Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge. The right to a jury trial is a bulwark of liberty enshrined in the Constitution. Because “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” courts need to ensure that tainted jury verdicts — even those reached after long and costly trials — do not stand. But justice also demands that a defendant having reason to suspect juror misconduct not remain silent in order to secure a risk-free trial. The sanctity of an oath is central to the sound administration of justice. An oath impresses on one’s conscience the duty to testify truthfully. And attorneys, as officers of the court, owe an unflagging duty of candor to the tribunal. When these foundational duties are breached, the integrity of the judicial process is undermined and a free society imperiled. This case lays bare the damage that ensues when the obligation to be forthright is cast aside. The trial of this tax shelter fraud prosecution spanned three months and included 9,200 pages of testimony from forty-one witnesses. The Government produced more than twenty-two million documents during discovery, and the Court received approximately 1,300 exhibits in evidence. No expense was spared. On the ninth day of deliberations, a jury returned a split verdict convicting Paul M. Daugerdas, Donna M. Guerin, Denis M. Field, and David K. Parse (collectively, “Defendants”) of multiple tax-related offenses and acquitting Raymond Craig Brubaker. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), Defendants move for a new trial based on juror misconduct. For the following reasons, Defendants Daugerdas, Guerin, and Field’s motion for a new trial is granted, but Defendant Parse’s motion is denied. BACKGROUND The facts underlying this motion are not in dispute, and are gleaned from transcripts of the trial and related proceedings and the parties’ submissions. 1. Voir Dire On February 23, 2011, 450 prospective jurors reported to the courthouse and completed a basic hardship questionnaire. Catherine M. Conrad (“Conrad”) was among them. The questionnaire posed three questions: (1) whether “service as a juror on a 3-month trial [would] cause undue hardship or extreme inconvenience”; (2) whether each prospective juror had “any difficulty reading or understanding English”; and (3) whether each prospective juror suffered “any physical ailment or other limitation that would make it difficult to serve as a juror.” (See Declaration of Theresa Trzaskoma in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial, dated July 8, 2011 (“Trzaskoma Deck”) Ex. 2, at 2-1 to 2-2.) Conrad answered each question “no.” Later that day, the Jury Department provided counsel with a jury roll identifying the prospective jurors in the venire, and listing a “Catherine M. Conrad” with a Bronxville residence. (See Trzaskoma Deck Ex. 1.) The following day, copies of the juror questionnaires were distributed to counsel. (Trzaskoma Deck Ex. 2, at 2-1 to 2-2.) During a final pretrial conference on February 28, the Court excused a number of prospective jurors who had claimed hardships on their questionnaires. (Feb. 28, 2011 Transcript (“2/28 Tr.”) 6.) On March 1, 2011, voir dire commenced, and approximately 175 jurors, including Conrad, swore the following oath: “Do each of you solemnly swear that you will give true answers to all questions as shall be put to you touching upon your qualifications to serve as jurors in this case?” The Court sought to qualify forty-two prospective jurors from whom a twelve-person jury and six alternates would be selected. Conrad was present in the courtroom throughout the three-day voir dire and was among the first to be seated in the jury box. After the prospective jurors were sworn, the Court explained, inter alia, the function of voir dire and that it is a French term meaning “to speak the truth.” (Trial Transcript dated Mar. 1, 2011 through May 24, 2011 (“Trial Tr.”) 10.) This Court then posed a number of questions to the panel as a whole, including five that are relevant to this motion: 1. “Do any of you know or have you had any association, professional, business, social, direct or indirect, with any member of the staff of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the United States Department of Justice, or the Internal Revenue Service? Has anybody had any dealings with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice, or the IRS?” (Trial Tr. 84-85.) 2. “Are you or [has] any member of your family ever been a party to [a] lawsuit, that is, a plaintiff or a defendant in a civil case or a criminal ease?” (Trial Tr. 105.) 3. “Have any of you or a close relative ever been involved or appeared as a witness in any investigation by a federal or state grand jury or any congressional committees or state legislative bodies or licensing authorities or planning boards?” (Trial Tr. 107.) 4. “Have any of you ever been a witness or a complainant in any hearing or trial, whether it be in the state or federal courts?” (Trial Tr. 108.) 5. “[H]ave you or any member of your family or any very close personal friend ever been arrested or charged with a crime?” (Trial Tr. 118.) Conrad responded affirmatively to only two of these questions. In response to the first question, Conrad offered that her father “works for DOJ across the street” as “an immigration officer.” (Trial Tr. 85.) She then assured this Court that his position would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial. (Trial Tr. 85.) In response to the second question, Conrad stated that she “was a plaintiff in a personal injury negligence case ... pending” in Bronx Supreme Court. (Trial Tr. 105.) Again, she represented that her personal injury action would not interfere with her ability to serve as a juror. (Trial Tr. 106.) Conrad did not provide any additional information or any other affirmative answers to questions posed to the group. This Court informed prospective jurors that “if any of you have an answer to any question that you prefer not to give in public, just let me know, and the lawyers and I will hear you up here at the sidebar of the bench.” (Trial Tr. 15-16.) Throughout voir dire, several prospective jurors offered sensitive or potentially embarrassing personal information at sidebar. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. 31, 40, 47, 52, 79, 82,112.) Conrad did not. After posing questions generally to the venire, this Court made inquiries of each prospective juror individually. Conrad was present for all of the individual questioning, including each prospective juror’s responses and all of the Court’s follow-up inquiries. Importantly, Conrad listened to the Court’s individual voir dire of two jurors on the first day of jury selection and had the opportunity to reflect overnight on how she would answer the following morning. (Trial Tr. 133-39.) The individual voir dire of Conrad proceeded on March 2 as follows: THE COURT: Now I think what I’d like to do is to return to some individual questioning of jurors. I think Ms. Conrad, Juror No. 3, that I was about to begin with you when we suspended yesterday. So first would you tell us what neighborhood you reside in? CONRAD: Bronx Village [sic] [Bronx-ville] in Westchester. THE COURT: How long have you lived at your current address? CONRAD: My whole life. THE COURT: Do you own or rent? CONRAD: We own. THE COURT: Who are the other members of your household? CONRAD: I live with my husband. He’s retired at this point. THE COURT: What is he retired from? CONRAD: He owns some bus companies. THE COURT: Do you work outside the home? CONRAD: No. I’m a stay-at-home wife. THE COURT: Do you have any children? CONRAD: No. THE COURT: All right. What is the highest level of education you’ve attained? CONRAD: I have a BA in English literature [and] classics, and I studied archeology abroad. THE COURT: What do you do in your spare time? CONRAD: I like to read. We travel. I take care of an elderly aunt. THE COURT: How generally do you get your news? CONRAD: Periodicals, magazines, newspapers, radio, cable, internet. THE COURT: Can you identify someone for us who we’d all know who you admire most? CONRAD: Probably dating myself, but the ex-grid [sic] great Lynn Swann from the Steelers. Unbeknownst to many people, he did study ballet, and I admire him because I think he combined grace and grit under pressure. THE COURT: All right. Is there anything that you think it would be important for us to know about you in making a decision as to whether you should serve as a juror in this case? CONRAD: If the trial lasts more than three months, I’m still available. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Is there any reason that you feel you could not be fair and impartial in this case, Ms. Conrad? CONRAD: Not at all. THE COURT: Thank you, ma’am. (Trial Tr. 203-05.) During the course of voir dire, this Court excused 117 prospective jurors from the venire. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. 113-15, 293-95.) At the conclusion of voir dire on March 3, this Court asked whether counsel wished that further inquiry be made of any particular juror or the panel as a whole. No counsel requested any further inquiries. (Trial Tr. 354.) Following the exercise of peremptory challenges, this Court empanelled the jury, and Conrad became Juror No. 1. (Trial Tr. 353.) Each empanelled juror swore the following oath: “Do each of you solemnly swear that you shall well and truly try this case now on trial and give a true verdict according to the law and the evidence?” As discussed below, it is now undisputed that Conrad lied extensively during voir dire and concealed important information about her background. II. The Verdict On May 24, 2011 — after eight days of jury deliberations and forty-six jury notes — the jury returned a split verdict against the five defendants. The jury convicted Daugerdas of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and the IRS, to commit tax evasion, and to commit mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“the conspiracy count”); eighteen counts of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; three counts of personal income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201; one count of corruptly obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue Laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a); and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2. The jury convicted Guerin of the conspiracy count; nine counts of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; one count of corruptly obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue Laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a); and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2. The jury convicted Field of the conspiracy count; four counts of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201; one count of corruptly obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue Laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a); and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2. The jury convicted Parse of one count of corruptly obstructing and impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue Laws in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2, but acquitted him of the conspiracy count and three counts of tax evasion. The jury acquitted Brubaker of all charges. III. Conrad’s May Letter and Her True Identity Conrad authored a two-page type-written letter dated May 25, 2011 to Assistant United States Attorney Stanley J. Okula, Jr. (“Okula”) praising the Government’s prosecution of the case (the “May Letter”). The May Letter was postmarked May 28. On June 22, the Government forwarded the May Letter to the Court and defense counsel. (ECF No. 458.) In her letter, Conrad wrote, “I thought that you [i.e., Okula], Ms. Davis and Mr. Hernandez [other members of the Government’s trial team] did an outstanding job on behalf of Our Government.” In describing the jury’s role, she stated that “I did feel that we reached a fair and just verdict based on the case, facts and evidence presented to us.” She further explained that “we did have qualms with Mr. David Parse. I solely held out for two days on the conspiracy charge for him I wanted to convict 100%, (not only on that charge) — but on Tuesday, May 24, 2011, we had asked for the Judge’s clarification of ‘willfully’ and ‘knowingly’, I believe, and I had to throw in the towel.” Conrad went on for an additional two paragraphs discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the Government’s case against Parse, the effectiveness of expert witness testimony, the persuasiveness of certain evidence, and the credibility of fact witnesses. She concluded her letter by writing, “I have learned, the saying a ‘federal case’ is REALLY a ‘federal case’, and I feel privileged to have had the opportunity to observe la creme de la creme — KUDOS to you and your team!!!” (All punctuation and emphasis in original.) According to Defendants, the May Letter caused Parse’s trial counsel Bruñe & Richard LLP to investigate Conrad’s background. That inquiry led to the current motion for a new trial based on Conrad’s numerous lies and omissions during voir dire. This Court now recounts Conrad’s torrent of false and misleading testimony. A. Personal Background Conrad lied about her educational, professional, and personal background. While she informed the Court that her highest level of education was a bachelor’s degree, she in fact obtained her juris doctorate from Brooklyn Law School in 1997 and was admitted to practice law in New York in January 2000. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 4; Ex. 27 at 27-2 to 27-3.) Further, although she informed the Court that she was a “stay-at-home wife,” she had practiced law for some time until the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department (the “Appellate Division”) suspended her law license. (Trzaskoma Deck Ex. 27 at 27-3.) And the day before she was sworn as a prospective juror, she sought to have her law license reinstated. Conrad answered under oath that she owned a home and lived in Bronxville in Westchester County “all my life.” (Trial Tr. at 203.) That, too, was a lie. In fact, Conrad rented an apartment and lived on Barker Avenue in the Bronx for years. B. Prior Litigation Experience Conrad also failed to disclose during voir dire the disposition of her personal injury action and she concealed the fact that she was a witness in that litigation. While Conrad represented that she was a plaintiff in a “pending” personal injury action, she failed to disclose that in May 2007, the Bronx Supreme Court dismissed her case for her failure to appear for a compliance conference. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 22, at 22-4.) The Bronx Supreme Court later reinstated the case because Conrad claimed that her failure to prosecute was the result of a hospitalization for medical issues “unrelated” to the lawsuit. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 23, at 23-4; Ex. 24.) After seven days of trial in June and July 2010, a jury returned a verdict against Conrad, finding that the defendants had not been negligent. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 26, at 26-3.) On March 24, 2011, the Bronx Supreme Court denied Conrad’s motion to set aside the verdict. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 28, at 28-5.) While this Court asked directly whether any juror had ever been a trial witness, Conrad never revealed to this Court that she had testified as a witness, both at trial and deposition or that a jury rejected her person injury claim and the only aspect of the case still pending was her motion for a new trial and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. C. Prior Investigation by State Licensing Authority Conrad also hid the fact that she was the subject of an investigation and disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Depai’tmental Disciplinary Committee (the “Disciplinary Committee”) of the Appellate Division. In December 2007, the Appellate Division suspended Conrad from the practice of law for failing “to cooperate with the [Disciplinary] Committee’s investigation into two complaints alleging professional misconduct which threatens the public interest.” In the Matter of Catherine M. Conrad, (“2007 Suspension Order”), 48 A.D.3d 187, 188, 846 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1st Dep’t 2007). According to one complaint, Conrad “violated court orders and failed to appear as directed, ultimately resulting in the dismissal of the action.” 2007 Suspension Order, 48 A.D.3d at 188, 846 N.Y.S.2d 912. According to the second complaint, she failed to oppose an order to show cause, resulting in an adverse ruling against her client. 2007 Suspension Order, 48 A.D.3d at 188, 846 N.Y.S.2d 912. In response to her state bar suspension, on January 4, 2008, Conrad was suspended from the bar of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See In re Catherine M. Conrad, No. M-2-238 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2008); see also Local Civ. Rule 1.5(b)(5) (violations of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct are grounds for discipline, including suspension). On January 29, 2008, Conrad was suspended from the bar of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See In re Catherine M. Conrad, No. MC-08-010 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2008). Shortly after her December 2007 suspension, Conrad began cooperating with the Disciplinary Committee’s investigation and acknowledged an alcohol dependency. In the Matter of Catherine M. Conrad (“2010 Suspension Order”), 80 A.D.3d 168, 169-70, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1st Dep’t 2010). Conrad moved to convert her existing suspension to a medical suspension nunc pro tunc and sought an order vacating the suspension and reinstating her to the practice of law due to her yearlong sobriety. 2010 Suspension Order, 80 A.D.3d at 169, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187. She attributed her earlier failure to cooperate with the investigation and her underlying professional misconduct to her alcohol dependence. 2010 Suspension Order, 80 A.D.3d at 169-70, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187. As part of the Disciplinary Committee’s investigation, Conrad submitted to a psychiatric evaluation in May 2010. The examining psychiatrist detexmined that Conrad was not yet “fit to re-commence the practice of law.” 2010 Suspension Order, 80 A.D.3d at 169, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187. As a result, on December 9, 2010, the Appellate Division modified the 2007 Suspension Order and indefinitely suspended Conrad from the practice of law because she suffered from a “disability by reason of physical or mental infirmity or illness.” 2010 Suspension Order, 80 A.D.3d at 170, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187. On February 28, 2011, just days after she reported for jury service, and the day before voir dire commenced, Conrad filed an application for reinstatement to the bar. (Affirmation of Paul Shechtman, dated Oct. 26, 2011 (“Shechtman Affn”) Ex. F: Notice of Motion for Reinstatement as Attorney, dated Feb. 26, 2011.) Conrad’s application for reinstatement was riddled with falsehoods. She failed to report that she had not paid a fine imposed on her by the Eastern District of New York, even though the application required that disclosure. {See Shechtman Affn Ex. A: Letter from Chief Counsel Jorge Dopico of the Disciplinary Committee, dated Aug. 9, 2011 (“Dopico Letter”), at 3.) She also stated, in response to a direct question on the application, that she had not used any other names, even though she had used the name “Catherine Rosa” when arrested in May 2009. (Dopico Letter, at 5). Finally, she stated that she had no arrests or convictions since her suspension in 2007, when in fact she had pleaded guilty to shoplifting charges in October 2009. (Dopico Letter, at 5.) Because of this deceitful conduct, in August 2011, the Disciplinary Counsel recommended that Conrad’s application for reinstatement be denied and that she be disbarred nunc pro tunc to February 28, 2011. (Dopico Letter, at 9.) D. Criminal History During voir dire, Conrad also concealed her and her husband’s extensive histories of criminal arrests and convictions. According to New York and Arizona criminal records, Conrad was arrested and charged with crimes on at least five occasions. Conrad’s husband, Frank J. Rosa (“Rosa”), is a career criminal. On April 17, 1998, Conrad was arrested in New York and charged with driving while intoxicated, reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident, assault, resisting arrest, and harassment. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 11, at 11-1.) On October 21, 1998, she pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor driving while intoxicated charge. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 11, at 11-1.) Shortly before that plea, on September 23, 1998, she was arrested again and charged with criminal contempt and aggravated harassment. She pleaded guilty to these misdemeanors on May 17, 1999, and was sentenced to three years probation. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 11, at 11-1.) On August 4, 2007, Conrad was arrested in Arizona for disorderly conduct. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 14.) At approximately 5:00 a.m., local police responded to a call from Conrad, complaining of a domestic dispute at a motel with Rosa, who she had married six weeks earlier. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 14, at 14-10.) As the police investigated, she was highly disruptive, disturbed other hotel guests, and ignored the responding officers’ requests to quiet down. Ultimately, the officers placed Conrad under arrest and booked her at the Navajo County Jail on charges of disorderly conduct. On August 7, 2007, Conrad was released on her own recognizance and ordered to appear for arraignment on August 14. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 14, at 14-17.) She failed to appear and an arrest warrant was issued. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 14, at 14-14 to 14-16.) It appears that warrant remains outstanding. In May 2009, Conrad was arrested in New York on two separate occasions for shoplifting. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 11, at 11-2 to 11-3.) On May 6, she was arrested for shoplifting $47 worth of groceries from a Yonkers supermarket. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 15, at 15-2.) Days later, on May 14, she was arrested again for shoplifting approximately $27 worth of goods from a New Rochelle supermarket. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 16, at 16-5.) Both charges were resolved by a plea to a single count of petit larceny. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 15, at 15-1.) Under her plea agreement, Conrad was placed on probation for three years. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 16, at 16-1.) A July 14 probation report noted that Conrad was in an outpatient treatment program for alcoholism. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 16, at 16-11.) An October probation report indicated that the outpatient program expelled her because of her continued use of alcohol and recommended a four-week inpatient program. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 16, at 16-4.) While it is unclear whether she participated in that program, Conrad was on probation during voir dire and throughout the entire trial of this case. Conrad’s fabrication that her husband was retired from “own[ing] some bus companies” was designed to conceal his criminal past. According to public records, from 1980 through the late 1990s, Rosa was convicted of at least nine criminal offenses. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 17.) Among other crimes, he was convicted of receiving stolen property, criminal contempt, possession of a controlled substance, forgery, and illegal possession of a firearm. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 17.) He has been incarcerated on numerous occasions and served a seven year sentence in Northern State Prison in New Jersey. (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 18, at 18-1.) When sentencing Rosa, the New Jersey Superior Court, Middlesex County, observed that Rosa “had substantial contacts with the justice system,” “an extensive history of mental illness,” and a “history of domestic violence.” (Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 17, at 17-45.) Like Conrad, he also has a history of alcoholism. (See Trzaskoma Decl. Ex. 17, at 17-40.) IV. The December 20 Advice of Rights Hearing On November 15, 2011, after briefing on Defendants’ motion for a new trial was complete, this Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. (ECF No. 499.) On November 29, this Court set the hearing for February 15-16 (“Hearing”). (ECF No. 500.) In anticipation of that hearing, this Court directed Conrad to appear in person on December 20, to instruct her regarding her constitutional rights and to appoint counsel for her if she could not afford an attorney. (ECF No. 502.) The Court directed the U.S. Marshals to serve Conrad with a copy of the order to appear. The marshals served Conrad at her apartment in the Bronx, and on receiving the order, she stated, “I think I know what this is about, I failed to disclose that I’m a lawyer, but they never asked, so I didn’t lie.” Conrad recognized a photograph of herself that the marshals carried and said, “that picture must be from my rap sheet.” (GX 3500-2, U.S. Marshals Report dated Dec. 16, 2011.) At the December 20 hearing, this Court delivered its instructions to Conrad on the record, with a deputy clerk, two deputy U.S. marshals, and a Criminal Justice Act attorney present. All counsel and the parties consented to participate by telephone. At the hearing, Conrad’s behavior was erratic and her remarks often incoherent. Several times the Court directed her to sit down, and deputy marshals blocked her attempts to leave the courtroom before the proceedings were concluded. (Dec. 20, 2011 Transcript (“12/20 Tr.”) 11-12.) Conrad advised the Court that there was no reason for an evidentiary hearing because, in her view “[Defendants are] fricken crooks and they should be in jail and you know that.” (12/20 Tr. 17.) She went on to opine: “come on, this is anything in favor of the defendants.... And they brought the motion against the prosecution .... It’s ridiculous.” (12/20 Tr. 17.) Y. February 15-16 Juror Misconduct Hearing At the Hearing, Conrad admitted that she lied to the Court to make herself more “marketable” as a juror. (Feb. 15 and 16, 2012 Hearing Transcript (“Hr’g Tr.”) 153, 160, 208.) She also testified that she believed that if the truth were known, “the defense counsel would be wild to have me” on the jury. (Hr’g Tr. 210.) Conrad reasoned that Defendants would want “crooks” on the jury because they themselves were “crooks.” (Hr’g Tr. 210, 229.) Indeed, Conrad admitted that she had used this to rationalize her conduct to herself at the time of voir dire. (Hr’g Tr. 229 (“Q. You told yourself at the time that it was OK from the defendants’ perspective because, if anything, somebody who was married to a criminal would tend to favor other criminals, right? A. I guess it can be characterized as that.”).) Conrad acknowledged that she made the conscious decision to perjure herself between the first and second day of voir dire. After hearing the questions posed to the first two prospective jurors, she conjured up a personal profile that she thought would be attractive. (Hr’g Tr. 185.) Throughout the trial she thought of the fact that she had lied to get on the jury, and she knew what she had done was wrong. (Hr’g Tr. 168.) At the Hearing, Conrad opined that “most attorneys” are “career criminals.” (Hr’g Tr. 148.) Daugerdas and Guerin are attorneys, and while Parse is licensed to practice law, he is an investment banker. She twice underlined the difference in financial success between herself and Daugerdas. When asked if she had about $14,000 in assets, Conrad retorted: “Correct. Much less than your client.” (Hr’g Tr. 134.) When asked whether she was financially successful as a lawyer, Conrad testified: “I don’t live an extravagant lifestyle like Mr. Daugerdas.” (Hr’g Tr. 136-37.) She also lashed out at defense counsel. When asked whether her behavior at the December 20 hearing was irrational, she shot back, “I’m not University of Chicago trained” — a reference to her cross-examiner’s law school alma matter. (Hr’g Tr. 105-06.) Similarly, when asked if failing to tell the Court that she was an attorney was a lie, Conrad responded, “You’re the evidence professor” — a reference to defense counsel’s adjunct teaching position at DePaul University College of Law:- (Hr’g Tr. 143.) These responses, among others, indicate that contrary to the Court’s instructions, Conrad may have accessed electronic databases to learn about the professional backgrounds of various trial participants. When given a chance to explain her declaration that all the Defendants were “crooks” and that their motion for a new trial was “ridiculous,” she claimed repeatedly that she did not recall what she meant to convey. She also claimed she did not know why she made those statements because “I’m not a psychologist.” (Hr’g Tr. 115.) Throughout the Hearing, Conrad behaved erratically and responded to questions evasively. She claimed repeatedly that she could neither understand the questions nor remember the facts. For instance: • Conrad claimed that she did not recall why she told the Court on December 20 that the Defendants’ motion was ridiculous because she was not a psychologist. (Hr’g Tr. 115; see also 12/20 Tr. at 17.) • Conrad claimed that she did not recall telling the deputy clerk on December 20 that her time was being wasted by being ordered to appear and that she was going to leave the courthouse. (Hr’g Tr. 117-18; see also 12/20 Tr. at 21.) • Conrad said that based on her experience as a lawyer, she did not know whether it was unusual for a lawyer to defy a judge’s instructions to appear for a hearing because she was not a psychologist. (Hr’g Tr. 119.) • When asked what medications she takes, Conrad