic for each subscriber, wherein said characteristic is common to a group of said subscribers, input means at said user station for identifying at least one characteristic of said group, means responsive to the identification at said user station of said at least one characteristic for searching said data base means with reference to said at least one characteristic to determine the members of said selected group as at least those subscribers having locations in said predetermined region and said at least one characteristic, and means for displaying said map at said user station with the locations thereon of said members of said selected group relative to the location of said user station. [Claim 2] Apparatus according to claim 1 wherein said means for generating said map comprises an electronic memory element. [Claim 5] A method for identifying the location within a predetermined region of a selected group of a set of a plurality of subscribers relative to the location of a user station comprising, providing to said user station map electronic information representing a map of said predetermined region around said user station, providing to said user station subscriber electronic information representing the location and at least one characteristic for each subscriber of said set of subscribers, said at least one characteristic being common to the members of a group, selecting at said user station at least one of said characteristics as a group characterization identifying a group of said subscribers, searching said subscriber electronic information with respect to said group characterization, and providing said map at said user location displaying the locations of members of said selected group identified by said group characterization relative to the location of said user station. 1. Claims 1 & 5 — “User Station” The term “user station” appears throughout the ’170 patent and is a term crucial to the invention. Defendants argue that “user station” is a fixed, public structure and not a non-fixed, non-public structure, such as a personal computer. CI-VIX, on the other hand, contends that “user station” should not be so narrowly defined and instead is any computer or other electronic device, available to a user for interrogating a database. CIVIX bases its interpretation of “user station” on the view that “work station,” a common computer term, is defined as “a computer terminal or microcomputer connected to a mainframe, minicomputer, or data-processing network.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition 1997. Additionally, CIVIX stresses that the ’170 patent itself explains that the “user station” is designed to interrogate a database containing a map and subscriber electronic information. (T70 Patent, Col. 1 lines 46-55). Furthermore, CIVIX looks to the prosecution history where the applicants added the phrase “user station, such as” before the word “kiosks” to emphasize the fact that a kiosk is merely a type of user station. (’170 Patent, Col. 1 line 81) (T70 Prosecution History File, CIV000015, CIV 000058). Finally, CIVIX argues that the terms “kiosk” and/or “fixed” never appear in the claims themselves and, therefore, I should not read this limitation into them. Instead, a fixed kiosk is merely one embodiment of a user station. I first address Defendants’ means-plus-function argument surrounding the term “user station.” Defendants urge that the term “user station” appears as part of a functional term and is thus limited to the kiosk specification. Claim 1 of the ’170 patent teaches, “a user station within said predetermined region for interrogating said apparatus.” Defendants argue that this phrase denotes only a place for interrogating the apparatus, recites no structure and, accordingly, must be construed as limited to the corresponding structure disclosed in the patent specification. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶6. I disagree that this phrase implies a means-plus-function limitation. Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides that limitations “expressed as a means ... for performing a specified function without the recital of structure ... in support thereof, ... shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure ... described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Paragraph 6 “operates to cut back on the type of means which could literally satisfy the claim language.” Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1989). More specifically, “where a claim sets forth a means for performing a specific function, without reciting any specific structure for performing that function, the structure disclosed in the specification must be considered, and the patent claim construed to cover both the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof.” Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201 (Fed.Cir. 1987). The phrase at issue here does not use the word “means,” and although a claim element might still meet the requirements of § 112, ¶ 6, this does not. In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Com’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed.Cir.1998), the Federal Circuit stated: We also made clear that use of the term “means” is central to the analysis: “the use of the term ‘means’ has come to be so closely associated with ‘means-plus-function’ claiming that it is fair to say that the use of the term ‘means’ ... generally invokes [§ 112, ¶ 6] and that the use of a different formulation generally does not.” ... [F]ailure to use the word “means” creates a presumption that § 112, ¶6 does not apply.... In deciding whether either presumption has been rebutted, the focus remains on whether the claim as properly construed recites sufficiently definite structure to avoid the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6. Id. at 703-704 (internal citations omitted); see also Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“To invoke [35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6], the alleged means-plus-function claim element must not recite a definite structure which performs the described function.”). In Cole, the claim recited a “perforation means ... for tearing.” The court held that the statute did not apply