Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge. Earl Hayes (“Plaintiff’) brings this action against the County of Sullivan (“County”), the Sullivan County Sheriffs Department (“Sheriffs Department”) (collectively, “County Defendants”), and individual Defendants Detective Jason Gorr (“Detective Gorr” or “Gorr”), Detective Don Starner (“Detective Starner” or “Starner”), Deputy Patrolman Richard Morgan (“Deputy Morgan” or “Morgan”), Colonel Harold Smith, Jr. (“Colonel Smith” or “Smith”), Lieutenant Cole (“Lieutenant Cole” or “Cole”), and Corporal Harry Gardner (“Corporal Gardner” or “Gardner”) in their official and individual capacities (collectively, “Individual Defendants”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”). Plaintiff alleges that his federal constitutional rights were violated before and during his arrest on October 26, 2005, and in the court proceedings leading up to his guilty plea, which he entered on March 2, 2007. Plaintiff also alleges that his federal constitutional rights were violated during his incarceration at the Sullivan County Jail. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the motions are granted in part and denied in part. I. Background A. Facts 1. Plaintiff’s Arrest Plaintiff was arrested on October 26, 2005 for driving with a suspended license and for possession of a forged instrument. (Aff. of Det. Jason Gorr in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.. J. (“Gorr Aff.”) ¶ 15.) The Parties dispute the chain of events which led to Plaintiffs arrest. Defendants’ version of the facts starts with the decision of Judge Burton Ledina, the Sullivan County Court judge who presided over Plaintiffs suppression hearing on December 21, 2006 and January 9, 2007. On February 9, 2007, Judge Ledina issued a nine-page decision, denying Plaintiffs suppression motion, and finding that Detective Gorr and Deputy Morgan had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on October 26, 2005. See People v. Hayes, Indictment No. 13-2006 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct. Feb. 9, 2007) (“Suppression Order”). As found by Judge Ledina, on October 26, 2005, a security officer at the WalMart store in the town of Thompson contacted Detective Starner of the Sullivan County Sheriffs Department, and informed him that an individual had attempted to purchase a cell phone using a credit card where the name printed on the front of the card did not match the name which appeared on the register receipt after the card was scanned. (Suppression Order 2; Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 56.1 (“Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1”) ¶¶ 15-16; Aff. of Det. Don A. Starner in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Starner Aff.”) ¶¶8-9.) The name printed on the front of the card was “Earl Hayes,” but the name which appeared on the receipt was “Joblanski Samuels.” (Suppression Order 2; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 16; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15.) Starner requested that Detective Gorr, also of the Sullivan County Sheriffs Department, respond to the call. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 17; Starner Aff. ¶ 10.) Upon arrival at the Wal-Mart, Gorr met with Joe Brown, a Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, who showed him a copy of the receipt bearing the name Joblanski Samuels. (Suppression Order 2; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15.) During this meeting, Gorr and Brown were advised that the individual had re-entered the store and was purchasing a laptop computer. (Suppression Order 2; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 18.) Using the store’s video surveillance equipment, security personnel pointed out the individual, Plaintiff Earl Hayes, to Gorr. (Id.) Gorr followed Plaintiff out of the store and observed him place the laptop in the trunk of a car and open the driver’s side door. (Suppression Order 2; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15; In-div. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 19.) Gorr then approached Plaintiff, identified himself, and told Plaintiff that he wanted to speak to him regarding the credit card Plaintiff had used in the Wal-Mart. (Suppression Order 2; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15.) Gorr asked Plaintiff for identification and Plaintiff produced a New York State identification card in the name of Earl Hayes. Suppression Order 2-3. According to Gorr, Plaintiff explained that there had been a problem with the cashier and produced several credit cards, identifying a Pay Pal card as the one he had used in the store. (Suppression Order 3; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 23.) While Gorr was speaking to Plaintiff in the parking lot, Deputy Morgan, of the Sullivan County Sheriffs Department, arrived as back-up. (Suppression Order 3; Aff. of Richard Morgan in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Morgan Aff.”) ¶¶ 6-8.) Deputy Morgan ran a check of Plaintiffs driver’s license and it came back over the radio that Plaintiffs license was suspended. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 24; Suppression Hr’g Tr. 19:20-25, 138:13-20, 141:4-7, Dec. 21, 2006.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff then told Gorr and Morgan that he had not driven the car and that a friend named “Mark” had driven him to the Wal-Mart. (Suppression Order 3; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 25; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15; Morgan Aff. ¶ 10.) Gorr asked Morgan to enter the Wal-Mart and page Mark. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 25; Morgan Aff. ¶ 11.) According to Morgan, Mark was paged twice by store personnel and never appeared. (Morgan Aff. ¶¶ 12-13.) According to Gorr, Plaintiff then used his cell phone to call his then-fiancee Dina Tomlinson (“Tomlinson”), who was listed as the owner of the car. Gorr claims that he asked to speak with Tomlinson and she informed Gorr that Plaintiff had been alone in the car when he left her. (Suppression Order 3; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 26-27; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15.) Gorr and Plaintiff then went into the Wal-Mart and Plaintiff stayed with Morgan while Gorr entered the store’s security office to watch surveillance videos of the parking lot. Suppression Order 3. According to Gorr, the surveillance videos showed Plaintiff parking the vehicle and walking into the Wal-Mart store alone. (Suppression Order 3; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 28; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15.) Gorr then arrested Plaintiff for driving with a suspended license and for possession of a forged instrument (the credit card). (Suppression Order 3; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 30; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was searched and several items including papers, an activation slip, shopping cards, gift cards, and credit cards were found on his person. (Suppression Order 3^4; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 31; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15; Suppression Hr’g Tr. 27:3-31:8, Dec. 21, 2006.) Tomlinson arrived to claim her car and denied ownership of the items in the car. She granted Gorr her written consent to search the car and pursuant to the search, Gorr found two laptops (one that was turned on and the one that had just been purchased and placed in the trunk), a phone, and various documents and receipts. (Suppression Order 4; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 32-33; Gorr Aff. ¶ 15; Suppression Hr’g Tr. 33:3-37:2, Dec. 21,2006.) Plaintiff, however, presents a very different version of the events leading up to his arrest. According to Plaintiff, the Wal-Mart parking lot encounter with Detective Gorr began at approximately 2:00 pm on October 26, 2005. (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to [Indiv.] Defs.’ Mot. For Summ. J. (“PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs.”) ¶ 11.) Gorr approached Plaintiff, identified himself, and asked Plaintiff to produce identification. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff then handed Gorr his Department of Motor Vehicles-issued identification card. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Gorr then demanded that Plaintiff empty his pockets, which Plaintiff refused to do, and that Plaintiff asked for his identification back. (Id.) When Gorr allegedly refused to return Plaintiffs identification, Plaintiff claims that he attempted to walk away from Gorr and leave the parking lot. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Gorr then grabbed him, struck him in the chest, and refused to let him leave. (Id) Gorr then allegedly removed all the property from Plaintiffs pockets, including six credit cards, and asked Plaintiff which card he had attempted to use in the Wal-Mart. (Id) Plaintiff claims he refused to answer Gorr, who asked Morgan to “hold” Plaintiff while Gorr entered the Wal-Mart alone. (Id) Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, Gorr returned to the parking lot and told Plaintiff that his driver’s license was suspended. (Id) Plaintiff claims that he denied driving to the Wal-Mart, and that Morgan continued to hold Plaintiff while Gorr again went back into the Wal-Mart for approximately 20 minutes. (Id) Plaintiff claims that when Gorr returned, he placed Plaintiff under arrest for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. (Id) Gorr denies hitting Plaintiff in the chest (Gorr Aff. ¶ 9), and claims that he did not touch Plaintiff other than when he arrested Plaintiff, (Suppression Hr’g Tr. 61:12— 15, Dec. 21, 2006). Gorr also claims that Plaintiff never said he wanted to leave and that Gorr never told Plaintiff that he was not free to leave before he was arrested. (Suppression Hr’g Tr. 60:4-11, 61:8-18, 65:3-23, Dec. 21,2006.) After Plaintiffs arrest, Detective Starner prepared a search warrant application for Plaintiffs residence, which was granted by Judge Ledina. (Suppression Order 4; Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 34-35; Starner Aff. ¶¶ 13-15.) A search of Plaintiffs residence pursuant to that warrant produced “substantial evidence of credit card forgery,” including blank credit cards, a device for cloning credit cards, a computer with credit card information for other people, a number of fake driver’s licenses from other states, and sheets of paper with credit card numbers from USAA Bank. (Starner Aff. ¶ 17.) 2. Plaintiffs Criminal Proceedings Plaintiff was charged on January 11, 2006 in a twenty-nine count indictment, which included thirteen counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, seven counts of unlawful possession of personal identification information in the second degree, one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree, one count of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, two counts of identity theft in the third degree, three counts of identity theft in the second degree, one count of scheme to defraud in the first degree, and one count of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 37; People v. Hayes, Indictment No. 13-2006, 1-2 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct. Oct. 24, 2006) (“Hayes Order (Oct. 24, 2006)”).) Plaintiffs criminal case was assigned to Judge Ledina, in the Sullivan County Court. Plaintiff was represented by private counsel, Mr. Deveraux L. Cannick, during his criminal proceedings. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 38.) On August 25, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel filed an omnibus motion with the County Court seeking to have the indictment dismissed and seeking several pre-trial hearings. (Id. ¶ 39; Hayes Order 2 (Oct. 24, 2006).) On October 24, 2006, Judge Ledina dismissed several counts of the indictment, scheduled a Mapp/Dunaway hearing for the possible suppression of seized evidence, and scheduled a Huntley hearing for the possible suppression of post-arrest statements (“suppression hearing”). (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 40; Hayes Order 5-7 (Oct. 24, 2006).) The suppression hearing was held on December 21, 2006 and January 9, 2007. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 41.) Gorr, Starner, and Morgan testified at the suppression hearing on December 21, 2006, while Plaintiff called one witness, Tressa Evans, to testify on January 9, 2007. Mr. Cannick, Plaintiffs counsel, had the opportunity to cross examine Gorr, Starner, and Morgan. (Suppression Hr’g Tr., Dec. 21, 2006.) On January 31, 2007, Mr. Cannick submitted an affirmation in support of the suppression motion, arguing that Plaintiff “was arrested without probable cause and all items seized from him subsequent to that illegal arrest must be suppressed as ‘fruits of the poisonous tree.’ ” (Affirmation in Supp. of Suppression Mot., unnumbered page 1 (Jan. 31, 2007).) Mr. Cannick highlighted alleged discrepancies in the testimony of Gorr, Starner and Morgan, and argued that contrary to Gorr’s testimony, the Wal-Mart video clips did not show Plaintiff driving the car. (Id. at unnumbered pages 1-3.) He also argued for the suppression of Plaintiffs post-arrest statements (id. at unnumbered page 1), but did not challenge the validity of the search warrant used to search Plaintiffs residence. On February 9, 2007, Judge Ledina denied Plaintiffs motion to suppress and held that Detective Gorr had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on October 26, 2005. Suppression Order 2, 7-8. Judge Ledina found: The defendant argues that there was no probable cause for the arrest, and that the seized evidence incidental thereto must be suppressed. He maintains that there was no probable cause for the arrest for unlicensed operation because Detective Gorr had never seen him driving, either directly, or in the store video tapes. However, prior to the arrest for unlicensed operation, Detective Gorr had observed Defendant put purchases in the car and walk up to and open the driver’s door. The defendant’s story about having been driven to the store by Mark proved to be disingenuous. Mark never appeared, and Dina Tomlinson, the owner of the car, informed Detective Gorr that the defendant had left her alone in her vehicle. Finally, the WalMart video showed an individual wearing a dark jacket with a distinctive white stripe on the sleeve exit the car, and no one else. The defendant .was wearing a dark jacket with a white stripe on the sleeve. There is thus more than ample probable cause to have arrested defendant for operating a vehicle with a suspended license. There was also ample probable cause to have arrested the defendant on the charge of possession of a forged credit card. The initial call from the store security department indicated that a card bearing the name of Earl Hayes had been