Full opinion text
ORDER NEIL V. WAKE, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. SUMMARY OF COUNTS TO BE DISMISSED...........................1034 II. BACKGROUND FACTS ...............................................1035 A. Wilcox Complaint................................................., 1036 B. Mundell Complaint.................................................1038 C. Donahoe Complaint................................................1041 D. Schuerman Complaint..............................................1044 E. Wilson Complaint..................................................1046 F. Stapley Complaint.................................................1048 III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. (12)(B)(6) ...........................................................1051 IV. CIVIL RICO COMPLAINT.............................................1052 V. ANALYSIS OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS...............................1053 A. Wrongful Institution of Civil Proceedings.............................1054 1. Absolute Immunity for Federal Civil RICO Filing..................1054 2. Non-Immunity Challenges ......................................1057 B. Malicious Prosecution ..............................................1057 1. Immunity as to Prosecutorial or Investigative Functions.............1057 2. Non-Immunity Challenges ......................................1059 C. Abuse of Process ..................................................1060 D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress............................1061 E. Defamation .......................................................1061 F. False Light Invasion of Privacy......................................1063 G. Intrusion Upon Seclusion...........................................1064 H. False Arrest......................................................1064 I. Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute...........................1065 J. Violations of the Arizona Constitution.................................1067 K. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983......................................1067 1. Qualified Immunity.............................................1067 2. Retaliation for Exercise of Free Speech Rights.....................1069 3. Unlawful Search ...............................................1070 4. Substantive Due Process........................................1072 5. Retaliation for Exercise of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights......................................................1072 6. Equal Protection...............................................1073 7. Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights........................1074 8. Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, Failure to Train, and Negligent Supervision ........................................1075 VI. MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 8...................................1076 VII. DEFENDANT SPAW’S MOTION TO DISMISS..........................1076 VIII. LEAVE TO AMEND...................................................1077 IX. ORDER..............................................................1078 Pending before the Court are multiple motions to dismiss the amended complaints filed by Plaintiffs in this action: Defendant Maricopa County’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaints of Plaintiffs Stapley, Donahoe and Wilson (Doc. 270); Thomas Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss Claims in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaints Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), as the Claims are Barred by Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity (Doc. 271); Defendants Arpaios’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCivP 8, 10, and 12(b)(6) Applicable Collectively to the Newly Amended Complaints Filed by Plaintiffs Donahoe, Mundell, Schuerman, Stapley, Wilcox, and Wilson (Doc. 283); Defendants Lisa Aubuchon and Peter R. Pestalozzi’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaints Pursuant to Rules 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1) (as to Plaintiffs Wilcox, Mundell and Stapley) and 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as to Plaintiffs Wilcox, Mundell, Stapley, Wilson, Schuerman, and Donahoe) (Doc. 284); and Defendants Peter and Mary Spawns Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 315). The Court heard argument on the motions on February 10, 2012 (Doc. 335). For the reasons stated below, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part. I. SUMMARY OF COUNTS TO BE DISMISSED In summary, the following claims of each complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend: A. Wilcox Complaint • Count 5: Violations of the Arizona Constitution except for free speech claim under Article II, § 6 • Count 7: as to claims for substantive due process, abuse of process, abuse of power, and equal protection only • Count 9: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights B. Mundell Complaint • Count 1: Abuse of Process • Count 3: False Light Invasion of Privacy • Count 6: as to claims for privileges and immunities, abuse of process, and false light only; and defamation as to Aubuchon only C. Donahoe Complaint • Count 6: as to claims for false light only • Count 7: as to claims for false light only • Count 8: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Substantive Due Process • Count 11: Intrusion Upon Seclusion in Violation of Arizona Law • Count 13: Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04 D. Schuerman Complaint • Count 3: Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona Law • Count 4: for claim for defamation as to Aubuchon only • Count 5: for claim for defamation as to Aubuchon only • Count 9: Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04 E. Wilson Complaint • Count 1: as to claims for abuse of process only • Count 3: as to claims for abuse of process only • Count 5: as to claims for false light only • Count 6: as to claims for false light only • Count 7: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Substantive Due Process • Count 11: Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04. F. Stapley Complaint • Count 2: as to claims grounded directly on criminal prosecution only • Count 5: as to claims grounded directly on criminal prosecution only • Count 8: as to claims for substantive due process, privileges and immunities, abuse of process, and abuse of power only • Count 11: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Equal Protection • Count 12: Conspiracy to Violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 In all other respects, Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss (Docs. 270, 271, 283, 284, 315) will be denied. II. BACKGROUND FACTS In these consolidated cases, which arise from widely reported controversies between members of the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office and County Attorney’s Office and members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Maricopa County staff, and judges of the Maricopa County Superior Court, multiple Plaintiffs allege various and overlapping claims against several Defendants. At all relevant times, Wilcox and Stapley were members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. Donahoe was the presiding criminal judge for the Maricopa County Superior Court. Mundell was also a judge for the Maricopa County Superior Court. Wilson was Deputy County Manager and Schuerman was Stapley’s Deputy Administrator. Arpaio was the Maricopa County Sheriff and head of the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office and Hendershott was the Deputy Chief for the Sheriffs Office. Thomas was the County Attorney for Maricopa County and Aubuchon was a Deputy County Attorney. Spaw was the supervising attorney for non-party Deputy Attorney Rachel Alexander, who was involved in prosecuting the federal civil RICO action. The following facts, as alleged in the complaints, are accepted as true at this stage in the proceedings. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2009). A. Wilcox Complaint Mary Rose Wilcox was a member of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. She alleges that Defendants conspired to use the power of the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office and the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office to retaliate against her for her actions taken as a member of the Board of Supervisors, mainly related to the construction of a new Criminal Court Tower in Maricopa County. She alleges that Defendants attempted to advance their own political agendas by targeting Wilcox for investigation, prosecution, and harassment without probable cause. Wilcox also claims Arpaio and Thomas used an investigative division of the Sheriffs Office, the Maricopa Anti-Corruption Enforcement (“MACE”) team, to target, investigate, harass, and intimidate Wilcox. Hendershott was the investigative head of MACE, and Aubuchon was assigned by Thomas to give MACE legal advice. Wilcox claims Aubuchon and Hendershott, in association with the MACE unit, “began criminal investigations without probable cause, conducted fishing expeditions to find evidence of crimes, and, finding none, falsified the law and evidence, and falsified the application of the law to the evidence to justify an investigative report recommending prosecution against ... Wilcox.” (Doc. 239 at 6.) Wilcox claims Defendants initiated a baseless criminal investigation against her in 2008, culminating in obtaining two criminal indictments against Wilcox, in December 2009 and January 2010, as well as a baseless federal civil racketeering suit in 2009. The criminal indictments were dismissed on February 24, 2010, after a finding that Thomas was using his office to retaliate against and gain political advantage over Wilcox, and Thomas and Arpaio misused the power of the Sheriffs Office to target her for criminal investigation. Wilcox also alleges that Defendants took other actions to harm, intimidate, and humiliate her, including directing Sheriffs deputies to park outside Wilcox’s home and business and sending undercover informants into their business to surreptitiously tape record them. Wilcox raises nine causes of action: (1) Wrongful Institution of Civil Proceedings; (2) Malicious Prosecution against Arpaio and Hendershott; (3) Malicious Prosecution against Thomas and Aubuchon; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Violations of the Arizona Constitution; (6) Negligent Supervision; (7) 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Free Speech, Law Enforcement Retaliatory Conduct, Abuse of Process, and Abuse of Power; (8) 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, and Failure to Train; and (9) 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights. Arpaio and Aubuchon have moved to dismiss Wilcox’s complaint in its entirety for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Summarily stated, Defendants move to dismiss the individual counts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows: 1. Wrongful Institution of Civil Proceedings Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 2. Malicious Prosecution against Arpaio and Hendershott Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 3. Malicious Prosecution against Thomas and Aubuchon Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. 5. Violations of the Arizona Constitution Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that there is no cause of action for bringing a civil rights claim under the Arizona constitution. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims that Wilcox has not presented separate arguments for her state and federal claims, and is therefore unable to allege simultaneous claims. Alternatively, she claims the factual allegations are insufficient to state any claim. 6. Negligent Supervision against Thomas and Arpaio Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Free Speech, Law Enforcement Retaliatory Conduct, Abuse of Process, and Abuse of Power Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count (with respect to the First Amendment) because there are no facts in the count related to speech or association. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count (with respect to the equal protection claim) because there are no facts in the count alleged related to equal protection and it is only conclusorily alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims insufficient factual allegations to state a claim for due process violations. Alternatively, she claims the equal protection claim fails because the “class of one” theory does not apply. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for abuse of process because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, and Failure to Train against Thomas and Arpaio Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to the claim for failure to train on the basis that the claim is vague and conclusory and fails to specify facts regarding deputy training was insufficient or caused a constitutional violation. 9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the claim is vague and conclusory and fails to specify each defendant’s role in the alleged conspiracy. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon claims that no conspiracy action can lie because the county cannot conspire with itself. B. Mundell Complaint Barbara Mundell was a judge for the Maricopa County Superior Court; she retired from this position in 2009. After Stapley was initially criminally indicted, Mundell appointed retired Judge Kenneth Fields to preside over his criminal trial. Mundell alleges that in retaliation for this appointment, Defendants took improper action against her. Hendershott attempted to gain access to Mundell’s emails and threatened litigation if his request was denied. Aubuchon sought an ex parte meeting with Mundell regarding Judge Fields’ appointment. Defendants issued press releases implying Mundell’s involvement in the litigation related to the investigation of the Board of Supervisors and the Court Tower project was improper. Beginning in April 2009 and lasting for approximately fourteen months, the Sheriffs Office conducted surveillance of Mundell’s home. Further, Hendershott filed a judicial ethics complaint against Mundell on November 30, 2009, claiming that Mundell (1) conspired with the Maricopa County Public Defenders’ office to bring a lawsuit regarding the jail visitation hours and conceal the public record communications requested by the Sheriffs Office, (2) solicited Judge Fields to file a bar complaint against Thomas, (3) failed to explain her reasons for appointing retired Judge Fields to preside over the Stapley litigation, and (4) admonished Aubuchon for questioning Mundell’s decision to appoint Judge Fields. Mundell was also a named defendant in the federal civil RICO lawsuit underlying these consolidated cases. Mundell claims Hendershott conducted the investigation that led to the filing of the suit, Aubuchon drafted and signed the complaint, and Arpaio and Thomas were named as Plaintiffs. Mundell claims the RICO suit was filed even though Defendants knew, and were advised by experienced attorneys, that there was no evidence to support a RICO complaint. Thomas issued a press release on December 8, 2009, stating that Mundell and the rest of the defendants in the RICO suit were under criminal investigation “for hindering prosecution and for other offenses.” (Doc. 242 at 10.) Arpaio, Thomas, Hendershott, and Aubuchon planned to search Mundell’s office and home and obtain a criminal indictment against her; this plan was leaked to the press and apparently did not occur. The RICO complaint was dismissed by Arpaio and Thomas on March 11, 2010; at that time, Arpaio and Thomas held a press conference and falsely stated that they had withdrew the case because the Department of Justice had agreed to take over the investigation. Mundell claims Defendants made various other public statements claiming Mundell had acted improperly. Mundell claims that she was offered twenty-four hour security by Maricopa County in response to Hendershott’s behavior related to the RICO suit. Mundell raises seven causes of action: (1) Abuse of Process; (2) Malicious Prosecution; (3) False Light Invasion of Privacy; (4) Defamation against Arpaio, Thomas, and Hendershott; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (6) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Claims Against Defendants in Individual Capacities; (7) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Supervisory Defendant in Individual capacity against Arpaio and Thomas. Aubuchon has moved to dismiss Mundell’s complaint in its entirety for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Summarily stated, Defendants move to dismiss the individual counts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows: 1. Abuse of Process Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that nothing more than persistence in the litigation has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 2. Malicious Prosecution Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 3. False Light Invasion of Privacy Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that a false light claim is not available to public officials. 4. Defamation against Arpaio, Thomas, and Hendershott Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the published statements were opinion and protected by the First Amendment, and not made with actual malice. Alternatively, Arpaio claims he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for these statements since they relate to judicial proceedings. 5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state a claim. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state a claim. 6. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Claims Against Defendants in Individual Capacities Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count (reading it as a substantive due process claim) on the basis that the conduct at issue here is not sufficiently outrageous and that no sufficient interest has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims insufficient factual allegations to state a claim for due process violations. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Finally, with respect to the defamation count, Aubuchon claims that her statements were all contained in the criminal and RICO filings and are thus absolutely immune, and that Aubuchon did not publish any of the statements. 7. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Supervisory Defendant in Individual capacity against Arpaio and Thomas Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. C. Donahoe Complaint Gary Donahoe was a judge for the Maricopa County Superior Court. He served as the Presiding Criminal Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court from January 16, 2009, to March 31, 2010. In February 2009, Donahoe presided over a dispute between the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office related to the Board of Supervisors’ decision to assign cases away from the County Attorney’s Office to independent counsel. In that action, Donahoe: (1) denied the MCAO’s motion to reassign the case to an out-of-county judge; (2) denied the MCAO’s motion to disqualify the BOS’s independently retained counsel; (3) quashed a grand jury subpoena obtained by the MCAO to investigate the Court Tower Project; and (4) disqualified the MCAO from investigating the Court Tower Project based on the MCAO’s conflict of interest. (Doc. 243 at 6.) He also had a hearing on orders to show cause why an officer of the Sheriff’s Office should not be held in contempt for failing to obey a court order regarding the timely transportation of prisoners to criminal hearings at the Maricopa County Superior Court. Finally, Donahoe held a Maricopa County detention officer in contempt for perusing a criminal defense attorney’s file in Court. Donahoe claims that Defendants retaliated against him for these rulings he made in his capacity as Superior Court Judge by naming him as a defendant in the federal civil RICO lawsuit filed by Defendants and selecting an individual who had previously threatened Donahoe’s life to serve the summons and complaint. Donahoe raises thirteen causes of action: (1) Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of Arizona Law; (3) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Supervisor Liability against Spaw; (4) Malicious Prosecution in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona Law against Arpaio and Hendershott; (5) Retaliation for the Exercise of First Amendment Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) Defamation and False Light in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Thomas and Arpaio; (7) Defamation and False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas, Arpaio, and Maricopa County; (8) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Substantive Due Process; (9) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Municipal Liability against Maricopa County; (10) Defamation/False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas; (11) Intrusion Upon Seclusion in Violation of Arizona Law; (12) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (13) Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04. Summarily stated, Defendants move to dismiss the individual counts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows: 1. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Spaw has moved to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity or, in the alternative, it is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to malicious prosecution on the basis that it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to abuse of process on the basis that nothing more than persistence in the litigation has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 2. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of Arizona Law Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to malicious prosecution on the basis that it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to abuse of process on the basis that nothing more than persistence in the litigation has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 3. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Supervisor Liability against Spaw Spaw has moved to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity or, in the alternative, it is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 4. Malicious Prosecution in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona Law against Arpaio and Hendershott Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 5. Retaliation for the Exercise of First Amendment Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that Donahoe’s First Amendment rights were not implicated by issuing rulings, which is the act for which he claims retaliation. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 6. Defamation and False Light in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Thomas and Arpaio Arpaio moves to dismiss the false light action on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of his public duties. Arpaio moves to dismiss the defamation action on the basis that the published statements were opinion and protected by the First Amendment, and not made with actual malice. Alternatively, Arpaio claims he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for these statements since they relate to judicial proceedings. 7. Defamation and False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas, Arpaio, and Maricopa County Arpaio moves to dismiss the defamation action on the basis that the published statements were opinion and protected by the First Amendment, and not made with actual malice. Alternatively, Arpaio claims he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for these statements since they relate to judicial proceedings. 8. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Substantive Due Process Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the conduct at issue here is not sufficiently outrageous and that no sufficient interest has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon claims the conduct alleged is not sufficiently outrageous to state a claim. 9. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Municipal Liability against Maricopa County Maricopa County has not moved to dismiss this count. 10. Defamation/False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas Thomas has not moved to dismiss this count. 