because the claim “describes the structure supporting the tearing function (i.e., perforations).” Id. In addition, the claim “describes not only the structure that supports the tearing function, but also its location (extending from the leg band to the waist band) and extent (extending through the outer impermeable layer).” Id. The court concluded that “an element with such a detailed recitation of its structure, as opposed to its function, cannot meet the requirements of the statute.” Id. The same rationale applies here. The phrase at issue provides for a “a user station within said predetermined region for interrogating said apparatus.” (’525 patent, Claim 1). Although the latter part of the quoted phrase describes a function, the claim includes a specific recitation of the structure to support that function — a “user station.” In addition, as in Cole, this phrase includes a limitation on the user station — it must be “within said predetermined region.” Furthermore, the phrase “user station” is expressed throughout Claims 1 & 5 as a specific structural element, such as a kiosk. Accordingly, the phrase at issue does not meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, and I will not analyze it as a means-plus-function element. Although I do not find that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 limits the scope of the term “user station,” the overwhelming weight of relevant evidence supports a more limited construction than that proposed by CIVIX. This invention was intended to provide travelers a convenient substitute for visitor’s centers and Chambers of Commerce. (170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 25-27). For example, the 170 patent states that a kiosk is to be “placed on the sidewalk of the downtown area of a city. Preferably, user station, such as kiosks are placed on the sidewalks at a plurality of locations throughout the city.” (170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 29-32). The preferred embodiment in figure 1 shows a “base station 2 in the form of a kiosk. The kiosk is preferably placed on a sidewalk, and receives power from cables (not shown) buried beneath the sidewalk.” (170 Patent, Col. 2 lines 40-43). The patent explains that a user station “may be located on a sidewalk at a street intersection for easy access by pedestrians.” (170 Patent, Col. 2 lines 53-54). Further, the patent proudly states that, It will be appreciated that a unique method and apparatus has been described wherein anyone in the city may obtain a map of the area immediately surrounding where they are, the map having information regarding the locations of businesses, historical sites, or the like by simply activating an input key on a kiosk. (170 Patent, Col. 3 lines 62-67) (emphasis added). The patent specification does not detail or teach any mobile, private, or non-fixed user station. In fact, the patent’s stated purpose to provide travelers with information about local businesses could not be furthered without an accessible public structure. I look to the ordinary meaning of these terms because there is no specialized meaning asserted. See, e.g., Karlin Technology, Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968 (Fed.Cir.1999). A “station” merely denotes “a place established to provide a public service,” such as a fire station, police station, or gas station. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2229 (3d ed.1986). The modifying word “user,” in this context, not surprisingly, means that the station is one for users. I conclude that in early 1990, the time of the filing of the 170 patent application, one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood the term “user station” to mean a personal computer or “work station,” see Markman, 52 F.3d at 986 (“the focus is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.”), especially in light of the other language and specifications of the 170 patent. (Waite Declaration, ¶ 17). Therefore, I am not persuaded by CIVIX’ citation of the term “work station” in the 1997 Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, as this definition was created subsequent to the patent application. Finally, if any ambiguity remains in the meaning of the term “user station,” the ’525 patent is illuminating. The ’525 patent notes the insufficiencies of the 170 patent: “such a system is inflexible.... A user of the system must also know the exact location of the kiosk in order to use the system. Tourists and business travelers to the city are unlikely to know of the kiosk; and thus the kiosk system is of little use to such users. Further, a user must be physically present at the kiosk in order to access the information about the businesses and/or sites in the surrounding area.” (’525 Patent, Col. 1 lines 29-37) (emphasis added). This characterization by the ’525 patentees are also those of Mr. Bouve, a named inventor on both the 170 and ’525 patents. Therefore, these comments are relevant to the construction of the terms and corroborate my interpretation. Although I do not limit the term “user station” to include only “kiosks,” I conclude that “user station,” as used in the ’170 patent, is limited to a fixed public structure. 2. Claims 1 & 5 — “Predetermined Region” The term “predetermined region” appears throughout the T70 patent and is another term crucial to the invention. Defendants argue that “predetermined region” is a region determined prior to user station installation, which region the user cannot change. CIVIX, on the other hand, contends that “predetermined region” is a bounded geographical region around a user station which is determined before a map is provided to the user, but which is not necessarily fixed prior to use by the user. The parties do not disagree on the meaning of the word “region” which is defined as “a particular part of the world or universe.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1912 (3d ed.1986). Nor do the parties appear to disagree with the definition of the word “predetermined” which Webster’s defines as “to determine beforehand: settle in advance.