Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge. Plaintiffs National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”), et al and National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation (“NRTW”) et al. each brought separate actions against the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB,” “Board”), and its members and General Counsel in their official capacities. They allege that the Board’s promulgation of the Final Rule entitled “Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act” exceeded its authority under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and that it violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. The actions were consolidated [Dkt. # 16], and the motions for preliminary injunction that originally accompanied the complaints became moot when the Board extended the effective date of the new rule. See Minute Order dated 10/5/2011. The parties have now cross-moved for summary judgment, and the Court has also received several amicus briefs in support of both sides. The Court holds that the NLRA granted the Board broad rulemaking authority to implement the provisions of the Act, and that the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating Subpart A of the challenged rule — the notice posting provision. But it also holds that the provision of Subpart B that deems a failure to post to be an unfair labor practice, and the provision that tolls the statute of limitations in unfair labor practice actions against employers who have failed to post, do violate the NLRA and are invalid as a matter of law. BACKGROUND Statutory Background The National Labor Relations Act is the federal statute that regulates most private sector labor-employer relations in the United States. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The first version of the National Labor Relations Act, known informally as the “Wagner Act,” was passed by Congress in 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). It has since been amended three times, most recently in 1974. See Labor Management Relations Act (“Taft-Harley Act”), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“Landrum-Griffin Act”), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959); Health Care Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). The Act begins with an unequivocal declaration of national policy: It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 151. This statement is followed by a number of substantive provisions, including several that are relevant to this case. Sections 153 to 156 establish the National Labor Relations Board. Most pertinent here, section 156 grants the Board the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Act], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act].” Section 157 is a declaration of the rights that employees “shall have,” including, in part, “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively ... [, and] to refrain from any or all of [those] activities.” The next section of the Act defines unfair labor practices for both employers and labor organizations, and, in particular, it provides: “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 158 also specifies that the “expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this sub-chapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Finally, sections 159, 160, and 161 of the Act establish the Board’s authority over bargaining representatives and elections, its authority to adjudicate disputes about unfair labor practices, and its investigatory authority in its adjudicative role. Under section 160, the Board may only exercise its adjudicatory powers once a charge, alleging that some employer or labor organization has engaged in an unfair labor practice, has been filed. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Section 160 also contains the statute of limitations for the issuance of a complaint: “[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made.... ” 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Regulatory Background The Board promulgated its Final Rule, “Notification of Employee Rights under the National Labor Relations Act,” in the Federal Register on August 30, 2011, after announcing a Proposed Rule and subjecting it to a notice and comment process. 75 Fed.Reg. 80,410 (Dec. 22, 2010); 76 Fed.Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011) . One Board member dissented. 76 Fed.Reg. 54,006, 54,037-42. The text of the Rule is about four pages long. Id. at 54,046-50. It is divided into three sub-parts: Subpart A contains the definitions and notice posting provisions, Subpart B contains the enforcement provisions, and Subpart C contains ancillary provisions. Id. The relevant provisions are summarized below. A. Notice Posting Subpart A requires all employers subject to the NLRA to “post notices to employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of their NLRA rights, together with Board contact information and information concerning basic enforcement procedures.” 29 CFR § 104.202(a). The notice takes the form of an eleven-by-seventeen-inch poster that employers can either download from the NLRB website and print or obtain in hard-copy from any of the Board’s regional, subregional, or resident offices. Id. § 104.202(b), (e). The Board also provides translated versions of the posters for employers who are required to post translations. Id. § 104.202(d). Employers who customarily communicate with their employees about personnel rules or policies using an intranet or internet site are required to also post the notice prominently on the site. Id. § 104.202(f). The NLRB seal is prominently displayed on the top left corner of the poster, and the phrase, “This is an official Government Notice ...” is printed in bold typeface along the bottom margin. See Notice, http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/1562/employeerightsposter-8-5 x11.pdf. The notice describes the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and it states the following: Under the NLRA, you have the right to: • Organize a union to negotiate with your employer concerning your wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. • Form, join or assist a union. • Bargain collectively through representatives of employees’ own choosing for a contract with your employer setting your wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions. • Discuss your wages and benefits and other terms and conditions of employment or union organizing with your coworkers or a union. • Take action with one or more co-workers to improve your working conditions by, among other means, raising work-related complaints directly with your employer or with a government agency, and seeking help from a union. • Strike and picket, depending on the purpose or means of the strike or the picketing. • Chose not to do any of these activities, including joining or remaining a member of a union. The text then breaks into two columns. The left column contains a list of items that “it is illegal for your employer” to do, and the right column consists of a list of items that “it is illegal for a union or for the union that represents you in bargaining with your employer” to do. Finally, the text merges back into a single column where the contact information for the NLRB is provided. The notice concludes with the instruction: “If you believe your rights or the rights of others have been violated, you should contact the NLRB promptly to protect your rights, generally within six months of the unlawful activity.” B. Enforcement Subpart B lays out the methods by which NLRB will enforce the notice posting provisions of the Rule. It begins with the explanation, “The Board has determined that employees must be aware of their NLRA rights in order to exercise those rights effectively.” 