Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SUSAN K. GAUVEY, United States Magistrate Judge. The issue before the Court is the government’s authority to prospectively acquire precise location information derived from cellular and Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology (collectively “location data”) to aid in the apprehension of the subject of an arrest warrant. The government has reported no attempts of the subject to flee and the requested location data does not otherwise constitute evidence of any crime. The government argues its entitlement to prospective location data under these circumstances pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Stored Communications Act, -the All Writs Act, and the inherent authority of the court. In so doing, the government asks to use location data in a new way — not to collect evidence of a crime, but solely to locate a charged defendant. To some, this use would appear reasonable, even commendable and efficient. To others, this use of location data by law enforcement would appear chillingly invasive and unnecessary in the apprehension of defendants. In any event, there is no precedent for use of location data solely to apprehend a defendant in the absence of evidence of flight to avoid prosecution. The government did not submit, and the court did not find, any sufficient authority for this use of location technology. In light of legitimate privacy concerns and the absence of any emergency or extraordinary considerations here, the Court concludes that approval of use of location data for this purpose is best considered deliberately in the legislature, or in the appellate courts. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the underlying warrant applications, but sets forth its guidance on the showing necessary for law enforcement access to prospective location data to aid in the execution of an arrest warrant. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History On June 3, 2010, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (“Rule 41”) and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A), the United States (“government”) applied for “authoriz[ation] ... to ascertain the physical location of the [subject] cellular phone ..., including but not limited to E911 Phase II data (or other precise location information) ... for a period of thirty (30) days.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 2). The government also asked for “records reflecting the tower and antenna face (“cell site”) used by the target phone at start and end of any call” where precise location information was not available. (Id. at n. 1). The government asked that the Court order the wireless service provider to send a signal to defendant’s cell phone (“ping”) that would direct the phone to compute its current GPS coordinates and communicate that data back to the provider, which would in turn forward the coordinates immediately to government agents. (Id. at ¶ 16). The government based its request on “probable cause to believe that the Requested Information w[ould] lead to evidence regarding certain activities described above.” (Id. at ¶ 12). The government has asked that the particulars of the application not be disclosed, but has stipulated that defendant’s location was not evidence of a crime. The government also stated that the “requested information [was] necessary to determine the location of [the subject] so that law enforcement officers may execute the arrest warrant [on him].” (Id.). The Court denied the government’s application. On June 4, 2010, the government submitted another application seeking identical information as its first application, but further stated that the subject cell phone was pre-equipped with a GPS enabled chip and that the subject’s wireless service provider maintains a “Precision Locate Service” capable of approximating the location of any telephone so equipped. (ECF No. 2, ¶ 2). The government explained that, in order to use the Precision Locate Service, the cellular service provider “sends a signal to a telephone directing it to immediately transmit its current GPS reading, then processes the reading to compute the telephone’s current GPS Coordinates.” (Id.). The government elaborated that the Precision Locate Service can be used “without disclosing to a telephone’s user the existence of either the Carrier’s signal requesting the telephone to send a current GPS reading or that telephone’s response.” (Id.). The government asked for an order directing the wireless service provider “on oral request ... at any times specified by the agents [to] use its Precision Locate Service ... to acquire the GPS Coordinates.” (ECF No. 2,7). Although the government in its first application invoked Rule 41 and the Stored Communications Act, the government’s second application cited as authority the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). (Id. at ¶ 4). Specifically, the government noted: The Court has authority pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to order disclosure of GPS Coordinates on a showing of probable cause to believe that a federal fugitive is using a specified wireless telephone. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), such disclosure is of appropriate aid to the Court’s extant jurisdiction over an open arrest warrant because it assists agents to find the fugitive so that the warrant can be executed and he can be brought before the Court. (Id.) (emphasis added). In support of its application, the government stated that: On [XXXX], Special Agent [XXXX] of [XXX] called [defendant] on cellular telephone number [XXXXXX-XXXX], which he answered and indicated he was on the “west coast.” She asked if he was in [XXXX] and he said, “Yes.” [Defendant] had previously given this cellular telephone number to SA [XXXX] as a means to contact him. (Id.). The government referred to defendant as a “federal fugitive” and “the subject fugitive,” but alleged no facts to support defendant’s fugitive status. (Id.). There was no indication that defendant was aware of the charge or arrest warrant, and the government did not so allege. (ECF No. 15, 17-18). Other than the government’s applications under review here, there were no reported efforts on the part of law enforcement to apprehend and arrest the defendant. See (ECF No. 6, 1). The Court again denied the government’s application. Notwithstanding the Court’s denial of location data, the government arrested the defendant a few days thereafter. (Id.). While the government is correct that apprehension of defendant moots its applications, the issues presented will certainly arise again, most likely in urgent situations that do not allow an opportunity for deliberate consideration. Because of the importance of these largely-unexplored issues, the Court writes this opinion. Although the government’s applications have been sealed, this opinion will not be sealed as it concerns matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation which do not hinge on the particulars of the underlying-investigation and charge. The issues explored herein involve the balance between privacy rights