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1786 (3d ed.1986). Instead, the disagreement centers on when the region is determined. CIVIX argues that the geographical area surrounding the user station is necessarily decided before a map is provided to a user, and no other limitation should apply. CIVIX contends that Defendants are wrongly attempting to saddle the term “predetermined region” with the limitations in the preferred embodiment where the predetermined region is created by a master database and loaded into a kiosk located on a city sidewalk. This region is not determined by the user at the user station. However, CIVIX urges that it is legal error to thus saddle the phrase. The claim language, not the preferred embodiments define the scope and meaning of the phrase. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the term “predetermined” in the T70 patent means that the region is determined prior to kiosk installation. I disagree with both proffered interpretations. I conclude that “predetermined region” means that the region is determined prior to use by the user and thus cannot be changed by the user, but that it has the potential to be changed by those who maintain the user station by loading new information into the user station to reflect a new, altered, or broader region. CIVIX’ definition of “predetermined region” as a region determined before a map is provided to a user would render the term “predetermined” superfluous. Necessarily, any system providing a geographical representation to a user must determine such a region before providing a map. However, this broad concept of determination prior to provision of a map would allow for the system to flexibly select a region or a user to select such a region. Necessarily a region must be determined before a map is provided. This would be true even if the term “predetermined” were ignored. This is not the broad meaning to be given the term “predetermined region” in this context. CI-VIX chose to limit the region to a “predetermined” region and I cannot read this limitation out of the claims. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1583 (Fed.Cir. 1996) (“[Plaintiff] need not have included this limitation in its claim. Having done so, it. must live with the language it chose.”); Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir.1995) (recognizing that the court “must give meaning to all the words in [the] claims”). Further, it is proper for me to refer to the specification in determining the meaning of the term “predetermined region.” See Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 1578 (“the district court did not import an additional limitation into the claim; instead, it looked to the specification to aid its interpretation of a term already in the claim, an entirely appropriate practice.”)- CIVIX’s embodiment of the purported invention is clear. Data for one region surrounding a user station is loaded into the user station’s memory during installation. Specifically, the location of the new kiosk is entered into a primary database and a map is generated having the kiosk at the center. (’170 Patent, Col. 3 lines 12-16). The perimeter of this map is then clipped to provide a circular shape. (’170 Patent, Col. 3 lines 16-17). The transfer of this map is completed by being “physically carried to the new kiosk, and the information therein is loaded into the memory of the base station.” (’170 Patent, Col. 3 lines 22-24). This specification only contemplates a predetermined region loaded into the user station upon installation of each new user station. However, I conclude that the same process can be used to update the region periodically. Furthermore, I cannot construe the ’170 patent claims broadly, to cover an apparatus providing a user-specified region, because the prosecution file shows that the applicants added the term “predefined region” to the claims to distinguish them from prior art which provided user-defined regions. (CIV 000058 — 000061). In distinguishing the ’170 patent from the Es-parza patent, which taught the automated dispensing of maps of any one of a number of regions depending on user choice and regardless of user location, the ’170 patent applicants noted: The claims ... call for identifying locations within a predetermined region of a selected group of this set relative to the location of a user station. The claims call for the data including an identification of the location for each subscriber in the predetermined region .... (CIV 000063). Thus, “predetermined region” is not open-ended enough to include user-defined regions. Finally, the inventors of the ’525 patent have acknowledged that the ’170 patent is limited in that it does not employ user-selected regions: U.S. Pat. No. 4,974,170 [170 patent] describes one system which includes a fixed kiosk with an internal memory for storing locations such as businesses and historical sites within a predetermined distance from the kiosk.... However, such a system is inflexible. The map generated by the system is predefined; and thus the user cannot access or select information about businesses and historical sites outside of the predefined map. (’525 Patent, Col. 1 lines 21-32) (emphasis added). These comments are relevant to the construction of the term “predetermined region” in the 170 patent because they are representative of comments of common inventors of both the 170 and ’525 patents. I conclude that “predetermined region” denotes a region stored in the user station and determined prior to use by the user subject, however, to new information loaded into the base station memory, by the system developers, from time to time. 3. Claims 1 & 5 — “Subscriber,” “Subscribers,” “Set of Subscribers,” “Selected Group of Subscribers” The 170 patent uses the term “subscribers” to describe those businesses, historical sites or governmental sites included in the map of the predetermined region given to the user. CIVIX argues that “subscriber” means any and all businesses, historical sites, governmental sites and the like that have an identifiable location that can be stored in a database. Defendants argue that “subscriber” means a business or site that requests to be' included in the invention’s data. I agree with Defendants’ interpretation. In construing the terms of a patent, I must give such terms their ordinary and plain meanings unless the patentee has defined them differently within the patent. See Process Control, 190 F.3d at 1357 (“a patentee can act as his own lexicographer to specifically define terms of a claim contrary to their ordinary meaning”); see also Karlin, 177 F.3d at 971 (using dictionary to define terms). “Subscriber” in ordinary parlance means “one that agrees or consents.