Full opinion text
ORDER ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD, Senior District Judge. Introduction This is the latest permutation of a nearly decade long battle by plaintiffs Fidelity National Financial, Inc. and Fidelity Express Network, Inc. (“Fidelity”) to enforce a roughly $8.5 million dollar judgment, plus interest. Fidelity obtained that judgment against defendants Colin H. Friedman and Hedy Kramer Friedman (“the Friedmans”), among others, following a trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (“the California federal court”). Fidelity’s judgment was entered in that court on July 12, 2002 (“the California judgment”). Fidelity then registered that California judgment in this Arizona district court by filing, among other things, a certified copy of that judgment on November 14, 2002 (“the Arizona judgment”). Essentially, the Friedmans are once again seeking to have this court quash enforcement of that Arizona judgment because in their view it has expired and Fidelity never properly or timely renewed it. Fidelity vigorously disputes that the Arizona judgment has expired. That judgment has not expired, Fidelity counters, because on April 5, 2007, it filed in this court what it deems to be “both a second registration” of that judgment under federal law “and a renewal” of the Arizona judgment under Arizona law. Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 6:19-20 (emphasis added). Then, viewing that April 5th document strictly as a “renewal affidavit,” Fidelity further asserts that any “defect[s]” therein were “de minimis” and were “cured” by the filing of “an additional affidavit ... in 2008.” Id. at 6:24-25. Fidelity thus contends that there is no basis for quashing its Arizona judgment, which by Fidelity’s most recent estimation totals $10,685,204. See id. at 8:9 (citation omitted). Background I. Procedural The court assumes familiarity with the prolonged and rather tortuous history of this litigation. This most recent dispute begins with this court’s order denying the Friedmans’ motion to quash enforcement of Fidelity’s Arizona judgment. This court found two grounds for denial. Both derive from A.R.S. §§ 12-1611, which provides that “[a] judgment may be renewed by action thereon at any time within five years after the date of the judgment.” A.R.S. § 12-1611. First, this court found that Fidelity’s “collection activities in this case” were tantamount to an “action thereon” within the meaning of section 12-1611. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, 2008 WL 3049988, at *10 (D.Ariz. Aug. 8, 2008) (“Fidelity I”). Hence, Fidelity “renew[ed] its [Arizona registered] judgment under” that statute. Id. Second, this court held that Fidelity’s federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) action also constituted an “action thereon” for purposes of renewing its Arizona judgment in accordance with A.R.S. § 12-1611. The court thus concluded that because Fidelity had properly renewed the Arizona judgment by those activities, there was no basis for quashing it. Disagreeing, the Friedmans appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions to the Arizona Supreme Court: (1) Do collection activities (such as filing for a writ of garnishment or applying for orders from the court to inspect a safety deposit box or require a debtor’s exam) taken within Arizona, renew a judgment previously registered in Arizona? (2) Does the filing of a related lawsuit in a state other than Arizona renew a judgment previously registered in Arizona? Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, 602 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.2010). The Arizona Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative. To renew a judgment pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-1551(B) or 12-1611, the Supreme Court explained, a party must bring a “specific form of suit — -the common law action on a judgment!,]” ... “not simply an action in some way related to the earlier judgment!.]” Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, 225 Ariz. 307, 310, 238 P.3d 118, 121 (2010) (“Fidelity III”). Fidelity’s Arizona collection efforts were not “a common law action on the 2002 judgment!,]” the Supreme Court reasoned, because those “efforts were attempts to collect upon the 2002 judgment, not to renew it.” Id. at 123 (citation omitted). Additionally, that Court held that Fidelity’s RICO lawsuit “was not a common law action on the judgment!] [in that] it did not simply recite the amount owed and seek a judgment on that debt.” Id. Instead, that RICO “suit sought remedies under federal and California law because of actions allegedly undertaken by the [Friedmans] to frustrate collection of the 2002 judgment.” Id. Adopting the answers of the Arizona Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that because “Fidelity did not file a common law action for renewal on the 2002 judgment within five years of its entry, the judgment expired by 2008.” Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, 402 Fed.Appx. 194, 196 (9th Cir.2010) (“Fidelity TV”) (citation omitted). In Fidelity TV the Court noted that Fidelity “also question[ed][,]” as it does now, “(1) whether it successfully renewed the judgment by affidavit in 2008, and (2) whether its 2007 registration of the final California judgment also renewed the judgment.” Id. at 196. The Ninth Circuit did not address those issues though because this court did not in Fidelity I. The Ninth Circuit also declined to address those two issues because “the parties did not provide comprehensive briefing to inform [the Ninth Circuit’s] review[.]” Id. (citations omitted). Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s “formal mandate[,]” its judgment took effect November 22, 2010. See Defs.’ Request For Judicial Notice (“RJN”), exh. B thereto (Doc. 328-2) at 2. II. Factual The federal judgment registration statute provides in relevant part: A judgment in an action for the recovery of money ... entered in any ..., district court, ... may be registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment in any other district ..., when the judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown. 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Presumably in accordance with that statute, on November 14, 2002, Fidelity registered its California judgment by filing, inter alia, a certified copy of its judgment rendered in the California federal court. Doc. 1. That copy of the judgment is attached to a document entitled “Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another District!.]” Id. (emphasis omitted). That 2002 Certification states: An appeal was taken from this judgment and is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, ... has entered an order allowing plaintiff to register its Judgment in Arizona. Certified copies of the Judgment (filed July 10, 2002), and the Order Allowing Plaintiff to Register Its Judgment in Arizona (filed October 22, 2002) are attached. Id. After registering its California judgment here in 2002, in the following years Fidelity engaged in numerous, mostly unsuccessful, collection efforts in this district. Eventually, on April 5, 2007, Fidelity filed in this court a document entitled “Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another District (dated January l, 2007) and Renewal of Judgment in District of Arizona[.]” Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 2 (bold emphasis omitted, italicized emphasis and footnote added). This dual designation reflects Fidelity’s uncertainty as to the exact nature of this document. For brevity’s sake, the court will refer to this document as the “2007 Certification,” but no legal significance shall be accorded to that designation. Attached to that 2007 Certification is another “Certification of . Judgment for Registration in Another District[,]” again emanating from the California federal court. That California Certification indicates that the Ninth Circuit “appeal was dismissed by order entered on May 15, 2003.” Id., exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 3. Besides filing those two Certifications, on February 7, 2008, Fidelity filed a document it designated as an “Additional Renewal Affidavit Renewing the Judgment Registered in Arizona on November 15, 2002” (“additional renewal affidavit”). Id., exh. H thereto (Doc. 382-8) at 2 (emphasis omitted) (footnote added). Fidelity filed that affidavit in response to the Fried-mans’ original motion to quash the Arizona judgment. Summary of Arguments The Friedmans argue that the court should quash the 2002 Arizona judgment because it has expired and Fidelity did not properly or timely renew it. The Fried-mans first contend that the 2007 Certification did not renew the Arizona judgment because it was not a “renewal affidavit” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). Assuming arguendo that the 2007 Certification “was sufficient to operate as a renewal affidavit[,]” nonetheless, the Friedmans contend that it was untimely. Thus, from the Friedmans’ standpoint, Fidelity cannot rely upon the 2007 Certification to renew the expired Arizona judgment. Next, the Friedmans argue that the 2008 additional renewal affidavit did not operate to renew the Arizona judgment because it, too, was untimely. Regardless of its timeliness, the Friedmans contend that that affidavit was “filed to correct the deficiencies in the [2007] Certifieationf,]” and hence it constitutes “an admission that the Certification did not meet the requirements of’ a renewal affidavit under “A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) and was, therefore, invalid.” Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 327) at 7:23-24. From Fidelity’s perspective, its Arizona judgment is “valid and enforceable” because its “California judgment was timely registered in Arizona in 2007 as both a second registration and as a renewal.” Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 6:18-20 (emphasis added). Fidelity does not explain why, as it maintains, “[t]he 2007 renewal was timely[.]” Id. at 6:24. Instead, Fidelity offers the following non sequitur: That renewal “was timely because any defect in the renewal affidavit was de minimis and was cured by an additional affidavit filed in 2008.” Id. at 6:24-25. Discussion I. Requests for Judicial Notice Before addressing the parties’ respective arguments, the court must consider their separate RJNs made pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201. Defendants’ RJN lists ten court filings, all pertaining directly to this action. See Defs.’ RJN (Doc. 328) at 1-3. The first such filing is the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. 307, 238 P.3d 118 (2010). Defendants’ RJN also includes the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Fidelity IV, 402 Fed.Appx. 194 (9th Cir.2010), and mandate issued in accordance therewith. Third, defendants’ RJN lists six filings in this action and a filing in the related action in the federal court in California, Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, No. CV 06-4271 CAS (JWJx). Rather than relying upon any specific pleading, Fidelity simply seeks to have this court take judicial notice of the docket sheet herein. See Pis.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 1. Pleadings and orders in this action, or others, are matters of public record and hence properly the subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir.2006) (taking judicial notice, as a matter of public record, of “pleadings, memoranda, expert reports, etc., from [earlier] litigation[,]” which were thus “readily verifiable”); Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 994 n. 2 (9th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (“court records from related proceedings can be taken into account without converting a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion[]”), overruled on other grounds, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008). Therefore, to the extent necessary to resolve this motion, the court grants the defendants’ and Fidelity’s respective RJNs. The court is only taking judicial notice of those prior filings and orders to show, for example, that a prior proceeding occurred or that a certain argument or position was asserted therein. See, e.g., Faurie v. Berkeley Unified School District, 2008 WL 820682, at *2 n. 3 (N.D.Cal. March 26, 2008) (taking judicial notice of pleadings to “see what arguments Defendants advanced in” another court and “what that court ruled[ ]”); Mitchell v. Branham, 2008 WL 3200666, at *8 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 5, 2008) (“[d]ocuments that are part of the public record may be judicially noticed to show ... that a judicial proceeding occurred or that a document was filed in another court case[ ]”). The parties are not requesting that the court take judicial notice of factual findings made by other courts; and, indeed, the court could not do that. See Mitchell, 2008 WL 3200666, at *8 (citations omitted) (“[A] court may not take judicial notice of findings of facts from another case.”) II. “Request for Ruling Consistent with Ninth Circuit Mandate” A. Rule of Mandate It is well settled in this Circuit that “ ‘[w]hen a case has been decided by an appellate court and remanded, the court to which it is remanded must proceed in accordance with the mandate and such law of the case as was established by the appellate court.’ ” United States v. Luong, 627 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Firth v. United States, 554 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir.1977)). An equally well settled corollary is that a district court “ ‘may consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate [.]’ ” United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 256, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895)) (emphasis added). Thus, on remand where “courts are often confronted with issues that were never considered by the remanding court[,] ... [b]roadly speaking, mandates require respect for what the higher court decided, not for what it did not decide.” United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). So, “although lower courts are obliged to execute the terms of a mandate, they are free as to anything not foreclosed by the mandate, and, under certain circumstances, an order issued after remand may deviate from the mandate if it is not counter to the spirit of the circuit court’s decision.” United States v. Perez, 475 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he ultimate task is to distinguish matters that have been decided on appeal, and are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court, from matters that have not[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, footnote and emphasis omitted). In undertaking that task, “the Supreme Court [has] emphasized that, in addition to the mandate itself, ‘[t]he opinion by this court at the time of rendering its' decree may be consulted to ascertain what was intended by its mandate[.]’ ” Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1093 (quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 256, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895)). “[I]n construing a mandate, the lower court may consider the opinion the mandate purports to enforce as well as the procedural posture and substantive law from which it arises.” Id. at 1093. The mandate here is exceedingly brief, indicating that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment takes effect November 22, 2010. Defs.’ RJN, exh. B thereto (Doc. 328-2) at 2. It concludes by specifying that it is “the formal mandate of this [Ninth Circuit] Court issued pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Id. Because the mandate is silent as to its scope, the court will look to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. When the court does that, it is readily apparent, as earlier mentioned, that the Ninth Circuit expressly left open the issues of renewal by affidavit in 2008 and renewal by registration in 2007. Thus, the mandate does not foreclose consideration of those two issues now. Consequently, this court may properly resolve those two issues without impermissibly exceeding the scope of the mandate. B. “2007 Certification” 1. Contents Section 12-1612(A) permits renewal of a judgment “by filing an affidavit for renewal with the clerk of the proper court.” A.R.S. § 12-1612(A). The Friedmans argue that Fidelity did not renew the Arizona judgment by affidavit because it did not file a document pursuant to that statute specifically designated as a “renewal affidavit.” Further, regardless of its title, and contrary to what Fidelity believes, the Friedmans argue that the 2007 Certification is not tantamount to a renewal affidavit because it does not include many of the details section 12-1612(B) specifies. Given that lack of detail, that 2007 Certification was “woefully inadequate” from the Fried-mans’ perspective in that it did not serve the notice purpose of that statute. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. D thereto (Doc. 328-4) at 7:14. Strenuously disagreeing, Fidelity claims that the 2007 Certification did provide the requisite notice because it “identifie[d] the parties, the court in which the judgment was docketed, the date and amount of judgment, and the owner of the judgment.” Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 14:4-5. Fidelity also points out that “[t]he Fried-mans do not dispute that they had notice of the 2007 renewal, nor do they contend that any other person lacked notice of the existence of the judgment.” Id. at 14:7-8. Characterizing the omissions from the 2007 Certification as “alleged technical ‘deficiencies!,]’ ” Fidelity further asserts they are not “misleading[.]” Id. at 14:22. Hence, Fidelity reasons that “if’ such deficiencies “exist, [they] are all correctable” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) and its state counterpart, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Id. at 14:21-22. Therefore, Fidelity argues that such “deficiencies” do not “‘doom’ the validity of the renewal.” Id. at 14:8-9. “[T]he statutory requirements must be strictly followed in order that a judgment be renewed.” Triple E. Produce Corp. v. Valencia, 170 Ariz. 375, 824 P.2d 771 (App.1991) (citing, inter alia, Fay v. Harris, 64 Ariz. 10, 164 P.2d 860 (1945)). At the same time, however, “some defects contained in an affidavit may not defeat a renewal of judgment[.]” State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Galloway, 224 Ariz. 325, 330 n. 5, 230 P.3d 708, 713 n. 5 (App.2010). For example, in Weltsch v. O’Brien, 25 Ariz.App. 50, 540 P.2d 1269 (App.1975), the court held that “the failure to include in the renewal affidavit information as to the book and page of the clerk’s docket in which the judgment sought to be renewed appears was not fatal and d[id] not affect the validity of the renewal.” Id. at 53, 540 P.2d at 1272. Those omissions were of “no practical signifieance[,]” the court reasoned, because the information in the renewal affidavit “sufficiently identifie[d] the judgment sought to be renewed[.]” Id. Likewise, in Fay, an arguably more significant error in a renewal affidavit, failure to “show the exact balance due[ ]” because of “errors in computation^]” did not defeat renewal. Fay, 64 Ariz. at 11, 164 P.2d at 861. That error was not fatal to renewal, explained the Fay Court, because “all of the items of the judgment appeared, all of the credits were set out, the data appeared on the face of the affidavit, from which the exact balance could be determined.” Id. (emphasis added). “Any party interested, under these circumstances, would have the right on notice, or the court would have the right to correct the judgment on its own motion[,]” the Court pointed out. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Court in Fay held that the judgment was properly renewed based upon the “data and correct computations” which did “show the exact amount due.” Id. at 14, 164 P.2d at 862. Heavily relying upon Fay, the court in Triple E. reached a similar result. Due to an inadvertent failure to credit a payment made, in Triple E. the renewal affidavit incorrectly overstated the balance due on the judgment. The Triple E. court held that that error did not “prevent the judgment from being renewed[,]” but only “in the amount actually due and owing.” Triple E., 170 Ariz. at 378, 824 P.2d at 774 (footnote omitted). Admittedly, the renewal affidavits in Fay, Triple E. and Weltsch were each flawed in their own way. Significantly, despite those flaws, the judgment debtor and interested third parties could determine the balance due from the face of those renewal affidavits. Hence, those judgment creditors sufficiently complied with section 12-1612 because each provided the notice which that statute contemplates. See Weltsch, 25 Ariz.App. at 53, 540 P.2d at 1272 (“[0]ne of the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-1611 et seq. is to give notice to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the identity of the judgment to be renewed.”); J.C. Penney v. Lane, 197 Ariz. 113, 119, 3 P.3d 1033, 1039 (App. 1999) (emphasis added) (“[0]ne of the purposes for the requirements concerning the affidavit of renewal is to give notice to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the status of the judgment.”); In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 345, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (filing of a renewal affidavit “serves to notify interested parties of the existence and continued viability of the judgment.”); but see J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. at 119, 3 P.3d at 1039 (filing of a renewal affidavit “in a superior court in a county different from that in which its judgment was docketed, ... did not provide reasonable notice to interested persons of the status of the judgment and cannot be considered a correctable error[ ]”). Here, it is undisputed that on April 5, 2007, Fidelity did not file a document explicitly designated as a “renewal affidavit.” Ordinarily, the court would be hesitant to exalt form over substance. Thus, merely inaccurately titling a document would not necessarily render it defective or somehow invalid. If the only omission from the 2007 Certification was the failure to properly designate it as a “renewal affidavit,” in all likelihood, the court would overlook that omission. Failing to properly title the 2007 Certification as a “renewal affidavit” is not simply a matter of form given the legal import of an affidavit, however. By definition, “[a]n ‘affidavit’ is a signed, written statement, made under oath before an officer authorized to administer an oath or affirmation in which the affiant vouches that what is stated is true.” In re Wetzel, 143 Ariz. 35, 43, 691 P.2d 1063, 1071 (1984); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (an affidavit is “[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths[ ]”) The 2007 Certification itself is not signed and does not include a notary’s jurat. A “ ‘[j]urat’ means a notarial act in which the notary certifies that a signer, ..., has made in the notary’s presence a voluntary signature and has taken an oath or affirmation vouching for the truthfulness of the signed document.” A.R.S. § 41-311(6); see also A.R.S. § 12-2221(A) (“oath or affirmation shall be administered” to “best awaken the conscience and impress the mind of the person taking the oath or affirmation!]” and “shall be taken upon the penalty of perjury! ]”)• Additionally, the 2007 Certification is not a statement of any kind. It is a one page document, reciting the caption in this case and the names of Fidelity’s attorneys and their contact information. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 2. That Certification also notes the civil docket case number for the California federal court. See id. Plainly the 2007 Certification itself lacks even the most basic attributes of an affidavit of any sort. Compounding Fidelity’s failure to file a document specifically designated as a “renewal affidavit,” and containing the essential components of such an affidavit, is that even taking into account the attachments to the 2007 Certification, the bulk of the information set forth in A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) is missing. Certified copies of the California judgment, the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal order, and minutes of the California district court’s dismissal order following issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate, are attached to the 2007 Certification. It is possible to glean from those attachments, as Fidelity emphasizes, the names of the parties, the court in which the California judgment was docketed, as well as the date, amount and owners of that judgment. That basic information is only a small portion of the contents of a renewal affidavit, however, as section 12-1612(B)(1) delineates. Fidelity’s additional renewal affidavit declares that it recorded the California judgment in Maricopa and Coconino Counties. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8) at 4.T1-13, ¶ 7. Assuming those recordings were made prior to April 5, 2007, they should have been included in the 2007 Certification, along with “the name of the county in which recorded, ... the number and page of the docket book in which recorded by the county recorder!,]” as section 12-1612(B)(1) specifies. See A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)(1). The 2007 Certification and its attachments do not mention those County recordings at all. The court could overlook the omission of those County recordings, especially, although unlikely, if they occurred after the filing of the 2007 Certification. However, the court cannot overlook, and what is far more troubling is, the absence of any of the information enumerated in the four other subparts of section 12 — 1612(B). In accordance with that statute, “[t]he judgment creditor, ... may ..., make and file ... a renewal affidavit, ... setting forth[,]” inter alia: 2. That no execution is anywhere outstanding and unreturned upon the judgment, or if any execution is outstanding, that fact shall be stated. 3. The date and amount of all payments upon the judgment and that all payments have been duly credited upon the judgment. 4. That there are no set-offs or counterclaims in favor of the judgment debt- or, and if a counterclaim or set-off does exist in favor of the judgment debtor, the amount thereof, if certain, or, if the counterclaim or set-off is unsettled or undetermined, a statement that when it is settled or determined by action or otherwise, it may be allowed as a payment or credit upon the judgment. 5. The exact amount due upon the judgment after allowing all set-offs and counterclaims known to affiant, and other facts or circumstances necessary to a complete disclosure as to the exact condition of the judgment A.R.S. § 12 — 1612(B)(2)-(5) (emphases added). None of that enumerated information can be found in the 2007 Certification or its attachments. Tellingly, the additional renewal affidavit which Fidelity filed on February 8, 2008, as part of its response to the Fried-mans’ original motion to quash, mirrors section 12-1612(B) in its entirety. That later filed affidavit indicates that by February 20, 2007, prior to the filing of the 2007 Certification, Fidelity had collected nearly $15,000.00 in cash and two sets of coins having an unstated value. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8) at 4-5, ¶ 10. Those successful ■ collection efforts are conspicuously absent from the 2007 Certification. Obviously, without that information the “exact amount due upon the judgment” on April 5, 2007, when the Certification was filed, cannot be ascertained. Moreover, section 12-1612(B)(2) is mandatory in terms of whether or not any execution of the judgment is outstanding. Despite that statutorily mandated obligation, Fidelity did not disclose that information anywhere in the 2007■ Certification or its attachments. Further, arguably the later filed additional renewal affidavit contains “other facts or circumstances necessary to a complete disclosure as to the exact condition of the judgment[ ]” information of which Fidelity was fully aware of on April 5, 2007 when it filed its second Certification. See A.R.S. § 12 — 1612(B)(5). That renewal affidavit explains the filing of the RICO action by Fidelity on July 6, 2007. Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (328-8) at 5, ¶ 13. It also indicates that in that RICO action, “[o]n July 12, 2007, the court issued a preliminary injunction freezing defendants’ assets and enjoining their transfer.” Id. The additional renewal affidavit also states that “[o]n March 22, 2007, Fidelity recorded th[at] preliminary injunction in Maricopa County, Arizona, number 2007-0339883.” Id. Neither the 2007 Certification nor any of its attachments mentions that litigation, which at least from Fidelity’s perspective, bears directly on the judgment it is attempting to enforce herein. Despite Fidelity’s urging, the court cannot agree that the missing information described above amounts to nothing more than “technical omission[s] or errors” that should not “defeat the renewal of the judgment.” See Weltsch, 25 Ariz.App. at 54, 540 P.2d at 1272. The omissions from the 2007 Certification are glaring and critical. In sharp contrast to Weltsch, where the clerk’s docket number and page were omitted, the omissions here, such as “[t]he date and amount of all payments upon the judgment and that all payments have been duly credited upon the judgment[,]” A.R.S. § 12 — 1612(B)(3), are of “practical significance.” See id. at 53, 540 P.2d at 1272. Without that information, neither judgment debtors nor interested third parties have any way to determine the amount outstanding on the judgment, thus thwarting the notice purpose of section 12-1612. This is not a situation such as Fay where all of the information necessary to ascertain “the exact balance [of the judgment] could be determined from the face of the” 2007 Certification and its attachments. See Triple E., 170 Ariz. at 378, 824 P.2d at 774. Nor are the outright omissions from the 2007 Certification mere computational errors, as in Fay, where the amount due and owing was incorrect. Simply put, here, interested parties could not ascertain from the documents Fidelity filed on April 5, 2007, the exact outstanding balance of the California judgment. Likewise, they could not confirm whether execution on that judgment is outstanding — a fact which must be disclosed pursuant to A.R.S. § 12 — 1612(B)(2). Deficiencies in the 2007 Certification do exist, as is abundantly clear. And, although Fidelity asserts otherwise, those omissions are misleading. That is because section 12-1612(B) places equal import on disclosing the existence of set-offs, counterclaims, or outstanding executions, as it does on disclosing the lack of such items. Yet, Fidelity did not disclose the lack of any of the foregoing in its 2007 Certification or attachments. It was not until roughly ten months later that Fidelity disclosed that information in its additional renewal affidavit. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8)at 4, ¶ 9; at 5, ¶ 11. Finally, the court finds unavailing Fidelity’s bald assertion that the numerous omissions from the 2007 Certification and its attachments are mere “clerical mistakes ... arising from oversight or omission” which are “correctable” under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(a) and its state counterpart, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a). See Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 14:9-11; and 14:22. Quite simply, Fidelity’s omissions are not “clerical mistakes” within the meaning of those Rules. In pertinent part, that Rule states: The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) (emphasis added). Mirroring its Federal counterpart, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a) states in relevant part: Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. That similarity is not a coincidence. “The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted from the federal rules.” La Paz County v. Yuma County, 153 Ariz. 162, 164, 735 P.2d 772, 774 (Ariz.1987). Arizona state courts thus “give great weight to interpretations given to similar federal rules.” Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, here, there is no reason to separately analyze the clerical mistake issue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Further, a singular analysis is in keeping with the notion that “uniformity in interpretation of [Arizona] rules and federal rules is highly desirable.” See Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 304, 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1990). “The basic distinction between ‘clerical mistakes’ and mistakes that cannot be corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist of ‘blunders in execution’ whereas the latter consist of instances where the court changes its mind [.]” Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987). “It is a mistake in mechanics, rather than apprehension.” Dearing v. United States, 1996 WL 523782, at *2 (E.D.Wash.1996). “The focus of Rule 60(a) is ‘on what the court originally intended to do.’ ” In re Fort Defiance Housing Corp., 2011 WL 1578504, at *4 (D.Ariz. April 27, 2011) (quoting Blanton, 813 F.2d at 1576). “Mistakes under Rule 60(a) are not factual or legal and deal with the intent of the trial court.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Put differently, “Rule 60(a) errors are minor and ministerial ones, not substantively factual or legal.” Id. at *4 n. 4 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, Rule 60(a) “may not be used to correct substantial errors, such as errors of law.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir.1990) (citation omitted); accord Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“The relevant test for the application of Rule 60(a) is whether the change affects substantive rights of the parties and is therefore beyond the scope of Rule 60(a) or is instead a clerical error, a copying or computational mistake, which is correctable under the Rule.”) What is more, Rule 60(a) does not permit a court to “correct something that was deliberately done but later discovered to be wrong.” McNickle v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 888 F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir.1989). Fidelity’s errors, in the form of omissions from the 2007 Certification and its attachments, were substantial, as discussed herein. Fidelity did not commit a mathematical error or an error in computation. See In re Hale, 359 B.R. 310, 318 (Bankr.E.D.Wash.2007) (describing “Mathematical errors” as “classic examples of clerical mistakes under Rule 60(a)”). Likewise, Fidelity did not misidentify a party. See Mitchell Repair Information Co. v. Rutchey, 2009 WL 3242093 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 2, 2009) (granting Rule 60(a) relief correcting the judgment to include defendant’s “true name” in addition to his alias). Rather, Fidelity omitted from the 2007 Certification the majority of the information A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) specifies for a renewal affidavit. Those substantive factual and legal omissions left judgment debtors and interested third parties alike uncertain, in many respects, as to the status of the California judgment. Accordingly, that 2007 Certification did not serve the essential purpose of A.R.S. § 12-1612(B> — notice. Those omissions had nothing to do with this court’s intent. Hence, if for no other reason, because Fidelity has not shown that the omissions from the 2007 Certification were clerical mistakes, it has no basis for seeking or obtaining relief under federal or state Rule 60(a). To summarize, Fidelity’s 2007 Certification did not serve, in accordance with A.R.S. § 12-1612(B), to renew its 2002 Arizona judgment because that Certification is not specifically designated as a renewal affidavit. More problematic is that even considering the 2007 Certification’s attachments, that Certification has almost none of the characteristics of a renewal affidavit. Lastly, there is no basis whatsoever for “correcting” Fidelity’s 2007 Certification under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) or Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Consequently, Fidelity’s 2007 Certification did not serve to renew its 2002 Arizona judgment, as section 12-1612(B) permits. 2. Timeliness Even assuming arguendo that the 2007 Certification “was sufficient to operate as a renewal affidavit ...nonetheless, the Friedmans contend that it was “premature[,]” because that Certification was not filed within the time frame set forth in A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). See Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 327) at 5:23. The Friedmans thus argue that that Certification was “ineffective[]” to renew the 2002 Arizona judgment. See id. at 5:24. Also assuming arguendo that the 2007 Certification is a renewal affidavit, Fidelity-does not directly dispute the untimeliness of that filing. Instead, Fidelity is taking the position that because it “took the debt- or examination of [defendant] Anita Meshkatai” within the time frame for the filing of a renewal affidavit, i.e., within 90 days of the expiration of the 2002 Arizona judgment, that “examination gave notice of the Arizona judgment and its renewal.” Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 14:26 (emphasis added). Strenuously disagreeing, the Fried-mans counter that “[knowledge [by] a judgment debtor does not excuse a judgment creditor from following Arizona law[,]” requiring the timely filing of a renewal affidavit. Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 332) at 10:1-2. Defendants have the stronger argument by far. Essentially that is because Arizona requires strict compliance with its judgment renewal statutes, and Fidelity did not so comply. Furthermore, Mrs. Meshkatai’s judgment debtor examination did not provide the notice which those renewal statutes contemplate. Fidelity registered its California judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. As relevant at this juncture, that statute provides in part that a judgment registered thereunder “shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.” 