29 C.F.R. § 104.210. It goes on to state that an employer’s failure to post the employee notice “may be found to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by NLRA Section 7, 29 U.S.C. 157, in violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1).” Id. Subpart B also describes the enforcement process from beginning to end. According to the regulation, enforcement generally begins when an individual files an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the employer has failed to post the employee notice. Id. After an investigation and an attempt to persuade the employer to comply, a formal complaint may be issued, triggering a hearing before an administrative law judge and an adjudication process governed by the Board’s customary procedures. Id. § 104.212. Under the terms of the rule, if the Board finds that the employer failed to post the notice, the employer will be ordered to cease and desist from the unlawful conduct and post the required notice, as well as a remedial notice. Id. § 104.213(1) The employer may also face additional remedies “in keeping with the Board’s remedial authority.” Id. Furthermore, the Rule details two ways in which other Board proceedings might be affected by an employer’s failure to post the employee notice. Id. § 104.214. First, the Board may find it appropriate to toll the statutory six month statute of interpretations for an employee who files an unfair labor practice charge if the employer has failed to post the notice. Id. § 104.214(a). Second, the Board may consider an employer’s “knowing and willful refusal to comply with the requirement to post the employee notice as evidence of unlawful motive in a case in which motive is an issue.” Id. § 104.214(b). Procedural Background Plaintiffs NRTW et al. are all employers who will be required to post notices under the Board’s Final Rule. NRTW Compl. ¶¶ 1-4. Plaintiffs NAM and Coalition for a Democratic Workplace are both trade associations that represent other such employers, as well as employers themselves. NAM Am. Compl. ¶¶3-5. Both sets of plaintiffs brought suits against the Board, which the Court consolidated on October 4, 2011 [Dkt. # 1, 11, 16; Case No. 11-1683, Dkt. # 1, 8], Both complaints allege that the NLRB’s promulgation of the Final Rule violates section 706(2)(C) of the APA because the NLRB lacks the authority: (1) to promulgate and enforce the notice posting rule under section 6 of the NLRA; (2) to require employers to post a notice absent the filing of a charge or petition; (3) to deem the failure to post to be an unfair labor practice; and (4) to toll the statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge. NAM Am. Compl. Counts IV; NRTW Compl. Count I. Both sets of plaintiffs also argue that the Rule violates the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. NAM Am. Compl. Count VI; NRTW Compl. Count II. Plaintiffs NAM et al. further argue that the rule is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706(2)(A) of the APA. NAM Compl. Count I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id.; see also Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C.Cir.1987). “The rule governing cross-motions for summary judgment ... is that neither party waives the right to a full trial on the merits by filing its own motion; each side concedes that no material facts are at issue only for the purposes of its own motion.” Sherwood v. Wash. Post, 871 F.2d 1144, 1148 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1989), quoting McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 68 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1982). In assessing each party’s motion, “[a]ll underlying facts and inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709 F.Supp.2d 57, 65 (D.D.C.2010), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505. ANALYSIS This case presents no genuine issues of material fact, and so it may be properly decided on summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The questions presented are: (1) whether the Board has the authority under the NLRA to promulgate the Final Rule; (2) whether the Board’s action was arbitrary and capricious; and (3) whether the Rule violates the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. I. The Challenge to the Rule Under the Administrative Procedure Act A. The Standard for Review of Agency Action This Court has jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to hear plaintiffs’ claims regarding the authority of the Board to promulgate the Final Rule. The parties agree that the APA establishes the scope of judicial review of agency action. NLRB Mem. at 44; see Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-549, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). The standard of review under the APA is quite narrow. Where, as here, the plaintiffs challenge an agency’s authority to act, the Court is required to analyze an agency’s interpretation of the authorizing statute by following the two-step procedure set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). First, the Court must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Courts “use ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to determine whether Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent,” Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C.Cir.1998), including an examination of the statute’s text, structure, purpose, and legislative history. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C.Cir.1997). If the Court concludes that the statute is either silent or ambiguous, the second step of the Court’s review process is to determine whether the interpretation proffered by the agency is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Once a reviewing court reaches the second step, it must accord “considerable weight” to an executive agency’s construction of a statutory scheme it has been “entrusted to administer.” Id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Indeed, “under Chevron, courts are bound to uphold an agency interpretation as long as it is reasonable — regardless whether there may be other reasonable, or even more reasonable, views.” Serono Labs., 158 F.3d at 1321. B. Subpart A: The Notice Posting Provision Plaintiffs contend that the Board lacks the authority under the NLRA to promulgate a rule that requires all employers to post a notice of employee rights. Mem. of NAM and Coalition for a Democratic Workplace in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“NAM Mem”) at 6-17 [Dkt. # 21]; Mot. for Summ. J. by Pls. NRTW et al. (“NRTW Mem.”) at 9-23 [Dkt. # 20]. Defendants acknowledge that Congress did not speak directly to the Board’s authority to promulgate this particular sort of rule, but they argue that the Board reasonably interpreted section 156 of the Act to authorize the rulemaking here and that the rule should be upheld under Chevron step two. NLRB Mem. at 12-21. The Court agrees. 1. Chevron Step One Section 156 of the NLRA states, “The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [this subchapter], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.” Plaintiffs argue that this section authorizes the Board to establish rules for elections and for the adjudication of unfair labor practice charges, and that it does not grant the Board authority to promulgate general rules for the workplace. See, e.g., NAM Memo at 3^4. But the section does not limit the Board to enacting rules for carrying out particular duties; rather, it expressly grants the Board the broad rulemaking authority to make rules necessary to carry out any of the provisions of the Act. Section 151 and 157 are the provisions that the Board contends it is implementing with this rulemaking. See NLRB Mem. at 7-11. Section 151 articulates a national policy to encourage and protect collective bargaining activity, and section 157 enumerates the rights of employees guaranteed by the Act: Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.... Defendants posit that employees cannot exercise their rights without knowledge of what those rights are, and they submit that the rule simply mandates that employers inform employees of those rights, which furthers the purposes of the Act. NLRB Mem. at 7-11. Notwithstanding the breadth of the grant of rulemaking authority in section 156, plaintiffs argue that “the deliberate decision by Congress not to include a penal notice posting requirement anywhere in the NLRA must be interpreted as a prohibition on the Board’s attempt to assert that power here.” NAM Mem. at 10. But plaintiffs read too much into Congress’s silence on the subject, and their vehemence alone is not enough to make their position consistent with the guidance provided by the Court of Appeals in this circuit. See Serono, 158 F.3d at 1319. In Serono, the court rejected as a matter of law the district court’s conclusion that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act barred certain types of testing in an abbreviated new drug application because “while the court was correct in noting that nothing in the statute permits the use of animal assays, the important point is that nothing in the statute prohibits their use.” Id. (emphasis in original). That is an important point here, as well. The court in Serono was also persuaded by the fact that the statute, as here, granted “broad ... discretion to the agency.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that their reading of the rulemaking provision is compelled by the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in American Bar Ass’n (“ABA”) v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C.Cir.2005). Brief in Opp. to NLRB’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“NRTW Opp.”) at 3 [Dkt. # 32], In ABA, the court reviewed an FTC rule promulgated under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”). ABA 430 F.3d at 458. The GLBA authorized the FTC to regulate institutions engaging in the business of financial activities. Id. at 465. The challenged rule purported to regulate attorneys engaged in the practice of law under that grant of authority. Id. at 466. Although the court determined that the GLBA was ambiguous as to whether it authorized the FTC to regulate attorneys, it refused to accord the agency’s interpretation any deference. Id. at 468-71. Instead, it found that “[w]hen we examine a scheme of the length, detail, and intricacy of the one before us, we find it difficult to believe that Congress, by any remaining ambiguity, intended to undertake the regulation of the profession of law — a profession never before regulated by ‘federal functional regulators’ — and never mentioned in the statute.” Id. at 469. In other words, the agency’s “attempted turf expansion,” id. at 467, was such a “poor fit” with the language and purpose of the statute that the agency’s claim of authority failed under Chevron step one, id. at 470. This case is easily distinguished from the FTC’s failed grab for power over the legal profession. The NLRA places the Board squarely at the heart of labor-management relations, and the Board did not have to engage in the tortured reading of the law and mental gymnastics condemned by the court in ABA to find that the dissemination of information about employee rights is well within its bailiwick. The Board is not attempting to regulate entities or individuals other than those that Congress expressly authorized it to regulate, and it is not extending its reach to cover activities that do not fall within the ambit of the Act. The stated purpose of the Rule is directly related to the policy behind the NLRA that is set forth in section 151, and the notice posting requirement can hardly be described as a “poor fit” with the language of section 157. More relevant to this decision, then, is the Supreme Court’s decision in American Hospital Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991). There, the Board promulgated a rule defining the employee units appropriate for collective bargaining in certain acute care hospitals. Id. at 608, 111 S.Ct. 1539. Petitioners challenged the rule, in part asserting that the express language in section 159(b) of the Act, which required the Board to determine the appropriate collective bargaining units “in each case,” prohibited it from enacting rules that define collective bargaining units for entire categories of cases. Id. at 608-09, 111 S.Ct. 1539. Rejecting that argument, the Court explained that the section 156 grant of rule-making authority “was unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at issue in this case unless limited by some other provision in the Act.” Id. at 609-10, 111 S.Ct. 1539. It then concluded that the phrase “in each case” was not a limiting provision. Id. at 613-14, 111 S.Ct. 1539. “The more natural reading of these three words is simply to indicate that whenever there is a disagreement about the appropriateness of a unit, the Board shall resolve the dispute.” Id. at 611, 111 S.Ct. 1539; see also Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir.1997) (“Agencies often are allowed through rulemaking to regulate beyond the express substantive directives of the statute, so