Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge: On March 7, 2011, defendant Kamal Abdallah (hereinafter “Abdallah” or “defendant”) was convicted following a jury trial of one count of conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1348 and 1349, one count of securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, and one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. On July 1, 2011, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and for a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a). In his motion for a judgment of acquittal, defendant argues that venue in the Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”) was not proper for the conspiracy charge, the securities fraud charge, or the wire fraud charge, and contends that the government manufactured venue as to each count. Defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the wire fraud charge. In his motion for a new trial, defendant seeks to overturn his conviction on the following four grounds: (1) there was a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance to the superseding indictment; (2) the government withheld witness statements in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (3) the government improperly introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (4) the government misled the jury during its rebuttal summation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and defendant’s motion for a new trial in their entirety. I. Background A. Superseding Indictment The grand jury returned a superseding indictment (“Superseding Indictment”) against the defendant on August 17, 2010 in seven counts, including conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, substantive securities fraud, and five counts of wire fraud. The Superseding Indictment charged that between June 2009 and August 2009, the defendant paid Eric T. Seiden to create false demand for stock in Universal Property Development and Acquisition Corporation (“UPDV”), which inflated UPDV’s share price. (Sup. Ind., ¶¶ 4-9.) Defendant and an individual named Roger Kainth then allegedly sold them UPDV stock at these artificially high prices. (Sup. Ind., ¶¶ 5, 9.) The indictment also alleged that, during a phone call that Seiden made to the defendant on July 28, 2009, while Seiden was in the EDNY, the defendant and Seiden discussed a scheme to manipulate the stock price of UPDV and another company called Alphatrade. (Sup. Ind., ¶ 11.) During that discussion, the defendant allegedly asked Seiden to place fraudulent trades for Alphatrade at a certain price in order to artificially inflate the price and allow defendant and Kainth to sell their stock. (Sup. Ind., ¶ 11.) Before the trial began, the government voluntarily dismissed three counts of wire fraud on venue grounds, and proceeded at trial on Count One charging conspiracy to commit wire fraud, Count Two charging substantive securities fraud, and Count Seven charging wire fraud on or about July 28, 2009 (which was re-numbered as Count Three for purposes of the jury’s consideration). The trial began on February 14, 2011 with the selection of the jury. B. The Trial Familiarity with the trial record is presumed. However, the Court briefly summarizes below the evidence relevant to the instant motions. The evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the government, as required under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1. Relevant Companies and Loans The defendant was the CEO and Chairman of the Board of UPDV, an oil and gas services company. (Tr. 671, 1013-14.) The defendant was also Chairman of the Board of Continental Fuels (“Continental”), an oil products-related company in which UPDV owned a controlling interest. (Tr. 677-78.) In April 2007, Sheridan Asset Management, LLC (“Sheridan”), a commercial finance and investment management company, lent UPDV about $3.6 million. (Tr. 671-72.) In August 2007, Sheridan extended an additional $3.25 million to UPDV. (Tr. 675-77.) In December 2007, Sheridan lent Continental $5.5 million so that Continental could acquire Geer Tank Trucks, Inc. (“Geer”). (Tr. 677-79.) That same month, Sheridan extended Continental a $3 million line of credit. UPDV guaranteed the loan and the line of credit. (Tr. 680.) In October 2008, UPDV stopped making payments to Sheridan on the $3.6 and $3.25 million loans and went into default on both. (Tr. 684-87.) That month, Continental stopped producing collateral reports to Sheridan. (Tr. 688.) Bank statements for Continental and UPDV show that $4 million was transferred on October 14, 2008 from Geer to Continental, then to UPDV. (Tr. 693-94, 695-97; Gvt. Ex. 166.) On the same day, $3.5 million was transferred from UPDV to the defendant’s personal bank account. (Tr. 699; Gvt. Ex. 165.) Defendant later acknowledged that he lost $3 million out of the $3.5 million that was transferred to his account by engaging in currency trading. (Tr. 699-700.) Because of defendant’s actions, Geer was unable to pay its suppliers and began to bounce checks. (Tr. 701-02.) In December 2008, defendant resigned from UPDV, Continental, and all related companies. At that point, UPDV owed Sheridan more than $14 million. (Tr. 704-06.) 2.Issuance of 600 Million UPDV Shares On October 27, 2008, after the defendant had already taken the above-referenced money from Geer, he sent an email to UPDV’s transfer agent asking the transfer agent to issue 600 million UPDV shares in the name of Mohamed Abdellatif Yassine. (Tr. 304-05, 1120; Gvt. Ex. 98.) The defendant asserted that the 600 million shares could be properly issued because he had converted into common stock some 15,000 shares of Preferred B stock that UPDV had issued to him on December 27, 2007. (Gvt. Ex. 98.) The defendant also requested that the stock certificates be sent by the transfer agent overseas to A1 Mawarid Financial Services (“AM Financials”) in Beirut, Lebanon. (Id.) The stock certificates were issued and sent overseas as instructed by the defendant. (Id.) 3.Defendant and Roger Kainth Beginning in June 2009, defendant and Roger Kainth used different brokerage accounts to buy and sell UPDV shares between their respective accounts in order to artificially increase trading volume in UPDV stock. (Tr. 877-882; Gvt. Exs. 213, 214.) Between June 1 and June 19, 2009, defendant and Kainth bought or sold UPDV stock every day that the stock market was open, buying a total of over 30 million shares, and selling 28.5 million shares. (Tr. 881; Gvt. Ex. 215.) Moreover, their trading activity was very similar. For example, on June 4, 2009, defendant bought 3,921,500 UPDV shares in his Fidelity brokerage account, and sold 1,206,953 UPDV shares in his Ameritrade account. (Tr. 878; Gvt. Ex. 213.) Similarly, on June 1, 2009, Kainth bought a total of 424,999 UPDV shares in his E*Trade and Schwab accounts and sold 5,999,994 shares in his Schwab account. (Gvt. Ex. 214.) In addition, Kainth, who sold more shares than he bought, sent some of the proceeds of such sales to the defendant. (Tr. 893-97.) Finally, once the defendant was introduced to Seiden on June 18, 2009, and Seiden began fraudulently inflating the demand in the UPDV shares, defendant and Kainth ceased their pattern of buying and selling UPDV shares between their accounts, and began to almost exclusively sell their UPDV shares. (Gvt. Exs. 215, 218.) 