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2278 (3d ed.1986). The ordinary meaning of the term “subscriber” implies action on the part of the one to which it refers (e.g., paying a fee or requesting to be part of a service). The T70 patent’s specification does not teach differently when it explains that “[t]he subscribers are typically businesses within the predetermined area surrounding the kiosk, or historical or governmental sites.” (’170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 39-42). “Subscribers” is not deliberately or precisely defined in a lexicographical manner by the inventors. Instead, the excerpt gives examples of types of subscribers. See, e.g., Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249 (“The patentee’s lexicography must ... appear ‘with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision’ before it can affect the claim.”). The ordinary meaning of the term “subscribers” implies some action on behalf of the listed entities, otherwise the inventors could have used a more generic term such as “entities.” Most likely, the patentees envisioned a profit making device whereby subscribers would pay to be included in the directory. (Custom Page Information and Rates, CIV 000083). I conclude that the term “subscribers” in the T70 patent means businesses, historical sites, governmental sites or the like that either agreed or requested in some manner to be a part of the database. The parties agree that the term “set of subscribers” includes all “subscribers” in the predetermined region stored in the apparatus. CIVIX contends that the term “group” of subscribers includes those subscribers that share “at least one characteristic.” CIVIX disputes the Defendants’ limitation of this to a single characteristic. CIVIX argues that a set of subscribers can clearly be searched using more than a single characteristic. Defendants dispute this and contend that “selected group” refers to all of the subscribers within a set of subscribers that have the particular characteristics identified via input means. Defendants contend that there is no indication in the T70 patent that the user station’s database can be searched with respect to more than one characteristic at a time. However, I conclude that the language in Claim 1 reciting “input means at said user station for identifying at least one characteristic of said group” denotes that searching with more than one characteristic at a time was contemplated by the inventors. (’170 Patent, Col. 4 lines 16-17) (emphasis added). I may not incorporate limitations from the specification that are not present in the claims themselves. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Burke, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1341 (“an attribute of the preferred embodiment cannot be read into the claim as a limitation.”). 4. Claim 1 — “Input Means” Defendants’ argue, and I agree, that “input means” is a means-plus-function term. The entire phrase reads, “input means at said user station for identifying at least one characteristic of said group.” Defendants urge that “input means” are thus limited to the only means of input disclosed in the ’170 patent (an input panel with input keys each labeled with a corresponding characteristic) and its equivalents. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. CIVIX, on the other hand, argues that the “input means” limitation is not the “means” of a means-plus-function limitation. Instead, CIVIX argues that the term “input” provides sufficient structure for performing the function of identifying characteristics. As stated above, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, provides that limitations “expressed as a means ... for performing a specified function without the recital of structure ... in support thereof, ... shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure ... described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Paragraph 6 “operates to cut back on the type of means which could literally satisfy the claim language.” Johnston, 885 F.2d at 1580. More specifically, “where a claim sets forth a means for performing a specific function, without reciting any specific structure for performing that function, the structure disclosed in the specification must be considered, and the patent claim construed to cover both the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof.” Data Line, 813 F.2d at 1201. The phrase at issue here uses the word “means,” and although this does not dictate that a claim falls under § 112, ¶ 6, I conclude that this claim does. See Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 703 (“use of the word ‘means’ has come to be so closely associated with ‘means-plus-function’ claiming that it is fair to say that the use of the term ‘means’ ... generally invokes [§ 112, ¶ 6] .... [U]se of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”) (internal citations omitted). There is no definite structure recited in this phrase that is used to perform the described function. “Input” is not structural. Thus, I construe the patent to cover both the disclosed structure and equivalents thereof. The structure disclosed by the ’170 patent is “an input panel having a plurality of input keys.” (’170 Patent, Abstract). Further, Figure 2 depicts an “input panel includ[ing] a plurality of input keys.” (’170 Patent, Col. 2 lines 55-56). In operation, “a user selects one of the input keys 12 corresponding to the characteristic of the organization desired. For example, if a key labeled ‘Drugstores’ is activated, internal electronic means ... searches ... for the group of subscribers which are drugstores.” (’170 Patent, Col. 2 lines 60-65). Thus, I conclude that “input means” is limited to an input panel with input keys each labeled with a corresponding subscriber characteristic, and equivalent structures. 