rejected. The defendant was identified as having attempted to use the card in question, and admitted such use when questioned. He showed the detective the card with “Earl Hayes” named on the front as the cardholder, but the store printout showed that the card had been issued to one Joblanski Samuels. Suppression Order 4-5. Judge Ledina thus ruled that all of the items seized from Plaintiffs person and from Tomlinson’s vehicle would be admissible at trial, as would Plaintiffs pre- and post-arrest statements. Suppression Order 6-8. Judge Ledina also ruled that although Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the search warrant used to search his home, to the extent that the issue was raised at the suppression hearing, “defendant has not presented any evidence showing that the warrant was improperly issued or executed,” and thus “the evidence seized thereunder is admissible.” Suppression Order 9. On March 2, 2007, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to three counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, one count of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, one count of a scheme to defraud, and one count of identity theft in the second degree. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶45; Plea Tr. 6:8-7:11, 26:5-27:24, Mar. 2, 2007.) This plea was entered into by Plaintiff in full satisfaction of the indictment and with the understanding that Plaintiff would be sentenced to imprisonment for five and a half to eleven years. (Plea Tr. 2:10-19.) As part of the plea agreement, and in consideration for the dismissal of the other eighteen counts of the indictment, Plaintiff agreed to waive his right to appeal. (Id. at 2:20-4:8.) At the plea colloquy, Judge Ledina informed Plaintiff of the constitutional rights that he would be foregoing by pleading guilty, and confirmed that Plaintiff understood the implications of his guilty plea. (Id. at 7:8-13:9.) Specifically, Judge Ledina informed Plaintiff that he would be giving up his right “to challenge the conduct of police officers in connection with obtaining evidence” (id. at 11:12-16), would be giving up the right to appeal his conviction to a higher court (id. at 11:17-12:18), and would “be foreclosed forever from complaining of any errors that might have occurred from the date of the crime involved right through to the time of sentencing,” (id. at 12:19-13:1). Plaintiff indicated that he understood Judge Ledina and was entering into the plea agreement and waiver of right to appeal of his own free will. (Id. at 10:4-13:9.) After having Plaintiff describe, in his own words, what he had done in relation to each count to which he was pleading guilty, Judge Ledina accepted Plaintiffs guilty plea. (Id. at 13:10-31:17.) On April 25, 2007, the date set for sentencing, Plaintiff submitted a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 49; People v. Hayes, Indictment No. 13-2006, 1-2 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct. Aug. 17, 2007) (“Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Pled”).) Plaintiff claimed that his counsel was ineffective for his handling of the suppression hearing, so Judge Ledina allowed Mr. Cannick to withdraw as counsel. Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Plea 2. The court assigned another attorney, Ms. Donna Lasher, to assist Plaintiff in preparing his reply to the District Attorney’s response to his motion. (Indiv. Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 49; Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Plea 2.) Judge Ledina found that Plaintiffs claims against Mr. Cannick were “based for the most part on [Plaintiffs] unsupported allegations of events that were gone into and determined against him at the suppression hearing,” and that nevertheless at the plea hearing, Plaintiff swore that he had discussed the plea with counsel and was satisfied with his counsel’s services. Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Plea 4. Judge Ledina also found significant that “during the plea colloquy, [Plaintiff] specifically waived his right to challenge the conduct of the police in collecting evidence against him,” admitted his guilt, and at no time since then, had he claimed innocence. Id. at 4-5. “Rather, [Plaintiff] ... argued that he might have a defense of illegal search and seizure.” Id. at 5. Judge Ledina denied Plaintiffs motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding nothing in the record to indicate that counsel was ineffective in connection with the plea process. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff was sentenced before Judge Ledina on August 28, 2007. (Sentencing Tr., Aug. 28, 2007.) At the sentencing, during which Plaintiff was represented by Ms. Lasher, Plaintiff accused Gorr of having committed perjury at the suppression hearing (id. at 12:22-13:23, 15:8-17), accused the prosecutor, Mr. James R. Farrell, and Judge Ledina of taking no action regarding Gorr’s alleged perjury (id. at 15:18-16:21), and accused Mr. Cannick of lying and not carrying out his responsibilities as a defense attorney, (id. at 16:22-27:20). Judge Ledina, having already denied Plaintiffs motion to withdraw his guilty plea, sentenced Plaintiff to a term of imprisonment of five and half to eleven years, in accordance with the negotiated plea bargain and sentencing agreement. (Id. at 33:5-8.) On October 16, 2007, Plaintiff moved pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 (§ 440.10) to vacate his judgment of conviction, claiming fraud and ineffective assistance of counsel. Judge Ledina ruled that § 440.10(l)(b), which requires a judgment to be vacated where it was “procured by duress, misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the court or a prosecutor,” was inapplicable because Plaintiff provided no evidence of such duress, misrepresentation, or fraud. People v. Hayes, Indictment No. 13-2006, 2 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct. Jan. 9, 2008) (“Order Denying § 440.10 Motion”). Judge Ledina also noted that Plaintiff had waived his right to challenge the result of the suppression hearing, that such a right is waivable, and that it was “knowingly and voluntarily” waived. Id. at 5. Regarding Plaintiffs ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Judge Ledina ruled that Plaintiff had previously raised, and the court had previously denied, the same arguments in Plaintiffs motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 2-4. Therefore, because “the record clearly indicates that there was no ineffectiveness of counsel connected with the plea process,” and because Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge the actions of police with respect to their obtaining evidence, Judge Ledina denied Plaintiffs § 440.10 motion. Id. at 4-5. On January 9, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Judge Ledina recuse himself from deciding his § 440.10 motion and that the action be transferred to the Bronx or New York County Supreme Court, and, on January 28, 2008, Plaintiff moved to reargue/renew the court’s denial of his § 440.10 motion. Judge Ledina addressed both motions in an order dated April 2, 2008. Judge Ledina declined to recuse himself or transfer the case, finding that there had been neither impropriety nor the appearance of impropriety in any of the court’s rulings. People v. Hayes, Indictment No. 13-2006, 4 (N.Y. Cnty.Ct. Apr. 2, 2008) (“Order Denying Recusal/Reconsideration”). “That some rulings were made