4.Defendant and Eric Seiden Defendant first spoke to Seiden during a phone conference on June 18, 2009. (Tr. 394-95.) Seiden told the defendant that he had a lot of relationships with people and could buy a lot of stock. (Tr. 398-99.) The defendant agreed to wire Seiden money if Seiden successfully procured buy orders for UPDV shares. Defendant also agreed to pay Seiden 25 percent of the purchase price of any of the UPDV shares that Seiden bought. (Tr. 400-01.) That same day, Seiden bought a few million UPDV shares, and defendant wired him $8,500. (Tr. 402-04; Gvt. Ex. 18.) After June 18, 2009, Seiden continued to place buy orders in UPDV stock on the defendant’s behalf. (Tr, 407-08.) To do so, Seiden called brokerage firms pretending to be various individuals from institutional investors who had existing accounts at the brokerage firms. (Tr. 408.) During these phone calls, Seiden would place buy orders into the accounts of the investors he was impersonating. Seiden placed fake buy orders on June 22, June 25, June 26, July 7, and July 8, 2009 at brokerage firms such as Cantor Fitzgerald, Dinosaur Securities, Roth Capital Partners, and Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets. ■ (Tr. 41-43, 70-74,119-125,134-35,155-56.) Between June 19 and July 10, 2009, defendant and Seiden communicated several times per day by phone and through text messages. (Tr. 404-05.) Through these communications, defendant told Seiden how many shares to buy, the price that UPDV shares were selling for at the time, and the price at which defendant wanted to sell the shares, which was “always above where the market was trading.” (Tr. 405, 407, 411.) On days that Seiden successfully placed a fake buy order, the defendant sold or attempted to sell UPDV stock. (Gvt. Ex. 216.) He also made multiple phone calls or text messages on those days, and wired money to Seiden on or around the days when Seiden placed the buy orders. (Gvt. Ex. 211; Tr. 287-88, 425-28, 431.) For example, on June 22, 2009, which was the day Seiden placed fraudulent buy orders with Cantor Fitzgerald for 10 million UPDV shares, defendant sold about 5.3 million UPDV shares in his personal brokerage accounts. (Gvt. Ex. 216.) On that day, there were twenty-eight phone calls and text messages between the defendant and Seiden. (Gvt. Ex. 211.) In addition, the defendant wired Seiden $3,500 on that day. (Tr. 425-46; Gvt. Ex. 18.) On June 25 and 26, 2009, which were the days Seiden placed false buy orders with Dinosaur Securities for a total of 38 million UPDV shares, the defendant sold about 8.2 million UPDV shares in his personal brokerage accounts. (Gvt. Ex. 216.) On June 25, 2009, the defendant exchanged forty-five telephone calls and text messages with Seiden and, on June 26, 2009, they exchanged nineteen telephone calls and text messages. (Gvt. Ex. 211.) Moreover, defendant deposited $2,000 into Seiden’s bank account on June 25, 2009, and Seiden received a payment of $9,800 on June 26, 2009, from one of defendant’s companies. (Tr. 426-28.) Seiden also received another wire from the defendant in the amount of $5,000 on July 1, 2009. (Tr. 431.) On July 7, 2009, which was the day Seiden put in a false buy order with Roth Capital Partners, defendant sold about 2.4 million UPDV shares in his personal brokerage accounts. (Gvt. Ex. 216.) On that day, Seiden and the defendant exchanged twenty-five telephone calls and text messages. (Gvt. Ex. 211.) On July 8, 2009, which was the day that Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets bought 95 million shares for Seiden based upon a false buy order, defendant tried to sell 30 million UPDV shares through an account at AM Financials in Lebanon. In particular, at 3:39 p.m., the defendant made a twelve minute call to AM Financials. (Tr. 852; Gvt. Ex. 212.) While the defendant was on the telephone with AM Financials, an order was placed by AM Financials to sell 30 million UPDV shares through another brokerage ' firm called Pinnacle. (Tr. 848^49; Gvt. Ex. 95.) Moreover, while the defendant was on the telephone with AM Financials, he also received two calls from Seiden, and appeared to place AM Financials on hold to speak to Seiden. (Tr. 852; Gvt. Ex. 212.) AM Financials subsequently reported to Pinnacle that the sell order for 30 million shares was an unsolicited trade that was placed by one of its clients. (Tr. 620; Gvt. Ex. 96.) AM Financials described its client as a “heavy trader” who “work[ed] a lot on penny stocks” and who “also trades futures, currencies, oil, natural gas, et cetera.” (Tr. 622; Gvt. Ex. 96.) In addition, AM Financials reported that its client was “a big shareholder in UPDV and [had] been trading the stock for more than a year.” (Tr. 622; Gvt. Ex. 96.) The 30 million share trade was subsequently “busted,” or cancelled, at the request of RBC, who had bought the AM Financials shares. (Tr. 614-16.) During his trial testimony, Seiden recalled that the defendant had told him that he received a call from one of his overseas traders about a cancelled trade, which had resulted from the compliance department of the brokerage firm stating there was a problem on the buy side of defendant’s trade. (Tr. 432-33.) 5. Kainth’s Trades Between June 22, 2009 and July 8, 2009 The evidence at trial demonstrated that Roger Kainth sold UPDV shares in his brokerage accounts on days that Seiden made the false buy orders, including on June 22, June 25, June 26, and July 7, 2009. (Gvt. Ex. 217.) For example, Kainth made the following trades: (a) on June 22, 2009, Kainth sold 999,999 UPDV shares in his personal brokerage account; (b) on June 25, 2009, Kainth sold more than 10 million UPDV shares; (c) on June 26, 2009, Kainth sold 4.47 million UPDV shares; and (d) on July 7, 2009, Kainth sold approximately 8 million UPDV shares. (Gvt. Ex. 217.) Kainth also wired a portion of the proceeds from the UPDV shares to the defendant. (Tr. 893-96.) 6. In-Person Meeting in Texas Between Seiden and the Defendant On July 15, 2009, Seiden flew to San Antonio, Texas, where defendant resided, to meet with defendant. (Tr. 436, 441, 998-99.) The defendant paid for Seiden’s flight. (Tr. 437.) During the visit, the defendant and Seiden discussed putting in buy orders for UPDV and another company defendant owned shares in called Alphatrade. (Tr. 442-43, 445.) Later that day, Seiden told defendant his particular fraudulent technique for securing the buy orders. Specifically, Seiden told the defendant that he (Seiden) was telling brokerage firms that he had accounts there, when in fact he did not. (Tr. 446.) Seiden explained to the defendant that some buy orders failed because the firms figured out that Seiden did not have an account and refused to place the buy order. (Id.) The next day, defendant asked Seiden to buy more stock for him. (Tr. 447-48.) Seiden said he was running out of firms to call, but the defendant agreed to provide Seiden with more names of people to call. (Tr. 448.) Both before and after Seiden’s trip to Texas on July 15, 2009, defendant bought Alphatrade shares in his personal brokerage account, including the following: (a) on July 14, 2009, defendant bought 420,000 Alphatrade shares at a cost of $11,385; and (b) on July 16, 2009, defendant bought another 50,00 shares of Alphatrade in his brokerage account at a cost of $1,555. (Tr. 903; Gvt. Ex. 36.) 