long as the statute is not contradicted.”). Applying those principles, the notice posting rule at issue is authorized unless some other provision of the Act limits the Board’s authority to impose such a requirement on employers. Plaintiffs complain loudly about the lack of Board authority here, but they fail to point to any limiting provision. Instead, plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the instant case from American Hospital. They argue that the NLRB is a “quasi-judicial body” with only the election and adjudicatory powers specifically enumerated in the NLRA — specifically in sections 159, 160, and 161 of the NLRA. NRTW Mem. at 9-16; NAM Mem. at 1, 6-10. They point out that in exercising its adjudicatory functions, the Board is only authorized to act once an unfair labor practice charge or election petition has been filed, and so they reason that the Board can only invoke its section 156 rulemaking powers to carry out its express post-charge or election petition duties. NRTW Mem. at 9-16, NAM Mem. at 1, 12-13. Because the rule in American Hospital was promulgated in furtherance of the Board’s express section 159(b) duty to determine appropriate bargaining units, and the notice posting rule does not further such an express duty of the Board, they assert that American Hospital is inapplicable. NRTW Mem. at 17-19; NAM Mem. at 15. _ Yet the Court finds no grounds to conclude that a rule aimed at carrying out section 157 of the Act is any less valid than a rule aimed at carrying out section 159. In assessing the validity of agency rule-making, the Court must first look to the language of the statute, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 1107, 179 L.Ed.2d 37 (2011), and here, the language expressly extends rulemaking authority “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter,” 29 U.S.C. § 156 (emphasis added). If Congress wanted to limit the Board’s authority to promulgate only those rules needed to carry out its section 159, 160, and 161 powers, it could have expressly extended rulemaking authority only “as may be necessary to carry out its duties under sections 159, 160, and 161 of this subchapter.” See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395-96, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) (finding that if Congress had wanted to exclude elected judges from the term “representatives” in the provision “to elect representatives of their choice,” Congress would have “made it explicit in the statute”). In fact, Congress did exactly that in section 161 of the statute, which grants the Board the powers to obtain evidence and summon and examine witnesses “[flor the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which ... are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by sections 159 and 160 of this title .29 U.S.C. § 161 (emphasis added). So it is significant that Congress did not similarly limit the scope of the Board’s rulemaking power under section 156. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (Internal quotation marks omitted). There has been extensive briefing on this matter, but plaintiffs’ argument that the Board lacks the authority to promulgate rules for employers is not aided by the authority they advance; the cases they cite are narrower than described, and they do not actually stand for that proposition. See NRTW Mem. at 9-16; NAM Mem. at 9-10. The cases speak only to the Board’s authority when carrying out its adjudicative functions. They address the limits on the Board’s authority to fashion a remedy once a violation has been found, and none of them purport to consider the scope of the Board’s general rulemaking authority, so they are not apposite or instructive here. For example, in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938), the Court held that, in adjudicating unfair labor practice cases, the NLRB could only impose remedial remedies and it had no express authority to order punitive sanctions. Id. at 220, 59 S.Ct. 206. Similarly, in Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940), the Court held that the Board cannot fashion a remedy designed to redress a perceived injury to the public arising out of an employer’s conduct; it is restricted to redressing the employees’ grievances and imposing a remedy that secures their collective bargaining rights and makes them whole. Id. at 10-13, 61 S.Ct. 77; see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900-05, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (backpay award exceeded Board’s authority to impose “tailored” remedies); NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Emps., 475 U.S. 192, 106 S.Ct. 1007, 89 L.Ed.2d 151 (1986) (union brought unfair labor practices charge against an em ployer that refused to bargain with it, but NLRB responded by invalidating the union affiliation; the Court found the decertification to be unlawful and held that the statute only authorizes the Board to step into an election where affiliation raises a question of representation). Finally, the Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that the fact that the Board has never before invoked its rulemaking authority in furtherance of provisions of the Act other than those establishing its adjudication and election powers is evidence that the Board lacks such authority. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693 (D.C.Cir.1973) “The fact that powers long have been unexercised well may call for close scrutiny as to whether they exist; but if granted, they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more than nonexistent powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise.” Id. at 694, quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647-48, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950). Therefore, the Court cannot find that in enacting the NLRA, Congress unambiguously intended to preclude the Board from promulgating a rule that requires employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under the Act. Neither the text of the statute nor any binding precedent supports plaintiffs’ narrow reading of a broad, express grant of rulemaking authority. Thus, the Court must proceed to Chevron step two. 2. Chevron Step Two Under Chevron step two, the Court defers to the agency’s interpretation of the statute so long as it is reasonable. Serono, 158 F.3d at 1321. The Board provides a reasonable explanation for why the Final Rule is “necessary” to carry out the provisions of this statute: it concluded that in order for employees to fully exercise their NLRA rights, as they have the absolute right to do under section 157 of the Act, they must know that those rights exist. 76 Fed.Reg. at 54,006. And requiring employers to post notices of employee rights raises employee awareness. Id. at 54,007. As the Board explains, “[g]iven the direct relationship between employees’ timely awareness of their rights under the NLRA and the Board’s ability to protect and enforce those rights, this rule is ‘necessary’ for purposes of Section 6.” Id. at 54,010-11. This is so clearly a reasonable interpretation, that plaintiffs do not even proffer an argument for why the Court should find it to be unreasonable should it reach Chevron’s second stage. 3. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard “Even where [an agency’s] construction satisfies Chevron, we must still ensure that its action is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C.Cir.2007). The agency action will be upheld if “has considered the relevant factors and articulated a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Id., quoting Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA 215 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C.Cir.2000). The review is “[h]ighly deferential” and “presumes the validity of agency action.” Id., citing AT & T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 698 (D.C.Cir.2003). The agency may rely on comments submitted during the notice and comment period as justification for the rule, so long as the submissions are examined critically. See Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1125 (D.C.Cir.1984). But it “need not, indeed cannot, base its every action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‘entitled to conduct ... a general analysis based on informed conjecture.’ ” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C.Cir.2005), quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C.Cir.1998). Without any specificity, plaintiffs NAM et al. argue that the Board’s promulgation of the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious because its justifications “are not supported by substantial, or in this case any, empirical evidence.” Reply Mem. of NAM and Coalition for a Democratic Workplace (“NAM Reply”) at 13 [Dkt. # 33]; see also NAM Mem. at 17-18. Defendants counter that the Board was not required to provide the comprehensive empirical evidence that plaintiffs demand, and that the Board considered all the relevant factors and supported its choice with sufficient empirical and anecdotal evidence. Defs.’ Cross-Opp. to Pls.’ Cross-Mots. For Summ. J. (“NLRB Reply”) at 29-30 [Dkt. # 34], In justifying the notice-posting provision, the Board reasoned that “many employees are unaware of their NLRA rights and ... a notice posting requirement is a reasonable means of promoting greater knowledge among employees” so that they can freely exercise their rights. 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,015. So, the Court must determine whether the Board considered the relevant factors for both of these assertions and whether it articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice the Board made to require employers to post the notice. 1. Employees lack awareness of their rights The Board determined that many employees are unaware of their NLRA rights, and therefore cannot effectively exercise those rights, based on the following factors: • The comparatively small percentage of private sector employees who are represented by unions and thus have ready access to information about the NLRA; • The high percentage of immigrants in the labor force, who are likely to be unfamiliar with workplace rights in the United States; • Studies indicating that employees and high school students about to enter the work force are generally uninformed about labor law; and • The absence of a requirement that, except in very limited circumstances, employers or anyone else inform employees about their NLRA rights. 76 Fed.Reg. at 54014-18. The Board cited studies, law review articles, and comments submitted during the notice and comment period in support of its conclusion. Id. at 54,006-7, 54,014-18; AR 47-608. While the Board did not commission studies to determine exactly how many employees are unaware of their NLRA rights, it did cite outside studies, and it gave the public the opportunity to bring any evidence that disputed its findings to its attention by subjecting the rule to a notice and comment period. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 142 (construing the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, 737 F.2d 1095, as “failure to conduct independent study not violative of APA because notice and comment procedures ‘permit parties to bring relevant information quickly to the agency’s attention’ ”). After notice and comment, the Board found that “[f]ew if any of the comments contending that employees know about their NLRA rights assert that employees are aware of the right to engage in such protected concerted activities in the nonunion setting.” 76 Fed.Reg. at 54,-016. It also found that no submissions credibly debunked its findings or presented any evidence that employees are largely aware of their NLRA rights. Id. at 54016-17. While plaintiffs call this analysis inadequate, they do not point to any evidence, let alone any evidence that was before the Board, that contradicts these findings or that should have led the Board to a different conclusion. Some commenters did contend that employees should actually be more informed of their rights now than ever before because the availability of the Internet makes information more readily accessible. The Board responded that “an employee who has no idea that he or she has a right ... would be less likely to seek such information than one who is aware of such rights and wants to learn more about them.” Id. at 54,017. In other words, the Board posited that even if information about employee rights is available to be found, the employee has to be aware that the rights exist before she will seek it out. The Board also cited statistics showing that the percentage of the private sector workforce represented by unions has declined since the 1980s. Id. at 54,016. Since unions have traditionally been important for spreading awareness about employee rights, their decline suggests that it has become more difficult for employees to become aware of their rights. Id. And the Board pointed to “the increasing proportion of immigrants in the work force, who are unlikely to be familiar with them workplace rights; and lack of information about labor law and labor relations on the part of high school students who are about to enter the labor force.” Id. at 54,006 (citing three law review articles). Given the Board’s thorough consideration of the comments that it received, and plaintiffs’ inability to point to any specific factor that counsels against the Board’s conclusion or any piece of evidence that the Board failed to address, the Court cannot find the Board’s conclusion that employees lack awareness of their NLRA rights to be arbitrary and capricious. 2. The notice posting rule is a reasonable means of promoting awareness The Board next determined that the notice posting rule was a reasonable means of promoting greater knowledge among employees. In making that determination, it referred to the following: • The potential benefit of a notice posting requirement to employees; • The modest cost of the notice posting requirement to employers; • The content of the notice and manner of posting. 