Full opinion text
AMENDED ORDER AMY TOTENBERG, District Judge. I. Background..............................................................1336 A. Church of Scientology .................................................1337 B. Subject Property and CSI’s Space Requirements..........................1339 C. Rezoning Application..................................................1341 D. Zoning Requirements..................................................1341 E. Planning Staff & Commission Recommendations..........................1342 1. Parking Studies...................................................1343 2. Alternate Conditions...............................................1344 F. City Council Decision..................................................1345 G. Plaintiffs Complaint...................................................1345 H. Parties’ Contentions...................................................1345 II. Summary Judgment Standard..............................................1346 III. Ripeness.................................................................1347 IV. Analysis .................................................................1349 A. RLUIPA.............................................................1349 1. Section (a) Substantial Burden Provision..............................1350 a. Whether the City Made an Individualized Assessment..............1350 b. Whether the City’s Decision Imposed a Substantial Burden on the Church’s Religious Exercise ...............................1352 2. Section (b): Equal Terms, Nondiscrimination, Exclusions and Limits----1359 a. RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision...............................1359 b. RLUIPA’s Nondiscrimination Provision...........................1360 i. WOiether Plaintiff Identified Similarly Situated Comparators...........................................1362 ii. Whether the City Acted With a Discriminatory Purpose.......1370 c. RLUIPA’s Exclusions and Limits Provision.......................1377 B. Freedom of Speech....................................................1377 C. Federal Takings and State Inverse Condemnation Claims..................1378 D. Violation of Substantive Due Process Under Georgia Constitution...........1379 E. Mandamus...........................................................1380 V. Conclusion...............................................................1380 This case arises from a zoning dispute over the Church of Scientology’s desire to convert a 32,053 square foot office building into a roughly 44,000 square foot Church, referred to by Scientologists as an “Ideal Organization.” The City of Sandy Springs approved the use of the subject property for a church but limited the size of the building to the existing 32,053 square feet based on a lack of sufficient on-site parking. The Church of Scientology filed this suit pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which prohibits governments from implementing land use regulations that impose a “substantial burden” on religious exercise or that discriminate against any religious assemblies or institutions on the basis of religious denomination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) & (b)(2). However, as Plaintiffs counsel recognized before the City Council, “[t]he issue in this case has not been one of land use. It has been one of parking and a perceived issue as it relates to traffic.” (Tr. Dec. 15, 2009, City Council Hearing 4:18-20, Doc. 47-1.) On September 30, 2011, the Court issued an Order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 86.) The Court raised the question of whether Plaintiffs claims were ripe and directed the parties to submit additional briefing on the ripeness issue. This issue has now been fully briefed. (Docs. 87, 88.) Additionally, the parties have fully briefed the issues raised in Plaintiffs October 28, 2011, Motion for Reconsideration of the September 30, 2011, Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs claim for discrimination under RLUIPA. (Docs. 89, 90.) Having reviewed the parties’ briefs on ripeness and the motion for reconsideration as well as the additional evidence submitted by Plaintiff regarding its original request for a parking variance, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, [Doc. 89], inasmuch as a question of fact exists as to whether the City discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of its religious denomination in granting Plaintiff conditional approval of its rezoning application. Accordingly, the Court VACATES its Order issued on September 80, 2011, and ENTERS the following Order. I. BACKGROUND Keeping in mind that when deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the Court provides the following statement of facts. See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir.2007) (observing that, in connection with summary judgment, court must review all facts and inferences in light most favorable to non-moving party). This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir.2007). Instead, the Court has provided the statement simply to place the Court’s legal analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy. A. Church of Scientology Plaintiff, the Church of Scientology of Georgia, is a religious organization that currently operates a church at 4588 Winters Chapel Road, in Doraville, Georgia (“the Winters Chapel Location”). (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 4, Doc. 37-4, (hereinafter “PSMF”); Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 4, Doc. 60, (hereinafter “Defs.’ Resp. SMF”); Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4, Doc. 38-1, Ex. A; Danos Aff. ¶ 4, Doc. 38-1, Ex. B.) When the Complaint in this matter was filed, the Church operated in leased space at 4480 North Shallowford Road, Dun-woody, Georgia (“the Dunwoody Location”). (PSMF ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 3; Danos Aff. ¶ 3.) Scientology is an applied religion based upon the research, writings and recorded lectures of L. Ron Hubbard, which collectively constitute the Scriptures of the religion. (PSMF ¶ 8; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 8; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 6-8.) The Scriptures are the source of the beliefs, practices, rituals, and policies of the religion. (Id.) The Church serves a state-wide congregation of 600 members, 100 of whom are currently active. It has a staff of 20 volunteer and paid employees. (Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶2, Doc. 43-2, (hereinafter “DSMF”); Pl.’s Response to Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 2, Doc. 67, (hereinafter “Pl.’s Resp. DSMF”); Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff is the only church of Scientology in the state. (DSMF ¶ 6; Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 2; Danos Dep. 40:10-20.) Scientology facilities are classified in one of four ways: (1) groups, (2) missions, (3) Class Y Organizations, or (4) advanced organizations. (DSMF ¶ 3; Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 3; Wright Dep. 10:19-11:10.) Plaintiff is a Class V Organization. (DSMF ¶ 7; PL’s Resp. DSMF ¶7; Wright Dep. 11:21-24.) The Church of Scientology International (hereinafter “CSI”) is the senior ecclesiastical management church in the Scientology religion. (DSMF ¶ 7; PL’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 7; Compl. ¶ 34; Wright Aff. ¶ 3; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 35-38.) CSI mandates that all new Class V Organizations conform to the template of an “Ideal Central Organization” more commonly known as an “Ideal Org.” (DSMF ¶ 9; PL’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 9; Danos Dep. 50:11-51:24; Wright Aff. ¶ 3; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 35-38.) CSI expects that Plaintiff, as part of its function as an Ideal Org, will open up new missions and new groups that will eventually grow to become new Class V Churches. (Wright Aff. ¶ 10.) The concept of the Ideal Org originated in Hubbard’s writings on Scientology, but the actual implementation of the concept of the Ideal Org was developed more recently from approximately 2003 to 2007 when CSI undertook a study of Hubbard’s writings to determine the necessary physical requirements for a Church to ensure that religious services are orthodox and uniform, which is a fundamental requirement of Scientology religious doctrine. (PSMF ¶ 33; Defs. Resp. PSMF ¶ 33; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 38-43; Wright Aff. ¶ 4; Wright Dep. 43:16-45:21.) According to the December 12, 2010, Affidavit of Robert Wright, [Beginning in 2003, CSI embarked on a program to create [Ideal Orgs].... An Ideal Class V Organization holds and houses all of the functions required for a Class V Church, according to the Scientology Scriptures, and is able to actually deliver all of those functions and services. Even many today, an estimated 90% or more)[sic] of our existing Church buildings are not of the correct size to house all the functions. For that reason, for the last five (5) or six (6) years, Scientology churches around the world have been purchasing new buildings so that they can provide all the needed programs and functions of the church. (Wright Aff. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff contends that CSI determined that a minimum of 40,000 square feet is required to provide all the necessary religious services, although ideally a “range of 50,000 to 65,000 square feet is easier” in terms of space planning. (PSMF ¶ 34; Wright Aff. ¶ 9.) However, Mr. Wright testified that there is no written document specifying the amount of square feet required. (Wright Dep. 46:19-47:3.) Scientology’s core religious services are “Training” and “Auditing.” (PSMF ¶ 17; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 17; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 18.) Through Scientology Training “one obtains the wisdom to understand who he is, what he is, where he comes from and his relationship to the Universe.” (PSMF ¶ 20; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 20; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 19.) One half of the spiritual gains in Scientology come from Training. (Id.) Scientology Auditing is a form of religious counseling ministered at Scientology churches in confidential one-on-one sessions between a specially trained individual called an “Auditor” and a parishioner. (PSMF ¶ 24; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 24; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Training is provided through Scientology religious courses at Scientology churches. (PSMF ¶ 19; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 19; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 19.) Most Training courses are divided into Theory and Practical sections. (PSMF ¶ 21; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 21; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 20.) The Theory course rooms are arranged differently from the Practical course rooms and are configured to use a variety of equipment. (Id.) Certain course rooms are designed to be located adjacent to other related course rooms. (PSMF ¶ 22; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶22; Wright Aff. ¶17.) Many course rooms relate to one another such that as many as five (5) course rooms may be utilized by the students of one class, who migrate from room to room at their own pace during a study period. (PSMF ¶ 23; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶23; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 21.) Auditing must be provided in quiet and confidential surroundings, away from other activities that may be going on in a church. (PSMF ¶ 25; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 25; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 24.) Each Scientology church has numerous small Auditing rooms where Auditing sessions take place. (Cartwright Aff. ¶ 23.) With the exception of certain advanced Scientology churches, each local Scientology church must have sufficient facilities to provide the full range of Training and Auditing religious practices necessary to follow the prescribed path of spiritual healing and enlightenment known as “The Bridge to Total Freedom.” (PSMF ¶¶ 15, 18; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶¶ 15, 18; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 16, 17; Wright Aff. ¶ 6.) Scientology churches also hold congregational services on Sundays, religious holidays, and certain other occasions. (PSMF ¶ 28; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶28; Cartwright Aff. ¶ 27; Wright Aff. ¶21.) Scientologists believe that the expansion and dissemination of the religion is necessary to salvage human civilization. (PSMF ¶ 29; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶29; Cartwright Aff. ¶32.) All Scientology churches have a religious obligation to reach out to their community to spread the word of Scientology to new members and are therefore mandated to include large public display areas. (PSMF ¶¶ 30, 31; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶¶30, 31; Cartwright Aff. ¶¶ 33, 34.) B. Subject Property and CSI’s Space Requirements The Church purchased property at 5395 Roswell Road, Sandy Springs, Georgia (“the property” or “the subject property”) in 2005 to enable it to provide a full range of Scientology religious services and to allow for future growth, which it was unable to accommodate at the Dunwoody location or at its current Winters Chapel Road location. (PSMF ¶¶ 5, 6; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶¶ 5, 6; Danos Aff. ¶¶5, 6.) The physical space needs of the Church are dictated by the nature of Scientology and its religious beliefs and practices. (PSMF ¶ 7; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 7; Wright Aff. ¶ 8.) While CSI had established some guidelines on the types of services to be provided in a Class V Ideal Org as of 2005 when Plaintiff purchased the property at issue, CSI had yet to complete its study of the minimum space requirements necessary to house those services. (DSMF ¶ 10; Pl.’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 10; Wright Dep. 44-46.) Plaintiff contends that although the study was not complete as of 2005, the size of the building on the property was an important factor in CSI’s approval of the property for purchase by Plaintiff. (PL’s Resp. DSMF ¶ 10; Wright Aff. ¶ 24.) In accordance with the procedures that CSI has promulgated, Plaintiff submitted a Building Investment Committee Checklist (“Checklist”) to CSI for approval prior to its purchase of the property. (PSMF ¶ 37; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 37; Wright Aff. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff asserts that prior to purchasing the property the Church “confirmed that a church was a permitted use in the property’s O-I zoning designation and that the number of existing surface parking spaces would satisfy the applicable parking regulations.” (PSMF ¶45.) The City denies that the Church requested a parking space confirmation prior to its purchase of the subject property or in turn, that the City provided a pre-purchase confirmation that the number of surface parking spaces on the property was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Parking Ordinance. (DSMF ¶ 45.) The Certificate of Zoning provided by the City to the Church on June 6, 2005, states only that the subject property is currently zoned in the O-I (Office & Institutional District) and does not address parking. (Danos Dep., Ex. 5.) The total square footage of the existing office building is roughly 43,000 square feet, including an approximate 12,000 square foot basement that was previously used, in part, as a parking garage. (PSMF ¶¶ 41-42; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 41; DSMF ¶ 12; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 12; Compl. ¶ 38; Leathers Dep. Ex. 20 at 1.) While the exact configuration is unclear from the record, the property was served by 111 parking spaces comprised of surface spaces, garage spaces, and spaces provided by an easement on the neighboring post office property. (PSMF ¶ 50, Ex. E, Kimley-Horn Parking Study, June 2009 Doc. 39-1; DSMF ¶ 13; Leathers Dep. Ex. 20 at 21.) In order to accommodate its growing needs and to provide an adequate facility in which to exercise its religious precepts, the Church developed plans to redesign the existing building on the property and to convert the 11,193 square foot basement to religious uses, including a chapel, in the area formerly used for parking. (PSMF ¶ 43; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 43; Danos Aff. ¶ 9; Compl. ¶ 42.) C. Rezoning Application A church is a permitted use in the O-I (Office and Institutional District) zoning classification under the Sandy Springs Zoning Ordinance (“Zoning Ordinance”). (PSMF ¶ 46; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 46; Danos Aff. ¶ 12; Compl. ¶ 41.) However, pri- or to Plaintiffs purchase, the property’s O-I zoning was conditioned on its use as office space, thus preventing its use as a church without a rezoning to remove this condition. (PSMF ¶ 46; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 46; DSMF ¶ 22; Danos Aff. ¶ 12; Leathers Aff. ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 41.) In March 2009, the Church submitted an application to the City of Sandy Springs (“the City”) for a rezoning to permit the use of the property as a church (hereinafter “the Application”). (PSMF ¶ 47; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶47; DSMF 1f 23; Danos Aff. ¶ 13; Leathers Aff. ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs Application also requested several concurrent variances, including acceptance of the existing quantity of parking spaces. (Doc. 88-1.) The Application sought approval of the expansion of the building from 32,053 square feet to 43,916 square feet by conversion of the 11,193 square foot basement/garage area to religious uses. (PSMF ¶ 47; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶47; DSMF ¶ 24; Danos Aff. ¶ 13; Leathers Aff. ¶ 5; Compl. ¶ 43.) As a result of the needed expansion, the Church’s Application proposed eliminating 30 parking spaces in the basement garage, thereby decreasing the amount of available parking from 111 existing spaces to 81 spaces. (Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 8; Leathers Dep. Ex. 21 at 8; PSMF Ex. E, KimleyHorn Parking Study, June 2009, Doc. 39-1; PSMF ¶47; DSMF ¶25.) On.March 24, 2009, a City planner informed the Church via e-mail that it did not need a parking variance because “[t]he required parking count is 47 and according to the site plan you have 64.” (Doe. 88-3.) Thereafter, on May 5, 2009, Plaintiff amended its Zoning Application, in part, to remove its request for a parking variance. (Doc. 88-4.) D. Zoning Requirements The Zoning Ordinance defines “Church, Temple or Place of Worship” as “[a] facility in which persons regularly assemble for religious ceremonies. This shall include, on the same lot, accessory structures and uses such as minister’s and caretaker’s residences, and other uses identified under the provisions for Administrative and Use Permits.” (Zoning Ordinance § 3.3.3, Doc. 49-1 at 15 (R000560); DSMF ¶32; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 32.) Section 18.2.1 of the Zoning Ordinance (hereinafter “the Parking Ordinance”) contains a schedule of parking requirements based on industry standards and broken down by use. (DSMF ¶ 29; PL’s Resp. SMF ¶29; Leather’s Decl. ¶ 6; Zoning Ordinance § 18.2.1, Doc. 51-1 at 1-6.) The Parking Ordinance provides that “[pjarking requirements shall be calculated based on the proportion that each use contributes to the total.” (Zoning Ordinance § 18.2.1, Doc. 51-1 at 1.) According to the City, based on the use of a property, the staff applies these standards to determine how much parking is required on the site, assuming operation at full capacity. (DSMF ¶ 30; Leather’s Decl. ¶ 6.) For “Churches and Other Places of Worship,” parking is generally calculated on the total number of fixed seats or the total square footage of the largest assembly area. (DSMF ¶ 31; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 31; Leather’s Deck ¶ 7.) Specifically, the Parking Ordinance requires 1 parking space per 3.5 fixed seats in the largest assembly area or 1 parking space per 30 square feet in the largest assembly area. (Zoning Ordinance § 18.2.1, Doc. 51-1 at 1-6.) The Parking Ordinance requires 3 spaces per 1,000 square feet of office space and 5 spaces per 1,000 square feet of classroom space. (Zoning Ordinance § 18.2.1, Doc. 51-1 at 1-6; Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 9.) E. Planning Staff & Commission Recommendations Despite a City planner previously advising Plaintiff on March 24, 2009, that there was sufficient parking on the subject property, the City’s Planning Staff (hereinafter “the staff’) determined that the on-site parking was deficient in its initial Staff Report prepared for the Planning Commission Hearing on May 21, 2009 (hereinafter “May 21, 2009, Staff Report”). (Doc. 88-5.) Specifically, the May 21, 2009, Staff Report determined the required parking for the property as follows: Article 18.2.1 indicates parking requirements are to be calculated based upon the proportion that each use contributes to the total. For example, a building with multiple uses would be required to provide parking based upon the total parking requirement associated with each use. On the other hand, parking requirements for uses with large public assembly areas relative to the remainder of the building (i.e. meeting halls or libraries) are based upon the largest public assembly area. Normally, staff would analyze the parking needs for the Church of Scientology building relative to the size of the sanctuary. However, because proposed development will have a sanctuary which