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ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF DR. OWEN R. PHILLIPS [403] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR CLASS DECERTIFICATION [410] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DENVER ACTION) [438] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (LOS ANGELES ACTION) [441] PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PLAN FOR CLASS NOTICE, TO ORDER DEFENDANTS TO PRODUCE CLASS MEMBER INFORMATION, AND TO MODIFY THE CLASS DEFINITION [460] PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE “AFFINITY ANALYSIS” OF DR. JANUSZ ORDOVER [469] PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATION OF JULIA VANDER PLOEG [516] STEPHEN V. WILSON, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 13, 2002, Malinda Heerwagen filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging claims of monopolization, attempted monopolization, and unjust enrichment against Clear Channel, Inc. and related entities. Heerwagen claimed that the defendants had engaged in anticompetitive conduct in connection with their nationwide promotion of live music concerts. On August 11, 2003, the district court denied Heerwageris motion for class certification, concluding that the putative class’s antitrust claims required a separate analysis for each relevant geographic market, and, therefore, certification of a nationwide class was unwarranted. The Second Circuit affirmed. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. et al., 435 F.3d 219 (2d Cir.2006). Heerwagen subsequently dismissed the case voluntarily. Twenty-two regional putative class actions subsequently were filed against Clear Channel, Inc. and related entities, alleging substantively identical claims of: (1) Monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; (2) Attempted Monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) Unjust Enrichment. These actions ultimately were consolidated and assigned to this Court as part of this Multi-District Litigation (“MDL”). On November 1, 2006, this Court issued an order staying discovery in every action except those in the following five geographic markets: Los Angeles, Chicago, New Jersey/New York, Boston, and Denver. (Dkt. 36, 37). On October 22, 2007, this Court issued an order certifying classes in these five markets and denying Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ attempted monopolization claims. (Dkt. 160); Thompson v. Clear Channel Communs., Inc. (In re Live Concert Antitrust Litiq.), 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D.Cal.2007). On November 16, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for approval of plan for class notice, and further ordered that the action be stayed pending the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Dukes v. WalMart, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.2007). (Dkt. 215). On October 7, 2010, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to lift the stay, denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc), and ordered the parties to submit a joint stipulation as to how best to proceed with this action. (Dkt. 240). Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court entered an Order Regarding Scheduling of Action on December 10, 2010. (Dkt. 260) Under this stipulated order, the parties agreed to limit further discovery to the Denver and Los Angeles markets. “The remaining three certified template markets (Chicago, New York and Boston) shall be stayed until the Denver and Los Angeles markets are tried or otherwise resolved.” (Id.). On February 7, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Statute of Limitations (with respect to the Denver and Los Angeles actions). (Dkt. 271). On April 7, 2011, the Court granted the motion. (Dkt. 310). The following motions are currently pending before the Court: • Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Owen R. Phillips, (Dkt. 403); • Defendants’ Motion for Class Decertification, (Dkt. 410); • Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Denver Action), (Dkt. 438); • Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Los Angeles Action), (Dkt. 441); • Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Plan for Class Notice, to Order Defendants to Produce Class Member Information, and to Modify the Class Definition, (Dkt. 460); and • Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Declaration of Julia Vander Ploeg, (Dkt. 516). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Owen R. Phillips, (Dkt. 403), is GRANTED IN PART. Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. 438, 441), are GRANTED. The remaining motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT. II. PRIOR CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER As noted above, on October 22, 2007, the Court issued an Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (in the Chicago, Boston, New York/New Jersey, Denver, and Los Angeles markets). In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D.Cal.2007). At that time, however, the Court was bound by then-governing Ninth Circuit precedent, under which district courts were precluded from resolving factual disputes — and, in particular, weighing conflicting expert testimony — at the class certification stage. Thus, the Court concluded “Dukes [v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1229 (9th Cir.2007)] clearly precludes the Court from conducting a Daubert analysis or weighing expert testimony,” id. at 116 n. 7, and effectively accepted as true, for purposes of that motion only, the representations of Plaintiffs’ expert. “[T]his order views the allegations, expert testimony, and evidence through the very narrow prism permitted by Dukes. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23[.]” Id. at 155. The original decision in Dukes, however, was subsequently withdrawn and replaced by Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc), which was, in turn, reversed by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). In its decision, the Supreme Court enunciated a significantly different standard than that applied by this Court in its 2007 Class Certification Order. “[C]ertifieation is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied .... Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the Plaintiffs’ underlying claim. That cannot be helped.” Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551. The Court went on to observe, “The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt that is so[.]” Id. at 2553-54. In short, the Court’s prior Order Granting Class Certification was based on a legal standard that is no longer in effect, which precluded the Court from undertaking a meaningful analysis of either the underlying facts of the case or the representations of the parties’ respective experts. As such, that order has little to no precedential value at this point in the litigation. The Court is writing on a proverbial “clean slate.” III. PENDING MOTIONS (ORDER OF ANALYSIS) There are several motions currently pending before the Court, including: (1) Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs expert Dr. Owen Phillips, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702; and (2) Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the Denver and Los Angeles markets. These motions require two distinct inquiries. First, the Court must evaluate the admissibility of Dr. Phillips’ proffered expert testimony in its role as “gatekeeper” under Rule 702. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 501 (9th Cir.1994) (prior to ruling on summary judgment motion, “[t]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but rehable. The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma, 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). Second, the Court will evaluate the merits of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, considering Dr. Phillips’ testimony only to the extent that it is admissible under Rule 702. See generally id. at 504-05 (affirming summary judgment based on the exclusion of testimony by plaintiffs’ damages expert, holding: “To survive [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs were required to offer admissible expert testimony showing that exposure to chemicals in the workplace played some part in producing their injuries.”). IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF DR. OWEN R. PHILLIPS A. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts. Rule 702 provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702. “[T]he admissibility of all expert testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a). Under that Rule, the proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 702, Notes of Advisory Committee on 2000 amendments (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). The admissibility of expert testimony is a question for the Court. Fed.R.Evid. 104(a); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775. To that end, the Supreme Court has recognized the obligation of the trial court to fulfill a “gatekeeping role” in order to “ensure that any and all [expert] testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). “The objective of that [gatekeeping] requirement is ... to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). With respect to the reliability of expert testimony, the Supreme Court in Daubert identified several factors that the court may consider when making its determination, including: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence, and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786; accord Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (holding Daubert factors may be applied to non-scientific expert testimony, depending upon “the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue”). The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that these factors are not exclusive, and that “the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (emphasis in original). “[T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Thus, the admissibility of expert testimony is “a subject peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial judge, who alone must decide the qualifications of the expert on a given subject and the extent to which his opinions may be required.’” United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.1968)). Since “[district courts are not required to hold a Daubert hearing before ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence,” this Court may rule on Defendant’s Daubert motion on the basis of the parties’ papers. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 292 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000)). B. Discussion Defendants argue that the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert economist, Dr. Owen Phillips, should be excluded on several grounds. In particular, Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Phillips’ testimony regarding: (1) the fact and amount of damages; (2) causation of Plaintiffs’ injury; (3) the definition of the relevant product market; (4) Defendants’ share of the relevant market; and (5) Defendants’ alleged anticompetitive conduct. The Court will address each of these issues in turn. 1. Damages and Causation Dr. Phillips performed several statistical analyses in order to estimate the damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants’ allegedly anticompetitive conduct. These analyses are of four basic types: (1) the “Yardstick” approach; (2) the “Before- and-After” approach; (3) the “pooled sample” analysis; and (4) damages attributable to ticket surcharges. Defendants do not dispute that Dr. Phillips is qualified as an expert economist, nor do they dispute that statistical analysis may, under appropriate circumstances, properly be admitted into evidence. Instead, Defendants contend that Dr. Phillips failed to “reliably appl[y] the principles and methods [of proper statistical analysis] to the facts of the case” in violation of Rule 702(d). a. Legal Requirements For Statistical Analysis As a general matter, flaws in a proffered expert’s analysis typically go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the expert’s testimony. See, e.g., Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir.2002) (“In most cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Vigorous cross-examination of a study’s inadequacies allows the jury to appropriately weigh the alleged defects and reduces the possibility of prejudice.”) (internal citation omitted). “In some cases, however, the analysis may be ‘so incomplete as to be inadmissable as irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400, n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986)). A somewhat unique body of law has developed governing whether and under what circumstances statistical analysis proffered by an expert — and, in particular, regression analyses such as those conducted by Dr. Phillips — pass muster under Rule 702. In the seminal case Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in ignoring statistical evidence presented by plaintiffs in connection with their employment discrimination claim. Id. at 386, 106 S.Ct. 3000. The Court reasoned: While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major factors “must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.” Normally, failure to include variables will affect the analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility. Id. at 400, 106 S.Ct. 3000. The Court further reasoned that “[tjhere may, of course, be some regressions so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant; but such was clearly not the case here.” Id. at 400, n. 10,106 S.Ct. 3000. “Bazemore, however, does not give blanket approval to the introduction of all evidence derived from multiple regression analyses.” Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1987). Instead, courts have recognized that by its own terms, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bazemore applies only to a regression analysis “which accounts for the major factors.” See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400, 106 S.Ct. 3000. Thus, in Bicherstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 449 (2d Cir.1999), the Second Circuit concluded that the district court properly gave plaintiffs expert report “no probative value,” holding: the district court did not reject Gray’s regression analysis because it included less than all the relevant variables; rather, it found the evidence not probative because it omitted the major variables. Thus ... Gray’s statistical analysis falls within the Bazemore exception — that “there may ... be some regressions so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant.” Id. at 449 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 3000) (internal citations omitted). The importance of accounting for the relevant “major variables” has been recognized as particularly important in the context of antitrust litigation. Damage estimates in antitrust cases hinge on careful statistical analysis, reasonable assumptions, reliable data, and the robustness of the results. If any of these areas are circumspect, then the analysis could provide faulty conclusions as to the existence or the amount of damages. 2A P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 399c, p. 447 (3d ed. 2006). The correct application of the before- and-after approach [in the context of an alleged conspiracy to monopolize] requires using the prices in the “before” period as an evidentiary foundation for inferring what the prices would have been in the conspiracy period but for the illegal activity. The determination of the “but for” prices, however, must take into account nonconspiratorial factors that would have caused prices to be different in the conspiracy period even if there had been no conspiracy. Id. ¶399^ at 446 (emphasis added) (discussing potential problems with the application of the “before-and-after” and “yardstick” methodologies in antitrust cases). By not including any additional variables in the regression, the possibility of omitted variable bias is high. In other words, there are omitted factors that may influence market share growth. These omitted factors could confound the results of the statistical analysis by biasing the damage estimates. In this way, the regression results do not necessarily identify an effect of USTC’s alleged behavior on Conwood’s market-share growth by state. Rather, the results only suggest a relationship between initial market share and market-share growth. Because the possibility of omitted variable bias is high, we cannot, therefore, infer anything from these results as to whether there was any illegal behavior and, if so, whether that behavior had any anticompetitive effects. Id. ¶ 399c2, at 455 (discussing flaws in plaintiffs statistical analysis in Conwood Company, LP v. United States Tobacco Company, 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.2002)). Accordingly, the key question regarding the admissibility of Dr. Phillips’ statistical analyses is whether they account for the “major factors.” In making this determination, the Court cannot simply assume that variables omitted from the analysis are, in fact, “major factors” which should have been included. There must be some indication that the excluded variables would have impacted the results. See Sobel v. Yeshiva University, 839 F.2d 18, 34 (2d Cir.1988) (“We read Bazemore to require a defendant challenging the validity of a multiple regression analysis to make a showing that the factors it contends ought to have been included would weaken ... the analysis.”). The burden of proof, however, remains on the proponent of the expert testimony. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775. b. “Yardstick” Approach Dr. Phillips’ “Yardstick” methodology of calculating damages is fairly straightforward. {See Dkt. 494, Exh. A, Economic Report of Owen R. Phillips. Ph.D. as it Relates to Denver and Los Angeles Markets (“Phillips Expert Report”), at ¶¶ 264-66). In each geographic market (Denver and Los Angeles), Dr. Phillips calculated the average ticket price for rock concerts promoted by Defendants, and compared this amount to the average ticket price for rock concerts promoted by other promoters {i.e., the “yardstick”). Dr. Phillips found that the average ticket price was higher for rock concerts promoted by Defendants, and concluded that this disparity in price was the result of Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct. Dr. Phillips then calculated the difference between these average ticket prices in each market, and multiplied this amount by the total number of tickets sold by Defendants during the relevant time period, resulting in estimated damages of $21,700,599 (Denver market) and $70,596,699 (Los Angeles market). (Dkt. 494, Exh. B, Rebuttal Economic Report of Owen R. Phillips. Ph.D. as it Relates to Denver and Los Angeles Markets (“Phillips Rebuttal Report”), at 39 (revised damages calculations)). Dr. Phillips’ “Yardstick” comparison, however, simply assumes — without further examination — that the difference in average ticket prices observed by Dr. Phillips is due entirely to Defendants’ allegedly anticompetitive conduct. The analysis does not account for any other possible explanation(s) for this disparity. Among other variables, Dr. Phillips’ analysis fails to account for differences in artist quality/popularity. Common sense dictates that a more popular music artist typically will command higher ticket prices than a less popular artist. Thus, if Defendants consistently promoted concerts for highly popular acts, one would expect their average ticket prices to be higher than those of rival promoters. Dr. Phillips himself has acknowledged that artist popularity affects ticket prices and that Defendants promoted many of the most popular artists during the relevant time period. During the June 4, 2007 hearing on class certification, for example, the following exchanges with Dr. Phillips took place: Q. And you realize that there are factors in addition to considering the competitive price versus the monopoly price that you would have to consider in this analysis, correct? A. Well, there’s going to be complications, because as Clear Channel became larger, they also [began] attracting the very best talent.... But I think there needs to be a check done on the quality of the artists that Clear Channel promotes versus the rest of the market so that damages aren’t ... overestimated in effect. Q. Is there a way, as an economist, that you can do that check for quality in doing a damage analysis here? A. Yes. THE COURT. It seems to me that if Clear Channel was attracting the best talent, that, as you said, that talent would command a higher ticket price, correct? WITNESS. Correct. THE COURT. So the damage analysis would have to include some further analysis to account for that qualitative difference in talent, correct? WITNESS. Yes, to see if there is a difference. Q. Do you believe that using those average ticket prices will bias damages against Clear Channel? A. It’s possible. And that is why we have to look at differences in qualities of the artists.... [W]e have to make some adjustments for quality in doing the damage analysis. (Dkt. 405, Exh. 2, at 41:6-51:1; see also id. at 43:17-23 (artist popularity can be accounted for by using, e.g., CD sales)). The only “check” that