Full opinion text
ORDER M. CASEY RODGERS, Chief Judge. This cause comes on for consideration upon the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation dated February 28, 2012 (doc. 309). The parties have been furnished a copy of the Report and Recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). Having fully and carefully considered the Report and Recommendation and having made a de novo determination of all objections filed, the undersigned concludes that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED as follows: 1. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated by reference in this order. 2. Attorneys Reino, Channapasappa, and Avery are permitted to formally withdraw as counsel for their respective clients. 3. Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and sanctions (Doc. 156), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: The motion is GRANTED with respect to the request for fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.104 and DENIED with respect to the request for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 4. Plaintiffs motion for Rule 11 sanctions (Doc. 294) is DENIED, with Defendants to be awarded attorneys’ fees for their expenses incurred in opposing the motion. Defendants shall file proof of attorneys’ fees incurred in opposing the Rule 11 sanctions motion within thirty (30) days. 5. Plaintiff is found liable for attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.104, and the parties shall immediately commence complying with N.D. Fla. Loe. R. 54.1(E) to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. ORDER, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY, United States Magistrate Judge. This case began as an action for retaliatory discharge under state and federal law. It is now before the undersigned upon referral by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) and N.D. Fla. Loe. R. 72.3 to conduct evidentiary and such other necessary proceedings and to enter a Report and Recommendation on the motion for attorneys’ fees and sanctions filed by Defendants Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. (“PSI”), Premier Behavioral Solutions, Inc. (“PBS”), and Gulf Coast Treatment Center, Inc. (“GCTC”) (collectively, “Defendants”) (see Doc. 204, referring Doc. 156). Plaintiff Leslie Smith (“Plaintiff’), through her attorney Richard E. Johnson (“Johnson”), filed a response to Defendants’ motion, opposing their demand for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.104; on his own behalf Johnson also opposes Defendants’ request for sanctions against counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (see Doc. 160). Additionally pending is Johnson’s motion to file the affidavit of attorney Michael D. Kohn (“Kohn”) (Doc. 286), and Plaintiffs motion for sanctions against Defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (Doc. 294). Defendants oppose both of these motions (respectively, Doc. 287 and Docs. 293, 296). For the reasons that follow, the court denies Johnson’s motion for leave to file Kohn’s affidavit. Additionally, the court recommends that Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and sanctions be granted in part and denied in part and that Plaintiffs motion for Rule 11 sanctions be denied. BACKGROUND As an initial matter, the court finds it appropriate to identify the parties’ counsel and to discuss the current status of their representation. The docket reflects that Johnson has represented Plaintiff as lead counsel in this ease from its commencement in state court. In addition to Johnson, attorneys Andrea Lynn Reino (“Reino”) and Melissa Ann Horwitz (“Horwitz”) — from Johnson’s firm, the Law Offices of Richard E. Johnson — have also represented Plaintiff during the course of the litigation. After Defendants filed their motion for sanctions, attorney Marie Mattox (“Mattox”) entered an appearance for Johnson (Doc. 209). The docket reflects that no counsel has entered an appearance for either Reino or Horwitz. Attorney Mark Warfield Peters (“Peters”), whose law firm is based in Nashville, Tennessee, has represented Defendants pro hac vice in this case from the time of its initiation. Additionally, attorney Sneha Channapasappa (“Channapasappa”), from Peters’ firm, and local attorneys Alfred Benjamin Gordon, III (“Gordon”), and Jamie McEachern Avery (“Avery”) have appeared for Defendants. In August 2009 Peters filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel for Channapasappa (Doc. 178), in February 2010 Johnson filed a notice of withdrawal for Reino (Doc. 220), and in September 2011 Gordon submitted a notice of withdrawal for Avery (Doc. 306). None of these filings reflects that the requirements set forth in this court’s local rules for the withdrawal of counsel have been satisfied. See N.D. Fla. Loe. R. 11.1(F) (stating that attorney may only withdraw by written leave of court obtained after giving ten days notice to the affected party or client and to all other counsel of record). None states that at least ten days notice was given before filing the request to withdraw nor does the docket reflect that the district court has given written leave to withdraw to any of these attorneys. Regrettably, the clerk did not refer the notices to chambers for action, and thus the district court was not given an opportunity to review them and advise the parties of their deficiencies. Regardless, it remains the attorneys’ responsibility to comply with the court’s local rules and to obtain written leave of court to withdraw. Having failed to submit appropriate notice and to acquire the court’s written authorization to withdraw, Reino, Channapasappa, and Avery remain on the docket as counsel of record in this case (notwithstanding the clerk’s erroneous termination of Reino’s representation (see style of case on docket sheet noting termination in February 2010) and discontinuation of electronic noticing to Avery (see Doc. 307)). Nevertheless, the court notes the passage of time with respect to each attorney’s attempted withdrawal and the apparent lack of any objections having been voiced to date by an affected client or other counsel. Accordingly, this court will recommend to the district court that Reino, Channapasappa, and Avery be permitted at this time to formally withdraw as counsel for their respective clients. The following facts are taken from the district court’s March 31, 2009, order granting summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and the Florida Private Whistleblower Act (“FWA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101, et seq. (see Doc. 150). Plaintiff is a therapist who worked for less than four months in 2006 at a treatment center — operated by GCTC — that offers a program for juvenile delinquents who have been court-ordered to attend. The program and the physical facility are generally known as the Gulf Coast Youth Academy (“GCYA”), which is operated under contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”). The DJJ and the Florida Department of Children and Families have regulatory jurisdiction over GCYA. PSI is a publicly traded company. PBS is a subsidiary of PSI and has a contract with the DJJ to operate the GCYA program. The GCYA is located in a Fort Walton Beach, Florida, facility owned by GCTC. Thus, simply put, the corporate structure of the three Defendant entities is that PSI owns PBS, which owns GCTC (see id. at 2, n. 1). According to Plaintiff, while working at the treatment center she uncovered