comprises less than 5% of the total net floor area, staff has instead analyzed the parking impact using an aggregate of the uses in the building (sanctuary, offices and classrooms). (Id. at 8; see also Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 8; Leathers Dep. Ex. 21 at 8; PSMF ¶ 51; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 51.) Using the City’s typical parking calculation for “Churches or Other Places of Worship,” Plaintiffs property would be required to provide 41 parking spaces. (PSMF ¶49; KimleyHorn Parking Study, Doc. 39-1.) Based on information provided by Plaintiff during the rezoning process regarding the nature of its religious practices, the City determined that the Church of Scientology is different from “traditional” churches or places of worship as defined by the Zoning Ordinance in that Scientology focuses on individualized study and course work rather than large congregational gatherings in the sanctuary. (DSMF II33; Leather’s Decl. ¶8; Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 12.) During the November 19, 2009, Planning Commission meeting, counsel for Plaintiff stated “they have a chapel service that occurs on the weekend. And that is where they come together for chapel. It is not like a congregational style church like you may be accustomed to that everybody turns out at the same time every week for one particular hour or a series of several hours. They don’t typically do that .... the general use of the building will be the offices, for counseling and classroom study.” (Tr. Nov. 19, 2009, Planning Commission Meeting, Doc. 46-1 at 33:16-22.) The City found that a lack of adequate parking on the property “could cause an excessive or burdensome use of the existing infrastructure.” (Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 12.) As a result, the staff initially calculated the parking requirement under Section 18.2.1 based on a breakdown by square footage of the facility’s various proposed uses (office, classroom, sanctuary) by totaling the required parking for each type of use. (DSMF ¶ 36; PSMF ¶ 52; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 52; Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 9.) The staff determined that Plaintiffs proposed use of the property required 148 parking spaces broken out as follows: (1) Chapel (1,218 SF) — 41 spaces; (2) Classrooms (11,153 SF) — 56 spaces; (3) Offices (17,065 SF)— 51 spaces. (DSMF ¶ 37; Compl. ¶ 49; Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 9.) Accordingly, the staff made the following recommendations to the Planning Commission: The proposed use (a place of worship) incorporates a build-out of the existing lower level parking deck to create a new sanctuary, additional office space and classrooms. An analysis was prepared by staff comparing the proposed uses within the building and minimum parking standards from Article 18.2.1 of the Zoning Ordinance associated with each use. According to this analysis (see Table 1), the site at full build-out would not provide the minimum number of parking spaces required per code. Because of this, staff recommends the total building area be limited to 32,053 square feet unless the applicant receives a variance from the minimum parking requirements or can demonstrate a reduction is warranted due to the operation of use such that parking spaces could be shared.... It is the opinion of the staff that the proposed use and density are consistent with the Future Land use Map and the policies of the Comprehensive Plan. The entire 43,246 square feet could be recommended for approval by staff if the applicant can demonstrate that the on-site parking will be sufficient to meet the full use of the proposed building including the expansion through either a parking study or shared-parking analysis. Therefore, based on these reasons, the staff recommends APPROVAL CONDITIONAL of the request to rezone the subject property from O-I (Office and Institutional District) to O-I (Office and Institutional District) conditional and the associated concurrent variance. (Doc. 88-5 at 13; see also Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 13; Leathers Dep. Ex. 21 at 12; PSMF ¶ 55; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 55.) The City deferred consideration of the Church’s Application to allow the Church time to provide staff with a parking study to demonstrate the parking needs for the property. (PSMF ¶ 56; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 56; DSMF ¶ 40; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 40.) 1. Parking Studies Plaintiff submitted a parking study of its Nashville, Tennessee and Dunwoody, Georgia facilities conducted by KimleyHorn in June 2009, and supplemented the study in July 2009, with an analysis of a third facility in Buffalo, New York (“the Parking Studies”). (DSMF ¶41; PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 41; PSMF ¶ 71; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 71; Leather’s Decl. ¶ 12; Compl. ¶ 52; Kimley-Horn Parking Study, Docs. 39-1, 39-2.) The Parking Studies determined that the maximum number of parking spaces needed for Plaintiffs proposed use of the property, based on peak demand per square foot of the Nashville facility, would be 52 parking spaces. (PSMF ¶¶ 58-63; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶¶ 58-63; Kimley-Horn Parking Study, Docs. 39-1, 39-2.) Upon review of the Parking Studies, the staff subsequently revised its parking recommendation and calculated an alternate parking ratio, based on the information provided regarding the Nashville facility, to reduce the required parking from 148 spaces to 130 spaces. (DSMF ¶ 42; PL’s Resp. SMF ¶42; PSMF ¶¶66-67; Defs.’ Resp. ¶¶ 66-67; Leather’s Decl. ¶¶ 12-14; Leathers Dep., Ex. 21 at 8; Leathers Dep., Ex. 22 at 8-9.) Nonetheless, the staff found that the available parking was still deficient to support Plaintiffs proposed expansion at full capacity and once again recommended “restricting the use of the subject property to the existing 32,053 square foot building with the existing 111 spaces.” (Leathers Dep., Ex. 22 at 8-9, 14.) The Church’s Application was again deferred. (Leathers Dep., Ex. 23 at 2.) 2. Alternate Conditions On September 1, 2009, representatives of the Church met with the staff and the City Attorney to discuss alternate conditions for approval of the Church’s Application requesting conversion of the basement to religious uses. (PSMF ¶ 77; Defs.’ Resp. ¶ 77; Leathers Decl. ¶ 15.) The Church submitted a set of alternate conditions to its Application proposing a limitation on the occupancy of the building to 283 people, based on the 81 parking spaces provided after conversion of the basement, and applying a parking ratio of 3.5 people per vehicle (“the First Alternate Conditions”). (PSMF ¶ 77; Defs.’ Resp. ¶ 77; Leathers Decl. ¶ 15; Leathers Dep., Ex. 23 at 19.) The staff recommended approval of the First Alternate Conditions. (PSMF ¶ 78; Defs.’ Resp. ¶ 78; Leathers Dep., Ex. 23 at 19.) The City deferred consideration of the Application to allow the Planning Commission an opportunity to review and make a recommendation in light of these alternate conditions. (Compl. ¶ 58; Leathers Dep., Ex. 23 at 2.) On September 17, 2009, the Planning Commission recommended denial of the Application with the First Alternate Conditions. (Leathers Dep., Ex. 23 at 2.) Prior to the scheduled October 20, 2009, City Council Hearing, the Church submitted a second amendment to its Application. (Comply 60.) The Church proposed reconfiguring the property’s surface lot to increase the total number of parking spaces from 81 to 111. (DSMF ¶ 43; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 43; Leathers Decl. ¶ 15.) The Church then proposed lowering the occupancy limit to 170 people, based on 111 parking spaces provided after reconfiguration of the surface lot, and applying a parking ratio of 1.5 people per vehicle (“the Second Alternate Conditions”). (PSMF ¶ 78; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶78; Leathers Decl. ¶ 15; Compl. ¶ 60.) The staff recommended approval of the Second Alternate Conditions. (PSMF ¶ 78; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 78; Leathers Deck ¶ 16; Leathers Dep., Exs. 24 & 25; Compl. ¶ 61.) F. City Council Decision On December 15, 2009, the City Council rejected the Second Alternate Conditions proposing an occupancy limitation based on a concern regarding how to enforce such a limitation, considering the current size of the Church’s congregation and its potential for growth as a regional church. (Tr. Dec. 15, 2009, City Council Hearing at 38^0, 46-48, 54-55, Doc. 47-1; Dec. 15, 2009, City Council Minutes at 15-19, Doc. 48-1.) The City Council approved Plaintiffs rezoning Application to allow the use of the property as a church with the condition that the property be limited to 32,053 square feet, but denied Plaintiffs request to expand the use of the property to the proposed 43,916 square feet based on a lack of sufficient parking. (DSMF ¶¶ 27, 28; PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶27, 28; Compl. ¶ 64; Dec. 15, 2009, City Council Minutes, Doc. 48-1 at 23-24.) According to Plaintiff, the City has issued development approval to eleven (11) other churches or places of worship since the City’s formation on December 31, 2005, for which the “Church” parking standard (1 parking space per 3.5 fixed seats in the largest assembly area or 1 parking space per 30 square feet in the largest assembly area) was applied rather than the “multiuse” parking standard initially applied to Plaintiff. (PSMF ¶¶ 81-82; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶¶ 81-82.) G. Plaintiffs Complaint On January 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this matter against the City of Sandy Springs, its Mayor and Council members in their official capacity (“Defendants”), setting forth the following claims: (1) various violations of RLUIPA, Counts I through III; (2) violations of the rights to free exercise, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of establishment, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, Counts V through VIII; (3) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Count IX; (4) an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Count X; (5) costs of litigation under RLUIPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Count IV; (6) deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution and state law, Counts XI and XII; and (7) equitable relief, Counts XIII and XIV. H. Parties’ Contentions The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff sought summary judgment on its RLUIPA claims and its Free Exercise claim only. The City sought summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs substantive claims and claims for relief. In essence, Plaintiffs claim is that the City’s conditional approval of its rezoning Application limiting its use of the building to 32,053 square feet and denying its proposed conversion of the 11,193 square foot basement area into religious use (based on the City’s failure to apply the City’s church parking standard) impinges on Plaintiffs use of the building as a church in accordance with Scientology’s Scriptures. As such, Plaintiff asserts that the City’s action substantially burdens its religious exercise and discriminates against the Church on the basis of its religious denomination in violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. On the other hand, the City contends that Plaintiff has not been denied the use of its building as a church and that the City applied the same parking standard it has applied to other multi-use religious institutions. The City further argues that any burden suffered by Plaintiff is the result of its own actions in purchasing the property prior to the completion of CSI’s study on the minimum space requirements for a Class Y Ideal Org. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Both parties have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The substantive law applicable to the case determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Id. Accordingly, when a reasonable jury could not find that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. “The district court should resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (citations and punctuation omitted). The court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.1993), reh’g denied, 16 F.3d 1233 (1994) (en banc). For issues upon which the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of its claim on that legal issue. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). It must support its motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Id. If the moving party makes such a showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the non-moving party comes forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of an issue of fact. Id. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the [nonmoving party’s] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, however, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent’s claim. Id. Instead, the moving party may point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support an element of the non-moving party’s case. Id. The non-moving party must then respond with sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir.1994). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. III. RIPENESS At outset of its analysis of Plaintiffs claims in the September 30, 2011, Order, the Court expressed its concern as to whether Plaintiffs claims were ripe. Based on the Court’s review of the record as presented by the parties at that time, it appeared that Plaintiff failed to apply for a variance from the parking requirement as multiple iterations of the City Planning Department Staff Reports shared with the Plaintiff indicated the Department’s suggestion that a variance might address the parking issue. (See Leathers Dep., Ex. 20 at 8; Leathers Dep. Ex. 21 at 8; PSMF ¶ 51; Defs.’ Resp. SMF ¶ 51.) Thus, the Court noted that “because Plaintiff failed to avail itself of this remedy, it is possible that the City’s decision as to the property’s proposed expansion is subject to modification via a variance and therefore not final.” See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573-74 (11th Cir.1989), re’g denied, en banc, 893 F.2d 346 (1989) (noting that courts have found an absence of finality where property owners did not avail themselves of the opportunities provided by state or federal statute to seek variances or waivers from zoning decisions); Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 352 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs’ failure to apply for a variance deprived the court of any certainty as to what use of the plaintiffs property would be permitted). However, as noted above, it is now clear that Plaintiff did in fact make an early request for a variance as to the number of required on-site parking spaces but subsequently withdrew the request after a City planner initially handling the application informed Plaintiff a variance was unnecessary. The Staff Reports referenced above were issued and provided to the City Planning Commission and later to the City Council as foundational predicates to their formal review of the Church’s rezoning request. Ripeness, a doctrine rooted in both Article Ill’s case or controversy requirement and prudential limitations on the exercise of judicial authority, goes to whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and therefore may be raised sua sponte by the court. See Greenbriar, Ltd., 881 F.2d at 1574 n. 7; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1224 (11th Cir. 2004). “The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.’ ” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1224 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977)). The Eleventh Circuit has held that the decision of a municipality is not ripe for review unless that decision is final and definite with respect to the property at issue, relying on the Supreme Court’s ripeness test in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). See Greenbriar, Ltd., 881 F.2d at 1573-74 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985)); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724-27 (11th Cir.1990) (following Greenbriar’s holding and requiring that the zoning decision under attack be finally made and applied to the property at issue). As noted by the Second Circuit in Murphy in the context of RLUIPA, “the Williamson County ripeness test is a fact-sensitive inquiry that may, when circumstances warrant, be applicable to various types of land use challenges.” 402 F.3d at 350 (citing RLUIPA’s legislative history as support for the proposition that RLUIPA was not intended to “relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, where available without discrimination or unfair delay”). In deciding whether a claim is ripe for adjudication or review, the court should look primarily at two considerations: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1224. In an as-applied challenge to a zoning ordinance, the plaintiff is not required to obtain a final decision if pursuing an appeal to a zoning board of appeals or seeking a variance would be futile. See, e.g., Eide, 908 F.2d at 727-28; Murphy, 402 F.3d at 350. In other words, “a property owner need not pursue such applications when a zoning agency lacks discretion to grant variances or has dug in its heels and made clear that all such applications will be denied.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 350 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 n. 3, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (stating that an application for a variance is not required when it would be “pointless”)). In their supplemental briefing, both parties contend that Plaintiffs claims are ripe. The parties appear to agree that the City Council’s conditional approval of Plaintiffs Rezoning Application was a final decision. {See Does. 87, 88.) Plaintiff contends that the City’s zoning decision is a final decision because it can be modified only by City Council action on another zoning petition. Plaintiff also asserts that a second attempt to seek a variance from the City’s parking requirement, after 8 months of failed negotiations with the City, would have been futile. The City contends the zoning conditions attached to the Church’s property by the City’s rezoning decision cannot be modified by a variance under the terms of the Ordinance. According to the City, “absent a second and independent rezoning by the City, the zoning conditions limiting the church use on the Subject Property to 32,053 square feet cannot be lifted or modified.” (Doc. 87 at 3.) The City’s Zoning Ordinance does not allow for a variance to increase the density or change the use approved under a rezoning. (Zoning Ordinance § 22.2.4 D.) A variance is available only to provide relief from the strict application of the general provisions of the Zoning Ordinance and cannot be applied to zoning conditions which relate to a specific property. {See Zoning Ordinance § 22.3.) Thus, it appears that by attaching conditions to Plaintiffs use of the property in its rezoning, the City has limited Plaintiffs ability under the Zoning Ordinance to simply seek a variance from the parking requirement. Although the Court is not convinced that the City’s conditional zoning approval could not be modified by the issuance of a concurrent variance on a subsequent petition for a rezoning, the Court need not reach the issue because the Court finds that a subsequent attempt by Plaintiff to obtain a variance would in fact prove futile. Indeed, in its supplemental brief addressing the ripeness issue, the City inexplicably asserts that “[e]ven if a variance from the City’s parking requirements were to be issued, Plaintiff still cannot expand its facility on the Subject Property by eliminating the basement parking garage because of the zoning conditions on the Subject Property.” (Doc. 87 at 3.) Accordingly, it is apparent that the City has made clear that any request by Plaintiff to reduce the number of on-site parking spaces and to expand the use of its basement for church use will be denied at this juncture. IV. ANALYSIS The Court will now address the merits of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs motion seeks partial summary judgment on its RLUIPA claims (Counts I — III) and its free exercise claim (Count V) and requests an award of compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ motion seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs substantive claims (Counts I — III, and V— XII), and Plaintiffs claims for costs, damages and equitable relief (Counts IV, XIII and XIV). A. RLUIPA Both parties seek summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs RLUIPA claims (Counts I, II, and III). Plaintiff argues that the City’s conditional approval of its rezoning application — which limits the use of the building to the existing 32,053 square foot office building and excludes the proposed use of the 11,863 square foot basement for a chapel, executive offices, and classrooms — is a violation of RLUIPA and its right to the free exercise of its religion. The Complaint alleges that the City violated RLUIPA in the following ways: (1) by imposing and implementing a land use regulation that substantially burdens religious exercise (Count I); (2) by applying the zoning ordinance in a way that treats this religious organization on less than equal terms with other religious and non-religious assemblies (Count II); (3) by implementing a land use regulation in a manner than discriminates on the basis of religion (Count II); and (4) by imposing a land use regulation that unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, and structures within the City (Count III). RLUIPA prohibits governments from imposing a “substantial burden” on the religious exercise of a person or a religious assembly by imposing a land use regulation, unless that land use regulation is necessary to further a compelling state interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ec(a)(l). In addition, governments may not impose land use regulations that treat religious institutions on less than equal terms with secular institutions, discriminate against religious institutions, or unreasonably limit religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ce(b). A land use regulation is defined as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). 