Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ELLEN LIPTON HOLLANDER, District Judge. Melissa Sager, plaintiff, resides in an apartment that is owned and operated by the Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County (the “Commission” or “HCAAC”), as part of the federal public housing program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq.; 24 C.F.R. ch. IX. She has sued the Commission; its executive director, Clifton Martin; and the Commission’s senior property manager, Diana Flynn, defendants, alleging violations of federal and Maryland law. Count I of the Complaint (ECF 2) alleges violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), Md.Code (2005 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.), §§ 13-101 et seq. of the Commercial Law Article (“C.L.”), which bars “unfair or deceptive trade practices.” C.L. § 13-301. Count II asserts a violation of Md.Code (2010 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.), § 8-208(d)(l) of the Real Property Article (“R.P.”), which prohibits the inclusion in a residential lease of any provision authorizing a confessed judgment against the tenant. Count III claims several violations of the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq., and its implementing federal regulations, governing the operation of public housing. In Count IV, plaintiff alleges discrimination in housing on the basis of disability, in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. And, in Count V, she claims deprivation of due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to the Complaint, “Enforcement of rights conferred by federal law is sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Complaint ¶ 5. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment pronouncing that various practices of defendants are unlawful; damages of $648.36, trebled to $1,945.08, for sums allegedly collected by the Commission under illegal lease provisions; and $10,000 in damages for “emotional distress and mental anguish.” Complaint at 16. Defendants have filed a “Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment” (ECF 8), as well as a supporting memorandum (ECF 8-1) (collectively, “Motion”), to which plaintiff has filed an opposition (ECF 9) and a supporting memorandum (ECF 10) (collectively, “Opposition” or “Opp.”). After the Court directed the parties to address whether the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction (ECF 11), defendants filed a Reply (ECF 12), and, by leave of Court, see Local Rule 105.2(a), plaintiff filed a Surreply (ECF 13). No hearing is necessary to resolve the issues presented. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the Court will not abstain from exercising jurisdiction at this juncture, and defendants’ Motion will be granted in part and denied in part. Background A. The Commission and the Public Housing Program The Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County is a public housing agency (“PHA”) that operates federally subsidized public housing. The Commission is recognized under Maryland state law as a “public body corporate and politic,” pursuant to Md.Code (2006, 2011 Supp.), § 14-102 of the Housing and Community Development Article (“H.C.”), and is the state-designated “housing authority” for Anne Arundel County under Title 12 of the H.C. Article. See H.C. §§ 12-101 et seq. (providing for a housing authority in each political subdivision of Maryland, and establishing requirements for housing authorities generally); H.C. § 14-101 (providing that Title 12 of the H.C. Article applies to the HCAAC); see also Anne Arundel County Code (2005, Dec. 2011 Supp.), §§ 3-4-101 et seq. (authorizing HCAAC to function in the County, under designation of “Housing Authority”); H.C. § 14-101 (recognizing name change of HCAAC from “Authority” to “Commission”). The federal public housing program is authorized by the United States Housing Act of 1937, codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq. Under the public housing program, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) provides operating subsidies to local PHAs, such as the Commission, which own and operate housing for eligible low-income families and individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(6) (defining “public housing agency” for purposes of the public housing program as “any State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality thereof) which is authorized to engage in or assist in the development or operation of public housing”). Tenants of public housing pay their PHAs monthly rent that is substantially below the cost of rental housing in the open market. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a) (establishing income eligibility standards and methods of rent calculation for residents of public housing); 24 C.F.R. part 960 (same). The operation of public housing by PHAs is subject to comprehensive federal regulation. Among other things, federal law dictates much of the content of public housing leases, requiring the inclusion of various provisions and prohibiting other provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(i); 24 C.F.R. part 966, subpart A. In general, PHAs are prohibited from including “unreasonable terms and conditions” in public housing leases. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(Z)(2). Federal law also imposes eligibility requirements, both financial and otherwise, for admission to and continued residence in public housing. See 24 C.F.R. part 960, subparts A & B. Moreover, each PHA is required to promulgate an Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policy, which must set forth the agency’s policies regarding operation of its public housing units, and which must be approved by HUD in the course of its review of the PHA’s Annual Plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-l(d)(3)-(6), (12)-(15); 24 C.F.R. § 903.7(b), (e)-(f), (Z)(n). See also 76 Fed.Reg. 51049, 51050 (Aug. 17, 2011) (“PHAs must develop and keep on file the admission and continued occupancy policies and include this information in their Administrative Plan.”). Leases in public housing are “automatically renewed” on an annual basis, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(Z)(l), and cannot be terminated by a PHA except for “serious or repeated violation of the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause.” Id. § 1437d(Z )(5); see also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(a)(2), (Z )(2). The right of a public housing tenant to remain in his or her housing is “entitled to due process protection.” Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir.1970) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003, 91 S.Ct. 1228, 28 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971); see also Carroll v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n of Montgomery County, 306 Md. 515, 525, 510 A.2d 540, 545 (1986) (holding that resident of public housing “has a right to remain in her townhouse indefinitely until the [PHA] can establish good cause for eviction”). Except in eases of eviction for certain types of dangerous or drug-related criminal activity, federal law requires a PHA that intends to terminate a tenant’s lease to afford the tenant an opportunity for a hearing, pursuant to grievance procedures that each PHA must adopt. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.4(Z)(3), 966.51(a)(2). The grievance procedures apply not only to lease terminations, but also to any other “dispute which a tenant may have with respect to PHA action or failure to act in accordance with the individual tenant’s lease or PHA regulations which adversely affect the individual tenant’s rights, duties, welfare or status.” 24 C.F.R. § 966.53(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k). Federal regulations permit each PHA to craft its own procedures for hearing of grievances within certain parameters, including the requirement that the PHA provide an opportunity for “[i]nformal settlement of grievances,” 24 C.F.R. § 966.54, followed by the opportunity for a more formal hearing, “if the complainant is not satisfied.” Id.-, see 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.55, 966.56, 966.57 (regulations governing procedures for formal hearing of grievances). B. Plaintiffs Tenancy 1. Plaintiff and Her Lease On or about May 17, 2010, Ms. Sager entered into a lease agreement with the Commission for premises located at 7849 Crilley Road, Apt. 500, Glen Burnie, Maryland (the “Property”). See Complaint ¶ 8; see also Residential Lease Agreement (“Lease”) (ECF 8-5 at 6), Ex. H to Affidavit of Clifton Martin (“Martin Aff.”), Ex. 3 to Motion (ECF 8-4 & 8-5). The Property is an efficiency apartment in Pinewood Village, one of the public housing apartment complexes operated by the Commission that is specifically designated for persons who are elderly or have a disability. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 58; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437e (providing for designation of public housing projects for occupancy by elderly persons and/or persons with disabilities); 24 C.F.R. part 945 (implementing regulations for 42 U.S.C. § 1437e). Born in 1956, Ms. Sager was 53 at the time she entered into the Lease. See Lease at 1. Therefore, Ms. Sager is not “elderly” within the meaning of applicable law, which defines an “elderly person” as one who is at least 62 years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(3)(D). According to the Complaint, plaintiff is a “person with disabilities,” Complaint ¶ 1, although her disabilities are described only as “mental health disabilities,” without further detail. Id. ¶ 16. Ms. Sager is obligated under the Lease to pay rent of $192 per month, due on the first day of each month. Lease, § II.B, at 1. She is also “responsible for the payment of certain other charges specified in this lease,” including “late charges” equal to the lesser of $10 or 5% of the monthly rent for any rent payment made after the tenth day of a given month, and “maintenance costs” for services or damages beyond normal wear and tear. Id,., § III.A-D, at 2. The Lease requires the Commission to provide written notice of the amount and due date of “other charges,” and provides that such charges may be due “no sooner than two weeks after Tenant receives the PHA’s written notice of the charge.” Id., § III, at 2. Further, the Lease states, id.: Any payment by the Tenant to the Landlord under this Lease which is not specifically designated, in written notation, as “rent” or “for rent”, may be applied at the Landlord’s option, as follows: first to outstanding maintenance charges and/or late fees and/or legal fees and secondly to rent. The Lease contains detailed provisions concerning termination. It specifies that the “Lease may be terminated only for serious or repeated violations of material terms of the Lease.” Lease § XIII.A, at 8. Under the Lease, the Commission is required to “give written notice of the proposed termination of the Lease” in the following time frames: (1) “14 days in the case of failure to pay rent”; (2) a “reasonable time, but not to exceed thirty days, considering the seriousness of the situation when the health or safety of other Tenants or PHA staff is threatened”; or (3) “30 days in any other case.” Id., § XIII.B, at 8. The Lease also enumerates several requirements for any notice of termination, including the following, id., § XIII.C, at 8-9: 1. The notice of termination to Tenant shall state specific reasons for the termination, shall inform Tenant of his/her right to make such reply as he/she may wish, and of Tenant’s right to examine PHA documents directly relevant to the termination or eviction. 2. When the PHA is required to offer Tenant the opportunity for a grievance hearing, the notice shall also inform Tenant of the right to request such a hearing in accordance with the PHA’s Grievance Procedures. * * * 4. When the PHA is required to offer Tenant the opportunity for a grievance hearing under the PHA’s Grievance Procedure for a grievance concerning the Lease termination, the tenancy shall not terminate (even if any Notice to Vacate under State or local law has expired) until the period to request a hearing has expired, or (if a hearing is requested) the grievance process has been completed. * * * 6. The PHA may evict Tenant from the unit only by bringing a court action. 2. The Vacate Agreement, the Grievance Hearings, and the Breach of Lease Case Plaintiff claims that, on or about November 8, 2010, the Commission’s property manager, Ms. Flynn, induced her to sign a “Vacate Agreement” obligating her to terminate her Lease and vacate the Property, effective as of noon on December 8, 2010. Complaint ¶¶ 9-10; see also Vacate Agreement, Ex. 1 to Complaint (ECF 2-1). The Vacate Agreement, which was also signed by Ms. Flynn, purported to “satisf[y] the written notice requirement” for termination, contained in the Lease, and stated: “If I [i.e., plaintiff] should violate this agreement, I realize that the Housing Commission will proceeds [sic] with the filing of a PETITION — FOR WARRANT OP RESTITUTION with the Courts to move forward and accomplish the eviction process with the Sheriff.” Vacate Agreement at 1. According to the Complaint, Ms. Sager “was not represented by counsel” when she signed the Vacate Agreement. Complaint ¶ 10. Plaintiff explains the circumstances that led to the execution of the Vacate Agreement by quoting from a “7 page lease termination letter dated November 29, 2010,” authored by Ms. Flynn (the “Termination Letter”). According to the Complaint, Ms. Flynn “made an unannounced visit to Ms. Sager’s unit” on or about November 8, 2010. Complaint ¶ 9. At that time, Ms. Flynn advised Ms. Sager that the Commission “intended to terminate her lease due to ‘numerous, serious lease violations,’ ” and “ ‘informed [Ms. Sager] of the ramifications of not being able to reapply for [public] housing if [her] Lease was terminated.’ ” Id. (quoting Termination Letter) (some alterations in Complaint). However, Ms. Flynn suggested to plaintiff that she “ ‘could agree to consent to move instead,’ ” and thereby preserve her ability to “ ‘reapply’ ” for housing with the Commission “ ‘once [she was] capable of meeting [her] Lease requirements.’ ” Id. (quoting Termination Letter at 5) (alterations in Complaint). In response, Ms. Sager “ ‘elected to sign’ ” the Vacate Agreement instead of “ ‘going through the [lease termination] process.’ ” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting Termination Letter) (alteration to restore accurate quotation of Termination Letter). On or about November 29, 2010, Ms. Sager’s brother notified the Commission in writing that a complaint had been filed with HUD regarding the process by which Ms. Sager had been induced to sign the Vacate Agreement. Id. ¶ 12. The same day, Ms. Flynn sent the Termination Letter to plaintiff, stating that her Lease was terminated, effective December 8, 2010, because of “ ‘violations of material terms of [her] lease.’ ” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Termination Letter at 1). The Termination Letter articulated the alleged breaches in detail. In brief,- most of the alleged violations cited by Ms. Flynn consisted of several occasions in October and November 2010, in which plaintiff either left the water in her kitchen sink running, causing flooding and water damage in her apartment and other nearby apartments, or left her stove on, creating smoke and causing a fire hazard and, in one instance, a fire. During many of these incidents, plaintiff allegedly was incoherent and delusional, and her apartment also contained serious housekeeping deficiencies, including trash spread throughout the apartment and open and spoiled food on the floors and counters. See generally Termination Letter at 3-6. Plaintiff attributes these incidents, in part, to her “mental health disabilities,” which she claims were exacerbated by “recent traumatic events in her life including the death of her mother in August” 2010. Complaint ¶ 16. As noted, the Termination Letter purported to terminate Ms. Sager’s Lease “effective December 8, 2010.” Termination Letter at 1. It also advised plaintiff: “[Y]ou have the right to an Informal Grievance Hearing in accordance with our grievance procedure, providing you request same within ten (10) working days from the date of this letter.” Id. at 7. Moreover, the letter stated: “Should the Informal Grievance Hearing not resolve the above matters to your satisfaction, you shall have the right to request a Formal Grievance Hearing within five (5) days of the date of the notice of determination of the Informal Hearing.” Id. Along with the Termination Letter, the Commission sent Ms. Sager an invoice for three maintenance charges, totaling $380, for “kitchen sink,” “excessive cleaning,” and “flooding.” Ex. 2 to Complaint (“November 2010 Invoice”) (ECF 2-2) (capitalization altered). The November 2010 Invoice informed Ms. Sager that the charges were “due and payable with [her] rent,” and advised that she had the right, within ten working days, to request an “informal hearing” regarding the matter, pursuant to the Commission’s grievance procedure. Id. The November 2010 Invoice also stated: “If you do not request a hearing as stated above, you will be deemed to have waived your right to dispute the charges.” Id. On or about December 6, 2010, Ms. Sager sent the Commission a written request for an “informal grievance hearing” as to the termination of her Lease. Complaint ¶ 15. It was held on December 9, 2010, before Diane Haislip, a “hearing officer.” Ms. Sager was not represented by counsel, but “presented evidence regarding her mental health disabilities, the recent traumatic events in her life including the death of her mother in August, and the supports [sic] and treatment that she was receiving at the time.” Complaint ¶ 16. Ms. Sager also informally requested transfer to another apartment. Id. In a letter issued on or about December 21, 2010, Ms. Haislip upheld Ms. Flynn’s determination to terminate plaintiffs Lease. Id. ¶ 17. On or about December 26, 2010, Ms. Sager requested a formal grievance hearing. Id. ¶ 18. At the hearing, conducted on February 14, 2011, by hearing officer John Harris, Ms. Sager was represented by counsel. Id. ¶ 19. According to plaintiff, the Commission’s evidence included testimony by Ms. Haislip, the informal hearing officer, and an “Incident Inquiry Report” dated November 18, 2010. Id. ¶ 20. No evidence regarding the basis for the determination of the maintenance charges for “excessive cleaning” or “flooding” was presented. Id. ¶ 21. On February 16, 2011, Ms. Flynn sent plaintiff a letter via certified mail, on behalf of the Commission, regarding the “results for [the] formal grievance hearing,” which stated, in its entirety: “This is to officially inform you that the decision of the Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County was upheld as a result of the hearing on Monday, February 14, 2011 at 1:00 p.m.” Ex. 3 to Complaint (ECF 2-3) (capitalization and emphasis omitted); see Complaint ¶ 23. The same day, the Commission filed a Complaint for Breach of Lease against Ms. Sager in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County (District 7), docketed as Case No. 0702-SP-00442-2011 (the “Breach of Lease Case”). Complaint ¶ 22; see Md. Code (2006 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.), § 1-602(7) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”). On or about March 3, 2011, Ms. Sager filed a written request for transfer to a different apartment building operated by the Commission. Complaint ¶ 24; see also Ex. 4 to Complaint (“March 2011 Transfer Request”) (ECF 2-4). The Commission denied the request on March 22, 2011. Complaint ¶ 29; see also Ex. 8 to Complaint (ECF 2-8). On March 29, 2011, plaintiffs counsel wrote to the Commission’s counsel, asserting that Ms. Sager was now receiving additional professional services for her disabilities and was “stable.” Her attorney also requested that the Commission offer plaintiff a “reasonable accommodation” for her disabilities, in the form of “accepting Ms. Sager’s good faith efforts and subsequent success in proactively addressing her medical needs,” and urged voluntary dismissal of the Breach of Lease Case. Ex. 9 to Complaint (ECF 2-9); see Complaint ¶ 30. The Commission would not agree to this request, and the Breach of Lease Case proceeded. On April 5, 2011, the District Court scheduled trial in the Breach of Lease Case for September 1, 2011. See Ex. 15 to Complaint (ECF 2-15). 3. “Other Charges” and the Rent Cases In the meantime, on or about March 2, 2011, Ms. Sager tendered to the Commission a money order in the amount of $192, a sum equal to her monthly rent for March. Complaint ¶ 25. According to the Commission’s ledger, however, the Commission applied the payment to the $380 in outstanding maintenance charges. Id. (citing Ex. 5 to Complaint (ECF 2-5)). On March 15, 2011, the Commission sent Ms. Sager a letter stating that $481.36 was due and owing on her account, which consisted of $192 in rent; $9.60 in “Late & Other”; $78 for “Legal”; and $201.76 for “Maintenance.” Ex. 6 to Complaint (ECF 2-6). The letter also stated that “Housing Commission policy is to file for non-payment of rent on the 15th of the month,” but also stated that the “ ‘PHA shall give written notice of the proposed termination of the Lease in ... 14 days in the case of failure to pay rent.’ ” Id. (quoting Lease). The letter contained the handwritten notation, “Please pay by 3/21/11.” Id. The same day, March 15, 2011, HCAAC initiated a summary ejectment action against Ms. Sager for failure to pay rent, which was docketed in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County as Case No. S. Ej. 1172-0000-7364 (the “First Rent Case”). Complaint ¶ 27. The Commission alleged that Ms. Sager owed $192 in rent plus $9.60 in late fees. Id. On March 21, 2011, the Commission sent another letter to plaintiff, generally containing the same contents as the letter of March 15, 2011, but this time asserting that a total of $498.36 was due and owing. Ex. 7 to Complaint (ECF 2-7); see also Complaint ¶ 28. The basis for the $17 increase, over and above the amount stated in the previous letter, was that the Commission now alleged that $95 in “Legal” fees was due and owing. Ex. 7 to Complaint. Handwritten on the letter was the notation, “Court 3/22/11 Please pay by 7:00 AM.” Id. Trial was held in the First Rent Case on March 22, 2011. Complaint ¶ 27. Ms. Sager appeared without counsel and produced a receipt for her March rent payment. The court then dismissed the case. Id. In early April 2011, Ms. Sager tendered to the Commission a money order in the amount of $192, a sum equal to her monthly rent for April. The Commission again credited the payment to the maintenance charges, rather than plaintiffs rent. Complaint ¶ 32; see also Ex. 5 to Complaint. On April 12, 2011, the Commission sent a third letter to Ms. Sager regarding her account balance. See Ex. 10 to Complaint (ECF 2-10). The letter had the same content as the previous two letters, except that it stated that a total of $700.36 was due and owing, consisting of $384 in rent; $19.60 in “Late & Other” fees; $95 in “Legal” fees; and $201.75 for “Maintenance.” Id. The letter also contained a handwritten notation: “Please pay this amount as we filed in court on 4-15-11. Pay by 5:00 PM on 4-14-11.” Id. Notably, the letter of April 12, 2011, did not reflect plaintiffs payment of $192. Apparently, that payment was not credited to plaintiffs account until April 14, 2011. See note 17, supra. On April 15, 2011, the Commission filed a second ejectment action against Ms. Sager, docketed in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County as Case No. 1172-0000-9803 (the “Second Rent Case”). Complaint ¶ 34. In its complaint, HCAAC alleged that $384 in rent was due and owing (ie., two months’ worth of rent, at the monthly rate of $192), plus $10 in late fees. Id. On April 18, 2011, the Commission sent Ms. Sager a fourth letter regarding her account balance, reflecting that her payment of $192 had been applied to the maintenance charges. Ex. 11 to Complaint (ECF 2-11). According to the fourth letter, Ms. Sager owed a total of $508.36, comprised of $384 in rent; $19.60 in “Late & Other” fees; $95 in “Legal” fees; and $9.76 for “Maintenance.” Id. Otherwise, the content of the fourth letter was the same as the prior letters, except that there was no handwritten notation. See id. Trial was held in the Second Rent Case on April 22, 2011. Complaint ¶ 36. Again, Ms. Sager appeared without counsel and presented a receipt for her April payment. Id. This time, however, the District Court granted judgment for possession of the premises in favor of the Commission. Id. According to plaintiff, the court accepted the Commission’s argument that a provision of the Lease, quoted supra, permitted the Commission to apply rental payments to other outstanding charges unless the words “rent” or “for rent” were written on the instrument of payment. Id. On April 27, 2011, Ms. Sager noted an appeal in the Second Rent Case to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Complaint ¶ 37. Simultaneously with filing her notice of appeal, Ms. Sager filed in the state District Court a “Motion to Stay Warrant of Restitution and to Accept Security Instead of Surety” (“Motion to Stay”). See Motion to Stay, Ex. 12 to Complaint (ECF 2-12); see also Complaint ¶ 38. In her Motion to Stay, Ms. Sager requested that, in lieu of a bond, the court accept as security a promissory note and a money order payable to the Commission, totaling $387, to be held in escrow pending resolution of the appeal. See Motion to Stay at 1. The following day, April 28, 2011, the District Court denied Ms. Sager’s Motion to Stay by marginal order, stating: “Denied — not filed — once rent is paid — court will vacate judgment.” Id. As a result, Ms. Sager paid $384 to the Commission on April 29, 2011, along with a handwritten note stating that her payment was “not an admission of liability.” Ex. 13 to Complaint (ECF 2-13); see also Complaint ¶ 39. Nevertheless, on the same day, the Commission filed a petition for a warrant of restitution in the District Court, contending that $401 was due, consisting of $384 in rent and $17 in costs. Complaint ¶40. The Commission never sought to execute the warrant, however, due to Ms. Sager’s $384 payment and because, on May 4, 2011, one of the Commission’s property managers, Lisa Hahn, credited another $104.60 to Ms. Sager’s account, consisting of $9.60 for the March late fee; $17 for “FTP court notice”; and $78 for “Breach of Lease charge.” Ex. 14 to Complaint (ECF 2-14); see also Complaint ¶ 41. In the document granting the credit, Ms. Hahn noted that the “$78.00 charge may be reapplied once case is settled or judgment determined.” Ex. 14 to Complaint. C. Initiation of This Lawsuit and Conclusion of the Breach of Lease Case As noted, trial of the Breach of Lease Case was set for September 1, 2011. On August 18, 2011, Ms. Sager, represented by counsel, initiated this lawsuit by filing her Complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland, docketed as Case No. 02-C-l1-163554. On the same date, Ms. Sager filed in the Breach of Lease Case a “Motion to Consolidate Cases,” which she also attached as Exhibit 15 to her Complaint in the circuit court. See Ex. 15 to Complaint (ECF 2-15). In that motion, plaintiff requested that the Breach of Lease Case, then awaiting trial in the state District Court, be consolidated with this case, then pending in state circuit court. In support of her request, plaintiff contended that the Breach of Lease Case would “require the same proof and witnesses” as this case, and that it was “in the interest of justice and judicial economy that the cases be consolidated” in the circuit court proceeding. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Defendants report that the District Court denied the consolidation motion. See Motion at 2. Trial commenced in the Breach of Lease Case on September 1, 2011, but was not completed on that date. See Motion at 2. It was scheduled to resume on November 30, 2011. Id. In the meantime, on September 14, 2011, defendants timely removed this case from state circuit court to this Court, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal (ECF 1); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. Thereafter, they filed the pending Motion. The parties have not notified this Court regarding any further proceedings in the Breach of Lease Case. The unofficial public docket for that case, available on the Maryland Judiciary’s “Case Search” website (http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/), indicates that the trial was again continued to January 30, 2012, and that, on that date, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Sager. However, the “Case Search” docket does not reflect the basis for the District Court’s ruling, nor have the parties provided any information about it. Additional facts will be presented in the Discussion. Discussion A. Standard of Review Defendants’ Motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “or in the alternative” for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436-37 (D.Md.2011). Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However, under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). When the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court “does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir.1998). Nevertheless, a district judge has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.). This discretion “should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties’ procedural rights.” Id. at 149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material “is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action,” and “whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure” is necessary. Id. at 165-67. Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate “where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont, supra, 637 F.3d at 448-49. However, “the party opposing summary judgment ‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.’ ” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir.1996)). To raise adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the non-movant typically must file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explaining why, “for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” without needed discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d); see Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244-45 (discussing affidavit requirement of former Rule 56(f)). Notably, “ ‘Rule 56(d) affidavits cannot simply demand discovery for the sake of discovery.’ ” Hamilton v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 807 F.Supp.2d 331, 342 (D.Md.2011) (quoting Young v. UPS, No. DKC-08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *20, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266, at *62 (D.Md. Feb. 14, 2011)). “Rather, to justify a denial of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit must be ‘essential to [the] opposition.’ ” Scott v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., LLC, 789 F.Supp.2d 637, 641 (D.Md.2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A non-moving party’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly denied “where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven Cmty. Coll, 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir.1995); see Amirmokri v. Abraham, 437 F.Supp.2d 414, 420 (D.Md.2006), aff'd, 266 Fed.Appx. 274 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 885, 129 S.Ct. 259, 172 L.Ed.2d 147 (2008). In her Opposition, plaintiff strenuously insists that summary judgment is premature, because “multiple material facts are in dispute in all of the Plaintiffs causes of action,” Opp. at 13, and the “parties have not engaged in discovery yet, so [plaintiff] cannot state all of the facts in dispute at this time.” Opp. at 14 n. 6. Nevertheless, plaintiff has not filed an affidavit under Rule 56(d). Moreover, several of the purported disputes of material fact that plaintiff proffers are actually legal disputes. For instance, the “parties dispute whether the lease provisions constitute a confessed judgment.” Opp. at 14. Other factual matters raised by plaintiff do not actually appear to be in dispute. To illustrate, plaintiff argues that, “on page 14 [of their memorandum in support of the Motion], Defendants state that HCAAC denied Ms. Sager’s transfer request, while on page 17 Defendants state they did offer her a transfer.” It is evident, however, that on the referenced pages the defendants were referring to two separate transfer requests. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, more is required to oppose a properly presented request for conversion to summary judgment. Despite the inadequacy of plaintiffs opposition to conversion, I will exercise my discretion under Rule 12(d) not to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. As noted, however, in “deciding whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss, a court evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into the complaint” or that are “ ‘integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint’ [to which] there [is] no authenticity challenge.” E.I. du Pont, supra, 637 F.3d at 448 (citation omitted). As I shall explain in more detail, the issues presented by the Motion are for the most part purely legal questions; resolution does not depend on consideration of matters outside the pleadings. For purposes of the contentions presented as to Counts I, II, III, and V, the legal issues are adequately framed by the facts contained in the Complaint and the other documents submitted by the parties that may be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). As to plaintiffs claim of disability discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (Count IV), defendants have submitted some matter outside of the pleadings that is relevant but, as I shall discuss, resolution of Count IV based on summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture. Therefore, consideration of extraneous material (to the extent submitted by defendants) is unnecessary. Accordingly, I will review the Motion under the well established standards for consideration of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “ ‘to test the sufficiency of a complaint.’ ” McBurey v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by the defendant that, even if the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, the complaint fails, as a matter of law, “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A court decides whether this standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. A Society Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1960, 182 L.Ed.2d 772 (2012). Dismissal “is inappropriate unless, accepting as true the well-pled facts in the complaint and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is unable to ‘state a claim to relief.’ ” Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). B. Abstention Because the Breach of Lease Case remained pending when this case was initiated and when the Motion was filed, I directed the parties to address whether the Court should abstain from resolving the merits of their dispute. See ECF 11. In particular, I asked the parties to consider the applicability of two abstention doctrines: the doctrine of Younger abstention, which counsels against federal judicial interference in certain ongoing state judicial proceedings, and the Wilton-Brillhart doctrine, which affirms that the pendency of parallel state proceedings is a factor in a federal court’s inherent discretion to abstain from issuing declaratory relief. Both sides argue that abstention is unnecessary here. See Reply at 12-14; Surreply at 1-9. As I shall explain, I agree. Younger abstention takes its name from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding, due to concerns for comity and federalism. Since Younger, the Court has widened the scope of this abstention doctrine to include some cases in which the underlying state proceeding is civil, see, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), as well as cases seeking equitable relief other than injunctions, including declaratory relief. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971). Under Younger abstention, federal courts abstain from resolving suits when there is “an ongoing state judicial proceeding brought prior to substantial progress in the federal proceeding,” and the state proceeding “implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests” and provides an adequate opportunity to resolve the parties’ federal claims or defenses. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir.2006). Whether to abstain under Younger is discretionary with the district court. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm’n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, abstention “is not necessarily appropriate in every civil action that meets the formal requirements of the Younger doctrine.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 251 (4th Cir.1993). Upon careful consideration, I conclude that Younger abstention is unwarranted here. First, although the Breach of Lease Case was pending when this suit was initiated, it appears that the Breach of Lease Case has now been resolved. Therefore, there is no longer “an ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Nivens, 444 F.3d at 241. Notably, “ ‘Younger requires that the state proceeding must be ongoing at the time the district court enters its order regarding abstention.’ ” Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1250 n. 3 (8th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). Therefore, “[a]bsent any pending proceeding in state tribunals ... application by the lower courts of Younger abstention [is] clearly erroneous.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) (emphasis in original). See also Edwards v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, 261 F.3d 723, 727-28 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, where state judicial proceedings concluded between issuance of district court’s order and federal appellate court’s decision reviewing order: “Abstention is only appropriate ‘when there is an ongoing state proceeding,’ thus ‘abstention is no longer appropriate’ here ....”) (citations omitted); Nat’l Pharmacies, Inc. v. Felicianode-Melecio, 221 F.3d 235, 240 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A federal court cannot be expected to defer to local proceedings that either no longer exist or in which the decisionmakers have clearly indicated their preference that the federal court act. Thus, the district court correctly declined to abstain under Younger.”); Reaching Hearts Int'l Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 584 F.Supp.2d 766, 793 & n. 20 (D.Md.2008) (holding Younger abstention inapplicable “because the state proceedings are no longer pending”), aff'd, 368 Fed.Appx. 370 (4th Cir.2010). Moreover, Younger abstention is only appropriate where the parallel state proceeding “implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests.” Nivens, supra, 444 F.3d at 241. “Courts are divided as to whether a state has a significant interest in an eviction action.” Kemp v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 10-C-3347, 2010 WL 2927417, at *5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73895, at *16 (N.D.Ill. July 21, 2010) (collecting cases). However, the cases finding that a significant state interest is present in an eviction proceeding so as to warrant Younger abstention “have not involved the additional federal interest in public housing.” Id. As the Third Circuit concluded, rejecting Younger abstention in a case concerning federal rights established under the Housing Act, “whatever the state’s interest may be in regulating proceedings which result in removal of citizens from their homes, it cannot supersede the relevant federal interests in governing the expenditure of federal funds for [public] housing programs.” Ayers v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1195 n. 21 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1086 (1991); accord Kemp, 2010 WL 2927417, at *5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73895, at *17-18 (quoting Ayers); see also Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 396 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir.2005) (“When there is an overwhelming federal interest ... no state interest, for abstention purposes, can be nearly as strong at the same time.”). For the foregoing reasons, I do not find that Younger abstention is appropriate. Consideration of the Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine is also appropriate. In Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that “ ‘[o]rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties.’ ” Id. at 282, 115 S.Ct. 2137 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942)). Fourth Circuit decisions subsequent to Wilton have considered the pendency of parallel state court proceedings as one of several factors that federal district courts should consider in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory proceeding. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419 (4th Cir.1998). Here, of course, plaintiff seeks not only declaratory relief, but also damages. The Fourth Circuit has held that “the BrillhartfWilton standard does not apply when a declaratory judgment claim is joined with a nondeclaratory claim, such as a claim for damages or injunctive relief.” Great American Ins. Co. v. Gross, 468 F.3d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court explained: “Because a court is required to address nondeclaratory claims, ... the benefit derived from exercising discretion not to grant declaratory relief is frustrated” in such a case. Id. Moreover, as already discussed, the Breach of Lease Case is no longer pending. Therefore, Wilton-Brillhart abstention is not warranted. A federal court considering abstention from a matter over which it has jurisdiction must always be mindful of the “basic proposition that ‘abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.’ ” Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S.Ct. 816, 133 L.Ed.2d 761 (1996). Indeed, the federal courts have a “ ‘virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given’ ” them. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 204, 108 S.Ct. 523, 531, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976)). For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will not abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, and will address the merits. C. Availability of Relief and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Preliminarily, defendants claim that plaintiff “is not legally entitled to any of the relief she seeks.” Motion at 22. They claim that Count III of plaintiffs Complaint, which alleges violations of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq., and its implementing regulations, is deficient because the Housing Act does not contain a private right of action. Motion at 16. In addition, they assert that none of the statutes on which plaintiffs suit is based permits an award of treble damages, or damages for pain and suffering. Motion at 12-13. Finally, defendants assert that at least some of plaintiffs claims are barred due to her alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Motion at 10-11. I will consider these arguments in turn. Defendants’ challenge to Count III is unavailing. It is true that the Housing Act does not, itself, contain an express private right of action, and courts have held that it does not support direct implication of a cause of action. See Perry v. Hous. Auth. of City of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1211-17 (4th Cir.1981). However, the Supreme Court has held that particular provisions of the Housing Act, which provide residents of public housing with “specific or definable rights” that are not “beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce,” are “enforceable rights under ... [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430, 432, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (holding that residents of public housing have cause of action under § 1983 for PHA’s denial of statutorily-mandated “reasonable” utility allowances); see Farley v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth, 102 F.3d 697, 702-04 (3d Cir.1996) (holding that, under § 1983, residents of public housing may enforce award issued pursuant to the statutorily-mandated grievance procedure); Mananioba v. Fairmont Hous. Auth, 922 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 1991) (unreported) (per curiam) (holding that resident of public housing has right to grievance hearing prior to eviction, enforceable under § 1983); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 197 (D.C.Cir.1985) (same); Conway v. Hous. Auth. of City of Asheville, 239 F.Supp.2d 593, 598-600 (W.D.N.C.2002) (same); Richmond Tenants Org. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth, 751 F.Supp. 1204, 1212-13 (E.D.Va.1990) (holding that public housing residents’ right against “unreasonable terms and conditions” in leases is enforceable under § 1983), aff'd, 947 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.1991) (unreported) (per curiam). Plaintiff expressly invokes § 1983 as the mechanism for her cause of action as to “rights conferred by federal law.” See Complaint ¶ 5. To the extent that she asserts violations of specific and definable rights conferred on residents of public housing by the Housing Act, her claims do not fail for want of a private right of action. However, defendants are correct in asserting that treble damages are not available to plaintiff; there is no statutory entitlement to treble damages, per se, in a suit under § 1983. In a suit by a private litigant, the Maryland CPA authorizes the plaintiff to “recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result” of an unfair or deceptive trade practice, C.L. § 13-408(a), as well as an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees.” C.L. § 13-408(b). However, there is no statutory provision in the CPA for treble damages, and “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded in an action brought under § 13-408.” Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 49, 867 A.2d 276, 304 (2005). Similarly, R.P. § 8-208, which prohibits certain provisions in residential leases and forms the basis of Count II of plaintiffs Complaint, entitles a tenant to recover only “actual damages incurred ... including reasonable attorney’s fees” as the result of a landlord’s inclusion of a prohibited provision in a lease. R.P. § 8-208(g). It does not authorize recovery of treble damages. Accordingly, I will dismiss plaintiffs request for treble damages. In contrast, both § 1983 and the CPA permit recovery of damages for emotional distress or pain and suffering, under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that “mental and emotional distress” caused by the denial of federal civil rights “is compensable under § 1983,” provided that there is “proof that such injury actually was caused,” which is “evidenced by one’s conduct and observed by others.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 & n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307-08, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). In Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116, 117 S.Ct. 1246, 137 L.Ed.2d 328 (1997), the Fourth Circuit held that a § 1983 plaintiff who seeks damages for emotional distress “must establish that the plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated; neither conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress nor the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred supports an award of compensatory damages.” The Price Court also articulated several factors to “aid triers of fact in determining the propriety of awarding compensatory damages for emotional distress.” Id. Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that “noneconomic damages,” which include damages for pain and suffering, are available under the CPA, up to the limits established by C.J. § 11-108, Maryland’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages for personal injury. See Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 541, 976 A.2d 279, 286 (2009); accord Brooks ex rel. Wright v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 411 Md. 603, 627, 984 A.2d 836, 850 (2009). As the Maryland court explained in the CPA case of Hoffman v. Stamper, supra, 385 Md. at 32-38, 867 A.2d at 295-98, Maryland adheres to the so-called “modern rule” articulated in Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979), which permits “recovery of damages for emotional distress if there was at least a ‘consequential’ physical injury,” in the sense that “ ‘the injury for which recovery is sought is capable of objective determination.’ ” Hoffman, 385 Md. at 34, 867 A.2d at 296 (quoting Vance). This “physical” injury standard permits recovery for “such things as depression, inability to work or perform routine household chores, loss of appetite, insomnia, nightmares, loss of weight, extreme nervousness and irritability, withdrawal from socialization, fainting, chest pains, headaches, and upset stomachs,” id. at 34-35, 867 A.2d at 296, but excludes recovery “based on the plaintiff simply saying, ‘This made me feel bad; this upset me.’ ” Id. at 34, 867 A.2d at 296. See also Hauk v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 749 F.Supp.2d 358, 369 (D.Md.2010) (stating that “emotional damages are cognizable damages” under the Maryland CPA). Therefore, plaintiffs request for damages for “emotional distress and mental anguish” is permissible under both § 1983 and the CPA, and is not subject to dismissal as a matter of law. As noted, defendants argue that plaintiffs failure to file grievances as to various contentions she raises, by way of the Commission’s grievance procedure, “amounts to a waiver” of her claims. Motion at 10. Defendants also observe that plaintiff did not challenge the Commission’s actions in Maryland state court within thirty days of each action, via the “administrative mandamus” procedure provided under Maryland Rules 7-401 et seq. Contending that plaintiffs “failure to exhaust her available administrative remedies bars her right” to proceed, defendants invoke the “ ‘long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.’ ” Motion at 11 (quoting Thetford Props. IV Ltd. P’ship v. HUD, 907 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir.1990)). However, although defendants cite cases, including Thetford, that endorse the general principle of administrative exhaustion, they have produced no authority for the proposition that administrative exhaustion applies to the public housing grievance procedure. In response, plaintiff notes that, in fact, she initiated a grievance proceeding with the Commission, and asserts that it is unclear which of her claims defendants contend have not been exhausted administratively. In any event, she counters that failure to request a grievance hearing under public housing regulations does not waive a resident’s right to challenge judicially an adverse action by a PHA. See Opp. at 6-9. Moreover, plaintiff argues that Maryland’s administrative mandamus procedure does not apply to housing authorities because a PHA is not an “administrative agency” within the meaning of Maryland Rule 7-401(b). See Opp. at 5-6. I need not resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Maryland housing authorities are subject to administrative mandamus because, in my view, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to the public housing grievance procedure. PHAs are required by federal law to “establish and implement an administrative grievance procedure” for residents of public housing to challenge “any proposed adverse public housing agency action.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k). The grievance procedure must conform to federal regulations codified in 24 C.F.R. part 966, subpart B. In particular, if a resident’s grievance cannot be resolved through an informal meeting, see 24 C.F.R. § 966.54, a resident is entitled to the opportunity for a hearing conducted by an impartial person or panel, see id. § 966.55(b), which must afford, inter alia, the rights to “examine before the grievance hearing any PHA documents, including records and regulations, that are directly relevant to the hearing,” id. § 966.56(b)(1); to be represented by counsel or another representative of the tenant’s choice, id. § 966.56(b)(2); to present evidence and argument and to controvert and cross-examine evidence and witnesses presented by the PHA, id. § 966.56(b)(4); and to obtain a “decision based solely and exclusively upon the facts presented at the hearing.” Id. § 966.56(b)(5). The hearing procedure gives tenants an opportunity to challenge adverse actions by the PHA and to bind the PHA to the result. But, the procedure cannot be used by the PHA to bind a tenant. In this respect, the grievance procedure is a one-way street. Notably, the regulations expressly state that “failure to request a hearing shall not constitute a waiver by the complainant of his right thereafter to contest the PHA’s action in disposing of the complaint in an appropriate judicial proceeding.” 24 C.F.R. § 966.55(c). Moreover, a “decision by the hearing officer, hearing panel, or [PHA’s] Board of Commissioners in favor of the PHA or which denies the relief requested by the complainant in whole or in part shall not constitute a waiver of, nor affect in any manner whatever, any rights the complainant may have to a trial de novo or judicial review in any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in the matter.” Id. § 966.57(c). In contrast, a “decision of the hearing officer or hearing panel shall be binding on the PHA which shall take all actions, or refrain from any actions, necessary to carry out the decision.” Id. § 966.57(b). There are, however, two narrow exceptions. The PHA’s Board of Commissioners may overturn a grievance decision if (1) the grievance does not concern a matter that is subject to the grievance procedure, i.e., it does not involve “PHA action or failure to act in accordance with or involving the complainant’s lease [or] PHA regulations, which adversely affect the complainant’s rights, duties, welfare or status,” id. § 966.57(b)(1); see also id. § 966.53(a) (definition of “grievance”); or (2) the “decision of the hearing officer or hearing panel is contrary to applicable Federal, State or local law, HUD regulations or requirements of the annual contributions contract between HUD and the PHA.” Id. § 966.57(b)(2). Given that the regulations expressly provide that neither failure to initiate the grievance procedure nor an adverse decision in the grievance procedure waives or limits a tenant’s right to obtain judicial relief, it is not surprising that the Court has not discovered any case applying the requirement of administrative exhaustion to the public housing grievance procedure. Rather, the cases that address the issue have held that administrative exhaustion principles do not apply. See, e.g., Spieth v. Bucks County Hous. Auth., 594 F.Supp.2d 584, 586 n. 1 (E.D.Pa.2009); Jackson v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 858 F.Supp. 464, 470-71 (E.D.Pa.1994); Timmons v. Cisneros, Civ. No. 93-1854, 1993 WL 276863, at *1,1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, at *4-5 (E.D.Pa., July 22, 1993). But see Bennington Hous. Auth. v. Bush, 182 Vt. 133, 933 A.2d 207, 221 (2007) (Burgess, J„ dissenting) (arguing that administrative exhaustion principles ought to apply to the public housing grievance procedure); Jackson, 858 F.Supp. at 471 (while holding that administrative exhaustion is not required, opining that the “reasons advanced for the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be served if exhaustion were required,” and concluding that “a court may still consider a plaintiffs willful failure to take advantage of an obvious and easy opportunity to obtain relief without litigation, in determining the ‘reasonableness’ of [an] attorney fee request”). As the foregoing cases have explained, the conclusion that exhaustion of the public housing grievance procedure is not required is consonant with the “general rule” that “plaintiffs proceeding under § 1983 need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 676 (4th Cir.2005) (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002), and Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)). Indeed, in Wright, supra, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, the Supreme Court invoked this general rule in concluding that rights conferred by the Housing Act may be enforced in § 1983 proceedings. The Court rejected the contention that the existence of the mandatory grievance procedure foreclosed a judicial remedy, stating: “[E]ven if tenants may grieve about a PHA’s utility allowance schedule, ... the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to § 1983.” Id. at 427-28, 107 S.Ct. 766. In accordance with the plain text of the applicable federal regulations and the case law I have reviewe