Full opinion text
OPINION PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge. This matter is before the Court on the motion of named plaintiffs James Copeland, Earl Moorer, and Marshallene McNeil (“the Moving Plaintiffs”) for final certification of a plaintiffs’ class and approval of a settlement agreement that would resolve the pending claims of approximately 40,000 plaintiffs and compensate thousands of victims of race discrimination whose complaints have gone unanswered for decades. The defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture, supports the motion. After careful consideration of the arguments made by the Moving Plaintiffs and the defendant, the comments and objections offered by interested parties, the statements made by interested persons at the Fairness Hearing on September 1, 2011, and the long history of this case and that of its predecessor, Pigford v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1978 (D.D.C.), the Court will grant the motion, certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and approve the settlement. Although, like any compromise, the settlement agreement before the Court will not satisfy everyone, it offers class members their best option for obtaining meaningful redress of longstanding injuries. I. BACKGROUND A. Pigford v. Glickman (“Pigford I") 1. Claims of Pigford I Plaintiffs and Their Resolution by Consent Decree In 1997, a group of African-American farmers brought suit in this Court against Dan Glickman, at that time the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). Their final amended complaint alleged that, from January 1983 through January 1997, the USDA discriminated on the basis of race in allocating benefits under various federal agricultural programs, denying African-American farmers loans and other benefits that were freely granted to similarly situated white farmers. See Pigford v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Seventh Amended Complaint at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1998) (“Pigford I Compl.”). The Pigford plaintiffs further alleged that, when they attempted to protest that discrimination by filing complaints with the USDA, the Department failed to investigate those complaints, flouting its responsibilities under federal civil rights laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”). Pigford I Compl. at 4. According to the complaint, that history of discrimination in the administration of USDA farm programs, combined with the agency’s long-standing refusal to investigate and remedy specific instances of discrimination, deprived countless farmers of desperately needed credit and payments under various aid programs, with the result that many farmers suffered severe financial losses and even, in many cases, lost title to their farms. See, e.g., id. at 7-34 (summarizing the damages claimed by the named plaintiffs); see generally Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86-89 (D.D.C.1999). The plaintiffs thus alleged that the USDA had committed and then exacerbated a vast array of civil rights violations over a period spanning nearly twenty years. Their claims, though broad in scope, were no exaggeration. The USDA itself, in a report commissioned by Secretary Glickman at the behest of then-President Clinton, noted that the “USDA’s painful history of individual and class action lawsuits, court orders, media exposés, numerous Congressional hearings, and reports depicts the Department as a stubborn bureaucracy that refuses to provide equal opportunity for all as the law requires.” USDA Civil Rights Action Team, Civil Rights at the United States Department of Agriculture 6 (1997). Congress acknowledged the scope of the civil rights problems plaguing the USDA by giving new life to thousands of claims of past discrimination by the agency. Claims alleging violations of ECOA typically have a short life; they must be brought within two years of the occurrence of the statutory violations in question. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). In 1998 Congress eliminated that restriction on ECOA claims against the USDA, creating a new statute of limitations for complaints alleging ECOA violations in the administration of various farm-related benefit programs. See Pub.L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-3-1 (1998). Such complaints could be brought at any time within two years of Congress’ enactment of the new statute of limitations, so long as (1) the allegations underlying those complaints had previously been presented to the USDA before July 1, 1997, and (2) the ECOA violations alleged had occurred between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996. Id. § 741(e). Congress’ action thus had the effect of opening the courthouse doors to large numbers of old claims, including many subsequently brought in Pigford I. In light of Congress’ 1998 amendments to the statute of limitations applicable to ECOA claims, this Court ultimately certified a plaintiffs’ class in Pigford under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that was composed of [a]ll African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA’s response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA’s treatment of such farm credit or benefit application. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 92. Rather than proceeding to trial on the claims of the plaintiffs’ class members, class counsel and the USDA negotiated a settlement, which was approved by the Court and memorialized in a consent decree filed on April 14, 1999. That consent decree did not provide for the automatic payment of damages to any plaintiff. Instead, it established a non-judicial mechanism by which each class member would have an opportunity to demonstrate that he or she had been the victim of past discrimination by the USDA and therefore was entitled to compensatory damages. Potential class members were not required to participate in that alternative claims resolution process, however; those African-American farmers who wished to pursue their ECOA claims against the USDA in court were permitted to opt out of the Pigford plaintiffs’ class by submitting an opt-out request within 120 days of the entry of the consent decree. Pigford v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Consent Decree ¶ 5(b)-(f) (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1999) (“Consent Decree”); see also Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 95-96. For those who did not opt out of the plaintiffs’ class, the Pigford consent decree created a distinctive process for resolving class members’ claims against the USDA. First, any individual seeking an award under the consent decree was required to submit to a neutral “Facilitator,” the Poor-man-Douglas Corporation (now Epiq Systems, Inc.), evidence that he or she was in fact a member of the class. See Consent Decree ¶ 2(b). Next, if the Facilitator determined that a given claimant was a member of the class, the claimant was permitted, at his or her election, to proceed along one of two “tracks” for determining the merits of the claim. Id. ¶ 5(f). “Track A” allowed a claimant to prevail by presenting “substantial evidence” of discrimination to a neutral, third-party “Adjudicator.” Id. ¶ 9. The requirement of “substantial evidence” — defined as “such relevant evidence as ... a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion after taking into account other evidence ... that fairly detracts from that conclusion,” id. ¶ l(i) — represents a less stringent evidentiary standard than the more common preponderance of the evidence standard. Still, prevailing on a Track A claim in Pigford was not easy, largely because the claimant was required to demonstrate that he or she had made a request for USDA program benefits that yielded a less favorable result than a request or requests made by “specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers.” Id. ¶ 9(a)(i)(C); see Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2001) (discussing the difficulty of satisfying this requirement). Nevertheless, because claimants proceeding along this track were not required to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, their potential recovery was limited: with respect to monetary compensation, a successful Track A claimant was entitled only to liquidated damages in the amount of $50,000, plus forgiveness of certain types of debt owed to the USDA and a payment to offset federal taxes owed on other portions of the award. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 97. The second form of claim resolution created by the consent decree, known as “Track B,” also involved a streamlined process of dispute resolution. Track B claims were to be heard by another third-party neutral, the “Arbitrator,” who could receive written testimony and documentation as evidence but would conduct only a one-day mini-trial of each plaintiffs claims. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 97. Claimants choosing Track B, unlike those proceeding along Track A, were required to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the more lenient substantial evidence standard, but, if successful, they were awarded the full amount of damages necessary to compensate them for their losses. Id. Pigford class members were not given an unlimited amount of time in which to submit their claims and supporting documentation to the Facilitator. Under the terms of the consent decree, all claims packages had to be postmarked on or before October 12, 1999. ■ Consent Decree ¶ 5(c). Paragraph 5(g) of the consent decree provided that if a claims package was not postmarked within that period of time, the claimant could pursue relief under the decree only by receiving permission from the Arbitrator. Consent Decree ¶ 5(g). The claimant could receive such permission, however, only if he or she demonstrated that “his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” Id. Furthermore, there was also a time limit on the period during which late claimants could submit petitions under Paragraph 5(g); by order of the Court, those petitions were to be postmarked no later than January 30, 2000. Pigford v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Order, at 2 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1999). Implementation of all of these provisions of the consent decree was to be overseen by the “Monitor,” another independent, neutral third party whose responsibilities were delineated by the decree itself. See Consent Decree ¶ 12. The Monitor was responsible for (1) making periodic written reports on the good faith implementation of the consent decree; (2) attempting to resolve any problems that any class member may have with the consent decree; and (3) being available to class members and the public through a toll-free number to provide information about the consent decree and the claims process and to facilitate the lodging of any consent decree complaints and to expedite their resolution. Id. ¶ 12(b). While there was no appellate review of the decisions of the Arbitrator, the Adjudicator, and the Facilitator, the Monitor was authorized to examine them for “clear and manifest error” in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the claim that has resulted or is likely to result in “a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. ¶ 12(b)(iii). On a petition for review of a decision granting or denying a claim submitted in Track A, the Monitor was permitted within her discretion to consider new evidence — documentation not previously submitted to the Adjudicator— if she found that “such materials address[ed] a potential flaw or mistake in the claims process that in the Monitor’s opinion would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice if left unaddressed.” Pigford v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Order of Reference ¶ 8(e)(i) (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2000). 2. Results of the Consent Decree’s Claim Resolution Process As of December 31, 2010, more than 22,700 completed claim packages had been submitted by individuals eligible to pursue relief under the terms of the consent decree. Pigford v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1978, Monitor’s Report Regarding Implementation of the Consent Decree for the Period of January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010, at 7 (D.D.C. May 27, 2011) (“2010 Monitor Report”). Of those eligible claimants, approximately 99% elected to pursue Track A relief, while 170 claimants proceeded to Track B arbitration. Id. at 10. Over one billion dollars has been awarded to the approximately 16,000 successful claimants in the form of direct payments, loan forgiveness, and tax relief. Id. at 10, 19-20. Although the number of eligible claimants who submitted timely claims under the consent decree may seem staggering, that figure is dwarfed by the number of individuals who have sought to submit late claims. As of September 15, 2000, the court-set deadline by which late claimants were to request permission to file late claims under Paragraph 5(g) of the consent decree, more than 61,000 individuals had petitioned the Arbitrator for leave to submit untimely claim packages. 2010 Monitor Report at 5. These “late filers” were later joined by an as-yet uncertain number of “late-late filers” — individuals who filed Paragraph 5(g) petitions with the Arbitrator after September 15, 2000. See Mot. to Stay at 1-2 (suggesting that the number of late-late filers may be as high as 25,000). In light of this Court’s order that such petitions should be postmarked by September 15, 2000, the Arbitrator did not consider any petitions postmarked after that date. See 2010 Monitor Report at 4-5. Instead, in accordance with the dictates of Paragraph 5(g), he reviewed the 61,252 timely petitions to determine whether each petitioner’s failure to file a claim package within the prescribed timeframe resulted from “extraordinary circumstances beyond [the petitioner’s] control.” Id. Those petitioners who ascribed their failure to submit timely claims to such uncontrollable circumstances as ill health or the ravages of Hurricane Floyd were given permission to complete late-claim packages. Id. at 4. That permission was denied to all those who explained that they had failed to complete timely claim packages because they had only recently learned of the Pigford lawsuit or the consent decree. Id. Ultimately, only 2,585 late filers — 4% of the total number — were permitted to pursue relief under the consent decree. Id. at 5. B. The 2008 Farm Bill In 2008, after extensive hearings on the Pigford case and the consent decree, see, e.g., “Notice” Provision in the Pigford v. Glickman Consent Decree: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. (2004), Congress resurrected the claims of those who had unsuccessfully petitioned