Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, District Judge. Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Center for Individual Freedom, Inc.’s (CFIF) Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 210] and Plaintiffs Zane Lawhorn and West Virginians for Life, Inc.’s (WVFL) Second Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 209]. On February 11, 2011, the parties argued both motions at a hearing before the Court. (Docket 225.) The parties agree that no issues of fact remain outstanding and that the Court can properly dispose of the case on summary judgment. /. SUMMARY OF HOLDINGS 1. PAC and Related Definitions. The Court finds no reason to depart from its preliminary injunction order. The reach of W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(19) is limited to committees organized “for the purpose of supporting or opposing the election or nomination of one or more candidates.” Id. (emphasis added). This language is equivalent to “the sole purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate,” and it is narrower than “the major purpose” test approved by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). WVFL’s Second Motion for Summary Judgement [Docket 209] is DENIED on this issue. 2. “Expressly Advocating” Definition. Subsection (B) of the “expressly advocating” definition, W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(12), is not constitutionally overbroad, as Plaintiffs suggest. Likewise, after examining Citizens United and other relevant case law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that subsection (C) is constitutionally overbroad either. However, relying on the opinions in WRTL II authored by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, the Court finds that subsection (C) is unconstitutionally vague for employing the “appeal to vote” test as a freestanding test. In WRTL II, two justices upheld the “appeal to vote” test only within the “bright-line” context of electioneering communications, and three justices indicated their disapproval of the test’s constitutionality in any context. The motions for summary judgment [Dockets 209, 210] are therefore GRANTED IN PART on this issue, and subsection (C) is SEVERED from the remainder of the “expressly advocating” definition. S. Corporate Expenditure Ban. In the wake of Citizens United, the West Virginia Legislature repealed the ban on certain corporate speech. There being no live issue for the Court to resolve, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment [Dockets 209, 210] are DENIED AS MOOT on this issue. A “Electioneering Communication” Definition. The West Virginia Legislature’s failure to justify the inclusion of non-targeted print media sources renders the definition of “electioneering communication” unconstitutionally overbroad. Pursuant to W. Va.Code § 2-2-10(cc), the definition’s reference to communications appearing in newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals is SEVERED, and the motions for summary judgment [Dockets 209, 210] are therefore GRANTED IN PART. The Court is unable to determine whether the definition of “targeted to the relevant electorate” — one element of the “electioneering communication” definition — is unconstitutionally vague, and the motions for summary judgment are DENIED IN PART on that issue. 5. “Electioneering Communication” Exemptions. The “grassroots lobbying” exemption to the “electioneering communication” definition, W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(ll)(B)(v) is neither vague nor insufficiently tailored to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The “voter guide” exemption contained in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1 a(l 1)(B)(viii) contains two clauses that impermissibly depend on “intent-and-effect” tests of the kind criticized in WRTL II. The phrases “intended as nonpartisan public education” and “appearance of’ are therefore SEVERED from the exemption. CFIF lacks standing to challenge the “bona fide news account” exemption in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(ll)(B)(I). Finally, the “501(c)(3) organization” exemption is sufficiently tailored to meet West Virginia’s interest in regulating election-related speech, and CFIF lacks standing to challenge the “operating under” language. In sum, CFIF’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 210] is DENIED as to the “grassroots lobbying,” “bona fide news account,” and “501(c)(3) organization” exemptions, and it is GRANTED as to the “voter guide” exemption. Accordingly, portions of the “voter guide” exemption are SEVERED. 6. Reporting Requirements. CFIF’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [210] is GRANTED IN PART as to W. Va.Code § 3-8-2b(b)(5), such that the names and other information of corporate contributors must only be disclosed pursuant to that subsection if the individuals contributed in response to a solicitation or earmarked the funds for use in electioneering communications. As to the Plaintiffs’ other challenges to the reporting requirements, the motions for summary judgment [Dockets 209, 210] are DENIED. None of the remaining provisions are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 7. Preliminary Injunction Dissolution. The Court’s preliminary injunction order, entered on October 17, 2008, is DISSOLVED upon entry of this summary judgment order. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Center for Individual Freedom and Judge Faber’s Preliminary Injunction This action is the consolidation of two similar actions, Center for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant et al., Case No. 1:08-cv-00190, and West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Tennant et al., Case No. 1:08-cv-01133. CFIF is a non-partisan, nonprofit organization organized under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Docket 1 ¶¶ 3, 3(b) in Case No. l:08-cv00190.) CFIF’s stated mission “is to protect and defend individual freedoms and individual rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” (Id. ¶ 3.) It plans to “speak to the public in the Southern District of West Virginia on matters of litigation reform and related justice issues, including criminal law enforcement and sentencing, legal reform, and judicial decision-making [using] various media, including broadcast, print, and telephone banks.” (Id. ¶ 17.) That speech “will refer to West Virginia candidates to illustrate its points and ask members of the public to contact the candidates and petition them to take or maintain certain positions.” (Id.) For fear of prosecution and litigation, CFIF suspended its plans pending judicial intervention, allegedly resulting in an unconstitutional chill on its speech. (Id. ¶ 23.) CFIF filed its initial action on March 21, 2008, seeking to invalidate a number of provisions of West Virginia’s campaign finance laws as unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. Specifically, CFIF challenged West Virginia’s prohibition on corporate spending, W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-8(a), 3-8-8(b)(2)(H), 3-9-14, and W. Va. Code R. § 146-1-3, and reporting and disclosure requirements