serious physical and sexual abuse of juveniles, Medicaid fraud, and a suspiciously altered medication form that suggested to her that a juvenile had been forcibly medicated (see Doc. 150 at 1). Plaintiff reported some of these incidents to state officials and to GCYA’s management (id. at 2). Immediately after complaining to GCYA about the altered medication form, Plaintiff was escorted from the GCTC premises and within a short time her employment was terminated. Thereafter, asserting that she had been fired in retaliation for whistleblowing activity, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint, which named PSI only, with the Department of Labor through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) concerning her allegations of abuse, fraud, and an altered medication form (id. at 4). According to Plaintiffs complaint, by reporting and objecting to the complained-of acts she engaged in protected activity as contemplated in Section 806 of the SOX (id.). See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who reports violations of the fraud provisions of SOX, rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and/or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders). Plaintiff maintained that PSI’s investors were effectively defrauded through their unknowing purchase of stock in a company with a potential exposure to significant criminal and civil liability (id. at 4-5). After an investigation, OSHA dismissed Plaintiffs complaint. It concluded that the complaint did not fall within the scope of the SOX because the allegations concerned youths in a correctional setting, which did not constitute violations of any of the laws or rules enumerated in the statute (id. at 5). The OSHA ruling also questioned whether Plaintiffs employer, identified as GCTC, was governed by the SOX but it did not reach the issue in light of its conclusion that Plaintiffs conduct was not covered under the statute (id. at n. 3). The docket reflects that in January 2007, through a complaint signed by Reino, Plaintiff brought suit in the First Judicial Circuit for Okaloosa County, Florida, under the FWA as well as the Florida Public Whistleblower Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3187, et seq. (see Doc. 1-2). GCYA, which was named as a Defendant at that time, filed a motion for partial dismissal (Doc. 1-6), and PSI and PBS filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 1-8). After discovery commenced, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint (Doc. 1-18). Following a hearing, the state court on December 27, 2007, dismissed Plaintiffs claims arising under the Florida Public Whistleblower Act as untimely; denied without prejudice PSI’s and PBS’s motion to dismiss that was based on lack of jurisdiction; and granted Plaintiffs motion to amend insofar as she proposed to assert a claim under the SOX and denied the motion insofar as it asserted an untimely claim under the False Claims Act (Doc. 10-2). Defendants removed the case to this federal forum on January 2, 2008 (see, generally, Doc. 1). Following removal, the district court issued initial and final scheduling orders (Docs. 7, 15), and the parties proceeded through an extended and highly contentious period of discovery in this forum. On March 4, 2008, Plaintiff-through Horwitz — filed an amended complaint which, citing the authority of the state court’s order prior to removal, asserted claims under the SOX and FWA (see Doc. 25). On April 25, 2008, the undersigned granted the parties’ consented motion to extend the discovery deadline (from June 1, 2008, to August 1, 2008), as well as other related deadlines (see Docs. 38-40). On May 15, 2008, Plaintiff — through Horwitz — filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 motion to compel discovery and a motion for a case management conference (Docs. 45, 46). The court directed the parties on May 19, 2008, to confer in a good faith effort to resolve their dispute without the court’s intervention and pointedly warned Plaintiff that “[deposition scheduling is not the type of matter deserving of the court’s limited time” (Doc. 48 at 1, n. 1). On May 31, 2008, after Defendants had responded to the pending motions but before this court had ruled on them (Docs. 49, 50), Plaintiff — through Johnson — filed a motion to compel depositions; the motion requested the court’s expedited review (Doc. 51). On June 3, 2008, Plaintiff — through Johnson — filed a notice advising the court that the parties had reached agreement concerning the scheduling of the depositions, which he said mooted Plaintiffs most recent motion to compel and, “at least temporarily,” mooted her motion for a case management conference (Doc. 55). The same date, this court issued an order ruling on Plaintiffs motion to compel depositions and her motion for a scheduling conference (Doc. 56). The court advised Plaintiff that prior to learning the parties had resolved the matters in dispute the court had spent considerable time drafting an order addressing her motions and Defendants’ responses. The court, stating that its then-unnecessary draft order had been “quite scathing” in its condemnation of the conduct of Plaintiffs counsel, advised that it likely would impose sanctions against counsel and in an order issued September 12, 2008, 2008 WL 4274496, did so, awarding the amount of $1470.60 (Doc. 81). In an earlier, comprehensive seven-page order, the court denied in its entirety Plaintiffs pending Rule 37 motion to compel discovery (Doc. 58). Addressing whether expenses should be awarded to Defendants, the court stated that “much like the last dispute between these parties, Plaintiff appears primarily responsible for the needless involvement of this court.” (Id. at 7). The court ultimately concluded, however, that circumstances existed that would make an award of expenses unjust and thus declined to impose sanctions against Plaintiff (id.). After Defendants timely filed a motion for summary judgment on August 21, 2008 (Docs. 75-77), Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ statement of material facts (Doc. 86), and a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 87). Also, through Johnson, Plaintiff filed a Rule 56 motion for additional discovery to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (see Doc. 88, rejected for lack of attorney consultation certificate at Doc. 89; amended motion at Doc. 91), which Defendants opposed (Doc. 93; see also Doc. 94, affidavit in support, and Doc. 95, “Schleuss Report” filed under seal). Plaintiff, through Johnson, sought leave to file a reply (Doc. 108). On November 7, 2008, the undersigned denied Plaintiffs amended Rule 56(f) motion as well as her motion for leave to file a reply (Doc. 122). On October 7, 2008, with Defendants’ summary judgment motion still pending, Plaintiff — through Horwitz — ought leave to file a second amended complaint (see Does. 101, 106; proposed second amended complaint at Doc. 104). Defendants opposed the motion in part (Doc. 110). The district court granted the motion to amend to the extent that Plaintiff sought to correct the name of GCYA to GCTC but denied it in all other respects (Doc. 119). A second amended complaint, signed by Horwitz, was filed November 6, 2008 (Doc. 120). In its March 31, 2009, order addressing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court first ordered that the second amended complaint at Document # 104 be stricken from the docket and instructed that it would proceed on the first amended complaint, “with the exception of treating that complaint as though all references to Gulf Coast Youth Academy were made to Gulf Coast Treatment Center, Inc.” (Doc. 150 at 5). Additionally, the district court overruled Plaintiffs Rule 72 objections to this court’s November 7, 2008, order denying her amended Rule 56(f) motion and request to file a reply, finding the objections “meritless” (id. at 6). Finally, the court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs declaration, to the extent one paragraph of the declaration was stricken (id. at 8). Turning to the substance of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court first addressed Plaintiffs state law claim under the FWA, stating that to prevail on a claim under this statute a plaintiff “ ‘must prove that the activity, policy or practice objected to is, in fact, in violation of a law, rule or regulation.’ ” (Doc. 150 at 10) (citation omitted). The district court noted that while on summary judgment this standard did not require Plaintiff to prove that violations had in fact occurred it did require her to come forward with some evidence of acts, which if proven, would be actual violations (id. at n. 5). The district court sharply criticized Plaintiffs argument that she need only show a “good faith belief’ that her employer’s conduct or policy violated the law, stating that such a position was wholly unsupported by the case law Plaintiff had cited in support, in particular The Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561 (Fla.2000) (id.). Finding that Plaintiff had presented “no evidence” that Defendants were responsible for violating a law, rule, or regulation within the meaning of the FWA, the court granted summary judgment to Defendants on that claim (id. at 12). More specifically, the court noted that, as to the allegations of fraud and an altered medication form, there was no evidence that the conduct, if proven, would be a violation of a law, rule, or regulation within the meaning of the FWA (id. at 11). As to the allegations of sexual abuse and physical abuse, the court found that Plaintiff had put forth nothing to show that the asserted abuse actually occurred (id. at 12). Moreover, although required to do so, Plaintiff had failed to inform Defendants of these incidents in writing prior to contacting state officials to report them (id.). The district court then addressed Plaintiffs SOX claim, on which it also granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court noted that Plaintiff had failed to name PBS or GCTC in her administrative complaint and thus could not establish a claim against either Defendant due to her failure to properly exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to them (Doc. 150 at 13). Nor could Plaintiff make out a claim against PSI, the only Defendant named in the OSHA complaint, because she had failed to allege that PSI was her employer, a necessary element of a SOX whistleblower claim (id. at 14). Even if Plaintiff had named PSI as her employer, however, the court found she had failed to come forward with evidence that supported an employment relationship between PSI and herself (id.). Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Shortly after it heard oral argument, the appellate court issued an unpublished opinion affirming the district court’s rulings. See Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 358 Fed.Appx. 76 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (see also Doc. 213). Addressing the summary judgment rulings in its decision, the Eleventh Circuit first concluded that the district court had correctly applied the “actual violation” standard as opposed to the “good faith belief’ standard on the FWA claim. The appellate court noted, however, that even if the good faith belief standard were the correct standard to apply to a FWA claim and even if Plaintiff could make out a prima facie case of retaliation, she had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence of pretext. Id. at 78. On the SOX claim, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiff had not produced any evidence that showed she had engaged in protected conduct. Even- if she had, the court . added, dismissal of this claim on the grounds Plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to PBS and GCTC and was not an employee of PSI, as the district court had found, was proper. Id., n. 2. Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which on May 21, 2010, denied certiorari (see Doc. 237). Defendants filed their motion for fees in April 2009, while Plaintiffs appeal was pending before the Eleventh Circuit (Doc. 156). The district court deferred ruling on the motion pending disposition of the appeal (Doc. 161). After the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in the case (see Doc. 213, mandate entered December 21, 2009), the district court referred this matter to the undersigned (Doc. 204). Following referral, this court, after directing the parties to make a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute (Doc. 212), decided to hold Defendants’ motion in abeyance pending the Eleventh Circuit’s resolution of the appeal in a potentially instructive case, Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood, Inc., 2009 WL 1616496 (N.D.Fla.2009). After the Eleventh Circuit entered its ruling in that case, see Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood, Inc., 395 Fed.Appx. 629 (11th Cir.2010), as authorized by this court the parties supplemented their prior filings on the fees and sanctions dispute (see Doc. 248; Doc. 249, signed by Mattox only). The court set the matter for oral argument and an evidentiary hearing on Defendants’ motion. In the same order the court directed Defendants to file a notice detailing the specific conduct allegedly engaged in by Plaintiffs counsel which Defendants contended vexatiously and unreasonably multiplied the proceedings in this case and thus warranted the imposition of attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1927 (Doc. 253). After Defendants filed their notice (“ § 1927 Notice”) (Doc. 264), Plaintiff, through Mattox, sought leave to file a motion for sanctions against defense counsel pursuant to § 1927, to which Defendants responded in opposition (Docs. 260, 263). Finding no merit in Plaintiffs arguments for granting leave to file her untimely § 1927 motion, either in law or .equity, this court denied Plaintiffs motion (Doc. 269). At the April 19, 2011, evidentiary hearing on the motion for fees and sanctions, Johnson appeared for Plaintiff, Mattox appeared for Johnson, and Peters appeared for Defendants (see Doe. 278, transcript, at 2). Peters, Johnson, and Plaintiff testified. Defendants introduced one exhibit into evidence, which the court admitted (see Doc. 276-1, Defendants’ Exhibit 1). During the proceedings, and also in an order issued after the hearing to memorialize its instructions (Doc. 277), the court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs, including documents referenced during the evidentiary hearing but not introduced or placed into evidence at that time. The court specified that only those particular exhibits could be filed (id. at 1). As directed by the court, the parties timely submitted their final briefs and exhibits on May 18, 2011 (see Doc. 283, Defendants’ exhibits; Doc. 284, Defendants’ final brief; and Doc. 285, Plaintiff/Johnson’s final response with attached exhibits, signed by Mattox and Johnson). One