7.Seiden’s Cooperation and Subsequent Phone Calls The FBI arrested Seiden on July 21, 2009. (Tr. 448.) On July 21, July 28, and July 31, 2009, Seiden made consensually recorded phone calls to the defendant. (Gvt. Exs. 4, 5, 6.) Seiden was located in the EDNY when he made the July 28, 2009 phone call. (Gvt. Ex. 5.) During these calls, defendant requested that Seiden continue placing fake buy orders for UPDV and for Alphatrade. In the July 21, 2009 call, for example, defendant told Seiden to buy 25 to 50 million shares of UPDV every other day and to try to raise the price of UPDV. (Gvt. Ex. 4.) In exchange, the defendant agreed to provide a kickback to Seiden of 25 percent of whatever shares they were able to sell. (Id.) In the July 28, 2009 call, during which Seiden told the defendant that he was “still in New York,” defendant told Seiden to put in buy orders for UPDV at up to $0.0045 per share, even though UPDV was trading between $0.0024 and $0.0028 per share. (Gvt. Ex. 5.) The defendant again mentioned that he would pay Seiden a kickback of 25 percent on all shares that were sold. (Id.) In calls on July 31, 2009, the defendant and Seiden again discussed the UPDV buy orders. (Gvt. Ex. 6-9.) Seiden said “you know how I’m doing it” and agreed that if the brokerage firms realized how Seiden was buying the stock, defendant would not tell them that he knew Seiden. (Gvt. Ex. 6.) Seiden told the defendant that he had to be “cautious because of what I do.” (Gvt. Ex. 8.) Seiden explained that he was talking “outta my, my butt when I tell them who I am and everything,” and that he had to “pretend who I am.” (Id. at 2, 3.) In the two weeks or so after the July 31 phone calls, defendant sent multiple text messages to Seiden imploring him to contact him so they could keep working together. (Gvt. Ex. 10.) For example, on July 31, 2009, at 1:57 p.m., defendant sent a text message to Seiden stating: “Eric U wanna do 20 or 25 and let’s see what happens.” (Tr. 214; Gvt. Ex. 10.) On August 2, 2009, defendant sent Seiden the following text message: “Eric Let’s chat to prepare for the week!?” (Id.) On August 3, 2009, defendant sent the following text message to Seiden: “Good morning eric, hope all is well call me let’s put a strategy together.” (Tr. 215; Gvt. Ex. 10.) On August 6, 2009, defendant sent Seiden the following text message: “Young man, call me let’s make some money.” (Tr. 219; Gvt. Ex. 10.) On August 10, 2009, defendant sent the following text to Seiden: “What’s going young man please call me, let’s do something here.” (Tr. 221; Gvt. Ex. 10.) 8.Defendant’s Testimony At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf. (Tr. 998-1383.) During that testimony, the defendant testified in detail as to the circumstances that led to his transactions with Seiden and denied any knowledge that Seiden was fraudulently inflating the price of stocks. 9.The Verdict On March 7, 2011, the jury found the defendant guilty on all three remaining counts of the Superseding Indictment— namely, Counts One, Two, and Seven. C. The Post-Trial Motions By letter filed May 10, 2011, defendant Abdallah requested that he be allowed to proceed pro se. On July 1, 2011, following a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Court granted Abdallah’s application to proceed pro se and, with the consent of Abdallah, his former counsel was appointed to be his legal ad-visor. On July 1, 2011, Abdallah filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and a motion for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 11, 2011, the government filed its opposition to Abdallah’s motions. On August 26, 2011, Abdallah filed his reply. On September 15, and 21, 2011, the Court heard oral argument on the motions. At oral argument on September 21, 2011, the Court permitted Abdallah to file a supplemental document containing a chronology of events in connection with his motions. Abdallah also made additional submissions following the argument. The Court has fully considered the arguments and submissions of the parties. II. Discussion A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Defendant Abdallah filed a Rule 29(c) motion requesting a judgment of acquittal on the following grounds: (1) venue was improper on each of the three counts; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the wire fraud count. As discussed below, the Court finds each of these arguments to be without merit. 1. Legal Standard Motions under Rule 29(c) are governed by the same standard as motions under Rule 29(a). Pursuant to Rule 29(a), a district court shall enter a judgment of acquittal as to “any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). Rule 29(c) permits a defendant to “move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c). However, as set forth below, “ ‘[a] defendant bears a heavy burden in seeking to overturn a conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient.’ ” United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir.2004)); accord United States v. Pipóla, 83 F.3d 556, 564 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)); see also United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 821 (2d Cir.1990) (stating that motions to challenge sufficiency of evidence “rarely carry the day”). The standard under Rule 29, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2008); Lorenzo, 534 F.3d at 159; United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.2006). In other words, “ ‘[a] court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Temple, 447 F.3d at 136 (quoting United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is important to emphasize that, in evaluating the evidence under this standard, “courts must be careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury when confronted with a motion for acquittal.” United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In assessing sufficiency, we are obliged to view the evidence in its totality and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, mindful that the task of choosing among permissible competing inferences is for the jury, not a reviewing court.”); Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (holding that a court must bear in mind that Rule 29 “does not provide [it] with an opportunity to substitute its own determination of ... the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government means “drawing all inferences in the government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 391 (2d Cir.1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir.2000) (“[T]he credibility of witnesses is the province of the jury, and [a court] simply cannot replace the jury’s credibility determinations with [its] own.”) (quotation omitted). In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court also should not analyze pieces of evidence in isolation, but rather must consider the evidence in its totality. See United