and law enforcement interests, and the role of judicial oversight. These particular issues present a matter of first impression in the Fourth Circuit, as well as many others. B. Technological Background At the outset, a basic review of GPS and cellular location technology is essential to understanding the nature of the government’s request — highly-precise, real-time GPS and cell-site location information, on demand at any time during a 30-day period and the privacy interests it implicates. Given that the Court did not take evidence on the relevant technology, this background discussion relies primarily on uncontroverted government and industry publications. Moreover, there is no dispute as to two key technical points, namely the minimum precision of the location data requested (within 300 meters or less) (ECF No. 15, 22) and the fact that the GPS data requested is not collected as part of the routine provision of cellular telephone service (Id. at 26-31). The government’s request for “E911 Phase II data” is a reference to location information that meets accuracy requirements mandated by the Federal Communication Commission’s Enhanced 9-1-1 (“E-911”) regulations, which require cellular service providers to upgrade their systems to identify more precisely the longitude and latitude of mobile units making emergency 911 calls. E-911 Phase II regulations mandate that cellular telephone carriers have the ability to provide, within six minutes of a valid request from a public safety answering point, the latitude and longitude of a cellular telephone caller to within 50 to 300 meters depending on the type of technology used. See 47 C.F.R. 20.18(h) (2011) (establishing accuracy and reliability standards of 100 meters for 67 percent of calls and 300 meters for 95 percent of calls for network-based (non-GPS) technologies, and 50 meters for 67 percent of calls and 150 meters for 95 percent of calls for handset-based (GPS) technologies). The government at the hearing conceded that, due to the requirements of the E-911 regulations, its request would necessarily locate the subject cellular telephone within 300 meters. (ECF No. 15, 22). As set forth below, however, current GPS technology would almost certainly enable law enforcement to locate the subject cellular telephone with a significantly greater degree of accuracy — possibly within ten meters or less. The Global Positioning System or “GPS” is a space-based radionavigation utility owned and operated by the United States that provides highly-accurate positioning, navigation, and timing services worldwide to any device equipped with a GPS satellite receiver. See GPS.gov, The Global Positioning System, http://www.gps.gov/ systems/gps/ (last visited Jul. 5, 2011). To determine the location of a cellular telephone using GPS, special hardware in the user’s handset calculates the longitude and latitude of the cellular telephone in real time based upon the relative strength of signals from multiple satellites. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 20, 21 (2010) (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania) (“Blaze Testimony”). Current GPS technology typically achieves spatial resolution within ten meters, or approximately 33 feet. Id. at 21; see also The Collection and Use of Location Information for Commercial Purposes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection and Subcomm. on Communications, Technology, and the Internet of the H. Comm, on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of John B. Morris, General Counsel and Director of CDT’s Internet Standards, Technology & Policy Project, Center for Democracy and Technology) (stating that GPS produces high-precision locations on the order of meters or tens of meters). High-quality GPS receivers, however, are capable of achieving horizontal accuracy of 3 meters or better and vertical accuracy of 5 meters or better 95 percent of the time. U.S. Dept. Of Defense, Global Positioning System Standard Positioning Service Performance Standard V (4th ed. Sept. 2008). Use of GPS in combination with augmentation systems enables real-time positioning within a few centimeters. See GPS.gov, Augmentation Systems, http://www.gps. gov/systems/augmentations/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2011) (explaining that a GPS augmentation is any system that aids GPS by providing accuracy, integrity, availability, or any other improvement to positioning, navigation, and timing that is not inherently part of GPS itself). Despite the superior accuracy of GPS location technology, however, it is not without limitations. Cellular telephone users may be able to disable GPS functionality and GPS may not work reliably in the event that the receiver’s view of satellites is obstructed. Blaze Testimony at 22; see also ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 41 (2010) (statement of Michael Amarosa, Senior Vice President for Public Affairs, TruePosition) (“GPS devices can be deactivated — that is, the ability to locate them disabled — by the user”). In the event that GPS location data is not available, the government’s request also sought access to cell-site location data. See (EOF No. 1, n. 1) (requesting access to “records reflecting the tower and antenna face (“cell site”) used by the target phone at the start- and end of any call”). While GPS location technology locates a user by triangulating satellite signals, “cellular identification locates a user by triangulating their position based on the cell towers within signal range of their mobile phone.” The Collection and Use of Location Information for Commercial Purposes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection and Sub-comm. on Communications, Technology, and the Internet of the H. Comm, on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Lori Faith Cranor, Professor of Computer Science and of Engineering & Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University). Cellular providers can obtain cell-site location information even when no call is in progress. Id. This data is routinely collected and tracked by cellular service providers, at various time intervals depending on the provider. Blaze Testimony at 23; See also CTIA-The Wireless Association, Wireless Glossary of Terms, http://www.ctia.org/media/ industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10321 (last visited Jul. 28, 2011) (explaining that each “registration,” or cell phone-initiated contact with a cell tower, is automatically logged by the cell and stored temporarily by the phone’s unique Electronic Serial Number (ESN)). While retention practices vary by carrier, many retain registration data only for about 10 minutes, unless the cell phone has registered again at the same or another cell tower. See FTC Workshop, “Introduction to Privacy and Security Issues Panel” (Dec. 12, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ workshops/wireless/001212.htm. However, when a user makes a call, the carrier records the cell tower that originated that call, and this information is retained, and often appears on the user’s bill. Id. Unlike GPS, network-based location