against [Plaintiff] does not show that the Court was partial, the rulings having been made on the basis of applicable law and procedure.” Id. at 3-4. Judge Ledina then denied Plaintiffs motion for reargument/renewal of his § 440.10 motion as without merit, as Plaintiff made the same arguments he had previously made, and there was “no showing that the Court misapprehended the law or misapplied the facts in its prior decision.” Id. at 4-5. On December 5, 2008, Plaintiff again moved the County Court under § 440.10, alleging that the prosecution presented false testimony at the suppression hearing. Plaintiff also asked the court again to recuse. Judge Ledina denied both requests in an Order dated April 8, 2009. Judge Ledina again highlighted, as he had at length in the first § 440.10 decision, that Plaintiff knowingly waived his right to appeal, which included all grounds for appeal that could be validly waived. People v. Hayes, Indictment No. 13-2006, 3 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct. Apr. 8, 2009) (“Second Order Denying § 440.10 Motion”). Plaintiffs waiver of rights included the waiver of the right to challenge his conviction under § 440.10, and also the waiver of the right to challenge the outcome of the suppression hearing. Id. Judge Ledina also rejected Plaintiffs ineffective assistance of counsel argument for the same reasons he had rejected it previously in denying Plaintiffs motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Plaintiffs initial § 440.10 motion, and Plaintiffs motion for reargument of the denial of his initial § 440.10 motion. Id. at 3-4. Although Plaintiff had waived his right to appeal, he filed an appeal with the Appellate Division challenging the County Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his sentencing on August 28, 2007. People v. Hayes, 71 A.D.3d 1187, 896 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2010). The Appellate Division held that “[a]s a result of his knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal, [Plaintiff] has given up his right to challenge the County Court’s ruling on his suppression motion.” Id. at 227 (citations omitted). The court found no support in the record for Plaintiffs contention that the waiver was the result of coercion, “particularly considering the court’s thorough colloquy and [Plaintiffs] affirmative statements that he had discussed the waiver with counsel and that he agreed to it of his own free will.” Id. The Appellate Division also rejected Plaintiffs ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding that the record before it indicated that he had received “meaningful representation.” Id. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment below. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal the judgment of the Appellate Division to the New York Court of Appeals several times. The New York Court of Appeals denied him leave to appeal on September 3, 2010, People v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.3d 852, 909 N.Y.S.2d 29, 935 N.E.2d 821 (Table) (N.Y.2010), November 30, 2010, People v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.3d 921, 913 N.Y.S.2d 647, 939 N.E.2d 813 (Table) (N.Y.2010), and August 19, 2011, People v. Hayes, 17 N.Y.3d 817, 929 N.Y.S.2d 805, 954 N.E.2d 96 (Table) (N.Y.2011). S. Sullivan County Jail a. Plaintiffs Complaint About Gorr Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Sullivan County Jail from October 27, 2005 until August 31, 2007, when he was transferred to the Downstate Correctional Facility after his August 28, 2007 sentencing. (Aff. of Col. Harold L. Smith, Jr. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs.”) ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claims that when he arrived at the Sullivan County Jail on October 26, 2005, he told an unidentified officer that he had been assaulted by Detective Gorr and wanted to file a formal complaint and press an assault charge. (Compl., Hayes v. Gorr, No. 09-CV-2071 (“Gorr Compl.”) ¶ 15.) Plaintiff claims he was ignored and placed in a holding cell. (Id. ¶ 16.) According to Plaintiff, on October 27, 2005, after he began experiencing sharp pains in his chest, broke out in a cold sweat, and had numbness in his extremities, he was taken to the Catskill Regional Medical Center in Harris, New York. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20; PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. Ex. 10, at 2 (U.S. Secret Serv. Notification of State Arrest).) On October 28, 2005, Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and returned to the Sullivan County Jail. (Gorr Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff claims that he spoke to several individuals at the Sullivan County Jail, including Defendants Corporal Gardner and Colonel Smith, about filing a complaint and an assault charge against Gorr. (Id. ¶¶ 25-34, 43-47.) Colonel Smith is the Jail Administrator of the Sullivan County Jail and has served in that capacity since January 2005. (Aff. of Col. Harold Smith, Jr. (“Smith Aff. Cnty. Defs.”) ¶ 1.) Corporal Gardner was assigned to the Sullivan County Jail at the time of Plaintiffs incarceration. (Aff. of Harry Gardner in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Gardner Aff.”) ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2005, Corporal Gardner told Plaintiff that he would notify the appropriate individuals regarding Plaintiffs complaint, and on October 29, Gardner told Plaintiff that he would follow up on the matter. (Gorr Compl. ¶¶ 31-34; Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff also sent a letter to the Sullivan County District Attorney on November 6, 2005, informing him of Gorr’s alleged assault of Plaintiff and stating that he wanted to file an assault charge against Gorr. (Gorr Compl. ¶ 35; Defs.’ Resp. to R. 26 Disc. Demand 2, Ex. A (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 33).) Plaintiff also claims that he wrote a letter to Defendant Smith in early November 2005, informing him of the “physical assault” he had “been subjected to” by Gorr, and of Plaintiffs desire to file administrative and criminal complaints against Gorr. (Gorr Compl. ¶ 43; Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff claims that Smith acknowledged receiving the letter and assured Plaintiff that the matter would be handled soon. (Gorr Compl. ¶¶ 44-46; Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff claims that no one ever contacted him about the charges he wished to file against Gorr. (Gorr Compl. ¶ 47.) b. Sullivan County Jail Law Library Plaintiff also raises several complaints about the law library at the Sullivan County Jail. For example, Plaintiff asserts that the law library at the Sullivan County Jail was inadequate and that Plaintiff was sometimes denied access to the law library. (Gorr Compl. ¶¶ 53-70; Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶¶ 16, 20, 25.) He also claims that he was denied access to federal jurisprudence, including Supreme Court authority (PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to In-div. Defs. ¶ 16), and that the law library consisted only of volumes of the New York Supplement, Second Series, updated through 1993, as well as á few volumes of McKinney’s Consolidated Laws, (PL’s Aff. in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to Cnty. Defs.”) ¶ 10). He also claims that he was denied access to legal reference materials housed at the Hamilton O’Dell Library at the Sullivan County