States v. Rosenthal, 9 F.3d 1016, 1024 (2d Cir.1993); see also Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (holding that sufficiency test must be applied “to the totality of the government’s case and not to each element, as each fact may gain color from others”). Finally, “[d]irect evidence is not required; ‘[i]n fact, the government is entitled to prove its case solely through circumstantial evidence, provided, of course, that the government still demonstrates each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Lorenzo, 534 F.3d at 159 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir.2004)); see also Irving, 452 F.3d at 117 (“A jury may convict on circumstantial evidence alone.”); accord Jackson, 335 F.3d at 180; United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir.1995). However, “if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir.2005). In short, “[w]here a court concludes after a full analysis of the evidence in connection with a Rule 29 motion that ‘either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, [the court] must let the jury decide the matter.’ ” Temple, 447 F.3d at 137 (quoting United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). On the other hand, “‘in passing upon a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, ... if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted.’” Temple, 447 F.3d at 137 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir.1972)). 2. Challenges to Venue Defendant Abdallah challenges venue on each of the counts. As discussed below, the Court concludes that venue existed in the Eastern District of New York for each of the counts based upon an interstate telephone call between the defendant and Seiden on July 28, 2009, while Seiden was in this District, during which the fraudulent scheme was discussed and Abdallah directed that Seiden make fraudulent purchases of Alphatrade and UPDV stock in exchange for a 25 percent kickback, so that Abdallah could sell his stock at the artificially inflated price caused by the fraudulent purchase. a. Applicable Law Two provisions of the U.S. Constitution guarantee that the defendant must be tried in the place where the crime was committed. Article III, section 2, states, in relevant part, that criminal trials “shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant shall be tried “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. In furtherance of these provisions, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that, “[ujnless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 18. Moreover, in this Circuit, [T]here is no single defined policy or mechanical test to determine constitutional venue. Rather, the test is best described as a substantial contacts rule that takes into account a number of factors — the site of the defendant’s acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding.... United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir.1985); accord United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 893 (2d Cir.2008). The government bears the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir.1994). Courts “review the sufficiency of the evidence as to venue in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in its favor.” Smith, 198 F.3d at 382 (quotations omitted). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), venue properly lies in “any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” The Second Circuit, “[a]pplying this rule to the continuing crime of conspiracy!,] ... has held that venue may lie in any district in which the conspiracy was formed or in any district in which a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the criminal scheme.” United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir.2007). Any “act performed by any conspirator for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives of the conspiracy” is an overt act, whether it is “innocent or illegal.” United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir.2011). Phone calls can constitute overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 120 (“It is beyond question that telephone calls can constitute overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.”); Smith, 198 F.3d at 382; United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d. Cir.1994); see also United States v. Christo, 413 Fed.Appx. 375, 376 (2d Cir.2011) (“the overt act can be something as simple as a phone call in furtherance of the conspiracy”). Moreover, it is not legally significant whether the defendant is the conspirator in the district where venue is being sought, or whether the defendant initiated or received the call; rather, phone calls into or out of a district can establish venue in that district so long as they further the ends of the conspiracy. See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 120 (venue proper based on calls from undercover government agent inside the venue to out-of-venue defendant); Smith, 198 F.3d at 382 (venue proper based on co-conspirator’s calls from inside venue to victim outside of venue); Naranjo, 14 F.3d at 147 (venue proper where defendant’s out-of-venue coconspirator made calls to inside-venue government informant); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir.1993) (venue proper based on out-of-venue conspirator’s phone call to inside-venue conspirator, even though charges against inside-venue co-conspirator were later dropped). With respect to the offense of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) states that “[a]ny offense involving the use of the mails [or] transportation in interstate or foreign commerce ... may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such commerce [or] mail matter ... moves.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). The Second Circuit has held that this statute applies when determining the appropriate venue for wire fraud offenses. United States v. Kim, 246 F.3d 186, 191-92 (2d Cir.2001) (affirming district court conclusion that venue was proper in district where wires were sent and received because “the act of causing a wire to be transmitted in furtherance of a fraud is criminalized by the statute, and ... a wire is ‘transmitted’ both where it was sent and where it was received”); United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1982) (telexes and phone calls to and from New York that defendant “caused,” as well as transfer of proceeds of fraud through New York so that “such commerce” moved “from, through, or into” New York pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) properly conveyed venue). Because “venue must be proper with respect to each count,” the Court reviews each count separately. Tzolov, 642 F.3d at 318 (quoting United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Novak, 443 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir.2006)). b. Venue on Count One: Conspiracy Defendant argues that venue for the conspiracy count did not lie in the EDNY. The government’s evidentiary basis for venue in this District on the conspiracy count was the telephone call on July 28, 2009 between Seiden in Brooklyn and the defendant in Texas, during which the defendant attempts to