Dr. Phillips performed to account for artist popularity, however, was to compare Defendants’ promoter share (measured in ticket sales) of the “Top 100” rock acts in each geographic market to Defendants’ share of the overall market. Dr. Phillips concluded that “Clear Channel’s market share for the Top 100 Acts is consistent with its market share in the remainder of the market.” (Phillips’ Expert Report, at ¶ 263). The glaring flaw in this purported analysis is that the Top 100 rock acts in each market account for virtually all of the relevant ticket sales. In other words, the Top 100 acts in each geographic market effectively comprise the entire market. Thus, Dr. Phillips’ “analysis” amounts to nothing more than a simple tautology: Defendants’ share of the overall market is consistent with Defendants’ share of the overall market. Dr. Phillips conceded as much in his deposition: Q. So your conclusion is that Clear Channel’s share of all concerts is the same as Clear Channel’s share of all concerts? A. In Los Angeles, yeah. (Dkt. 405-3, Phillips Depo., at 102:11-14). Q. So the [Top 100] analysis is meaningless? [referring to the Denver market] A. The money is in the top 100 concerts. Q. The top 100 analysis is meaningless? A. Right. Yeah. The top 100 — the money is in the top 100 concerts. (Phillips Depo., at 103:7-11). In contrast, Defendants have submitted evidence that the artists promoted by Defendants during the relevant time period were, on average, more popular than the artists promoted by rival promoters. This evidence is consistent with Dr. Phillips’ observation that Defendants attracted “the very best talent.” Moreover, in order to demonstrate the impact of Dr. Phillips’ failure to account for artist popularity, Defendants’ expert economist, Dr. Janusz Ordover, conducted a comparison of ticket prices for concerts promoted by Defendants to concerts promoted by other promoters for the same artists. Dr. Ordover found that Defendants’ ticket prices generally were comparable to, and in several instances lower than, those of competing promoters for concerts by the same artist. (Ordover Expert Report, ¶¶ 170-80). In his Rebuttal Report, Dr. Phillips contends that Dr. Ordover’s analysis fails to account for venue size and, therefore, “is meaningless because the venue size is an important determinant of how prices are set.... A popular artist in a small venue will command a higher price than the same performance at a large venue.” (Phillips Rebuttal Report, at 34). This assertion by Dr. Phillips, however, simply provides another reason to exclude his “Yardstick” analysis, which similarly fails to account for venue size (or artist popularity, or any variable other than the identity of the concert promoter). In any event, while Dr. Ordover’s analysis may be flawed, artist popularity is undoubtedly a “major factor” in determining ticket prices, which should have been included in Dr. Phillips’ “Yardstick” analysis. The failure to do so renders this analysis “so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant.” See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400, n. 10,106 S.Ct. 3000. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that Dr. Phillips’ “Yardstick” damages analysis satisfies the requirements of Rule 702. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Exclude this testimony. c. “Before-and-After” Approach Dr. Phillips’ “Before-and-After” analysis is similarly flawed. In performing this analysis, Dr. Phillips first analyzed average ticket prices (for all live rock music concerts in the Denver and Los Angeles markets) from 1981 through 1998, a period that Dr. Phillips characterizes as “competitive.” (See Phillips Expert Report, at ¶¶ 267-73). Dr. Phillips then uses this data to “predict” the expected average ticket prices from 2000 through 2006. Next, Dr. Phillips compares these expected average ticket prices to the actual average ticket prices from 2000 to 2006. Because the actual ticket prices are higher than the “expected” values, Dr. Phillips concludes that Defendants’ entry into the market in 2000 caused an increase in ticket prices. Based on the difference between the expected ticket prices and the actual prices, Dr. Phillips calculates damages as follows: “Before-and-After” _Damages Calculations Convergence Linear Time _Model_Trend Model Denver $ 36,005.988 S21.295.572 Los Angeles $126.772.722 $69.725.212 With respect to Dr. Phillips’ “Before- and-After” analysis, the court’s holding in In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F.Supp.2d 1202 (S.D.Cal.2010) is instructive. There, the plaintiffs’ expert performed a multivariate regression analysis (as part of an “event study”) to analyze the impact of “corrective disclosures” on the stock price of a public company. Id. at 1271-72. The plaintiffs’ expert first created a “market index” and an “industry index” (the “independent variables”) to account for the market and industry forces that one would expect to impact the company’s stock price. Id. He then used these independent variables to calculate the daily predicted return on the company’s stock (i.e., the “dependent variable”). Id. Finally, the plaintiffs’ expert compared this predicted return with the actual return during the relevant time period and found that on the day following a corrective disclosure, the actual stock return “varie[d] markedly from the predicted return.” Id. Based on his analysis, the plaintiffs’ expert concluded that the corrective disclosures had caused these declines in stock price. Id. The court granted defendants’ motion to exclude the above-described analysis, holding that it did not meet Rule 702’s standards for admissibility as articulated in Daubert. Id. at 1273-74. The court reasoned: Dr. Nye predetermines the results of his analysis. Nye purports to test the hypothesis that REMEC’s corrective disclosures exerted a material negative influence on the per-share price of RE-MEC stock during the class period____ Nye’s model assumes that the difference between actual return and predicted return is necessarily a result of company-specific information. Dr. Nye makes no attempt to account for other possible causes, ie., industry-specific news (for example, if an increase in global sales of defense products due to an increase in U.S. presence in Iraq was announced during the class period), market-specific news (for example, if a 5% decline in stock prices occurred across the market due to an announcement of an expected drop in consumer sales in December), or other measurable macroeconomic variables (for example, the inflation rate and GDP). Id. at 1273 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court held that Dr. Nye’s expert opinion was not relevant and reliable as required under Rule 702. Id. at 1275. Where a study accounts for the “major factors” but not “all measurable variables,” it is admissible. [Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986).] However, where significant variables that are quantifiable are omitted from a regression analysis, the study may become so incomplete that it is inadmissible as irrelevant and unreliable. Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 449. Because the burden of proving helpfulness and relevance rests on the proponent of a regression analysis, it is the proponent who must establish that other major factors have been accounted for in a regression analysis. Dr. Nye makes no attempt to do so here, aside from his assertion/assumption that company-specific information is the only major factor. Id. at 1273. Notably, Dr. Phillips’ “Before-and-After” analysis is significantly less robust than the analysis rejected by the Court in In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig. There, the expert’s analysis accounted for two independent variables (the “market index” and the “industry index”), in addition to the corrective disclosures that allegedly caused the declines in stock price. Here, Dr. Phillips’ “Before-and-After” analysis accounts for no independent variables other than time. Moreover, in In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., the expert observed stock declines after several corrective disclosures by the defendants, arguably supporting his hypothesis that the disclosures were, in fact, the cause of the declines. Here, only one “event” (i.e., the entry of Defendants into the market in 2000) was considered. Finally, as discussed in more detail below, Dr. Phillips improperly excluded data from the year 1999 from his analysis. Thus, as in In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., Dr. Phillips impermissibly assumes that any observed increase in average ticket prices after 2000 is due entirely to Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, without meaningfully testing this assumption. In particular, Dr. Phillips’ analysis impermissibly fails to account for at least two major variables, both of which he has conceded could impact ticket prices: (1) changes in artist quality over the relevant time period; and (2) the emergence of digital downloading of music (using, e.g., Napster or iTunes) and its impact on the price of tickets for live concerts. With respect to artist quality, Dr. Phillips testified in his deposition that he believes ticket prices have increased due to changes in the “quality” of rock concerts, and that this increase began prior to Defendants’ entry into the market. I let the market self-adjust for quality. So when you look at the market, you can see prices even before the entry of Clear Channel going up. Even without any anticompetitive behavior in the market, I see prices going up, and I presume and I believe that’s because of quality changes in rock and roll concerts. So I am saying that the self-adjustment took place in the market. (Phillips Depo., at 88:11-18). (See also Phillips Expert Report, at ¶ 274 (referring to “the emergence of ‘superstar’ acts in the late 1990s that continued to exist throughout the class period here”)). Nevertheless, Dr. Phillips’ “Before-and-After” analyses fail to account for changes in concert quality during the relevant time period. In effect, Dr. Phillips simply assumes — without analysis — that to the extent concert quality changed from 1981 through 1998, concert quality continued to change from 2000 to 2006 at precisely the same rate. This is, of course, not necessarily true. For example, if the Rolling Stones and other highly popular acts began touring more heavily in 2000, one would expect average concert “quality” (and, consequently, average ticket prices) to increase. Moreover, given Dr. Phillips’ stated belief that changes in concert quality affect ticket prices, such changes undoubtedly constitute a “major factor,” which should have been accounted for under Bazemore and its progeny. With respect to the emergence of digital downloading, at least one industry observer has concluded that the increasing availability of music on the Internet is the “main reason” for the recent increase in concert ticket prices. I suspect the main reason [for rising ticket prices] is that the growing ability of fans to download music free from the Web — legally or illegally — has cut into artists’ revenues. Millions of people have downloaded music from Napster, Morpheus and KaZaA — and bought fewer records as a result. Music sales are plummeting, putting downward pressure on artists’ royalties. In this environment, concerts take on a different meaning for artists and their managers. In pre-Napster days, concert prices were kept below their market rate to help sell albums, a complementary good. Now concert prices are set with an eye toward maximizing concert revenue. Bands have always had cadres of fans, whose loyalty conferred monopoly power. Yet they were reluctant to exploit this power by charging higher prices because they wanted to sell more albums. When revenue from albums began to dry up, it was natural for bands to raise concert prices. It is not that bands have become greedier; it is that the technology changed to make it less profitable to charge below-market prices for concerts. (Dkt. 405-12, Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; Music sales slump, concert ticket costs jump and rock fans pay the price, New York Times (October 17, 2002)). In his deposition, Dr. Phillips conceded that digital downloading of music has, in fact, affected artists’ approach to concert profitability. Q. What is Napster? A. Napster is a digital download music site back in the late '90s. Q. 1998,1999, right? A. Yes. Q. Didn’t that fundamentally change the pricing of concert tickets? MS. CONNOLLY: Objection to form. A. Possibly. You know, it’s interesting. I don’t — it’s hard to sort out the impact of Napstar (sic) from iTunes, and in my mind, Napster really started the digital download movement, but I think iTunes really had more of an impact. Q. (BY MR. JACOBSON) So isn’t it true before Napster and iTunes that artists performed in concerts to promote record sales, while after Napster and during iTunes, artists now release records to promote concert revenue? MS. CONNOLLY: Objection to form. Q. (BY MR. JACOBSON) Isn’t that undeniably true? MS. CONNOLLY: Same objection. A. I don’t know if it’s true because here’s what I think. I think that all along there’s a relationship there where an artist will do a concert to promote their recordings and they will do recordings to promote their concerts. It’s a complementary relationship, but I think, you know, over time, given the popularity of digital downloads that the complementary relationship has changed. I’m not quite sure how it has changed, but it has changed, and artists are doing more concerts now because they have the opportunity to make more profit from the concert, more revenue from the concert relative to their recordings than I think before. Q. All right. So how does your Before-and-After analysis capture that impact? A. It captures the trend. I mean the trend begins, and it just maps it out. (Phillips Depo., at 211:24-213:10). Notably, the emergence of digitally-available music on the Internet (in approximately 1998/1999 according to Dr. Phillips) occurred immediately prior to 2000, the year in which Dr. Phillips concluded Defendants’ entry into the market caused ticket prices to increase. This fundamental change in marketplace dynamics