5. Claims 1 & 2 — “Means for Generating a Map of Said Predetermined Region.” The parties agree that the phrase, “means for generating a map of said predetermined region” is a means-plus-function limitation governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. CIVIX contends that a skilled artisan reading the T70 patent would clearly understand that the structure of the means is an electronic logic processor, such as that found in a computer, and software that converts electronic signals into a map, and their equivalents. (CI-VIX’ Bench Book, Exh. F). Defendants, on the other hand, argue that no structure has been disclosed in the patent for the generation of the map of a predetermined region. Defendants contend that because no corresponding structure is actually disclosed in the patent specification, each claim incorporating this claim element violates 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. Although 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 provides that a patentee may use means-plus-function language in a claim, the patentee is still required to particularly point out the structure of the invention. See In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed.Cir.1997) (citing In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed.Cir.1994)). To be valid, a patent must contain claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. A claim complies with the definiteness requirement of paragraph 2 if “one of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 1998 WL 184274, *1 (N.D.Cal. April 14, 1998) (citing Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed.Cir. 1984)). Therefore, if one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language. If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112. See In re Dossel, 115 F.3d at 946 (citing In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d at 1195). CIVIX argues that “a skilled artisan reading the ’170 patent disclosure and claims would clearly understand that the structure of the means is an electronic logic processor (such as the kind found in a computer) and software that convert electronic signals into a map, and equivalents.” However, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 requires that the specification disclose at least a minimal structure corresponding to the claimed means, regardless of whether one skilled in the art could understand the claim. CI-VIX cannot escape this requirement by claiming that such a structure is understood. See, e.g., Atmel Corp., 1998 WL 184274 at *4 (“A patent holder cannot evade [the specificity] requirement with a conelusory assertion that one skilled in the art would understand the claimed means despite the failure to disclose a structure.”). Although a close call, I conclude the ’170 patent specifications convey sufficient structure for the means of generating a map. See, e.g., Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 700. The ’170 patent contains the following language: The kiosk has an internal electronic memory which contains signals representative of a map of the city in a region surrounding the kiosk. [I]f a key labeled “Drugstores” is activated, internal electronic means in the base station 2 searches its data base of subscribers for the group of subscribers which are drugstores. The data base includes the coordinates for each of the subscribers, and the coordinates for the selected group of subscribers is thus obtained. Then, the apparatus prints a map having the location of the drugstores indicated thereon, and the map is dispensed in the hopper. (170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 33-35, Col. 2 line 62 through Col. 3 line 2). This language leaves much to be desired in terms of detail. Nevertheless, the language discloses sufficient supporting structure. No computer or algorithm, per se, is disclosed. However, the language “internal electronic means in the base station” denotes the use of a computer and corresponding software. See In re Dossel, 115 F.3d at 946-47 (“Neither the written description nor the claims uses the magic word ‘computer,’ nor do they quote the computer code that may be used in the invention.... [However, w]hile the written description does not disclose exactly what mathematical algorithm will be used to compute the end result, it does state that ‘known algorithms’ can be used to solve standard equations which are known in the art.”). Further, the patent generally discloses the functions of such software in generating the map by searching the data base of subscribers and including the coordinates for each subscriber. See Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“providing the functions of the software was more important than providing the computer code.”). Therefore, this term in the T70 patent does not fail for indefiniteness. 6. Claim 1 — “Means ... for Searching said Data Base Means” The parties agree that the limitation of “means responsive to the identification at said user station of said at least one characteristic for searching said data base means ...” is a means-plus-function limitation controlled by 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6. The claimed function is searching the database with reference to at least one characteristic to determine the members of the selected group of subscribers that have locations in the predetermined region. Defendants contend that the phrase should be construed as an undisclosed structure for searching the user station database with reference to the at least one characteristic. Because no corresponding structure is disclosed, Defendants argue that each claim incorporating this claim element should be held invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. For the reasons stated in the previous section, this claim recites sufficient structure and does not fail for indefiniteness. Again, this term references “electronic means” for its structure. (’170 Patent, Col. 1 lines 45-53). See In re Dossel, 115 F.3d at 946-47. Further, the patent generally discloses the functions of such software. See Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1549 (“providing the functions of the software was more important than providing the computer code.”). Therefore, this term in the ’170 patent does not fail for indefiniteness. 