Full opinion text
ORDER CLAY D. LAND, District Judge. After being detained for fifty-one days by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE”), Mark Daniel Lyttle (“Lyttle”), a United States citizen with diminished mental capacity, was flown to Hidalgo, Texas, transported to the Mexican border, forced to disembark, and sent off on foot into Mexico with only three dollars in his pocket. Wearing his prison-issued jump suit from the Stewart Detention Center, a privately managed ICE facility in Georgia, and speaking no Spanish, Lyttle wandered around Central America for 125 days, sleeping in the streets, staying in shelters, and being imprisoned and abused in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua because he had no identity or proof of citizenship. Ultimately, Lyttle found his way to the United States Embassy in Guatemala, where an Embassy employee helped him contact his family in the United States to arrange for his return home. In his Complaint, Lyttle alleges that ICE employees detained him without probable cause and subsequently deported him unlawfully to Mexico, knowing that he was a United States citizen with a diminished mental capacity. Lyttle seeks damages from the responsible ICE officers in their individual capacities pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for violating his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Lyttle also asserts a claim against Hayes and several high-ranking government officials under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. He seeks injunctive relief against several high-ranking government officials in their official capacities to prevent his future detention and deportation. Finally, Lyttle claims he is entitled to money damages from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 to 2680, contending that the conduct by the ICE officers amounted to false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The individual federal defendants, David Collado, James Hayes, Charles Johnston, Brian Keys, Michael Moore, Marco Mon-dragon, Tracy Moten, and Raymond Simonse (collectively, “ICE Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them: claims 1 through 3, asserted against all ICE Defendants, and claim 4, asserted against Hayes (ECF No. 49). The ICE Defendants seek dismissal of Lyttle’s Bivens claims for failure to state a claim based on three contentions: (1) no cause of action exists under Bivens and its progeny for the alleged conduct; (2) the alleged conduct does not establish a constitutional violation; and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants Eric Holder, John Morton, Janet Napolitano, and Thomas Snow (collectively, “official capacity Defendants”) and the United States filed a motion as to the claims against them, seeking to dismiss claims 4 through 7 and 9, and seeking summary judgment as to claim 8 (ECF No. 47). The official capacity Defendants seek dismissal of Lyttle’s injunctive relief claims based in part on a lack of standing. And, the United States seeks dismissal of Lyttle’s FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed in the remainder of this Order, the Court dismisses the following claims: (1) the official capacity claims against James Hayes, Eric Holder, John Morton, Janet Napolitano, and Thomas Snow; (2) the individual capacity Bivens equal protection claims as to all Defendants against whom they are asserted; (3) the individual capacity Bivens Fifth Amendment due process claims against Defendants Johnston, Keys, and Moore; and (4) the individual capacity Bivens Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claims against Johnston, Keys, and Moore. The following claims remain pending: (1) the Bivens Fifth Amendment due process claims against Defendants Collado, Moten, Mondragon, Simonse, and Hayes; (2) the Bivens Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claims against Defendants Collado, Moten, Mondragon, Simonse, and Hayes; (3) the Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. STANDARDS The United States and the official capacity Defendants seek dismissal of the FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and alternatively for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The individual capacity Defendants seek to have the Bivens claims dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The standards for these motions are as follows. I. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Defendants’ challenge to jurisdiction is a facial one which “require[s] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction^]” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive such a challenge, “[a] complaint must contain ‘enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ ” each required jurisdictional element. Rance v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 316 Fed.Appx. 860, 862 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (quoting Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.2007)). “ ‘It is sufficient if the complaint succeeds in identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render the element plausible.’” Id. (quoting Watts, 495 F.3d at 1296). II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all facts set forth in the plaintiffs complaint and limit its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir.2009). The Court can properly consider documents referred to in the complaint and not attached thereto without converting a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion if the documents are central to the plaintiffs claim and the authenticity is not challenged. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. Although the complaint must contain factual allegations that “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the plaintiffs claims, id. at 556, 127 5. Ct. 1955, “Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,’ ” Watts, 495 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Accepting the allegations in Lyttle’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) as true and construing all reasonable inferences in his favor as required at this stage of the proceedings, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, the Court finds that Lyttle has alleged the following facts. Lyttle is a thirty-four-year-old U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican descent. He was born in North Carolina. Compl. Ex. A, Certificate of Live Birth, ECF No. 1-1. Lyttle was adopted in 1985, Compl. Ex. B., Final Judgment of Adoption, ECF No. 1-2, and raised primarily in North Carolina. Lyttle did not receive a high school education and is barely literate. He suffers from mental disabilities, including cognitive disorders, and has spent time