76 Fed.Reg. at 54,015, 54,017-21. This is a textbook example of a circumstance where factual determinations are primarily of a judgmental or predictive nature, and thus, “complete factual support in the record for the [agency’s] judgment or prediction is not possible or required; a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency.” FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). To ensure that the rule addressed the specific reasons that it had found for why employees’ lack of awareness of their rights, the Board drafted the mandatory language of the notice in a way that conveyed the information of which employees were likely to be unaware. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,018-27. It also mandated the size and placement of the notices (including the placement on internet and intranet sites) to ensure that employees were likely to see them. See id. at 54017-18. And while it acknowledged the argument raised by commenters that some employees will not read the notices, it noted that “not every employee has to read workplace notices for those notices to be effective.” Id. at 54,017. The Board made the notice readily available to employers and made compliance uncomplicated. Given the deferential standard of review that applies here, the Court declines to find the Board’s promulgation of the notice posting provision to be arbitrary and capricious. C. Subpart B, Section 104.210: The Unfair Labor Practice Provision Plaintiffs next challenge the Board’s authority to promulgate section 104.210 of the Final Rule. That section reads, in relevant part: “Failure to post the employee notice may be found to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by NLRA Section 7, 29 U.S.C. 157, in violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1).” 76 Fed.Reg. at 54,049. Plaintiffs maintain, and the Court agrees, that the agency lacked the authority to deem a failure to post to be an unfair labor practice under the Act. To determine whether the Board exceeded its authority by designating an employer’s failure to post to be an unfair labor practice, the Court returns to American Hospital Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991). As described above, the Board’s authority to promulgate a rule that aids it in carrying out a provision of the NLRA survives Chevron step one “unless limited by some other provision of the Act.” Id. at 609-10, 111 S.Ct. 1539. The Court finds that the unfair labor practice provision of the Rule, section 104.210, is expressly limited by NLRA sections 158(a) and 160(a), in which Congress specifically defined and limited the conduct that could constitute an unfair labor practice. It is true that Congress did not enumerate every conceivable practice that the Board could find to be an unfair labor practice. See Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945) (“[The Wagner] Act left to the Board the work of applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms.”). However, . it did establish bounds. Section 160(a) empowers the Board “to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of [title 29]) affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). This section has been interpreted as limiting the unfair labor practices that the Board may prohibit to only those enumerated under section 158. Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676, 81 S.Ct. 835, 6 L.Ed.2d 11 (1961) (“Where, as here, Congress has aimed its sanctions only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board cannot go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme.”); see 76 Fed.Reg. at 54,032 (concession by the Board that section 160(a) “specifically limits the NLRB’s powers to preventing only the unfair labor practices listed in [section 158] of the Act.”). Defendants contend that failure to post the employee rights notice qualifies as an unfair labor practice under section 158(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.” The Final Rule explains that “[b]ecause ... notice posting is necessary to ensure effective exercise of Section [157] rights, a refusal to post the required notice is at least an interference with employees’ exercise of those rights.” 76 Fed Reg. at 54,032 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs counter that failing to post a notice of employee rights does not “interfere with” an employee’s exercise of his section 157 rights, and therefore, the Court must find under Chevron step one that the Board is unambiguously barred from designating it an unfair labor practice. The Court must begin with the language of the statute. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 1107, 179 L.Ed.2d 37 (2011). The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “interfere,” in the context “of things generally,” as “[t]o strike against each other; to come into physical collision; to collide or clash, so as to hamper or hinder each other; to get in each other’s way, cross each other’s path.” See Oxford English Dictionary online at 2(a), http://www. oed.com/view/Entry/97761?rskey=aLZ2 wl&result=2#eid (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). In the context of persons, to interfere means “[t]o meddle with; to interpose and take part in something, esp. without having the right to do so; to intermeddle.” Id. at 4(b) (emphasis in original). An alternative definition indicates that the term means “to interpose, take part, so as to affect some action; to intervene.” Id. at 5. Similarly, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “interfere,” in relevant part, as “to interpose in a way that hinders or impedes: come into collision or be in opposition[;] ... to enter into or take a part in the concerns of others.” Meriam-Webster Dictionary online at 1, 3, http://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interfere; see also N.L.R.B v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 243 n. *, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (adopting the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary definition of “interference”: “the act of meddling in or hampering an activity or process”). In other words, section 158(a)(1) prohibits employers from getting in the way— from doing something that impedes or hampers an employee’s exercise of the rights guaranteed by section 157 of the statute. It does not prohibit a mere failure to facilitate the exercise of those rights. Yet, section 104.210 does not distinguish between a situation where an employer’s failure to post was intended to or did exert influence over an employee’s organizational efforts, and where the employer merely declined or failed to post the information publicizing those rights. It allows the Board to deem the failure to post to be an unfair labor practice in every situation. Even if the Court were to find that the definition of the word “interfere,” read in isolation, leaves