technology cannot be affirmatively disabled by the user. Blaze Testimony at 22. Due to advances in technology and the proliferation of cellular infrastructure, cell-site location data can place a particular cellular telephone within a range approaching the accuracy of GPS. Id. at 23-27 (explaining that depending upon a variety of factors the accuracy of cell-site location data may range from miles in diameter to individual floors and rooms within buildings); see also In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.Supp.2d 827, 834 (S.D.Tex. 2010) (“As cellular network technology evolves, the traditional distinction between “high accuracy” GPS tracking and “low accuracy” cell site tracking is increasingly obsolete, and will soon be effectively meaningless.”). Cellular service providers can also employ a hybrid method or combination of methods to locate phones with considerable precision even where GPS or cell-site technology alone would be inadequate. One example of many hybrid location techniques currently in use is Assisted GPS (A-GPS), an enhanced version of GPS that uses advanced techniques and hardware to allow reception of GPS signals indoors. Fed. Communic’ns Comm’n., FCC Report to Congress on the Deployment of E-911 Phase II Services by Tier III Service Providers, 7 n. 29 (2005). Cellular service providers typically do not maintain records of the GPS coordinates of cellular telephones operating on their network, but the provider may generate such location data at any time by sending a signal directing the built-in satellite receiver in a particular cellular telephone to calculate its location and transmit the location data back to the service provider. This process, known as “pinging,” is undetectable to the cellular telephone user. In the underlying applications, the government seeks an order directing Sprint Nextel to “ping” the subject cellular telephone and use its Precision Locator Service™ to provide the resulting location data to the government. See Gpsrevtew.net, Sprint Offers GPS Fleeting Tracking through Precision Locator Wireless Devices (Aug. 24, 2005), http:/Avww.gpsreview.neVsprintoffers-gps-fleet-tracking-through-precision locator-wireless-devices/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2011) (describing the Precision Locator Service™ as an interactive location and mapping application marketed to business as a way to communicate with and monitor a mobile and decentralized staff). To use the Precision Locator Service ™, subscribers or other authorized parties log onto a website hosted by Sprint to locate and track a particular cellular telephone in real time, to map or export its location information, and to determine whether GPS-capabilities are powered on or off. Id. The government noted in its application that, “the Carrier has advised that the [sic] Precision Locate Service can be used unobtrusively, i.e., without disclosing to a telephone user the existence either of the Carrier’s signal requesting the telephone to send a current GPS reading or that telephone’s response.” (ECF No. 2, ¶ 2). Here, the government seeks more than the records generated in the ordinary course of provision of cellular service, i.e., the cell site used by a target phone at the beginning and end of a call and the cell site detected at routine, intermittent registration. Rather, the government requested an order requiring the carrier “at any times specified by the agents” to acquire the GPS coordinates of the subject cellular telephone, thus asking for the creation of a record that would not otherwise be generated in the ordinary provision of service. Moreover, the government asked for an order for a period not to exceed 30 days, which would allow essentially continuous monitoring of the precise location of the user for a month. Thus, the issue is whether the request for highly-accurate, prospective and real-time location data of the cell phone of a non-fugitive defendant for as long as 30 days on an essentially continuous basis is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, Rule 41, the Stored Communications Act, the All Writs Act, or the inherent authority of the Court. II. ANALYSIS A. Government’s Arguments and Defense Response The government bases its entitlement to prospective location data under the Fourth Amendment on essentially two, alternative arguments. First, the government argues that the underlying arrest warrant provides the necessary authority for access to the location data under the Fourth Amendment and interpretive Supreme Court decisions, particularly Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The government apparently posits that the existence of the arrest warrant supplants or satisfies the probable cause requirement of a search warrant as defined by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Alternatively, the government argues that Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), permits the use of a search warrant to obtain evidence in aid of apprehension of a defendant, such as the location data at issue here, even where there is no evidence of flight, that is, where the location data would not be evidence of a crime. Having taken the stance that its request does not offend, and indeed is consistent with, the Fourth Amendment, the government presents various statutory grounds for access to this prospective location data. In its first application, the government argues that the requested warrant is authorized under Rule 41 and the Stored Communications Act. In its second application, the government, apparently recognizing the absence of clear statutory authority, argues that issuance of a search warrant for prospective location data under the circumstances presented is proper under the Court’s inherent power and the All Writs Act. The Federal Public Defender argues that an arrest warrant does not authorize access to location data for the subject of the arrest warrant and that the Fourth Amendment prohibits use of a search warrant to access prospective location data where the information does not constitute evidence of a crime. Thus, the argument goes, governmental assertions of authority under the Stored Communications Act, Rule 41, the All Writs Act, or the Court’s inherent authority are futile, as the warrant does not comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case presents an issue at the intersection of the law on arrests and searches: whether this “search” should be considered under the second clause of the Fourth Amendment (the “warrant” clause) or as a “reasonable” search in execution of an arrest warrant under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment — an exception to the procedures and requirements of the warrant clause. This case also reveals the dearth of analysis and authority on this issue. The Court has concluded that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence neither sanctions access to location data on the basis of an arrest warrant alone, nor authorizes use of a search warrant to obtain information to aid in the apprehension of the subject of an arrest warrant where there is no evidence of flight to avoid prosecution and the requested information does not otherwise constitute evidence of a crime. Additionally, the Stored Communications Act (also, of course, subject to the Fourth Amendment) does not authorize use of a warrant for that purpose. While Rule 41(c)(4) authorizes use of a warrant to search for a “person to be arrested,” that rule (and Fourth Amendment principles) requires probable cause that the defendant will be found in a specifically identified location. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(4). Thus, Rule 41 does not authorize use of a warrant for the purpose sought. Finally, exercise of judicial authority under the All Writs Act or the Court’s inherent authority is likewise subject to Fourth Amendment constraints. Review of pertinent case law demonstrates that the courts have not sanctioned use of a warrant or other order for location data or other extraordinary information to aid in the apprehension of the subject of a warrant in the absence of evidence of flight. This ruling does not, of course, foreclose use of a search warrant to obtain prospective location data in circumstances where the Fourth Amendment is satisfied. While the Court disagrees that the Stored Communications Act provides independent authority for access to prospective location data under these circumstances, the Court finds that the government may obtain prospective location data where that data constitutes evidence of a crime under the Fourth Amendment. Had the government’s request included demonstration of the fugitive status of the subject of the arrest warrant, the request would have been fairly routine. Courts grant warrants for location data where presented with facts demonstrating flight to avoid prosecution, most frequently in conjunction with a complaint charging this new, criminal violation against a defendant already charged with a serious crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2011). However, if the government seeks to use a particular cellular telephone as a tracking device to aid in execution of an arrest warrant, the government must obtain a tracking device warrant pursuant to Rule 41(b) and in accord with 18 U.S.C. § 3117. As set forth more fully below, this Court requires a showing of probable cause that: 1) a valid arrest warrant has issued for the user of the subject cellular telephone; 2) the subject cellular telephone is in the possession of the subject of the arrest warrant; and 3) the subject of the arrest warrant is a fugitive, that is, is or could be charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073. Moreover, the time period of the warrant must be measured by its purpose, that is, only until the defendant is located, to prevent inappropriate use of the warrant as an investigative tool. Having summarized its conclusions, the Court discusses each of the government’s asserted bases for entitlement in turn. B. Asserted Sources of the Government’s Entitlement to Location Data 1. Fourth Amendment a. Protected Status of Information Sought Under the Fourth Amendment The government and Federal Public Defender agree that this matter is at heart a question of Fourth Amendment interpretation. (ECF No. 8, 1-2; ECF No. 10, 2). Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides that: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV. Rooted in early British constitutionalism and the American colonial experience of unchecked monarchic power, the Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy by establishing a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, the threshold issue in every Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a particular government action constitutes a “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Amendment. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (stating that the Fourth Amendment “protects two types of expectations, one involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’ ”); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.1 (2010) (explaining that the words “searches and seizures” are terms of limitation; law enforcement practices do not fall within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment unless they are either “searches” or “seizures.”). Historically, courts resolved this inquiry using a property trespass theory. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928). More recently, the Supreme Court has moved beyond this paradigm to broaden the range of privacy interests protected under the Fourth Amendment. See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In Katz v. United States, the Court famously noted that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and developed an analytical framework under which the Amendment’s protection of privacy interests is implicated wherever there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” id. at 360-61, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J. concurring). The modern test for analyzing the expectation question is two-part: first, whether the defendant has exhibited an actual, subjective, expectation of privacy; and second, whether such subjective expectation is one which society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable. Id.; see, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). b. An Individual Has a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in His Location and Movement The government’s request for real-time location data implicates at least two distinct privacy interests: the subject’s right to privacy in his location and his right to privacy in his movement. The government conceded at the hearing that the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy while physically present within a non-public place, and that the government would infringe upon that privacy interest by asking the wireless carrier to “ping” the subject’s cell phone essentially on a continuous basis while he is in a constitutionally-protected location. (ECF No. 15, 4). At the same time, the government suggested, but could not satisfactorily support, that the subject of an arrest warrant has a diminished expectation of privacy in his location. (ECF No. 15, 5) (It is “less clear that someone [who is the subject of an arrest warrant] has an expectation of privacy in their location.”). The Court finds that the subject here has a reasonable expectation of privacy both in his location as revealed by real-time location data and in his movement where his location is subject to continuous tracking over an extended period of time, here thirty days. i. An Individual Has a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in His Location The Supreme Court has maintained a distinction between areas where a person can be publicly viewed and areas that could not be observed “from the outside” using traditional investigatory techniques. For example, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements on public highways during a discrete journey. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). Because traditional, visual surveillance allows the government to observe a person’s movements in public areas, the fact that the government chooses to do so electronically does “not alter the situation.” Id. However, the government does run afoul of the Fourth Amendment when it uses enhanced surveillance techniques not available to the public to “see” into private areas. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (holding that warrant-less use of a thermal imaging device that allowed surveillance into a private home violated the Fourth Amendment because it allowed the government to “obtain[] by sense-enhancing technology [ ] information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without a physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ ”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). While location data has been described as “a proxy for [the suspect’s] physical location” because the cell phone provides similar information as that traditionally generated by physical surveillance or tracking techniques, United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir.2004), abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (on other grounds), that is not entirely correct. Location data from a cell phone is distinguishable from traditional physical surveillance because it enables law enforcement to locate a person entirely divorced from all visual observation. Indeed, this is ostensibly the very characteristic that makes obtaining location data a desirable method of locating the subject of an arrest warrant. This also means, however, that there is no way to know before receipt of location data whether the phone is physically located in a constitutionally-protected place. In other words, it is impossible for law enforcement agents to determine prior to obtaining real-time location data whether doing so infringes upon the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. However, the precision of GPS and cell site location technology considered in combination with other factors demonstrates that pinging a particular cellular telephone will in many instances place the user within a home, or even a particular room of a home, and thus, the requested location data falls squarely within the protected precinct of United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). Consider, for instance, the import of the following. Coordinates expressed in longitude and latitude allow us to locate places on the Earth quite precisely — to within inches. Nationalatlas.gov, Article: Latitude and Longitude, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/ artieles/mapping/aJiatlong.html (last visited Jul. 19, 2011). GPS technology typically generates location data accurate within a range of approximately ten meters, Blaze Testimony at 21, or within a few centimeters when used in combination with augmentation systems, Gps.gov, Augmentation Systems, http://www.gps.gov/systems/ augmentations/ (last visited Jul. 19, 2011). Thus, location data generated by GPS and expressed as longitude and latitude coordinates will identify a point on a map that, in many cases, represents the location of a particular GPS-enabled cellular telephone within a radius of ten meters or significantly less. Given that the average home size in the United States in 2009 was approximately 743 square meters, it is clear that GPS location data with the high degree of accuracy described above would likely place a cellular telephone inside a residence, at least where law enforcement have information regarding the coordinates of the home. U.S. Census Bureau, Median and Average Square Feet of Floor Area in New Single-Family Houses Compared by Location, available at http://www.census. gov/const/C25Ann/sftotalmedavgsqft.pdf (statistics include houses built for rent). Such information about the coordinates of various physical structures would almost certainly be available to law enforcement. For example, publicly-available interactive mapping programs such as Google Earth display satellite images of the Earth’s surface, allowing users to view the latitude and longitude of physical structures. See Google Earth, About Google Earth: What is Google Earth?, http://earth.google.com/ support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer= 176145 (last visited Jul. 19, 2011). In addition, the U.S. Census Bureau began using handheld computers in 2010 to collect the GPS coordinates of every residence in the United States and Puerto Rico as part of its address canvassing efforts. U.S. Census Bureau, Address Canvassing Facts/Statistics, available at http://2010.census.gov/ news/press-kits/one-year-out/address eanvasing/address-canvassing-factsstatistics.html. Because cellular telephone users tend to keep their phone on their person or very close by, placing a particular cellular telephone within a home is essentially the corollary of locating the user within the home. See Pew Research Center, Cell Phones and American Adults, available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/CellPhones-and-AmericanAdults.aspx (reporting that 65 percent of adults with cell phones report sleeping with their cell phone on or right next to their bed). In addition, cell phone users typically carry their phone on their person when conducting daily activities. See In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 534 F.Supp.2d 585, 597 (W.D.Pa.2008) (“Our individual cell phones now come with us everywhere: not only on the streets, but in (a) a business, financial, medical, or other offices; (b) restaurants, theaters, and other venues of leisure activity; (c) churches, synagogues, and other places of religious affiliation; and (d) the homes of our family members, friends, and personal and professional associates.”). The Court recognizes that a determination that, based on GPS location data, a cellular telephone user is within a particular physical place may require some inference, but notes the Supreme Court’s admonition in Kyllo v. United States that “the novel proposition that inference insulates a search is blatantly contrary to United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), where the police ‘inferred’ from the activation of a beeper that a certain can of ether was in the home. The police activity was held to be a search, and the search was held unlawful.” 