Courthouse. (PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 20.) The New York State Commission of Corrections details minimum standards (“NYS Minimum Standards”) with which correctional facility law libraries must comply, which are set out in Part 7031 of Title 9 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York. (Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs. ¶ 16; N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 9, § 7031.) The NYS Minimum Standards §§ 7031.4(b) and (d) detail certain reference materials which must maintained within the facility and made available to inmates. (Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. Ex. A.) Section 7031.4(e) lists reference materials to which inmates must have access, but pursuant to § 7031.4(f), these materials are not required to be kept within the facility. (Id.) To comply with the requirements of § 7031, the Sullivan County Jail adopted a Standard Operating Procedure. (Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. ¶ 5, Ex. B.) The Standard Operating Procedure provides that inmates must be provided access to current legal materials, as set forth in § 7031.4 of the NYS Minimum Standards, that no more than four inmates may occupy the law library at any given time, that inmates may request legal materials to be made available to them in their housing units, and that the administrator shall comply with reasonable requests to photocopy legal reference materials, to be borne at the facility’s expense. (Id.) According to Smith, during Plaintiffs incarceration, the Sullivan County Jail law library contained all the required materials set out in the New York State Commission of Corrections NYS Minimum Standards § 7031.4. (Smith Aff. Cnty. Defs. ¶ 6; Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs. ¶ 19.) In fact, according to Smith, the New York State Commission of Corrections in Albany conducted two reviews of the Sullivan County Jail during Plaintiffs incarceration at the jail and on both occasions found the facility in full compliance with the standards set forth in § 7031 for access to legal services. (Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. ¶¶ 10-12, Exs. C, D.) The first review was conducted in January 2006 and the second in November 2006. (Id.) Furthermore, Smith claims that when an inmate requests reference materials that are not required to be available at the jail facility but that must be available to inmates (pursuant to §§ 7031.4(e) and (f)), the reference materials are made available to the inmate through the Hamilton O’Dell Library at the Sullivan County Courthouse. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) To request this reference material, the inmate is required to submit a written request to the Sullivan County Deputy in charge of the jail law library, and the Deputy then makes copies of that material from the Sullivan County Courthouse and provides the copies to the inmate. (Id. ¶ 9, Ex. A.) Plaintiff claims, however, that this process was not followed, and that for the first twenty months that he was incarcerated at the Sullivan County Jail, he had no access to the material in the law library at the Sullivan County Courthouse. (PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to In-div. Defs. ¶ 20; PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to Cnty. Defs. ¶¶ 21-23.) Plaintiff also asserts that he was routinely denied access to the law library, that he often had to choose between attending recreation or going to the law library, and that he submitted several grievances complaining of these problems to the jail administrators. (PL’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 16-17, 20, 25; Gorr Compl. ¶¶ 53-58.) In response to Defendants’ interrogatories, Plaintiff produced several grievances which he claims he filed between September 5, 2006 and August 6, 2007, complaining of being denied access to the law library. (Aff. of Michael Davidoff, Esq. (“Davidoff Aff.”) Ex. F (PL’s Answers to Interrogs.).) According to Smith, whenever a grievance is submitted and received by the Sullivan County Jail, it is signed by a deputy and is assigned a number. (Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs. ¶¶ 46^17.) The grievances which Smith claims were never received by the jail are not signed by a deputy and have no grievance number assigned. (Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. ¶ 32; Davidoff Aff. Ex. F (PL’s Answers to Interrogs.: Grievance dated Sept. 5, 2006; Grievance dated Dec. 31, 2006; Grievance dated Apr. 25, 2006; Grievance undated; Grievance dated Aug. 6, 2007; Grievance dated May 28, 2007).) Smith claims the jail received a grievance from Plaintiff regarding his use of the law library on January 29, 2007 (Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. ¶ 24, Ex. I), and two such grievances on August 13, 2007, which were dated August 6, 2007, (id. ¶¶ 26-30, Exs. J, L). Each of these was resolved. (Id ¶¶ 23-31.) The Sullivan County Jail maintains logs of an inmate’s activity, including what times the inmate spends at recreation and in the law library. (Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs. ¶24.) Smith reviewed those logs and prepared an analysis of the dates and times which Plaintiff spent at recreation and at the law library during his incarceration at the jail. (Id. ¶ 26; Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. Ex. G.) Smith’s analysis shows that during the 673 days which Plaintiff was an inmate at the Sullivan County Jail, there were 51 occasions where there was some overlap between the time Plaintiffs cell block was called for recreation and the time he was allotted to go to the law library. (Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs. ¶ 36; Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. Ex. G.) However, the record also reveals that on 244 occasions, Plaintiff chose not to attend recreation where there was no scheduling conflict between Plaintiffs recreation and library time. (Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. Ex. G.) Furthermore, the analysis shows that Plaintiff visited the law library on 345 out of the 673 days he was incarcerated and spent over 500 hours in the law library while he was an inmate at the Sullivan County Jail. (Smith Aff., Indiv. Defs. ¶ 37; Smith Aff., Cnty. Defs. Ex. G.) c. Plaintiff’s Allegation of Scalding Plaintiff has also alleged that he was scalded by hot water in the shower at the Sullivan County Jail in early June 2006. (Am. Compl., Hayes v. Cnty. of Sullivan, No. 07-CV-7667 (“Cnty. of Sullivan Am. Compl.”) 