the Arbitrator for permission to submit late claim packages. Under the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (“2008 Farm Bill”), “[a]ny Pigford claimant who has not previously obtained a determination on the merits of a Pigford claim may, in a civil action brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, obtain that determination.” Pub. L. 110-234, § 14012(b), 122 Stat. 923, 1448 (2008). A “Pigford claim” is “a discrimination complaint” as defined by the Pigford consent decree, id. § 14012(a)(3): a communication from a class member directly to USDA, or to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local or federal official who forwarded the class member’s communication to USDA, asserting that USDA had discriminated against the class member on the basis of race in connection with a federal farm credit transaction or benefit application. Consent Decree ¶ 1(h). To be a “Pigford claim” for the purposes of the statute, such a discrimination complaint must be “documented under section 5(b) of the consent decree” — the portion of the decree that lists the required elements of a complete claim package. 2008 Farm Bill § 14012(a)(3). An individual qualifies as a “Pigford claimant” within the meaning of the 2008 Farm Bill only if that person “previously submitted a late-filing request under section 5(g) of the consent decree.” 2008 Farm Bill § 14012(a)(4). Notably, the statute does not specify the time during which, to qualify as a “Pigford claimant,” an individual must have submitted a 5(g) late-filing request, although the phrasing of the statute makes clear that the request must have been made prior to the effective date of the 2008 Farm Bill. See id. (late-filing request must have been “previously submitted”). For those individuals who meet its eligibility requirements, the 2008 Farm Bill provides for forms of adjudication and relief that are similar, but not identical, to those created by the Pigford I consent decree. Claimants under the 2008 Farm Bill may elect to pursue “expedited resolution” of their claims by means of a process that mirrors Track A. See Pub.L. 110-234, § 14012(f). If claimants choose to participate in that expedited process, they are entitled to “liquidated damages of $50,000,” loan forgiveness, and tax relief so long as they can prove their claims by substantial evidence, “as defined in section 1(Z) of the consent decree.” Id. Under the 2008 Farm Bill, however, “the court” is to “decide the case based on a review of documents” submitted by the claimant and the USDA; the statute makes no mention of any third-party neutral that would be analogous to the consent decree’s Adjudicator. Id. § 14012(f)(1)(B). In addition, the 2008 Farm Bill, like the consent decree, allows claimants to pursue a more complete adjudication of their claims and provides for the payment of “actual damages” to claimants who prevail in such an adjudication by proving their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Pub.L. 110-234, § 14012(g). But again, the court is authorized to preside over those adjudications, and no mention is made of an Arbitrator. See id. § 14012(b), (g). Furthermore, the 2008 Farm Bill does not streamline those adjudications in the way that the consent decree did for Track B proceedings. While the consent decree limited Track B hearings to one day and permitted only limited discovery, the 2008 Farm Bill contains no such express restrictions. In contrast to the consent decree, which did not set a cap on the amount of damages recoverable by the Pigford class, the Farm Bill originally provided that “[t]he total amount of payments and debt relief pursuant to actions commenced under [this section] shall not exceed $100,000,000.” 2008 Farm Bill § 14012(c)(2). When 75% of that $100 million had been “depleted,” the Secretary of the USDA was to notify the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Id. § 14012(j)(2). The Secretary was also directed to report on the “status of available funds” under the statute every six months. Id. § 14012(j)(l). The Farm Bill does not purport to create an open-ended right for individuals to bring late Pigford claims. The right to file a complaint under the statute “terminate[d]” two years after the law’s enactment, on June 18, 2010. Pub.L. 110-234, § 14012(k). All complaints based on Section 14012 of the Farm Bill were to be filed in this Court. See id. § 14012(b). C. The Current Lawsuit and the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 Approximately 40,000 individuals have filed complaints in this Court pursuant to Section 14012 of the 2008 Farm Bill. Mot. for Prelim. Approval at 48. They did not file individual complaints. Instead, plaintiffs brought suit in groups, with large numbers of individuals aggregating their claims and summarizing them all in a single complaint. See, e.g., Agee v. Schafer, Civil Action No. 08-0882, Complaint at 1-24 (D.D.C. May 28, 2008) (listing plaintiffs). Twenty-three such complaints alleging claims under the 2008 Farm Bill (hereinafter “Pigford II ” actions or cases), most of them aggregating large numbers of plaintiffs in the manner described, were filed in this Court between May of 2008 and June of 2010 by plaintiffs represented by a wide array of counsel. Recognizing the substantial case management difficulties posed by the Pigford II actions, the Court stayed each individual lawsuit and consolidated all 23 actions into one miscellaneous case in order to permit the various parties, their counsel, and the Court to determine the best way to proceed in this matter. See, e.g., In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., Misc. No. 08-0511, Order (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2008) (consolidating the first eight cases brought pursuant to Section 14012). Beginning in the spring of 2009, counsel for the plaintiffs named in several Pigford II complaints initiated settlement negotiations with counsel for the USDA and the United States Department of Justice. See Mot. for Prelim. Approval, Ex. 13 (Declaration of Andrew H. Marks) (“Marks Deck”) ¶ 2. In February 2010, after extensive negotiations, the defendant and certain plaintiffs executed the first version of a settlement agreement that has since been signed by counsel for every plaintiff named in a pending Pigford II complaint except for those in five cases, Civil Action Nos. 09-1019, 10-0465, 10-0737, 10-0801, and 10-0839. See Mot. for Prelim. Approval, Ex. 2 (Settlement Agreement) (“SA”) HII.HH. Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack and Attorney General Eric Holder announced the settlement on February 18, 2010. See Press Release, USDA, USDA and Department of Justice Announce Historic Settlement in Lawsuit by Black Farmers Claiming Discrimination by USDA (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/ usdahome?contentidonly=true& contentid=2010/02/0072.xml. As the Attorney General explained, the settlement provided that a total of $1.25 billion would be made available for the resolution of claims brought pursuant to Section 14012 of the 2008 Farm Bill — but at the time the settlement was executed, the only funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose were the $100 million set aside by the Farm Bill itself. See id. The settlement’s continuing validity was contingent upon the appropriation by Congress of an additional $1.15 billion. Id. Beginning in March of 2010, members of Congress introduced legislation intended to fund the settlement agreement reached by the USDA and the Moving Plaintiffs. See S. Amend. 