responded: “Water.” (Hr’g Tr. 120.) • When asked whether her attempt to reject a subpoena served on her in front of the Court on December 20 was irrational, Conrad quipped that it was “irrelevant.” (Hr’g Tr. 122.) • Conrad claimed not to know why she told the Court on December 20, “this is garbage.” (Hr’g Tr. 127; see also 12/20 Tr. at 8,18.) • Conrad variously claimed that she had no idea whether she was a financial success as a lawyer, that one would need to ask her mother to ascertain the answer, and that she did not know what the question meant. (Hr’g Tr. 134-36.) • Conrad claimed she did not remember telling the Court on December 20 that her finances were “[n]one of [the Court’s] business,” and that she would retain “[herself] or [her] husband, the convicted felon,” to act as her attorney. (Hr’g Tr. 138-39; see also 12/20 Tr. at 12,16.) After lengthy examinations by counsel, this Court asked Conrad directly why she had committed perjury to make herself “marketable for the jury.” Conrad replied: As I had mentioned, I knew I could be a fair, unbiased juror and substantively-wise [sic] it seemed as if it would be an interesting trial experience. And having been suspended for so long, I guess mentally I would think maybe I’m back in the swing of things now. I know misrepresenting myself and the perjury was wrong, and I apologize to the Court and to everybody else who has, I’m sure, devoted immeasurable amount of time, hours. Maybe it just wasn’t for the $40. That’s basically it. I know a lot of resources were spent because of this and I apologize to everybody. It wasn’t a calculated folly, it was just maybe folly. But I know I served and I did my civic duty and I believe I was fair and just in rendering the verdict. I know my disclosures definitely would not have allowed me to sit as a juror. I also know that I could have requested a side bar to speak with your Honor and the other attorneys during the voir dire and I didn’t do that. I apologize to everybody. (Hr’g Tr. 236-37.) Conrad’s attempt to express some degree of contrition reflects a jarring disconnect from reality. This was not mere folly. She made a calculated, criminal decision to get on the jury. Such a stratagem undermines the integrity of the jury system, the fair administration of justice, and is an affront to this Court. The human toll her deliberate lies inflicted on the parties, their counsel, the witnesses, and the jurors, who faithfully served, is inestimable. And there are myriad collateral consequences. For example, the Clerk of Court disbursed $110,569.85 for attendance and mileage fees and jury meals for this trial. (ECF No. 532.) Numerous witnesses face the prospect of having their lives interrupted again to testify at any retrial. And the fates of the cooperating witnesses continue in suspense. Finally, it appears that Conrad’s criminal conduct with respect to jury service began before voir dire. According to the records of the Jury Clerk, on November 2, 2010, Conrad declared under penalty of perjury, on a standard juror qualification questionnaire, that her permanent address was in Bronxville, New York. She also claimed two grounds for requesting to be excused: (1) prior jury service within the last four years and (2) true hardship if required to serve. (ECF No. 533.) Yet, this Court asked during voir dire “[h]ave any of you ever served on a grand jury or a trial jury, whether in federal, state, or local court prior to now?” (Trial Tr. 88.) Conrad said nothing about any prior jury service. She also volunteered that she was available to serve longer than three months. (Trial Tr. 204.) And because she lied about her permanent residence, she collected an additional $765 in travel expenses based on her use of a Westchester zip code. In fact, Conrad received a total of $3,777 in attendance and travel expenses from the Clerk of the Court as a result of her fraudulent conduct. (ECF Nos. 532, 534.) As these lies demonstrate, Conrad’s startling dishonesty began before trial, persisted through the proceeding, and continued well after the verdict. VI. Bruñe & Richard’s Pre-Verdict Investigation of Conrad In their memorandum of law in support of their motion for a new trial, filed July 8, 2011 (“Defendants’ Brief’), counsel for Defendants represented that “[t]he tone and content of [Conrad’s May Letter], which were in sharp contrast to the image Conrad had projected through the trial (‘always head down, taking notes!’), caused defendants concern and prompted them to investigate.” (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial, dated July 8, 2011 (“Def. Br.”) at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting the May Letter).) Defendants also stated they learned of, inter alia, Conrad’s status as a suspended lawyer and the pending disciplinary proceedings against her by “conducting public records searches in the wake of Conrad’s May 25, 2011 post-verdict letter to the govemmentf.]” (Def. Br. at 3 (emphasis added).) They further stated that “Conrad’s voir dire responses did not provide even a hint of bias and she exhibited no outward signs of any mental or emotional instability[.]” (Def. Br. at 8.) And they represented that they “had no basis to inquire whether Conrad was lying in response to each of the Court’s questions [during voir dire].” (Def. Br. at 32 n. 13.) With no other disclosures by Defendants, the clear implication of these statements was that they had no idea of Conrad’s true identity and background until their post-verdict investigation following the receipt of Conrad’s May Letter. On July 15, 2011, the Court convened a telephone conference with all parties and counsel to discuss Defendants’ motion for anew trial. (July 15, 2011 Transcript (“7/15 Tr.”).) During the conference, the Government stated that it “was unaware of any of the facts that were brought forth in connection with defendants’ motion” and expressed its desire to unearth any potential waiver arguments. (7/15 Tr. 9.) In response, this Court announced: “I fully intend as part of the record on this motion to ascertain from each of the defendants ... whether any of them were aware of the disturbing things that have been revealed by defense on this motion concerning Juror Number One.” (7/15 Tr. 11.) This Court added that it was “perfectly prepared to let defendants respond now or to provide a letter[.]” (7/15 Tr. 11.) This inquiry was not an invitation for counsel to engage in an iterative process testing the limits of how little could be revealed. Officers of the court are not adverse witnesses. Cf. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973) (holding that “any special problems arising from the literally true but unresponsive answers are to be remedied through the questioner’s acuity[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court’s directive called for prompt and complete disclosure. Without hesitation, Defendant Field’s counsel responded, “On behalf of Mr. Field we can say we have no knowledge of the fact that she was an attorney or of the things that came to light now.” (7/15 Tr. 11.) Then, counsel for Daugerdas chimed in, representing that “I can say the same with regard to defendant Daugerdas[.]” (7/15 Tr. 11.) Guerin’s counsel did the same: “I will advise the court that no member of the Guerin defense team ... [or] the defendant herself were aware of any of the issues that have surfaced with regard to Juror Number One. Everything I thought I knew about Juror Number One was learned by us in the course of the voir dire proceedings in this case.” (7/15 Tr. 11-12.) Lastly, Parse’s counsel, Theresa Trzaskoma (“Trzaskoma”), responded, “Your Honor, we were not aware of the facts that have come to light and I think that if your Honor deems it appropriate, we can submit a letter.” (7/15 Tr. 12.) This Court invited a submission from Parse’s counsel to make certain that no jury consultant had any information about Conrad before the verdict. (7/15 Tr. 12.) The colloquy concluded with a seemingly innocuous feint by Parse’s counsel: “The only thing additional that I would offer, your Honor, is — well, we can address this in the letter. I think it’s more appropriate.” (7/15 Tr. 12.) After this initial salvo, counsel for Parse' — Susan Bruñe (“Bruñe”), Trzaskoma, and Laurie Edelstein (“Edelstein”), each partners of the firm Bruñe & Richard LLP (collectively, “Bruñe & Richard” or “Parse’s attorneys”) — began to disclose in stages the full extent of their investigation into Conrad’s background. Indeed, they acknowledged candidly that had the Court or the Government not inquired, Bruñe & Richard would never have disclosed any of their investigation into Conrad. (Hr’g Tr. 79 (“[HERNANDEZ:] Ms. Trzaskoma, if the government had not inquired about your firm’s knowledge about certain facts that you had about Catherine Conrad, were you ever going to disclose that information to the Court? [TRZASKOMA:] I don’t know I can answer that.... It didn’t occur to me to disclose it. As I said, I regret that. But I can’t say that it wouldn’t have come up subsequently.”); Hr’g Tr. 317 (“COURT: Ms. Bruñe, ... would your firm have disclosed the information in your firm’s July 21 letter and the investigation into Juror No. 1 if the Court had not inquired or the government failed to raise the waiver issue? [BRUÑE]: I don’t think we would have your Honor[.]”); Hr’g Tr. at 357 (“OKU-LA: [A]re you saying that you would have felt comfortable that you had fulfilled all your obligations if the Court had decided this motion without learning of the facts concerning what your firm knew prior to receiving the [May Letter]? Yes or no. [EDELSTEIN]: Yes.”).) A. Tfie July 21 Bruñe & Richard Letter When Bruñe & Richard’s promised letter did not materialize, the Government prodded them on July 19 to provide their letter by My 21. (See ECF No. 469.) On July 21, Bruñe submitted a letter revealing for the first time that prior to voir dire, Bruñe & Richard had conducted a Google search of the terms “Catherine Conrad” and “New York” and discovered the 2010 Suspension Order, suspending a Catherine M. Conrad from the practice of law. (Bruñe & Richard Letter dated July 21, 2011 (“July 21 Letter”), at 1, ECF No. 464.) But because Conrad stated during voir dire that her highest level of education was a B.A. in English Literature, the Bruñe & Richard trial team concluded that Conrad could not be the suspended lawyer. (July 21 Letter, at 2.) Despite the exact match of Conrad’s name with the middle initial “M.” on both the jury roll and the 2010 Suspension Order, Bruñe & Richard ruled out the possibility that Conrad lied during voir dire, and they did not raise their discovery of the 2010 Suspension Order with the Court. (July 21 Letter, at 2.) While ruling out the possibility that Conrad was lying, Bruñe & Richard, along with other defense counsel, the Government, and the Court, raised far more minor issues during voir dire. Defense counsel for Daugerdas and Guerin had a juror excused because “he put his head on his fingers.” (Trial Tr. 114.) Counsel for Field had a postal worker excused because the prospective juror “might be stressed.” (Trial Tr. 126.) On the third -day of voir dire, Bruñe & Richard challenged a prospective juror’s impartiality on the grounds that he had contacts with law enforcement agencies and because he was “wearing an FBI turtleneck today.” (Trial Tr. 337.) The Government had a juror removed for cause due to his “extreme lack of desire to serve.” (Trial Tr. 175-77.) Based on a prospective juror’s apparent ethnicity and residence in Rockland County, the Government asked the Court to investigate whether he used a Spring Valley tax preparer whom the Government prosecuted fifteen years ago, and whose clients were primarily Haitian. (Trial Tr. 245^16.) The Court ruled out that remote possibility in less than one minute with three direct voir dire questions. (Trial Tr. 318.) This Court removed one prospective juror because she supposedly found the subject matter of the case so “boring” that she could not focus on it. (Trial Tr. 29.) Similarly, the parties consented to the removal of other jurors based on their behavior or odd demeanor. (Trial Tr. 114-15, 294.) In the July 21 Letter, Bruñe & Richard also disclosed for the first time that they had conducted additional research about Conrad following her submission of a note to the Court on May 11, 2011 (the “Juror Note”), in the midst of closing arguments. (July 21 Letter, at 2.) The Court shared the contents of the Juror Note with counsel at the end of the day after closing arguments concluded. (Trial Tr. 8832.) In the Juror Note, Conrad asked whether the Court would instruct the jury' on the legal doctrine of respondeat superior and posed a question about vicarious liability. (Trial Tr. 8832.) No party had raised either term during trial, and neither term was germane to the questions at issue. The Juror Note prompted Trzaskoma to direct a paralegal to conduct further research on Conrad early the next morning. The paralegal conducted a Google search and located the 2007 and 2010 Suspension Orders, which suspended “Catherine M. Conrad” from the practice of law in New York. (July 21 Letter, at 2.) The paralegal also searched Westlaw for information on “Catherine M. Conrad,” generated a report (the “Westlaw Report”), and provided it to Trzaskoma. (July 21 Letter, at 2; Ex. 1.) The Westlaw Report — in Bruñe & Richard’s hands just after the start of jury deliberations — was freighted with information revealing Juror No. l’s hidden identity. The Westlaw Report lists a previous address for Catherine M. Conrad in Bronxville — the same exact name and town listed for Conrad on the jury roll— and also shows that Conrad was a suspended attorney with a Bronx address. It lists Robert J. Conrad as a member of Conrad’s household and indicates that Conrad was involved in a civil lawsuit in Bronx Supreme Court. The Westlaw Report links the Bronx civil suit to Conrad— the suspended attorney — with a “Confidence Level” of 99%. According to the July 21 Letter, after receiving the Westlaw Report, “Trzaskoma had the initial thought that the lawyer and the juror were potentially one and the same, but she reviewed the report and found it confusing, internally inconsistent and not reliable.” (July 21 Letter, at 2.) Trzaskoma then conferred with Bruñe and Edelstein. They believed Conrad’s use of legal terms in the Juror Note was consistent with her involvement in a personal injury action and thought that it was “inconceivable” that Conrad lied during voir dire. Thus, they concluded collectively that she could not be the suspended attorney. (July 21 Letter, at 2-3.) After reaching that conclusion, they did not bring any of the underlying information to the attention of the Court or the Government. Nor did they revisit the question between May 12 and May 24, when the jury returned its verdict. After receiving Conrad’s post-verdict May Letter, Parse’s attorneys conducted another Google search of Conrad and once again located the 2010 Suspension Order. (July 21 Letter, at 3.) This time, they matched a telephone number Conrad provided in the May Letter with a telephone number associated with Conrad on the New York State Unified Court