for expenses incurred for “advocating or opposing the nomination, election or defeat of any candidate,” W. Va.Code § 3-8-5, for independent expenditures “in support of or opposition to the nomination or election” of a candidate, §§ 3-8-la(14), 3 — 8—2(b), and for “electioneering communications,” §§ 3-8-la(ll), 3-8-2b. In anticipation of the May 13, 2008, primary election, CFIF filed a motion for a preliminary injunction holding those laws unconstitutional facially and as applied to a number of communications CFIF intended to publish in the days leading up to the primary. By order, the West Virginia Association for Justice (WVAJ), West Virginia American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (WV AFL-CIO), West Virginia Council of Churches (WVCOC), West Virginia Education Association (WVEA), West Virginia Citizens Action Group (WVCAG), Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition (OVEC), (Docket 13), West Virginia Employment Lawyers Association (WVELA) and West Virginia State Democratic Executive Committee (WVSDEC), (Docket 45), were permitted to participate as amici curiae. Also by order, Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Margaret L. Workman, Menis E. Ketchum, WVEA and WV AFL-CIO were permitted to intervene as defendants. (Docket 25.) Judge Faber heard argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2008. On April 22, 2008, 2008 WL 1837324, Judge Faber entered an order granting in part and denying in part CFIF’s motion. More specifically, Judge Faber enjoined defendants Betty Ireland and Timothy D. Boggess “from applying West Virginia Code sections 3-8-la(14), 3-8 — 2(b), 3-8-5(a), 3-8-8(a), 3-8-8(b)(2)(H), and 3-9-14, and West Virginia Code of State Rules section 146-1-3, to anything other than communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” (Docket 38 at 1-2.) In that ruling, Judge Faber adopted “the bright-line definition” of express advocacy set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Judge Faber also restricted the definition of “electioneering communications” to certain forms of broadcast media and enjoined Defendants “from applying [West Virginia’s] reporting and disclosure requirements to the following forms of political advocacy: mailings, faxes, emails, phone banks, leaflets, pamphlets, and other printed or published materials.” (Docket 38 at 2.) Based on that ruling, CFIF ran a series of ads, including ads about current West Virginia Attorney General Darrell V. McGraw. (Docket 72-2 ¶ 2.) On June 28, 2008, in a second extraordinary session, the West Virginia Legislature passed H.B. No. 219, amending West Virginia Code sections 3-8-1, 3-8-la, 3-8-4, 3-8-5, and 3-9-14. Thereafter, several Defendants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the basis that the amendments rendered the injunction moot. Shortly before the amended sections took effect on October 1, 2008, Judge Faber granted Defendants’ motions and dissolved the injunction by Order entered on September 29, 2008, 2008 WL 4452659, and directed CFIF to move for a new injunction based on the language in the amendments. CFIF appealed that order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which issued an Order on October 8, 2008, agreeing with Judge Faber and dismissing the appeal. B. West Virginians for Life WVFL, like CFIF, is a non-partisan, non-profit organization organized under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Docket 1 ¶ 9 in Case No. l:08-cv-01133.) Zane Lawhorn, who is also a named Plaintiff in this case, is a resident of Princeton, West Virginia, and wishes to receive WVFL’s communications. {Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) WVFL’s stated purpose “is to present information upon which individuals and the general public may make informed decisions about such topics as fetal development, abortion and its alternatives, and euthanasia.” {Id. ¶ 25). WVFL alleges that its speech has been chilled by West Virginia’s campaign finance laws because it reasonably fears prosecution by Defendants if it proceeds with its planned communications. {Id. ¶ 44.) On September 30, 2008, WVFL filed a verified complaint and motion for preliminary injunction seeking relief from several of the amended provisions, such as West Virginia’s ban on corporate express advocacy, W. Va.Code §§ 3 — 8—la(13), 3-8-8, W. Va.Code R. § 146-1-3, reporting requirements for express advocacy, W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-2b, 3-8-5a, 3-8-5b, definition of political committee, political action committee (PAC), and unaffiliated PAC, §§ 3-8-la(21), (22), (29), definition of electioneering communication, §§ 3-8-la(12), (26), and reporting requirements for electioneering communications, §§ 3-8-la(20), 3-8-2(a), 3 — 8—2(d), 3-8-2b(a)-(g), 3-8-5, 3-8-5b. Specifically, WVFL alleged that those provisions are vague and overbroad and accordingly unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Shortly after WVFL filed its complaint, CFIF filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2008, challenging some of those same provisions, namely the ban on corporate express advocacy and the definition of electioneering communications, §§ 3-8-la(13), (12), (26), 3-8-8, and the reporting requirements resulting therefrom. In support of its emergency motion, CFIF stated that Attorney General McGraw engaged in a series of threats and retaliatory acts in response to CFIF’s earlier ads. (Docket 90-2 ¶ 2.) CFIF further stated that it wished to respond to MeGraw’s alleged threats and retaliatory acts, however, it feared that such a response would be deemed express advocacy or electioneering communications under the recent amendments. (Id. ¶ 6.) Accordingly, CFIF sought injunctive relief holding that the amended sections are unconstitutionally both facially and as applied. On October 7, 2008, CFIF v. Ireland, No. 1:08-cv-00190, was reassigned to the undersigned District Judge and consolidated with WVFL v. Ireland, No. 1:08-cv01133. One week later, on October 14, 2008, a hearing on the preliminary injunction motions was held. (Docket 118.) The Court issued its memorandum opinion and order on the preliminary injunction motions on October 17, 2008. (Docket 125.) In that opinion, the Court made the following findings. First, the Court applied a limiting principle in interpreting West Virginia’s ban on corporate express advocacy, holding that the West Virginia legislature impliedly excepted corporations, such as WVFL, that meet the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 263, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). (Docket 125 at 14-15.) This holding approximated the Supreme Court’s holding in Federal Election Commission v. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 209-11, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), and quashed WVFL’s argument that the corporate advocacy ban was overbroad as applied to it. Second, the Court agreed with CFIF and WVFL that West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy, as it then stood, was vague and overbroad for a multitude of reasons. Relying heavily on Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007), and North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2008), the Court found West Virginia’s express advocacy definition overbroad for failing to limit its application to electioneering communications as defined by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). (Docket 125 at 19-20.) Furthermore, because West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy relied on contextual factors and employed the interpretation of a “reasonable person” to determine the boundaries of express advocacy, the Court held W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(13)(B) unconstitutionally vague on its face. (Docket 125 at 20-23.) Third, the Court upheld West Virginia’s definitions of “political action committee,” “political committee,” and “unaffiliated political action committee” as sufficiently tailored. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that West Virginia’s definition was narrower than the “major purpose” test that was expounded in Buckley v. Valeo. (Docket 125 at 24-29.) West Virginia’s definition captures only those committees with the sole purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate’s nomination, rather than those with the major purpose of supporting or opposing nomination, as Buckley condoned. Additionally, and contrary to the arguments of CFIF and WVFL, the phrase “supporting or opposing” was held sufficiently definite to pass constitutional muster. (Docket 125 at 29-31.) Fourth, the Court struck down West Virginia’s definition of “electioneering communication” as overbroad because it encompassed more varied media than those contained in BCRA’s definition (which the Supreme Court upheld) and failed to adequately justify that broader scope. (Id. at 35-41.) Fifth and finally, the Court found that there was no significant risk of threats and reprisals such that WVFL should be exempted from all disclosure requirements imposed by West Virginia law. (Id. at 42-48.) On February 4, 2009, WVFL and Zane Lawhorn filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket 152.) CFIF filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment on the same day. (Docket 154.) In August 2009, the Fourth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction opinion in Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission (RTAO), 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir.2009), which potentially impacts the resolution of this case. In consideration of RTAO, on September 16, 2009, 2009 WL 3017705, the Court granted WVFL’s motion to stay this case pending resolution of a petition for rehearing en banc before the Fourth Circuit and a petition for writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court in RTAO. (Docket 184). On May 6, 2010, WVFL advised the Court that the Supreme Court granted the certiorari petition in RTAO, vacated the Fourth Circuit panel decision, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit in light of the recent Citizens United decision. Consequently, on May 26, 2010, the Court dissolved the stay. Only CFIF and WVFL/Zane Lawhorn remain as plaintiffs. In the 2010 regular session, the West Virginia legislature again revisited certain provisions of the election chapter. In particular, W. Va.Code § 3-9-14 was repealed, and §§ 3-8-1 (purposes), 3-8-la (definitions), 3-8-2 (requirements for reporting independent expenditures), 3-8-8 (corporate contribution ban), and 3-8-12 (anonymous advertising ban) were amended, effective June 11, 2010. See 2010 W. Va. Acts ch. 76 (H.B. 4647). Both WVFL and CFIF maintain that their challenges remain live issues because the 2010 amendments did little to remedy the constitutional infirmities they perceive in West Virginia’s election laws. On September 14, 2010, WVFL and Zane Lawhorn filed their Second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing many of the same points from the preliminary injunction stage. (Docket 209.) On the same day, CFIF filed its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket 210.) The Court held a lengthy hearing on both summary judgment motions on February 11, 2011, where it heard argument from counsel for Plaintiffs and the West Virginia defendants. The issues have been fully briefed and argued and the matter is now ripe for the Court’s consideration. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits in the record show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Conversely, summary judgment is inappropriate if there exist factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When construing such factual issues, it is well established that the Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the [party opposing summary judgment].” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). At the hearing on the summary judgment motions pending before the Court, all parties agreed that there are no outstanding factual issues to be resolved. Instead, the remaining questions are purely questions of law for the Court’s interpretation and analysis. Accordingly, this case is ripe for disposition on these motions. B. Vagueness and Overbreadth WVFL and CFIF challenge certain of West Virginia’s election laws as impermissibly vague. It is a fundamental tenet of constitutional law that a statute or regulation “is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). A vagueness challenge arises under the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2718, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010). Laws are impermissibly vague if they fail to “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294. A vagueness challenge can also be asserted on the basis that a statute or regulation permits “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” by “impermissibly delegating] basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Id. When assessing a statute or regulation that “interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). This “more stringent vagueness test” requires more than fair notice, but “perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)). Additionally, “even to the extent a heightened vagueness standard applies, a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause of [either] the Fifth [or Fourteenth] Amendment for lack of notice.” Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2719. To be certain, vagueness turns on considerations of clarity, not government reach. A statute may be attacked as unconstitutionally vague on its face only in limited circumstances. Courts are not “roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). A party who cannot complain that its own conduct was ensnared by an impermissibly vague statute generally is prohibited from arguing that the statute may injure others who are not before the court. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38, 120 S.Ct. 483,145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (“One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”). The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to this general rule when First Amendment freedoms are at issue: A defendant may challenge a statute as facially vague if it has the potential to inhibit First Amendment freedoms. See L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 38, 120 S.Ct. 483; Groyned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294. In addition to vagueness, the litigants in this case challenge West Virginia’s election laws as overbroad. When a statute or regulation is challenged as over-broad, a court’s task “is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186. “If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.” Id. In addressing an overbreadth challenge, the court is to first construe the challenged law to determine its proper scope, then ask whether the law burdens a substantial amount of protected activity. Williams, 553 U.S. at 293, 297, 128 S.Ct. 1830. The potential vagueness of a law impacts a court’s overbreadth analysis because uncertain boundaries (vagueness) can chill constitutionally protected speech without actually infringing on any constitutional rights. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (“[OJrdinarily a plaintiff ... cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others, [but] we have relaxed that requirement in the First Amendment context, permitting plaintiffs to argue that a statute is over-broad because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of protected speech.”); see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (noting that “the vagueness of a law affects over-breadth analysis”). C. Levels of Scrutiny in Political . Speech A threshold issue for courts weighing fundamental rights against government interests is the level of means-end scrutiny to apply in specific circumstances. The distinction relevant to this case centers on whether each challenged law amounts to (1) a prohibition or restriction on speech or certain speakers or (2) a disclaimer, disclosure, or reporting requirement, which may burden the ability to speak but “imposes no ceiling on campaign-related activities” and “do[es] not prevent anyone from speaking.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,-, 130 S.Ct. 876, 914, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (citations omitted). Political “[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 898 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.”)). For this reason, when a law burdens core political speech, courts apply strict scrutiny, under which “the Government must prove that [the law] furthers a compelling interest related to the process of governing.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (when law burdens core political speech, a court will “uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest”). For instance, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to strike down content-based restrictions on speech and restrictions based on the identity of the speaker. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (striking down content-based restriction); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (striking down restriction distinguishing among corporate and non-corporate speakers). These principles are at their zenith in the context of political speech. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to ... political expression.”); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971) (“[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee [of the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”). On the other hand, because disclosure and disclaimer requirements are a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech, challenges to such requirements are reviewed under a less rigorous test that has been termed “exacting scrutiny.” See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (“The Court has subjected [disclosure] requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny’ ”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam); accord Doe v. Reed, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2814, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010). This standard “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66, 96 S.Ct. 612). To withstand exacting scrutiny, “the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68, 96 S.Ct. 612). The Citizens United Court cited at least one government interest that is significant in the analysis: “ ‘[P]rovidfing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of election-related spending.” 130 S.Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612). IV. “POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE” AND RELATED DEFINITIONS WVFL challenges several subsections of W. Va.Code § 3-8-la, which provides the definitions for “political committee,” “political action committee” (or “PAC”), and “unaffiliated political action committee.” W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-la(19), (20), (26). WVFL requests “[a] declaratory judgment that ... [these definitions] ... are unconstitutional as applied to [WVFL’s] communications and facially, are void, and are set aside.” (Docket 128 ¶238.) The West Virginia legislature did not amend these definitions in 2010, except to renumber them. At the summary judgment hearing, West Virginia fully endorsed the Court’s preliminary injunction holding on this issue, and the Court can find no reason to depart from that analysis. Accordingly, the Court adopts in full the discussion and analysis of these arguments set forth in the preliminary injunction order, as set forth below: WVFL does not challenge the substance of the definitions. Rather, it is challenges then' scope. WVFL claims that the definitions of political committee, PAC, and unaffiliated PAC are facially vague and overbroad and that WVFL does not know if its planned advertising and advocacy efforts will convert it into a political committee as that term is defined by W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(22). As a consequence of this uncertainty, WVFL states that it will continue to refrain from communicating its message for fear that it will run afoul of West Virginia law. In WVFL’s words, it seeks to conduct its operations “without fear of becoming a political committee.” (Docket 2 ¶ 163 in Case No. l:08-cv-1133.) WVFL’s broader argument is that the phrase “the purpose of supporting or opposing” in the PAC definition is unconstitutional as applied to WVFL and facially vague and overbroad. However, WVFL dissects this phrase into “the purpose of’ and “supporting or opposing” and maintains that each constituent part is constitutionally infirm for separate reasons. WVFL points to its planned communications concerning West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals candidate Margaret Workman. In 1993, then-Chief Justice Workman penned the Supreme Court of Appeals’ decision in Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va. v. Panepinto, [191 W.Va. 436] 446 S.E.2d 658 (W.Va.1993), a prominent abortion-rights case. WVFL plans to conduct a mass mailing, radio advertising campaign, and petition drive to highlight Workman’s opinion in Panepinto. (Docket 2-2 at 42-45 in Case No. 1:08-ev-1133.) WVFL fears that these communications may be construed as “opposing” Workman’s candidacy, thereby converting WVFL into a PAC and subjecting it to West Virginia’s campaign laws. a. Applicable