28 U.S.C. § 1968. Rule 69(a)(1), governing the procedure for execution on money judgments “is to the same effect[J” Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 536 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir.2008). That Rule states in pertinent part: The procedure on execution — and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution — must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies. Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a)(1). “To paraphrase, Rule 69 provides that state law applies generally, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2010). There is no federal statute specifically governing renewal of judgments. Hence, treating the 2007 Certification as a “proceeding[] supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution[,]” as do the parties, Arizona law governs the renewal of the Arizona judgment herein. See In re Davis, 323 B.R. 745, 748 (Bankr.D.Ariz. 2005) (citing Fed. Bankr.R. 7069, incorporating Rule 69(a)(1), Arizona law governs renewal of bankruptcy court judgment registered in Arizona); accord In re Fifarek, 370 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr.W.D.Mich. 2007) (“Rule 69(a) mandates the practice and procedure of the State of Michigan be utilized to enforce or renew the prior bankruptcy court judgment.”); Lillie v. Hunt, 323 B.R. 665 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn. 2005) (applying Tennessee state rule pertaining to renewal of judgments to judgment registered in Tennessee District Bankruptcy Court). Likewise, because 28 U.S.C. § 1963, the statute under which Fidelity registered the California judgment, “has no limitations period[,]” this court will “look[ ] to the law of the registration forum[,]” ie., Arizona, “for its statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments.” See Hilao, 536 F.3d at 988 (citing cases). “In Arizona, a judgment becomes unenforceable after five years from the date of entry unless action is taken to renew it.” In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637; see also Crye v. Edwards, 178 Ariz. 327, 328, 873 P.2d 665, 666 (App.1993) (“monetary judgments expire in Arizona if not renewed every five years”). Section 12-1551(B) specifically provides: An execution or other process shall not be issued upon a judgment after the expiration of five years from the date of its entry unless the judgment is renewed by affidavit or process pursuant to § 12-1612 or an action is brought on it within five years from the date of the entry of the judgment or of its renewal. A.R.S. § 12-1551(B) (emphasis added). Thus, under that statute, “it is the judgment creditor who must act to prevent expiration, not the debtor who must act to achieve it.” Crye, 178 Ariz. at 329, 873 P.2d at 666. So, quite simply, “[i]f the creditor fails to renew the judgment, it expires. The judgment debtor need do nothing.” Id. at 328-329, 873 P.2d at 666-667. At issue now is the timeliness of Fidelity’s purported renewal affidavit, i.e., the 2007 Certification, under A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). Pursuant to that statute, a “judgment creditor need only file an affidavit, in a form specified by statute, within a ninety day period before the judgment expires to obtain renewal and maintain the priority of the original judgment.” Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122 (footnote omitted). Arizona courts have consistently held that “strict compliance with the renewal provisions is required to effect a renewal.” Galloway, 224 Ariz. at 329-330, 230 P.3d at 712-713 (citing cases) (footnote omitted). That is especially so with respect to the timeliness of a renewal affidavit, as the Galloway court explained. While “recognizing] that some defects contained in an affidavit may not defeat a renewal of judgment,” that court stressed that “timeliness of the affidavit is a rigid statutory requirement and is not subject to modification by the court.” Id. at 330 n. 5, 230 P.3d at 713 n. 5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Mobile Discount Corp. v. Hargus, 156 Ariz. 559, 753 P.2d 1215 (App.1988), illustrates just how critical the timely filing of an affidavit of renewal is in Arizona. A.R.S. § 12-1612(E), governing the filing of additional and successive renewal affidavits, allows for the filing of same “within ninety days of expiration of five years from the date of the filing of a prior renewal affidavit.” A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) (emphasis added). Finding “[t]he language of th[at] statute” to be “plain and unambiguous!,]” the Mobile Discount court held that the italicized phrase “means within 90 days before expiration and not 90 days after expiration.” Mobile Discount, 156 Ariz. at 560, 753 P.2d at 1216. The court thus held that a second renewal affidavit, recorded just “16 days past the expiration of five years from the filing and recordation of the first affidavit of renewal[,]” was not timely. Id. To be sure, the Mobile Discount court was considering the filing of a second renewal affidavit under subsection (E), and not, as here, the filing of an initial renewal affidavit under subsection (B) of A.R.S. § 12-1612. Mobile Discount is no less instructive on the issue of whether the 2007 Certification was timely filed, however. That is because sections 12-1612(E) and 12-1612(B) contain substantially similar language as to the time frame for filing under each. Much like A.R.S. § 12-1612(E), section 12-1612(B) specifies that the time for filing a renewal affidavit is “within ninety days preceding the expiration of five years from the date of entry of ... judgment[.]” A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). Thus that statute, too, is “plain and unambiguous[ ]” as to the time frame for filing a renewal affidavit. See Mobile Discount, 156 Ariz. at 560, 753 P.2d at 1216. A renewal affidavit must be filed within 90 days before “the expiration of five years from the date of entry of ... judgment! ]” — not some indefinite time prior thereto. See A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). “[0]ne of the purposes for the requirements concerning the affidavit of renewal is to give notice to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the status of the judgment.” J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. at 119, 3 P.3d at 1039 (citations omitted). “Among the parties most interested in the status of the judgment are those considering extending credit to the judgment debt- or.” Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122. In addition to providing notice, “the filing requirements of’ Arizona’s statutes allowing for renewal by affidavit “limit the amount of record searching interested parties must do to ascertain whether the judgment remains valid.” Smith, 209 Ariz. at 346, 101 P.3d at 640 (citation omitted). Strict statutory adherence to the renewal statutes thus is essential to serve “their central purpose” — notice. See Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122. Here, even deeming the 2007 Certification to be a renewal affidavit (which the court has already found that it was not), it is evident that Fidelity did not file that Certification within the time frame section 12-1612(B) imposes. Fidelity registered its California judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 by filing a certified copy of that judgment in this district court on November 14, 2002. See Pis.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 10. Relying upon A.R.S. § 12-1551(A), the Friedmans declare that the Arizona judgment “was effective for a period of five years from the date of docketing.” Defs.’ RJN, exh. D thereto (Doc. 328-^4) at 4:11-12 (emphasis added). So, when calculating the time for filing a renewal affidavit under that statute, the Friedmans use November 14, 2002 — Fidelity’s original registration date. See id. at 4:21-5:3. Before proceeding, some clarification is necessary. First, in computing the time frame for filing a renewal affidavit pursuant to section 12-1612(B), the date of the “entry of such judgment” governs, not the “date of docketing” as the Friedmans presume. See A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). That distinction is especially relevant here because whether looking to the California judgment, or, as the Friedmans do, to the Arizona judgment, the filing dates are different than the entry dates. The California judgment was filed on July 10, 2002, but not entered until July 12, 2002. Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 8. Likewise, the Arizona judgment was filed on November 14, 2002, but not entered until November 18, 2002. Pis.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 10. As A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) mandates, this court will use the date of entry — not the docketing date, as the Fried-mans urge. Next, the court must consider which “judgment” forms the basis for computing the date by which Fidelity had to timely file a renewal affidavit based upon Arizona statute. Section 12-1612(B) requires that renewal affidavits be made and filed “within ninety days preceding the expiration of five years from the date of entry of such judgment [.]” A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) (emphasis added). Assuming with no explanation that registering a judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is the equivalent of entry of a judgment in the first instance, the Friedmans base their timeliness argument only on the Arizona judgment, entered on November 18, 2002. That assumption finds support in the Ninth Circuit’s settled view that registration of a judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is “the functional equivalent of obtaining a new judgment of the registration court.” See Hilao, 536 F.3d at 989 (citing Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir.1966); Marx v. Go Publ’g Co., 721 F.2d 1272, 1273 (9th Cir. 1983)). Consistent with that view, in determining whether Fidelity’s purported renewal affidavit was timely, the relevant judgment is the Arizona, not the California, judgment. For these reasons, the court finds that when calculating the time frame for filing a renewal affidavit in this particular case: (1) the date of entry of the judgment governs; and (2) the pertinent judgment is the Arizona judgment. With that clarification, even if Fidelity’s 2007 Certification fit the statutory definition of a renewal affidavit under Arizona law, that Certification was not timely. Based upon the Arizona judgment’s entry date of November 18, 2002, “within ninety days of [November 18, 2007], or the expiration of five years from the entry of the Judgment, [Fidelity] w[as] required to file [its] first renewal affidavit.” See Davis, 323 B.R. at 750 (citing A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)) (footnote omitted). In other words, Fidelity had a 90 day window commencing roughly August 20, 2007, in which to file its renewal affidavit. Fidelity did not do that; it filed its purported renewal affidavit (the 2007 Certification), on April 5, 2007, approximately 225 days prior to the expiration of its Arizona judgment. Given the unequivocal language of A.R.S. § 12-1612(B), undoubtedly, Fidelity did not file that Certification within the statutorily prescribed time frame. That premature filing renders the 2007 Certification ineffective to renew the Arizona judgment by the filing of an affidavit. Cf. Galloway, 224 Ariz. at 330, 230 P.3d at 713 (creditor’s 16 month “premature filing of its renewal affidavit” was “ineffective”). The court is fully aware, as Fidelity mentions, that ultimately the Galloway court found that the “prematurity of the renewal affidavit” did not preclude the judgment creditor from proceeding with that garnishment action. See id. Even if, as Fidelity maintains, the “ruling on the validity of the renewal affidavit was ... unnecessary to the holding” in Galloway, that does not somehow excuse Fidelity’s premature filing of the purported renewal affidavit, i.e., the 2007 Certification. Unquestionably, the timing of the filing of a renewal affidavit is critical. Indeed, earlier in this litigation the Arizona Supreme Court unequivocally stated: [T]he judgment debtor will be released from further obligation unless a judgment creditor timely files a renewal affidavit or brings an action on the judgment within five years after its entry. Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122 (emphasis added). Fidelity did not comply with the time frame for filing a renewal affidavit under Arizona’s statutes. Those statutes reflect the Arizona state legislature’s determination that renewal affidavits must be filed within the time frame specified therein. It is not within this court’s prerogative to alter that time frame by, for example, arbitrarily allowing, as here, a purported renewal affidavit to be filed well in advance of that 90 day window. Fidelity makes an attempt to show its compliance with section 12-1612(B)’s 90 day window. Fidelity points out that on August 24, 2007, within that statutory window, it conducted a judgment debtor examination of Mrs. Meshkatai. The taking of that deposition, reflected not in a filing by Fidelity, but only in a minute entry on the court’s docket (stating that it was “held” and took four and a half hours), can hardly be said to provide the requisite notice that the Arizona judgment was renewed. See Pis.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 24. That meager docket entry certainly does not “serve[ ] to notify interested parties of the existence and continued viability” of the Arizona judgment. See Smith, 209 Ariz. at 345, 101 P.3d at 639. Furthermore, this theory of renewal by deposition is just a narrower variant of Fidelity’s theory, argued unsuccessfully in Fidelity III, that “a judgment could be renewed by ‘any matter or proceeding in a court, civil or criminal!)]’ ” See Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122. Under that theory: [a] potential lender would be required to search the records of at least every court in the state — and perhaps the nation — to determine whether a writ of garnishment or other proceeding relating to the judgment^ such as a judgment debtor’s examination,] had been instituted. See id. (citations omitted). In contrast, section 12-1612, allowing for renewal by affidavit, provides a far less tedious and more efficient means of notification. Under that statute, “a potential creditor need only search the docket of the court in which the original judgment was entered for the ninety days preceding the five-year expiration date to determine whether a judgment has been renewed by affidavit.” Id. Adopting the sound reasoning of the Fidelity III Court, this court likewise concludes that: It would make little sense for the legislature to have provided strict temporal and filing limitations on the affidavit process, while at the same time allowing any action relating to the judgment, filed anywhere, to renew it. Id. Consequently, Fidelity’s judgment debtor examination of Mrs. Meshkatai is not a substitute for the timely filing of a renewal affidavit under A.R.S. § 12-1612. “Inherent in any statute of limitations is the risk that a party who owes money