1. Section (a) Substantial Burden Provision The Court’s analysis of the Church’s claim under Section (a) of RLUIPA involves three considerations: (1) whether the City made an individual assessment of the Church’s proposed use of the property such that RLUIPA applies; (2) whether the Church has established a prima facie case that the City has imposed a substantial burden on its religious exercise; and (3) if the Church establishes its prima facie case, whether the City can justify the burden imposed by demonstrating a compelling interest achieved by the least restrictive means. See Midrash Sephardi Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir.2004); Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir.2005). a. Whether the City Made an Individualized Assessment First, RLUIPA’s “individualized assessment test” has been characterized by the Eleventh Circuit as a jurisdictional determination. Midrash, 366 F.3d 1214, 1225; Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F.Supp.2d 1296 (S.D.Fla.2006). The Court has jurisdiction over the City’s alleged violation of Section (a) of RLUIPA only if the Church can show that the “burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes ... individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). An individualized assessment involves a “case-by-case evaluation of the proposed activity.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that “[b]y the imposition and implementation of a land use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on the Church’s exercise of the Scientology religion within the City of Sandy Springs, Defendants made an individualized assessment of the proposed uses for the property involved.” (Compl. ¶ 73.) Plaintiff asserts in its motion that the City does not dispute that its treatment of the Church’s zoning application constitutes an individualized assessment. (Pl.’s Br. Summ. J. at 32.) However, in its Answer, the City denied Plaintiffs allegation that the City made an individualized assessment. (Answer ¶ 73.) The City contends that Section 18.2.1 of the Zoning Ordinance is neutral and generally applied to determine the required, amount of parking. (Defs.’ Br. Summ. J. at 11.) According to the City, [The Parking Ordinance] establishes a table of parking standards keyed to types of uses. Zoning Ord. § 18.2.1. All of the terms in the table are neutrally defined in the Zoning Ordinance based on the nature of the operative use. Zoning Ord. § 3.3.1. In order to calculate required parking Defendants find a use on the table in Section 18.2.1 that best captures the applicant’s proposed primary use or uses and then applies the parking standard that correlates to that use or uses assuming the facility operates at maximum capacity. Doc. 42-1 p. 77-79; Leathers Deck ¶ 6. If the parking standard appears inadequate or has the effect of creating an adverse situation, the Zoning Ordinance affords the City Council flexibility to impose additional mitigating conditions. Zoning Ord. § 28.1 ¶ 3. (Defs.’ Br. Summ. J. at 11-12.) Even where the government’s regulation is neutral and generally applicable, its application to particular facts can constitute an individualized assessment, particularly where “the application does not involve a mere numerical or mechanistic assessment,” but involves criteria that are at least partially subjective in nature. Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township of Meridian, 384 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1130 (W.D.Mich.2005), rev’d on other grounds, 258 Fed.Appx. 729 (6th Cir.2007); Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck (‘Westchester Day School VI”), 417 F.Supp.2d 477, 541-42 (S.D.N.Y.2006), aff'd 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.2007). In Lighthouse Community Church of God v. City of Southfield, the court found no individualized assessment where the government’s application of a parking ordinance — requiring the addition of all the uses of the building (including the worship space, Sunday school classrooms, and administrative offices) to calculate the total number of required parking spaces — involved a numerical application with no subjective element. 2007 WL 30280, at *6 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 3, 2007). The Court went on to find, however, that the Zoning Board of Appeals’ (“ZBA”) denial of the plaintiffs request for a parking variance, being partially subjective in nature, was an individualized assessment since the ZBA is able to authorize relaxation of the ordinance provisions and to grant variances in certain cases. Id. at *7. Here, as in Lighthouse Community Church of God, the Parking Ordinance, which provides that “[p]arking requirements shall be calculated based on the proportion that each use contributes to the total,” appears to be a law of general and neutral numerical application with no subjective element. However, the City’s application of the Parking Ordinance to the Church was based on consideration of the Church’s individual case. The staff determined that Plaintiff did not meet the definition of a “church” under the Zoning Ordinance based on information provided by Plaintiff during the rezoning process. A “Church, Temple or Place of Worship” is defined in the Zoning Ordinance as “[a] facility in which persons regularly assemble for religious ceremonies. This shall include, on the same lot, accessory structures and uses such as minister’s and caretaker’s residences, and other uses identified under the provisions for Administrative and Use Permits.” (Zoning Ordinance § 3.3.3, Doc. 49-1 at 15.) Here, “[s]ince Plaintiff was not an assembly-type use, Defendants determined that application of the ‘church’ use parking standard was inadequate to determine what level of parking was sufficient to service the proposed use,” the staff used its flexibility to impose additional mitigating conditions pursuant to Section 28.1. (Defs.’ Br. Summ. J. at 12-13.) According to the Staff Reports, Article 18.2.1 indicates parking requirements are to be calculated based upon the proportion that each use contributes to the total. For example, a building with multiple uses would be required to provide parking based upon the total parking requirement associated with each use. On the other hand, parking requirements for uses with large public assembly areas relative to the remainder of the building (i.e. meeting halls or libraries) are based upon the largest public assembly area. Normally, staff would analyze the parking needs for the Church of Scientology building relative to the size of the sanctuary. However, because proposed development will have a sanctuary which comprises less than 5% of the total net floor area, staff has instead analyzed the parking impact using an aggregate of the uses in the building (sanctuary, offices and classrooms). (Doc. 42-2, Ex. 20 at 19, R000173.) The City found that the lack of adequate parking “could cause an excessive or burdensome use of the existing infrastructure.” Based on this concern, the staff deviated from its normal practice of analyzing the parking needs for a church building relative to the size of the sanctuary without requiring additional parking for accessory uses, and instead applied a multi-use formula in its initial parking calculation. Id. Subsequently, the staff considered the Parking Studies and the Alternate Conditions submitted by Plaintiff and revised its parking calculation to reduce the number of parking spaces required for Plaintiffs property. Thus, the Court finds that the City made an individualized assessment of the Church’s proposed use of the property by taking into account the particular details of Plaintiffs proposed use of the property in its conditional approval of Plaintiffs rezoning Application. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225; Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City, 456 F.3d at 986 (holding that RLUIPA applies when the government may take into account the particular details of an applicant’s proposed use of land when deciding to permit or deny that use). b. Whether the City’s Decision Imposed a Substantial Burden on the Church’s Religious Exercise Section (a) of RLUIPA provides in relevant part: No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution — (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case under Section (a) of RLUIPA that the City has imposed a substantial burden on its religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225. If Plaintiff makes such a showing, then the burden shifts to the City to demonstrate that the challenged imposition or implementation of the Ordinance “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l)(A)-(B). Under RLUIPA, “religious exercise” includes the “use, building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225 (“In passing RLUIPA, Congress recognized that places of assembly are needed to facilitate religious practices, as well as the possibility that local governments may use zoning regulations to prevent religious groups from using land for such purposes.”). It is not necessary that religious exercise be “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief’ in order to be protected under RLUIPA. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225. Therefore, the question is whether the application of the City’s Parking Ordinance imposes a “substantial burden” on Plaintiffs use and/or conversion of its property for the purpose of religious exercise. Id. RLUIPA does not define the term “substantial burden.” As a result, courts have looked to the Supreme Court’s definition of substantial burden in its free exercise jurisprudence. E.g., Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225 (citing cases). The Eleventh Circuit has held that a substantial burden “must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise ... [it] is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly. Thus, a substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct.” Id. at 1227; Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck (‘Westchester Day School V”), 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir.2007) (“when there has been a denial of a religious institution’s building application, courts appropriately speak of government action that directly coerces the religious institution to change its behavior, rather than government action that forces the religious entity to choose between religious precepts and government benefits ... [w]here the denial of an institution’s application to build will have minimal impact on the institution’s religious exercise, it does not constitute a substantial burden, even when the denial is definitive. There must exist a close nexus between the coerced or impeded conduct and the institution’s religious exercise for such conduct to be a substantial burden on that religious exercise”); Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. Of Meridian, 258 Fed.Appx. 729, 741 (6th Cir.2007) (finding that while the township’s action will require the church to incur increased expense and to endure increased inconvenience if it is not able to build a facility of the desired size, the township’s action did not impose a substantial burden where the action did not require the church to violate, modify, or forego its religious beliefs or precepts); Williams Island Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Aventura, 329 F.Supp.2d 1319, 1325-26 (S.D.Fla.2004). In the “Free Exercise” First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has made clear that the substantial burden hurdle is high and that determining its existence is fact intensive. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (finding burden when government puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that compulsory school attendance law and criminal sanctions for noncompliance interfered with free exercise rights of Amish); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790,10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (finding burden when individual is required “to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion ... on the other hand”). But see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (no burden where government action interferes with, but does not coerce, individual’s beliefs); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (no burden where regulation made religious observation more expensive). See also Living Water Church of God, 258 Fed.Appx. at 734 (citing cases). “Courts must ensure that the facts warrant protection under RLUIPA, rather than simply granting a blanket immunity from zoning laws.” Westchester Day Sch. IV, 417 F.Supp.2d at 544; Living Water Church of God, 258 Fed.Appx. at 736 (noting that “a substantial burden is a difficult threshold to cross. If the term substantial burden is not to be read out of the statute, RLUIPA cannot stand for the proposition that a construction plan is immune from a town’s zoning ordinance simply because the institution undertaking the construction pursues a religious mission.”). Plaintiff argues that “the inability to utilize the entire 43,916 square feet of the existing building owned by the Church of Scientology is far more than an inconvenience” and constitutes a substantial burden for the following reasons: (1) the Church cannot meet its religious needs with the 32,053 square foot limitation on the building; (2) restricting the Church’s ability to use the whole building would severely compromise the religious programs the Church can offer its congregants, depriving them of the opportunity to fully practice their religion; (3) denying the Church the ability to utilize the basement would require the Church to revise its existing renovation plans and re-engineer the structural support of the building, which would be prohibitively expensive; (4) alternatively, if the Church were unable to use the entire 43,916 square foot building, it would have to sell the property and relocate; and (5) assuming the Church were able to find a property of suitable size and locati