week later, on May 25, 2011, Plaintiff, through Johnson only, submitted a motion seeking leave to file Kohn’s affidavit (Doc. 286). On June 22, 2011, Defendants filed a “Notice in Response to Plaintiffs Threatened Rule 11 Sanctions Motion....” (Doc. 293). This was followed, on June 24, 2011, by Plaintiffs motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants, signed by Johnson only (Doc. 294). After the Rule 11 motion was filed, Defendants also filed a response in opposition (Doc. 296). DISCUSSION Johnson’s Motion to File Kohn’s Affidavit In its order following the evidentiary hearing on the fees and sanctions dispute, this court clearly and firmly advised the parties that only evidence that had been identified at the hearing could be submitted and that such exhibits must be filed on or before May 18, 2011 (see Doc. 277). Johnson acknowledges his understanding of these instructions. Yet Johnson now seeks to file a declaration that is neither authorized nor timely. It was not identified at the evidentiary hearing — indeed, that Johnson anticipated submitting an affidavit or declaration was not even hinted at during the hearing — and the declaration was not filed until May 25, 2011. Only if Johnson could show good cause for filing the declaration would the court permit him to file it. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes he has not. In seeking leave to file the declaration, Johnson states that it was only in connection with the April 19, 2011, evidentiary hearing he and his counsel realized that the “viability of the original theory of the case,” particularly with regard to the SOX claims, would be “central to the outcome of the sanctions motion.” (Doc. 286 at 1). Given the extensive record in this case and Johnson’s long-time involvement with it, as well as his statement in the original response to the demand for § 1927 sanctions acknowledging Defendants’ characterization of the suit as “frivolous from the outset,” the court finds this assertion is not credible (see Doc. 160 at 10; see also Doc. Doc. 217-11 at 14, Peters’ transcribed statement during court-ordered Local Rule 7.1(B) conference attended by Johnson and Mattox that “So, I do think that we have a strong argument that, from the day this complaint was filed, that it was frivolous ....”). Johnson had to have been fully aware, well before the hearing in April 2011, that Defendants were taking the position that Plaintiffs claims had been frivolous from the beginning of the case, a position which clearly implicates the “viability of the original theory of the case.” Johnson also advocates the value of an expert’s perspective on certain issues in this case, including the corporate parent/subsidiary link and the viability of claims not directly implicating shareholder fraud. Even if there were value in such an opinion, and assuming the court approved the affiant or declarant as an expert, Johnson had ample opportunity to timely and properly submit such an affidavit or declaration, but he failed to do so. Furthermore, had Johnson or Mattox wished to call Kohn or some other expert witness at the evidentiary hearing they could have done so, but they did not. Johnson also raises equitable and due process concerns as bases for granting his motion. According to Johnson, “in view of the gravity and harshness of the possible sanctions in this case for Plaintiff and her counsel, fairness dictates that those facing potential ruin be permitted to make a record in this case.” (Doc. 286 at 2). But, as the record amply reflects, this court has been more than fair in affording the parties extensive opportunities to present their arguments and evidence. Johnson also states that he should be permitted to file Kohn’s declaration “due at least in part to the fact that the Defendants] submitted additional issues and materials for consideration during the hearing ... and thus ha[ve] attained a 35- to 25-page advantage over Plaintiff.” (Id. at 3). This contention warrants little discussion. No unfairness accrues to Johnson simply because Defendants came to the hearing properly prepared to introduce an exhibit for admission into evidence while Johnson — who had the same advance knowledge of the hearing and the same opportunity — did not. In any event, as noted above, the court authorized the filing of certain additional materials. Indeed, although the court does not accept all of them (see n. 15, infra), Plaintiff and Johnson attempted to avail themselves of that opportunity by submitting four exhibits with their final response (see Doc. 285, Exhs. 1-4). Next, contrary to Johnson’s contention, the court’s admission of Defendants’ Exhibit 1 (a summary exhibit that outlined the conduct which allegedly constituted § 1927 violations) did not violate Johnson’s right to due process. Reasonably viewed, the exhibit was not, as he contends, “too extensive to be absorbed at the time of the hearing”; nor did the exhibit amount to a “surprise” or ambush filing that “effectively deprived” counsel of sufficient notice of the specific charges asserted and as “to which Plaintiff had no meaningful opportunity to respond.” (Doc. 286 at 3, 4). As the court stated at the hearing when it admitted Exhibit 1 into evidence over Johnson’s objection (Doc. 278 at 140-43), the document essentially restates, albeit with some elaboration, the very same conduct and dates provided in Defendants’ earlier-filed § 1927 Notice (Doc. 264). Johnson had an adequate opportunity to prepare for the hearing on the basis of the § 1927 Notice, as well as his familiarity with the lengthy proceedings in this case as lead counsel. In any event, the court provided Johnson, after the hearing, with the opportunity to respond once again to Defendants’ positions, including the information presented in the supplemental exhibit. In short, Johnson has not been prejudiced in any manner by the admission of Defendants’ Exhibit 1. If anything, as matters now stand, if the declaration were admitted Defendants would be prejudiced by having had no opportunity to cross-examine Kohn or otherwise challenge the opinions offered in his declaration. For all the reasons discussed above, the court concludes Johnson has failed to show good cause for permitting him to file Kohn’s declaration, which is both unauthorized and untimely. The court therefore denies Johnson’s motion for leave to file the declaration. As a final matter, the court briefly discusses what amounts to an allegation by Johnson of judicial misconduct by this court. Specifically, Johnson asserts that: The affidavit has been available for a week, but has not been submitted until now because of internal consultations within Plaintiffs legal team and consultations with others outside. The difficulties of decision arose from a perception of unfairness and threat during the hearing and a perception by Marie Mattox that her representation of Rick Johnson in this matter was perhaps a cause of adverse treatment of her in another case. The team has therefore been torn between the need to have an important item in the record on the one hand and the prospect of further adverse action in this case and others as a result of submitting this request. (Doc. 286 at 3). Unequivocally, Johnson’s unfounded and offensive assertions are false. A review of the transcript of the'hearing held April 19, 2011, reveals no “threat” of any sort (see Doc. 278). Likewise, Johnson’s suggestion that the undersigned retaliated against Mattox in another case, based on her