may escape liability if the creditor does not act in a timely fashion.” Id. (emphasis added). That is precisely what happened to Fidelity. Fidelity had available to it “a simple mechanism for renewing the [Arizona registered] judgment.” See id. As “[t]he judgment creditor[,]” Fidelity “needfed] only [to] file an affidavit, in a form specified by statute, within a ninety day period before the [Arizona registered] judgment expire[d][,]” but Fidelity did not do that. See id. Fidelity’s 2007 Certification did not contain most of the information set forth in A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). Therefore, it did not constitute a “renewal affidavit” within the meaning of that statute. Even construing that 2007 Certification as a “renewal affidavit,” Fidelity cannot rely upon it to renew the Arizona judgment because Fidelity did not file that Certification within section 12-1612(B)’s 90 day window before the expiration of that judgment. C. 2008 “Additional Renewal Affidavit” Having found that the 2007 Certification is not tantamount to a renewal affidavit under section 12 — 1612(B) and, alternatively, that that Certification was not timely filed, the court turns to Fidelity’s 2008 additional renewal affidavit. Fidelity is taking the position that that affidavit, too, renewed the Arizona judgment. As part of its response to the Fried-mans’ original 2008 motion to quash, Fidelity attached a document entitled, “Additional Renewal Affidavit Renewing the Judgment Registered in Arizona on November 15, 2002,” which was being “submitted under A.R.S. § 12 — 1612(B) and (E).” Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8) at 2 (emphasis omitted); and at 3:16-17, ¶ 3. That additional renewal affidavit is “ineffective” to renew the Arizona judgment, the Friedmans argue, because it “was filed on February 7, 2008, more than five years after the Judgment was registered.” Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 327) at 7:15-16 (citations omitted). Timeliness aside, there is a more fundamental shortcoming with Fidelity’s additional affidavit. It cannot serve to “cure[] any deficiencies in the original [April 5, 2007] Renewal request[,]” as Fidelity claims, Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 15:9, because the 2007 Certification did not constitute a renewal affidavit, as earlier discussed in section (B)(1) above. A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) allows for, inter alia, “[additional ... renewal affidavits as provided for in subsection B [to] be made and filed within ninety days of expiration of five years from the date of the filing of a prior renewal affidavit.” A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) (emphasis added). The filing of a valid “prior renewal affidavit” thus is a predicate to the filing of an additional renewal affidavit under that statute. It follows, a fortiori, that because Fidelity did not file a “renewal affidavit” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-1612(B), necessarily there could be no “additional ... affidavit” as section 12-1613(E) allows. See A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no merit to Fidelity’s claim that the filing of an additional renewal affidavit on February 7, 2008, renewed its California judgment entered here on November 18, 2002. D. 2007 “Re-Registration” Arizona’s renewal statutes notwithstanding, Fidelity asserts that in accordance with federal law, more particularly, 28 U.S.C. § 1963, on April 5, 2007, it “validly registered the California judgment.” Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 9:2 (emphasis omitted). Relying exclusively upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Del Prado v. B.N. Development Co., 602 F.3d 660 (5th Cir.2010), Fidelity contends that “registration of its California judgment in Arizona in 2002 did not preclude [that] second registration in 2007.” See Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 13:14-15. Additionally, Fidelity argues that its April 5, 2007, re-registration was timely because it was filed within Arizona’s four year statute of limitations governing the enforcement of foreign judgments, i.e., A.R.S. § 12-544(3). Thus, even if this court finds, as it has, that Fidelity did not properly renew its judgment under Arizona law, Fidelity maintains that that judgment is still enforceable because in 2007 it timely re-registered that judgment here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Disagreeing, the Friedmans contend that: (1) “federal law does not permit a second registration of a judgment in the same foreign court[;]” and (2) Fidelity’s reliance upon Del Prado is “misplaced.” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 332) at 6:16-17 (emphasis omitted); and at 6:27. Then, stressing that because the “California Judgment was final and enforceable in 2002[,]” id. at 5:7-8, the Friedmans retort that the 2007 “[Certification is not a [v]alid [[Independent [Registration of th[at] California [¡judgment in Arizona.” Id. at 3:23-24 (emphases omitted). Consequently, despite the purported 2007 “re-registration,” the Friedmans counter that because Fidelity did not properly renew its Arizona judgment in accordance with Arizona’s renewal statutes, that judgment is no longer enforceable. 1. “Re-registration” under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 Section 1963 allows, inter alia, money judgments entered in a district court to be registered in another district court in several situations. Under one scenario, such registration is allowed “when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown.” 28 U.S.C. § 1963. On July 12, 2002, Fidelity entered its judgment against defendants in the California federal court. Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 8. Without explicitly finding good cause, that California Court issued an order “allow[ing] [Fidelity] to register its judgment in the State of Arizona.” See id. at 14. The California federal court also issued a “Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another District^]” Id. at 3. Consistent with section 1963, on November 14, 2002, Fidelity registered its California judgment in this Arizona federal district court. See Pis.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 10. More than four years after issuing the first Certification of Judgment, on January 31, 2007, the California federal court issued a second “Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another District^]” Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 3. That 2007 Certification indicates that the appeal of Fidelity’s 2002 California judgment was “dismissed by order entered May 15, 2003.” Id. As did the 2002 Certification, this 2007 Certification pertains to Fidelity’s underlying California judgment. See id. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1963 allows, inter alia, registration of a foreign judgment “when the judgment has become final by appeal[,]” Fidelity asserts that when it filed that second certification in this district court on April 5, 2007, it “met all the criteria under” that statute “for registering a federal judgment in another district.” Pis.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 9:15-16. Fidelity thus reasons that even if it did not properly and timely renew its judgment under Arizona law, that judgment remains valid and enforceable here because in 2007 it properly “re-registered” that judgment under section 1963. Based solely upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Del Prado, 602 F.3d 660, Fidelity contends “registration of its California judgment in Arizona in 2002” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 “di