some ambiguity as to whether a failure to post can be universally classified as an unfair labor practice, the need for something more becomes clear when the word is read in the context of the rest of the provision. The fact that section 158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce” further demonstrates that Congress intended some act of meddling or interposition by the employer. See Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36, 110 S.Ct. 929, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990) (“‘words grouped in a list should be given a related meaning’”); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09, 24 L.Ed. 586 (1877) (“the coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense”); Valdes v. U.S., 475 F.3d 1319, 1324 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“[R]elying on the canon of noscitur a sociis, we believe the words ‘question’ and ‘matter’ are known by the company that they keep.”). The common thread among the three words is an act of obstruction, which is not fulfilled by a mere unwillingness to help. Second, section 158(c), which prohibits the Board from construing “[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form” as an unfair labor practice or as evidence of an unfair labor practice “if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” also suggests that Congress had a narrow reading of the word “interfere” in mind. See Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 403, 95 S.Ct. 1066, 43 L.Ed.2d 279 (1975) (all, parts of a statute must be read together). Since Congress prohibited the Board from considering an employer’s express statement of its views to be an unfair labor practice, it follows that it did not intend that an employer’s mere failure to supply information would be designated as one. The Court points out that nothing in this decision prevents the Board from finding that a failure to post constitutes an unfair labor practice in any individual case brought before it. But the ruling does mean that the Board must make a specific finding based on the facts and circumstances in the individual case before it that the failure to post interfered with the employee’s exercise of his or her rights. The Court is not making an absolute statement that inaction can never be interference; rather this memorandum opinion simply holds that the Board cannot make a blanket advance determination that a failure to post will always constitute an unfair labor practice. Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the Court’s reading of the word “interfere” does not contravene the ruling in NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an employer’s inaction — its refusal to submit financial information to a union, which the union had requested in order to assess the truthfulness of the employer’s statement that it could not afford to pay employees higher wages — constituted a failure to bargain in good faith with respect to wages in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Id. at 150-52, 76 S.Ct. 753. However, the Court was assessing the employer’s failure to submit the financial information under section 8(a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,” not under section 8(a)(1). The question whether inaction may qualify as a “refusal” — which is another form of inaction — is distinguishable from the question of whether inaction may qualify as “interference.” And, in that case, the Board made its determination in the context of a specific adjudication. It weighed the specific facts of the case and determined that the employer’s conduct constituted a refusal to bargain collectively. As noted above, the Court’s decision in the instant case would not prevent the Board from making an individualized determination under section 8(a)(1) in the future. Similarly, defendants’ argument that failure to provide notice has been construed as “interference” under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) is unpersuasive. See 76 Fed.Reg. 54,032. The FMLA requires employers to notify employees that FMLA coverage may apply whenever the employer is put on notice that the employee qualifies for FMLA benefits. See, e.g., Greenwell v. Charles Machine Works Inc., No. CIV-10-0313-HE, 2011 WL 1458565, at *4 (W.D.Okla. April 15, 2011). Department of Labor regulations state that an employer’s failure to follow the notice requirements “may constitute an interference with, restraint, or denial of the exercise of an employee’s FMLA rights.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(e). There, however, the employer is only required to notify a specific employee when it knows that the employee qualifies for the benefits. See id. § 825.300(a)-(d). In that context, the assumption that an employer’s failure to notify qualifies as interference with the employee’s exercise of his rights is more individualized than the broad finding incorporated in subpart B. In the FMLA context, the employer has information that the employee lacks, it knows that the employee would benefit from receiving the information, and yet fails to provide it. Under the NLRB Rule, a mere failure to post a generic notice of employee rights, no matter what the context, would qualify as “interference” with the exercise of those rights. Thus, the Court finds under Chevron step one that Congress has expressed its unambiguous intent and that the Board exceeded its authority under the NLRA when it promulgated a rule that labels any failure to post the required notice to be an unfair labor practice. D. Subpart B, Section 104.214(a): Equitable Tolling Provision Similarly, the NLRA does not authorize the Board to enact a rule which permits it to toll the statute of limitations in any future unfair labor practice action involving a job site where the notice was not posted. The challenged provision, section 104.214(a) states: “When an employee files an unfair labor practice charge, the Board may find it appropriate to excuse the employee from the requirement that charges be filed within six months after the occurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct if the employer has failed to post the required employee notice unless the employee has received actual or constructive notice that the conduct complained of is unlawful.” 