System’s attorney registration website. (July 21 Letter, at 3.) At this point, Parse’s trial team purportedly realized, for the first time, that it was no longer “inconceivable” that Conrad was not who she claimed to be during voir dire. (July 21 Letter, at 3.) Bruñe & Richard then conducted a two-week investigation, which unearthed Conrad’s personal injury lawsuit filings, her property records, her criminal records, her husband’s criminal records, and their marriage records. (July 21 Letter, at 3-4.) Only then did they apparently conclude that they had the metaphysical certainty necessary to alert this Court to Conrad’s juror misconduct and to seek a new trial for Parse. (July 21 Letter, at 3-4.) Upon receiving the July 21 Letter, this Court scheduled another conference call with the parties and counsel. During that call, this Court questioned Bruñe about the discrepancies between the version of events provided in the motion papers and the July 21 Letter. (See July 22, 2011 Transcript (“7/22 Tr.”) 5.) Bruñe endeavored to explain: Your Honor, when we submitted the brief that we did we were submitting with the other three lawyers and as demonstrated by the statements that three of the firms made on the phone on the Friday [July 15th] conference, their level of knowledge is apparently nonexistent and our situation is different and it is for that reason that Ms. Trzaskoma proposed to file the letter which we did as opposed to just responding on the call. We did not know that this juror was essentially posing as a different person at no point during the trial. We certainly anticipated that the government was going to raise the issue of waiver, it features prominently in the Supreme Court case that controls here, and we anticipated that when he inquired, which he inevitably was going to do, we were going to lay out the facts accurately as we have. And my sense of what we are trying to accomplish — but of course your Honor will guide me on this-is that Mr. Okula needed the facts so that he can make whatever waiver argument he proposes to make in his brief. And it is with that in mind, and I of course also responded to the Court, that I laid this out. But, I certainly didn’t mean to suggest by our opening brief that we had no information about Ms. Conrad. We had the information that I’ve laid out but at no point did we know that she was perpetrating a fraud on this Court and unfortunately harming Mr. Parse in the way that she did. (7/22 Tr. 5-6.) B. Additional Disclosures by Parse’s Attorneys In response to the revelations in Bruñe & Richard’s July 21 Letter, the Government sought discovery from Defendants to determine precisely what they knew concerning Conrad prior to the jury verdict. Specifically, the Government sought, inter alia, “[a]ny and all documents concerning any and all research performed by the defendants, their counsel, and their counsel’s employees, agents, and consultants, including any jury or trial consultant, or by anyone on their behalf, as to Juror # 1, Catherine M. Conrad (including but not limited to searches related to ‘Catherine Conrad’), prior to the return of the verdict on May 24, 2011.” (ECF No. 469.) In a letter submission to the Court and during an August 8 telephone conference, Parse’s attorneys resisted the Government’s discovery requests. First, Bruñe urged this Court to decide the legal question of whether Parse could ever waive his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury before reaching any discovery issues. Second, Bruñe argued that most of the material sought by the Government was protected by the attorney work product doctrine. (Aug. 8, 2011 Transcript (“8/8 Tr.”) 10-11.) This Court rejected both arguments during the August 8 teleconference. In ruling that the Government had the right to determine the extent and timing of Parse’s attorneys’ knowledge of the facts relating to Conrad, this Court ordered Bruñe & Richard to comply with five out of six of the Government’s document requests and directed counsel for Daugerdas, Guerin, Field, and Brubaker to submit affidavits with respect to their preverdict knowledge of Conrad. (8/8 Tr. 12-14.) With respect to any claim of attorney work product privilege, the Court directed Bruñe & Richard to submit a detailed privilege log and alerted counsel that the Court would conduct an in camera review of any documents withheld as work product. (8/8 Tr. 14.) On August 30, Stillman Friedman & Shechtman, P.C. appeared on behalf of Parse. (ECF No. 486.) As a result of the Court’s August 8 discovery ruling, significant new details emerged concerning Bruñe & Richard’s knowledge and investigation of Conrad during trial. (See Bruñe Affidavit dated Sept. 15, 2011 and Attached Exhibits (“Bruñe Aff.”).) Document discovery revealed that prior to voir dire, Parse’s attorneys created a “juror snapshot” where they recorded Conrad’s middle initial as M. (Bruñe Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. C). Thus, they knew Conrad’s full name from the jury roll prior to voir dire, and incorporated that knowledge in their research. Conrad’s full name matched the name on the 2010 Suspension Order, which was in their possession and should have set off an alarm. Further, Bruñe & Richard e-mails reveal that on May 12 when the jury began its deliberations, Trzaskoma expressed her belief that the suspended attorney Catherine M. Conrad and Juror No. 1 were the same person. (Bruñe Aff., Ex. J (Emails).) The e-mails pinpoint the precise sequence of exchanges on May 12 among Parse’s trial team: 7:25 a.m.: Trzaskoma requests that her team “send [her] all of our intelligence on juror # 1, including pre-voir dire info we thought we had.” 7:54 a.m.: Paralegal David Benhamou e-mails Trzaskoma a summary of Conrad’s answers during voir dire. 8:02 a.m.: Vivian Stapp, an associate at Bruñe & Richard, responds to Benhamou’s email regarding the lack of information in their files. She observes: “We don’t have Nardello info gathered for her. She was initially given a ‘Z’ grade and then it looks like we gave a ‘D’ at some point, probably because we thought she was that lawyer. Unfortunately we don’t have anything else for her. I’ll keep looking but that’s what the spreadsheet is showing. A little more: ‘is a plaintiff in a pending personal injury case in South Bronx Division.’ ” 10:55 a.m.: Trzaskoma advises Benhamou, “What we found before voir dire was that maybe she was a suspended lawyer.” 11:06 a.m.: Randall Kim, an associate at Bruñe & Richard, replies to Stapp: “We (I thought TT [Trzaskoma]) found something more, which more clearly suggested she has been/is and [sic] alcoholic.” 11:07 a.m.: Benhamou sends Kim, Stapp, and Trzaskoma the link to the 2010 Suspension Order. 11:13 a.m.: Stapp then observes to Kim, ‘We have Conrad down as a ‘Do Not Search.’ I don’t think she’s that lawyer, unless she blatantly omitted information during voir dire when describing her educational background (or was able to become a lawyer without going to law school.)” 11:15 a.m.: Benhamou, at Trzaskoma’s request, sends Trzaskoma, Kim, and Stapp an excerpt of Conrad’s voir dire testimony. 