7. Claim 1 — “Means for Displaying Said Map” Again, the parties agree that “means for displaying said map at said user station” is a means-plus-function limitation controlled by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. CIVIX contends that the means is not limited to a printer as described in the specification. Instead, CIVIX argues that a skilled artisan would have recognized that a monitor or similar device for presenting the map in visual form could perform the claimed function. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that this term is to be narrowly construed as a printer and the structural equivalents of a printer. The only “means for displaying” a map indicated in the ’170 patent is through a printer providing a hard copy of the map. For example, In operation, a user selects one of the input keys 12 corresponding to the characteristic of the organization.... Then, the apparatus prints a map having the locations of the drugstores indicated thereon, and that map is dispensed into a hopper 16. The user then withdraws the map and ascertains which drugstore to use. (T70 Patent, Col. 2 line 60 through Col. 3 line 4). Nowhere in the ’170 patent does the inventor indicate that a monitor or similar device for presenting a map in visual form could be used. In construing a means-plus-function claim controlled by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6,1 am limited to the specifications of the patent and their equivalents. I cannot find that a monitor or similar device is a structural equivalent of a printer. Therefore, the means are thus limited. 8. Claim 5 — “Providing to Said User Station Map/Subscriber Electronic Information” Defendants contend that Claim 5 is comprised of step-plus-function limitations controlled and limited by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and the precise embodiments and specifications of the claim. CIVIX disagrees and asserts that Claim 5 is a method claim and not limited by Section 112. I disagree with Defendants’ characterization of this claim as steps-plus-function and hold Claim 5 to be one of method. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 states, in relevant part: An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a ... step for performing a specified function without the recital of ... acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding ... acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6; see also O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co. Inc., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582-1583 (Fed.Cir.1997). However, this paragraph “is implicated only when steps plus function without acts are present.” Id. at 1583. The paragraph allows that “an element in a combination method or process claim may be recited as a step for performing a specified function without the recital of acts in support of the function.” Id. The price for this convenience is limitation of the claim to the steps specified in the written description and equivalents thereof. Id. However, merely claiming a step or even a series of steps without recital of a function does not implicate 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Claim 5 reads, in pertinent part: A method for identifying the location within a predetermined region of a selected group of a set of a plurality of subscribers relative to the location of a user station comprising, providing to said user station map electronic information representing a map of said predetermined region around said user station, providing to said user station subscriber electronic information representing the location and at least one characteristic for each subscriber of said set of subscribers, said at least one characteristic being common to the members of a group, selecting at said user station at least one of said characteristics as a group characterization identifying a group of said subscribers, searching said subscriber electronic information with respect to said group characterization, and providing said map at said user location displaying the locations of members of said selected group identified by said group characterization relative to the location of said user station. Defendants contend that the emphasized elements of this claim, beginning with the terms providing, providing, selecting, searching, providing, constitute steps-plus-function limitations. 35 U.S.C. § 115 ¶ 6.1 disagree. Although not determinative, the term “step for” does not appear in this method claim. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Construction, 172 F.3d 836, 849 (Fed.Cir.1999) (Rader, J., concurring) (holding that only the words “step for” raise the presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies). Further, this method claim is not composed of steps aimed at performing a specified function. The Federal Circuit addressed an analogous situation in O.I. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1576. This case involved a method claim that read, in pertinent part: A method for removing water vapor from an analyte slug passing between a sparge vessel, trap and gas chromato-graph, comprising the steps of: (A) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated ...; (B) passing the analyte slug through the passage that is air cooled .... The Federal Circuit rejected the Defendants’ arguments that both “passing” limitations were part of a means plus function limitation. The Court stated, [Claiming a step by itself, or even a series of steps, does not implicate Section 112, P 6 .... If we were to construe every process claim containing steps described by an “ing” verb, such as passing, heating, reacting, transferring, etc. into a step-plus-function limitation, we would be limiting process claims in a manner never intended by Congress. Id. at 1583. I find no reason here to limit Claim 5’s terms by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Thus, I reject Defendants’ contention that “providing to said user station map electronic information” is limited to only the eight acts specified by Defendants and present as specifications in the patent. I further reject the contention that “providing to said user station subscriber