in psychiatric hospitals. He has difficulty with conceptualization, memory, and visual processing, and he has a diminished capacity to comprehend everyday events. Lyttle has also been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and takes medication to control this disorder and the seizures associated with it. I. Lyttle’s Arrest and Detention in North Carolina In 2008, Lyttle was being treated at Cherry Hospital, a state psychiatric hospital in Goldsboro, North Carolina. During treatment, Lyttle was charged with inappropriately touching a female orderly and arrested for misdemeanor assault. Lyttle was sentenced to 100 days at Neuse Correctional Institution in North Carolina. Lyttle began serving his sentence on August 22, 2008, and he was housed in the mental health ward. On September 2, 2008, North Carolina ICE agents Robert Kendall and Dashanta Faucette took Lyttle into custody from the North Carolina Department of Corrections and interrogated him without a witness present. The agents were aware of Lyttle’s mental disorders. Faucette’s interview notes state that Lyttle’s name was presumed to be Jose Thomas and the name Mark Daniel Lyttle was an alias. She further noted Lyttle was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States at age three without permission. The notes state his home address as an assisted living facility in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. After the interview, the agents instructed Lyttle to sign his name on the notes form without permitting him to review the contents of the notes or disclosing the contents to him. Lyttle signed his real name, Mark Lyttle. On a separate form, Faucette wrote that Lyttle’s mother was from Kentucky. In the category asking for details regarding whether Lyttle was eligible for a special status program, she wrote “Mental Illness” and “Bipolar.” Compl. ¶ 43, ECF No. 1. ICE agents then conducted a search of the U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Information Services Division and other databases. The searches revealed records showing Lyttle was a U.S. citizen with a valid Social Security number. The records made no reference to the name Jose Thomas. On September 5, 2008, ICE agent Dean Caputo signed a Warrant for Arrest of Alien (“Warrant”) authorizing any officer to take Lyttle into custody and process him for removal as an alien in the country in violation of the immigration laws. Caputo also signed a Notice of Intent to Issue Final Administrative Removal Order (“Notice of Intent”). The Notice of Intent stated that it had been determined Lyttle was a not a U.S. citizen but rather a native of Mexico and deemed him deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony.” Compl. ¶¶ 46-47. Caputo then signed a Notice of Custody Determination placing Lyttle in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) pending a final determination by an immigration judge. Kendall notified the North Carolina Department of Corrections that Lyttle must remain in custody after his criminal sentence because he was deportable. The Notice of Intent and Warrant were served on Lyttle on September 8, 2008. Lyttle alleges that Faucette coerced and manipulated Lyttle into signing the Notice of Intent. By signing, Lyttle waived his legal right to a removal hearing before an immigration judge, falsely acknowledged he was a Mexican citizen, and agreed to be deported to Mexico. He did not understand the document or the implications of signing it. No one assisted Lyttle in reading or understanding the document. Faueette also allegedly coerced Lyttle to sign an acknowledgement of the Notice of Custody Determination. The acknowledgement identified Lyttle as Jose Thomas, but Lyttle signed his name as Mark Lyttle. II. Lyttle’s Detention in Georgia Awaiting Removal The North Carolina Department of Corrections was scheduled to release Lyttle at the end of his criminal sentence on October 26, 2008. On October 28, 2008, however, Lyttle’s detention was continued, and he was transferred into ICE custody in North Carolina. He was then transported to the Stewart Detention Center (“SDC”) in Lumpkin, Georgia. ICE Detention and Removal Operations and Corrections Corporation of America operate SDC. A. Interrogation and Recommendation ICE agent David Collado interrogated Lyttle on November 3, 2008 and recorded Lyttle’s responses on a Record of Sworn Statement in Affidavit Form. During the interrogation, Lyttle stated unequivocally that he was a U.S. citizen born in North Carolina and “repeatedly denied being a Mexican citizen.” Compl. ¶ 58. Despite Lyttle’s answers, Collado attached an unserved Notice of Intent to Issue Final Administrative Removal Order to the interrogation form stating Lyttle was deportable because of his criminal convictions. On November 5, 2008, Collado filled out an 1-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, noting that Lyttle had “a bipolar mental illness condition.” Id. ¶ 60. Lyttle did not review or receive a copy of this form. Because Lyttle claimed U.S. citizenship, Collado recommended Lyttle be referred for a removal hearing before an immigration judge. That same day, ICE agent Tracy Moten issued Lyttle a Notice to Appear at removal proceedings. The Notice to Appear falsely alleged that Lyttle was not a U.S. citizen or national. Rather, it alleged he was a citizen of Mexico, even though Lyttle had affirmatively claimed he was a U.S. citizen and there was a complete lack of independent evidence supporting the allegation that he was a citizen of Mexico. Id. ¶ 62. B. The Hayes Memo On February 13, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee sponsored a hearing on ICE procedures related to the deportation of U.S. citizens. On November 6, 2008, James Hayes, Director of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (“DRO”), issued a memorandum (“Hayes Memo”) to all ICE Field Office Directors regarding reporting and investigating claims of U.S. citizenship. Id. ¶ 63; Reply Mem. in Supp. of U.S.’ & Official Capacity Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. M, Mem. from James T. Hayes, Jr. to Field Office Directors (Nov. 6, 2008), ECF No. 64-1 [hereinafter Hayes Memo]. The Hayes Memo set forth notification guidelines for ICE “officers who encounter an individual who they have reason to believe is in the United States in violation of law ... but who claims U.S. citizenship.” Hayes Memo 1. The Field Office Director “shall make the appropriate notification to DRO headquarters ... [and] ensure that all affirmative claims to U.S. citizenship made by any individual encountered within their area of responsibility are appropriately reported and investigated.” Id. at 1-2. The Memo further requires that interviews of detainees claiming citizenship be recorded as sworn statements, include questions needed to complete Form 1-213, and include questions to garner information for a full investigation of the individual’s citizenship. Id. at 2. The “investigation may include vital records searches, family interviews, and other appropriate investigative measures.” Id. The Hayes Memo provides that where the detainee claims U.S. citizenship before formal removal proceedings, the Field Office Director must consult with the DRO, and the local Office of Chief Counsel to “determine whether sufficient evidence exists to place that individual into removal proceedings.” Id. A claim of citizenship following a Notice to Appear requires consultation between the Field Office Director and Office of Chief Counsel, and if necessary the Office of DRO, to determine the proper course of action. Id. Field Office Directors “shall ensure that all DRO employees in their area of responsibility ... understand and adhere to this policy.” Id. C. Lyttle’s Detention After Issuance of the Hayes Memo ICE agent Marco Mondragon interrogated Lyttle on November 12, 2008. He recorded Lyttle’s sworn responses on a Record of Sworn Statement in Affidavit Form. During the interrogation, Lyttle told Mondragon he was a U.S. citizen. Mondragon disregarded Lyttle’s claim of citizenship, ignored the independent evidence of Lyttle’s U.S. citizenship, and failed to consider Lyttle’s obvious mental disabilities and how they affected his ability to comprehend the gravity of the situation. Mondragon also “struck through” some of Lyttle’s answers and replaced them with different answers, “creating a conflicting, inconsistent and factually inaccurate record.” Compl. ¶ 76. Lyttle alleges that Mondragon ultimately coerced and manipulated Lyttle into signing an affidavit that falsely stated his name was Jose Thomas and that his father was a Mexican citizen also named Jose Thomas. Id. ¶¶ 76-78. While in custody, Lyttle required Glucophage, a daily diabetic medication. On November 17, 2008, Lyttle ingested sixty Glucophage pills in a suicide attempt. He was rushed to the Emergency Room at Doctors Hospital in Columbus, Georgia. The hospital treated him for toxic drug overdose, held and monitored him for several days, and then returned him to SDC. III. Lyttle’s Removal from the United States On December 9, 2008, Immigration Judge Cassidy (“the IJ”) ordered that Lyttle be removed to Mexico. At the hearing before the IJ, Lyttle did not have an opportunity to present evidence or challenge the evidence of Mexican citizenship brought against him. Despite Lyttle’s mental disabilities, the IJ did not assess whether Lyttle was competent to proceed unrepresented in his removal proceedings or waive his right to counsel. The IJ did not determine whether safeguards were necessary to ensure Lyttle received a fair hearing. Construing these allegations in Lyttle’s favor, it is reasonable to infer that the IJ simply rubber-stamped the false conclusion and unsupported record constructed by North Carolina ICE and the Georgia ICE Defendants that stated Lyttle was a citizen of Mexico. After the IJ’s order and prior to Lyttle’s deportation, on December 12, 2008, “Defendant ICE Field Office Director Raymond Simonse or an ICE Doe Defendant performed an additional criminal background search of Mr. Lyttle’s state records from North Carolina and Virginia, and pulled electronic records from various federal agencies.” Compl. ¶ 92. This search was the first such search in the record conducted by any Georgia ICE officer. This search revealed numerous references to Lyttle’s U.S. citizenship and Social Security number. Notwithstanding this evidence of Lyttle’s U.S. citizenship and with no additional follow-up or referral to one of his superiors, three days later, Simonse issued a Warrant of Removal/Deportation that declared Lyttle removable by order of an immigration judge. ICE personnel put Lyttle on a plane to Hidalgo, Texas on December 18, 2008. “When the plane touched down, Mr. Lyttle was transported to the Mexican border, forced to disembark and sent off on foot into Mexico, still wearing the prison-issued jumpsuit from [SDC].” Id. ¶ 101. Lyttle did not speak Spanish, was unfamiliar with Mexico, and had only three dollars. Eight days later, Lyttle attempted to cross back into the United States at the Hidalgo, Texas border crossing. The Customs and Border Patrol agents at Hidalgo detained Lyttle. Lyttle informed the agents he was a U.S. citizen from North Carolina. The agents then interrogated him in Spanish. Because he did not speak Spanish, Lyttle did not respond to the questioning. The agents found a computerized record of Lyttle’s deportation and described Lyttle as a “prior deported alien.” Id. ¶ 108. They determined he would be processed for removal and “returned to Mexico in the custody of Mexican Immigration.” Id. Lyttle never received a copy of the expedited removal form, did not have an opportunity to review the form or have it read to him, and did not have an immigration judge review his status at that time. The agents turned Lyttle over to Mexican Immigration. Over the next 115 days, Lyttle wandered through Central America. In Mexico, missionaries picked him up, arranged for his transport to Mexico City, and told him to find the U.S. Embassy. Mexican Immigration officials arrested Lyttle in Mexico City and placed him on a bus in handcuffs for deportation to Honduras because he could not prove Mexican citizenship. Honduran Immigration officials arrested Lyttle and placed him in an immigration camp. He was ultimately transferred from the camp to a criminal jail, “where he suffered severe physical and mental abuse by the guards of the prison.” Id. ¶ 113. After public pressure and a media campaign exposing the harsh treatment of Lyttle, he was released from the Honduran jail. Lyttle was later incarcerated in Nicaragua because he could not produce evidence of his citizenship or identity. Finally, Lyttle arrived in Guatemala and located the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City. An employee at the embassy used the names of Lyttle’s brothers and his birthplace to locate Lyttle’s brothers, who serve in the U.S. military. The employee arranged for copies of Lyttle’s adoption records to be sent to the embassy and then printed and issued him a U.S. passport within twenty-four hours. IV. Lyttle’s Return to the United States Lyttle’s family wired him funds and purchased him an airplane ticket to the United States. On April 22, 2009, Lyttle boarded a plane for Nashville, Tennessee. On his way to Tennessee, Lyttle landed in Atlanta, Georgia. As Lyttle passed through customs in Atlanta, ICE agents Charles