3407 to H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010) (failed proposed amendment that would have appropriated $1.15 billion “to the Department of Agriculture ... tó carry out the terms of a Settlement Agreement ... executed in In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation”), reprinted in 156 Cong. Rec. S1189 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2010). Several such attempts to fund the settlement agreement were defeated in the Senate during the spring, summer, and fall of 2010. See Tadlock Cowan and Jody Feder, Cong. Research Serv., RS 20430, The Pigford Cases: USDA Settlement of Discrimination Suits by Black Farmers 12 (2011). On November 30, 2010, Congress passed the Claims Resolution Act of 2010, which was signed into law by President Barack Obama on December 8, 2010. See Pub.L. 111-291,124 Stat. 3064. The Act “appropriated to the Secretary of Agriculture $1,150,000,000, to remain available until expended, to carry out the terms of the Settlement Agreement [in In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation ] if the Settlement Agreement is approved by a court order that is or becomes final and nonappealable[.]” Claims Resolution Act § 201(b). “Settlement Agreement” is specifically defined by the statute to refer to “the settlement agreement dated February 18, 2010 (including any modifications agreed to by the parties and approved by the court under that agreement) between certain plaintiffs ... and the [USDA] ... in In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation, Misc. No. 08-mc-0511.” Id. § 201(a)(1). In addition to funding the settlement agreement reached by the defendant and the Moving Plaintiffs, the Claims Resolution Act amended Section 14012 of the 2008 Farm Bill. Those amendments included the removal of two provisions of Section 14012 that would have required the USDA to (1) supply each Pigford II plaintiff with reports on USDA loans and other benefits awarded in the plaintiffs county of residence, and (2) make progress reports to Congress regarding the depletion of the $100 million made available by Section 14012 for the payment of awards in Pig-ford II. See Claims Resolution Act § 201(f)(2), (5) (striking subsections 14012(e) and (j) of the 2008 Farm Bill). It also makes clear that the claims under the settlement agreement should be resolved by a Neutral Adjudicator rather than by the Court itself. See Claims Resolution Act § 201(b), (g)(1). On March 30, 2011, the Moving Plaintiffs requested preliminary certification of a plaintiffs’ class and approval of the settlement agreement first executed on February 18, 2010. See Mot. for Prelim. Approval. On April 25, 2011, the Court sent counsel for the Moving Plaintiffs a letter in which it communicated several questions and concerns raised by the proposed settlement agreement. See Docket No. 168. Those questions and concerns were addressed by the Moving Plaintiffs in a written response dated May 11, 2011. See Docket No. 171-1. The Court granted preliminary class certification and preliminary approval of the settlement on May 13, 2011, set a deadline for the filing of written objections to the settlement, and scheduled a Fairness Hearing for September 1, 2011. After preliminary approval of the settlement agreement, the Moving Plaintiffs initiated a comprehensive program intended to provide notice of the proposed settlement to putative class members. See Mot. for Final Approval, Ex. A (Declaration of Katherine Kinsella). Kinsella Media, LLC, the firm engaged by the Moving Plaintiffs to effect notice, arranged for the mailing of packets describing the settlement agreement in detail directly to all individuals who, according to the records of the Pigford I Facilitator, made any written request to participate in the Pig-ford I claims resolution process between October of 1999 and June 18, 2008. See id. ¶ 7. Notice was also broadly disseminated through radio, television, print, and online advertising. A 60-second advertisement announcing the proposed settlement aired on two national radio stations with large African-American audiences and 52 local radio stations located in areas with high concentrations of African-American farmers. See id. ¶ 13. Written announcements appeared once in American Profile, a newspaper supplement available in many rural counties; once in Jet magazine; once in 46 daily newspapers that circulate in areas where high concentrations of putative class members reside; twice in numerous newspapers targeting African-Americans; once or twice in almost 200 community newspapers; and at least once in 20 trade publications geared toward farmers and ranchers. See id. ¶¶ 17, 23-24. Online announcements appeared on a variety of websites with large numbers of African-American visitors, see id. ¶ 22, and directed Internet users to a website, www.blackfarmercase.com, providing detailed information about this case and the proposed settlement. See id. ¶ 21. Press releases announcing details of the settlement were circulated and widely reported on by various media outlets. See id. ¶¶ 27-29. After that notice program was implemented, as of August 5, 2011, interested persons had made more than 62,000 requests for the claim packages that must be completed by any individual wishing to participate in the claims resolution process that would be created by the proposed settlement agreement. Mot. for Final Approval, Ex. A ¶ 32. Nearly 150,000 calls had been placed to a toll-free telephone number established to provide information about the settlement agreement. Id. Almost 70,000 visitors have viewed the website announcing the settlement. Id. In spite of the overwhelming degree of interest indicated by these numbers, however, the Court received only a handful of written objections from parties who may be members of the putative plaintiffs’ class. The Court also received several written comments or objections from organizations or individuals that either do not appear to be or to represent potential class members, or have made no attempt to establish that they are class members. See In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., 806 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.D.C.2011) (listing objections). The Court held an all-day Fairness Hearing on September 1, 2011. Because so few objections by putative class members had been received, and because the Court is aware that this litigation is a subject of intense interest among many African-American farmers and farming organizations, the Court allowed any individual who had experience with or an established interest in Pigford I or communities of African-American farmers to offer comments at the hearing. Although few of those who spoke demonstrated that they are putative plaintiffs’ class members and so have standing to object to the settlement agreement, the Court appreciates and has considered their comments. II. CLASS CERTIFICATION The Moving Plaintiffs seek final certification of a settlement class consisting of: All individuals: (1) who submitted Late-Filing Requests under Section 5(g) of the Pigford v. Glickman Consent Decree on or after October 13,1999, and on or before June 18, 2008; but (2) who have not obtained a determination on the merits of their discrimination complaints, as defined by Section 1(h) of the Consent Decree. SA ¶ III.A. A “Late-Filing Request” is defined as “a written request to the Court, the Pigford Facilitator, the Pigford Monitor, the Pigford Adjudicator, or the Pig-ford Arbitrator seeking to participate in the claims resolution processes in the Pigford Consent Decree.” Id. ¶ II.T. The dates specified in the class definition— October 13, 1999, and June 18, 2008— correspond, respectively, to (1) the day after the deadline for the filing of a timely claim under the Pigford I consent decree, and (2) the effective date of the 2008 Farm Bill. The remainder of the class definition tracks the language of Section 14012. See 2008 Farm Bill § 14012(a)-(b). As the parties seeking class certification, the Moving Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). The parties must show that all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met and that the proposed class falls within at least one of the three categories delineated by Rule 23(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b); Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.2006). If the Moving Plaintiffs are able to satisfy those requirements, then the Court may decide, in its discretion, whether a class should be certified. See Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 631 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1410 (D.C.Cir.1984)). The Moving Plaintiffs’ request for class certification is supported by the defendant. See Def.’s Certification Resp. The only real opposition to the request comes from a group often potential class members represented by attorney Precious Martin (“the Martin Objectors”). See Martin Obj. at 1-2. According to those plaintiffs, the assets available for the payment of awards in this case do not truly qualify as a “limited fund,” and therefore certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is improper. Id. at 14-17. Furthermore, the Martin Objectors assert that the class proposed by the Moving Plaintiffs does not meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). See Martin Reply at 2-3. Because the matters in dispute all relate to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(a)(2), the Court first addresses those provisions together before moving on to consider the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1), (3), and (4). A. Requirements for a Limited Fund Class Action Under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiffs’ class meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a) may be certified if prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of ... adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(B). The Moving Plaintiffs request certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on the ground that this case involves the aggregation of “ ‘claims ... made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.’ ” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999) (citation omitted). In such a case every award made to one claimant reduces the amount of funds available to other claimants until, in the absence of equitable management of the fund, some claimants are able to obtain full satisfaction of their claims, while others are left with no recovery at all. Thus are “adjudications with respect to individual class members ... dispositive of the interests of the other members” in such a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(B); see generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. at 834-37, 119 S.Ct. 2295. To qualify for class certification on such a limited fund rationale, the Moving Plaintiffs must show that the fund and the proposed class in question meet three criteria. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. at 838, 119 S.Ct. 2295. First, “the totals of the aggregated liquidated claims and the fund available for satisfying them, set definitely at their máximums, demonstrate the inadequacy of the fund to pay all the claims.” Id. Next, “the whole of the inadequate fund” must be dedicated “to the overwhelming claims.” Id. at 839, 119 S.Ct. 2295. Finally, all claimants to the fund who are “identified by a common theory of recovery [must be] treated equitably among themselves.” Id. All three requirements are met in this case. 1. Inadequacy of the Fund The 2008 Farm Bill initially limited the amount of money available for the payment of damages to Pigford II plaintiffs to $100 million. Pub.L. 110-234, § 14012(c)(2). The Claims Resolution Act of 2010 increased that pool of assets by $1.15 billion, to a total of $1.25 billion, on the condition that the proposed settlement agreement be approved. See Pub.L. Ill— 291, § 201(b). Taken out of context, that fund might seem vast. When considered in light of the Pigford I proceedings, however, it appears woefully insufficient to fund the judgments or to satisfy the meritorious claims likely to result from this litigation. Of the roughly 22,700 individuals who pursued claims under the Consent Decree, 99% elected to proceed along Track A and receive liquidated damages if they prevailed on their claims. 2010 Monitor Report at 10. Roughly 69% of those Track A claimants, or 15,645, succeeded in proving their entitlement to relief. Id. Even though each of those successful Track A claimants was entitled only to $50,000 plus debt and tax relief (amounting to $12,500), the aggregate amount of damages paid to those claimants amounted to more than $1 billion. Id. at 19. More than 40,000 plaintiffs have already filed complaints in this case. Tens of thousands more may be entitled to participate in the litigation. See supra at 17. The $1.25 billion appropriated by Congress in the 2008 Farm Bill and the Claims Resolution Act would cover Track A cash damages and tax relief — a payment amounting to $62,500, see Pub.L. No. 110-234, § 14012(e), as amended by Pub.L. 111—291, § 201(f) (“Am.2008 Farm Bill”)—for only 20,000 successful claimants. That simple calculation does not take into account the facts that some claimants will also win debt relief, that others will pursue the more generous monetary relief afforded upon success in Track B, and that the costs of administering the claims resolution process will inevitably run into the tens of millions of dollars, further reducing the funds available for awards. Even if Pigford II class members prevail on their claims at far lower rates than their Pigford I predecessors — and there is no reason to believe that they would — it is apparent that the available $1.25 billion fund is inadequate to pay for the awards of all successful claimants. No party to this litigation — and none of those who filed objections or spoke at the Fairness Hearing — disputes that the funds made available by Congress in the 2008 Farm Bill and the Claims Resolution Act are insufficient to compensate the Pigford II plaintiffs. Instead, the Martin Objectors contend that the fund established by the 2008 Farm Bill and the Claims Resolution Act is not “set definitely at [its] maximum.” See Martin Obj. at 14-17; Martin Reply at 6-7. All of the arguments marshaled by the Martin Objectors in support of this assertion, however, are unpersuasive. The Martin Objectors claim first that no limited fund can exist in this case because the defendant has engineered the limitation on the fund, in contravention of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ortiz that a fund does not qualify as “limited” for the purposes of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) analysis if it is capped only “by the agreement of the parties.