76 Fed.Reg. 54,049. This provision not only extends the statute of limitations for unfair labor practice proceedings arising out of the failure to post, it applies to all unfair labor practice actions against employers where the notice was not posted. The Court concludes, as in the case of the unfair labor practices provision, that Congress did not leave a gap for the agency to fill with respect to the statute of limitations. Instead, in section 160(b), Congress plainly mandated a short time period during which an aggrieved person must file a charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (“[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board.... ”). The challenged provision of the rule upends that requirement. The statute of limitations in section 160(b) was the focus of significant attention when it was introduced as part of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947. See Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 424-29, 80 S.Ct. 822, 4 L.Ed.2d 832 (1960). Opponents of the amendment called it “the shortest statute of limitations known to the law.” S.Rep. No. 105 (pt. II), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5; see also Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 429 n. 19, 80 S.Ct. 822. Despite criticism that it gave “unjust assistance to employers or unions which commit those types of practices which are easily concealed and difficult to detect,” the amendment was adopted. 93 Cong. Rec. 4905 (remarks of Sen. Murray); see also Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 429 n. 19, 80 S.Ct. 822. The Supreme Court has recognized that courts may apply equitable doctrines, such as equitable tolling, to the statute of limitations under the NLRA. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Equitable tolling is a defense to a defendant’s argument that the plaintiff failed to bring a claim within the relevant statute of limitations. SmithHaynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C.Cir.1998). It is an exceptional defense, which courts grant “ ‘only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances,’ ” id. at 579-80, quoting Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C.Cir.1988), such as where “despite all due diligence [a plaintiff] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of her claim” or where “the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Id. at 579; see also Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990); Norman v. U.S., 467 F.3d 773, 775-76 (D.C.Cir.2006). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving facts that support an equitable tolling defense. See Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 579; see also Johnson v. Holder, 598 F.Supp.2d 50, 56 (D.D.C.2009). Defendants justify the equitable tolling provision of the Rule by pointing to a series of Title VII and ADEA cases where the courts equitably tolled statutes of limitations for employees’ causes of action based on their employers’ failures to post mandatory notices of employee rights. NLRB Mem. at 41 & n. 180. But these precedents are inapposite for several reasons. First, it is important to point out that it was Congress that expressly mandated the notice posting under the employment discrimination statutes, whereas here, it was the Board that crafted the notice posting rule. Thus, a key justification for the application of the tolling rule under the employee discrimination statutes — that Congress recognized the importance of employees being informed of their rights — does not apply here. See, e.g., Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (justifying equitable tolling based on an employer’s failure to post an EEOC notice because it was necessary in order to redress a violation of a “requirement [that] was undoubtedly created because Congress recognized that the very persons protected by the Act might be unaware of its existence”). More importantly, the tolling in the Title VII context is applied on a case by case basis; nearly all of the courts that have considered whether failure to post a notice can trigger equitable tolling have focused on the case-specific nature of the doctrine. For example, in Mercado v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, Spa & Casino, 410 F.3d 41 (1st Cir.2005), the Court held that an employee meets the threshold requirements for equitable tolling of a Title VII case where he alleges that his employer failed to post EEOC notices of employee rights as mandated by Title VII and that he had no actual knowledge of his legal rights. Id. at 48. It would refuse to toll the statute of limitations, however, if other factors weighed against it, such as whether the employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the filing requirement, whether the employee was actually prejudiced by the employer’s failure-to post, and the employee’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the filing requirement. Id. The court noted that “[i]t is in the nature of equity to entertain case-specific factors that may counsel in favor of tolling.” Id., quoting Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 753 n. 9 (1st Cir.1988). The Final Rule strips away the case-specific nature of the equitable tolling doctrine by imposing it as the rule rather than the exception. Defendants brush off this consequence, arguing that “the Final Rule’s use of the discretionary ‘may’ — stating that ‘the Board may find it appropriate’ to toll section [160](b) — emphasizes that the Board’s tolling doctrine is likewise flexible, discretionary, and grounded in equitable practice, including the factors cited by the courts in Mercado and other cases.” NLRB Mem. at 43. But as the preamble to the rule demonstrates, the rule establishes tolling as the standard practice unless the employer can prove to the Board that it should not be applied: The Board emphasizes, however, that failure to post the required notice will not automatically warrant a tolling remedy. If an employer proves that an employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct alleged to be unlawful, as well as actual or constructive knowledge that the conduct violated the NLRA, and yet failed to timely file an unfair labor practice charge, the Board will not toll the [160](b) period merely because of the employer’s failure to post the notice. 76 Fed.Reg. at 54,035. This turns the burden of proof on its head. The plaintiff generally bears the burden of proving that equitable tolling should apply in an individual case, but the rule demands that the employer prove that across the board, unlimited extension should not apply. Thus, section 104.214(a) is not simply a restatement of the Board’s unquestionable right to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in an appropriate case. See NLRB Mem. at 43 (“[T]he rule is nothing more than a brief summary, for the benefit of the public, of some of the equitable considerations that may be weighed by the Board in determining whether an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented timely filing.”). The rule substantially amends the statute of limitations that Congress expressly set out in the statute. And because Congress left no ambiguity as to the appropriate statute of limitations under section 160(b), the Board’s promulgation of this provision exceeds its statutory authority under Chevron step one. II. The Challenge to the Rule Under the First Amendment Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Final Rule violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it compels employers to speak against their will. NRTW Mem. at 33-34; NAM Mem. at 22-24;. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); Rumsfeld v. Forum