533 U.S. 27, 36-37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). Indeed, as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently noted, “the Government has asserted in other cases that a jury should rely on the accuracy of [ ] cell tower records to infer that an individual, or at least her cell phone, was at home.” In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 304, 311-12 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the District Court, In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir.2010)). Of course, the location information derived from cell tower records is considered less precise than the GPS data at issue here. Thus, as the majority of other courts that have examined this issue have found, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government must show probable cause prior to accessing such data. See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device, 396 F.Supp.2d 294, 323 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (“Because the government cannot demonstrate that cell site tracking could never under any circumstance implicate Fourth Amendment privacy rights, there is no reason to treat cell phone tracking differently from other forms of tracking ... which routinely require probable cause.”); In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F.Supp.2d 816, 837 (S.D.Tex.2006) (“[DJetailed location information, such as triangulation and GPS data, [] unquestionably implicate Fourth Amendment privacy rights.”); In re Application the of the United States for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers (Sealed), 402 F.Supp.2d 597, 604-05 (D.Md.2005) (recognizing that monitoring of cell phone location information is likely to violate a reasonable expectation of privacy). ii. An Individual Has a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in His Movements The scope of the government’s request here — unlimited location data at any time on demand during a thirty-day period— also implicates the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C.Cir.2010) (holding that “the whole of a person’s movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public” and is therefore protected by the Fourth Amendment). See also U.S. v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 949 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that “privacy of movement itself is deserving of Fourth Amendment protections”); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir.1977) (agreeing that “citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements, and that the possibility of being followed about in public by governmental agents does not mean that they anticipate that their every movement will be continuously monitored by a secret transmitter”). While Knotts held that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,” 460 U.S. at 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081, it expressly reserved the issue of 24-hour surveillance, id. at 283-84, 103 S.Ct. 1081. Addressing this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that “prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.” Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. But cf. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that GPS tracking of defendant’s car did not invade defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because it revealed only information the agents could have obtained by physically following the car). Although the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc in Pineda-Moreno, five judges dissented from the denial by published opinion. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.2010). In the lead dissent, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski argued that GPS tracking is much more invasive than the use of beepers discussed in Knotts, which merely augmented visual surveillance actually being conducted by the police; the combination of GPS tracking with other technologies in common use by law enforcement amounts to a virtual dragnet in dire need of regulation by the courts; and such “creepy and un-American” behavior should be checked by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc). Several district courts have since declined to adopt the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Maynard. See United States v. Sparks, 750 F.Supp.2d 384, 391-392 (D.Mass.2010) (finding that warrantless installation and monitoring of a GPS device attached to defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment where law enforcement did not invade any constitutionally-protected area within defendant’s dwelling or curtilage to attach the device, and used it to locate the vehicle only on public streets and highways); United States v. Walker, 771 F.Supp.2d 803, 809 (W.D.Mich.2011) (warrantless installation and use of a GPS device to track a vehicle as part of a drug trafficking investigation did not violate the Fourth Amendment where defendant’s vehicle was parked in a public lot when police attached the device and there was no evidence that law enforcement used the device to monitor defendant’s location anywhere other than on public thoroughfares). These cases are distinguishable from the instant matter, however, because they clearly deal with movement in a largely, if not entirely, public setting, that is, vehicle tracking. Here, of course, the tracking is of a cell phone, which is ordinarily on a person. While a vehicle may as a matter of fact remain within public spaces during a tracking period (not go into a private garage or other private property), it is highly unlikely— indeed almost unimaginable — that a cell phone would remain within public spaces. Given that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregate movement over a prolonged period of time, the government’s request to ping the subject’s cell phone on unlimited occasions during a thirty-day period constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Having established that the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location and his movement, the Court considers the government’s argument that a search warrant for real-time location data is not necessary, as a matter of law, where an arrest warrant based upon probable cause has issued, c. The Subject of an Arrest Warrant Maintains a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in His Location and Movements The government contends that where a valid arrest warrant has been issued for the cell phone user, government officials are entitled to “do what it takes to find and arrest the person.” (ECF No. 15, 8). Specifically, the government asserts that the arrest warrant authorizes acquisition of location data, even without further court warrant or order. “[T]he warrant for the arrest of the subject itself gives law enforcement sufficient authority to obtain location information for his phone without a further search warrant.” (ECF No. 6, 8). For support, the government relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), and an unreported Southern District of Indiana case, United States v. Bermudez, IP-05-43-CR, 2006 WL 3197181 (S.D.Ind. Jun. 30, 2006). (ECF No. 10, 7); (ECF No. 15, 6) (“If we [the government] hold the ability to [ping defendant’s phone] without involving any third party, I think Payton establishes that it is okay.”). The government notes that Payton establishes inter alia that it is constitutionally reasonable to require the subject of an arrest warrant to “open his doors” to law enforcement officers seeking to execute the warrant. See (ECF No. 15, 9-10). On this basis, the government eon-eludes that its possession of a valid arrest warrant in this case authorizes the “lesser” infringement of accessing location information pertaining to the suspect. Id. The government reasons that, Going into the home is one of the most protected areas in the Fourth Amendment — ... And yet in Payton, the Supreme Court says an arrest warrant is good enough to go into the target’s home. I think it follows that other lesser interests are also going to be subject or appropriate under an arrest