11. Intrusion Upon Seclusion in Violation of Arizona Law Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the decision to hire the process server does not implicate a private place or private affairs because there was no actual invasion of any place. 12. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. 13. Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04 Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is not sufficiently alleged that the predicate acts were committed for financial gain and failure to allege the necessary continuity. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is not sufficiently alleged that the predicate acts were committed for financial gain. D. Schuerman Complaint Susan Schuerman was Stapley’s executive assistant with the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. She alleges that Defendants targeted and harassed her in an attempt to “pressure her into providing information, or creating false evidence, [Defendants] could use against Stapley.” (Doc. 244 at 6.) Schuerman alleges that on December 2, 2009, deputies of the Sheriffs Office served her with a grand jury subpoena commanding her to provide testimony regarding the charges against Stapley. The deputies also requested an interview with Schuerman, which she declined. Schuerman claims deputies, including Hendershott, repeatedly attempted to interview her and threatened her if she failed to cooperate in the investigation of Stapley. In retaliation for her refusal to submit to an interview, a criminal investigation was instituted against Schuerman. Related to the investigation, Schuerman was served with a warrant, not supported by probable cause, authorizing a search of her office and files on February 26, 2009. Schuerman also alleges that Defendants directed undercover officers to park their cars on Schuerman’s street and follow her in an attempt to intimidate Schuerman into cooperating with the Stapley investigation. Schuerman raises nine causes of action: (1) Retaliation for the Exercise of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) § 1983 Fourth Amendment Violation; (3) Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona Law; (4) Defamation/False Light in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) Defamation and False Light in Violation of Arizona Law; (6) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Municipal Liability against Maricopa County; (7) Defamation/False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (9) Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04. Summarily stated, Defendants move to dismiss the individual counts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows: 1. Retaliation for the Exercise of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that her self-incrimination rights were never implicated. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon claims qualified immunity for her actions related to the search warrant. Alternatively, she claims insufficient factual allegations to state a claim for due process violations. 2. § 1983 Fourth Amendment Violation Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that there are insufficient allegations as to what allegedly false facts Arpaio submitted in the affidavit for probable cause to support the search warrant. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that her actions are protected by qualified immunity. Alternatively, she claims insufficient factual allegations to state a claim for Fourth Amendment violations. 3. Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona Law Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that nothing more than persistence in the litigation has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 4. Defamation/False Light in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Arpaio moves to dismiss the false light action on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of her public duties. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to defamation on the basis that there is no allegation of a false statement. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of her public duties, and for failing to identify any statements made by Aubuchon. 5. Defamation and False Light in Violation of Arizona Law Arpaio moves to dismiss the false light action on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of his public duties. Arpaio moves to dismiss the defamation action on the basis that the published statements were opinion and protected by the First Amendment, and not made with actual malice. Alternatively, Arpaio claims he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for these statements since they relate to judicial proceedings. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of her public duties, and for failing to identify any statements made by Aubuchon. 6. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Municipal Liability against Maricopa County Maricopa County has not moved to dismiss this count. 7. Defamation/False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas Thomas has not moved to dismiss this count. 8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. 9. Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04 Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is not sufficiently alleged that the predicate acts were committed for financial gain and failure to allege the necessary continuity. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is not sufficiently alleged that the predicate acts were committed for financial gain. E. Wilson Complaint Sandra Wilson was the Deputy County Manager of Maricopa County. Wilson alleges that Defendants targeted her for making recommendations to the Board of Supervisors on how to balance Maricopa County’s budget with respect to the allocation of funds for the Court Tower Project and budget cuts for other County agencies. Wilson claims Defendants retaliated against her for these recommendations by naming her as a defendant in the federal civil RICO lawsuit filed by Defendants. Wilson raises eleven causes of action: (1) Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Supervisor Liability against Spaw; (3) Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of Arizona Law (4) Retaliation for the Exercise of First Amendment Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) Defamation and False Light in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Thomas and Arpaio; (6) Defamation and False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas, Arpaio, and Maricopa County; (7) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Substantive Due Process; (8) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Municipal Liability against Maricopa County; (9) Defamation/False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas; (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (11) Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04. Summarily stated, Defendants move to dismiss the individual counts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows: 1. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Spaw has moved to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity or, in the alternative, it is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 2. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Supervisor Liability against Spaw Spaw has moved to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity or, in the alternative, it is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 3. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process in Violation of Arizona Law Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to malicious prosecution on the basis that it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count as to abuse of process on the basis that nothing more than persistence in the litigation has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 4. Retaliation for the Exercise of First Amendment Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that Wilson’s First Amendment rights were not implicated by her exercise of her official duties, which is the act for which she claims retaliation. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 5. Defamation and False Light in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Thomas and Arpaio Arpaio moves to dismiss the false light action on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of his public duties. 6. Defamation and False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas, Arpaio, and Maricopa County Arpaio moves to dismiss the false light action on the basis that Plaintiff was a public official and the publication related to the performance of his public duties. Arpaio moves to dismiss the defamation action on the basis that the published statements were opinion and protected by the First Amendment, and not made with actual malice. Alternatively, Arpaio claims he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for these statements since they relate to judicial proceedings. 7. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Substantive Due Process Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is- based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the conduct at issue here is not sufficiently outrageous and that no sufficient interest has been alleged. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon claims the conduct alleged is not sufficiently outrageous to state a claim. 8. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Municipal Liability against Maricopa County Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 9. Defamation/False Light in Violation of Arizona Law against Thomas Thomas has not moved to dismiss this count. . 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. 11. Violations of Arizona’s Racketeering Statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314.04. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is not sufficiently alleged that the predicate acts were committed for financial gain and failure to allege the necessary continuity. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is not sufficiently alleged that the predicate acts were committed for financial gain. F. Stapley Complaint Donald Stapley was a member' of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. He alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for actions he took in his official capacity with the Board of Supervisors. Stapley claims that Defendants animus against him stems from his challenges to Thomas’ use of outside counsel in representing Maricopa County, criticism of Sheriffs Office personnel’s trips to Central America financed by County funds, perceived interference with Thomas’ anti-methamphetamine program, and general disagreements regarding budget issues between the Board of Supervisors and the Sheriff and County Attorney’s offices. In retaliation against Stapey for these criticisms and other political disagreements, Stapley asserts Defendants commenced investigations into Stapley’s business affairs and ultimately obtained two criminal indictments against him. Stapley alleges that Defendants brought numerous time-barred and other unsupported charges against him in order to have a 118-count indictment for publicity purposes; the second indictment included only 27 charges. In connection with the criminal charges, Stapley alleges Defendants planned and executed his public, warrantless arrest and arranged for the media to be present at the time it occurred. Further, Stapley claims Defendants unlawfully searched his offices as part of their retaliatory investigation of him. Stapley was also named as a defendant in the federal civil RICO action. Stapley raises twelve causes of action: (1) Wrongful Institution of Civil Proceedings; (2) Malicious Prosecution: Stapley I against Thomas and Aubuchon; (3) Malicious Prosecution: Stapley I against Arpaio and Hendershott; (4) False/Wrongful Arresb-Imprisonment against Arpaio, Hendershott, and Aubuchon; (5) Malicious Prosecution: Stapley II against Thomas and Aubuehon; (6) Malicious Prosecution: Stapley II against Arpaio and Hendershott; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Free Speech, Free Association, Law Enforcement Retaliatory Conduct, Abuse of Process, and Abuse of Power; (9) Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, Failure