electronic information,” is limited to the specified six acts. Instead, I construe the term “providing” in both phrases according to its ordinary usage, “supplying for use.” Websters’ Third New International Dictionary, p. 1827. Nothing in the ’170 patent suggests a different meaning. In all the embodiments discussed in the specification, map and subscriber electronic information is supplied to the user station by loading this information into the user station. Likewise, the act of “providing” a map to a user at a user station is limited as it was above, through the element of a printer. For these reasons, I reject Defendants’ contention that the terms within this claim are limited to specific acts within the T70 patent. Instead, I construe the term “selecting” according to the specification which provides that the step of selecting at least one desired characteristic at a user station merely requires the entry of one or more desired characteristics to interrogate a database. Although the preferred embodiment represents the pressing of a single key representing at least one desired characteristic, limitations from these precise embodiments should not be read into the claim. See, e.g., Burke, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1341 (“an attribute of the preferred embodiment cannot be read into the claim as a limitation.”)- “In the absence of ambiguity, it is fundamental that the language of a count should be given the broadest reasonable interpretation it will support.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 500 (Fed.Cir.1997). Likewise, I find that the ordinary meaning of “searching” in database technology applies, such as “querying” a database. (Oxman Declaration, ¶ 13). This is supported by the specification: “A user activates the apparatus by pressing one of the input keys. This causes an electronic element to search the subscribers to determine the group of subscribers having that characteristic.” (’170 Patent, Abstract). Thus, “searching said subscriber electronic information with respect to said group characterization” denotes the act of querying the database to provide all subscribers within the database which have the user-selected group characterization. C. Claim Construction of the ’525 Patent The ’525 patent contains the following disputed claims with disputed terms emphasized. Some of the claims are independent and some depend from others, this distinction is obvious within each claim. I excerpt only those claims which are relevant for purposes of infringement which CIVIX alleges have been infringed by one or more of the Defendants. See, e.g., Markman, 52 F.3d at 976 (“The first step is determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed”). Because the claims include similar and sometimes identical elements, and the parties have not argued for different interpretations of identical words in different claims within the ’525 patent, my interpretation of a term applies whenever that term is used in the ’525 patent. [Claim 1] System for remotely determining the position of a selected category of items of interest in a selected geographic vicinity from a database, the system comprising (A) a database for storing information about a plurality of items of interest, the information including, for each of the items of interest, positional coordinates, a geographic vicinity, and at least one associated category, the positional coordinates locating the geographic vicinity, (B) a communications link for communicating between a user of the system and the database, (C) means for transmitting a portion of the information in the database to the user via the link upon receipt of a request signal representative of a selected category and geographic vicinity, the transmitted portion of the information including identification of a position for each of the items of interest within the selected category and geographic vicinity and relative to the positional coordinates and other items of interest within the vicinity, and (D) a port for remotely accessing the portion of information via the link, the port generating the request signal in response to inputs by the user which are representative of the selected category and geographic vicinity, the port having a user interface for accepting the inputs and for indicating to the user the position of each of the items of interest in the selected category and geographic vicinity. [Claim 7] System according to claim 1 wherein the geographic vicinity comprises a map of the items of interest in the selected category and selected geographic vicinity. [Claim 15] System according to claim 1, wherein the information comprises an advertisement associated with at least one of the items of interest, and further comprising means for communicating the advertisement to the user. [Claim 17] Database apparatus for storing information about a plurality of items of interest, the information including, for each of the items of interest, a geographic vicinity, positional coordinates locating the geographic vicinity, and at least one associated category, comprising (A) a communications link for communicating between a user of the database apparatus and a remote port, and (B) means for transmitting a portion of the information to the user via the link upon receipt of a request signal representative of a geographic vicinity and a selected category of the items of interest, the transmitted portion of the information including identification of a position for each of the items of interest within the selected category and geographic vicinity, the position for each of the items of interest within the Selected category and geographical vicinity being defined relative to the positional coordinates and other items of interest within the selected category and geographic vicinity. [Claim 23] Database apparatus according to claim 17, wherein the information comprises additional detail for at least one of the items of interest, and further comprising means for communicating the additional detail to the remote port upon receipt of a signal indicating that a user has selected one of the items of interest. [Claim 24] Database apparatus according to claim 17, wherein the information comprises an advertisement assoc