warrant for the Government to get the information it needs to effectuate the arrest warrant. Id. Payton and its progeny may be read as affording less procedural protection to the privacy rights of an un-apprehended defendant in his location — that is, that law enforcement is not required to obtain prospective judicial approval through a search warrant. However, the case law does not clearly establish that there is a lesser burden than demonstration of reasonable belief that the defendant is in the premises as a prerequisite for entry. Moreover, Payton does not support the government’s bold declaration that the arrest warrant authorizes law enforcement “to do what it takes to find and arrest the person and determine the location of the person.” (ECF No. 15, 8). To state the obvious: the arrest warrant demonstrates probable cause to arrest a person; the arrest warrant does not demonstrate probable cause that the person is in any particular place. Payton cannot be read to absolve the government from having a reasonable belief that the suspect is in a particular location before it may enter to effectuate an arrest warrant. Finally, the Court does not agree with the government’s characterization of access to location data as necessarily a lesser infringement of privacy than Payton’s limited access to a person’s home, in the wired and watched era of the 21st century. In Payton, the Supreme Court held that a routine felony arrest made during a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home violates the Fourth Amendment. 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). In addition, the Payton Court announced, “... for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that a search warrant was unnecessary (or would be redundant) under these circumstances. The Court reasoned that, “[i]f there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law.” M Thus, Payton does not deny that an entry into the home of the subject of an arrest warrant is a “search” (or an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy), but merely concludes that it is a constitutionally reasonable one. However, this narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement does not negate the subject’s expectation of privacy in his own home, much less in any other location. Rather than granting police unlimited authority to enter a suspect’s home when armed with a valid arrest warrant, as would presumably be appropriate if the arrest warrant deprived the suspect of any reasonable expectation of privacy, the Payton Court mandated that police have a “reasonable belief’ that the suspect both lives at the place to be searched and is present within the place to be searched at the time of arrest. Id. at 602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371. Thus, it is clear that an arrest warrant alone does not justify entry of a residence to apprehend the subject of the warrant. See United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2002) (“An arrest warrant forms only the necessary, rather than sufficient, basis for entry into a home, and, in addition to an arrest warrant, there must be reason to believe the suspect is within the residence.”). One year after its decision in Payton, the Supreme Court delineated additional limitations on law enforcement’s authority in execution of an arrest warrant in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 5. Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). In Steagald, police entered the home of the defendant to apprehend a third-person who was the subject of an arrest warrant. Id. at 205, 101 S.Ct. 1642. At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the evidence against him on the grounds that the police officers did not possess a search warrant when they entered his home. Id. at 205-07, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (1981). Addressing the narrow, unresolved issue of “whether an arrest warrant — as opposed to a search warrant — is adequate to protect the Foui'th Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances,” id. at 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642, the Steagald Coux't held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit police to enter a third person’s home to serve an arrest warrant on a suspect. Id. at 205-06, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Coxxrt determined that an arrest warrant does not sufficiently protect the Fourth Amendment rights of parties not named in the warrant. Id. at 212-13, 101 S.Ct. 1642. Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that law enforcement must obtain a search warrant before entering a third-party residence to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant. Id. at 205-06, 101 S.Ct. 1642. Although Steagald focused on the privacy interests of third-party residents rather than persons for whom an arrest warrant has issued, the Court made clear that an arrest warrant does not give law enforcement officers authoxity to enter any dwelling where they believe a suspect may be found. The Steagald Court recognized that “[a] contrary conclusion' — that the police, acting alone and in the absence of exigent circumstances, may decide when there is sufficient justification for searching the home of a third party for the subject of an arrest warrant — would create a significant potential for abuse.” Id. at 215, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Court also expressed concern that an arrest warrant “may serve as a pretext for entering a home in which police have suspicion, but not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking place.” Id. In other words, the Steagald Court declined to find that an arx-est warrant represents an exception to the search warrant requirement of probable cause allowing law enforcement unfettered authority to pursue the subject of an arrest warrant. Finally, the Supreme Coxn't in Steagald did not share the government’s view of the expansive meaning of Payton. The Supreme Court in Steagald characterized its ruling in Payton as “authorizing] a limited invasion of that person’s privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home.” Id. at 214, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (emphasis added). Thus Payton and Steagald are scant authority for the government’s bold assertion that the arrest warrant here allows the sweeping invasion of the defendant’s privacy lights — 24/7 tracking of his movements for as long as 30 days to effect the arrest — without any demonstration of necessity such as fugitive status. In addition to Steagald, the Supreme Court has cited Payton 78 times since rendering its decision in 1980. None of these cases involves a remotely similar fact situation as here and none expand the Payton holding as a doctrinal matter. The government can point to no subsequent, supportive Supreme Court decision but clings to its view of the Payton concept of plenary authority to effect an arrest warrant. Significantly, the Supreme Court has cited Payton most frequently not as an exception to the warrant clause in the arrest situation, but as standing for the cardinal principle that absent consent or exigent circumstances, law enforcement may not enter a private home to effectuate an arrest without a warrant. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 635-636, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). The Supreme Court has cited Payton only occasionally for the proposition that an arrest warrant provides authority to infringe upon the expectation of the privacy of the subject in his home or elsewhere, and, in none of those cases can be viewed as a significant expansion of Payton. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (“It is not disputed that until the point of Buie’s arrest the police had the right, based on the authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Buie might have been found, including the basement.”) (emphasis added); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 488, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that “In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the Court rejected the suggestion that a separate search warrant was required before police could execute an arrest warrant by entering the home of the subject of the warrant.”); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (same); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (same). None of these citations even suggest the radical expansion of government authority urged here. Finally, several cases clearly demonstrate the Supreme Court’s reluctance to approve police conduct unnecessary to the execution of an arrest warrant. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). In Wilson v. Layne, the Court found that media presence during the execution of an arrest warrant in a private home violated the Fourth Amendment. 526 U.S. 603, 606-608, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). While the government argued that the Payton Court’s finding that homeowners are required to open their “doors to officers of the law” seeking to effectuate an arrest warrant authorized the conduct in question, Brief for Respondents at 12 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (quoting Pay-ton, 445 U.S. at 602-603, 100 S.Ct. 1371), the Court rejected this argument, finding media presence unrelated to the purposes of the warrant. The Court signaled judicial vigilance against an unnecessarily broad view of police arrest authority under Payton — even in the face of purported law enforcement benefits: “[w]ere such generalized ‘law enforcement objectives’ themselves sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment, the protections guaranteed by that Amendment’s text would be significantly watered down.” Id. at 612, 100 S.Ct. 1371. See also, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment requires police action undertaken in execution of a warrant must relate to the objectives of the authorized intrusion); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-87, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (observing that the purposes justifying a warrant “strictly limit” the manner in which the warrant is executed). Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Payton and Steagald, five courts of appeals, not including the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have concluded that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant to effectuate an arrest in a third-party residence where they have a valid arrest warrant coupled with a reasonable belief that the suspect is inside. See United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir.2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.1983); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.1983). Notably, these decisions do not require prior judicial approval for entrance by the government; ex-post justification is sufficient if a defendant challenges the search or seizure. Although this rule appears to contradict the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Steagald, the apparent inconsistency can be explained by the posture of the cases — all involving the rights of the subjects of the arrest warrant, not third parties. Distinguishably, each of the defendants in the courts of appeals cases cited supra were suspects named in a valid arrest warrant, but apprehended without a search warrant in the residence of a third party. As the Sixth Circuit explained when discussing this factual scenario in United States v. Buckner, “the Payton rule does not directly apply because the defendant was not arrested in his own home” and “Steagald is also not on point because the person prosecuted in this case was the person named in the arrest warrant.” 717 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir.1983). Despite this observation, however, the Buckner Court ultimately determined that, “[t]he fact that the defendant was the person named in the arrest warrant mandates application of Payton rather than Steagald.” Id. at 300. Other courts of appeals have similarly applied Payton when considering Fourth Amendment challenges made by defendants named in arrest warrants, but apprehended in the residence of a third party without a search warrant. Accordingly, these courts have found that no search warrant was constitutionally required; the arrest warrant was sufficient to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect, so long as there was reasonable belief that he was there. See United, States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 467-68 (7th Cir.2009) (under the Fourth Amendment, police were not required to have a search warrant as well as an arrest warrant in order to enter the apartment of an acquaintance of defendant to arrest defendant, where they had reason to suspect that defendant was inside); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir.2005) (“[E]ven if Agnew was a non-resident with a privacy interest, the Fourth Amendment would not protect him from arrest by police armed with an arrest warrant.”); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir.1989) (the possession of a warrant for the defendant’s arrest and the officers’ reasonable belief of his presence in a third party’s home justified entry without a search warrant); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.1983) (“If an arrest warrant and reason to believe the person named in the warrant is sufficient to protect that person’s fourth amendment rights in his own home, they necessarily suffice to protect his privacy rights in the home of another. The right of a third party not named in the arrest warrant to the privacy of his home may not be invaded without a search warrant. But this right is personal to the home owner and cannot be asserted vicariously by the person named in the arrest warrant.”). These cases advance the notion that the subject of an arrest warrant has lesser procedural rights, that is, a search warrant need not be obtained on probable cause prior to entry, whether to his own home or to that of a third party. Steagald and subsequent case law also advance the notion that even where law enforcement officers apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant in a third-party residence without first obtaining a search warrant,