have Seiden conduct another fraudulent trade of UPDV stock (and also a new stock called Alpha-trade) in order to inflate the value of the stock and allow Seiden to sell his shares at the artificially inflated price. Defendant contends that the conspiracy ended when Seiden was arrested in Florida by the FBI on July 21, 2009 and became a government cooperator, and therefore Seiden’s post-arrest phone call to the defendant, at the direction of law enforcement, was not an “overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” The government counters that the conspiracy continued because Roger Kainth was still a conspirator. Additionally, the government argues, the defendant’s phone call urging Seiden to buy shares in order to drive up the stock price was in furtherance of the conspiracy. As set forth below, the Court agrees with the government and concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conspiracy continued with the defendant and Kainth after Seiden’s arrest, and that the July 28 telephone call between the defendant and Seiden was in furtherance of that conspiracy. It is axiomatic that the continuation of a conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Ortiz, 394 Fed.Appx. 722, 724-25 (2d Cir.2010) (circumstantial evidence sufficient for a rational jury to infer defendant’s participation in full duration of conspiracy); United States v: Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671 (2d Cir.2007) (“Both the existence of a conspiracy and a given defendant’s participation in it with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.”); accord United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 49 (2d Cir.1998). In fact, the Second Circuit has pointed out that “ ‘a single act may be sufficient for an inference of involvement in a criminal enterprise of substantial scope at least if the act is of a nature justifying an inference of knowledge of the broader conspiracy.’ ” Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1112 (2d Cir.1975)). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence to support the continuation of the conspiracy after Seiden’s arrest, based upon the ongoing efforts of. the defendant and Kainth to pay Seiden to fraudulently inflate the stock value of UPDV shares through fake purchases of the stock, which would allow the defendant and Kainth to sell the UPDV stock at the fraudulently inflated stock. Although the government had no evidence that Seiden spoke directly to Kainth, the government introduced compelling evidence of Kainth’s involvement in the scheme with the defendant based upon the timing of Kainth’s trading activities, and the wiring of the proceeds of those sales by Kainth back to the defendant.- In other words, the evidence admitted at trial shows that Kainth and defendant worked closely together to unload UPDV shares into Seiden’s false buy orders between June 22 and July 8, 2009. (Gvt. Exs. 216, 217.) In particular, on nearly all of the same days that Seiden entered his illegitimate buy orders, the defendant and Kainth sold UPDV shares from their respective brokerage accounts. (Id.) Moreover, Kainth wired the proceeds of his UPDV sales to the defendant while the stock fraud scheme was ongoing. (Tr. 893-96.) The timing of these trades and payments to the defendant certainly would allow a jury to rationally infer that Kainth was a knowing participant in the scheme. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy continued through July 28, 2009, the date that Seiden called the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2001) (“Circumstantial evidence is a legitimate form of evidence in this Circuit, and in fact-intensive cases such as this, requiring careful examination of trading records and a myriad of public information, the jury is the appropriate body to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence.”). Accordingly, defendant’s venue challenge based upon purported termination of the conspiracy on July 21, 2011 is without merit. Similarly, the Court concludes that the July 28, 2009 phone call was certainly in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy. See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 120; Smith, 198 F.3d at 382. During the call, defendant told Seiden how many shares of UPDV and Alphatrade to buy, and told Seiden how high he wanted him to drive up the stock price. (See Gvt. Ex. 5.) The defendant also discussed paying Seiden a kickback for helping him manipulate the stock prices of UPDV and Alphatrade. (Id.) Thus, defendant clearly used the phone call with Seiden on July 28, 2009 as a means to further the conspiracy, albeit unsuccessfully. To the extent that defendant argues that venue is insufficient because Seiden was a government informant in this District at the time of the call while defendant was never in the district, that argument is flatly contradicted by binding Second Circuit precedent. In particular, in Rommy, the Second Circuit explicitly held that “a telephone call placed by a government actor within a district to a conspirator outside the district can establish venue within the district provided the conspirator uses the call to further the conspiracy.” 506 F.3d at 122. In Rommy, the telephone call at issue involved calls to and from a government actor in Manhattan to the defendant in the Netherlands. The Second Circuit explained: [W]e conclude that the critical factor in conspiracy venue analysis is not whether it is a conspirator or a government actor who initiates the call; nor does it matter whether the conspirator is communicating with someone who is a knowing confederate, an undercover agent, or an unwitting third party. What is determinative of venue — as the district court emphasized to the jury — is whether the conspirator used the telephone call to further the objectives of the conspiracy. [...] What matters is that the conspirator speaks, not to hear the sound of his own voice, but to communicate to his listener because he thinks that, by doing so, he furthers a conspiratorial goal. Thus, the overt act may properly be understood to have occurred at the site where the listener receives the conspirator’s message. That an instrument of commerce or technology permits the conspirator to communicate with his listener, while physically removed from him does not alter the fact that the conspirator has committed an overt act at the recipient’s location. It means simply that his communication is a continuing act, supporting venue in the district of its initiation as well as the district of its receipt. Id.; see also United States v. Gonzalez, No. CR 10-00834 WHA, 2011 WL 500502, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) (“The holding in Rommy is also consistent with myriad decisions from other circuits that have found venue to be proper even if a defendant never set foot in the district in question but instead made telephone calls to and/or from one or more individuals in that district as a part of the conspiracy.”) (collecting cases). Therefore, because the July 28 telephone call in the instant case was clearly in furtherance of the Abdallah/Kainth conspiracy based upon defendant’s attempt to get Seiden to fraudulently inflate the