Johnston and Brian Keys detained and interrogated Lyttle based on a record search that identified Lyttle as an alien with “a lengthy criminal history.” Id. ¶ 119. Lyttle claimed U.S. citizenship to Johnston and Keys and told the story of his deportation in Central America. The agents documented Lyttle’s claims. Johnston discredited Lyttle’s passport and found him inadmissible without the proper papers to be admitted into the United States. Copies of Lyttle’s adoption and passport were faxed to the agents. The next day, without verifying Lyttle’s claims of U.S. citizenship, attempting to locate family, or substantiating the validity of the adoption papers or passport issued by the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, ICE agents Johnston and Keys issued an expedited removal order against Lyttle. The Notice and Order of Expedited Removal alleged Lyttle was not a U.S. citizen but rather a native and citizen of Mexico. Further, it stated, “Lyttle falsely presented himself as a U.S. citizen by using the passport issued by the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala.” Id. ¶ 126. Lyttle was detained in Atlanta. His family, expecting him to arrive in Tennessee, hired an attorney who located Lyttle and demanded his release. On April 24, 2009, ICE released Lyttle. On April 28, 2009, DHS filed a motion to terminate the deportation efforts on the basis that “it was determined that [Lyttle] was not a Mexican citizen and is, in fact, a citizen of the United States.” Compl. Ex. C, Department of Homeland Security’s Mot. to Terminate Proceedings ¶ 4, ECF No. 1-3 [hereinafter DHS Mot.]. DHS’ motion was granted. “Lyttle suffered and continues to suffer grievous physical and psychological injury” from his deportation. Compl. ¶ 130. V. The North Carolina Action Lyttle filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina asserting causes of action similar to the ones asserted in this action based on the conduct of ICE employees that occurred in North Carolina. See Lyttle v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-142-D (E.D.N.C). While the claims overlap somewhat, the acts giving rise to the present action in this Court relate to the conduct that occurred after ICE transferred Lyttle from North Carolina to Georgia. DISCUSSION The Court divides this Discussion into two sections. In section I, the Court addresses Lyttle’s constitutional Bivens claims against the ICE Defendants in their individual capacities. In section II, the Court addresses Lyttle’s official capacity claims for injunctive relief and Lyttle’s tort claims for monetary damages against the United States under the FTCA. I. Lyttle’s Bivens Claims Against the ICE Defendants in Their Individual Capacities To avoid dismissal of his claims against the ICE Defendants in their individual capacities, Lyttle must have sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating a constitutional violation, facts showing that the ICE Defendants are not protected by qualified immunity, and facts that support the availability of a damages remedy for the alleged constitutional violations. Lyttle seeks monetary damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) based on the alleged violation of his constitutional rights by the ICE Defendants when they detained him and caused his unlawful removal from the United States. Lyttle maintains that by detaining him, a United States citizen, and causing his removal without reasonable basis or authority, the ICE Defendants (1) deprived Lyttle of his right to liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (2) unreasonably seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) discriminated against him based on his race and/or ethnicity in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants respond that Lyttle’s claims should be dismissed because: (1) they are not cognizable under Bivens; (2) even if they are permitted under Bivens, they fail to state claims for a constitutional violation; and (3) if they are cognizable under Bivens and do state a constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court first analyzes the nature of the alleged constitutional violations to determine whether a claim for monetary damages against the responsible government agents should be allowed under the Bivens rationale. A. Bivens Analysis In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages caused by his unconstitutional conduct. 403 U.S. at 389-90, 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The Supreme Court explained that the cause of action in Bivens was an implied one because no statute or other provision of law provided a meaningful remedy for the constitutional violation. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001). A cause of action, however, does not exist for every constitutional violation by a federal agent. The Supreme Court has been careful to circumscribe the types of constitutional violations that may be vindicated through Bivens. In addition to the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations established in Bivens, the Supreme Court has only expressly recognized two other non-statutory damages remedies: a remedy for employment discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and a remedy for an Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549-50, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980)); accord Minneci v. Pollard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 617, 622, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012) (confirming that since Carlson, the Supreme Court has declined to recognize any new Bivens actions). The Supreme Court has expressly rejected a Bivens remedy for the following claims: First Amendment violations by federal employers, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386-88, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983); harm to military personnel through activity incident to service, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) and Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-300, 305, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983); denials of Social Security disability benefits in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988); and harassment and intimidation to obtain property rights, Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 2588. In its most recent Bivens case, the Supreme Court stated: “Although the Court, in reaching its decisions, has not always similarly emphasized the same aspects of the cases, Wilkie fairly summarizes the basic considerations that underlie those decisions.” Minneci, 132 S.Ct. at 623 (citing Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588). In Wilkie, the Supreme Court