clearly qualifies as a “major factor,” which should have been accounted for — in some fashion — in Dr. Phillips’ analysis. Finally, and perhaps most troubling to the Court, Dr. Phillips’ “Before-and-After” analyses completely ignore the dramatic increase in ticket prices that occurred in 1999, the year before Clear Channel entered the rock concert promotion market. To the Court’s chagrin, Dr. Phillips simply excluded 1999 from his data set, and performed the “Before-and-After” analyses as though 1999 had never occurred. Dr. Phillips explains that he excluded data from 1999 because “during this year SFX [whom Clear Channel ultimately acquired] was actively acquiring and consolidating concert promoters. In my opinion there was anticompetitive conduct taking place, and there were Department of Justice investigations in the company’s conduct. Including 1999 would be using an anticompetitive year in the markets to predict future competitive prices beginning in 2001.” (Phillips Rebuttal Report, at 36 (citing a September 3, 1998 Los Angeles Times article)). This purported explanation for the exclusion of 1999 fails for several reasons. First, according to Dr. Phillips’ own data, Defendants’ market share in 1999 was 2.34% in the Denver market and 0.0% in the Los Angeles market. {See Phillips Rebuttal Report, Revised Exhs. 1, 2). These de minimis market shares are insufficient as a matter of law to support monopolistic conduct. See 2 J. Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 25.03[3][a], at 25-37 (Matthew Bender 2d ed.) (hereinafter “Antitrust Laws and Trade”) (“[C]ourts have held that a low market share (generally below 40 percent) either precludes a finding of monopoly power or requires a finding of no monopoly power.”). Second, this explanation is directly contrary to Dr. Phillips’ previous representations to this Court, based upon which the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. See In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. at 136 & n. 32 (“At the hearing, Phillips testified that he could determine whether Clear Channel imposed a monopoly overcharge through a variety of methods. First, Phillips testified that he could use the relevant market in 1999 as a benchmark because Clear Channel possessed a small market presence in 1999 and its ticket prices were comparable with competitors’ ticket prices in 1999. This approach is commonly referred to as the ‘before-and-after’ approach.”) (citing Hearing Tr. at 39:25-40:19). Finally, even if anticompetitive conduct was, in fact, occurring in 1999, this conduct would not justify the wholesale exclusion of 1999 from Dr. Phillips’ analysis. The law is clear that Dr. Phillips must account for major factors (such as allegedly anti-competitive conduct in 1999); he cannot simply ignore them and perform the analysis as if they did not exist. The exclusion of 1999 undoubtedly had a significant impact on the results of Dr. Phillips’ analysis. (See generally Ordover Expert Report, ¶ 192). As demonstrated in the chart below, the average ticket prices (for all concerts) in both Denver and Los Angeles increased dramatically in 1999. In Los Angeles, the change in average ticket price from 1998 to 1999 represented the largest one-year increase (30.11%) in the twenty-five years studied by Dr. Phillips. In fact, average ticket prices in Los Angeles actually decreased in 2000, the year that Dr. Phillips concludes Defendants’ entry into the market caused ticket prices to rise to supracompetitive levels. Moreover, by excluding the significant price increase that occurred in 1999 from the “before” period, Dr. Phillips’ model effectively builds the full amount of this increase into his estimated damages— notwithstanding the fact that this increase occurred before Defendants’ entry into the market. As such, the analysis is hopelessly flawed. Average Ticket Prices (all concerts) Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that Dr. Phillips’ “Before- and-After” approach to calculating damages satisfies the requirements of Rule 702. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Exclude this testimony. d. “Pooled Sample” Analysis In his Rebuttal Report, Dr. Phillips performed an additional “pooled sample” analysis. For purposes of this analysis, Dr. Phillips combined all concerts from 1981-2006 (including concerts in both Los Angeles and Denver). (See Phillips Rebuttal Report, at 39, 64-67). He then analyzed this data in order to test his hypothesis that a “structural break” occurred in 2000. According to Dr. Phillips, this analysis “allows for a structural break in the market starting in 2000.” (Id. at 64). This “pooled sample” analysis is fatally flawed for the same basic reason discussed above; namely, it fails to account for any “major factors” (other than Defendants’ entry into the market in 2000) that could have caused and/or contributed to an increase in ticket prices. Moreover, the “pooled sample” analysis fails even to consider whether a so-called “structural break” occurred in any year other than 2000. To the contrary, Dr. Phillips concedes that there may be “structural breaks” in other years; he simply did not test for them. (See Dkt. 405-4, Phillips Depo., at 450:8-452:8). Finally, the “pooled sample” analysis impermissibly combines two geographic markets (Denver and Los Angeles) in order to reach the desired result. While these MDL actions have been consolidated for the sake of judicial efficiency, this Court consistently has recognized that the antitrust analysis in each case must be done on a market-specific basis. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that Dr. Phillips’ “pooled sample” analysis satisfies the requirements of Rule 702. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Exclude this testimony. e. Ticket Surcharges In his Expert Report, Dr. Phillips opines that Defendants’ monopoly power allowed them to add a variety of surcharges to the base price of tickets for the concerts they promoted. (See Phillips Expert Report, ¶¶ 276-82). “[Wjhile Clear Channel assesses these charges, for the most part its competitors do not.” (Id. at ¶ 279). In particular, Dr. Phillips contends that Defendants charged “monopoly rent” in the form of: (1) facility maintenance fees (“FMF”); and (2) parking fees in certain Los Angeles venues, which were charged regardless of whether the purchaser actually parked at the venue in question. According to Dr. Phillips, the total damages attributable to these surcharges is $2,753,709.12 (Denver) and $12,043,947.41 (Los Angeles). (Phillips Expert Report, at ¶ 282). Defendants do not argue in their Daubert Motion that Dr. Phillips’ testimony regarding these surcharges should be excluded; Defendants address these surcharges only in their Motions for Summary Judgment. Nor can the Court discern any obvious reason why this testimony should be excluded under Rule 702. The damage calculations appear to be straightforward, with no apparent methodological flaws that would render them unreliable. With respect to causation, Dr. Phillips’ opinion that Defendants’ monopoly power allowed them to assess the above-described surcharges generally appears to be within his area of expertise as an economist. Accordingly, the Court will not exclude Dr. Phillips’ damages calculations based on the ticket surcharges assessed by Defendants under Rule 702. 