UPDV stock price, it establishes venue on the conspiracy count even though Seiden (not defendant) was the one in this District and was working for the government at the time he initiated the call. In addition, the Court concludes that defendant knew that the overt act (namely, the telephone call) was taking place in New York or, at the very least, it was reasonably foreseeable to him. See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 123 (“[T]he law does not require a defendant to have actual knowledge that an overt act will occur in a particular district to support venue at that location. At most, it asks that the overt act’s occurrence in the district of venue have been reasonably foreseeable to a conspirator.”). Here, during conversations between July 21 and the July 28 telephone call, Seiden had told the defendant that he was going to be in New York (using the false reason that his mother was in the hospital). (Tr. 453-54.) During that period of time, as supported by the telephone records, defendant attempted to contact Seiden in order to continue the scheme. (Gvt. Exs. 10, 11,12A and 12B.) In fact, on July 28, defendant sent as many as six text messages to Seiden before Seiden called him back. (Tr. 846; Gvt. Exs. 10, 12B.) Moreover, at the beginning of the telephone call at issue on July 28, 2009, Seiden explicitly told the defendant that he was “still in New York.” (Gvt. Ex. 5, line 4.) After being told that Seiden was in New York, defendant continued the conversation and sought to have Seiden make fraudulent purchases of stock, in exchange for a kickback. Thus, defendant clearly knew that Seiden was in New York when defendant tried to contact Seiden by telephone and then, when Seiden eventually did contact defendant on July 28, defendant used the telephone call to try to further the objective of his ongoing conspiracy with Kainth. Finally, defendant’s argument that the government failed to demonstrate “substantial contacts” with the district, pursuant to United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir.1985), also fails. See Tzolov, 642 F.3d at 321 (describing “substantial contacts” rule). In the instant case, given the particular facts — where the defendant knew that Seiden was in New York, attempted to contact him, and then chose to engage in a telephone conversation with Seiden that was clearly in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud — the “substantial contacts” rule is satisfied. Under these circumstances, it was not unfair or prejudicial for the defendant to be tried for this conspiracy in this District. See, e.g., Tzolov, 642 F.3d at 321 (rejecting argument that defendant’s flights out of JFK Airport did not satisfy Reed’s “substantial contacts” rule); Rommy, 506 F.3d at 120 (venue proper based on calls from undercover government agent inside the venue to out-of-venue defendant); Smith, 198 F.3d at 382 (venue proper based on coconspirator’s calls from inside venue to victim outside of venue); Naranjo, 14 F.3d at 147 (telephone calls in furtherance of the conspiracy satisfied “substantial contacts” rule). In short, based on the particular overt act that occurred in the District during the July 28, 2009 telephone call, the defendant’s venue challenge on the conspiracy count under Reed fails. In sum, the Court concludes that venue was proper as to the conspiracy count, c. Venue on Count Two: Securities Fraud Count Two charged the defendant with securities fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1348. Specifically, the Superseding Indictment alleges that “between June 2009 and August 2009, both dates being approximate and inclusive ... the defendant ... did knowingly and intentionally execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice (a) to defraud ...” (Sup. Ind., ¶ 15.) The defendant argues that venue for Count Two did not lie in the EDNY because only Manhattan and California based brokerage firms were victimized by the stock fraud scheme, and there was no buying or selling of UPDV shares in the EDNY. In response, the government asserts that, although Seiden did place calls to brokerage firms in Manhattan and California for fraudulent purchases of stock in connection with his scheme with Abdallah, those earlier acts are not the basis of the securities fraud charge in Count Two; instead, the defendant was charged in Count Two with securities fraud in connection with the telephone call Seiden made to the defendant on July 28, 2009, from the EDNY, during which the defendant directed Seiden to make additional fraudulent purchases of certain stocks in exchange for a 25 percent kickback to Seiden. As discussed below, the Court agrees with the government and concludes that the July 28, 2009 telephone call was certainly an attempt by the defendant to engage in securities fraud and, because that call was made from the EDNY, venue lies in this District for Count Two. As noted swpm Part II.A.2.a., under 18 U.S.C. § 3237, venue properly lies in “any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237. In this case, the attempted securities fraud began in Texas, but involved the EDNY because the defendant, knowing that Seiden was in New York at the time, gave specific directions to Seiden during the July 28, 2009 telephone call to fraudulently purchase stock at an inflated price, in exchange for a kickback. See generally United States v. Motz, 652 F.Supp.2d 284, 290 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (faxes sent into district sufficient to support venue for securities fraud charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1348). Thus, this situation is clearly distinguishable from United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir.2011). In Tzolov, the only basis for venue by the government on the substantive securities fraud count was that the defendant and an accomplice traveled through JFK airport on their way to meeting with investors. Id. at 318. The Second Circuit concluded that “going to Kennedy airport and boarding flights to meetings with investors were not a constitutive part of the substantive securities fraud offense with which [the defendant] was charged,” and thus this preparatory act did not create venue in the EDNY for the substantive securities fraud count. Id. at 319. Here, in contrast, the telephone call between Seiden and the defendant was not a mere passing through EDNY at an airport or a preparatory act; rather, it was the very core act of the attempted securities fraud by defendant — namely, an attempt by the defendant to place a fraudulent trade through Seiden, as he had done many times prior to that date. For example, during the call, the defendant discussed the need to have Seiden place a fraudulent trade in Alphatrade to artificially inflate the price so Seiden could sell his stock, and then specifically directed Seiden to purchase a million shares of Alphatrade at twenty cents per share: SEIDEN: Wha What do you say — what do you want me to do with Alphatrade exactly? ABDALLAH: With Alphatrade you see now it’s offered at two and a half cents. When it goes back to ten, it goes up to ten cents, fifteen cents. I have, I have uh two hundred thousand shares. If we can sell this between