6; Gorr Compl. ¶¶ 48-52.) However, because Plaintiff does not address this claim in either of his affidavits in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the Court deems him to have abandoned the claim. See Ahmad v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 09-CV-3134, 2011 WL 7080691, at *3 n. 9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) (deeming pro se plaintiffs claims abandoned when he did not address those claims in his opposition to summary judgment and where there was no basis for the claims in the record), adopted by 2012 WL 194965 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012); Smith v. N.Y.C Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-9256, 2011 WL 5118797, at *6 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2011) (finding that pro se plaintiff abandoned claims he did not address in his opposition to summary judgment); Lipton v. Cnty. of Orange, 315 F.Supp.2d 434, 446 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (noting that courts “may, and generally will, deem a claim abandoned when a plaintiff fails to respond to a defendant’s arguments that the claim should be dismissed”). B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in Hayes v. County of Sullivan, No. 07-CV-7667 (“County of Sullivan”) with the Pro Se Clerk’s Office on June 6, 2007, naming the County of Sullivan and the Sullivan County Jail as defendants. By Order of Chief Judge Kimba M. Wood, dated August 28, 2007, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint within sixty days. (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 3.) Chief Judge Wood also dismissed Plaintiffs claims against the Sullivan County Jail. (Id.) On December 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint with the Pro Se Clerk’s Office (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 8), and on April 2, 2008, Chief Judge Wood entered an order directing the Clerk of the Court to file Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and effect service on the County of Sullivan, the only remaining defendant, (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 6). The case was initially assigned to Judge Victor Marrero and was reassigned to this Court on April 10, 2008. (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. Nos. 7,10.) On June 26, 2008, Defendant County of Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss. (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 14.) Plaintiff filed an application to stay the motion to dismiss, which was reviewed and denied by Magistrate Judge Lisa Smith on August 12, 2008. (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 17.) Magistrate Judge Smith then directed Plaintiff to submit a formal application to file a Second Amended Complaint. (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 17.) On October 10, 2008, Plaintiff filed a second action, Hayes v. Gorr, No. 09-CV-2071 (“Gorr”), with the Pro Se Clerk’s Office. This Court accepted Gorr as related to County of Sullivan and the case was assigned to this Court on March 6, 2009. (No. 09-CV-2071, Dkt. No. 3.) On March 26, 2009, the Court issued an Order consolidating Gorr and County of Sullivan, denying County Defendant’s motion to dismiss County of Sullivan without prejudice, and denying Plaintiffs application to file a Second Amended Complaint in County of Sullivan. (No. 07-CV-7677, Dkt. No. 24.) County Defendants filed their Answers on May 13, 2009 (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. Nos.25, 26), and Individual Defendants filed their Answer on June 4, 2009, (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 27). On July 27, 2011, County Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 58), which was fully submitted on August 25, 2011, (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 76). Individual Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on July 29, 2011 (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 67), which was fully submitted on October 6, 2011, (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 82). On July 29, 2011, Individual Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss Cole as a Defendant (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 65), which Plaintiff does not oppose, (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 3). II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Summary judgment may be granted where it is shown “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (same). “When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dall. Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir.2003); see also Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 85 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. CSX Lines, L.L.C, 432 F.3d 428, 433 (2d Cir.2005). “When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim. In that event, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also McPherson v. N.Y.C Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 n. 4 (2d Cir.2006) (“[Speculation alone is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). “A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). At summary judgment, a court is not charged with weighing the evidence and determining its truth, but with determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 735 F.Supp. 1205, 1212 (S.D.N.Y.1990). A court’s goal should be “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes Plaintiffs pleadings liberally and interprets them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006); see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”). B. Analysis Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeks to hold County Defendants and the various Individual Defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As against Detective Gorr, Plaintiff claims that Gorr assaulted him in the Wal-Mart Parking lot, unlawfully seized and searched Plaintiff without probable cause, unlawfully directed Deputy Morgan to arrest Plaintiff, and committed perjury at Plaintiffs suppression hearing. (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff claims that Deputy Morgan held and arrested him without probable cause and committed perjury at Plaintiffs suppression hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Detective Starner searched the files on Plaintiffs laptop without first obtaining a search warrant, willfully made false statements in the search warrant application which was used to obtain a warrant to search Plaintiffs home, and committed perjury at Plaintiff’s suppression hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Ledina, the prosecutor, Mr. James R. Farrell, and Plaintiffs former attorney, Mr. Deveraux Cannick, were involved in a conspiracy with Individual Defendants Gorr, Starner, and Morgan to doctor evidence, suborn perjury, and deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶¶ 6-9.) Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated by Colonel Smith and Corporal Gardner because they allegedly failed to take action when Plaintiff informed them that he wished to file a complaint against Detective Gorr. (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 25.) As against Smith, Plaintiff also claims that he manifested a deliberate indifference to the many complaints which Plaintiff brought to his attention, including Plaintiffs complaints regarding the condition of and his access to the Sullivan County Jail law library, and that he violated Plaintiffs right of access to the courts by failing to implement a policy to ensure that Plaintiff had access to legal material. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to hold County Defendants liable for the actions of Individual Defendants. 