representation of Johnson in the instant matter, lacks any factual support and is, simply put, false and outrageous. The court will not at this time further address Johnson’s fantastic, wholly unsupported — and unsupportable — accusations, other than to state that the fact Johnson would feel free to make such wild assertions reflects, at the very least, a shocking lack of professional judgment, self-restraint, and discretion. Fees Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.104 Defendants assert that as the prevailing parties in this lawsuit they are entitled under Fla. Stat. § 448.104 to fees incurred in defending Plaintiffs FWA claim because Plaintiff did not act in good faith and her claim had no arguable merit in fact or law (Doc. 156 at 3). Plaintiff submits that for two reasons the demand for fees pursuant to § 448.104 should be denied: (1) under Supremacy Clause principles, the SOX fees provision (which authorizes an award of fees only to the prevailing employee) preempts the FWA fees provision (which authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party), thus precluding an award of attorneys’ fees to Defendants; and (2) even absent federal preemption, granting a prevailing defendant attorneys’ fees under the FWA is disfavored. Federal Preemption Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land,” and any state law that is in conflict with a federal law is preempted. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2128-29, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981). The Supreme Court has identified three types of preemption: express, field, and conflict. See This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, Ga., 285 F.3d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir.2002). In this case, Plaintiff appears to invoke conflict preemption, which arises either when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law or when state law “stands as an obstacle” to achieving the objectives of the federal law. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2294, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent the clear intent and purpose of Congress, preemption — in any of its forms — will not be found. See CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (Congressional intent is the “ultimate touchstone” in a preemption case); and Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir.2000) (Congressional intent governs the court’s “determination of whether federal law preempts state law.”). As Plaintiff argues, the SOX and FWA claims in this case are both related to retaliation, and they share the same factual basis. These commonalities alone are not enough, however, for the SOX fees provision to preempt the FWA fees provision. Rather, with the understanding that the intent of Congress is at the center of the question, the court must assess whether it is impossible to comply with both the SOX and FWA fees provisions or whether the FWA fees provision is an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the SOX provision. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73, 120 S.Ct. 2288. As principles discussed in two preemption cases from other circuits cited by Plaintiff, Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d 742 (9th Cir.2009) (see Doc. 160 at 5; Doc. 249 at 5; and Doc. 285 at 22), and Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Comm’n, 242 F.3d 227 (4th Cir.2001) (Doc. 249 at 5; and Doc. 285 at 22) are instructive in making this assessment, the court begins its discussion with them. Plaintiff cites Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.2009), for the broad proposition that “the Supremacy Clause of the constitution forbids applying state law to a federal claim with its own fee law.” (Doc. 160 at 5). In Hubbard, the Ninth Circuit held that, to the extent state law “authorize^ the award of fees to a prevailing defendant on nonfrivolous CDPA [California Disabled Persons Act] state claims that parallel nonfrivolous ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] claims, there is a conflict and the ADA preempts” the CDPA. Hubbard, 554 F.3d at 747. In reaching this conclusion the court explained: A violation of the federal ADA constitutes a violation of the CDPA. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54(c), 54.1(d), 54.2(b). Therefore, to the extent that California’s Section 55 mandates the imposition of fees on a losing plaintiff who brought both a nonfrivolous ADA action and a parallel action under Section 55, an award of attorney’s fees under Section 55 would be inconsistent with the ADA, which would bar imposition of fees on the plaintiff. In such a case, the proof required to show a violation of the CDPA and of the ADA is identical. In that circumstance, it is impossible to distinguish the fees necessary to defend against the CDPA claim from those expended in defense against the ADA claim, so that a grant of fees on the California cause of action is necessarily a grant of fees as to the ADA claim. As federal law does not allow the grant of fees to defendants for nonfrivolous ADA actions, we must conclude that preemption principles preclude the imposition of fees on a plaintiff for bringing nonfrivolous claims under state law that parallel claims also filed pursuant to the federal law. [citation omitted] Hubbard, 554 F.3d at 745. In asserting flatly that a substantive violation of the FWA is also a violation of the SOX (see Doc. 160 at 4; and Doc. 249 at 5), Plaintiff apparently attempts to draw the same parallel as did the Hubbard court when it stated that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the CDPA. Plaintiff does not cite a single case in direct support of the parallel she proposes. Plaintiffs assertion in fact is not correct, as the separate discussions of the two claims in the district court’s summary judgment order and the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on appeal indicate. The district court conducted analyses under both the FWA and the SOX, noting that the analyses are different (see Doc. 150 at 10-15). The Eleventh Circuit likewise conducted separate analyses. Smith, 358 Fed.Appx. at 78. To be sure, there is overlap in the two kinds of cases as they share the related legal theory of retaliation, and there may be instances in which both statutes are violated under the same facts, but a violation of one statute is not necessarily a violation of the other. Additionally, the Hubbard court noted that the proof in the two types of claims in the appeal before it were identical, which is not the case in the instant matter. Indeed, as set forth below, much of the legal framework for SOX and FWA claims is distinct and different. As an initial matter, there are differences between SOX and FWA claims with respect to the reach and purposes of the respective statutes. In a recent opinion from the Eleventh Circuit, Johnson v. Stein Mart, Inc., 440 Fed.Appx. 795, 800 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam), in which attorney Johnson represented the plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the whistle-blower protections under the SOX that are afforded to employees of publicly traded companies. The court noted that the type of reporting protected by the SOX either specifically or, in many instances, effectively, pertains to fraud. Stein Mart, 440 Fed.Appx. at 800, quoting Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 54-55 (1st Cir.2009). The FWA, on the other hand, is not limited