2. Definition of the Relevant Market Dr. Phillips opines that for purposes of Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims, the relevant product market is comprised of “live rock music concerts.” (See Phillips Expert Report, ¶¶ 40-64). Defendants contend that this opinion should be excluded under Rule 702, because Dr. Phillips failed to utilize a reliable methodology in defining this purported market. As a result, Defendants contend that Dr. Phillips’ proposed market definition is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive; under-inclusive in that it improperly excludes concerts that are reasonable substitutes for concerts included in Dr. Phillips’ definition (e.g'., concerts by certain “pop” artists); over-inclusive in that it improperly includes concerts that are not reasonable substitutes for one another (e.g., “classic rock” concerts, which are not reasonable substitutes for “heavy metal” concerts). (See Motion, at 16). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that Dr. Phillips’ proposed definition of the relevant product market is sufficiently reliable and helpful to the trier of fact to warrant inclusion under Rule 702 and Daubert. a. Applicable Substantive Law “For antitrust purposes, a ‘market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced — price, use and qualities considered.’ ” Paladin Assocs. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Int’l Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250, 79 S.Ct. 245, 3 L.Ed.2d 270 (1959)). “The product market includes the pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand.” Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir.1988). In standard antitrust analysis, the court considers both “demand elasticity” and “supply elasticity” in determining whether anticompetitive effects are likely. Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436. In other words, courts determine the degree to which price increases will cause marginal buyers to turn to other products or marginal suppliers to increase output of the product. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1118 (N.D.Cal.2004). As this Court observed in its previous Order Granting Class Certification, calculating the cross-elasticity of demand is often an economist’s first step in defining the relevant product market. See In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. at 123. Nevertheless, while calculating the cross-elasticity of demand (and supply) is the preferred methodology, it is not an absolute requirement. In Independent Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F.Supp.2d 1155 (C.D.Cal.2002), for example, the court observed that in order to define the relevant product market: Plaintiff must proffer “market data, figures or other relevant material adequately describing the nature, cost, usage, or other features of competing products” to determine the bounds of the relevant market. Id. at 1170-71 (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 669 F.Supp. 998, 1018 (E.D.Cal.1987), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1991)). Reliable measures of supply and demand elasticities provide the most accurate estimates of relevant markets. However, it is ordinarily quite difficult to measure cross-elasticities of supply and demand accurately. Therefore, it is usually necessary to consider other factors that can serve as useful surrogates for cross-elasticity data. U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 7 F.3d 986, 995 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Interna tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 208, 409 (1984)). In the seminal Brown Shoe decision, the Supreme Court identified several “practical indicia,” which it concluded could be relied upon to determine the boundaries of a product submarket for purposes of antitrust analysis. The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962). Although Brown Shoe involved the challenge of a merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, courts have recognized that its submarket analysis is equally applicable to claims brought under the Sherman Act. Although Brown Shoe involved a claim under Clayton Act § 7, its submarket analysis is applicable in Sherman Act cases. See Greyhound [Computer Corp., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.], 559 F.2d [488], at 494 n. 7 [ (9th Cir.1977) ]. Such applicability follows because the same considerations essential to line of commerce analysis under the Clayton Act are essential to market analysis under the Sherman Act. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1270-71 (9th Cir.1975). Thurman Industries, Inc. v. Pay ’N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1375 n. 1 (9th Cir.1989). Moreover, while the Court in Brown Shoe was evaluating the definition of a product “submarket” (where the relevant product “market” already had been defined), the Ninth Circuit has observed: “Because every market that encompasses less than all products is, in a sense, a submarket, these [Brown Shoe] factors are relevant even in determining the primary market to be analyzed for antitrust purposes.” Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449-55, 84 S.Ct. 1738, 12 L.Ed.2d 953 (1964)). “[SJubmarket indicia” are best viewed as “proxies for cross-elasticities [of supply and demand], and thus the identification of a submarket is in principle no different than the identification of a relevant market.” This is to say that nothing would be lost by deleting the word “sub-market” from the antitrust lexicon. 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 533, at 257 (quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1986)). While the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the practical indicia identified in Brown Shoe are “relevant” to the definition of the primary product market, see Olin, 986 F.2d at 1299, it has never expressly held that a plaintiff (and, more specifically, a plaintiffs expert economist) can define the relevant product market exclusively by reference to these “practical indicia.” This case provides an additional wrinkle, in that Dr. Phillips effectively bases his proposed product market definition entirely upon his qualitative assessment of the market, without any supporting quantitative economic analysis. Even where an economist is unable to calculate the cross-elasticity of demand (and/or supply), at least two of the practical indicia identified in Brown Shoe — “distinct prices” and “sensitivity to price changes” — would appear to lend themselves well to a quantitative approach. The Court has had some difficulty in locating cases addressing the unique circumstances presented in this case. Nevertheless, for purposes of the instant motion, the Court assumes that an expert economist may, under appropriate circumstances, define the relevant product market through an entirely qualitative assessment of the “practical indicia” identified in Brown Shoe. See generally Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1082 (D.Colo.2004) (collecting cases in which courts held that a plaintiff may define the relevant product market without calculating the cross-elasticity of demand, so long as sufficient evidence of other indicia of reasonable interchangeability is introduced). Under these circumstances, however, the Court will closely scrutinize Dr. Phillips’ proposed product market definition in order to ensure that his analysis is sufficiently robust to warrant admission under Rule 702 and Daubert. See generally Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Utility Dist, 571 F.Supp. 1504, 1521 (E.D.Cal. 1983) (“As the defendant fairly observes, such a determination [of the relevant product market] generally requires a detailed examination of ‘market data, figures or other relevant material adequately describing the nature, cost, usage or other features of competing products.’ ”) (quoting Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 919 (8th Cir.1976)) (emphasis added). b. Dr. Phillips’ Definition of the Relevant Product Market Here, the Court finds that Dr. Phillips’ proffered definition of the relevant product market is inadmissible for two independent, albeit related, reasons. First, Dr. Phillips failed to satisfy Rule 702’s requirements in formulating his definition of the relevant product market; i.e., in determining that the relevant product market is comprised of “live rock music concerts.” Second, Dr. Phillips failed to utilize a reliable methodology to populate this market as defined; i.e., in determining which performers qualify as “rock” artists, and thus which concerts qualify as “rock” concerts, under his proposed definition. (1) Definition of the Relevant Market In formulating his proposed definition of the relevant product market (“live rock music concerts”), Dr. Phillips: (1) failed reliably to apply his chosen methodology to the facts of this case; (2) failed adequately to consider the “practical indicia” identified in Brown Shoe; and (3) failed to consider the cross-elasticity of supply. The Court will address each of these deficiencies in Dr. Phillips’ analysis in turn. (a) The SSNIP Test In his Expert Report, Dr. Phillips states that in defining the relevant product market, he utilized the methodology set forth in the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued August 19, 2010 (the “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”). The Court will refer to this methodology as the “SSNIP” methodology. As described by Dr. Phillips in his Expert Report, the SSNIP methodology requires an iterative approach. “In order to define a relevant market, economists begin with the narrowest definition of a product (or product group) and expand that definition until all reasonable substitutes are included.” (Phillips Expert Report, at ¶ 41 (emphasis in original)); see also 2 Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade, § 24.04[2], at 24-69, 24-70 (describing methodology set forth in the 1992 Guidelines). As a general matter, the Court assumes that the SSNIP methodology may, under appropriate circumstances, provide an acceptable framework with which to define a relevant product market for purposes of antitrust analysis under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See generally 2 Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade, § 24.02, at 24-34 (“The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have issued a set of guidelines describing how those agencies will review transactions generally and define markets specifically when considering a proposed combination. The guidelines do not deviate from judicial precedent but attempt to provide a simplified approach. These guidelines are not binding on the courts.”); see also Thurman Industries, 875 F.2d at 1375 n. 1 (noting Brown Shoe’s analysis of the relevant market under Section 7 of the Clayton Act (ie., in a merger case) is applicable in Sherman Act cases). After careful review of Dr. Phillips’ Expert Report, however, it is apparent to the Court that Dr. Phillips did not reliably apply the SSNIP methodology to the facts of this case. Accordingly, Dr. Phillips’ market definition must be excluded. See Rule 702(d) (expert testimony is admissible only where “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”). Here, Dr. Phillips did not employ the iterative approach called for under the SSNIP methodology. Instead, his market analysis both started and ended with the purported market for live “rock” music concerts. Dr. Phillips never meaningfully considered any narrower definition of the market, nor did he ever “expand that definition until all reasonable substitutes [were] included” as required under his own formulation of the SSNIP methodology. See id. In his deposition, for example, Dr. Phillips conceded that he never specifically evaluated any potential product markets narrower than his proposed market of live rock music concerts. Q. What did you do to apply the smallest market principle in this case? A. ... [M]y smallest market principle stopped at the music genre rock. Q. You would agree, wouldn’t you, that there are subgenres of rock? A. There are. Q. What did you do to test whether applying the smallest market principle one could determine a market under your own methodology that is smaller than rock, such as a subgenre? [Objection to form] A. It’s subjective in the sense that rock concerts generally substitute for one another.... (Phillips Depo., at 123:17-124:17 (emphasis added)). Thus, instead of starting with the “narrowest definition of a product (or product group)” — e.g., an identifiable “subgenre” of rock — and expanding that definition until he was satisfied that all reasonable substitutes were included, Dr. Phillips simply started his analysis with the assumption that “rock” concerts constituted the relevant market, and looked for corroborating evidence without meaningfully testing this assumption. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir.1994) (“Coming to a firm conclusion first and then doing research to support it is the antithesis of [the proper application of the scientific method under Daubert ].”). As a result, instead of answering the critical question: “What products comprise the relevant market?” Dr. Phillips’ analysis devolved into a determination of: ‘Which performers qualify as ‘rock’ musicians?” Q. To populate your relevant market and to exclude those outside of it, it was purely and simply a determination of, quote, whether an artist was, quote, rock or not, correct? [Objection] A. That was the main determinant, rock— Q. What else was there? A. —did they do rock music. Q. What else was there? A. That was the determination. It was rock, yeah. Q. Okay. A. Were they rock or not. If they were rock, they were in the market. If not, they were out of the market. (Phillips Depo., at 116:24-117:14). This approach impermissibly predetermined the results of Dr. Phillips’ analysis; i.e., that the relevant product market is comprised of live music concerts by “rock” artists. See generally In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F