1. Individual Defendants a. Claims against Gorr, Morgan and Starner Arising from Plaintiff’s Arrest and Suppression Hearing i. Perjury Claims Plaintiff claims that Gorr lied at Plaintiffs suppression hearing when he testified that he watched the Wal-Mart surveillance videos prior to Plaintiffs arrest (Letter from Earl Hayes (“Hayes”) to Michael Davidoff, Esq. (“Davidoff’) and Samuel S. Yasgur, Esq. (‘Yasgur”), unnumbered page 2 (Aug. 12, 2010)), and that he lied as to the contents of the videos, namely that the first video showed an individual with a dark jacket with a white stripe exiting the vehicle that Plaintiff was allegedly driving, and that the videos were date and time stamped, (Examination Before Trial of Earl Hayes (“Hayes Dep.”) 19:4-19, 22:18-23:18). Plaintiff further claims that Gorr lied about the entire encounter with Plaintiff in the Wal-Mart parking lot. (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff claims that Starner committed perjury at Plaintiffs suppression hearing “to conceal the misconduct” of his fellow officers (Gorr Compl. ¶ 92; Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 25), and that Morgan also committed perjury during the suppression hearing, (Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 25). Plaintiffs claims against Gorr, Morgan, and Starner for allegedly committing perjury at Plaintiffs suppression hearing are barred as a matter of law by the Second Circuit’s decision in Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.1988), where the Second Circuit held that “police officers who testify at adversarial pretrial proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity from liability based on that testimony.” Id. at 76; see also Khorrami v. Rolince, 539 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that law enforcement officials who testify at pretrial proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity); Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1987) (same); cf. Briscoe v. La-Hue, 460 U.S. 325, 328 n. 5, 345, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding that police officers who commit perjury during criminal trials are entitled to absolute immunity, but not reaching the question of immunity at pre-trial proceedings). Suppression hearings are adversarial pretrial proceedings, Daloia, 849 F.2d at 75, and thus Gorr and Starner are absolutely immune from any liability based on the testimony they provided at Plaintiffs suppression hearing. Therefore, Summary Judgment is granted to Defendants Gorr, Morgan and Starner for Plaintiffs claims of perjury. ii. Conspiracy Claims Plaintiff claims that Gorr, Morgan, and Starner were involved in a conspiracy, along with Judge Ledina, Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Cannick, to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and to obtain a conviction. (Letter from Hayes to Davidoff and Yasgur, unnumbered page 3 (Aug. 12, 2010); Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶8.) “To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999). Plaintiff has not demonstrated any facts in the record which could plausibly make out the elements of a conspiracy between Gorr, Morgan, Starner, Judge Ledina, Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Cannick. Plaintiff claims that there was a conspiracy because “the evidence clearly establishes that they were all on the same page” as far as falsifying the evidence against Plaintiff and accepting the officers’ allegedly perjured testimony. (Letter from Hayes to Davidoff and Yasgur, unnumbered page 3 (Aug. 12, 2010).) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that “[t]hey [Judge Ledina, Mr. Cannick, and Mr. Farrell] ignored the perjured testimony, and the implication being that there was a conspiracy.” (Hayes Dep. 37:19-21.) In short, this amorphous and circular assertion proves nothing and, indeed, assumes the testifying officers committed perjury at all, something Plaintiff has failed to prove and something which Judge Ledina found to not have happened. And, that Judge Ledina reached this conclusion does not prove a conspiracy. Thus, Plaintiff has done no more than make “conclusory, vague [and] general” allegations, as there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs claim that Gorr, Starner, Morgan, Cannick, Farrell, and Judge Ledina were involved in a conspiracy to violate his rights. See Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir.2011) (holding that plaintiffs allegations of conspiracy were “baseless” where plaintiff “offer[ed] not a single fact to corroborate her allegation of a ‘meeting of the minds’ among the coeonspirators”); Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir.2002) (“[C]omplaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed .... ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Hi Unlawful Search and False Arrest Claims Plaintiffs claims that Gorr and Morgan searched and arrested him unlawfully are barred by collateral estoppel, and Plaintiffs claim that Starner illegally searched Plaintiffs computer and made a false statement in his search warrant application is barred by res judicata. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 745 F.Supp.2d 150, 168 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 446 Fed.Appx. 360 (2d Cir.2011); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir.2010) (“Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). State court judgments must be given the same preclusive effect in federal court as they would be given in courts of the state itself, and therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel may “bar a plaintiff from bringing an action in federal court pursuant to [] § 1983, if the plaintiff would be precluded from litigating his claim in a New York State court.” Allison v. Farrell, No. 97-CV-2247, 2002 WL 88380, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373, 116 S.Ct. 873, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996) (“The Full Faith and Credit Act mandates that the ‘judicial proceedings’ of any State ‘shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.’ The Act thus directs all courts to treat a state court judgment with the same respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering state.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738)). In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), the Supreme Court held that federal courts should apply preclusion principles to § 1983 actions seeking to vindicate constitutional rights that were previously decided in state court criminal proceedings. See id. at 104, 101 S.Ct. 411. As the Supreme Court noted, “nothing in the legislative history of § 1983 reveals any purpose to afford less deference to judgments in state criminal proceedings than to those in state civil proceedings.” Id. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, there is “no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.” Id. The inquiry is governed by state law, and “[u]nder New York law, collateral estoppel will preclude a federal court from deciding an issue if (1) the issue in question was actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding.” McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Swiatkowski, 745 F.Supp.2d at 168 (same). Here, Plaintiff challenged the probable cause for his arrest and the search of his person during his criminal proceedings in Sullivan County Court. Judge Ledina held a two-day suppression hearing, where Plaintiff was represented by counsel who had a full and fair opportunity to cross examine Gorr, Starner, and Morgan. Furthermore, after the suppression hearing, Plaintiffs counsel submitted an affirmation in support of Plaintiff s suppression motion making the same exact arguments that Plaintiff makes before this court — namely that Gorr and Morgan lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, that the search of Plaintiff was conducted without probable cause, and that the testimony of Gorr, Starner, and Morgan at the suppression hearing was inconsistent and not credible. (Affirmation in Supp. of Suppression Mot., unnumbered pages 1-3 (Jan. 31, 2007).) Judge Ledina