Law In their current forms, the challenged definitions are as follows: (19) “Political action committee” means a committee organized by one or more persons for the purpose of supporting or opposing the nomination or election of one or more candidates. The following are types of political action committees: (A) A corporate political action committee, as that term is defined by subdivision (8) of this section; (B) A membership organization, as that term is defined by subdivision (18) of this section; (C) An unaffiliated political action committee, as that term is defined by subdivision (29) of this section. (20) “Political committee” means any candidate committee, political action committee or political party committee. (26) “Unaffiliated political action committee” means a political action committee that is not affiliated with a corporation or a membership organization. W. Va.Code § 3-8-la (emphasis added). The challenged definitions were enacted by the West Virginia Legislature on June 7, 2007 and were not changed subsequent to Judge Faber’s April 22, 2008, ruling. See 2008 W. Va. Acts 13. [They also were not substantively changed after the Court’s 2008 preliminary injunction order. See 2010 W. Va. Acts ch. 76 (H.B. 4647).] Although WVFL fears becoming a “political committee” under West Virginia law, only the definition of “political action committee” need be addressed; an organization becomes a “political committee” or “unaffiliated political action committee” by virtue of its status as a PAC. See W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(20) (defining political committee as “any candidate committee, political action committee or political party committee”). b. Analysis WVFL’s bifurcation of the phrase “the purpose of supporting or opposing” in the PAC definition unnecessarily complicates the issue. Cf. Leake, 525 F.3d at 286 (evaluating the phrase “a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates” as a compete unit in a challenge to North Carolina’s definition of political committee). However, in the interests of comprehensiveness, each argument will be addressed. i. “The Purpose Of" The definitions in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la were not cut from whole cloth. Similarly worded statutes have been challenged in other cases and the contours of constitutionally permissible language are well-established. As will be explained in detail below, the question presented by WVFL’s PAC definition argument is a matter of semantics: Is the phrase “the purpose of supporting or opposing” found in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(19) more like “a major purpose to support or oppose” (which is unconstitutionally vague) or “the major purpose of supporting or opposing” (which is constitutional)? In Buckley, the Supreme Court made a distinction between issue advocacy and advocacy for the election of a particular candidate. See Buckley, 424 [U.S.] at 80 [96 S.Ct. 612] (holding that campaign finance laws must be “unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular ... candidate”). Although each form of speech is of equal constitutional gravity, see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 [124 S.Ct. 619], the latter form may be subject to narrowly tailored regulation in order to serve the important governmental interests of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in elections. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26 [96 S.Ct. 612], The government’s interest in preventing corruption in elections, however, does not extend in equal measure to speech that advocates for or against issues that do not directly relate to the election of a candidate for public office. Accordingly, campaign finance laws must not be so broad as to infringe individuals’ rights to express opinions on such issues, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 [83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405] (1963) (“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”), nor may they be so vague as to make it uncertain whether they cover issue advocacy, see Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 665 (5th Cir.2005 [2006]). To screen issue advocacy groups from the reach of campaign finance laws, the Buckley Court stated that the term “political committee” “need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.” Id. at 79 [96 S.Ct. 612], Although the Buckley opinion addressed federal campaign law, many states, including West Virginia, have incorporated this language into their definitions of political committees, PACs, or similar terms. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 15.13.400(8); Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16-901(19); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-4143(k); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18:1483(14); N.C. GemStat. § 163-278.6(14); Wash. Rev.Code § 42.17.020(39); W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(19). It therefore behooves the Court to view West Virginia’s campaign law through the lense of Buckley and its progeny. Buckley makes it clear that it is constitutionally permissible to define a political committee as an organization controlled by a candidate or an organization for which “the major purpose” is the election of a candidate to public office. In Leake, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a North Carolina campaign law that closely tracked the language of Buckley. The law defined “political committee” as a combination of two or more individuals ... that makes, or accepts anything of value to make, contributions or expenditures and has one or more of the following characteristics: a. Is controlled by a candidate; [or] d. Has as a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-278.6(14) (emphasis added). North Carolina’s campaign laws, like West Virginia’s, impose significantly greater burdens on political committees than on other entities. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. lodged a facial challenge to the law, arguing that the phrase “a major purpose” was unconstitutionally vague and potentially subjected it to regulation as a political committee. See Leake, 525 F.3d at 287. The task before the Fourth Circuit in Leake was to determine if there was a constitutionally significant difference between “a major purpose,” which was used by North Carolina to define “political committee,” and “the major purpose,” which was approved by Buckley. The Fourth Circuit concluded there was. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court did not speak haphazardly in Buckley when it said that a political committee was an organization with “the major purpose” of electing a candidate. By use of the definite article, “the,” the Buckley court was signifying that the major-purpose test referred to organizations whose “only or primary goal” was the election or opposition of a candidate. Id. at 287. In contrast, the phrase, “a major purpose,” does not denote an only or primary purpose. It indicates that the election or opposition of a candidate is but one purpose among many. “Permitting the regulation of organizations as political committees when the goal of influencing elections is merely one of multiple ‘major purposes’ threatens the regulation of too much ordinary political speech to be constitutional.” Id. at 288-89. West Virginia’s definition of PAC does not use “the major purpose” or “a major purpose.” It omits the word “major,” regulating groups “organized ... for the purpose of supporting or opposing the nomination or election of one or more candidates.” W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(19) (emphasis added). The question, therefore, is whether the absence of the adjective “major” makes West Virginia’s statute more like the definition of political committee in Buckley or Leake. Like the Supreme Court in Buckley, West Virginia’s legislature chose the definite article to limit the word “purpose.” However, West Virginia differs because it does not qualify the requisite purpose with the word “major.” This difference does not make West Virginia’s statute more vague or more broad; the opposite is true. Stating that an organization has one “major purpose” implies that it at least could have other, minor purposes. “The purpose,” being without qualification, indicates that there is but one and only one purpose— namely, to support or oppose a candidate. Thus, by omitting “major,” West Virginia’s definition of a PAC more precisely identifies the scope of regulated organizations than the language found to be constitutional in Buckley. The Court does not arrive at this meaning by construction or interpretation. Instead, it is the plain meaning of this statute to limit its application to singular — purpose organizations. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 [37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) ] (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first' instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”). An organization is a regulable “political committee” under W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(20) only if it is a “candidate committee, [PAC] or political party committee.” Similarly, “unaffiliated PACs,” as defined in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(26), are merely a subset of organizations labeled as PACs. Because the definition of PAC is not unconstitutionally vague or over-broad on its face, it follows that the definitions of political committee and unaffiliated PAC are not unconstitutional on the grounds alleged by WVFL. ii. “Supporting or Opposing ” WVFL lodges a facial constitutional challenge to the use of “supporting or opposing” in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(22). It therefore bears the “heavy burden” of proving “a substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of speech.” Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 [118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500] (1998). WVFL does not appear to meet this burden. Tellingly, WVFL cites no authority where a court has found the terms “supporting or opposing” a candidate in the definition of political committee or PAC to be unconstitutionally vague. The few courts which have addressed the issue raised here have concluded that “supporting or opposing” a candidate is not vague or overbroad. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64 [124 S.Ct. 619]; Leake, 525 F.3d at 289 (“[T]he Supreme Court[ ] insist[s] that political committees can only be regulated if they have the support or opposition of candidates as their primary purpose....”); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, No. 3:08-cv-483 [2008 WL 4416282, at *13], 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73551, at *37 (E.D.Va. Sept. 24, 2008) (“[C]ase law and Supreme Court precedent make it clear that the use of ‘support or oppose’ is not unconstitutionally vague----”); EMILY’S List v. FEC, No. 05-0049(CKK) [569 F.Supp.2d 18, 53], 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58046, at *98 (D.D.C. July 31, 2008) (“EMILY’s List’s [vagueness] argument is entirely unavailing as to the words ‘support’ or ‘oppose,’ because the Supreme Court rejected just such a claim in McConnell .... ”); Voters Educ. Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, [161 Wash.2d 470] 166 P.3d 1174, 1184 (Wash.2007) (“[W]e conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to understand the meaning of ‘in support of, or opposition to, any candidate’ in the definition of ‘[political committee’ ....”); cf. Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 663 (dismissing a vagueness and overbroad challenge to a Louisiana statute that defined “expenditure” as “a purchase ... made for the purpose of supporting, opposing, or otherwise influencing the nomination or election of a person to public office” because a limiting construction was sufficient). In cases where statutes containing the phrase “support or oppose” were found to be vague or overbroad, the words “support” and “oppose” were not the offending terms. See Real Truth About Obama, [2008 WL 4416282, at *12-*13] 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73551, at *36-*38 (discussing cases). WVFL’s attempt to distinguish the instant action from McConnell is not persuasive. In McConnell, the Supreme Court held that the words “support” and “oppose” are not unconstitutionally vague in the campaign finance law context because they “clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619 (emphasis added). WVFL correctly points out that the statute at issue in this section of McConnell, 2 U.S.C. § 301(20)(A)(iii), applies to political parties involved in federal election campaigns. WVFL would have this Court limit the application of the McConnell Court’s holding to statutes applying to sophisticated political parties, but not other individuals. This argument might be more convincing were it not for the remainder of the Supreme Court’s discussion on the matter: “These words [support and oppose] ‘provide explicit standards for those who apply them’ and ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’ ” Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 [92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222] (1972)) (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that the McConnell Court’s reasoning should not be limited to sophisticated political party members. The phrase “supporting or opposing” is not unconstitutionally vague. Furthermore, because it has been established that the phrase applies to groups organized for the only purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate for election, its sweep is not overbroad. For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that West Virginia’s definitions of political committee, PAC, and unaffiliated PAC are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The definitions are “ ‘unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular ... candidate.’ ” Leake, 525 F.3d at 287 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80 [96 S.Ct. 612]). Accordingly, the Court further FINDS that there is no likelihood that WVFL will succeed on the merits with its facial challenge to those definitions. c. Political Action Committee Definition As-Applied WVFL’s as-applied challenge to the definitions has a similar fate. Defendants have not argued in their briefs that WVFL’s only or primary purpose is to support or oppose a candidate for state election. Furthermore, Defendant Betty Ireland, West Virginia Secretary of State, conceded at the hearing on October 14, 2008, that WVFL’s sole purpose is not supporting or opposing candidates. Because there appears to be no basis to find that WVFL’s sole, or even major, purpose is supporting or opposing candidates, the likelihood of success of WVFL’s as-applied challenge is easily ascertained. As WVFL will be not be deemed a PAC under the constitutionally valid definition in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la, there is little likelihood that the challenged section will be impermissibly applied to WVFL. See Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d 719, 721 n. 3 [ (8th Cir.1977) ] (distinguishing over-breadth and as-applied challenges in First Amendment context). Accordingly, the Court FINDS that there is little likelihood that WVFL will succeed on the merits of its as-applied challenge to the organizational definitions in W. Va. Code § 3-8-la. (Docket 125 at 23-32.) As to the Court’s overbreadth holding, at the summary judgment hearing, WVFL argued that the Court’s interpretation of the PAC definition, as set forth above, cannot be correct because it would permit foolish results. In particular, WVFL stated that, under the Court’s construction of W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(19), an organization could spend 99% of its treasury to “support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more candidates” (and 1% on, say, charitable activity) but not fall within the definition of “PAC” because supporting or opposing a candidate’s nomination or election is not the organization’s sole purpose. In lieu of the Court’s interpretation, WVFL proposes that the Court refuse to “read[ ] ‘only’ ... into West Virginia law” and hold § 3-8-la(19) unconstitutionally overbroad for capturing organizations that have simply a purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate’s nomination or election. (Docket 211 at 32-34.) Contrary to WVFL’s suggestion, the Court is not reading anything into the PAC definition. Rather, the Court is giving warranted deference to the West Virginia Legislature in interpreting § 3-8-la(19), taking that elected body to mean what it says in crafting the laws of West Virginia. The legislature chose the definite article “the” in drafting the PAC definition, and the Court’s analysis is faithful to that choice. If WVFL takes issue with what it perceives as poor draftsmanship in the West Virginia Code, it would be better served to argue its case to the West Virginia Legislature. As to the Court’s vagueness holding, WVFL makes no new arguments and simply reiterates that the phrase “support or oppose” is unconstitutionally vague as a matter of law. Based on the analysis in the Court’s preliminary injunction order, and with particular emphasis on the Supreme Court’s holding in McConnell, WVFL’s argument remains unpersuasive. The PAC definition is sufficiently definite to withstand constitutional scrutiny, and accordingly, WVFL’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 209] is DENIED as to this issue. V “EXPRESSLY ADVOCATING’’ DEFINITION Plaintiffs challenge West Virginia’s definition of “expressly advocating,” contained in W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(12). That section, which was amended by the Legislature in 2010, admittedly in response to the Court’s preliminary injunction hearing, reads: “Expressly advocating” means any communication that: (A) Uses phrases such as “vote for the Governor,” “re-elect your Senator,” “support the Democratic nominee for Supreme Court,” “cast your ballot for the Republican challenger for House of Delegates,” “Smith for House,” “Bob Smith in '04,” “vote Pro-Life” or “vote Pro-Choice” accompanied by a listing of clearly identified candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-Choice, “vote against Old Hickory,” “defeat” accompanied by a picture of one or more candidates, “reject the incumbent”; (B) Communications of campaign slogans or individual words, that can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates, such as posters, bumper stickers, advertisements, etc., which say “Smith’s the One,” “Jones '06,” “Baker”, etc; or (C) Is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Id. The West Virginia Code incorporates the phrase “expressly advocating” into the definition of “independent expenditure” and nowhere else. An “independent expenditure” is “an expenditure ... by a person ... [ejxpressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate ... [and not made by or in cooperation with a candidate or PAC].” W. Va. Code § 3-8-la(15). Independent expenditures are the subject of fairly extensive disclosure and disclaimer requirements once certain annual dollar amounts are reached. All parties agree that subsection (A) of the “expressly advocating” definition embodies the “magic words” of express advocacy embraced by the Supreme Court in Buckley, and it is therefore per se constitutional. Plaintiffs CFIF and WVFL allege that subsections (B) and (C) are unconstitutionally vague and subsection (C) is unconstitutionally overbroad, both facially and as applied. In particular, Plaintiffs take issue with the phrase “reasonable meaning” in subsection (B) and the entirety of subsection (C), arguing that the language is vague, imprecise, and impermissibly relies on “intent and effect” tests, as condemned by the Supreme Court in WRTL II. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that subsection (C) exceeds the scope of constitutionally permissible election regulation by capturing communications that “appeal to vote” but are neither express advocacy nor electioneering communications. (Docket 210 at 13-15.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the reporting requirements that attend expressly advocating, W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-2 and 3-8-5, chill their speech and are thus unconstitutional by extension. West Virginia retorts that no constitutional infirmity remains after the 2010 amendments. The 2010 amendments broke former subsection (A) into current subsections (A) and (B) and removed an instruction in the latter subsection to evaluate communications “in context.” (Docket 193-1 at 13.) The 2010 amendments also thoroughly revised what was subsection (B), currently subsection (C), to approximate Chief Justice Roberts’s “appeal to vote” test from WRTL II. See 551 U.S. at 469-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (“[A] court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”). In the preliminary injunction order, the Court held old subsection (B) unconstitutionally vague for failing to incorporate the definition of electioneering communication from BCRA, as required by Leake, and for referring to context and incorporating other vague standards of the kind decried in WRTL II. (Docket 125 at 20-23.) Although much of the Court’s analysis is no longer applicable to the amended definition of “expressly advocating,” a