explained that “any free-standing damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest.” 551 U.S. at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588. The Supreme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether to recognize a Bivens remedy when federal employees violate a constitutionally recognized interest. First, the Court should consider “whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.” Id. (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 378, 103 S.Ct. 2404). Second, even if no alternative remedy exists, “ ‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378, 103 S.Ct. 2404). The Eleventh Circuit applies this two-step inquiry. Hardison v. Cohen, 375 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir.2004). The Court must therefore determine whether Lyttle’s alleged Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and Fifth Amendment due process violations are the types of constitutional violations that may be vindicated through Bivens. To make that determination, the Court first evaluates whether an alternative process exists to protect these rights in a meaningful way. The Court then considers whether special factors exist that counsel hesitation in the establishment of a remedy for these alleged violations. Defendants argue that no Bivens remedy should be created for Lyttle’s constitutional claims for two reasons: (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., provides a comprehensive statutory scheme including remedies, thus, precluding a Bivens remedy; and (2) the political branch has plenary power over immigration, which is a special factor counseling hesitation that precludes a Bivens remedy. The Court addresses each issue in turn. 1. Existence of an Adequate Alternative Remedy “ ‘When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, [the Supreme Court has] not created additional Bivens remedies.’ ” Hardison, 375 F.3d at 1264 (quoting Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460). But an alternative remedy must be “clearly constitutionally adequate” for it to preclude additional remedies under Bivens. Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2404. Congress enacted the INA as a comprehensive scheme to regulate “ ‘immigration and naturalization’ ” and set “ ‘the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.’ ” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1973, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976)) (emphasis added). Defendants ignore the fact that the INA provides an administrative process for the deportation and immigration of aliens who are not constitutionally or statutorily permitted to remain in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Nothing in the INA addresses a meaningful remedy for a United States citizen who is wrongfully detained under the auspices of the Act and then banished from the country without justification. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”). The remedy under the INA is not constitutionally adequate for citizens. Accordingly, the scheme in place is not sufficiently comprehensive because it does not provide “meaningful safeguards or remedies” for a U.S. citizen like Lyttle. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460. The Court finds those cases that hold that the INA is sufficiently comprehensive and adequate to preclude Bivens claims for persons who are not citizens of the United States to be inapposite. See, e.g., Mirmehdi v. United States, 662 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir.2011) (refusing to extend Bivens to aliens alleging invalid detention during immigration proceedings because of the complex, comprehensive INA remedial system and factors counseling hesitation in the immigration context); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 573-74 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that it was difficult in the context presented to determine if the INA provided an alternative remedial scheme, but declining to extend Bivens to the context of extraordinary rendition of an alien because of special factors counseling hesitation); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that an alien’s Bivens claims for unreasonable search and seizure and discrimination upon entry were properly dismissed because “[a]liens are not afforded due process protections when they seek admission to the United States.”); D'Alessandro v. Chertoff, No. 10-CV-927A, 2011 WL 6148756, at *4 (Dec. 12, 2011 W.D.N.Y.) (applying Mirmehdi to deny Bivens relief for improper detention claims by a legal permanent resident of the United States). The persuasiveness of the rationale underlying these cases weakens considerably when extended to a citizen of the United States instead of an alien. Neither the holdings in these cases nor their constitutional basis apply to U.S. citizens wrongfully subjected to the removal procedures of the immigration system that lack sufficient constitutional safeguards for U.S. citizens. Defendants fail to recognize this important distinction between aliens and citizens — a distinction that is well recognized in the case law. “It is well established that immigrants’ remedies for vindicating the rights which they possess under the Constitution are not coextensive with those offered citizens.” Mirmehdi, 662 F.3d at 1079 (citing, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999)); see, e.g., Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1555 (11th Cir.1990) (“[A]liens have no constitutional rights with regard to their applications [for entry into the United States] and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights and privileges they are granted by Congress.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distinction between the constitutional protections available to a citizen compared to a non-citizen when each faces removal from the United States has long been recognized by the Supreme Court: The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893). On the other hand, it logically follows that when a citizen is removed, the United States cannot rely upon the “diminished constitutional rights” theory because a citizen does not give up the full panoply of rights available to him just because the government mistakenly determines that he is an alien. It is certainly not a startling proposition to suggest that if the government or its officer mistakenly treats a citizen as a non-citizen and does not afford the citizen the rights to which he is entitled, it does so at the peril of violating the citizen’s constitutional rights. It would be a startling proposition to suggest that a person’s constitutional rights depend upon whether a government official identifies the person as a citizen or an alien regardless of whether their designation is accurate. The Court does not imply that the INA provides no procedural protections for citizens who may be wrongly identified as deportable aliens. See e.g. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (providing a procedure for review of a petitioner’s claim of U.S. nationality following issuance of a final order of removal). However, the Court finds these protections are constitutionally inadequate to avoid the wrongful detention and removal of a United States citizen and to remedy such constitutional violations after they have occurred. There is scant evidence that Congress gave any thought to what the remedy should be for a citizen who is wrongly detained and deported. The INA scheme as applied to U.S. citizens is in stark contrast to the comprehensive programs precluding Bivens remedies for plaintiffs in other cases. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429, 108 S.Ct. 2460 (finding no Bivens remedy because Congress “has addressed the problems created by state agencies’ wrongful termination of disability benefits,” and “Congress is the body charged with ... the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program”); Bush, 462 U.S. at 386, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (declining to extend Bivens where the civil service statute “provides meaningful remedies for employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments about their agencies” because the Supreme Court was “convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating [a new legal liability]”). The Court concludes that the INA does not provide any meaningful remedy and review procedure for Lyttle, a U.S. citizen, in this case. Where, as here, there is no congressionally created remedy for the Constitutional violations Lyttle suffered and Congress has not explicitly declared an alternative remedy to be a substitute for recovery, the Court may craft a remedy so long as no factors counseling hesitation demand that the Court refrain from doing so. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588; accord Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. 2. Factors Counseling Hesitation The only factor that Defendants assert as counseling hesitation is that the political branch has plenary power over immigration. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731, 13 S.Ct. 1016. The Court does not quarrel with this general observation. Defendants’ argument, however, again fails to make the distinction between the use of the immigration process to regulate the admission and removal of aliens, a legitimate exercise of the power of the political branch of government, and the use of that process to detain and remove citizens, an unauthorized exercise of political branch power unless additional constitutional protections are provided to safeguard against the wrongful removal of a citizen from his own country. The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that sufficient factors exist counseling that the Court resist finding a Bivens remedy in this context — the wrongful detention and removal of a citizen from the United States. The Court emphasizes that today’s ruling is a narrow one. Specifically, the Court holds that a United States citizen with a diminished mental capacity who has been detained without probable cause, who the federal agents know claims to be a U.S. citizen, whose claim of citizenship is not investigated, whose claim is supported by easily accessible corroborating evidence, and who is manipulated by the federal agents through coercion and distortion of the record, should have a claim against the responsible agents to recover damages for his injuries caused by his detention and subsequent banishment from the United States, if he is able to prove that the government employee violated his constitutional rights in the process and if that employee is not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Court finds that Lyttle’s Fourth Amendment seizure claim and his Fifth Amendment due process claim for monetary damages against the individual ICE Defendants shall not be dismissed as disallowed under Bivens. B. Failure to State a Claim and Qualified Immunity 1. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims Deciding that a Bivens remedy is available for Lyttle’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim and Fifth Amendment due process claim is not dis-positive of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In a Bivens action, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Keating v. City of Miami 598 F.3d 753, 763 (11th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To this end, “a plaintiff must allege some factual detail as the basis” for a claim. Id. Therefore, the Court must examine the alleged conduct of each individual Defendant against whom Lyttle seeks monetary damages and determine whether Lyttle’s allegations support a constitutional violation, and if they do, whether the Defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-07, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Lyttle alleges that the conduct of the individual ICE Defendants, individually and in combination, violated his right not to be subjected to unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and his right not to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. He contends that by detaining him without probable cause and being consciously indifferent to evidence of his U.S. citizenship, the ICE Defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. His Fourth Amendment rights were allegedly violated based on the administrative decisions by the ICE Defendants to detain him without probable cause. His Fifth Amendment rights were allegedly violated based on the ICE Defendants’ continued detention of him after discovering evidence indicating that they had no probable cause to continue the detention. Lyttle also alleges that by removing him from the United States without probable cause to believe he was an alien and with a conscious indifference to the evidence demonstrating that he was a U.S. citizen, the ICE Defendants who engaged in this conduct violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Even if the Court finds that Lyttle has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation against an individual ICE Defendant, that Defendant can only be held legally responsible for the violation if the Court also finds the Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects public officers acting within the scope of their discretionary authority from liability if their acts do not violate clearly established law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 838 (11th Cir.2010). “A government agent is entitled to immunity unless his act is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing.” Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 838 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, courts “generally accord ... official conduct a presumption of legitimacy.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish qualified immunity, the official must first establish he was acting in the scope of his discretionary authority when performing the acts a plaintiff complains of. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir.2004). Here, Lyttle does not dispute that the ICE Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority. The record demonstrates that all ICE Defendants were engaged in activities within their job responsibilities during the events at issue. See id. at 1265 (stating that in the qualified immunity context, “discretionary function” means whether the acts at issue “are of a type that fell within the [official’s] job responsibilities.”). Accordingly, Lyttle has the burden “to show that the defendants are] not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 1264. The Court undertakes a two-part analysis to evaluate qualified immunity: “whether (1) the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s misconduct.” Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 838-39. “This two-pronged analysis may be done in whatever order is deemed most appropriate for the case.” Id. at 839 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)). “To deny their qualified-immunity defenses, the law [at the time of the alleged conduct] must have been sufficiently clear to put [Defendants] on notice that their conduct violated [Lyttle’s rights].” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir.2011). The Eleventh Circuit “uses two methods to determine whether a reasonable officer would know his conduct is unconstitutional.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). One method “looks at the relevant case law at the time of the violation” to determine if the case law “make[s] it obvious to a reasonable government actor that his actions violate federal law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The second method looks “at the officer’s conduct, and inquires whether that conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the [Constitution] prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to [the officer], notwithstanding the lack of fact-specific case law.” Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether Lyttle’s claims may proceed against the individual ICE Defendants, the Court must examine the factual allegations pertaining to the conduct of each Defendant to determine whether that conduct violates the Fourth and/or Fifth Amendments. If so, the Court must determine whether it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that such conduct would violate those constitutional provisions. Under the Fourth Amendment, Lyttle has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV. A seizure occurs when “a person’s freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force or by submission to a show of authority,” which includes an arrest or detention. United States v. Allen, 447 Fed.Appx. 118, 120 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam). An arrest, a complete seizure, must be supported by probable cause. United States v. Blackley, 439 Fed.Appx. 803, 805 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam). “It is settled law that warrantless searches [and seizures] require the same investigative basis in fact or reasonable conjecture as searches [and seizures] under warrant.” United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 720 (5th Cir.1976). An officer may arrest “any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”). Officers may inquire about an individual’s citizenship and immigration status, but the officer must have probable cause or consent to detain the individual. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). “[A]n arrest or [detention] without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment,” and is thus an unconstitutional seizure. Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir.1998). “[T]he probable cause standard for pretrial detention is the same as that for an arrest.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). “Under federal law, probable cause to arrest exists when an arrest is objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir.2003). “This standard is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To seize and detain a person for being an illegal alien, an officer must have probable cause to believe that the individual is an illegal alien. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (stating that the Fourth Amendment “forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.”). “As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. at 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574. Even if no probable cause ultimately exits, officers making an arrest are entitled to qualified immunity so long as “arguable probable cause for the arrest” exists. Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1089 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that an officer has qualified immunity so long as he “reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed, in light of the information he possessed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Indeed, ‘it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and ... in such cases those officials ... should not be held personally liable.’ ” Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir.1990) (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The Court finds that at the time the Defendants arrested and continued Lyttle’s detention, the law was clearly established that an arrest without arguable probable cause to believe that Lyttle was an alien in the United States illegally violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. It was also clearly established that an ICE officer did not have the authority to detain or deport U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226-28, 1231, 1357(a)-(d) (granting ICE agents authority to arrest, detain and deport aliens). Applying the qualified immunity test in the context of Lyttle’s unlawful immigration detention, the Court “must determine whether reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest” Lyttle for violation of the immigration laws. Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579. As previously noted, Lyttle also alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated his Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. The Fifth Amendment in pertinent part states that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. V. Lyttle alleges that by continuing his detention without probable cause and ultimately removing him from the United States when no legal basis existed for his removal, Defendants’ conduct, individually and jointly, deprived him of his liberty without due process. Defendants respond that they had the authority under the INA to take the actions that they took, but they fail to appreciate the distinction between taking those actions against an alien compared to a U.S. citizen. “In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In asserting this distinction between citizens and aliens, the Supreme Court held that “[detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process,” and specifically held as constitutional the mandatory “INS detention of ... a criminal alien who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings.” Id. at 531, 123 S.Ct. 1708. In the present case, Lyttle was detained as a criminal alien notwithstanding his U.S. citizenship and clear and convincing evidence available to certain Defendants indicating his citizenship. He was therefore provided with the rights of a criminal alien and not a United States citizen. The question remains as to whether this continued detention gives rise to a substantive due process violation. Generally, “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). Thus, to the extent that the detention of Lyttle was prohibited under the Fourth Amendment, the Court would not resort to substantive due process to protect against the unconstitutional detention. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). However, to the extent that the Fourth Amendment does not cover a continued detention of the nature alleged here, Fifth Amendment substantive due process would be implicated. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (“Substantive due process analysis is therefore inappropriate in this case only if respondents’ claim is ‘covered by’ the Fourth Amendment,” which “covers only ‘searches and seizures.’ ”). To establish a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant “acted with deliberate indifference,” meaning the defendant “had (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; [and] (2) disregarded] ... that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court in Baker v. McCollan held that innocent people may be arrested without a constitutional violation occurring — as long as the arrest meets the standards of the Fourth Amendment. 443 U.S. at 144, 99 S.Ct. 2689. But, the Court qualified that holding by stating that after a period of time continued detention may amount to a Fifth Amendment substantive due process violation. Id. at 144-45, 99 S.Ct. 2689. Thus, even if the initial arrest or detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment, continued detention without probable cause could violate a detainee’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Supreme Court further stated that an individual “could not be detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of innocence even though the warrant under which he was arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 144, 99 S.Ct. 2689. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that due process includes the “right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.” Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1993), modified on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1022 (1994). The Court finds that whether the violation is asserted under the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment, the law was clear at the time of the alleged conduct that a U.S. citizen could not lawfully be detained without probable cause to believe the citizen was not a citizen, particularly when confronted with substantial evidence of such citizenship. Lyttle’s Fifth Amendment due process claim extends beyond his detention to his ultimate removal from the United States. In addition to detaining aliens, “[t]he executive may deport certain aliens but has no authority to deport citizens. An assertion of U.S. citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact in a deportation proceeding.” Rivera v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 835, 843 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), modified on other grounds, 394 F.3d 1129 (2005). Deporting one who claims to be a citizen is a deprivation of liberty implicating Fifth Amendment constitutional concerns. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922). Banishment of a U.S. citizen likewise deprives the citizen “of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016. Accordingly, the Court finds that the detention and subsequent removal of a U.S. citizen, like Lyttle, who federal agents know has a diminished mental capacity and who affirmatively claims citizenship, which the federal agents fail to attempt to confirm through readily available corroborating information, implicates Fifth Amendment due process protections. However, to be personally liable, the government agent must have been on notice that his conduct violated clearly established law. An ICE officer is authorized to arrest and initiate deportation proceedings against persons who are in the United States illegally. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231, 1357(a)-(d). Any ICE officer with this responsibility would know it is illegal and unconstitutional to deport, detain for deportation, or recommend deportation of a U.S. citizen. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 67, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 150 L.Ed.2d 115 (2001) (affirming that a citizen has the “absolute right to enter [the United States] borders”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (“This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Thus, an ICE officer who actively participates in the detention and/or removal of a person who he knows to be a U.S. citizen, or upon minimal investigation would discover is a U.S. citizen, would be deemed to know that such conduct clearly denies that person liberty without due process of law. Consequently, any such officer would not be protected by qualified immunity. The Court next must examine the conduct of each individual ICE Defendant to determine whether that Defendant’s conduct violated Lyttle’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. a. DEFENDANTS COLLADO AND MOTEN Defendant Collado was an ICE enforcement agent who conducted the initial interrogation of Lyttle when he arrived at the SDC in Georgia. In that interview, Lyttle stated unequivocally that he