to publicly traded companies; additionally, the type of reporting it covers is less restrictive than the SOX, as it covers other types of conduct. See Fla. Stat. § 448.102(2). Next, and significantly, the initial showing a plaintiff must make under the two statutes is different. Under the whistle-blower protection provision of SOX, a publicly traded company is prohibited from discharging an employee for providing information to a supervisory authority about conduct that the employee “reasonably believes” constitutes a violation of federal laws against mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, any SEC rule or regulation, or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). The Eleventh Circuit has held that this provision requires an employee to demonstrate both an actual belief as well as an objectively reasonable belief that his employer has engaged in enumerated illegal or fraudulent conduct. See Gale v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 384 Fed.Appx. 926, 929-30 (11th Cir.2010) (citations omitted). For an FWA claim, under the current law of this circuit (as both the district and appellate courts in this case have stated), a plaintiff is required to identify an actual violation of a law, rule, or regulation (see Doc. 150 at 10; Smith, 358 Fed.Appx. at 78). Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction decides otherwise, in this circuit the correct standard to apply to a FWA claim is the actual violation standard. On the other hand, for a SOX claim the threshold showing requires only a good faith belief of a violation. There are other differences between the legal framework for SOX and FWA claims. While the elements for these two claims sharing the related legal theory of retaliation appear similar, the burdens are different. As noted by the Johnson court, “SOX does not follow the familiar Title VII McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework” that is applied to FWA claims. Stein Mart, 440 Fed.Appx. at 801. Instead, in a SOX retaliation case [A]n employee bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of retaliatory discrimination; the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the employee’s prima facie case by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected activity. Id., citing Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir.2008); also citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (“An action brought under paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.”); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(ii) (“[N]o investigation otherwise required under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted if the employer demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior.”); and Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344, 352-53 (4th Cir.2008) (setting out SOX affirmative defense standard). In her initial response, Plaintiff states that “[t]he proof required to show a violation of the state and federal acts is identical.” (Doc. 160 at 5). Her second response to Defendants’ motion leaves out this sentence, although the argument on preemption otherwise is nearly the same (Doc. 249). In her final response, Plaintiff appears to concede that the models of proof necessary to make out a SOX claim and a FWA claim are different, but she contends the preemption analysis is unaffected (Doc. 284 at 22-25). Plaintiffs current position is inconsistent with her reliance on Hubbard, as the case notes the identical nature of the violations and the proof between the federal and state claims at issue. As outlined above, the proof needed to make out SOX and FWA claims is not identical and the violation of one statute is not necessarily a violation of the other. Indeed, as discussed, although both statutes are related to retaliation, aspects of their legal frameworks are different. Plaintiff also cites, without meaningful discussion, Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Comrn’n, 242 F.3d 227, 232-33 (4th Cir.2001), in support of her contention that under the Supremacy Clause the SOX fee provision “trump[s] a common-fact state claim’s fee law even where the state law is expressly contrary.” (Doc. 249 at 5; see also Doc. 285 at 22). In Brinn, after the parties reached a settlement on the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the district court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs under the statutes’ fee provisions. The defendant appealed the award, primarily on the ground that a provision of the Virginians with Disabilities Act (‘VDA”) prohibited the award of any fees to the plaintiff. Brinn, 242 F.3d at 231— 32. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court first held that the VDA only prohibited awards of attorneys’ fees in claims arising under the VDA; the law did not apply to claims asserted under federal law and thus did not prohibit the district court’s award of fees. Furthermore, the court explained, even if the disputed provision in the VDA did apply to federal claims it would offend the Supremacy Clause to hold that a state law prohibited payment of certain attorneys’ fees that a federal law specifically gave courts the discretion to award. Id. at 232-33. In other words, the state statute could not be permitted to limit, or stand as an obstacle to, “Congress’s intent to give federal courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to any entity they deem appropriate ....” Id. at 233. In Brinn, the fees provisions of the federal statutes at issue were discretionary, which gave rise to the court’s Supremacy Clause concerns and its conclusion that the state statute’s mandatory fee provision, if it in fact applied to the facts of the case at bar, would be preempted by federal law. Similarly, in Hubbard the federal fees provision was discretionary. See Hubbard, 554 F.3d at 744. In contrast, significantly, in the instant case it is the state law that is discretionary and the federal law that is mandatory (see n. 10, supra). As the discretionary FWA provision may give way to the mandatory SOX provision, the state law presents no obstacle to achieving the federal law’s objective, which is to assure a prevailing employee is awarded fees and certain other compensation. Nor is complying with both the mandatory federal and discretionary state law provisions impossible. As in the instant case, a prevailing defendant employer may seek and be eligible to obtain fees under the FWA but not the SOX. Where the plaintiff employee has prevailed on both types of claims, the Supremacy Clause would present no obstacle to her applying for fees under each statute. In summary, differences exist between the legal frameworks for whistle-blower claims under the SOX and such claims under the FWA. These differences render the claims unidentical in nature, which does not support a finding that the state fees provision is preempted by the federal one. See Hubbard, 554 F.3d at 745. Regardless, comparison of the mandatory versus discretionary schemes of the fees provisions of the two statutes at issue yields the following crucial, if not dispositive, conclusions for purposes of conflict preemption analysis. See id.; Brinn, 242 F.3d at 233. First, it is not impossible to comply with both the SOX fees provision and the FWA fees provision and, second, the FWA provision does not “stand[ ] as an obstacle” to achieving the objectives of the SOX provision. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73, 120 S.Ct. 2288. As the fees provision of the FWA does not frustrate the Congressional intent to award fees to prevailing employees in SOX actions, it does not contravene the Supremacy Clause. Accordingly, the court concludes that the SOX fees provision does not preempt the FWA fees provision. An additional case the court and the parties have addressed in connection with Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants’ demand for fees pursuant to § 448.104 is Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood, Inc., 395 Fed.Appx. 629 (11th Cir.2010) (see Doc. 225, deferring action in this case until the appeal in Alansari had been decided; Doc. 253 at 3, n. 4, referencing Alansari; Doc. 248, Defendants’ supplemental response; and Doc. 249, Plaintiffs supplemental response). Alansari is another case in which the plaintiff was represented by attorney Johnson. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to the FWA, the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act, and Title VII, the court denied the defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees. Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood, Inc., 2009 WL 1616496 (N.D.Fla. 2009). In opposing the motion for fees, Johnson asserted some of the same arguments he raises in the present case, including those on preemption and the applicable fees standard for federal and state claims sharing common facts (see Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood, Case No. 4:07-cv-00438/SPM7WCS, Doc. 158). When it denied the defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees, the district court did not discuss preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause but it did agree with Johnson that: [B]eeause the state Whistleblower claim has the same nucleus of operative facts as the Title VII claims, a grant of fees for the state claim, pursuant to Section 768.79 [regarding offers of judgment] is the same as a grant of fees under Title VII, which is prohibited. Therefore, Defendant is similarly prohibited from an award of fees on the state claim. Alansari, 2009 WL 1616496, at *2. The court also noted that: [B]ecause the violations for which [Plaintiff] sought Whistleblower protection were violations of Title VII and Florida Civil Rights Act, the standard for an award of attorney’s fees under the Whistleblower claim should similarly apply. An award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant, in a state Whistleblower claim that involves a potential employer violation of Title VII or the Florida Civil Rights Act is prohibited unless Plaintiffs Whistleblower claim is deemed to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless [and here, Alansari’s FWA claim was not frivolous, so Defendant is not entitled to fees]. Id. On appeal, also making no mention of preemption doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, in part stating that “Title VI and whistleblower retaliation claims employ the same analysis, just as Title VII and FCRA claims do.” Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood, Inc., 395 Fed.Appx. 629, 632 (11th Cir.2010), citing Sierminski, 216 F.3d at 950, and Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir.1998). The court observed that “Florida courts have recognized the similarity and overlap between claims under the FCRA and the Florida Whistle-blower Act.” Id. (citations omitted). It then went on to hold that because “Plaintiffs civil rights claims were based on the same set of facts” and “these facts— whether brought pursuant to state or federal civil rights statutes — are governed by the same legal standards[,]” there was no error in declining to award fees under Florida’s offer of judgment statute “because Florida law prevents awards of attorneys’ fees ... in state and federal civil rights cases absent a showing of frivolity[.]” Id. Discussing the Alansari case and her contention that a federal attorneys’ fees standard should govern both the federal claim and a state claim with common facts, Plaintiff submits that In Jones [v. United Space Alliance, LEG, 494 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir.2007) ], the Title VII and FCRA claims were both about discrimination and the claims shared common facts, so the federal fee standard governed both. In Alansari, the Title VII and the whistleblower claims were both about retaliation and shared common facts, so the federal fee standard governed both. In this case, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and the whistleblower claims are both about retaliation and share common facts, so the federal fee standard should govern both. How could it be otherwise? The court concludes it is “otherwise” here because, as discussed above, Plaintiffs SOX and FWA claims, while sharing a common nucleus of operative fact and also sharing retaliation as a related legal theory, are governed by legal standards that differ. Putting aside for the instant analysis the question of frivolity, the court notes the fact that Plaintiffs SOX and FWA claims in this case are both “about retaliation” is not what the Eleventh Circuit found or required in Alansari. As quoted above, the appellate court noted that the claims at issue not only were based on the same set of facts but also that “these facts — whether brought pursuant to state or federal civil rights statutes — are governed by the same legal standards .... ” Alansari, 395 Fed.Appx. at 632 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this court does not agree with Plaintiffs argument that simply because her SOX and FWA claims are both “about retaliation” and are based on common facts, an award of attorneys’ fees to Defendants under § 448.104 is precluded. Propriety of Granting Fees Award to Prevailing Defendant under Fla. Stat. § mm The Supreme Court has made clear that in most circumstances a losing plaintiff “should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). In this case, Plaintiff apparently concedes that the courts which have addressed the issue have found the Christiansburg standard to be inapplicable to claims for fees under § 448.104, which means that a prevailing defendant need not show that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous in order to recover attorneys’ fees. New World Communications of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So.2d 1231, 1235-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see also Gamb v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1997 WL 893874, at *2 (M.D.Fla.1997) (finding award of attorneys’ fees under § 448.104 does not require a showing of frivolity), aff'd, 132 F.3d 46 (11th Cir.1997); Stone v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3333674, at *3 (M.D.Fla. 2006) (“The Christiansburg standard is not applicable to fee awards under § 448.104.”). Accordingly, as Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case, they are entitled to receive attorneys’ fees without being required to show that Plaintiffs FWA claim was frivolous. As noted, courts have discretion in deciding whether or not to award attorneys’ fees under § 448.104. Akre, 866 So.2d at 1235. With respect to a discretionary award of attorneys’ fees, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “the fact that a losing party has acted in good faith or that his legal position had arguable merit will justify an exercise of the district court’s discretion in deciding not to award attorney’s fees.” Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., 822 F.2d 1031, 1034 (11th Cir.1987) (addressing award of fees to a prevailing defendant in a copyright case); see James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1339 (S.D.Fla.2007) (citing Sherry in addressing FWA fees demand). Nevertheless, even if it is found that a plaintiff proceeded in good faith on a non-frivolous claim, fees need not be denied as “it is not a precondition to an award to show that the losing party acted in bad faith or brought a frivolous claim.” Id. at 1035. As noted in Bush v. Raytheon Co., 2009 WL 5128040, at *2 (M.D.Fla.2009), § 448.104 does not set out any particular elements for courts to consider in deciding whether an award of fees is appropriate. In Blanco v. TransAtlantic Bank, 2009 WL 2762361, at *2 (S.D.Fla.2009), the district court articulated five factors, derived from the FWA and other Florida fee statutes, which are non-exhaustive and non-controlling but nonetheless may guide the court’s discretion in assessing a claim for fees under this statute. These include: (1) whether the party’s case was meritorious or frivolous; (2) the scope and history of the litigation, including whether the party continued to prosecute the action despite the presence of an efficient resolution; (3) the parties’ wealth disparity; (4) whether an award of fees would frustrate the FWA’s remedial purpose by deterring worthy claimants; and (5) whether the party acted in good or bad faith. Id. See also Raytheon, 2009 WL 5128040, at *2 (reciting factors laid out in Blanco). This court considers the five factors below. 1. Meritorious or Frivolous Nature of Plaintiffs FWA Claim This factor has been the focus of much contention and debate between the parties. While the parties, Plaintiff in particular, apparently would have it otherwise, the current fees and sanctions dispute is not an opportunity to relitigate the merits of this case. In order to describe the factual backdrop and the context of the instant matter, this court has consulted the relevant summary judgment record. Also, in making its recommendation the court has considered the papers and evidence the parties were either entitled to file or present or which the court invited them to submit. The court only references and relies on those materials, however, to the extent they are relevant to the limited purpose of resolving the instant dispute without revisiting issues of law or fact that the district court and the Eleventh Circuit have already settled. With that preamble, the court considers whether Plaintiffs FWA claim is frivolous. A claim may be found to be frivolous where, on summary judgment, defendants prevail and the plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence in support of her claims. See Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 355 (11th Cir.1995) (noting that findings of frivolity have generally been sustained when plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence supporting their claims), citing Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.1985). A case is not frivolous where the plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to support her claims. Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189. Additionally, in Sullivan the Eleventh Circuit instructed that courts should consider several other factors in examining a claim for frivolity: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that these guidelines are not hard and fast rules, however, and that frivolity determinations should be made on a ease-by-case basis. Id. The district court determined at summary judgment that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case on her FWA claim. The court concluded that Plaintiff had presented “no evidence” that Defendants were responsible for violating a law, rule, or regulation within the meaning of the FWA, and there was “no admissible evidence” that the complained — of abuse incidents had actually occurred (Doc. 150 at 12). Accordingly, Plaintiffs FWA claim may be considered frivolous, as her case was dismissed prior to trial and, having failed to introduce evidence which supported the claim, she failed to establish a prima facie case under the FWA. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgement ruling. Smith, 358 Fed. App’x at 78. The court therefore concludes that this factor favors Defendants. 2. Scope and History of the Litigation The history of this litigation reflects that Plaintiffs counsel at times was uncooperative and intransigent in dealing with defense counsel. For example, after removal Horwitz (“probably” at Johnson’s direction (see Doc. 278 at 75)) refused to recognize certain discovery responses provided during the state court proceedings (Docs. 283-7-9). Johnson testified that this essentially was due to his preference of having all discovery conducted in this forum under “the Magistrate Judge Miles Davis” discovery order, which Johnson perceived as being stricter and more favorable to Plaintiff (Doc. 278 at 55-56, 77). The parties’ activities during the state court proceedings is beyond the scope of this inquiry, but Plaintiffs requiring duplicative efforts and production of documents by Defendants once the case was removed to federal court was unnecessary and wasteful (see Docs. 283-7-9). Also, as discussed above, the record reflects that Plaintiffs counsel heedlessly and unsuccessfully pursued numerous discovery-related motions, one of which resulted in the imposition of sanctions against Johnson. Moreover, Plaintiff and her counsel should have recognized — surely no later than by the close of discovery — that the evidence on which she intended to rely was insufficient to support her FWA claim. By that point, Plaintiff and her counsel had the benefit of the information not only brought out in her own deposition but also in the depositions of eight former and current GCTC employees, as well as the GCTC corporate representative, and almost fifteen hundred pages of documents produced by Defendants. Nonetheless, Plaintiff forged ahead, continuing to pursue her claim through summary judgment (and beyond). Accordingly, the court concludes that certain conduct by Plaintiffs counsel was wasteful of the time and resources of the district court, this court, and Defendants, and it unnecessarily lengthened the litigation. This factor thus weighs in favor of Defendants. 3. The Parties’ Wealth Disparity Although there is little in the record regarding the parties’ respective financial circumstances, the court may readily deduce that there is a large disparity in wealth between the corporate Defendants and Plaintiff, an individual now earning approximately $50,000 per year (see Doc. 278 at 127); see Bell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 2005 WL 1618223, at *1 (M.D.Fla. July 6, 2005). While the court should consider the disparity in wealth between parties to avoid impoverishing an individual or unfairly punishing her for exercising the right to seek legal redress, neither should it penalize a corporation simply because it has greater resources. Raytheon, 2009 WL 5128040, at *2. The disparity in wealth should not result in refusing to allow any attorneys’ fees whatsoever to Defendants. Should fees be awarded, the court may consider the disparity in wealth when setting the amount to be awarded. 4. Effect on Remedial Purposes of the FWA The FWA “establishes Florida’s public policy in favor of promoting the disclosure of wrongdoing and the protection of those who make such disclosure ....” Bell, 2005 WL 1618223, at *1. Requirin