11:17 a.m.: After reviewing Conrad’s voir dire testimony, Trzaskoma instructs Benhamou, Kim, and Stapp to keep a dossier on Conrad, by noting: “Ok, unless Conrad totally lied about her highest level of education, it can’t be the same person as the suspended lawyer. But let’s keep a little dossier on her.” 11:22 a.m.: Benhamou asks Trzaskoma if she wants him to “do a people search on Westlaw,” and she responds less than one minute later, “Sure.” 2:24 p.m.: Benhamou sends Trzaskoma the Westlaw Report with the following message: “Attached is a West-law report. I picked the Catherine M. Conrad who has an address in Bronx-ville, which seemed to match her testimony. Westlaw thinks this is the same suspended lawyer from the Bronx, but perhaps it’s confusing two people or I picked the wrong one. If you really care about this, I suggest you have Nardello run this down as I’m not too sure what I’m doing here.” Benhamou then went on to describe some of the information in the West-law Report, including the reference to a “Robert J. Conrad.” 2:32 p.m.: Trzaskoma responds to Benhamou: “I think Robert Conrad is her father — he is an immigration judge.” 2:36 p.m.: Trzaskoma shares with Benhamou: “Jesus, I do think that it’s her. Can you please track down that lawsuit?” (Emphasis added). Any fair reading of these e-mail exchanges shows that Parse’s attorneys had actionable intelligence that Conrad was an imposter. That knowledge demanded swift action to bring the matter to the Court’s attention. Further investigation would have been easy and prudent. But Parse’s attorneys chose to do neither. In her September 15 affidavit, Bruñe asserts that sometime after 2:36 p.m., Trzaskoma shared with her and Edelstein the possibility that the suspended lawyer and Juror No. 1 were the same person. (Bruñe Aff. ¶ 12.) While now armed with the Westlaw Report, Bruñe, Trzaskoma, and Edelstein nevertheless adhered to their earlier conclusion during voir dire, namely that “Ms. Conrad could be a suspended lawyer only if she had lied repeatedly during voir dire, and it seemed inconceivable that any juror, much less a lawyer, would perjure herself so brazenly.” (Bruñe Aff. ¶ 12.) Through that rationalization, Parse’s attorneys convinced themselves that “no additional research was warranted, and none was conducted.” (Bruñe Aff. ¶ 12.) Missing from the Bruñe Affidavit are any particulars about Parse’s attorneys’ thought processes in the wake of the newly acquired Westlaw Report, Benhamou’s professed uncertainty with his research and, most importantly, Trzaskoma’s epiphany just hours earlier that Juror No. 1 was the suspended attorney with alcohol issues (“Jesus, I do think that it’s her”). Moreover, Brune’s Affidavit provides no details about whether Parse’s attorneys discussed alerting the Court to their investigation, nor does it explain why they did not ask the Nardello firm to investigate Juror No. 1 immediately. After digesting Brune’s Affidavit, this Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was needed on the Government’s argument that Parse had waived his right to challenge Conrad’s misconduct. By Order dated November 29, 2011, the Court fixed hearing dates of February 15 and 16, 2012. (ECF No. 500.) C. Parse’s Attorneys’ Testimony at the Juror Misconduct Hearing During the Hearing, Bruñe & Richard offered another layer of detail about the events of May 12. Trzaskoma acknowledged reviewing the Westlaw Report after Benhamou sent it to her that morning. (See Hr’g Tr. 49-50 (“It struck me that holy cow, it’s possible that it’s the same person, and I was looking at the Westlaw report to try to figure out is there some way that this tells me one way or the other, that gives me more information.”).) But she testified that she did not look at the Westlaw Report until after sending the “Jesus” e-mail and she minimized its significance on her thought process. (Hr’g Tr. 55-56.) Citing her inexperience in reading such reports, Trzaskoma claimed that she questioned the Westlaw Report’s accuracy and whether it had aggregated information about multiple Catherine Con-rads. (Hr’g Tr. 49-55.) Trzaskoma offered no explanation for her failure to seek assistance from her colleagues. She also quibbled over whether Juror No. 1 physically appeared to be a woman in her early forties (maintaining that she believed Juror No. 1 to be “close to 50”). And even though she was looking for correlations to Juror No. 1, she “did"not focus on the [middle initial] ‘M’ ” and she “didn’t think of it” as a way to help her narrow down the information in the Westlaw Report. (Hr’g Tr. 24, 50). Trzaskoma also provided more details regarding her May 12 discussion with Bruñe and Edelstein about Conrad. The conversation was short, lasting “no longer than five minutes” and took place in Foley Square Plaza. (Hr’g Tr. 58.) Notwithstanding her Eureka e-mail a few hours earlier — “Jesus, I do think that it’s her”— Trzaskoma claimed that when she met with her partners, she did not think that Conrad and the suspended attorney were the same person, but raised only the “possibility” that there might be a connection. (Hr’g Tr. 58, 92, 280.) Trzaskoma never shared the existence of the Westlaw Report or its contents with Bruñe or Edelstein. Indeed, all three Bruñe & Richard partners testified in unison that they never mentioned, let alone discussed, the West-law Report in their Foley Square conversation. (Hr’g Tr. at 58-59, 281, 328.) Bruñe made the point emphatically: “I’m confident that [Trzaskoma made no mention whatsoever of the Westlaw Report], and here is why. Laurie Edelstein is the kind of person who will always kind of say, well, show me the case, show me the document. She is extremely thorough and if [Trzaskoma] had referenced the document in the conversation, that’s what Ms. Edelstein would have said. So I know that there was no reference to [the Westlaw Report] in the conversation.” (Hr’g Tr. 281.) In exploring the basis for Trzaskoma’s rekindled belief that Conrad could be the suspended attorney, Parse’s attorneys only considered the Juror Note and the transcript of Conrad’s voir dire testimony. (Hr’g Tr. 58-59, 281, 328.) Further, according to Brune’s and Edelstein’s testimony, Trzaskoma never mentioned the Westlaw Report or the May 12 internal emails about Bruñe & Richard’s research of Conrad at any point during the eleven days of jury deliberations. (Hr’g Tr. 59, 281.) Bruñe, Edelstein, and Trzaskoma all testified that, after Trzaskoma raised her concern about Conrad during their Foley Square conversation, they discussed Conrad’s voir dire answers, and observed that Conrad’s odd note about vicarious liability and respondeat superior could be explained as relating to her personal injury lawsuit, which Conrad had mentioned during voir dire. (Hr’g Tr. 38, 60, 280.) On that slender reed, they unilaterally decided that no further investigation was necessary — even though Trzaskoma recalled mentioning that they should have an investigator look at the issue: “what I thought at the time was that we would need to investigate.” (Hr’g Tr. 60, 92.) Trzaskoma asked Bruñe whether they should keep looking at the issue, and Bruñe told her “no, just leave it.” (Hr’g Tr. 60, 283.) According to Bruñe, she shut down further inquiry because she credited Conrad’s voir dire responses. But she also acknowledged that Parse’s trial team had not taken any additional steps to rule out that Conrad was the suspended lawyer. (Hr’g Tr. 282.) This Court cannot fathom how lawyers as thorough as Bruñe, Edelstein, and Trzaskoma would neglect to tie off such a glaring loose end. Acting on Brune’s instruction to “leave it,” Trzaskoma directed Benhamou to “stand down” on his efforts to obtain records of the civil lawsuit referenced in the Westlaw Report. (Hr’g Tr. 93.) Edelstein added that she, Bruñe, and Trzaskoma specifically discussed whether they should bring the issue to the Court’s attention, and decided against it because she thought it was “inconceivable” that Conrad had lied. (Hr’g Tr. 354-55.) This was another tragic misjudgment. Paul Schoeman, Brubaker’s counsel, testifi