fifteen and twenty cents, then we’ll, we’ll have some cash. SEIDEN: Okay, so what do you want me to do? ABDALLAH: Uh, say that again um? SEIDEN: What exactly do you want me to do so at least I know? ABDALLAH: If you, you know, if you could buy um anywhere from seven hundred thousand to a million shares of it, that should that should that should go with wherever we want to move it. SEIDEN: Like what — like, no, specifically, like how do you want to do it? I want to make sure that I can — • ABDALLAH: Yeah. SEIDEN: — you know say yes to it. ABDALLAH: Yeah. A million shares at twenty cents. SEIDEN: What is it? ABDALLAH: A million shares at twenty cents if you could put the maximum order [UI] for twenty cents. (Gvt. Ex. 5, at 3-4.) The defendant then gave Seiden similar directions with respect to UPDY, in that Abdallah asked Seiden to put in buy orders for UPDV at up to $0.0045 per share, even though it was trading at between $0.0024 and $0.0028 per share: SEIDEN: What about um U-P-D-V? ABDALLAH: U-P-D-V, if you — whatever orders you can put in between — up to forty-five cents. Zero zero four five, not forty-five cents. Zero zero four five. SEIDEN: Okay. Where is that at? I haven’t, I haven’t even been watching it. ABDALLAH: It’s at twenty-four by twenty-eight. Yeah [UI]. (Gvt. Ex. 5, at 4.) Defendant told Seiden later in the conversation that he wanted to have Seiden do forty, fifty or sixty million shares of these purchases of UPDV stock. (Gvt. Ex. 5, at 6.) Moreover, the defendant told Seiden that his percentage, or kickback, for these fraudulent purchases would be “[t]weny-five percent.... Twenty-five on whatever I sell, um, um.” (Gvt. Ex. 5, at 5.) Thus, having given Seiden the name of the companies, the price for the fraudulent purchases by Seiden, and the number of shares, the only remaining act was for Seiden to turn around and place the fraudulent purchases in order to artificially inflate the prices of those stocks for defendant’s later sales. In short, by attempting to execute these fraudulent trades through Seiden, who defendant knew was in New York at the time of the telephone call, defendant created venue for substantive securities fraud in this District. See generally United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 484 & n. 13 (2d Cir.2003) (“[W]e find that the execution of trades on the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange is sufficient to establish venue in the Southern District of New York. We note that this conclusion is consistent with a number of district court decisions in this Circuit that have upheld venue where the only relevant contact to the venue was that various trades were executed in the district.”) (collecting cases). In sum, the July 28, 2009 call constitutes an attempt to engage in securities fraud. The defendant gave specific directions about how to manipulate the price of UPDV and confirmed that he would pay Seiden a kickback from his sale proceeds. By directing Seiden during the July 28, 2009 telephone call from Brooklyn to Texas to place these fraudulent purchases of stock, defendant engaged in attempted securities fraud and venue lies for that fraud in this District. d. Venue on Count Seven: Wire Fraud Count Seven (which was renumbered for trial as Count Three) charged the defendant with wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1348. The defendant asserts that venue was not proper for this charge. Defendant’s arguments regarding Count Seven are very similar to his arguments concerning Count Two. See Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, at 4 (“The defendant never travelled to the Eastern [District of New York; Defendant never telephoned anyone in the Eastern District of New York except the government informant Eric Seiden who initiated the call on July 28, 2009 to the defendant in San Antonio, Texas. This is the only contact that defendant had with the Eastern District of New York. This one telephone call on July 28, 2009 is not sufficient to establish Venue for the crime alleged in Count Three of the indictment.”). As set forth below, defendant’s venue challenge to the wire fraud offense, like the challenge to Count Two, fails because venue lies for the wire fraud in the districts that are at either end of the call regardless of whether defendant is in the district or whether defendant initiated the call. It is axiomatic that an interstate telephone call, during which defendant discusses the fraudulent scheme and directs his accomplice to place fraudulent stock orders to further the scheme, constitutes the crime of wire fraud. It is equally well settled that venue lies for that crime at either end of the telephone call — namely, the district where the call originated or the district where it was received. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 246 F.3d 186, 191, 192-93 (2d Cir.2001) (affirming district court’s conclusion that a wire is “transmitted” for purposes of the wire fraud statute both where it was sent and where it was received, and noting that “we reject the notion that the very wires which caused the fraud to bear fruit through payment by Chase Manhattan can be characterized as just passing through the Southern District”); see also United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir.2005) (“wire fraud [is] a ‘continuing offense,’ as defined in § 3237(a), properly tried in any district where a ... wire communication was transmitted in furtherance of [the] fraud scheme,” and “[e]ach of [the] transmittals occurred both where it was sent and where it was received”) (citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court made this clear in the context of the mail fraud statute where it stated that venue may constitutionally exist “in the district where [a defendant] sent the goods, or in the district of their arrival, or in any intervening district.” United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275, 65 S.Ct. 249, 89 L.Ed. 236 (1944). In the instant case, the July 28, 2009 telephone call was clearly an interstate wire for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme that was transmitted from the EDNY to Texas. As such, venue was proper in the EDNY for the wire fraud charge. To the extent that defendant argues that he must be present in this District for venue to exist for the wire fraud, the Second Circuit has rejected that argument. See Kim, 246 F.3d at 192 (“Here, [the defendant] caused- communications to be transmitted into and out of the Southern District when he approved fraudulent invoices knowing that [the customer] paid its vendors from New York banks. The fact that he was not in Manhattan when he caused the wire transmissions does not eliminate the connection between [the defendant’s] acts and the Southern District for the purposes of venue.”); accord United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1982); see also United States v. Martin, 411 F.Supp.2d 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“venue for the substantive wire fraud charge also lies in this district based on the acts of the [coconspirator,]” even where defendant was not present in venue and there was no evidence defendant knew that co-conspirator was engaging