to Train and Negligent Supervision against Arpaio and Thomas; (10) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Unlawful Search; (11) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Equal Protection; and (12) Conspiracy to Violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Arpaio and Aubuehon have moved to dismiss Wilcox’s complaint in its entirety for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Summarily stated, Defendants move to dismiss the individual counts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows: 1. Wrongful Institution of Civil Proceedings Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. Aubuehon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 2. Malicious Prosecution: Stapley I against Thomas and Aubuehon Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Aubuehon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 3. Malicious Prosecution: Stapley I against Arpaio and Hendershott Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 4. False/Wrongful Arrest-Imprisonment against Arpaio, Hendershott, and Aubuehon Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that there is no allegation that the arrest was made without probable cause. Aubuehon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 5. Malicious Prosecution: Stapley II against Thomas and Aubuehon Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Aubuehon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 6. Malicious Prosecution: Stapley II against Arpaio and Hendershott Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it fails to state a claim because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that it is barred by judicial immunity. Thomas moves to dismiss this count completely on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous. 8. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Free Speech, Free Association, Law Enforcement Retaliatory Conduct, Abuse of Process, and Abuse of Power Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count (reading it as a substantive due process claim) on the basis that the conduct at issue here is not sufficiently outrageous and that no sufficient interest has been alleged. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count (with respect to the First Amendment) because there are no facts in the count related to speech or association. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment or the civil RICO suit, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims it fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because no “favorable termination” has been pled. 9. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, Failure to Train and Negligent Supervision against Arpaio and Thomas Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based in part on the criminal indictment and in part on the filing of the civil RICO action, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to as to the claim for failure to train on the basis that the claim is vague and conclusory and fails to specify facts regarding deputy training was insufficient or caused a constitutional violation. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that she is absolutely immune from suit with regard to supervision and training claims related to the prosecutorial function. 10. .Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Unlawful Search Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that he does not allege what allegedly false facts Arpaio submitted in the affidavit for probable cause to support the search warrant. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that her actions are protected by qualified immunity. Alternatively, she claims insufficient factual allegations to state a claim for Fourth Amendment violations. 11. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Equal Protection Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the “class of one” theory does not apply. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, she claims the “class of one” theory does not apply. 12. Conspiracy to Violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Maricopa County moves to dismiss this claim on the basis that the county cannot conspire with itself. Thomas moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based, in part, on the criminal indictment, and as such the claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Arpaio moves to dismiss this count on the basis that the claim is vague and conclusory and fails to specify each defendant’s role in the alleged conspiracy. Aubuchon moves to dismiss this count on the basis that it is based on the criminal indictment, and as such is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Alternatively, Aubuchon claims that no conspiracy action can lie because the county cannot conspire with itself. III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. (12)(B)(6) On a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are assumed to be true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on “the lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The principle that allegations in a complaint are accepted as true does not apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). To show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the complaint must permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). IV. CIVIL RICO COMPLAINT To aid the substantive analysis that follows, the Court here briefly outlines the civil RICO action underlying many of Plaintiffs’ complaints. As stated above, Thomas brought separate criminal prosecutions against Wilcox, Stapley, and Donahoe. The first two were dismissed by the Superior Court, and Thomas voluntarily dismissed the third. On December 1, 2009, Arpaio and Thomas as plaintiffs and Thomas and Aubuchon as counsel for both filed an action in the United States District Court under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and its five members, Max Wilson, David Smith, Sandra Wilson, Wade Swanson, Superior Court Judges Mundell, Baca, Donahoe, and Fields, and attorneys Thomas Irvine, Edward Novak, and their firm Polsinelli Shughart P.C. The filing of that action