denied Plaintiffs motion to suppress in a written order, holding that Gorr and Morgan had probable cause to arrest and search him. Suppression Order 2. Plaintiff subsequently pleaded guilty and pursuant to his guilty plea waived his right to appeal as well as his right “to challenge the conduct of police officers in connection with obtaining evidence,” and acknowledged that he would “be foreclosed forever from complaining of any errors that might have occurred from the date of the crime involved right through the time of sentencing.” (Plea Tr. 11:12-13:1, Mar. 2, 2007.) Even though Plaintiff waived his right to appeal, an appeal of his guilty plea was heard by the Appellate Division, which affirmed that Plaintiff received meaningful representation in connection with his guilty plea, and that his waiver of the right to appeal was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See People v. Hayes, 71 A.D.3d 1187, 896 N.Y.S.2d 225, 227 (2010). “Settled authority establishes that where, as here, a state court has determined that the ... warrantless [search or] seizure was supported by probable cause, the defendant may not relitigate that determination in a federal Section 1983 action.” DeFranco v. Town of Irondequoit, No. 06-CV-6442, 2009 WL 2957813, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs who pled guilty after their motion to suppress evidence was denied were barred by collateral estoppel from re-litigating their Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983); see also Allen, 449 U.S. at 103-05, 101 S.Ct. 411 (holding that collateral estoppel applied to § 1983 claims and remanding ease for a determination of whether state collateral estoppel law barred plaintiff from proceeding on § 1983 claim for unlawful search and seizure when he had lost suppression hearing in state court); Reyes v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-1838, 2012 WL 37544, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2012) (applying collateral estoppel to dismiss § 1983 action where “plaintiff previously challenged his arrest in a pretrial motion in state court, arguing the police lacked probable cause to arrest”); Mitchell v. Hartnett, 262 F.Supp.2d 153, 155 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (holding that plaintiff who unsuccessfully challenged the lawfulness of his arrest at suppression hearing was barred by collateral estoppel from raising the same argument in a § 1983 action); Perlleshi v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 98-CV-6927, 2000 WL 554294, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2000) (“[W]here a claimant has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment issue in state court, the federal court should award the state court’s findings preclusive effect in accordance with that state’s preclusion doctrine.”); Brown v. De Fillipis, 717 F.Supp. 172, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that collateral estoppel barred plaintiffs § 1983 claim where plaintiff challenged his arrest in a suppression hearing, pled guilty before trial, and guilty plea was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division). Plaintiff claims that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court “because the Court manifested a bias for the [s]tate against [Plaintiff], as demonstrated by its failure to act upon Detective Gorr’s palpably false suppression hearing testimony .... ” (Letter from Hayes to the Court, unnumbered page 1 (Oct. 11, 2011) (No. 07-CV-7667, Dkt. No. 85); Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n to Indiv. Defs. ¶ 9.) However, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy and bias are unsupported by any evidence in the record and are utterly without merit. Moreover, despite waiving his right to appeal and challenge the conduct of the officers on the day of his arrest, Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, three § 440.10 motions to vacate his conviction, has had an appeal heard by the Appellate Division, and has submitted three applications to the New York Court of Appeals seeking leave to appeal. No decision of any state court has raised even the slightest doubt about the integrity of the lower court proceedings in Plaintiffs criminal case. That does not demonstrate bias against Plaintiff; rather, it establishes that Plaintiffs assertions are baseless. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims that he was searched and arrested without probable cause are precluded by collateral estoppel. In addition to being barred by collateral estoppel, Plaintiffs claim that he was arrested without probable cause is also precluded as a matter of law by his guilty plea. The Court construes plaintiffs claim that he was arrested without probable cause as a claim for false arrest. “A § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New York law, a plaintiff claiming false arrest must show “that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification.” Id.; see also Toliver v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-3165, 2011 WL 4964665, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) (“To state a claim for false arrest under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he was intentionally confined, (2) he was conscious of the confinement, (3) he did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not privileged.” (citing Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 67 (2d Cir.2001))). However, probable cause for the arrest is a complete defense to a claim of false arrest, whether the claim is brought under § 1983 or New York law. See Covington, 171 F.3d at 122; see also Frigerio v. United States, No. 10-CV-9086, 2011 WL 3163330, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2011) (“[T]he existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” (citing Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir.2006))); Feurtado v. Gillespie, No. 04-CV-3405, 2005 WL 3088327, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2005) (“A showing of probable cause ... will defeat a false arrest claim as a matter of law as ‘[tjhere can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause.’ ” (quoting Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir.1995))). “When a Section 1983 plaintiff ... pleads guilty to the underlying or a lesser charge, th[is] faet[ ] alone provide[s] sufficient evidence that probable cause existed at the time of the arrest and preclude[s] a false arrest claim under Section 1983.” Feurtado, 2005 WL 3088327, at *4 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 439 Fed.Appx. 38, 39 (2d Cir.2011) (“An independent review of the record confirms that the district court properly granted summary judgment ... with respect to the § 1983 false arrest claims, on the ground that Appellant’s conviction established probable cause for the arrest as a matter of law.” (citing Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 388-89 (2d Cir.1986))); Wang v. Vahldieck, No. 09-CV-3783, 2012 WL 92423, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2012) (“A ‘plaintiff can under no circumstances recover [on a claim for false arrest] if he was convicted of the offense for which he was arrested.’ ” (quoting Cameron, 806 F.2d at 388)); Green v. Gonzalez, No. 09-CV-2636, 2010 WL 5094324, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2010) (“[A] plaintiff can under no circumstances recover [on a claim for false arrest] if he was convicted of the offense for which he w