in activity in furtherance of the conspiracy in the venue). Accordingly, because defendant caused Seiden to call him (by texting him prior to the call), and because Seiden was in the EDNY at the time of his telephone call with the defendant, venue was proper on the wire fraud offense in Count Seven. e. Manufacturing Venue Claim The defendant argues that the “government artificially created [v]enue” as to each count by having Seiden place a call from the EDNY on July 28, 2009 to the defendant, who was in San Antonio, Texas. As set forth below, assuming arguendo that a doctrine of manufactured venue exists, there is no basis for such a finding here because (1) Seiden was in New York at the time of the telephone call because his lawyer was here; (2) defendant reached out to Seiden prior to the telephone call knowing that Seiden was in New York; and (3) Seiden told the defendant at the beginning of the call that he was in New York and the defendant proceeded to discuss the scheme and give directions regarding fraudulent trades to Seiden. In the Second Circuit, the concept of “manufactured venue” appears to have originated in a footnote in United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 847 n. 21 (2d Cir. 1982). In that case, the court addressed a claim by appellants that the government manufactured venue for “ulterior reasons, primarily to enable the Eastern District prosecutors to handle the trials.” Id. The court rejected the argument, but noted that it did not “preclude the possibility of similar concerns if a case should arise in which key events occur in one district, but the prosecution, preferring trial elsewhere, lures a defendant to a distant district for some minor event simply to establish venue.” Id. The Second Circuit has never vacated a conviction on the basis of manufactured venue. See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 127. Similarly, other circuits have rejected or at least questioned the doctrine of manufactured venue. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 453 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir.2006) (rejecting both manufactured venue and manufactured jurisdiction); United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir.1995) (“There is no such thing as manufactured venue or venue entrapment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1250 (D.C.Cir.1996) (expressing reservations as to “manufactured venue”); Andrews v. United States, 817 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (7th Cir.1987) (observing that appropriate way to address prosecution venue shopping is through transfer pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 21). In any event, even assuming arguendo that the doctrine exists, there is no evidence in this case that the prosecution, “preferring trial” in the EDNY, “lure[d]” the individual to the EDNY “for some minor event simply to establish venue.” Myers, 692 F.2d at 847 n. 21. Seiden was in the EDNY for reasons independent of any purported attempt to manufacture venue. In particular, Special Agent Samantha Lockery, the agent who arrested Seiden, testified at trial that Seiden appeared in New York for a July 24, 2009 court appearance before a magistrate judge in the EDNY. (Tr. 262.) At that time, he was appointed counsel whose office was located in Brooklyn. (Tr. 290-91.) The FBI agent could no longer meet with Seiden unless Seiden’s counsel was present, so the government and Seiden’s counsel agreed that Seiden would make the trip to the EDNY on July 28, 2009. (Tr. 264-65, 290.) Additionally, by July 28, the phone company had not yet set up Seiden’s phone to automatically record calls, so the FBI needed to use its own devices to record the call. (Tr. 292.) Moreover, it was the defendant who sought out Seiden in order to speak with him. See Naranjo, 14 F.3d at 147 (no manufactured venue where co-conspirator “sought out” the government agent who was located in district by calling the agent repeatedly, and agent did not go to the district to create venue there). On July 28, 2009, defendant sent as many as six text messages to Seiden before Seiden called him back. (Tr. 846; Gvt. Exs. 10, 12B.) Finally, when Seiden did call the defendant back, he informed the defendant at the beginning of the call that he was in New York. See Gvt. Ex. 5; Rommy, 506 F.3d at 124 (government agent’s remark to defendant that agent was in New York when he called out-of-venue defendant alleviated concern that venue was “the product of some ‘chance use of a telephone’ by a government agent”). Defendant continued the conversation in an effort to further his ongoing conspiratorial goals. Moreover, as noted supra, defendant continued to try to contact Seiden by text message after the telephone call, still being told that Seiden was in New York. See supra note 6. In sum, there is no evidence of manufactured venue in this case. The calls were made from EDNY because Seiden could only meet with the government with his counsel present. In any event, defendant tried to contact Seiden, knowing Seiden was in New York (purportedly to visit his sick mother), and then was told at the beginning of the critical July 28, 2009 conversation that Seiden was in New York. Knowing that Seiden was in New York, defendant continued the telephone conversation in an effort to further his fraudulent scheme and then repeatedly texted and attempted to contact Seiden after that telephone call (while being told Seiden was still in New York) to continue the scheme. Under such circumstances, any claim for manufactured venue must fail. 3. Insufficiency Claim on Count Seven: Wire Fraud Defendant challenges his conviction under Count Three, which charged the defendant with wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Defendant argues that he is “actually innocent” of wire fraud because Seiden’s phone call from the EDNY on July 28, 2009 was not made “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice,” but was rather made to “gain incriminating information” about the defendant, since Seiden was cooperating with the FBI at the time he made the phone call. As set forth below, this argument has no merit. A defendant challenging a conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence bears a heavy burden. United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all permissible inferences in the government’s favor. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2006). The wire fraud statute makes it a crime to use wires in furtherance of a “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343. “The essential elements of a mail [or wire] fraud violation are (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property [as the object of the scheme], and (3) use of the mails [or wires] to further the scheme.’ ” United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010, 1017 (2d Cir.1993)) (all alterations in Dinome and some alterations in Miller). The government does not need to prove that “the scheme successfully defrauded the intended victim,” but “the government must show that some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the schemer.” Dinome, 86 F.3d at 283 (quotations omitted). In this case, the