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. at 848, 119 S.Ct. 2295. This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, the defendant in this case is the USDA. As the text of the 2008 Farm Bill and the Claims Resolution Act makes clear, the USDA did.not impose the.limitation on the fund at issue here — Congress did. Second, even if one were to ignore the fact that the USDA is a separate juridical entity from Congress, and so to imagine that the defendant here is simply equivalent to the United States government, the Martin Objectors ignore the fact that the government is that unique defendant which has the legal authority to define the extent of its own liability, unlike the private defendants in Ortiz. See id. at 850, 119 S.Ct. 2295 (limited fund would comprise defendant corporation’s entire equity and insurance assets). There is nothing improper or illegal about Congress’ limitation of the plaintiffs’ possible recovery in this case to $1.25 billion, if the proposed settlement is approved, or to $100 million, if it is not. Next, the Martin Objectors contend that there is no limited fund in this case because the Claims Resolution Act is unconstitutional, or because it “does not apply retroactively.” Martin Reply at 6-8. While creative, these arguments are bizarre and frivolous. According to the Martin Objectors, the Claims Resolution Act violates the separation of powers between branches of government because it represents an attempt by Congress “to coerce the class and the Court into accepting th[e] proposed settlement.” Id. at 6. Congress has not overstepped its bounds with respect to this case. Although Congress may lack authority to direct a court to reach a particular result in a given case without amending substantive law, see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 436, 441, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992), Congress certainly has not done so here. Indeed, the Claims Resolution Act makes clear that Congress has funded the proposed settlement agreement only if this Court approves the settlement in a final order. But nothing in the statute presumes to instruct the Court how or whether to decide if the settlement should be approved. Nor is the Claims Resolution Act impermissibly retroactive. The Martin Objectors contend that the Act “is a conditional attempt to limit the funds of this case retroactively, contingent upon the class and this Court’s acceptance of the settlement.” Martin Reply at 213. That contention is silly. There is nothing retroactive about the limitation on funds in this case; the 2008 Farm Bill limited the available funds first, and it did so to a much lower number, $100 million, than the Claims Resolution Act. Furthermore, contrary to the conclusory assertions of the Martin Objectors, the Claims Resolution Act did not “ ‘attach! ] new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.’ ” Id. at 8 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). The Act is a valid statute, one that makes available for the payment of claims in this case limited funds that may be combined with the even more limited funds appropriated by the 2008 Farm Bill. Since there is no reason to believe that any further funds are or will be available for the payment of Pigford II claims, and since the available funds are inadequate to pay all claims fully, the first Ortiz requirement is satisfied. 2. Dedication of the Fund to Class Claims To qualify as a limited fund justifying the certification of a plaintiffs’ class, “the whole of the inadequate fund” available for the payment of judgments must be- dedicated “to the overwhelming claims.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. at 839, 119 S.Ct. 2295. That criterion is easily met in this case. The 2008 Farm Bill and the Claims Resolution Act appropriate the total of $1.25 billion specifically for use in the resolution and payment of Pigford II claims. See Claims Resolution Act § 201(b); Am.2008 Farm Bill § 201(f). 3. Equitable Distribution of the Fund In order for a class to be certified on a limited fund theory, “the class [must] comprise everyone who might state a claim on a single or repeated set of facts, invoking a common theory of recovery, to be satisfied from the limited fund as the source of payment.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. at 839, 119 S.Ct. 2295. Every plaintiff in this case proceeds on the theory of recovery spelled out in the 2008 Farm Bill, and every prevailing plaintiff will be paid out of the limited fund created by Congress. Furthermore, the proposed class would include every person who could potentially be eligible for relief under Section 14012, encompassing every individual who unsuccessfully petitioned for leave to file a late Pigford claim under Paragraph 5(g) of the consent decree. With all potential plaintiffs gathered into one class, the Court will be able to ensure that, even given an available fund insufficient to pay the full amount of all judgments, similarly situated plaintiffs will ultimately receive the same awards, thus satisfying the requirement that all claimants to the fund who are “identified by a common theory of recovery [will be] treated equitably among themselves.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. at 839, 119 S.Ct. 2295. As explained below, see infra at 31-32, the proposed settlement agreement provides for an equitable division of the common fund among members of the plaintiffs’ class. 4. Commonality As the foregoing analysis indicates, the proposed plaintiffs’ class meets the requirements identified in Ortiz as prerequisites for the formation of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class. For similar reasons, the proposed class also meets the requirement of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R.Crv.P. 23(a)(2). “ ‘What matters to class certification,’ ” however, “ ‘is not the raising of common “questions” — even in droves — but, rather the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the ■ resolution of the litigation.’ ” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)) (emphasis in original). In other words, the determination of a disputed question or questions that are common to the various class members will “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. “Implicit in a finding that an action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) is the decision that there are questions of law or fact shared by the persons affected.” 