similar conclusion is unavoidable— subsection (C) is unconstitutionally vague. A. Applicable Law Any discussion regarding the proper definition of express advocacy and associated reporting requirements must necessarily begin with Buckley. At the time Buckley was decided, it was well established that “compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Supreme Court examined Congress’s purpose for enacting reporting and disclosure requirements in FECA — “promoting] full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process,” id. at 78-79, 96 S.Ct. 612 — and determined that the purpose was insufficient to restrict the speech of persons and groups engaging only in issue advocacy. Id. (“To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the disclosure requirements] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.”) Accordingly, the Court limited the definition of “expenditure” to “reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate [and that are] directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612 (footnote omitted). The Court then articulated a list of what have become known as “magic words” which are indicative of such express advocacy. Id. at 44 n. 52 and 80 n. 108, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley thus stands for the dual proposition that the “magic words” of express advocacy are both within government’s regulatory reach, at least as to reporting and disclosure requirements, and sufficiently definite to avoid a vagueness challenge. Buckley’s bright line “magic words” test stood as the law on this issue for over twenty-five years, until Congress passed BCRA, and the Supreme Court revisited the issue in McConnell. In McConnell, the Court rejected the idea that “the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy” and determined that the “magic words” test was “functionally meaningless” as a limit of government reach because persons and organizations could avoid reporting simply by not using those particular words. Id. at 192, 124 S.Ct. 619. Then, finding that the governmental interests articulated in Buckley applied in full to the new provisions of BCRA requiring reporting and disclosure of expenditures for ads that “are intended to influence voters’ decisions and have that effect,” the Court expanded the legitimate sweep of such requirements to reach the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Id. at 206, 124 S.Ct. 619. In other words, McConnell upheld BCRA’s reporting and disclosure requirements as a valid exercise of government regulatory authority “to the extent that” the electioneering communication ads to be regulated “are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Id. The McConnell Court also stated that the definition of “electioneering communication” was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 103 (electioneering communication definition is “both easily understood and objectively determinable.”). The Supreme Court revisited and refined the definition of “functional equivalent of express advocacy” four years later in WRTL II. Addressing an as-applied challenge to the same provision that was held to be facially valid in McConnell (BCRA § 203), Chief Justice Roberts recognized that McConnell “did not explain that it was adopting a particular test for determining what constituted the ‘functional equivalent’ of express advocacy.” 551 U.S. at 466, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts held that “a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 469-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652. In declining to adopt a more subjective, intent-driven test because such a test “would chill core political speech by opening the door to a trial on every ad,” id. at 468, 127 S.Ct. 2652, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that “the proper standard for an as-applied challenge ... must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communication rather than the amorphous considerations of intent and effect,” id., and that “contextual factors ... should seldom play a significant role in the inquiry.” Id. at 473-74, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Since WRTL II was decided, the Fourth Circuit has had occasion to apply the Supreme Court’s holding to a case strikingly similar to the one at bar. In North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2008), a non-profit corporation challenged, among other things, North Carolina’s two-pronged test to determine whether “an individual acted ‘to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates.’ ” Id. (quoting N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-278.14A(a)). The Fourth Circuit held that to be considered the “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” a communication must meet two separate requirements[:] the communication must qualify as an “electioneering communication,” [as] defined by [BCRA], [and then] only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Leake, 525 F.3d at 281-82. Applying that test and recognizing that WRTL II “was entertaining an ‘as-applied challenge’ ” to a statute held facially valid in McConnell, the Fourth Circuit struck down North Carolina’s regulation as facially vague and overbroad. Leake, 525 F.3d at 285. The Court based its holding on the “multiple First Amendment deficiencies that North Carolina’s definition displays,” including “determining] whether speech is regulable based on how a ‘reasonable person’ interprets the speech’s ‘essential nature’ in light of four ‘contextual factors.’ ” Id. at 285-86. Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down the federal ban that made it a “felony for all corporations ... either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or broadcast electioneering communications.” Id. at 897. Under the challenged law, corporations and unions were barred from using general treasury funds for express advocacy or for electioneering communications, but they were permitted to establish a PAC to engage in those communications. Id. at 887. Notably, although the Supreme Court struck down the federal ban on independent expenditures, it upheld disclosure and disclaimer requirements, which impose no ceiling on campaign spending and are considered a less restrictive alternative, and stated that such requirements need not “be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Id. at 915. In other words, Citizens United held that government cannot all-out ban independent express advocacy or electioneering communications (regardless of the speaker’s identity), but it can impose well-tailored disclosure and disclaimer requirements on such express advocacy and electioneering communications. With these precedents in mind, the Court turns to West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy. B. Analysis of Subsection (B): “No ... Reasonable Meaning ” Prior to the 2010 amendments, W. Va.Code § 3-8-la(12)(B) included in the definition of “expressly advocating” “communications ... which in context can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates.” Id. (words “in context” deleted in 2010). That provision was subject to constitutional attack, because the S