1 William B. Rubenstein, Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg On Class Actions § 3:10 (4th ed.2002). The logic of that principle is evident upon a brief examination of the factual questions that must be answered before the common fund may be divided equitably among similarly situated plaintiffs: How many plaintiffs will prevail? What amount of damages will each prevailing class member be entitled to recover? And how, in the likely event that total recoverable damages exceed available funds, will each award be reduced? These questions are “central to the validity” of every single claim that could be brought in this matter because they will determine the extent to which any prevailing claimant is entitled to relief. The Martin Objectors dismiss these common questions as “related solely to the issue of how potential class members, and consequently, class counsel, might get paid.” Martin Reply at 3. But they fail to explain why that distinction matters. The sole function of the 2008 Farm Bill is to allow those farmers who were the subject of discrimination by the USDA and who meet other eligibility requirements to “get paid” — i. e., be compensated for their injuries. Determining the amount of compensation that a given plaintiff may receive is central to the claims made in this lawsuit, and that determination cannot be made without answering the “common questions” identified above. The Martin Objectors have identified no way in which those questions could be answered in the absence of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class. Certification of a class to permit the proper determination of common questions is thus not only appropriate, but necessary in this case. B. Other Requirements of Rule 23(a) In addition to the commonality requirement, Rule 23(a) conditions class certification upon a showing that the proposed class “is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1); that “the claims ... of the representative parties are typical of the claims ... of the class,” id. 23(a)(3); and that the named plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Id. 23(a)(4). No party or objector has claimed that the proposed class fails to meet any of those three requirements, and the Court finds that each is satisfied here. 1. Numerosity “Courts in this District have generally found that the numerosity requirement is satisfied and that joinder is impracticable where a proposed class has at least forty members.” Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Warner Holdings Co. III, Ltd., 246 F.R.D. 349, 357 (D.D.C.2007) (listing cases); see also Cohen v. Chilcott, 522 F.Supp.2d 105, 114 (D.D.C.2007) (same). Roughly 40,000 plaintiffs have filed claims at this point in the Pigford II litigation, and thousands more may follow. Those thousands of plaintiffs and potential class members are scattered throughout the country. See 2010 Monitor Report, App. 5 (showing the successful Pigford I claimants came from more than forty states). Joining such a vast number of dispersed parties is not practicable. See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 347-48 (D.D.C.1998). The numerosity requirement is satisfied. 2. Typicality The remaining requirements of Rule 23(a) identify “the desired qualifications of the representative parties” to a class action, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment), that the “claims or defenses” of the representative parties be “typical” of the claims of the class, and that the representative parties “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3)-(4). The typicality requirement “is ‘intended to assess whether the action can be efficiently maintained as a class action and whether the named plaintiffs have incentives that align with those of the absent class members so as to assure that the absentees’ interests will be fairly represented.’” Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. at 349 (quoting Baby Neal for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir.1994)). In other words, “[t]he typicality prerequisite assures that the class representative^] share[] the issues common to other class members.” 1 Rubenstein, Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:13. The three named plaintiffs proposed by the Moving Plaintiffs all share the class-wide need for and interest in an equitable distribution of the limited fund available for damage awards. Taken together, the allegations advanced by these plaintiffs are appropriately representative of the fact patterns underlying the claims of other putative class members. Proposed named plaintiffs James Copeland and Marshallene McNeil both allege that they were denied USDA program benefits between January 1,1981, and December 31,1996, as a result of racial discrimination. See Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (alleging that “[b]etween 1990 and 1992, Mr. Copeland attempted to apply to USDA for an operating loan, but was told repeatedly that the USDA office had lost his applications”); id. ¶ 26 (claiming that “[i]n 1982, Ms. McNeil went to the [Farmers Home Administration] office in Camden, Alabama to request an operating loan, but ... her loan application was denied” based on racial discrimination). The third named plaintiff proposed by the Moving Plaintiffs, Earl Moorer, proceeds not on his own behalf, but, like numerous other plaintiffs, as the heir of a family member— in his case, his father, John Moorer — who applied for and was denied USDA loan benefits repeatedly between 1981 and 1984 even as local white farmers received the benefits he was denied. See id. ¶ 24. Mr. Copeland, Ms. McNeil, and John Moorer each complained to the USDA about racial discrimination at least once between January 1, 1981, and July 1, 1997, but their complaints went unanswered. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26. Mr. Copeland and Earl Moorer, on behalf of the Estate of John Moorer, were both “late filers” in Pigford P, between October 13, 1999, and September 15, 2000, they petitioned under Paragraph 5(g) of the consent decree for the right to submit late claims, but their petitions were denied, and their claims went unadjudicated. See id. ¶¶ 23, 35. Ms. McNeil, on the other hand, is a “late-late filer.” She submitted a 5(g) petition prior to the effective date of the 2008 Farm Bill, but after the deadline established by this Court for the timely submission of such petitions. See id. ¶ 27. Each of these proposed representative plaintiffs alleges the same core facts as all other potential class members: injury resulting from racial discrimination by the USDA, followed by complaints about that discrimination that went unaddressed, and ultimately an unsuccessful and untimely attempt to join the claim resolution process established in Pigford I. Since each of these plaintiffs has the same interest in ensuring equitable division of the available limited fund as do other putative class members, the Court finds the typicality requirement satisfied. 3. Adequacy of Representation “The final element of Rule 23(a) necessitates an inquiry into the adequacy of representation, including the quality of class counsel, any disparity of interest between class representatives and members of the class, communication between class counsel and the class and the overall context of the litigation.” Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. at 350 (citing Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C.Cir.1997)). The Court has already found the interests of the representative plaintiffs to be in alignment with those of other putative class members. It also finds that the representation afforded by class counsel is more than adequate. Counsel for the proposed plaintiffs’ class are 42 attorneys associated with 20 different law firms. See Mot. for Final Approval, Ex. 2 ([Proposed] Final Approval Order and Judgment) ¶ 10. These attorneys serve a wide variety of geographical areas in which likely claimants reside, including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. See id. Among them are several attorneys — including Henry Sanders, Fayarose Sanders, David Frantz, and Phillip L. Fraas — who were deeply involved in the litigation of class claims in Pigford I and are familiar with the sorts of factual, legal, and administrative issues that may arise in this case. Several members of class counsel have extensive experience in complex litigation in general and in class action litigation in particular. See, e.g., Mot. for Prelim. Approval, Ex. 13 at 3 (professional accomplishments of co-lead counsel Andrew H. Marks). In short, the members of this group of counsel collectively offer class members highly relevant legal skill and experience. The overall context of this litigation confirms the Court’s belief that class counsel will provide adequate representation. Although this case, involving many separate legal complaints and scores of attorneys, could have devolved into an endless series of squabbles between rival attorneys, class counsel, representing the vast majority of plaintiffs who have filed complaints under the 2008 Farm Bill, have managed to band together and to negotiate with the defendant a single comprehensive settlement. Perceiving that late filers and late-late filers might have adverse interests, see infra at 37-38, several class counsel sought to ensure that the two groups were represented by separate and independent attorneys. See Mot. to Withdraw at 3-4. Despite the large number of attorneys designated as class counsel, the responses of counsel to the Orders of this Court have been prompt, efficient, and well-coordinated. Based on the procedural history of this matter, the Court concludes that proposed class counsel will provide more than adequate representation to class members. C. The Court’s Conclusion on Certification The Court is satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are fulfilled by the proposed plaintiffs’ class. Furthermore, the Court cannot imagine how the claims of the thousands of putative class members could be resolved efficiently and fairly in the absence of class treatment. Accordingly, the Court will certify a plaintiffs’ class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules. III. PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT A. Overview of the Claim Resolution Process The proposed settlement agreement maintains the two-track claim resolution process created in Pigford I and replicated in Section 14012 of the 2008 Farm Bill, but modifies some aspects of that process in light of the strictly limited funds available for the resolution and payment of claims. As in Pigford I, the agreement provides for the creation of two alternative forms of claim resolution, designated Track A and Track B. See SA ¶ V. Under Track A, claimants must prove their claims by substantial evidence, the same evidentiary standard that was mandated for Track A claims in the Pigford I consent decree, and the standard that is prescribed by Section 14012 of the 2008 Farm Bill. Id. Those who prevail in Track A on a claim of discrimination in a credit program are entitled to a maximum of $50,000 in cash, forgiveness of certain categories of debt to the USDA, and tax relief equal to one-quarter of the combined value of awarded cash and debt relief. Id. ¶¶ II.LL-NN. Those claimants who proceed along Track B must, as in Pigford I, prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. SA 1ÍV. If they prevail, those Track B claimants are entitled to a maximum of their proven actual damages or $250,000, whichever is less. Id. Claim determinations in both Track A and Track B will be made by a neutral third party, the “Track A Neutral” or the “Track B Neutral,” and the determinations of both neutrals are final and not subject to appeal. Id. ¶ Y.A.8. No award will be paid to any claimant until after determinations have been rendered on all claims — a process expected to last for approximately a year. Once all claims have been resolved, the cash value of awards payable to successful claimants will be compared to the value of available funds, consisting of the appropriated $1.25 billion, less administrative and implementation costs and attorneys’ fees. See SA HITV.E.4-5. If payable awards exceed available funds, awards will be reduced ratably according to a predetermined procedure. First, if the total of Track B awards exceeds $100 million, those awards will be proportionately reduced until their total falls below the $100 million cap. Id. ¶ V.E.5.a. If the total value of Track A and Track B awards still exceeds available funds, then the awards of late-late filers will be reduced, again on a pro rata basis, by up to 30% of their value. Id. ¶ V.E.5.b. If the total value of awards still, even after those reductions, exceeds available funds, then all awards will be proportionately reduced until their aggregate value is equal to or less than the amount of available funds. Id. ¶ V.E.5.C. Awards will then be paid out to successful claimants. Id. ¶¶ V.E.8. B. Method of Determining Claims Beginning on a date designated by the Court in the Order and Judgment that accompanies this Opinion, members of the plaintiffs’ class will have 180 days — roughly six months — to submit their claims for resolution. See In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig., Misc. No. 08-0511, Order and Judgment ¶ 17 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2011) (“[T]he 180-day claim period specified in the Settlement Agreement shall commence on November 14, 2011 and end on May 11, 2012.”). To do so, each claimant must submit to Epiq Systems, Inc. (the “Claims Administrator”) a “Claim Package” that includes, among other documentation, the following: (1) a sworn declaration by the claimant in which he or she states, among other things, whether he or she submitted a late-filing request under Paragraph 5(g) of the Pigford I consent decree during the relevant time period, and whether he or she has received a determination on the merits of a claim in Pigford I, see SA, Ex. C at 3; and (2) a sworn declaration by the claimant’s counsel that “the claim is supported by existing law and the factual contentions have evidentiary support.” Id. UV.A. The claimant must also indicate at that time whether the claim is to be evaluated under Track A or Track B of the claim resolution structure. See id., Ex. C at 4. For those who choose Track A, that choice is final. See id. Class counsel have committed to providing direct assistance to would-be claimants as they prepare their claim packages and decide whether to proceed along Track A or Track B. See Mot. for Prelim. Approval at 21. Once the claimant has submitted a timely and complete Claim Package to the Claims Administrator, the Claims Administrator will determine whether the claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is a member of the plaintiffs’ class. SA irV.B.4. The Claims Administrator’s determination regarding class membership is final and not subject to review. Id. HV.B.5. If the Claims Administrator determines that a claimant has established class membership, and that claimant has elected to proceed along Track A, the Claim Package will be forwarded to the Track A Neutral for review and determination of the claim. Id. ¶ V.B.6. The Claims Administrator will retain Track B Claim Packages until the close of the 180-day claim submission period. At that point, the Claims Administrator will notify all claimants who have elected to proceed along Track B of the number of other claimants who have chosen to do the same. Id. HV.B.7. At that point, claimants who have selected Track B may opt instead for Track A if they choose to do so and notify the Claims Administrator. Id. If they do not so notify the Claims Administrator within a specified period of time, their selecti